

PRINCE ALEXANDER WOLKONSKY

THE UKRAINE QUESTION

THE HISTORIC TRUTH

VERSUS

THE SEPARATIST PROPAGANDA

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reign at Kiev and said: 'This
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sian Cities' ».

Chronicle of Nestor.

Translated under the direction of William Gibson



ROME

DITTA E. ARMANI

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*The dismemberment of Russia was one of the aims pursued by Germany in the Great War. The Allied Powers, in this matter, follow the track marked out by Germany: it only remains for them to recognise the independence of the whole of South Russia (arbitrarily * called the Ukraine by Germany) and the German dream will be realised.*

When one intends to commit an act of injustice, one willingly takes for certain every fact which seems to lend a colour of justice to it. This explains the legend of an Ukrainian people and of a Russian yoke that was crushing out their life, which has found such a successful reception in the press of the Entente countries. Were one in search of a good example of the way in which the press can create a false public opinion, a better could not be found than that furnished by the propáganda of the Ukrainophile party.

* See sketch-map in appendix V.

Just to-day the newspapers publish the declaration of M. Petlura to « the Ukrainian People », in which he announces that the « Moscovites » are the secular enemies of the « Ukrainians ». The truth is totally different: the Russians of Moscow have never been the enemies of the Russians of Little Russia; quite the contrary, — it was the wars of Moscow against Poland which delivered the Little Russians from the dominion of their secular enemies, the Poles, and brought back the Ukraine into the Russian political orbit.

The readers of these pages will hear the historical truth. I can say this without any false modesty, because it is not my own opinions which are here set forth, but citations from the authorities on the question, going back to the writers and chroniclers (Greek, Arabian and Western) of the IXth century and coming down to the contemporary historian of Russian Art. The chronicler Nestor of Kiev (XIth century) is our best ally for the pre-Tartar period, and it is not I, but the eminent historian Klyuchévsky, who will tell you whether there exists or not an Ukrainian people, and who will explain to you the formation of the Little Russian branch of the one Russian people.

I have done my best to be convincing, by the citation of documents, historical facts, exact dates. But I nurse no illusions: none is so deaf as the man who will not hear.

*I only express my personal opinions, however, when I treat of the actual state of the question. Then I speak with the utmost freedom as a publicist bound to no political party. Very few of my compatriots will approve the lines on which I approach the religious question; but I am persuaded, on the other hand, that they will all share my opinion as to the Polish imperialism * — all of them without distinction of party, from the Tsarists to the bolshevist Leaders, that small number of them — to be precise — who are Russian by birth.*

A. W.

May 10th, 1920

Rome.

* See sketch-map no. 1.

One of the most unexpected phenomena in connection with the world war, is the Ukraine separatism. Prepared by our enemies, but unforeseen even by us Russians, the Ukraine separatism caught the public opinion of Western Europe quite unprepared. In the Foreign newspapers there suddenly appeared such unfamiliar names as these: *Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Lithuanians, Little Russians, Big Russians, White Russians*; many extravagant assertions were added without proof, such as that in ancient times Southern Russia lived a life of its own, and that Kiev was the capital, not of Russia, but of an imaginary Ruthenia, and that in the XVIIIth century there existed an autonomous Cossack State. The readers did not know what to make of all this, nor what credence was to be given to these affirmations: some believed in the existence of an Ukrainian people and thought its redemption from a foreign yoke, — the Russian, — as natural a thing as the redemption of the Poles; others in their uncertainty asked themselves: « Who is this people of

thirty millions that lives, not in the boundless plains of Siberia, but in the neighbourhood of Austria? In its territory Kiev, a place well known to us, is comprised, and they *say* Odessa too, a place of such easy access. How is it that up till now we have never heard of its existence? ».

There are those who still believe the principle of President Wilson as to the right of auto-decision of the peoples can be applied in actual life in all its theoretic purity. We, on the contrary, are convinced that, in applying this principle to the ex-Russian Empire, the element of nationality will lose its exclusive importance; it will be counterbalanced by other factors, such as, economic interests, the need of a common defence against the German world, age-long customs common to the life of the whole Russian people, and so on. And thus we believe that the isolation even of the non-Slav parts of Russia, such as Lithuania, Esthonia and Georgia, will be realised only in the attenuated form of local autonomy. But let us place ourselves for one moment at the point of view indicated above, — that of people too much given to theorising; then, with regard to the Ukraine, the following dilemma will arise:

if the Ukrainian people really exist, and have been living for centuries under the yoke of Northern Russia, and if the principle of auto-decision among

the nations become everywhere practically possible, then the future of this people is settled: they, like every other « oppressed nation » will have to create an autonomous State, certainly within the limits of their authentic, and not fantastic, ethnographic boundaries;

if, on the other hand, the « Little Russians » (Ukrainians) are simply a ramification of the one and only Russian race, distinct from the « Big Russians » only through a slight difference of language (a difference that has arisen in recent centuries) and certain details of customs and usages; if, at a certain period of their existence, the lot of this people, simply in virtue of external international conditions, unfolded itself differently from that of the rest of Russia; if, in addition, the Ukraine, torn from the living body of Russia, was never independent; then the separation of the Ukraine *would not be the carrying out of the principle of nationality, but the violation of it.* The principle of nationality is expressed to-day, not by separating the different parts of a great race, but by completely uniting them in one nation. New Slav States are being formed by uniting different branches of the same race, though of diverse dialects and even of diverse languages; the Alsations are uniting themselves to the rest of the French people; conquered Germany is also advancing towards her national unity; Italy is accomplishing her unity; it would then surely be illo-

gical were the idea of nationality, for the Russian people, to take shape by the exclusion of her people of the South.

The author has undertaken the task of following the destinies of South Russia, in order to give the reader of Western Europe a picture of the actual relations between the North and South parts of Russia, and thus to supply him with the data indispensable for the solution of the dilemma above mentioned. To carry out this aim he has based his statements on the undoubted witness of early sources, and on the opinions of the great Russian historians.

The execution of this aim should necessarily involve:

- 1) an examination of the pre-Tartar period, i. e. of the period of Russian unity first in order, which finished with the mangling of Southern and Western Russia by the Tartars, Lithuanians and Poles, and with the appearance within the one Russian nation of the Little Russian branch;

- 2) by an exposition of the events of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries, i. e. of the period when Little Russia (Ukraine), forming part of the Polish State, struggled for her independence, — a struggle which finished with her voluntary return to the bosom of united Russia; and finally

3) by a characterisation of the Ukrainian literary movement from the second half of last century, as well as of the work of the Austrians and Germans, which had for object the detachment from Russia of her Southern part.

The picture of the first period, on account of the author's ill health, has been delayed for a year: a still longer delay would deprive his work of all practical value: it is therefore necessary to bring out at least this first essay. To answer more completely, though not with the desirable thoroughness, the questions referred to above, he has been many times compelled to overpass the limits of the period chosen. In such cases he has contented himself with more general data. The reader will assuredly find out for himself that the style of these digressions, smacking somewhat of the daily paper, does not prejudice the seriousness of the method he has followed in studying the pre-Tartar period.

The present essay, then, handles the pre-Tartar period of the History of Russia, and is chiefly devoted to a critical examination of this fantastic assertion, — that the Ukraine already was in existence from the IXth to the XIIIth centuries; it furnishes also, in general lines, the real elements requisite for clearing up the Ukraine question, in the following centuries and in our own day.

CHAPTER I.

THE TERMINOLOGY

The word « UKRAINA ».

The Russian word *ukráina* (in Polish *ukraina*) means a country on the boundary line. The Russian adjective *ukráiny* means what one finds near the border, on the edge (*u*-near, *kráj*-border, edge). The etymology of this word is very significant, because it is clear that what takes the name of *Ukráina* is not something autonomous, but a certain region so designated by a Government or a people outside of it, who in times past considered that region as an adjunct to their own dominions. In fact, for Lithuania the territory of Kiev became *ukráina* (Southern) from the time of its conquest at the end of the XIVth century; for Poland it became *ukráina* (Eastern) from the time of the union of Lithuania and Poland in the second half of the XVIIth century; for the Russia of Moscow, it became *ukráina* (South-Western) from the time of the re-union of Little Russia in the middle of the XVIIth century. Any trace of the name « *Ukráina* » would with difficulty be found in documents previous to the end

of the XIVth century (1). Muscovite Russia possessed other ukráinas, the territories on the border of the Don and of the steppe of the lower Volga, occupied by nomad Tartars. That boundary (so far as one can speak of boundaries in the steppe, between the XIVth and XVII centuries), at the cost of great efforts prolonged for centuries, was moved towards the South, while at the same time the territories were changing to which one gave the name of ukráinas (2). Be it noted that the

(1) The Ukrainophiles cite two texts of the chronicles of the years 1187 and 1213; but this citation is made in bad faith. The texts of the chronicles do not contain the name *Ukráina*, but the word *ukráina*. See Appendix I.

(2) One reads in the annals of Nóvgorod of the year 1517: «By counsel of Sigismund [King of Poland] the Tartars of the Crimea came against the ukraina of the Grand Duke [of Moscow] near the city of *Túla*...». In the year 1580, in consequence of alarming news, the Tsar Ivan the Terrible ordered «what disposition the voevódy and the troops should take along the river [*Oká*] and in the ukrainian cities, in the ukraina [on the borders] of the Crimea and in that [on the borders] of Lithuania». («Drévniaia Biblióteca», vol. XIV, p. 368). In 1625, from the city of Valújki (now in the south of the governorship of Vorónez) they write that «the arrival of the Tartars on our ukrainas» is expected; of this menace a rescript of the Tsar immediately informs the voevódy of Vorónez. (Razriády, I, 1063, 1106, 1133: «Acts of Vorónez», I, pp. 120, 148). The names underlined give an idea how the Muscovite frontier advanced towards the South during the course of that hundred years. Analagous citations could be multiplied. So there was the *ukraine* of Seversk (the actual governorship of Kiev and of Chernígov), that of Voró-

adjective *ukráiny* is not only applied to the Southern part of Russia; the classic « Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language » by Dahl, explaining the etymology of the adjective *ukráiny* (ed. 1865), cites these examples: « The Siberian cities in ancient times were called *ukráinye*. The city of Solovetsk (on an island in the White Sea), is a locality *ukráínóie* » (1).

Such being the meaning of the word *ukráina*, to affirm that the territories of modern southern Russia were *Ukraina* from the Xth or XIIth century, is a gross error. This name has never been applied to those regions in those times; it could not be, for the simple fact that these territories, far from being on the borders, formed instead the nerve, the centre, the kernel of the State.

nez, of Biélgorod (province of Kursk), of Sloboda (governorship of Charkov), that called Polskaia (from *pole*, field), situated north of that of Seversk. See Bagalay: « Compendium of the History of the Colonisation of the Steppes bordering on the Muscovite State », Moscow, 1887 (in Russian). In this monograph one often finds the word *ukráina* (with the small *u*). The same word is frequently found, in this sense, also in the other historians, Soloviev, Klyuchévsky, Platonov, and others still.

(1) « In the Siberian *ukráina*,
In the mountains of Daúr... »

says a popular song about the river Amur, which accordingly appeared not before the end of the XVIIth century, since only in the middle of that century did Russia become mistress of the upper reaches of this river.

Russian Principalities not «Ukráina».

The State of which we are speaking, was not the mythical Ruthenia, nor the Ukraine, but that Russian Principality of Kiev which is the cradle of the Russian people and State. Here, on the river Dnieper, the only commercial route between the Baltic and Byzantium, at the end of the IXth century there arose a Power that, by force of arms and by commerce, began to reunite the Slav races scattered in the woods and fields of the basin of the Dnieper. The monkish chronicler of Kiev, Nestor (in the middle of the XIth century), enumerates the names of these races, and I can assure the reader that among them there is not a trace either of Ukrainians or of Ruthenians, for the very simple reason that the first did not exist, while the small Slav race to which the Hungarians have given the name «Ruthenian», lived beyond the Carpathians, 700 kilometres distant.

Of Prince Rurik there are no other evidences beyond those of the Russian chronicles, but of his son, Prince Igor, there is irrefutable proof: in 944 a commercial treaty was concluded between this Russian Prince and the Emperor of Byzantium, Romanus Lecapenus. In the treaty you will seek in vain the words «ukraini» or «ruteni», but you will find the expressions *russ* (ethnically), *rússin*, «Russian land», «Rus-

sian (1) Grand Duke ». Similarly, when in 988, under the rule of Prince Vladímir the Saint, grandson of Igor, the population of Kiev was baptised, this event is known in ancient documents as the conversion of none other than the Russian people, the « baptism of the *Russ* ».

When, under the rule of his son, Yaroslav I the Wise (1019-1054), the first legislative code was compiled at Kiev, it was called naught else but *Rúskaya Právda*, that is, « The Russian Truth ». The daughter of Yaroslav I, who espoused Henry I of France, is known in French history by the name of *Anne de Russie*. Every Russian school-boy knows that, at the congress of Russian Princes held in 1103, the grandson of this Yaroslav, Vladímir Monomákh, tried to convince his cousin to « work for the Russian land » and to unite with him against the Asiatic Pólovtsy; when his intent succeeded, Monomákh exclaimed, thanking him for his consent: « Thou wilt accomplish much good for the Russian land, brother! » The consciousness that the territories occupied by the races of the Dnieper basin formed one single block, — the Russian land,

(1) Similarly, in a still more ancient treaty between Prince Oleg and the Greeks (911), one also speaks of « Russian race », *Russ*, « Russian Princes », « Russian law », *Rússin*, « Russian land ».

the Russian country, — was therefore living in those days.

This term, the Russian land (*rúskaya zemlyá*), was already in the XIth century a stereotyped expression, commonly adopted in the chronicles and in every other literary document. Thus the Prince of Kiev « thought and dreamt of the *Russian* land »; the duty of the Princes is « to care for the *Russian* land and to fight the pagans »; whoever will not observe our laws, — so runs the decision of the Congress of the Princes of 1007, — « shall have against him the Holy Cross and all the *Russian* land »; such an one « gave his head for the *Russian* land »; the Metropolitan of Kiev is entitled « Metropolitan of all *Russia* », etc., etc. In 1006 the German missionary Bruno, guest of Prince Vladímir the Saint, wrote of him to the Emperor Henry II, calling him *Senior Ruzorum*. All these expressions belong to the XIth and XIIth centuries (1).

(1) We cite still other foreign evidence on the name *Russia*. The Bertinians chronicle, of date 839, states that together with the ambassadors of the Emperor Theophilus there arrived from Constantinople at Ingelsheim, several men *qui se, id est gentem suam, Rhos vocari dicebant*. The circular letter of the Patriarch Photius, in 866, speaks of the baptism of the tribe of the Russians, τοῦτο δὴ καλουμενον τὸ Ῥῶς. In 946 Constantine Porphyrogenitus mentions the baptism of the Russians (Ῥῶς) who were in the service of Byzantium, probably as mercenaries. In 967 a Papal Bull mentions the

But if so it is written in the historical sources, how does it come about, one may ask, that there are people ready to deny that Kiev in ancient days belonged to the Russian people? The logic of a political party, as everyone knows, has nothing in common with normal ways of thinking, while paper, — according to an acute Russian expression, — « can bear out anything », specially when it is an instrument of anonymous propaganda, and in times so tempestuous as ours. M. Hruszévski, historian of the pro-Ukrainian party, well knows the facts of Kiev's historic period. How then does he wriggle out of them? Very simply: in his book (1) the word « Russian », when it is a question of a well-defined historical event, remains as it is; but at the same time he takes the liberty of treating in a special manner those Russian events and facts which took place within the geographical limit of what became afterwards Little Russia, applying to them, with histo-

Slav rite used in divine service among the Russians. The Arab writer Ibno-Khordâdbeh (IXth century) speaks of Russian merchants; his contemporary Al-Bekri speaks of the tribe of the Russians. By the Arabian writers and in the Western sources (e. g. in the treaty between the Genoese and the Greeks in 1170) the city Kertch is called *Rosia*. The Emperor Manuel Comnenus (1143-80) considers a city 'Росѣа at the mouth of the Don as belonging to him.

(1) MICHAEL HRUSZÉWSKI: « Illustrated History of the Ukraine ». Kiev-Leopoli, 1913. Written in Ukrainian.

ric licence, the names (unknown in those centuries) of «Ukraina» and «ukrainian». The figures he handles are Russian, but the final addition is Ukrainian. Is this not an arithmetical method *sui generis*?

Let us take an example. Kiev lacked a dynastic branch of its own; as will appear afterwards, the throne of Kiev was won always by Princes of different branches, descendants of Rurik, members of a single pan-Russian family, if one may say so. But what sort of ancient State could this be, without a dynasty of its own? How does the Ukraine historian solve such a difficulty? Once again, most simply: he takes the genealogical tree of the Rurik up to the XIVth century; he detaches from it all those branches whose Princes afterwards acquired a local dynastic character in other parts of Russia, and tacks on to it the title, «Genealogical tree of the Ukraine Princes of the dynasty of Kiev».

The writer once made patient researches into the genealogy of the Rurik; he studied diligently the copious and able literature on the subject, and could cite small Principalities of the XIVth and XVth centuries, so tiny that one only knows their names, their geographical position, and the genealogy of their Princes (1); he knows also all the «Grand Duchies», the

(1) To show that I am not speaking unadvisedly, let me cite as examples the subdivisions of the Principality of Cher-

« lands », the « dominions » (*udély*), the « possessions » (*vólosti*), the « family lands » (*ótcina*), which unite the parcels of land into which the Russian territory was subdivided. But in the scores of volumes consulted, one thing only he has never found, and that is, traces of the « Ukraine Principality », or of a dynastic « ukrainian » branch. It only remains for him to thank M. Hruszévski for a « scientific » discovery which has rounded off his (the writer's) genealogical knowledge.

Radiant was the dawn of the new Russian State. The family of the Rurik, whose head occupied the

nígov. Under the grandson of Michael of Chernígov, martyred by the Tartars in 1246 because he refused to do homage to their idols, that is, from the end of the XIIIth century, the Principality of Chernígov was divided into the « dominions » (*udély*) of: Briansk, Glukov, Karachév, Tarussa, Obolensk, Mychaga, Konin, Wolkona. In the XIVth century there arose also those of: Novossil, Odóev, Vorotynsk. According to the theory of M. Hruszévski these Princelings should have been « ukrainian » (See the map at page 107 of his « History »). But certain of these Princelings, of their own accord, placed their dominions in the hands of the Grand Duke of Moscow; the dominions of others were absorbed by Moscow through the force of circumstances; their numerous descendants passed to Moscow in the XVth and XVIth centuries, where they entered into the service of the State. (Some of the lineage of these Princes have kept their territorial titles in the form of family names, as the Obolensky; others have taken the personal surname of some ancestor, as the Bariatinsky, the Gortchakov, the Dolgoruki, the Répnin, the Chterbatov).

throne of Kiev, in the XIth and XIIth centuries ruled, on the North, the territory of Nóvgorod; on the East, that of Rostóv (1); on the South-East, on the sea of Azóv, the Russian colony, the Principality of Tmutorokán (2); on the West, the Principality of Galicia (3).

(1) Rostóv (North): city on one of the tributaries on the right bank of the upper Volga; from the remotest times of Russian history the centre of a vast region, which in the following centuries occupied all the zone between the upper Volga and the Oká river. In that zone, the geographical centre of the future European Russia, the principal Russian rivers take their rise, — the Volga, the western Dwina, the Dnieper, — and so it was destined by nature as the Russian political centre. The centre of the region was gradually removed from Rostóv to the South, to Súzdal (in the first half of the XIIth century), then to Vladímír (second half of the XIIth century), and finally to Moscow (beginning of the XIVth century). To this region, subdivided into diverse Principalities, it has been agreed to give the generic name of «land of Rostóv-Súzdal».

(2) The Principality of Tmutorokán, presumably situated on the peninsula of Taman, had a short life.

(3) Galician Russia (the eastern part of modern Galicia, which is also called *Red Russia*), formed part of the Russian State from the times of Vladímír the Saint; in the XIIth century a branch of the family of the Rurik established there a hereditary dynasty with Galic (Halisz) as capital. The Principality prospered under the sceptre of Danilo (1249-64), who received the title of King from the Pope and carried the capital to Cholm. The last independent Galician Prince, Yury II, died in 1340. From 1349 (and definitely from 1387) the Principality was conquered by Poland, who ruled it till 1773, when in consequence of the first partition of Poland in 1772, Galicia was annexed to Austria.

The Russian land, therefore, comprised not only the fourth western part of the new-born Germanic Ukraine, but no small part also of the remaining Russia. At that time Russia had relations with the rest of Europe: the schism (1054) had not yet weakened those relations nor had the Mongol yoke yet broken them. As a sign of these relations it is sufficient to note that Yarosláv I married a Swedish Princess, that his sister was Queen of Poland, his son married to a sister of the King of Poland (1), his three daughters Queens of Norway, France and Hungary, and a nephew married to the daughter of King Harold of England. Kiev, « mother of all the Russian cities », was a wonder to strangers for its riches and its culture; it had 400 churches, monasteries and schools, a fortress of stone: Adam of Bremen called it the rival of Constantinople.

Does it not seem a little strange that people should be still discussing about the name of a State such as that, as though the question concerned some semi-barbarous horde of nomads, and should pin on to it at random the name of the Ukraine or Ruthenia?

(1) Another son of Yarosláv, Vsévolod, was married to a daughter of the Byzantine Emperor, who became the mother of Vladímír Monomákh. It is known that Vsévolod spoke five languages.

The word « RUTHENIA ».

« The capital of Southern Ruthenia » — so we read in an Italian newspaper — « a thousand years ago was Kiev. In the Xth and XIth centuries Ruthenia was a powerful State... ». Now, not only in the Xth, but in the XXth century, the word « Ruthenia » is unknown in Russia; you will find neither « Ruthenia » nor « Ruthenians » in the dictionary of Dahl, already cited, still less in the 40 volumes of the « Russian Encyclopedia » (ed. 1902), or in the 29 volumes of the « History of Russia from the Earliest Times », written by Soloviev (1). I repeat it: this word does not exist in the Russian language, and if you meet it in books issuing from the offices of the Ukrainian propaganda, even in texts of documents pertaining to the Government of Moscow, that is only because the authors and translators find it in the interest of their party to translate the words « Russian » and « Little Russian » by the word « Ruthenian ». To permit oneself such a liberty when translating historical documents is the same thing as to falsify them (2).

(1) In the « Russian Encyclopedia » the word *ruthenians* is referred to in the article *Rússin* as a foreign translation, or rather corruption.

(2) Thus, for example, the letter patent of the Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich, of March 27, 1654, to Bogdan Chmelnitsky,

The word *ruthenus* is found for the first time in Caesar; he calls by that name a Gallic tribe that lived south of the present Auvergne. They were long remembered in Auvergne under the name of Augusta Rutenorum, and they evidently have nothing in common with the Slavs except this chance resemblance of names (1).

speaks of recognition « of former rights and immunities of the army (*voiskovyh*) such as they have been from times of old to the times of the Russian Grand Dukes (*pri Velikih Kniáseh Rouúskih*) and of the Kings of Poland ». (« Collection of Letters and State Treaties », 1882, III, p. 512). Now open the booklet, « The Ukraine under the Russian Protectorate », published in 1915 at Lausanne by the editors of « The Ukraine »; at page 51 you will find the above citation translated thus: « former rights and immunities (the words « of the army » are omitted) as they were at all times under the Ruthenian Grand Dukes and under the Polish Kings ». If it is thus one *quotes*, one need not be astonished to read under the portraits attached to the translation such fantastic explanations as, for example, that Vygovsky was hetman, not only of the Zaporogs, but also « of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia ». And all this, with flagrant bad faith, is sheltered under the name of a serious author, Baron Nolde, since the booklet is but the translation of extracts from his Russian book « Essays on Russian Public Law » (St. Petersburg, 1911).

(1) The « Catholic Encyclopedia », in the article « Ruthenians », explains the name of Augusta Rutenorum by the exodus of the Slav people into France, made prisoners by Ezio in the defeat of the Huns near Chalons (451). One cannot really see why it is necessary to have recourse to such a complicated explanation, when one has the *De Bello Gallico* under one's eyes, in which « galli-ruteni » are spoken of at least seven times. In general, in the article cited, the influence of the Ukrainophile propaganda is manifest: it is sad to notice this in such an important work.

In Hungary, under the dynasty of Arpad (997-1301), Ruthenians were called the Slavs who lived (and even now live) under the southern slopes of the Carpathians, the same who, in May 1915, — for too short a time, alas! — saw the vanguard of the Russian army descending to liberate them. In this case, that is in its application to the Slav races, the word « Ruthenians » is nothing else than the foreign corruption of the word *rússin*, which one comes across in the old Russian documents, though but rarely. But what is of more grave concern for us is that it is cited just as much in the documents of Kiev (see above on the treaties of the Xth century with the Greeks), as in those of Nóvgorod (as in the treaty with the Germans of 1195). In these documents the word *rússin* has no special race significance, but is simply *synonymous with* « Russian » (singular *ruskij* or *rússin*, plural *ruskie*, collective *russ*). In the course of centuries the form *rússin* disappeared in Russia, but it lives on in Galicia to this day.

In the middle ages the term « Ruthenians » appears here and there in the chronicles (the first time in the chronicle of the Pole Martinus Gallus, of the XIth and XIIth centuries) with a very vague meaning. The Danish historian Saxo Grammaticus (1203) uses it to distinguish the Christian Slavs of the Baltic littoral from the Pagan Slavs there; in general, in the middle

ages, it was the Latin name for all the Russians (1). Later writers, who had a better knowledge of Russian affairs, avoid it; thus the celebrated Herberstein, imperial ambassador to Moscow (1517), analysing in the first page of his «Memoirs» the origin of the word «Russians (*rusские*)», notes that in Latin they were called *ruteni*, in German *Reissen*, but in the rest of the volume he no longer uses *ruteni* (2). Similarly Paolo Giovio of Como, who wrote of Russia in 1525, makes no use of it. Why, then, adopt old and confusing appellatives that have had their day? Today, for instance, we would not call China «Cathayum», the Baltic Sea of «Varjag», nor would we seek in Russia the «Ritiche» mountains of Ptolemy! Further, the name «Ruthenians» has the inconvenience of indicating at one and the same time, a race and a worship.

The race of the «Ruthenians» in Hungary, on account of their geographical position, was the first to whom the ecclesiastical unia was applied (XIIIth century); ecclesiastical Latin appropriated the name «ru-

(1) As we shall see later on, the names «*rusci*» and «*Russia*» were equally common in Latin.

(2) In the map that accompanies the Basel edition of the «Memoirs» (1556), the upper course of the western Dwina is called «Ruthenian Dwina», the lower one, «German Dwina»; on the other hand the Volga also is called «Ruthenian Volga».

thenus » to indicate the uniate rite in the celebration in the Slav language, also among the other Slav races, and spread it further towards the East, in Galicia, in Poland, in Little Russia (1). Nor is that to be wondered at; the Church is conservative in its language, and its aims are above differences of race.

But this term has acquired another meaning in the language of the Austrian Government: from the end of the last century it began to be the instrument for stifling in the minds of the people all consciousness of their relationship with the Russian people, subject to the Emperor of Russia. « Those are *Russians* », they began to say, « but you are *Ruthenians* ». The arbitrary nomenclature of the different races, the use of one alphabet instead of another, the changing of orthography, as is well known, were the methods preferred by the Austrian Government for political contests (2).

(1) To say truth, a special Ruthenian rite does not exist, but only certain modifications introduced by the people of Carpathia and Galicia and by the Latin Polish clergy in the Byzantine rite.

(2) In Galicia phonetic orthography is introduced; three letters of the Russian alphabet are abolished, and two new ones added. The entire difference is in five letters, — what more?! It is just in this artificial « Ukraine language » the book of M. Hruszévski is written, who uses every effort to make it as different as possible from Russian. He does not succeed: the cultured Russian, after struggling through the first few pages, reads the rest with ease. On the other hand,

To determine the individuality of a race, it is of slight importance to know how a foreign chronicler named it, who got his first notions about it, perhaps, from his predecessor; nor does it help much to know how other races call it; the great point is, to know how the race names itself. According to the Austrian terminology, all the Slavs (except the Poles and the Slovacs) that live in Galicia, in Bucovina and in the north-east of Hungary (about five millions in all), are called « Ruthenians »; but they call themselves: in Galicia, Russians or *Russini*, in Bucovina, *Russini*, Russians and Little Russians; in Hungary, Russians, Little Russians and *Rusniaki*. Persistent efforts have been made to stifle the national consciousness of these peoples: the intellectual class, small in number, has been up to this present systematically Germanized or Polonized; it is no wonder, then, if a common name has not been agreed upon, though meanwhile the most diffused is that of *rússin* and *rusiskij* (Russian) (1).

the « Ukraine language » is not understood by the peasants of Little Russia: the adoption of this language for official correspondence has produced extreme discontent in the Ukraine.

(1) Here are the sub-divisions of the *rússin* (in German, *Russinen* or *Ruthenen*):

a) In Galicia (to the East, beyond the river San): *po-kutiáni* (districts of the cities of Kut and Kolomya); *guzúl* (Kolomya, Stanislavov and Kossov); *podoliáni* (North of the

This fact gave small pleasure to the Austrian Government which, not certainly out of homage to the scholastic Latin of the Middle Ages, has given them all the generic name of Ruthenians (1).

At the end of last century, in the Austro-Hungarian plans the attractive project began to take shape of se-

Dniester); *bóiki*, that call themselves *goriáni* (district of Stry); *lémki*, that call themselves *russniaki*. They all speak the same dialect, which has the following diversities: *podolski*, *guzulski*, *boikovski*, *lemkovski*.

b) In Bucovina (to the North and North-West, in the districts of Chernov, Kozman, Vyznits and Seret): *podoliáni* or *poliáni* and *guzúli* (on the mountains in the West and South-West of Bucovina).

c) In Hungary (about four hundred thousand) in the North-East, on the Southern slopes of the Carpathians, in the provinces of Sharit, Uzgorod, Berezh, Ugoc and Marmarosh: *verkhóvnitzi* or *gorësháni*, in the mountains; *doliáni* or *dolesháni* (otherwise *vláhi* or *bláhi*) in the valleys; *spisháki* or *krainiáni*, who are Rumanians that have become Slavs. A great part of these populations is originally from the north of Little Russia, that is, from the provinces of Chernígov and those bordering on it. («Russian Encyclopedia»).

(1) *These Ruthenians (rússin)*, who have in the last two years been baptised as «Ukrainians», are nothing else than *unredeemed Russians*. Subjected to a foreign yoke for 530 years, they are really an «oppressed people». As to their future destiny there cannot be two opinions, if we are to be guided by the principles of President Wilson: re-entering the orbit of the Russian people, they will have to share the political lot of its Little Russian branch. With the labours of the Ukrainophile committees in this direction in the United States, we can have nothing but sympathy.

parating Southern Russia from the rest of the country. And then the political propaganda changed its tone. « There », they shouted, « beyond the border-line, round about Kiev, they are not Russians, but Ruthenians the same as yourselves ». That the resemblance of the two peoples on either side of the frontier sometimes approaches an affinity, is a fact; but that Ruthenians should be living in Southern Russia, is an invention. Pronounce this word in the provinces of Chernígov or Poltáva, and no one will understand you: they will not comprehend what you are speaking of, — whether of vegetables, animals, or minerals. In the Ukraine the peasant calls himself Little Russian, and simply Russian: the word « Ruthenian » does not exist (1).

And now all of a sudden they come to tell us that the ancient Russia of Kiev has never existed, and also that there was nothing but Ruthenia in its place a thousand years ago! It is thus history is written when German-Austrian ends are to be served.

(1) The word «rússin» within the former Russian Empire is only understood by the populations in the immediate neighbourhood of Austria, — in the western part of the governorship of Volynia, in that of Cholm, and in the district of Chotin of the governorship of Bessarabia, «where really the people speak the Little Russian dialect with the rússin divergence». « Russian Encyclopedia ».

The Word « Russia ».

We have examined two passports, made out in the last twenty to thirty years for the ancient Russia of the Kiev period with the courteous assistance of the Austrian Government; without doubt the reader is convinced that they have been falsified. Let us now say some words in favour of a legal and authentic passport.

« Russ », the « Russians » (*russskie*), — these are the only names that designate the races and the territories of ancient Russia. The word « russ » has two significations: in former times it denoted the race, later on it signified the country. According to the chronicler of Kiev, the name « russ » was given to that Varangian race (Scandinavian) from which the Rurik were called to reign (1). Soloviev very logically sup-

(1) The Ukrainophile theory evidently cannot accept the fact of the calling of these Princes: according to it, *russ* must be an Ukraine race, and the word *russ* must have had its origin (like the dynasty of the Rurik) in « Ukraina ». The remedy is quickly found: the indications of the chroniclers (see note on p. 40) are simply denied by M. Hruszévski. But here is where the shoe pinches: the names of the Ambassadors sent by Prince Oleg in 911 to Byzantium are known. Of the fourteen envoys, only two have names that might be Slav; the other twelve are undoubtedly Scandinavian. M. Hruszévski, with charming ingenuity, tranquilly explains that at that time there were many Northmen at Kiev, and Oleg sent

poses that it had played a rôle on the great river route between the Northmen and the Greeks, a long time before the calling of the Varangians. When it referred to territory, the word « russ » was applied in two ways: a wider way, that embraced the whole Russian territory (« Metropolitan of Kiev and of all the Russ »); and a narrower way, to denote only the Principality of Kiev (XIIth century). Gradually this name came to be applied to other territories, Chernígov, Volynia, Nóvgorod (1), Halicz, etc. « The possession (*vólost*) of Nóvgorod is the most ancient in all the Russian land », as it is written in the chronicles of 1206. The Lithuanian Grand Duke Gedimin (1316-41) is entitled at Vilna « Lithuanian, Smud and Russian Grand Du-

them. But how could a Prince, who was not a Scandinavian, send Ambassadors exclusively Scandinavian to Byzantium? And how is one to explain the Scandinavian names of the first Rurik: Rurik (*Hrörekr*), Sineus (*Signiutr*), Truvor (*Thorvardtr*), Olga (*Helga*), Igor (*Ingvarr*), Oleg (*Helgi*), the legend of whose death by the bite of a serpent exists alike in the Russian chronicles and the Norwegian Sagas? « The historian has no right to fabricate history, not paying any regard to the testimony of the chronicler », says Soloviev, as though he had had a presentiment of the advent of historians of the Ukrainophile type.

(1) The peace treaty of Nóvgorod with the Germans (1188 or 1195) differentiates the « russ » from the Germans, and speaks of « Russian » cities.

ke » (1). The north-east of Russia had no other generic name than that of *Russ* and *Rossia* (2): the word « muscovite » did not exist in the Russian language (3). It was invented in the West, when the power of the Prince of Moscow obscured by its splendour, for the eyes of strangers, the rest of Russia (4).

(1) Two thirds of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were formed of the north-western Russian Principalities (*White Russia*); the Russians predominated in it; the princely Lithuanian family became russified; the official language was Russian; all this explains the title.

(2) From the word *Rossia* was formed an adjective rarely used, *rossijsky*; in our days it is used in official language, and in literature it was used in the emphatic style of the XVIIIth century. If I mistake not, it appears for the first time in the manifesto for the election of the first Tsar of the Románov family (1613). Applying to contemporary Russia the word *Russ*, we lend it an idea of sentiment; applying to Russia the word *rossijsky*, an idea of imperialism; the word *Rossia* is a matter-of-fact word. I linger over such trifles because the Ukrainophile propaganda plays on these various denominations and tries to convince strangers that *Russ* and *russky* refer to Kiev, while *Rossia* and *rossijsky* refer to Moscow and Petersburg!

(3) There is but one single substantive derived from the word « mosca »: *moskvic*, which means the inhabitant of Moscow, and has no political significance (as one says, New Yorker). « Muscovite » conveys now a slight tone of disparagement for a Russian ear, like the Polish *moskal*, which, however, has entered the Russian language with the sense of « recruit » (man taken by the Moscow Government).

(4) Paolo Giovio writes in 1525: « The title of Muscovites, given to this people, has become known only in most recent times ». And Marco Foscarino in 1557: « this name Moscovia, and Moscoviti, is born a short time since ».

To make an end of the nomenclature, I pass into a note a series of Latin quotations, which prove that, through the centuries, in this language one said « Russia » and « Russi » (1). Like the name « Ruthenians », this word also was indifferently applied to the South (e. g. for Galicia), to the North (e. g. for Nóvgorod) (2), and also to the Russ-Lithuanian State (3).

(1) The chronicle of Réginon tells that there came to the Emperor Otho I: the *Legati Helenae* [christian name of the Princess Olga] *reginae Russorum* (Xth century). A brief of Pope Gregory VIIth in 1075, call Isiaslav (son of Yarosláv I) *Rex Ruscorum*; in a brief the same Pope counsels the King of Poland to restore to Isiaslav, *Regi Ruscorum*, the lands snatched from him. (*Ruscorum* is more exact than *Russorum*: it is permissible to suppose that this correct form was adopted owing to the presence in Rome then of a son of Isiaslav, who had gone there to place his territories in the bosom of the Holy See. Evidently, being asked how his people were named, he had replied, as we should do to-day, « we are *russkie* », — whence the genitive *ruscorum*). Plano Carpini (XIIIth century) wrote of « *Kiovia quae est Metropolis Russiae* ». A Bull of Pope Innocent IV, 1246, informs Daniel of Galicia « *Regem Russiae* », that the Holy See grants him its protection. In the first volume of the « *Historia Russiae Monumenta* », compiled by A. Turgheniev (ed. 1841) from documents which are found in the Vatican Archives, there are more than ten credentials and briefs addressed to Daniel of Galicia, in all which the word *Russia* occurs. A decree has also been preserved of Prince Yury II (1335) of Galicia and Volynia, in which he calls himself « *Dei gratia natvs dux totius Russiae Minoris* ».

(2) « *Hist. Russiae Monumenta* », I, document CXIX.

(3) *Id.*, doc. LXXIX, XC.

Of all these citations special interest attaches to the decree of Yury II of Galicia, because it bears witness that in the closing years of the Principality of Galicia, when the better classes there were already imbued with Western culture, the official designation was not « Ruthenia », but « Russia ». This, further, is the first reference in the documents to « Little Russia » (*dux Russiae Minoris*) (1). From the word « Little Russia » (*Maloróssia*) is derived the name of *Maloróssy* (Little Russians) which the population of Little Russia has ordinarily kept up to 1917, when that of Ukrainians

(1) There has come down to us, of an earlier date, the seal of Yuri I Prince of Galicia-Volynia (who died at a great age, not later than 1316); it bears the following inscription: « S. (i. e. seal) *Domini Georgii Regis Russiae* », and « S. *Domini Georgii Ducis Ladimeriae* » (*Ladimeria* — lands depending on the town of Vladimir-Volynsk, i. e. Volynia). Yuri II made use of the seal of his grandfather, and that was not an anachronism; the ruler of the land of Galicia (up to 1349) who succeeded him, was a boyar Dmitri who entitled himself *Provisor seu capitaneus terre Russie*; Ladislas Opolski, last Prince, though not independent, of Galicia (1372-78) had a seal with the inscription: « *Ladislaus D. Gratia Dux Opolient... et terre Russie domin. et heres* ». This is for us evidence that Galicia was called Russia for almost an entire century. It continued to be so called, not only under a Prince of Polish origin (the father of Yuri was a Prince of Masovia), but even when completely fallen under the Polish influence and dominion. This has only an indirect bearing on our subject, but it is not without a certain interest in view of the Polish pretensions to Galicia.

was pinned on (1). The word *ukráinetz* (an Ukrainian), although it existed (since last century, if I mistake not), was used so rarely that, when it was put in circulation in 1917, we Russians (including the Little Russians) asked ourselves on which syllable the accent should fall.

With the same object of taking out of the word any proof of the unity of the Russian people, there has just recently appeared in the European press the bizarre name White Ruthenians (*les Ruthènes blancs*) to indicate White Russians.

Let us now resume what we have said, so far as it applies to the pre-Tartar period.

In this discussion we have taken pains to keep our own opinions almost completely in the background; undeniable citations from documents have spoken for us. The time-honoured voice of these serene witnesses answers our question in a precise manner, as follows:

1. The territories that were occupied by the Russian people, from the Carpathians to the White Sea

(1) The supposition that *malarossy* is derived from *maly rost* (small stature) is erroneous.

and to Súzdal, from Nóvgorod to Kiev, were nothing but Russia.

2. The people that dwelt there called themselves *Russian* people (*Russ, russkie, russin*), both at Nóvgorod and in Galicia, and called their land *Russia* (*Russ*).

3. Strangers called the country *Russia*, and the people *Russians*, using also the corruptions *Ruthenia* and *Rutheniáns*. In applying these four names, the strangers did not mean to indicate a distinction between the North and South of Russia, and both the inhabitants of Kiev and those of Nóvgorod were equally called, now Russians, and again Ruthenians.

4. Lastly, as to the name *Ukraina*, not even the shadow of it ever existed, neither in the pre-Tartar period, nor 150 years later at the least; the name *Ukrainians* was born several centuries later.

Is it not clear, therefore, that the effort of the Ukrainophiles, taking advantage of the difference of the names « Russians » and « Ruthenians », to prove that in the North of Russia there lived one people and in the South another, has nothing in common with the respect due to historical fact? The affirmation of the existence of a Ruthenia of Kiev as a State different from Russia, or of the existence of an Ukraine in the pre-Tartar period, is nothing but a *political mystification*, put forward because the authors trusted in the slight

knowledge the outside public had of the history of ancient Russia and of the Russian tongue (1).

In this question of names we have passed the chronological boundaries we fixed for ourselves. Let us now return to the Russia of Kiev.

(1) It is painful to find the influence of this mystification in a sphere where inventions fabricated with a definite aim, ought not to find entrance. In the *Dublin Review* (October, 1917) the Rev. A. Fortescue, in an interesting article entitled «The Uniat Church in Poland and in Russia», gives a complete and melancholy picture of the intolerance of the Governments of both these countries towards the Russian Catholics; the three first pages, however, without any criticism, repeat the most fantastic Ukrainophile assertions as to the period of Kiev. The misunderstanding is easily explained: the Ukrainophile political propaganda, in its pamphlets, makes use of all languages, whilst our chief historians, who sought only the truth, wrote their great books in the Russian language, and are thus accessible only to the few.

CHAPTER II.

**THE UNITY OF PRE-TARTAR RUSSIA
AND THE SACK OF KIEV BY THE PRINCE OF
SUZDAL IN 1169 (1)**

Affirming that the territory of Kiev, in the first centuries of Russian history, formed the autonomous State of the Ukraine or of Ruthenia, the Ukrainophile party are compelled to pass over in silence its vital connection, maintained up to the XIVth century, with the rest of Russia. The problem is not an easy one, but once again it is solved « very simply ». The same operation is performed on the political life of the people as was performed on the genealogical tree of the Rurik. The « History » of M. Hruszévski nearly cuts out of Russian life all the North of Russia; in his book he exaggerates all the colours of the local life of the South; in the territory of Kiev, in Volýnia and in Galicia; of the North he speaks only in the time of the Grand Dukes of Kiev, when at Nóvgorod their sons and their

(1) The town of Súzdal is situated 200 kilometres north-east of Moscow (see note 1, p. 46).

brothers reigned; thus the North disappears from the historical horizon and only the struggle of the Prince of Súzdal, in the middle of the XIIth century, for the conquest of the throne of Kiev, compels him anew to remember the North; but he does so only to represent it as a force hostile to the South. Under the clever manipulation of the Ukrainophiles the taking of Kiev by Prince Andrew of Súzdal is used as a trump card to witness to outsiders that the future supremacy of the North (Moscow and Petersburg) was a yoke of strangers. Let us turn, on the other hand, to the opinion generally held in the master-works of our historic literature on the Kievian period, and let us linger specially over the campaign of 1169.

Kiev was the kernel of the State life of Russia, which, however, did not originate only in that centre. That life did not arise from the work of the sword, but was generated by the great line of river-borne commerce which unites the Gulf of Finland with the Black Sea; at one end of that line was Kiev, at the other Nóvgorod. By way of Nóvgorod there came to us from the Northmen Power (1); by way of Kiev, from

(1) As was said above, the Ukrainophiles deny the fact of calling in the Varangian Princes. Soloviev, after diligent search among the chronicles that treat of this matter, proved exhaustively that the statements of the chroniclers as to the calling in of the Varangians, are ethnographically, geo-

the Greeks, there came to us Christianity. At Nóvgorod there lived the same race; both the North and the South were the work of kindred workmen. Nóvgorod strengthened itself ever more on the Finnish borders and extended towards the east, through the whole of the extreme north of Rússia, in the direction of the Urals (1), and to the south-east in the territory of Rostóv-Súzdal, — in the region of the future Grand Duchy of Moscow. Kiev defended itself on the east from the brigands of the Steppes; sought to open for itself a path to Byzantium; extended its borders in Galicia and to the north-east, — in the same region as that of the future Grand Duchy of Moscow. In all this extension of territory there was diffused the one single ton-

graphically and psychologically probable and what is more, — are confirmed by the testimonies of strangers. Three years after the death of Rurik, that is (if one trust the chronology of the chronicler) in the year 872, his successor Oleg having assembled an army of Varangians and other races subject to him, moved towards the South by the usual river route, brought to submission the districts along his line of march and conquered Smolensk, Lubetch and Kiev. «This fact», says Soloviev, — that is, the movement of the united forces of the North towards the South, — «is the most important from the beginning of our history». However, it does not exist for M. Hruszévski, and according to the latest advices of the Italian newspapers, Nóvgorod was.... a Ukraine colony!

(1) In the XIIth century the possessions of Nóvgorod extended already as far as Viatka; at that time Nóvgorod collected taxes on the northern shores of the White Sea.

gue, Russian, used alike in the chronicles of Nóvgorod and of Kiev, in the legends of the Kievian cycle and in that of Nóvgorod; in all the territories reigned the same princely family. It was a common popular movement, creative, half-unconscious, in the boundless expanse of the Russian plain; the immense rivers were the roads along which it was propagated; the whispering forests, the marshes and the far-stretching distances were its refuge. Only the narrowest party-spirit can reduce this combined and cumulative process to the work of a single centre, Kiev.

The unity of the people, the community of the popular life, did not exclude diverse forms of existence in various localities, nor the rising of certain centres of power and their expansion in the vast territory. When Kiev grew weak through the pressure of the enemies from the Steppes, towards the end of the XIIth century, the nucleus of the forces of government seems to be seeking in which of the local centres it will abide. For a certain time it seemed that Russian life would concentrate itself at Galich (in the XIIth and XIIIth centuries), but the expansion of Poland and Lithuania put an end to the existence of this Principality. In the XIIth century the Grand-Ducal Russian power passed through Súzdal and Vladímir, and finally (in the beginning of the XIVth century) established itself at Moscow. Thus history decided. But

with whomsoever the hegemony would have remained, Galich or Moscow, it is certain that in either case Kiev would not have remained under the sceptre of a stranger, since both the one centre and the other were not strange powers for Kiev, but on the contrary, up to a certain point, her creatures. In the XIIth century the hour struck when the children became stronger than the mother, but they never repudiated her, despite the fact that they were sometimes not too tender in their treatment of her. The foreign and threatening power for the Russia of Kiev, was not then Moscow, but the Tartars and Poland.

If the populations of the lands washed by the waters of the Dnieper (Kiev) and those of the basin of the Oká (Súzdal) were related to each other, still closer bonds united the rulers of those parts of Russia. « The Prince of Súzdal took and destroyed Kiev ». With such a phrase under his eyes, the Western reader imagines a struggle between two reigning houses, of diverse origin, of different traditions and aims bound up with the problems of a given territory. But the picture of feudal struggles cannot be compared with the struggle of the Princes of ancient Russia. In Russia an exceptional state of affairs existed; she knew no other Princes than those of the family of the Rurik (1). This fa-

(1) Only in the Russian-Lithuanian State was there another dynasty (Gedimin).

mily was collectively invested with power (1); the Grand Duke was only *primus inter pares*; at first he had to be the eldest; but the right of primogeniture was not judicially established. So questions arose. Who was the eldest, the nephew or the uncle; the son of the brother first-born, who had died without becoming Grand Duke, or the son of the younger brother who sat on the throne of Kiev? Scores of similar questions were settled in a practical manner. Historians have laboured in vain to fix precisely the system followed by the Rurik; the life was too complicated to be confined within any system. One thing is certain, viz., that, when a new Prince mounted the throne of Kiev, the other younger Princes were transferred respectively from less important cities to those of more repute, and that the final judicial means for the possession of the throne of Kiev (against which there was no appeal) was... the sword. Two consequences flowed from all this; continual fratricidal struggles for the eagerly-sought throne of Kiev, and the incessant pilgrimage, so to say, of Princes from one Principality to another, which in its turn excluded, in the Kiev period of Russian history, the possibility of the forma-

(1) The question of the *véche* (something like the Greek ἀγορά), which in certain districts divided the supreme power with the Princes, is foreign to our subject.

tion of local branches in the family of the Rurik. As a matter of fact, such branches were only formed in the XIIIth century (1).

Accordingly, fratricidal struggles among the Rurik for the succession to the throne of Kiev, were habitual occurrences in the XIth, XIIth and XIIIth centuries, and the campaigns of a Prince against Kiev do not attest the political animosity of that Prince against her, nor of the people of his Principality against that of Kiev. This general state of affairs will aid us to consider with the needed objectivity the special case of Andrew of Súzdal.

Prince Andrew was a Rurik, and descended from that branch of the family which enjoyed a special popularity in Kiev: he was nephew of the Grand Duke Vladímir Monomákh. The father of Andrew, Prince Yuri (George) I (1090-1157) son of Monomákh, received in possession the lands of Rostóv-Súzdal; Yuri passed his youth in the South, and all his sympathies went out to the Russia of Kiev; « the mother of all the

(1) An exception is formed by the branch reigning in the distant Pólotsk, in existence since the first quarter of the XIth century, and by the branches of Chernígov and of Galich, founded in the XIIth century. The branch Rostóv-Súzdal was established in the middle of the XIIIth century, and that of Moscow in the end of the XIIIth century.

Russian cities » preserved for him all its fascinations and attractions; to gain the throne of Kiev was his dream, which he realised by conquering his rival, and he ruled that Principality from 1149 to 1151, and from 1154 until his death. It is true that Prince Andrew (1111-1174) up to his 38th year had never been in the South, and that he did not love it; his autocratic nature felt itself more free in the North, where, like his father, he had laboured much to free himself from the interference of the notabilities of the cities with his policy. On the death of his father, judging himself older than the other pretender (Prince Mstisláv), he sent his forces to the South, to which the regiments of many Southern Princes (discontented with Mstisláv) joined themselves. The allies took Kiev. Andrew became Grand Duke of all Russia, but continued to live in the North, at Vladímir (1).

The fact of the taking of Kiev by the troops of Andrew of Súzdal, would not of itself give any excuse for accusing the North of animosity towards the South. As we have seen, it was enough that a Prince be inflamed with sufficient self-love and confidence in his own good right to the throne of Kiev, for him to have re-

(1) Vladímir on the Kliázma, in distinction from Vladímir in Volynia, lies about 200 kilometres E. N. E. of Moscow in the neighbourhood of Súzdal.

course to all means, and above all to the aid of his troops, in order to win. But still worse happened. the rival of the father of Andrew, the southern Prince Isiaslav, in pursuit of the same object formed an alliance with the King of Hungary and with that of Poland (1149). The taking of Kiev in 1169 is characterised by two features that distinguish this event from previous struggles, that is, the destruction of the city and the fact that the conqueror continued to reign in the North.

Russia had never before seen such a dolorous happening, says the historian, that Kiev should be destroyed by the Russians themselves. The destruction may have been accidental, a consequence of the heat and violence of the battle (1), but it could also have been a premeditated political act. The residence of Andrew at Vladímir and the destruction of Kiev (if it be true that it was premeditated) prove how he despised Kiev. We know already that this desposal was not hereditary; it was an affirmation of his own personality, and it is also possible that it was a result of the

(1) Hruszévski, in his book « Sketch of the History of the land of Kiev » (Kiev, 1891), written in Russian, with supreme assurance supposes (p. 224) that the sack was carried out in consequence of orders given to the troops. Does not this show a too exalted opinion of the military discipline of the XIIth century?

new political conditions. Andrew's thirst for power had no limit; not without reason it gained him, at the hands of the chronicler, the name of « autocrat », and brought him to a tragic death. But he was, at the same time, a man full of the « modern ideas »: in the internal politics of his kingdom, in his deep-going efforts to free himself from the municipal interference of the notables, one divines a new consciousness of the power of the Prince, the first distant indications of that autocracy which established itself at Moscow two hundred and more years afterwards. He reigned in new surroundings; in his days the exodus of the people had already begun from the banks of the middle Dnieper towards the north-east (1), and in connection with these migrations the political centre of gravity already began to move from Kiev towards the territory of Súzdal. One might carry conjecture far as to the political aims of Prince Andrew, one might ask whether his attitude towards Kiev were not the result of a vague consciousness that the importance of the South was already on the decline; but there is one thing which cannot be affirmed, viz, that his action was the result of differences of *race* between the North and the South. He himself was a native of Kiev: his father,

(1) Of these emigrations we shall speak more at length in chapter III.

his grandfather, his great-grandfather and all his forbears in the direct line for seven generations, had been Grand Dukes of Kiev; the events which have given rise to the ramifications of the same race into Big Russians and Little Russians, as we shall see later, were in their very infancy and at that epoch could not furnish palpable results; they made themselves felt a century or two afterwards.

Russian history knows other instances of an armed conflict between the central state, conscious of its growing strength, and the local governments. The same Andrew of Suzdal made war on Nóvgorod and Tver by a series of wars of long duration. The struggle between Moscow and Nóvgorod lasted two centuries and is full of sanguinary episodes (1), but nobody ever pretended that the population of the two places was ethnographically different; on the contrary, everyone knows that these wars contributed to the unification of the Great Russian branch.

Did the plunder of Kiev produce a lasting feeling of ill-will between the North and the South? The chronicler describes this episode in moving terms, but without bringing out the least trace of any internatio-

(1) The principality of Nóvgorod-Séversk lay to the south of that of Tchernigov, between this latter and that of Pereyasláv.

nal enmity. No such feeling is to be found in the ballad of Kiev.

A fine heroic poem, « The Song of Igor's Army », the Russian « Chanson de Roland », describes the expedition of Igor, the Prince of Séversk, with his brethren to the east of the Don against the Pólovtsy (1).

The youthful courage of the princes drew them, flushed with their first victory, too far into the steppes. « The Pólovtsy came from the Don and from the sea, and surrounded the Russian forces ». The fight was a bitter one: « The black earth under the horses' hoofs, sown with corpses and watered with blood, brought forth sorrow for the Russian land ». There died « the brave *russachi* for the Russian soil ». The grief was great: « The grass bows down with pity and the tree bends to earth with sorrow ». Igor's wife Jaroslavna weeps as she gazes from the town walls towards the far-reaching steppe. « O wind, why hast thou with thy breath scattered my happiness over the feather-grass? ». Then did Sviatoslav, Grand Duke of Kiev, « let fall the golden word, bathed in tears », and called on the princes his brethren of Igor, of the brave Sviatoslavich ». He summons Jaroslav of Galitch, Rurik

(1) In 1389 the army of the Grand Duke Wassili took Nóvgorod; in 1478 it was occupied by the troops of Ivan III, who abolished all the Nóvgorod liberties; in 1570 Nóvgorod was destroyed by Ivan IV, the Terrible.

and David of Smolensk; he invites Romano and Mstislav of Volynia and Prince Vsevolod. « Grand Duke Vsevolod, fly from afar to defend thy father's golden throne; thou canst splash out the Volga with thine oars and drain the Don with the helmets of thine army ».

Who is the prince whose help is asked from Kiev and whose power is so poetically exalted? It is Vsevolod III (d. 1212), the brother of this same Andrew who plundered Kiev, the mighty successor to his policy of strengthening the northern part of Central Russia. Who is the unknown and gifted poet who invites the help of the northern prince? He is a southerner who is fighting along with the troops of the Grand Duke of Tchernigov. He grieves over the dissensions among the Russian princes « which shorten the lives of men », but he never makes mention of any collisions between different tribes of the Russian people. The Prince of Vladimir of the Súzdal land is as near to his heart as the princes of Volynia and Galitch. He sang that lay which enshrines the glory and the suffering of his native land, in the XIIIth century, when the political breach between the North and the South ought evidently to have grown wider than it had been in the days of Prince Andrew.

As in the XIIIth century differences of race did not exist, divergencies of race could not exist either. Let us

say at once that when differences showed themselves they did not generate divergencies: until the advent of the German-Bolsheviks there were never quarrels nor hostilities between the Great Russians and Little Russians; errors were committed by the Government of Moscow and Petersburg; in the second half of the XVIIth century and in Mazeppa's time there was an inclination of some of the chiefs of the Cossacks towards Poland for purely class interests; but among the people the slightest approach to enmity has been wanting: the two branches hardly took account of the fact that differences existed between them.

CHAPTER III.

THE THREE BRANCHES OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE.

We have seen that up to the Tartar invasion, throughout the whole extent of the Russia of that time, one single nationality acted and bore rule: the Russian. But we have also noted that, a hundred years after that invasion, that is to say in the XIVth century, we meet (applied to Galicia) the official denomination of Little Russia, from which in course of time a part of our Southern population will take the name of Little Russians. Among them a special dialect and special customs come into use and, in the XVIIth century, a kind of state autonomy appears, though only in embryonic form. Such historic phenomena cannot be improvised: clearly their roots stretch back through the depths of the centuries. Are we not perhaps fully justified in supposing that, in the pre-Tartar period which we are studying, changes were going on among the mass of the people which gradually prepared the way for the sub-division of the one Russian nationality?

In 1911 there died at Petrograd the venerable Professor Klyuchévsky, the latest head of the Russian hi-

storic school, a man endowed with an exceptional gift of penetration into the intimate recesses of the past life of a people. Under his critical chisel there falls off from the figures of history the plaster with which tradition had defaced them, in virtue of a long series of superficial judgments. In his books you will seek in vain for the incarnation of the ideal Statesman, or for an authentic monster of perversity: instead of that there pass before your eyes living people, a mixture of egotism and good-nature, wise government alternating with unrestrained personal ambition. And it is not only well-known figures, such as Andrew of Súzdal or Ivan the Terrible, that awake to life under his creative touch. He calls up for us the nameless, silent framer of the country's history, the plain everyday Russian who battles for existence amid the tyrannic forces of nature in the rigid North, hurling back stronger enemies and absorbing those who are weaker; who tills the ground, trafficks, intrigues, now humbly bows himself under evil fortune and again breaks out in wild rebellion, at one time longs to be dominated and at another overthrows the power that dominates him; who wears out his life in petty squabbles, or withdraws into the silence of the forest, where he buries himself like an anchorite and gives up his closing years to prayer, or flees to the boundless liberty of the Cossack Steppes; who lives out the grey

daily life of small personal interests (those monotonous and wearisome motive forces from whose tireless action is formed the skeleton of a people's life) and, when times of stress and trial come, aflame with love for the Mother-land in danger, rises to the loftiest heights of self-sacrifice. This simple, every-day Russian lives for us in the pages of Klyuchévsky, just as he was, without any ideal additions, in the manifold diversity of his labours and his aspirations. The great figures, the illuminating events, are for Klyuchévsky but the guide-posts of his history: from these run out an infinity of threads towards those obscure personalities who in their daily life, without being aware of it, are weaving the web of the national history. The idea of Klyuchévsky, welling forth from those bare heights where truth is sought for her own sake, percolates through the rich historical strata, absorbing their varied elements, whence it glides forth a full-bodied stream of thought, — passionless and free. Without verbosity, never lowering himself to narrow-minded transports (transports based on partial views), his work is an interblending of lights and shadows like life itself, while his serene and well-balanced judgment embraces impartially every subject that it meets, — individuals, classes, peoples, epochs. At a time like the present, when men are enslaved by partisan ideas and intoxicated by empty and deceitful phrases, the

work of Klyuchévsky refreshes the spirit and calms the soul. In this book we can have confidence. Here then is how it describes the ramifications of the Russian people.

The Russia of Kiev reached the height of its prosperity in the middle of the XIth century. After the death of Iaroslav I (1054) it begins gradually to decline: the chief cause of this decline is the incessant struggle with the Asiatic races pressing on Southern Russia from the East and South (1). Russia defended herself and then took the offensive; often the united bands of the principalities advanced far into the Steppes, inflicting cruel defeats on the Pólovtsy and on the other nomads; but in place of the first enemies others arrived unexpectedly from the East. The Russian forces were worn out in the unequal struggle until at last, incapable of further resistance, they began to give back. Life in the border districts (Eastward on the Vorskla, Southward on the Ross) became extremely dangerous, and at the end of the XIth century the population began to abandon them. From the XIIth century we have irrefutable testimonies as to the abandonment of the principality of Pereyasláv, territory that lies between the Dnieper and the Vorskla. In 1159

(1) On the struggles in the Steppes see chap. IV.

two cousins began quarelling with each other: Prince Isiaslav, who had just ascended the throne of Kiev, and Prince Svyatoslav, who had taken his place on the throne of Chernígov. To the reproaches of the former, Svyatoslav answers that «not wishing to shed christian blood» he humbly contented himself «with the city of Chernígov and with seven other cities, empty though they be; they are only occupied by game-keepers and the Pólovtsy». In other words, in these cities there remained only the followers of the Princes and the peaceful and russified Pólovtsy. In the number of these seven silent cities we find, to our great astonishment, one of the oldest and richest of the Russia of Kiev, the city of Liubech on the banks of the Dnieper. If cities situated in the centre of the kingdom were deserted, what must have happened in the defenceless villages? Contemporaneously with the symptoms of the emigration of masses of the people from the Russia of Kiev, we observe traces of the decline of its economic prosperity. The exchange of commercial products with other countries was hindered by the victorious nomads. «...But now came the heathen who cut us off from the roads (of commerce)», says Prince Mstislav of Volynia in 1167, when seeking to stir up the Princes his brothers to war against the barbarians of the Steppes. Thus the abandonment of the southern regions of Kiev in the second half of

the XIIth century is an assured fact. It remains to establish where these people who abandoned the Russia of Kiev took refuge.

The emigration from the valley of the Dnieper in the XIIth and XIIIth centuries, took two directions: to the North-East and to the West. The first current led to the creation of the Great Russian branch, the second to that of the Little Russian branch, of the one Russian people.

The Great Russians.

The emigration to the North-East moved into the regions situated between the upper Volga and the Oká, towards the territories of Rostóv-Súzdal. The country was separated from the South of Kiev by the dense forests of the upper Oká, occupying the territories where are now the Governorships of Orel and Kaluga. Communication was kept up by the affluents of the left of the Dnieper: with Kiev and with Súzdal there were hardly any direct means of communication save by river. Vladímír Monomákh (d. 1125), a tireless traveller who had traversed Russia on horseback from top to bottom, says in his « Instruction » for his sons with a certain vainglorious tone, that once he had gone from Kiev to Rostóv across these forests. So difficult was such an enterprise at that time. But in the middle of the XIIth century the Prince of Rostóv-Súzdal, Geor-

ge I, when fighting for the throne of Kiev, led entire regiments by this route against his rival Isiaslav of Volynia. This proves how a movement among the people was carried out which had cleared and opened the road in that direction. At the same time that voices of lament were raised for the abandonment of the territory of Kiev, in the distant regions of Súzdal there was to be noted an intensified work of construction. Under the reign of George I and that of his son, Andrew of Súzdal, new cities rise up one after the other. From 1147 the little city of Moscow begins to be known. George distributes subsidies to the emigrants, who people his territory «in many thousands». The very names given to the new cities reveal the origin of the greater part of the emigration: these cities bear the same names as the abandoned cities of the Russia of Kiev: Pereyasláv, Zvenigorod, Starodub, Vichgorod, Halitch; still more curious is the importation of the name of the river that bathes the city along with that of the city itself (1). Another testimony as to these emigrations from the valley of the Dnieper comes from the fortunes of our ancient ballads (*byline*). They grew up in the South in the pre-Tartar period; they speak of the struggle against the Pólovtsy and exalt

(1) In ancient Russia there were three Pereyaslávs, all three washed by three different rivers, each called Trubesc.

the prowess of the *bogatyr* (half mythical heroes) who offered themselves up for the Russian land. Of these Southern ballads the people of the South have to-day no longer any record: they have been supplanted by the Cossack chants, which sing the struggle of the Little Russian Cossacks with the Poles in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. But still the Ballads of Kiev are found in their pristine purity in the North, in the pre-Ural region, in the Governorships of Olónets and of Archangel. Clearly these Ballads have emigrated to the distant North along with the people who had created them and sung them. The emigration is anterior to the XIVth century, taking place, that is, before the appearance of the Lithuanians and the Poles in South Russia, since these Ballads contain no reference to these more recent enemies.

Whom did these new inhabitants find in the territory of Súzdal? History finds the North East of Russia a Finnish region; later on we see it Slavonic, a fact which proves the existence of a strong Slav colonisation which takes its rise in the dawn of Russian History; Rostóv existed before the summoning of the Varangians; in the reign of St. Vladimir his son Glieb is already reigning at Murom. This first Russian peopling of the country came from the North, from the territories of Nóvgorod and of the West. In this way

the emigrants of the Dnieper entered on land already Russian. But there still existed here some aborigenes: the Finns (1). The Finnish tribes were still at a low level of culture, not having yet issued from the clan system; they lived in the darkness of primitive paganism and retired without a conflict before the pacific Russian invasion. That this invasion was indeed pacific is proved by the absence of any traces of a struggle.

The Eastern Finns were of a gentle disposition and the new-comers were animated by anything but a warlike spirit. Instead of that they only sought a sure refuge, and here there was room for all. At the present day townships with Russian names are scattered here and there among townships in whose names one traces the old Finnish nomenclature; this proves that the Russians occupied the free spaces between the old Finnish townships. No bitter struggle was generated by the encounter of the two races, — neither racial, social, nor religious. The mixing up of the Russians with the Finns led to a certain anthropological change in the

(1) According to the census of 1897 the Empire, excluding Finland, contained three million and a half of Finns. The principal races are. Esthonians, one million; Finns properly so called, 140,000 (almost all in the Governorship of Petrograd); Karelians, 200,000 (between Finland and the White Sea); Mordvá, one million (in the Governorship of the middle Volga). The Karelians, and especially the Mordvá, are almost completely russified.

North Russian type: the prominent cheek-bones and the broad nose are a heredity from Finnish blood. The feeble Finnish culture was powerless to change the Russian idiom, which contains but sixty Finnish words; on the other hand there was some change in the pronunciation (1).

In this manner in the territory of Rostóv-Súzdal there crossed each other and interfused the migratory currents of the Russian element of the North-West, from the part of Nóvgorod, and of the South-West, from the part of Kiev; in this sea of Russian people the Finnish tribes were submerged and disappeared without leaving a trace, save at times a slight colour on the waves. The evidence of Finnish influence has been established by the observation of men of science; practically, it does not exist: not a single Great Russian has the consciousness of Finnish blood in his

(1) Strangers who study Russian, are generally surprised that so frequently the vowel *o*, on which the accent does not fall, must be pronounced like an *a*. The ancient *o* has remained in the orthography, but in pronunciation has a tendency to change into *a*. This is the most typical characteristic of the Great Russian idiom, or rather of its Southern dialect form, which became the literary language. It would seem that we have not here a Finnish influence, seeing that in the Northern dialects (North of Moscow, at Nóvgorod, at Kostroma, at Perm etc.) the pronunciation is *o*; it is clearly a case of Western influences, since the White Russians pronounce *a* instead of *o* even when the accent falls on it.

veins, and the humbler people have no suspicion of it either. Such is the ethnographic factor in the formation of the Great Russian (1). The influence of nature on the mixed population is the other factor.

Klyuchévsky dedicates several magnificent pages to the influence exercised by harsh Nature in the North (frost, floods, forests, swamps) on the country life of the Great Russian: how she drove the people asunder and broke them up into small townships, hindering the development of social life, as she habituated them to solitude and a narrow range of activity, as she har-

(1) The foreign press often follows the Ukrainophiles in repeating after them, that the origin of the Great Russians is the result of a mixture of Russian and Tartar blood; some people, even, naively endeavour to find in this one of the reasons of Bolshevism. But in fact Volga (Kasan) Tartars who are faithful to Mahometanism have never mixed with Russians, and up to the present time live in separate villages. The only exception in the case was the Tartar nobility, whom the Government of old Moscow used to attract into the State service by guaranteeing advantageous positions to them when baptised. Thus the Tartar princely family — Ouroussow — took precedency among the bureaucracy of some of the families descending from Rurik (such as the Bariátinsky, Gágárin, Dolgorúki, Wolkónsky and others). It should be noted that the idea that the modern Tartars, as is commonly held outside of Russia, are a set of barbarians, is altogether wrong. The Volga Tartars are a quiet and respectable people; they are sober, homeliving, orderly, and full of respect for the old tradition.

dened them to resist in patient struggle with tempests and privations of all kinds. « There is not in Europe a people less spoiled, with such few needs, more in the habit of hoping nothing from nature, or endowed with greater powers of resistance ». The short summer compels the Great Russian to an extreme effort of hard labour, the autumn and the winter to an involuntary and long period of inactivity, and « no other people in Europe is capable of putting forth such intense and proficuous labour at high pressure as the Great Russian; and at the same time, I believe, in no other part of Europe can one find a people so little accustomed to regular and steady labour as in Great Russia ». « The Great Russian struggled with nature in solitude in the depths of his forests, axe in hand ». « Life in the lonely villages could not habituate him to act in large bodies, in disciplined masses, and accordingly the Great Russian is better than the Great Russian society ». One must know that nature and that race in order to appreciate the intelligence that flashes in these pages of Klyuchévsky, pervaded by that genuine love of country which desires to keep hidden and yet inadvertently shines out between the lines.

Let us cast a glance at the political conditions amid which the formation of the Great Russian stock took place. The Russians entered the territory of Rostóv-

Súzdal and established themselves freely there; but they encountered opposition when they issued from these limits and attempted fresh colonisation. To the North strange neighbours were not to be found in strength; and yet along the rivers of the White Sea basin the daring pioneers of Nóvgorod had borne sway for a long time; to press into the limitless virgin forest without first securing the rivers, would have been a useless enterprise. To the East, near the mouths of the Kama and the Oká, there lived, besides the Finnish tribes, the Bulgarians of the Volga, who represented a certain civic force hostile to the Russians. To the South the stocks of the Asiatic nomads hindered their expansion, while to the West from the end of the XIIIth century a Lithuanian state began to take shape. Evidently the possibility of expansion was not entirely precluded; but we shall not be far from the truth in affirming that history had taken upon herself to place the people of the lands of Rostóv-Súzdal, for a period of two centuries (1150-1350), in an almost isolated situation; it is as though she desired that, abandoned to itself, this race should be transformed, should be mixed together, should be smelted in a crucible and should form a special ethnic unity. And thus it was, and this took place for the most part in a way that confounded the understanding of many rulers.

Comprised in the limits that have been cited, the

people of central European Russia formed a part of a very conglomeration of principalities. Tver, Iaroslav, Kostroma, Rostóv, Súzdal, Riasan, Nízni-Nóvgorod, these are the most important of their capitals. Here reigned the descendants of Monomákh, heirs of the brother of Andrew of Súzdal, Vsévolod III, the Big Nest, already mentioned by us. The law of succession to the throne of the Grand Duchy of Vladímir was the same as at Kiev, that is, « hereditary succession with limitations and infringements not a few » (1). Among the factors which contributed to the infringement of the hereditary right of succession, a fresh one appears in the middle of the XIIIth century: the consent of the Khan of Tartary. The multiplication of Princes leads to creation of local descending dynastic lines and of dynastic interests of the local Grand Duchies, for example, those of Tver, of Riasan, etc. As the blood-bond between the Princes weakened, the sense of unity of territory was relaxed among them. This complex of circumstances led to these results, that the astutest and strongest of the local Princes possessed himself of the Grand Duchy of Vladímir (limiting himself to the title of Grand Duke of Vladímir and sometimes to that of Kiev), but continuing to reside at his hereditary capi-

(1) PLATONOV, *Lectures on Russian History*, p. 108.

tal, as at Tver or at Kostroma. In 1328 one of the most powerful local Princes was John I Kalitá, ruler of the modest principality of Moscow. From that year the picture changes and the Grand Duchy remains in the gripe of Kalitá and his descendants.

The principality of Moscow was of very recent date; the uninterrupted succession of Princes began there only in 1283 (1); the territory was of small extent, Kalitá having inherited only the lands washed by the Moscova besides Pereyasláv-Zalesky: the Muscovite Princes belonged to the younger branch of the descendants of Monomákh. What are, then, the causes of their initial success over their rivals: what was the basis of the future power of the Grand Duchy of Moscow?

Let us reckon up these causes as they are laid down in the historic literature.

a) Moscow was situated at the ethnographic centre of the Great Russian stock: the two currents of emigration from Kiev and from Nóvgorod crossed each other there: she stood at the junction of several great roads and on the traffic route which went from Nóvgorod across Riasan towards the furthest East as then known: the lower Volga. *b)* The principality of Moscow was protected from invasion and from foreign influences by the adjacent principalities; the Grand Duchies of Riasan and of Chernígov received the first onset of the Tartars, and a great part of the pressure of Lithuania was swallowed up by the Grand Duchy of Smolensk.

(1) The first of these was the father of Kalitá, Daniel Alexandrovich (1262-1303).

c) The first Muscovite Princes were exemplary administrators: they knew how to extend their dominions by annexing the small territories adjacent through matrimonial alliances and by purchase; they knew how to save and how to cause the gold stream to flow in their direction. d) In their relations with the Tartars they showed exceptional subtlety; repairing to the Khan of the Golden Orda they understood how to win his good-will and secure the patent for the Grand Duchy. They themselves collected the taxes for the Tartars and undertook to remit them to the Khan, so that the Tartar tax-gatherers did not importune the people. e) Civil wars raged in the other principalities, while the succession to the throne proceeded in the regular way in the small family of the Muscovite Grand Dukes. The state-life was peaceful, so that the emigrants from Kiev and from Nóvgorod moved there willingly, and the people from the East of Súzdal streamed there also, to escape the torment of the Tartar *pogroms* and the sudden attacks of strangers from the East. The tranquillity and order attracted eminent statesmen to the Muscovite Prince. f) The higher clergy, trained in the Byzantine cult of authority, divined the future political importance of Moscow and became her ally. Removing from the forgotten Kiev (in 1299) to the North of Russia, the Metropolitans preferred Moscow to the Vladímir capital. So it came about that a concentration of the political and ecclesiastical authorities took place contemporaneously at Moscow, and the little town of a short time before became the centre of all Russia.

The petty local Princes lived but for their petty interests, offering disorder and turbulence; while the

people asked, harassed and worn-out as they were, peace and tranquillity. This Moscow offered: « from that date (that is, from the time John Kalitá ascended the throne) profound peace rested on the whole Russian land for forty years », writes the chronicler. The people set their feet on the path leading to unity: « in the middle of the XIVth century; amidst the political dismemberment a new national formation took shape » (1). Meantime, Moscow addressed herself to create the political unity: by the middle of the XIVth century she had absorbed so many of the little principalities that, according to the words of the chronicler, the son of John Kalitá, Simeon the Proud (1341-53) « had all the Russian Princes under him ». Thirty more years pass away and the Grand Duke of Moscow unites against the Tartars all the Russian forces and, greatly daring, leads them far from Moscow to the field of Kulikóvo, because he arms them not only for the defence of his own dominions, but for the protection of the whole Russian land. There, on the field of Kulikóvo, is born the national state of Moscow. A century later Moscow, reinforced, takes upon herself another high national problem: the freeing of the unredeemed Russian lands from the foreign yoke. In 1503 the Lithuanian ambassadors charged John III (1462-

(1) KLYUCHÉVSKY, II, 57.

1505, a descendant of Kalitá in the fifth degree), with having received the Princes of Chernigov (descendants of Riurik), who had withdrawn allegiance from Lithuania, along with their lands. John III replied: « Am I perhaps insensible to the diminution of my hereditary territory, Russian land, which to-day is under Lithuania, — Kiev, Smolensk, and other cities? ».

Thus the Great Russian stock took shape and united round Moscow. From the Grand Duke of Moscow there fell away the characteristic traits of a private landed proprietor, the Prince of a petty Principedom. He felt himself to be head of a national state, and the people felt their state-unity. What was the national idea that took root in this people? What nationality saw its aspirations personified by the Sovereign of this State? The Great Russian nationality? He who knows Russia will laugh at such suppositions. The Great Russian idea, Great Russian sentiments, Great Russian aims and problems, do not exist and have never existed. It would be ridiculous, for example, to speak of Great Russian patriotism. The national sentiment which animated the Muscovite Russian, was not Great Russian but simply *Russian*, and the Muscovite Sovereign was a *Russian* Sovereign. The official Muscovite language recognised the expression « Great Russia », but only as the designation of one of the parts of the country, like « White Russia » and « Little Russia »: the expression « Great

Russia » contained no other conception than this, — a dénomination of a part of the one entire Russian land : « by the grace of God, Grand Sovereign, Tsar, Grand Duke and Autocrat of all Russia (1), Great, White and Little », — thus was this idea expressed in the title of the Muscovite Tsars. It is possible that the term « Great Russian » was unknown at Moscow : this artificial and literary word evidently appeared at the epoch of the union with Little Russia by way of distinction. The term has come into general use (and abuse) only in our own days, since the Revolution. Till now the peasant of Kostroma has as little suspected that he was a Great Russian as that of Ekaterinosláv has suspected that he was a Ukrainian, and were he asked what he was, he would answer : — « I am a Kostromian », — or oftener : — « I am a Russian ».

The Little Russians.

Let us now turn to the conclusions of Professor Klyuchévsky.

Another current of emigration of the Russian people from the Dnieper territory, as we have already said, flowed Westward, towards the Western Bug, in

(1) Notice that it is « of all Russia », not « of all the Russias », as it is wrongly written abroad as a rule.

the region of the upper Dniester and of the upper Vistula, in Galicia and Poland. The traces of this emigration are met in the fate of the two border principalities, Galicia and Volynia. In the hierarchy of the Russian principalities these two belonged to the number of the younger. In the second half of the XIIth century, in the reign of Prince Romano Mstislavich, who reunited Galicia to his Volynia, and under the reign of his son Daniel, the reunited principality sensibly prospers and supports a dense population; the Princes grow rapidly wealthy, despite domestic troubles, put their fingers in the affairs of South-Western Russia and decide even the fortunes of Kiev. The chronicler exalts Romano (d. 1205) as « the autocrat of all the Russian lands ».

The depopulation of the Dnieper country, which began in the XIIth century, was completed in the XIIIth as a result of the Tartar invasion of 1229-1240. From that time the ancient provinces of Southern Russia, which had been so populous, became for a long period a desert, preserving but few of their early inhabitants. The result of this depopulation was the ruin of all political and national life in the whole country. In Kiev itself, after the invasion of 1240, there remained only two hundred houses, and the inhabitants suffered persecution of every kind. Among the deserted steppes on the border-line of Kiev territory, the survivors of the

ancient neighbours (nomad tribes of Pechenégs, Pólovtsy and Torcky) were still roaming. The southern districts of the provinces of Kiev, of Pereyasláv and part of Chernigov remained in this ruined condition till perhaps the middle of the XVth century. In the XVIth century the South-Western part of Russia, with Galicia, was seized by Poland and Lithuania. The Dnieper steppes became the southern boundary of Lithuania, and later the south-east boundary of the united Polish-Lithuanian State. In the documents of the XIVth century there appears for the first time a new name for South-Western Russia, but this name is not Ukraina: it is *Málaia Rossia* or « Little Russia ».

« In connection with the westward movement of the inhabitants there became apparent », says Prof. Klyuchévsky, « an important event of Russian ethnography (1): that is, the formation of the Little Russian race (tribe, *plémia*) ». The population of the Dnieper territory in the XIIIth century, having found in the depths of Galicia and Poland a safe refuge from the Pólovtsy and other nomáds, remained there during the whole Tartar period. The distance of the Tartar central authority, the more western organisation of these states, the existence of stone castles, the forests

(1) Italics ours.

and morasses of Poland and the mountains of Galicia, all protected the Southern Russians from entire Tartar enslavement. This settlement among their brethren of Galicia and among the Poles continued for two or three centuries.

From the XVth century onwards, however, there began a second influx to the Central Dnieper lands. This was the result of a return of the original peasantry, « facilitated by two circumstances: The southern steppe border-land of Russia became less dangerous because the Tartar Orda was dispersed, and the Muscovite Russian state was strengthened. In Poland the ancient system by which the peasants rented land was changed into one in which they worked for an over-lord; this serfdom rapidly developed into slavery, so that the oppressed peasants began to seek refuge from the yoke of their Polish landlords in the freedom of the steppes ». In the following chapter we shall give some chronological facts characteristic of this return of the Russian population to their old homes (1). For the moment, we follow our author as closely as possible.

« When the *ucraina* (in English: borderland) of the Dnieper, had thus been repopulated, it became evi-

(1) Chapter IV was published before the compiling of this one as an article in the Italian Review *Nuova Antologia* in February 1919, which explains the unsatisfactory distribution of these data between this chapter and the IVth.

dent that the mass of the returning inhabitants *were of purely Russian origin*. Therefore we can safely conclude that the majority of these settlers, coming from the depths of Poland, Galicia and Lithuania, were the descendants of the Russ who left the Dnieper to fly west in the XIIth and XIIIth centuries, and that during their two or three centuries of life among Poles and Lithuanians they had retained their nationality. These Russians, returning to their old homes, met there the wandering remnants of the former nomads, the Torky, Berendey, Pechenégs and others. I do not positively affirm that the Little Russian race (*plémia*) was formed by a blending of these oriental races just mentioned with those Russians who returned to their old homes in the Dnieper region and those Russians who remained there, for I do not myself possess, and do not find in historical literature, sufficient grounds for accepting or for rejecting such a thesis. Nor can I say whether it is clearly established when and under what influences the peculiarities which distinguish the dialect of the Little Russians from the ancient dialect of Kiev, and from the Great Russian dialect, took form. I only affirm that to the *formation of the Little Russian race* (*plémia*) *as a branch of the Russian nation* (1) an element was contributed by the return in the XVIIth century of the Rus-

(1) Italics ours.

sian population who had fled to the Carpathians and the Vistula in the XIIth and XIIIth centuries ».

All that we have hitherto said about the Little Russians is literally, or almost literally, quoted from the historical lectures of Professor Klyuchésky (vol. I, pp. 351-354). We have purposely chosen this simplified form of exposition, for the Ukrainophile party do not disdain to accuse their opponents of untruth and loading of the dice (1). Let that party lay their account with Klyuchévsky: it is he who holds the pass, not I. Certain men it is more dangerous to calumniate dead than those now living.

In the last sentence of this quotation we find a complete refutation of all the present absurd assertions, due to the Ukrainophile propaganda, that there exists a certain « Ukrainian nationality » and that it is of an origin other than Russian.

Professor Klyuchévsky did not consider that he could decide « positively » *when* the Little Russian branch took form and *when* the Little Russian dialect came into being. He knew weight was given to his conclusions, and he did not choose to enunciate them definitely unless he could bring incontestable evidence in corroboration of every word. For us, however,

(1) See, for example, the interview with Count M. Tyszkiewicz, head of the « Ukrainian Mission » at Rome, in the *Courriere d'Italia*, June 9, 1919.

there cannot be the slightest doubt that it all happened exactly as he says. The population which came from the Dnieper to Poland in the XIIth and the XIIIth centuries, came as refugees, miserably ruined and seeking for work and daily bread. Naturally, obliged to spread over a foreign land, they found themselves in an inferior position, among aliens. The difference of religion kept up to a certain extent the purity of the Russian and of the Polish blood, but the language of the Russian refugees could not remain uninfluenced by the surrounding nationality. It assimilated many Polish words, and without doubt the pronunciation changed at the same time, and thus the Little Russian dialect came into life (1). The sojourn as guests among Western neighbours also brought some few Hungarian and Moldavian words into the Little Russian vocabulary. When the descendants of these Russian refugees returned home, they found there descendants of the former nomads and of the Tartars. Traces of their blood can sometimes be seen

(1) The chief difference between the Little Russian dialect and that of Great Russia consists in the pronunciation. When a Little Russian speaks I should not at once grasp all he says, but the moment a cultured Russian opens a book written in Little Russian he can read it without difficulty. Unlike the Great Russian dialect, the Little Russian dialect has preserved intact the old Russian soft *g* (*h*), and has nearly everywhere changed the old sound *é* into the sound *i*.

in Little Russians, in the darkness of their skin and in their character.

It is lovely, this land where in the XIVth and XVth centuries the Little Russian race grew up.

« A pleasant and well-favoured land
Where the rivers flow clearer than silver
Where the gentle steppe-wind sways the grass
And the cottages sink among the cherry-orchards » (1).

Here the sun is so bright that the snow remains on the ground for three months only (2): there are not the morasses of Polessie, nor the sands of the Don, nor the waterless steppes of the Black-Sea region. In old times the high grass could hide the horseman from the cruel eye of the Crimean Tartar, but now endless wheat fields grow, waving their heavy ears, or plantations of broad-leaved sugar beet-root spread their carpets of green. Beautiful are the oak forests of the Ukraine, lofty the poplar trees, rich the orchards. Nature has done everything to render hard the life of the Great Russian; she has forgotten nothing in order to surround with joy and plenty his happier southern brother. He well knows how to prize the gifts of nature. His songs are mostly in happy major tones,

(1) Count Alexis Tolstoi.

(2) In Central Russia the snow lies from six to eight months.

he sings of love and joy. It is his pleasure to seek beauty in his life-surroundings; his white-washed cottage embowered in flowers strikes a poetic note; his populous villages often of an evening resound with dance and song; his handsome dress, longer than in other parts of Russia, has remained free from the ugly uniformity of the industrial centres. A charming sense of humour enters into his nature, and peeps forth when he narrates, and in those impromptu phrases that flash out under the pressure of the moment, as well as in jokes at his own expense. But in spite of his gay disposition there lurks in his mentality a certain slowness, an oriental impassibility. When a Little Russian comes to a decision, even if it be absurd, it is impossible to bring him to another way of thinking. No wonder that among other Russians there exists the saying: «obstinate as a *hohól* (Little Russian)» (1). But this obstinacy and perseverance, together with a grand physique, make him one of the best soldiers in the Russian army; he is also an excellent and clever agriculturist, who knows the value of good manure, even for his rich black soil. His agricultural aptitude

(1) *Hohól*, an appellative given to the Little Russian by the lower orders in Great Russia. It comes from the custom of the Ukrainian Cossacks in past centuries to shave their heads, leaving one long wisp (*hohól*) of hair on the crown.

has been developed, not only by a generous nature, but also by economic laws, for the Little Russian peasant owns his land right out, whereas the mass of peasants in Great Russia were oppressed till quite lately (up to 1907, when Stolypin brought in his land reform) by the despotism of the village commune which, many centuries ago, attained the ideal of Socialism, — that is to say, an enforced equality in terms of the weakest and most inefficient.

This description may seem slightly artificial, but that results from our desire to lay stress on the differences between the two branches of the Russian Nation. In real life the difference is less noticeable, and in the cultured classes it has completely disappeared. The Little Russians who have emigrated beyond the Volga and passed on to Siberia, who have along with Great Russians peopled the Black-Sea steppes, finding themselves under similar natural conditions with them, lose little by little their special characteristics; their dialect, after enriching the Great Russian speech, gradually gives ground before it. If one of these colonists is asked who he is, he answers: « a Russian »; or, « a Little Russian »; but no one ever heard him say « I am an Ukrainetz ».

The Little Russian race was formed under hard political conditions. With the conquest of Kiev by the Tartars in 1240 the principality of Kiev lost even its

outward signs of independence: for over a century not a single Prince of Kiev is mentioned. M. Hruszewski himself is obliged to express a doubt as to their existence. In 1363 this deserted land became an easy prey for Lithuania. In Kiev and other capital towns the members of the Gedimin family became the rulers. When the Russians began to return towards the Dnieper they found here a foreign government, and from that time up to the XVIIth century their destiny was controlled by foreigners. Towards the middle of the XVIth century the mild Lithuanian authority was exchanged for a hard Polish one; under the weight of religious and economic conditions the sense of nationhood awoke in this people who were sunk in nerveless passivity. The struggle with the Poles and Catholicism, which presented itself to them as the « Polish religion », filled up the whole life of the Little Russian population for over a hundred years. The principal facts of this struggle will be touched upon later, but now we must recall one positive historical fact: from its very birth, and till its complete political union with the Muscovite State, the Little Russian branch never had an independent existence.

History's monition to the three branches of the Russian people is: « Unite as brothers, otherwise you will be trampled under the pitiless heel of the stranger ».

The White Russians.

Among the Slavonic tribes mentioned in the first pages of Nestor's chronicles, are included those of Krivichy and Dregovichy. Both these names indicate the character of the country where these tribes have settled (1). The bond between the name of the tribe and the country, a fact we meet also in the case of the other tribes mentioned by Nestor (2), proves, it would seem, the near relationship of these tribes: it is believed that before settling on the Russian plain they had no separate names; the chronicler testifies that they all had «one Slav language». The Krivichys lived along the sources of the Volga, of the Western Dwina and of the Dnieper; their ancient towns were Isborsk, Polotsk and Smolensk. The Dregovichys occupied the space between the Dwina and Pripet; the principal town here was Minsk. These tribes soon mixed with others which composed the Russian people, and their names soon disappeared from the pages of the chronicle. Soloviev, after having deciphered some two or

(1) *Dregva* means swamp, quagmire: see Dahl's Dictionary. The word *drojati* means to tremble; the Lithuanian word *kirba* has the same meaning, whence probably the name of Krivichy. (SOLOVIEV, I, 47).

(2) Severiany, Bujany, Drevliane, Poliane, Polotchane, Novgorodtsy.

three texts where Nestor mentions these tribes, does not speak of them any more. They are, so to say, archeological antiquities, interesting only for a museum, and who could have thought, some three years ago, that the enemies of Russia would remember them for practical purposes of actual life, and would drag them out to speculate with them on the political stock-exchange?

The White Russians occupy nearly the same territory that was inhabited by the Krivichys and the Dregovichys, and as there are no traces of any migrations in these parts, one may suppose that the White Russians are their descendants. We are not going to analyse the differences between this branch of the Russian people and its dialect and the branches and idioms of Big Russians and Little Russians, but we want to prove here, with complete evidence, that the White Russians always were, and always were considered, a part of the Russian people, and that their land is essentially an inalienable part of the Russian land. In the White Russian as in the Ukraine question the enemies of Russian unity have a powerful ally, — I mean, the slight acquaintance of the outside public with Russian geography, history and ethnography. It does not seem therefore superfluous to draw attention to some rudimentary facts.

It is difficult to establish precisely the confines of

the White Russian settlements (still less those of the Nestorian Krivichy and Dregovichy), so it will be easier and shorter to follow out the fortunes of the principalities into which all the Western part of Russia, from Pskov in the North to Kiev in the South, was divided.

a) *Pskov* existed already before the *summoning of the Princes* (862); St. Olga, grand-mother of Vladimir the saint, was, tradition says, from Pskov. Its territory formed part of the land of Nóvgorod. Its frontier situation, the strife with the Esthonians, and later with the Teutonic Order, gave to this city, although politically depending on Nóvgorod, particular importance, and it gradually made itself independent of Nóvgorod; for that purpose (from the XIIIth century) Pskov sometimes took a Prince from Lithuania. This circumstance did not lead to any dependence upon Lithuania: the power of the Prince had no great importance in the *véche* organisation of Pskov. It is well known that the political administration of Pskov presents a typical example of the republican organisation in Russia; here it succeeded better than in the vast territory of Nóvgorod. The strife with the German Orders and the quarrells with Nóvgorod forced Pskov to turn towards Moscow, and from 1401 its rulers were appointed by her Grand-Duke; a hundred years later Pskov was entirely swallowed up by Moscow: in 1509 the Grand-Duke Vassili III decided that the *véche* should no longer exist and the *véche*-bell should be taken down. Ethnographically speaking the Pskov territory had of old been Russian

land; when the Great Russian race took form it passed into the Great Russian orbit.

b) *Polotsk* is looked upon as a colony of Nóvgorod. Already Rurik, when dividing his towns between his « men », granted it to one of them. The Polotsk territory early formed a separate principality. St. Vladimir gave Polotsk to his son Iziaslav (d. 1001), who became the founder of the oldest of the local Rurik stocks. In the beginning the principality embraced the territory inhabited by the Krivichys, who here took the name of Polochan; they lived along the middle part of the Western Dwina, along the river Polot, and in the upper part of the river Beresina. In the XIth century the Polotsk principality extended westward to the neighbouring non-Slavonic tribes, the Lithuanic, Lett and Finnish tribes. This principality reached the height of its power in the XIth and XIIth centuries. The princes waged civil war against Nóvgorod and the Kiev rulers. One of Isiaslav's grandsons was for a short time Grand-Duke of Kiev. Mstisláv of Kiev, son of Monomákh, devastated (about 1127) the Polotsk territory, banished its Princes and put his son in Polotsk. The *véche* system took an important development in Polotsk. In the middle of the XIIth century the Polotsk princes are the masters of all the land lying along the course of the Western Dwina, but by the end of the century the Livonian Order begins to move from the West. In the XIIIth century, simultaneously with the formation of the Lithuanic State, the Western frontier-line of the Polotsk territory moves Eastward, and, when the Tartars appear, it corresponds with the ethnographic Russian frontier. With the dissolution of the Russian state-unity,

the Polotsk domain gradually passes into the power of Lithuania, and under Vitovt (1392-1430) finally merges into the Lithuanic state. The domain of Polotsk was divided into many principalities, of which the most important were those of Vitebsk and Minsk.

c) *Vitebsk* is mentioned as far back as the Xth century. In 1101 the Vitebsk principality separated from the Polotsk principality and remained independent without a break up to the last years of the XIIth century, when, in consequence of civil war, it fell under the power of the Princes of Smolensk. In the XIIIth century it is again mentioned as independent. In the middle of the XIIIth century it is attacked by the Lithuanian Princes; after the death of the last Prince of Vitebsk, of the race of Rurik, the principality goes over to Olgerd by right of relationship and is swallowed up by Lithuania.

d) *Minsk* is mentioned in 1066 as belonging to the principality of Polotsk. It was taken more than once by the Kiev Grand-Dukes, Vladimir Monomakh among others, during their contendings with the Polotsk Princes (so in 1087 and 1129). Minsk became the capital in 1101; three generations of one of the Polotsk branches ruled here. In the second half of the XIIth century the Lithuanian power is established in the Princedom. In the end of the XIIth and beginning of the XIIIth century the domain was divided into several principalities; among them are mentioned that of Pinsk, Tourov and Mozir; they lie in the basin of the river Pripet. Thus we have reached the frontier of the Kiev principality.

The princedoms of Polotsk and Minsk were the frontier-

line of the Russian territory; behind them lay the principedom of Smolensk. When Lithuania moved to the East, it became the border-land.

e) The *Smolensk* territory is known since the Xth century: it lay to the East of that of Polotsk, and stretched far away Eastward, so that the place where later Moscow grew up was part of it. It was ruled by men appointed by the Kiev Princes, but in the middle of the XIIIth century it became an independent principedom: in 1054 Yarosláv I placed his son Vsévolod in Smolensk. Later it was ruled by Vsévolod's son Vladimir Monomákh and his descendants. They waged war against their Polotsk relations, who wanted to annex Smolensk to their dominions. The water-way between Nóvgorod and Kiev, and between Kiev and Súzdal territory, lay through the land of Smolensk; commercial interchange with the West was another reason for the prosperity of the country. Its strength reached its zenith under Vladimir Monomákh's grandson (Rostislav, son of Mstislav, 1128-1161). In 1180 the country begins to break up into small principalities; civil war breaks out for the possession of the Smolensk Grand-Ducal throne; the more noticeable principalities are those of Toropets (from the XIIIth century) and Viasma. In the second quarter of the XIIIth century begin the invasions of the Lithuanians; in 1242 the Tartar invasion is repulsed, yet the fame of the principality continues to decline: gradually its influence on Polotsk and Nóvgorod is lost, and its relations with Kiev are cut off. In 1274 Smolensk is subjected to the Tartar Khan. About 1320 the influence of Lithuania begins to be perceptible; the principality becomes an object

of discord between Moscow and Lithuania, and makes war, now against the one, now against the other. In 1395 Vitovt captured «by fraud» all the Princes of Smolensk and put his representative there; Riasan stood up for this part of the Russian land, but in 1404 Vitovt took Smolensk, and its independence was lost. Its limits at this time were reduced to the dimensions of the present government of Smolensk.

These territories, which some centuries later became White Russia, had from ancient times been overflowed by the Slavonic elements. Here Slavonic was spoken; «and the Russian and Slavonic language is one», as Nestor said long ago. Here, until the conquest of the land by a foreign power, the rulers were everywhere of the house of Rurik. Political life was moulded on the forms common to the Russia of the *Udel* period (1). «In the XIIth and XIIIth centuries in all the Russ prevailed», says an historian of Russian Law, «the one and self-same Common Law, that is, that which was expressed in the *Rúskaya Právda* (the Russian Truth)» (2). The principedoms warred with

(1) That is, the period of the division of Russia in small principalities (XIIth century).

(2) WLADIMIRSKI-BUDANOV, *Chrestomathy for the History of Russian Law*, vol. I, Yaroslavl, 1871. See there among his commentaries regarding the treaty of Prince Mstisláv of Smolensk with Riga, Gotland, and German towns of 1229. Conforming to the last article of this treaty its norms (entirely similar to the norms of the *Rúskaya Právda*) had force of law

each other; this was war with one's own, not with a racial foe, only with a political rival. When however danger from the East threatened all Russia, the local Rurik Princes also led their troops and militia against the common foe and gave their lives for the one Russia in the campaigns against the Polovtsy and the Tartars. And so we find Smolensk troops fighting also in the first unhappy encounter of the Russians with the Tartars near the far-off Southern river Kalka (1224) (1). The two famous Mstislavs, the Brave (d. 1180) and the Bold (d. 1228), who had wielded the sword in battle-fields throughout all Russia, both sprang from here, from Smolensk Princes.

But the nearest enemies of this part of Russia, the Esthonians, the Letts, Lithuanians and Germans, lived in the West, and in all ages this part of Russia had to defend the Western front. At the first the sovereignty of Russia did not here reach beyond ethnographic limits; with the growth of Russian power these limits were overpassed; Yarosláv the Wise in 1030 founded the town of Yúriev (Dorpat) in the land of the Estho-

for the Principalities of Smolensk, Polotsk and Vitebsk. And seeing that the same norms of the «Russian truth» of Kiev form the basis of the treaty of Nóvgorod with the Germans of 1195, we have still another very authoritative proof of the juridical unity of all Russia.

(1) The small river Kalka flows into the Sea of Azóv.

nians; in the XIth century Polotsk began to bring the Livonians (1) under subjection; in the middle of the next century all the land lying along the lower course of the West Dvina became subject to the principality of Polotsk; the people of Polotsk here owned the forts of Cuconoys and Hertzik; further South the Lithuanian tribes were brought under the power of Polotsk, and Grodno is included in the Russian boundary. The approximate frontier of this (the farthest) extension of Russia to the North-West in the pre-Tartar period, is marked on the annexed sketch-map by the dotted line which begins near the town of Yúriev.

From the XIIIth century the picture changes. In 1201 the Germans laid the foundations of Riga; in the following year the Livonian Order was founded (the Sword Brethren), which was to be the instrument of the sanguinary work of Germanisation. Gradually moving to the East, the Germans drove back in half a century the Russian power from the lands of the Letts and the Esthonians; here they remained as the predominating class without going farther East. The Lithuanian power, on the other hand, spread far into the depths of the Russian land.

(1) A ramification of the Finnish stock. From the XIIIth century the land occupied by them began to be called Livonia (the modern Courlandia or Latvia of our days).

The Lithuanians in the ethnographic sense are an independent race, different from the Slavs and the Germans. Their country is the basin of the Niemen; here they led a life apart from ancient times. In the XIIIth century they were caught up into the « international » life: the Teutonic order pressed in from the West, the Russians from the East and the South. Mindaog (d. 1263), who defeated the Teutonic order and made himself master of Vilna, Grodno, and even the Russian Volkovysk and Pinsk, is looked on as the founder of the Lithuanian state. Christianity and its resultant culture came to the Lithuanians from the East, from the Russians. Mindaog was the first Lithuanian Prince to be baptised. After began the strife between the Lithuanian (Pagan) party and the Russian (Christian) party. About 1290 a Lithuanian dynasty, known later under the name of the Gedimin dynasty, asserted itself. Under Gedimin (1316-1341) the dukedom grew in strength: a fresh attack of the Livonian Order was repulsed; the principalities of Minsk, Pinsk, and some parts of the neighbouring lands passed into the possession of Gedimin; two-thirds of the Lithuanian territories consisted of Russian lands; Russians held under him the most important posts; his title was « Grand Duke of the Lithuanians, the Jmudi (1) and the Russians ». After Gedimin's death the Germans profited by the division of Lithuania between several heirs to renew their attack, this time in alliance with Po-

(1) Jmud, one of the Lithuanian tribes. They dwelt between the lower Niemen and Vindova rivers.

land; but Olgerd (d. 1377), son of Gedimin, overcame the order. Olgerd was a Christian and married twice to Russian princesses, the former from Vitebsk and the latter from Tver: all his designs were directed towards Russian lands: he sought to influence the affairs of Nóvgorod and Pskov: he desired to possess Tver, and with that end in view undertook campaigns against Moscow, but without success. About 1360 he annexed the Russian principalities of Briansk (1), Chernígov, and Nóvgorod-Seversk (2), took possession of Podolia, and finally in 1363 of Kiev.

Thus during one century (from the middle of the XIIIth to the middle of the XIVth) the Lithuano-Russian state, stretching in a broad band from the West Dvina in the North to beyond Kiev in the South, united in itself all the West Russian principalities, all the basin of the right affluents of the Dnieper; half a century later it assimilated also Smolensk. The beginning of this process coincided with the weakening of Russia owing to the Tartar pogrom, and its rapid development was favoured by a series of causes. Let us remember that the power of the Galician principality was already waning one hundred years previously (from the death of the Prince-King Daniel in 1264), that the Moscow State during Olgerd's life was but a

(1) South of Smolensk.

(2) South of Chernígov.

feeble principality, whose limits formed on the West a semicircle but one hundred versts distant from Moscow, that the process of the formation of the Great Russian Branch was far from being effectuated, and finally that the subordination to Lithuania freed the Princes of the harried principalities of West and South Russia from the Tartar pressure, and we shall understand the reason of Olgerd's success.

There was one more reason why Lithuania met with such slight resistance. The Lithuanian State from its origin was under the Russian political and cultural influence; the Russian language was its official language; the family of Gedimin, which maintained matrimonial relationships with the Rurik family, became russified; the Gedimin were also Russian Princes, only springing from a new, Lithuanian dynasty; the Church life received its main impulses from Moscow, in the principalities which submitted themselves to Lithuania neither the political organisation nor the national form of life was interfered with. Already at the end of the XIVth century Lithuania, by the component parts of its population and by its form of social life, represents more a Russian than a Lithuanian principality: to historical science it is known under the name of the Russo-Lithuanian State. It seemed as if the centre of Russian political life did not know where to stop, whether at Moscow or at Vilna: a long duel

for predomination ensued: it lasted two centuries. The strong Moscow potentates John III (1462-1505) and Basil III (1505-1533) began to take away from Lithuania Russian provinces and declared their rights to all that part of Russia which belonged to Lithuania. In the third quarter of the XVIth century the troops of John the Terrible (1533-1584) took Polótsk and carried matters with a high hand in Lithuania. But here Poland also stood up against Moscow: before their united forces Moscow was obliged to yield.

We have followed up the political destiny of the White Russian part of the Russian population till the end of the XIIIth century, but we have not yet met with any traces of Polish influence upon it. One can easily understand that: in the northern part of White Russia, between the western frontier of the Russian nationality and the eastern ethnographic limit of Poland, lay a third nationality, the Lithuanian, different from the Russian as well as from the Polish: it removed these from one another to a distance of 150-300 kilometres. The Polish nationality spread to the East, approximately to the meridian of Lublin. To the South, from the parallel of Minsk and Mogilev, the frontiers of both these populations (Russian and Polish) met. But also here, in the south of White Russia, the two peoples could only approach each other after the Lithuanian State had been assimilated by Poland.

In 1386 the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagailo (son of Olgerd) married the Polish Queen Hedwig and became Catholic. From that time the Polish and Catholic influence installs itself solidly in Vilna, and Polish political ideas are by degrees transplanted to the Russo-Lithuanian democratic soil. In the XVth century an aristocratic class is created and endowed with high privileges; magnates sit in *seims*, concentrate in their hands high functions on the Polish model, and are endowed with immense estates; a smaller nobility, *schliahta*, begins to be formed; servitude develops more and more widely among the peasants; the landowners receive the right of patronal judgment of their peasants, and at the beginning of the XVIth century (that is to say, a century before it happens in Moscow-Russia) servitude takes definite forms. To Catholics are conceded all privileges obtained by the Orthodox only after stubborn efforts. Polish innovations meet with resistance from the Lithuanian and Russian national feeling; some of the Lithuanian Grand Dukes (such as Vitoft and his brother Svidrigailo) aspire to defend the independence of Lithuania. Vitoft was to be crowned King, but the crown was sent by the Pope through Poland and... never reached Vilna. The aspirations after independence found support in the class of the Magnates who, having got all their rights after the Polish model, did not wish the smaller no-

bility to gain strength like the Polish *schliahta*. For independence stood up, of course, the whole mass of the peasantry, who relished neither the enforced Catholicism nor the marked class-divisions that led to servitude. Russian influence and self-consciousness were very strong: Russian was still admitted as the official language in the statute of 1566. In this language (and properly in its White Russian idiom) the Lithuanian codex had been drawn up; in it were written the Lithuanian chronologies; into it the Bible was translated (1).

But Polish influence ended by predominating. A series of *seims* in the XVth century ratified the political union of the two countries: both thrones remained in the family of the Jagellons, and from the middle of the XVth century the power of the two Sovereigns was united almost without interruption in one person. The Russo-Lithuanian State gradually transformed itself into the Polo-Lithuanian, and in 1569 the personal

(1) For instance: « The Lithuanian Statute of Casimir-Jagellon », 1492; the « Lithuanian Statute », 1505, revised for the last time in 1588; « The Chronologist », edited by Danilovich; the Bible of Scarina, editions of 1517 and 1585. In the language of these documents there are a good many foreign words, — Church-Slavonic, Polish, even Czech; — and it differed much from the contemporary popular idiom. The White Russian dialect has never had an independent literary significance.

unity of Poland and Lithuania had become a reality. From this time the fate of the greatest part of the White Russian branch was in the hands of the Polish administration.

The duel between Moscow and Lithuania is changed into strife with Poland; the strife has become fiercer; it is no more a question of hegemony, it is a life and death struggle:

« Many a time now our side, now theirs
Bowed down under the storm » (1).

When at the end of the XVIth century, with the death of the last Tsar of the house of Rurik, the hereditary power disappeared and Russia, as in our days, stood on the brink of ruin, the Poles thought that the duel had been crowned for all time by their triumph: things indeed looked as though a Polish King were to sit on the throne of Moscow. But as soon as Moscow had issued from the Time of Troubles (1598-1613) under the first of the Románovs it renewed its strife for the Russian territories subject to Poland, so that a weakened Poland began to cede them to Moscow. Under Peter the Great the political predominance of Russia over Poland is manifest, but the historical problem of the liberation of the fettered Russian lands was not at an end; it was passed on to the XVIIIth century and

(1) POUCHKINE, *To the Calumniators of Russia.*

was solved (not completely, however, — Galicia was wanting) only by means of the third partition of Poland.

It is a prevalent idea in Western Europe that at the time of the threefold division of Poland, Russia encroached on the freedom of a part of the Polish people. It is sufficient to open any historical atlas to be convinced that we then did not obtain one scrap of really Polish land. At the time of the division of Poland Russia: *a*) freed lands that had been her own from ancient times (except Galicia, which was given over to Austria); *b*) in the place of Polish foreign government over non-Russian lands (such as Courland and Lithuania proper) set Russian government. The sin of usurping a part of the Polish land and people was committed by Russia, not at the time of the three-fold division, but in 1815, at the Vienna Congress, where all Europe, France excepted, was accomplice to the crime.

This short and unpretending setting forth of the leading historical facts which determined the fate of White Russia, is quite sufficient to warrant the following general conclusion.

A part of the Russian people, in the century when Russian unity was weak (XIIIth), fell under the yoke of Lithuania; thanks to its superior culture, it here acquired a predominating position and formed one

State with Lithuania, but in so doing did not lose its national self-consciousness. With the growth of Moscow the districts of Lithuania on the confines of Russia, in part on their own initiative, came under the power of the Grand Duke of Moscow. The rivalry of Vilna and Moscow was tending to the triumph of the latter, but here a new factor came on the scene, — the Polish Imperialism, — and the natural march of events, the political unification of the Russian people, was checked. The White Russians found themselves under the power of the Poles: neither prowess in arms, nor emigration, nor commerce had laid the fate of the White Russians in the hands of Poland: *Tu, felix... Polonia, nabe!* It would be difficult to find in history another dynastic match as rich in consequences as that arranged by the Polish Magnates between Hedvig and Jagailo (1). Poland received Lithuania, and with it a part of Russia, so to speak, as a dowry; it was but a question of waiting and then of entering into possession of the dowry. Practically, possession was

(1) The power of Poland in the XVth-XVIIth centuries, the subjection of Little and White Russia, the check to the growth of Muscovite Russia, its remoteness from Europe; the arrested German movement to the East, and the Turkish to Central Europe, — these are the positive and negative factors in the history of Europe that take their rise from the match made in 1386.

taken in the middle of the XVth century, from the time of the personal union, and the formalities were all completed in 1569. Instead of the constitution, at once autocratic and democratic, of the Russian State, the Polish oligarchical form of government, with strongly marked class distinctions, was extended to White Russia. The subjugation of the serfs to foreign landholders, *pani*, set a detrimental stamp on the character of the population, the impress of which they still bear (1). Our interest here is not with the character of the possession, but with the right to possess. It is important for us to mark that the national foundations for the Polish domination of White Russia do not exist. This domination was engendered by Imperialism, was effected in its name, and could not revive otherwise than in its name.

In our days Imperialism is not the fashion, at least so it is said, and to justify their appetite for lands which were always throughly Russian, the Polish chauvinists could find nothing better than the invention of a false ethnographic argument. And now they assure the foreigner that White Russians are no Russians, but « White Ruthenes ». But we have seen that *rutin*

(1) The physical conditions of life in the dense and marshy forests of the Polessie, furnish another reason for the backwardness of their culture.

is nothing else but an alteration of the word *russin*: consequently it is a synonym of the word Russian; we have mentioned that in Latin it was applied to all the parts of Russia: thus the Volga is named (1556) *Volga Rutenica* and John the Terrible — *universorum Ruthenorum Imperator*. More than that, there are Latin documents which name the State of Peter the Great, and even of the Empress Anna (d. 1740), « the government of the Ruthenes ». The same false transcription is met in many other names, but no one would for this reason dream of affirming that the true name of, say, London is *Londres*. Call Germans, Germans, Swabians, Allemands, Tedeschi or Nemtsi: you will not by so doing divide them into five peoples; they remain what they actually are, one people, whose only true and real name is *Deutsche*. Invent for us such names as Ukrainians or Ruthenes; we will still remain what we are, — Russians.

I sincerely wish our brethren of Poland a happy national existence, *but within their national limits*. For me, Warsaw, even when under Russia, was always a Polish town; but I cannot use two measures, and Minsk or Polotsk, though encircled by a Polish frontier, will always remain for me Russian towns. We committed a crime against you at the Vienna Congress when we took under tutelage a part of your peo-

ple, but there were for us attenuating circumstances. You were one of the twelve peoples who had just invaded the heart of Russia; but the Russian Emperor gave you at Vienna a wide autonomy and a most liberal constitution for those times. We were enemies then, but now you infringe on the integrity of the people who, through the manifesto of the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaiovich, first proclaimed your unity and your freedom, and, by the declaration of the provisional Government, your independence.

You profit by the hour of our unspeakable torment to dismember a people who but now for a whole year dyed your soil with its blood, disputing every inch of ground against your implacable, traditional enemy. A hundred years ago the fate of a State was decided by a King and a dozen of nobles; now the whole of democracy must bear the responsibility for false steps. At that time it was considered that the diplomatic shears were free to cut out from the inarticulate mass of the people such designs as pleased them, and that the people were not supposed to experience any pain from the operation. But now the whole world loudly proclaims the rights of nations as an immovable principle. Your crime is heavier than ours, you commit it fully conscious of what you are doing: beware lest it be the millstone which will sink you into the depths.

...

We might compare the growth of Russia to that of a tree. Its seedlings are those Slavonic tribes who came over to our plain in the pre-Rurik period. These seedlings were homogeneous and naturally combined to form one solid trunk, in which each separate element was harmoniously blended. And so the tree grew in sun and shine during four or five centuries until, in the XIIIth century, a hurricane passed over it, cleaving the trunk into three parts. It went hardly then for the tree: the vigour of former days decayed: the divided parts struggled to maintain their separate existence, while still cohering in the common root. The larger of these, favoured by the freer space around it, soon began to flourish, covering with its shade the other two sisters. The second, exhausted by 300 years of suffering, drew towards the stronger sister and was upheld by her. The third supported a constrained existence until at length embraced by the foliage of the other two. And so these divided ones, in their further growth, came to form again one harmonious whole, in which the old lines of cleavage sank from view.

In our own days the tree has been stricken with disease and half strangled by parasites, fell growths which attack without mercy every tree of the grove. There followed a second hurricane of greater violence

than the first, pitilessly buffeting the giant, who writhed and groaned in agony. Our enemies saw what had happened; some of our friends also; jealous and greedy hands were stretched forth to cleave the stem still more deeply than before. To all such we say: Stay your hands! The giant's roots run deep and strong: your labour will be vain.

The reader of this chapter will note how our metaphor accurately corresponds with the historical facts and the dates which sum up the ethnographic growth of our three-one people.

We must now pass on to consider the territorial ambitions of the Ukrainophiles.

CHAPTER IV

TO WHOM DO THE STEPPES OF THE BLACK SEA BELONG?

Russia and Asia.

The Russia of the period of Kiev had, on the East and South, a threatening enemy, the Steppe, — the scene for ages of the incursions of the Asiatic marauders.

From an immemorial antiquity Asia sent forth from its depths savage races of nomads; they flowed out through the great portals between the Caspian Sea and the Urals, concentrated round some spot on the lower Volga and, suddenly, like a cloud of locusts, hurled themselves towards the West, across the steppes of the Black Sea, the lower Don, the Dnieper and the Dniester crossing the Carpathians and the Danube, destroying and renewing the venerable heritage of the Roman world. Thus in the Vth century the invasion of the Huns broke forth, mowing down in the basin of the Dnieper the Ostrogoth State of Ermanric; thus there followed on them the flood of the Bulgarians, a

part of whom remained on the middle Volga; thus followed, a hundred years after the Huns, the wave of the Avars, swallowing up the eastern outposts of the Slav races of the valley of the Dnieper and molesting other peoples of the same blood in the Carpathian retreats where they had nested for centuries. Then there commenced, in the VIth century, an active dispersion of the Slav races of the Carpathians towards the South, the East and the North. The epoch which saw the birth of the Russian land, was an epoch of comparative calm on the Steppe: there were no tempests, but the waves of a ground swell followed on one another without intermission: Chosári (IXth and Xth centuries); Pecenéghi (Xth and XIth centuries); Pólovtzy (XIth, XIIth and XIIIth centuries); — for three hundred years without rest these races tormented the Russia of Kiev, hindering it from extending east of the lower Dnieper and from descending to the Black Sea.

The young Russia, an advanced post of the Christian culture of Europe, performed then for this latter a great service: by conquering, holding back, assimilating the nomad races, Russia protected the left wing of Europe during the Crusades. The West then knew nothing of, to-day it does not recall, this service; but it cost Russia, especially the South of the country, very dear, condemned as she was to meet the principal

shocks of the waves of assailants, once and again renewed.

Other causes besides led to the weakening of Russia in the XIIIth century, causes related to the internal condition of the country, — fratricidal struggles between the Rurik of which we have already spoken, and defects in the social organisation which lie outside of our subject. The organism of the young State could not resist the double assault of external enemies and internal forces of dissolution; the people began to abandon a roof that was no longer secure, and there began (at the end of the XIIth century) the depopulation of the Russia of Kiev; there began the moving of the State centre of gravity towards the North, in the forests, far away from the dangerous steppe, at a point where the Principality of Moscow was created. And when, in the XIIIth century, the greatest wave of invasion came from the steppe, that of the Tartars (1229-1240), the South was broken and overthrown; Kiev, after a brave defence, was taken and burned. In 1246 the Franciscan Plano Carpini travelled towards the Volga to preach the word of Christ to the Tartars; on the road from Vladimir of Volynia towards Kiev, and beyond it, he encountered none of the Russian people, but saw instead the fields sown with innumerable bones and human skulls.

That was the tragic hour of Russian history. Life

was quenched on the Dnieper; but life-seed, carried to a place relatively secure in the north-east, gradually sprouted: at the cost of painful and unflinching effort Moscow raised her head.

The reader will observe how opposed these facts are to the opinion commonly entertained about Russia in the West, where she is considered an Asiatic force threatening Europe. Not a threat for Europe, but instead a bulwark against Asia, — this has been the lot of Russia throughout all her history (1). But what now interests us is another consequence of these premises; I mean, the tracing of the eastern and southern frontier of Russia, or rather her eastern front, at the time of the Tartar invasion.

Having abandoned the Carpathians in the VIth century, and established themselves in the IXth century on the great line of river communication (Nóvgorod-Kiev), the Slav races forming the Russian people

(1) Not long ago Prince Maximilian of Baden, in a speech, repeated the usual German assertion, that Germany is the shield against Asia, that is Russia. During the whole course of her history Russia has entered the territory of Germany thrice: in the seven years war, when she fought alongside of Austria and France; in 1813, when at the head of Prussia and Austria, she freed Europe from the Napoleonic lordship; and in the present war. In which of these three cases did Russia play the part of an Asiatic power?

did not renounce their aspirations of advancing towards the East; but these aspirations met various resistance in various tracts of the front: in the North their movement was only impeded by nature; here the Russians advanced far towards the East, beyond Viatka; in central Russia, in the middle Volga, their path was obstructed by the Bulgarian State (the future Kingdom of Kasan); here, before the Tartar invasion, Russia only reached the estuary of the Oká, where she strengthened herself by building the city of Nízhi-Nóvgorod (1221); lastly, on the South the Asiatic forces got the upper hand, and Russia maintained herself with difficulty on the Dnieper. In relation with all this, the frontier commenced north-east of Viatka, went towards Nízhi-Nóvgorod, comprised the Principality of Ryazán, the territory of Orel, the Principality of Kursk, and along the valley of the Sulá approached the Dnieper; opposite the Kievian tract of the Dnieper, it was distant only 100-200 kilometres from the great river; on the river Ross (which falls into the Dnieper 150 kilometres south of Kiev), the frontier cut the Dnieper and advanced in a right angle on the Ross, towards the south of Bucóvina (1).

(1) The Russian of the Kiev period navigated freely on the lower Dnieper, imported merchandise and voyaged along the Byzantine coast, but both banks of the river were in Asiatic

Such a tracing of the frontier proves that the space occupied by the future European Russia was in ancient times subdivided, not in the direction of the parallel (as the Germans and the Bolsheviks of Brest-Litovsk have subdivided it), but in the direction from north-east to south-west: the north-western part is Russia (Europe), the south-eastern part is the steppe (Asia). The endless strife between these two parts forms one of the fundamental bases of Russian history. The process, lasting for a thousand years, of the moving of the south-eastern frontier, ceased only in the period of the Empire with the taking of Azóv, in 1736, and with the occupation of the littoral of the Black Sea, under Catherine II, in the closing years of the XVIIIth century.

If now we cast a glance on the map of the German Ukraine, we shall see that all, or nearly all, the extent of the old Asiatic steppe, situated west of the Don and up to the Rumanian frontier, is included by the pro-

hands. The Russia of Kiev (like that of Moscow) never possessed the shores of the Black Sea. The only exception was the Byzantine colony of Cherson-Tauris (near Sevastópol) which belonged to Vladímír the Saint for only one year (987), and the Principality of Tmutorokan, as to which information is lacking from the end of the XIth century. Probably this Russian colony on the Sea of Azóv was destroyed by an Asiatic invasion.

moters of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk in the limits of the Ukraine. Involuntarily the supposition arises that this steppe, in later times than those we have passed in review, was snatched from the Tartars by the Ukraine Cossacks, thereafter peopled only by Little Russians, and that the centre where the idea ripened of driving Russia forward to the shores of the Black Sea and getting established there, was Kiev. This supposition is completely erroneous.

Only the north-western part of this extended tract, stretching along the left bank of the Dnieper (that is: the Governorship of Poltava, the adjacent parts of that of Khárkov, and the south-western part of that of Kursk) was assimilated, if one may say so, by the expansion of Kiev; this sector formed in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries « the Ukraine of the Left Bank » (of the Dnieper). The remainder of the territory was annexed to Russia by the work of Moscow and Petersburg (1).

(1) Let us draw the reader's attention also to the western frontier of Russia. In the north part of it runs, on the sketch-map, a dotted line which comprises on the west Yuryev and Grodno; it represents the Russian frontier about 1100. Yuryev was founded by Yarosláv I, Grand Duke of Kiev, in 1030, in land inhabited by Esthonian Finns; in 1224 it was taken by the Germans of the Teutonic order, and re-baptized Dorpat. Grodno was founded (probably in the XIth century) by the Russians among Lithuanian populations; from 1270 it belon-

*The Conquest of the Steppe.
The action of Moscow.*

In 1239-41 the Tartars under Baty sacked and burnt the lands of Súzdal and Western Russia, penetrated into Lithuania, destroyed Gródno, passed with fire and sword from one point to another of the martyred Southern Russia, invaded Poland, Silésia, Moravia and Hungary, spreading destruction everywhere, and devastated Transylvania. But fate spared Western Europe; in the distant Mongolia the supreme Khan died, and Baty suddenly turned back, when in the steppe of the Volga. In the steppes were formed in course of time the Mongol States of the Horde of Nógay, west of the lower Dnieper, of the Dorat Horde etc., in the basins of the Don and the Volga.

Helpless, broken, headless, Russia lay exhausted at the feet of the victor. Nature had not furnished her

ged to Lithuania. The space comprised between the dotted line and the frontier from the middle of the XIIIth century, indicates the pressure brought on Russia by the Teutonic-Livonian order and by the expansion of the Lithuanian State in that period.

In the southern part the cities of Leopoli (founded in 1241 by the Prince-King Danilo of Galicia) and Cholm (founded before the XIth century), are indicated by a black disk: they were founded by Russians amidst Russian lands and peoples, — a fact that does not please some Polish friends of mine, *sed magis amicus veritas.*

with mountains or rivers to serve as bulwarks on her southern frontier, and there were not even stones with which to build fortresses. The XIIIth and XIVth centuries were centuries of sadness, of physical and moral decline. But in the depths of the soul of the people pulsed the throbs of a new life, and at last the longed-for day dawned.

On September 8th, 1380,* the coalition of the Russian Princes, captained by the Grand Duke of Moscow, defeated on the field of Kulikovo (in the territory of the present Governorship of Tula) the serried ranks of the Tartar Khan, Mamai. The battle of Kulikovo marks the descending phase in the history of the Mongol yoke. This victory was the work of Northern Russia, which knew, a century and a half after the Tartar invasion, how to strengthen itself and gather its forces around the young Moscow. The South of Russia did not take part in this struggle, nor could it; it lay under the strange yoke of the Tartars (1), of Li-

(1) The Tartars, in 1239 and 1240, laid waste all Southern Russia: Pereyasláv, Chernígov, Kiev, Cholm, Galich, were burned. A century and a half later Kiev was not in a condition to restore its fortunes, and simply vegetated; it is even doubtful whether it had Princes; in 1363 it became the easy prey of Lithuania. The Principality of Pereyasláv (between the Dnieper and the Sulá), the south of the Principalities of Chernígov and of Kursk, were sacked and remained under the yoke of the Tartars.

thuania (1) and of Poland (2). Exactly a century afterwards, in 1480, the Grand Duke of Moscow, in presence of the ambassadors of the Khan of Tartary tears up his message: in this manner the Tartar yoke is officially declared to be broken. In 1552 Ivan the Terrible takes Kasan, in 1554 Astrakan: the two principal Mongol Powers are destroyed and the entire Volga belongs to Moscow. As far as appears, the flowing in of Asiatic forces from the East ceased from the XVth century; but Asia found a new path, and now advan-

(1) After the invasion of the Tartars, as though to take the place of the broken Russia, Lithuania began to raise its head. We have mentioned before its rapid growth in the XIIIth and XIVth centuries at the cost of the Russian territory; in 1363 the Lithuanian Grand Duke Olgerod possessed already Kiev. In 1380 his son and heir Tagáilo hastened to the aid of Mamia, but arrived late.

(2) At the time of the battle of Kulikovo the extreme south-western Russian salient was already in the hands of Poland. The united Principality of Galicia and Volynia soon recovered from the Tartar invasion of 1240, and had a period of prosperity under the rule of the Prince-King Danilo (1249-64); but in the following hundred years it fell into decay; the extinction of the Galician branch of the Rurik, the struggle between the Princes and the Boyars, and the pressure of neighbouring Powers such as Hungary, Lithuania and Poland, put an end to its autonomy. Poland possessed herself of Galicia (1349) and of the western part of Volynia, that is the country of Cholm (1366); Lithuania became mistress of the rest of Volynia (1340); this division of territory was finally arranged in 1387.

ced by the South, by Constantinople. The Turks conquer the ancient Greek and Genoese colonies bordering on the Black Sea and the Sea of Azóv, and in 1475 the Crimea. Little by little the south of the steppe of the Black Sea becomes part of the Ottoman Empire; the Steppe of the Sea of Azóv remains in the hands of the Tartars of the Crimea, but these become the vanguard of Turkey. The Crimea is a nest of brigands: throughout the entire XVIth century, their cavalry, to whom as they pass along the nomads of all the steppe join themselves, year by year overflows into the neighbouring Russian territory, sacks and burns villages, attacks the peaceful inhabitants scattered over the fields at their work, carries off women and children; Caffa (the present Theodosia) becomes a market of Russian, Polish and Lithuanian women slaves, sold in the ports of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

The annual conflicts between Moscow and the Crimea sometimes assume the importance of very wars; thus, in 1556 a Moscow detachment descended the Dnieper, defeated at its mouth the Turco-Tartars and took the Turkish fort Otchakov. Let us notice that this detachment built its ships on the river Psiol, that is to say in the centre of the Ukraine of the left bank. In 1559 the Moscow forces in this same way passed to the open sea, invaded for the first time the Crimea and devastated it. In 1571-72 the Khan of the Crimea, with

a strength of 120,000 men, fell suddenly on Moscow twice. But the important thing for us is, to follow the gradual expansion of the Muscovite frontier towards the South.

For the protection of its southern frontiers, the State of Moscow created certain lines of defence. Towards 1500 the principal line of the system ran along the lower course of the Oká as far as Ryazán, turned at Túla and ended near the upper course of the Oká, where the territory of Lithuania already commenced; in the zone nearest Moscow this line was distant only 150 kilometres from that city: so limited were the horizons of the young State, still in process of formation. But about sixty years afterwards, during the reign of Ivan the Terrible, a second line is created, 150 kilometres more to the south of the first; it passes by Orel. Finally, at the end of the XVIth century, a third line is established, much farther south; it is formed by a group of fortified cities (1), the most southern of which

(1) Here are the chief of these towns, going from west to east: Krómy (upper Oká), Lívny (founded 1586) and Yelétz; more to the south: Kursk (rebuilt in 1586), Oskól and Vorónez (founded 1586); still more to the south: Bélgorod (founded 1593) and Valújki (founded 1593). To this epoch of intense organisation should probably be ascribed also the fortifications of Zarízín, on the lower Volga, which begins to be spoken of from 1589.

(Bélgorod and Valújki) are situated on the borders south of the present Governorships of Kursk and Vorónez, in such manner that towards 1600 the defensive line of Moscow runs almost adjacent to the territories where Tartar nomads wander (1). These cities were populated by those compelled to leave the Muscovite cities; so, for example, Kursk was peopled by those driven out from Orel. This raising of new cities and the fortification of those already existing, continued in the XVIIth century; in the middle of that century, at a time still prior to its union with Little Russia (1654), Moscow already possessed Khárkov and other inhabited centres more to the South (2).

The maximum of penetration of the power of Moscow towards the South was realized along the Don. Here the Cossacks, in 1637, seized Azov from the

(1) We indicate here the fundamental lines of the system; before each of these ran the lines of barricades, formed of trees, ditches and rudimentary *blockhaus*, and about 100-200 kilometres more in advance, the mobile defence was moved forward. In this manner the power of Moscow advanced sensibly more in the south of the localities where her defensive line passed.

(2) Thus Válki, near Khárkov, is remembered as a Muscovite city in 1642; Kupiánsk (70 kilometres south of Valújki) is named in the same sense in the middle of the XVIIth century. Izium (on the Donéts, 110 kilometres south-east of Khárkov) where already in the XVIth century there was a Muscovite outpost, became a fortress in 1681.

Turks. The Cossacks of the Don kept always a certain connection with Moscow; conscious of not being strong enough to preserve the fruit of their victory over the powerful Turkey, the Cossacks called the Tsar of Moscow to assume the protection of the conquered city; the Tsar Michael (the first Tsar of the Románov family) convened *ad hoc* in 1642 the *Zémski sobor* (national assembly): despite the assembly's opinion in favour of annexation, the Tsar did not wish to risk a war with Turkey; the Cossacks, offended, left the city. It was Peter the Great who retook it in 1696 with the help of a flotilla created by him for that purpose, and it was only in 1736 that Azóv, retaken once again, passed for ever under the Russian dominion.

On the sketch-map No. 2 here incerted, let the reader mark on the Seim a point about 150 kilometres below Kursk; from that let him trace a curve which, moving round Khárkov, passes 50 kilometres west of it; let him then move forward the same line towards the south-east, in the direction of the carboniferous basin of the Donéts, and let him prolong it to the east, towards the Don; finally let him descend the course of the river. All that which remains north-east of the line traced as far as the Volga, represents the platform conquered from the steppe by Moscow, represents the gains which Muscovite Russia left as a legacy to the Russian Empire (1721).

Thus not even Moscow had sufficient strength to conquer the coasts of the Black Sea, and this can be explained: contemporaneously with her incessant struggle with the Asiatic steppe, she was at war on her European front with very powerful neighbours, — Sweden and Livonia, — for the eastern shores of the Baltic; with Lithuania and Poland for the liberation of Western Russia. In 103 years, between 1492 and 1595, she had three wars with Sweden and seven with Lithuania and Poland together with Livonia; these wars occupied not less than 50 years: when accounts were made up in the West she rested one year to re-commence fighting the following year (1).

To hold out in this struggle for existence, an exceptional straining of all the forces of the country was needed, and the complete submission of every interest and individual right to the omnipotence of the State; there necessarily arose the heavy régime — but for that time a veritable element of salvation, — of Muscovite autocracy. It would be difficult to find another State like that of Moscow, which has grown at the price of more serious and age-long international conflicts.

Let us now see what Western Russia did to penetrate the Tartar steppe.

(1) KLYUCHÉVSKY, « Course of Russian History », II, p. 268.

The action of the Ukraine of the Left Bank.

« Kiev, rising from the Tartar devastation finds herself to be a little border town in the steppe of a strange State » (1) (Lithuania). The Principality of Pereyasláv, which covered it from the steppe on the east, had disappeared (2); the southern part of the Principality of Chernígov was also desert. The names of ancient cities, situated between the Dnieper and the Sulá, disappear from the pages of the chronicles for whole centuries, and the spot where the ancient Kursk once stood is populated by forests at the end of the XIIIth century.

The authority of Lithuania was supported with ease in Western and Southern Russia. The Lithuanian State, from its origin (in the XIIIth century), underwent the influence of Russian politics and culture; the Russian language was the official language up to 1575; in the subject Russian Principalities the Lithuanian authorities respected the habitudes of Russian life; that life, in its customs, continued in the territory of Kiev to be Russian, — but the voice of the Government came from Vilna.

Under the shield of the Lithuanian State and in the shadow of the successes of Moscow in the strug-

(1) KLYUCHÉVSKY, *Ib.*, I, p. 417.

(2) The city of Pereyasláv is indicated on the sketch-map with the first syllable.

gle with the steppe, the Russian people, returns from the other bank of the Dnieper, and repoples slowly the lands abandoned in the years of sorrow, between the Dnieper, the Vórskla, and the Seim (1). In

(1) It is just this triangle, comprised between the Dnieper, the Seim and the Vórskla, which forms the effective territory of the Ukraine of the left bank, of the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. On the right bank the name of Ukraine is applied with justice only to the lands of the ancient Principality of Kiev and to a strip of land adjacent to it on the South (cities of Brazláv and Zvenígorod); on the contrary, already towards the west commenced Volynia and Podolia. If one consults the map or the Italian « Encyclopedia Vallardi », inserted in the article « Russia », it will be found that of the name « Ucraina » only the letter « U » is placed on the right bank (a little to the north-west of Kiev), while all the other six letters pass along the left bank, and the last, « A », is situated a little to the north-east of the city of Poltava. One will find the same disposition of this inscription in every serious contemporary atlas, and it is perfectly right, for the region to which the name of Ukraine was given in the XVIth and XVIIth centuries (at a period when an Ukrainian state was supposed to exist) comprised exactly the same territories. There exists, it is true, a map of the year 1650, on which the borders of the Ukraine reach much further south (see the rectangle dotted on the sketch of Appendix V) as far as those of the Ottoman Empire, which was then in possession of the Black Sea coasts. But this map is evidently the result of Bogdan Chmelnit-sky's victories in 1648, when the Ukraine attained its maximum of independence and really acquired the semblance of a state. This did not last long, — only six years, till 1654. On this same map of 1650 we see that the entire southern portion of the territory was a desert: it was not really a part of the

the year 1430 mention is already made for the first time of the city of Poltáva; but the Tartars of the Crimea are still strong, and in 1482 their Khan, Mengli Ghirey, destroys all the Ukraine of the left bank; only at the beginning of the XVth century their incursions become less frequent and the life of the country more secure; the fugitives return from the North, where the depredations of Ghirey have hunted them, while from the steppes there meets them the emigration of the Turans, disposed to change their nomad habits for those of settlers; from the Dniester come the Valaks. Notwithstanding this, the re-population proceeded, in the period of the Lithuanian dominion, with such slowness that the most southern of the Lithuanian defensive lines cut the Dnieper near Cercássy, north of the mouth of the Sulá, and did not even defend the valley of this river (1). To sum up the mat-

Ukraine, but what we should call in these days its sphere of influence.

The application of the name «Ucraina» to all the other lands, including Galicia on the east and the ancient Principality of Pinsk on the north, as M. Hruszévski does, is neither more nor less than a retrospective megalomania.

(1) This line (the third in order of time) started from Vínitza on the upper Bug, crossed Biélaia Zérkov and Chercássy, and turned to the north. The second Lithuanian line passed by Gitómir, Kiév and Ostiór (on the lower Dessná); the first line was situated in the Poléssie (in the valley of the Pripet) and comprised the castles of Ovruc, Mozyr and Liúbec.

ter, one can calculate that in the middle of the XVIIth century, the Russia of Kiev, the *ukraine* of the Lithuanian State, re-occupied on the east the same confines which the autonomous Russia of Kiev occupied in its prosperous epoch under the rule of Yarosláv the Wise (1019-1054). The Ukraine made no further territorial gains; the Little Russians, betaking themselves further towards the east, entered Muscovite territory not as conquerors, but instead as fugitives, placing themselves in safety from the Polish domination under the protecting wing of the Muscovite eagle (1).

The advance of the population in the steppe and the attacks of the Tartars of the Crimea, occasioned (for defensive ends) in the XVth century, the formation of the Little Russian (Ucrainian) Cossacks. From the XVIth century they themselves began to attack the Tartars; but this struggle had not time to bear fruit in territorial gains beyond the valley of the Vórskla: from the second part of the XVIIth century the principal attention of the Cossacks is entirely attracted elsewhere.

We have seen that, since 1569, after the complete fusion of Poland and Lithuania, or more correctly

(1) So, the first inhabitants of the future Khárkov were the Little Russians of the other bank of the Dnieper.

speaking, after the absorption of the Lithuanian State by the Polish, Poland became the inheritor of all the Lithuanic lands. The territory of Kiev did not escape this common lot; from that year up to 1654, that is for 85 years, the Ukraine of the left bank remains under the domination of Poland.

The peopling of the Ukraine, after 1569, assumes the character of a regular colonisation; enormous stretches of land are donated to Polish magnates who plant on it those who had been driven out from the more western regions of ancient Russia. At first the colonisation goes on within the limits of the Ukraine of the Right bank, and passes to that of the Left bank only at the end of the XVIth century; the interior of the steppe is never reached. The King Stephen Batory founds the city of Baturin (1575), situated more to the west of the line of the Sulá; in the XVIIth century the family of the Polish Princes Wiesnowiecki, to whom belonged almost the entire province of the Poltava province of to-day, are still occupied in the colonisation of the valley of the Sulá. The Polish Government is preoccupied, not by the fact that the colonisation penetrates the depth of the steppe, but instead with restraining the infiltration of the exiles within the bounds of the steppe. Meantime the work of peopling the country is complicated by the struggle against the Crimea; the incursions of the Cossacks

provoke, not only raids on the part of the Tartars, but the threats of the Sublime Porte; for every caprice of the Ukraine Cossacks the King of Poland answers. Hence the constant efforts of the Government to reduce the number of the Cossacks.

The influence of Poland, and her consequent domination, was not a thing that could be easily borne. The application of the class principle, the distribution of the land among the Polish nobility, the introduction of agrarian slavery, the limitation of the number of the Cossacks and the subjection of all those who exceeded the prescribed number to the slavery aforesaid, provoke the hostility of the Cossacks. From the end of the XVIIth century the series of insurrection begins. The strained relations are complicated by the religious divergence. The mixing up of the national principle with the religious principle, — that sad running sore in the *psyche* of Russia and in that of every Slav State, — had struck deep even in catholic Poland: for her, to spread Catholicism meant to Polishize, while he is no authentic Pole who is not a Catholic and a Latinist as well. The chance coincidence of national, class, and religious rivalries, gives extreme violence to the struggle; it is prolonged, obstinately and pitilessly, for almost a century; on the part of Poland (to use the language of our own day), — imperialism; on the part of the Cossacks, — the struggle

for democratic liberties; on both sides victories and defeats, implacability and cruelty. Every now and then successful military action by the Cossacks, hurling themselves on the Ukraine of the right bank, — but without any effect for the autonomy of the country. At last when, under the Hataman Bogdan Chmielnicki, the Cossack insurrection assumes the proportions of a general popular movement, which in 1648 spread to all the population of Little Russia, the success, despite a series of initial victories, does not lead to the desired results. Succour for the brothers oppressed comes from the State of Moscow, and in 1654 the Ukraine of the left bank voluntarily recognises the sovereignty of the Tsar, thus finally liberating itself from a foreign domination which had lasted three hundred years.

With such an armful of conflicts for the gaining of their liberty, the Ukraine Cossacks, who often had recourse also to the aid of the Tartars of the Crimea, could not have territorial aims in the steppe.

The Action of the Ukraine of the Right Bank.

Let us now pass to the right bank of the Dnieper. We can be brief: it is not incumbent on us to speak of every expansion of the Little Russians towards the South. The Ukraine of the Right bank is simply a Polish province, and to follow the modifications of its

frontiers would mean to follow the traces of the territorial expansion or diminution of Poland according to the successes or reverses of the Polish arms. From the XVth to the XVIIth centuries Poland divides with Russia the honour of defending Europe from Asia. Bucovina, Moldavia, Podolia, Volynia, and in part the Ukraine, are the constant theatre of the Turco-Polish wars. We do not seek to take our bearings in this labyrinth of wars and peace-treaties; it would be impossible to do so shortly, still less in so slight a sketch as this. Victory brings the Polish armies near the Black Sea (for example, towards Akkerman in 1497) while the Turks reach Cracow (1498), Sandomir and Leopoli (1672). But the littoral of the steppe on the Black Sea is always in the hands of Turkey. From the end of the XVth century she already possesses Moldavia (including the present Bessarabia), so that the whole western steppe remains firmly in Asiatic hands (1).

Under the protection of the Lithuanian and Polish States, the frontiers of the Ukraine are prolonged south of the river Ross for about 150 kilometres on the Bug, and for 50 kilometres on the Dnieper (2).

(1) The city of Khotin, situated in the extreme north of Bessarabia, is a Turkish fortress in the XVth and XVIIth centuries, with a permanent Turkish garrison.

(2) This appendix of territory formed the Governorship of Bruzlav; the non-official name of «Ucraina» was also applied to it.

The Ukraine of the Right bank, as we have already seen, shared in the insurrection of the Cossacks of the Left bank, but without definite result. Moscow also showed herself powerless to free the whole of Little Russia; on the Right bank, only Kiev, with a small *hinterland*, was reunited to Moscow (1667). The rest of the Ukraine remained in the hands of Poland; its changeful lot depended on the development of the war between Turkey, Poland and Muscovy. In 1665 Doroszenko, Hataman of the Cossacks of the Right Bank, surrendered to Turkey; in 1667 he submitted once more to Poland; in 1672, by virtue of a treaty of peace, Poland ceded the Ukraine of the Right bank, together with Podolia, to the dominion of Turkey. Doroszenko becomes a vassal of the Sultan; in 1675 John Sobieski conquers the Ukraine and Podolia anew; by the peace of 1676 a third of the Ukraine remains to the Cossacks under the Ottoman sovereignty, and the rest returns to Poland. A ray of hope comes from the East: Moscow does not forget the Ukraine, and by the treaty of peace of 1681 between Moscow and Turkey, the Ukraine of the Right bank is recognised as belonging to no one, that is as almost independent; but two years afterwards Poland retakes it and holds it for more than 100 years. Only the second partition of Poland frees these Russian territories definitely from the yoke of a stranger

The Zaparog Cossacks (1).

We have followed the fortunes of the northern frontier of the steppe about the middle of the XVIIIth century, that is, till the time of the union of Little Russia with Muscovy. The frontier commenced on the Dniester, about 200 kilometres from the sea, cut the Bug at the same distance from its mouth, and leaned on the Dnieper north of the mouth of the Vórskla; on the left bank of the Dnieper it described a curve towards the north, to redescend to the south of Khárkov, whence it proceeded towards the lower Don. Ethnographically this was the frontier of the Russian people; politically, the western half represented the frontier of the Kingdom of Poland, and the eastern half that of Muscovy.

Parallel to this line, about 100 to 200 kilometres further south, from the Bug to the Don, ran the frontier of the Asiatic States; from the lower Bug to the lower Dnieper that of the Ottoman Empire; from the Dnieper to the lower Don, the frontier of the Khan of the Crimea (2).

(1) Literally: beyond (za) the cataract (poróg).

(2) On the territory between the Dniester and the Bug the Polish and Turkish frontiers marched together. Evidently our indications of the frontiers are extremely sketchy; but they are sufficient to give one an idea.

Between these two parallel frontiers there remained a vast zone of steppe, almost desert, as a *res nullius*; here roamed the insignificant remains of the Turanian peoples, at one time so threatening and so dangerous to Russia. They were unable to decide on union with this or that one of the neighbouring States, and preferred to roam on the half desert steppe. On the west this steppe, by means of the Bug, bordered on the Ottoman Empire; on the east with the lands of the Don.

That part of the lower Dnieper, where the river, under Ekaterinosláv, turns abruptly to the south and continues in that direction for 100 kilometres, marks exactly the centre of this space that had no owner. In this tract the river forms some cataracts, and lower down, where it resumes its south-westerly course, some islands, at that time covered with forests, are scattered among the reeds. A magnificent post for observing the steppe, to be beforehand with the assaults of the Tartars, where at the end of the XVth century the Little Russian Cossacks had an outpost. Hunting, fishing, liberty, absence of all authority, no masters, no laws nor tribunals. Here took refuge those who could not tolerate the burdensome social and economic conditions of the organised life of that period, hither came broken men and those in search of adventures. In the last days of the XVIth century there existed on

the islands a perpetual post of guard, and in summer considerable forces of Cossacks gathered to make incursions in the steppe, in the possessions of the Khan of the Crimea and of Turkey. After the Ukraine passed under the Polish dominion, the number of fugitives increased rapidly, the majority of them being Little Russians. A Cossack community was formed that in nothing recognised the Polish supremacy; it embraced the form of an original republican community, taking shape as a protest against the new order of things, against agrarian slavery and against the measures that limited the free development of the Cossack communities, becoming, at the same time, an instrument of offence against the Turks and the Tartars.

We shall not describe the organisation of this strange republic, full rights in which could be acquired by a young fellow of any nationality whatsoever provided he could recite the orthodox symbol of the faith; our interest lies solely with the part played by the Zaparog Cossacks in the conquest of the steppe.

Equally daring as horsemen and as mariners from the end of the XVIth century they make incursions along the Turkish shore of the Black Sea; they take Ochákov (1585), they hurl themselves on Varna (1605) and defeat the Turkish fleet; in 1613 they take Sinope; in 1616 Trebisond, where they afresh defeat the Ottoman flottilla; in 1607 they press on Ochákov and Pe-

rekop; in 1612 on Caffa (Theodosia). But these are only incursions: they dash forward, pillage, set free the prisoners, set fire to everything and vanish. To establish any permanent lordship over the places raided by them was an impossibility, and the reason is obvious: they were only a handful of braves. In 1594 they numbered altogether 1300 men, and in all the subsequent story of the Zaparog Cossacks their number never exceeded 13,000. Do not let us either exaggerate their moral importance in the struggle with the forces of Asia. With the Tartars of the Crimea they were now friends now enemies, against the Poles.

Always with the aim of avoiding international complications, the Polish Government takes coercive measures (first quarter of the XVIIIth century): to bridle the onset of Zaparog bands, it constructs the fortress of Kodak (1635) on the Dnieper at the part where the cataracts are, in order to divide the Zaparog from the other Ukraine Cossacks, and to prevent them from reaching the Black Sea: Kodak is taken and destroyed the same year. But Poland does not succeed in taming the Zaparog; they are too far distant. Here follows that which followed in the development of the Ukraine Cossacks: with the growth of the Polish power the struggle with the steppe grows less, and all the Cossack forces are turned against Poland. The Zaparog join in all the Ukraine insurrections:

their island becomes the moral centre in this contest. Here, from 1625 to 1650, are organised the insurrections of the Ukraine Cossacks. In 1654 the Zaporog recognise, contemporaneously with the whole of Little Russia, the authority of the Tsar of Moscow. In consequence that part of the steppe (which we have characterized by the words *res nullius*) where the Zaporog by reason of their incursions had almost become the masters, passes under the sceptre of Muscovy. Extended by the victories of the Empire to the shores of the Black sea, it formes in the XVIIIth century the so-called New Russia.

The New Russia.

After passing under the dominion of Moscow, the central part of the steppe still remains without population for about a hundred years. The adjacent states are withheld from colonising their borders by the consideration that their neighbours might adopt the same policy; according to the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1681, the territory between the Bug and the Dnieper was to be left uninhabited for twenty years. Towards the middle of the XVIIIth century some small villages begin to be formed by Little Russian Cossacks and fugitives from other parts of Russia; the fertile virgin soil is turned up for the first time. The Government of Petersburg willingly permits whoever wishes it, to

settle there: there flock the Serbian colonists from Austria, the Bulgars, the Valaks, etc. The foundations are laid of an administrative organisation of the district (1). During the reign of Catherine the Great lands are granted to German colonists; Greeks come; and from the regions of Great Russia there come a large number of *old believers*.

The Government busies itself with the building of cities, which are above all fortresses against the menace from the Turks and the Crimea. At present, in some districts of the New Russia, the percentage of Little Russians among the farming population is very high, but it is not necessary to believe that the cities arose among this population: they sprang up in the half desert places. In 1670 the entire population of the district amounted to 26,000 inhabitants (*sic*); in 1768 to 52,000; in 1778, when Catherine the Great visited the district, there were more than 700,000 (2). The govern-

(1) The Western part, from the Bug to the Dnieper, about 1755 was baptized *New Serbia*; the eastern part, from the Dnieper to the lands of the Don, was called *Slav Serbia*. From 1764 the country was called the governorship of Novorossia, and in proportion as it increased there arose new governorships.

(2) Here are the dates of the founding of some cities. In the interior: Ekaterinosláv and Chersón in 1778, Pavlográl in 1779, Nikoláev in 1784; on the littoral: Odessa in 1794, Sebastópol in 1784, Mariúpol in 1779, Rostóv on the Don in 1761, and the little fortress of S. Anna that stood beside it, in 1731.

ment apportions the land to the officers, soldiers and land-holders; some of the courtiers receive 100,000 acres each; the land-holders transfer « their » peasants from their other estates, that is, from all parts of Russia. The extension of the frontiers to the sea is the result of the victorious Turco-Russian wars in Catherine's reign. In 1799 Russian armies conquer Akkerman (1), in 1784 the Crimea, in 1788 Ochákov; in 1789 that village is occupied where Odessa is founded later on. During Catherine's reign the Black Sea fleet is created, and in 1787 Potemkin, the all-powerful Lieutenant of the South, shows the Empress in the roadstead of Sebastópol 15 large and 20 small ships of war. The confines of Russia continue to be extended at the cost of the Turks also in the following reigns: in 1812 Bessarabia is annexed. All the activity in the South, whether for the construction of the naval dock-yards in Cherson, or for the creation and enlargement of Odessa, or for the digging out of coal in the region of Donéts (from 1849) for the building of railways or of a merchant fleet, is the result of the united work of the whole Russian Empire.

To destroy the Asiatic dominion in the southern steppes, and to extend her own as far as the Black

(1) Passed definitely under the dominion of Russia in 1806.

Sea, was an enterprise that could be brought to a successful completion neither by the united Russia of Kiev of the pre-Tartar period, nor by Muscovy, nor by the Ukraine, — parts broken off from Russia under the pressure of strangers, — nor by Lithuania or Poland. Only the Empire, only the compact entirety of the Russian world showed itself powerful enough to master the southern Russian plain. The revolutionary folly will pass away, and this South will belong once more to its only natural owner, — the united Russian people.

* * *

Here we might close this chapter. But the historic facts which have been expounded so far give us the possibility, — unexpected by ourselves, — of immediately answering the question: *was the Ukraine ever independent?* The Ukrainophile propaganda affirms (and certain Western papers repeat the affirmation) that the Ukraine was an independent State (Cossack State) in the XVIth and XVII centuries.

But we have seen that in these centuries the Ukraine formed part of the Kingdom of Poland. The Polish government disposed of the Ukraine territory, granting some parts to its enemies; it built several cities; it introduced Polish law and order into the country, and into the cities the law of Magdeburg; the number of the Cossacks was limited, — in 1575 to 60,000 men;

in 1627 to 6,000; in 1638 to 1,200 men (!); agrarian slavery was set up and a part of the Cossacks were obliged to submit to it; the liberty of conscience extended to the Little Russians is such that the Metropolitan of Kiev begs the Tsar of Moscow (1625) to bring the Ukraine under his sceptre, and the Polish landowners let their lands to Jews with the right of patronage in the orthodox churches; the Hetman Cossacks are made prisoners and treated as revolutionaries, and as such are beheaded at Warsaw after being sometimes tortured (1). The Ukraine people of that time did not consider themselves free, and for a whole century sacrificed their lives in the vain hope of gaining their freedom. If the Ukrainophile party calls a country so situated an *independent state*, we must suppose that for them the words state, liberty, independence have a different meaning from that given them in English.

It is vain to seek in the history of Russia or of the Ukraine — her southern part — the basis for Ukrainian territorial aspirations or for the creation of an independent Ukraine State. It is better to consult the memoirs of Bismarck: he tells us how after 1848 the German Liberals elaborated a plan for detaching from Russia her southern part. Notice also the map we

(1) Ex: Sulimà and Pavliùk in the XVIIIth century.

found in the knapsacks of the German soldiers in 1914; in it Russia is drawn broken in pieces, Poland small, the Ukraine immense. Look also at any map of the Pan-German proposals, for example that given in the book of the Czech-Slovak minister Benes (1): in it one sees how useful for the ensuring of the grandiose project of the line to Bagdad, is the creation of an Ukraine independent... and grateful.

The invariable German *divide et impera*, — there is hidden the germ of the Ukraine separatism. Do the Allies wish to play Germany's game?

(1) « La Boemia contro l'Austro-Ungheria ». Rome, 1917.

CHAPTER V.

“ALL-RUSSIAN „ CULTURE, NOT UKRAINIAN.

In its effort to convince the world that from times immemorial, from the days of Herodotus himself, there existed an Ukrainian culture, different from the Russian, the Ukrainian propaganda stops at nothing. Once you have a distinct people, you find it necessarily with its own independent culture. Now, during the last year anonymous pamphlets about the Ukraine have been appearing, from which the astonished reader learns that the Cathedral of S. Sophia in Kiev, built in the time of Yarosláv, gave rise to a pretended Ukrainian style of architecture. Lectures have been given abroad about « Ukrainian Art », and the public, slightly acquainted with Russian matters, has listened to, and confidently accepted, the most incredible assurances of the shameless lecturers. Riepin, an eminent contemporary artist, is turned into a prominent representative of the « Ukrainian school of painting », probably because one of his many pictures was based on a *motif*

from the life of the Zaporog Cossacks. The XVIIIth century in Petersburg has been, according to these lecturers, a brilliant epoch in the development of the «Ukrainian School». At that period in the new capital there grew up, under the aegis of the Imperial court as by the waving of a magic wand, a splendid temple of Art. Through our gift of sympathetically assimilating spiritual ideas alien to us, the Gods of Olympus, obedient to our call, came down to the cold shores of the Neva, to glow on the canvasses of the pupils of the Art Academy. There appeared also the solemn heroes of ancient Rome as depicted in the pages of Racine; the grandees of the times of the Empresses were immortalised in their gorgeous attire, with rich draperies for background, while mincing young ladies of the Smolni Institute are seen curtseying with a refined affectation that seems directly imported from the Court of Versailles. But now they would persuade us that the Academy contained men who were representatives of Ukrainian art, and for this one and only reason, — that the parents of some of the boys who were admitted as pupils were of Little Russian origin (1).

We shall not spend our time in refuting these ridi-

(1) See Appendix III.

culous assertions. They clearly prove either complete ignorance of all questions concerning the history of Art or a calculated untruthfulness for political ends. From these impudent assertions of partisans whose zeal outruns their knowledge, let us turn to a subtler and abler defacer of historic truth, M. Hruszévski, whom the Ukrainian party calls « a great historian », but whom we, fully realising our responsibility, call « a forger of Russian History ».

We have his book, « History of the Ukraine », well furnished with illustrations, facsimiles and sketch-maps. Our copy is one of the ninth thousand: we know how the Austrian authorities understood to carry on propaganda on a large scale. I will admit that, at the first blush, the book produces an impression. The Russia of Kiev seems to stand out clearly as a land separate from the rest of pre-Tartar Russia. In turning over the pages one sees memorials of a culture that stands by itself: cathedrals, church-painting, coins, miniatures from the chronicles, extracts from the *by-line* (epic-cycles), — while the author speaks at length of the various periods of Ukrainian culture. As we look nearer, however, the fog begins to clear away. Did you believe that these things were memorials of Ukrainian antiquity, that would only be because you had not deciphered the Greek and Slavonic inscriptions on the coins and seals.

On page 77 of his book, Hruszévski figures certain coins of Vladímir the Saint (d. 1015), and describes them as such. But the strange thing is, that the inscriptions on the coins (1) are, with the exception of one archaic form, in the Russian of to-day, while in Hruszévski's description (2) the same words have changed their form, being written in Little Russian. It is clear, then, that we are here dealing with Russian money. The daughter of Yarosláv the Wise signs her name in France « Ana » (p. 89) according to Russian phonetic spelling; and Hruszévski's text informs us that it is the signature of « Hanna » Yaroslávna. Here is a seal of Theophany, a princess of Kiev of the XIth century, with the inscription princess Ροσιάστη (Russian). A further series of reproductions proves the unity of the South and North-East languages. For instance, the inscription on the bell cast in Lvov in 1341 (p. 143) could as well stand on a Moscow bell of the XVIIth century. Take a magnifying-glass and you will see that the facsimile of a charter concluded between Lubart and Casimir in 1366 (p. 145) is written in the purest Russian. It is utterly incomprehensible why Hruszévski assures us that a facsimile of a document of 1371 about the sale of land (p. 170) is written in the

(1) « Vladimir na stolé a cé égò sérébrò ».

(2) « Sribni moneti... Volodimira z iogo » portretom.

« old Ukrainian idiom », when it is written in the Russian language of that epoch. The facsimiles of the seals (pp. 128 & 146) and coins (p. 147) struck off by the Polish King Casimir the Great, prove that, during the whole of the XIVth century, Galicia was called Russia in Latin. Look through this « History of the Ukraine », and nowhere until the XVIth century can you find a document containing that word with which Hruszévski peppers his pages, — that so-longed-for word « Ukraine », — neither on coin, nor in epic-cycle, nor on wall-painting. And had you been inclined to believe in the Ukrainian origin of the art monuments, because you had neglected to search out from the Chronicles who built this cathedral, or over what country ruled the members of the family so naively depicted in the « codex of Sviatoslav » (1073), keep clearly in mind that in the whole of Nestor's Chronicle (Nestor, whom the Ukrainophiles dare to call « the Ukrainian chronicler ») the name « Ukrainia » and the adjective « Ukrainian » are not to be found (1).

But perhaps you may say: « let us suppose that all these monuments are, not from an Ukrainian, but

(1) In the MS. of the monk Laurence, which contains the chronicle of Nestor and its continuation up to the year 1377, the words *Rouss* and « Russian land » occur 176 times, the adjective « Russian » — hundreds of times; but the words *Ukraine* and *Ukrainians* never.

from a Russian past; still they are monuments of a very original, local, pre-Tartar, Kievian culture ». Here it is that Hruszévski's principal imposture lies. When treating of culture he adopts the same method as he used when making up his genealogical table of the Ruriks, and when writing of the administrative affairs of South Russia. The reader will probably remember what this method was. From the genealogical tree he struck off those branches which stretched out to, and over, the North, and arbitrarily called the rest « the Ukrainian line »; from the general Russian State and national organism he artificially excluded one Southern province, trying to hide from the reader's view the threads which bound it to the rest of Russia, and of his own motion affixing to it the name (then non-existent) of Ukraina. So also when it is the turn of culture, the method does not vary: the cathedral and the frescoes of Kiev are spoken of, while cathedrals in the North and frescoes at Nóvgorod of an identical type are passed over in silence.

Russia, especially ancient Russia, is a country of forests. It follows that its national architecture is of wood. In the far North, in the government of Vólogda, humble, wooden churches are still to be seen, with wood for slates, full of quaint charm. This wooden architecture was co-extensive with the territory of the

Russian race, and the soldier of the Russian army coming to Galicia in 1915 found there churches exactly like those of his Vólogda village (1). In the principedom of Kiev there were likewise wooden churches, but this is known only by one or two hints in the chronicles: the churches have completely disappeared. Our stone architecture is of foreign origin; it came to us from the Greeks with Christianity, and nearly two centuries passed before it took the national imprint. It came, not only to Kiev, but almost simultaneously to Nóvgorod also. St. Sophia in Kiev was finished in 1037, and already in 1045 the foundations of St. Sophia at Nóvgorod were laid. It is clearly unreasonable to consider St. Sophia of Kiev a production of «Ukraine Art», as is done by certain anonymous Ukraine propagandists in their pamphlets. This cathedral owes its inspiration to Greece, not to Russia: all that is Russian about it is the purpose of the Russian Yarosláv to erect it, and the Russian hands that raised the fabric. Owing to their greater distance from Byzantium, or for other reasons, the Nóvgorod builders shook off the yoke of their Greek masters sooner than did those of Kiev. At the end of the XIIth cen-

(1) Is not this an eloquent proof of the unity of the Russian people from the Ural to the Carpathians?

tury a Nóvgorod builder, Miloneg, who had already erected the church of the Ascension there, « was engaged in building the walls of the Vidubitsk monastery in Kiev. Until that time the people of Kiev had only seen Greek workmen, and they marvelled that a Russian builder could be so skilful. And verily (remarks the historian of Russian Art), Nóvgorod, that had once received its art from Kiev, had long since outrun her teacher, and could now have taught her former instructress many things » (1). In the Nóvgorod and Pskov domain deviations from the pure Byzantine models are very soon noticeable, and they « merge into forms so striking and unexpected, that already in the very earliest monuments you feel those local peculiarities, arising from ideals of taste of the people themselves, that afterwards led up to the brilliant art of Nóvgorod and of Pskov » (XIVth and XVth centuries). Not only has the North surpassed Kiev in the pre-Tartar epoch, but the North-East also. « The chief importance belongs to the monuments of the Nóvgorod and Súzdal lands » says Hrabâr. In the second half of the XIIth century, such beautiful monuments of church architectûre arose as the cathedral of the Assumption (Uspenski) in Vladímir, completed

(1) HRABÂR: *History of Russian Art*, 1909; vol. I; p. 171.

in 1161 under Andrew of Súzdal, the cathedral of the nativity of Our Lady in Rostóv, and the church of Pokrov on the Nerli, full of grave charm, — perhaps the most perfect architectural monument of ancient Russia.

There is more majestic simplicity in the severe walls of the church of Nóvgorod, more elegance and finish in the details of the churches of the Súzdal land, but all the ecclesiastical structures here, as in Nóvgorod and in the Russia of Kiev, repeat the same Byzantine style, — a cube and a Greek cross. This Byzantine style came to be adopted throughout the whole of Russia, in Vladímir, Belosersk, Tver, Yúriev-Polski and Moscow.

This similarity of architectural forms, with certain variations in the working out of details, is but natural. All the art was created and developed in connection with the needs of the Church, and the Church was one for the whole of Russia. Faith, authority, clergy, church-language, — all were common. The material conditions of Russian culture were also homogeneous, — forests, bricks, stuffs, climate. The monastery of Kievo-Petchiersk was revered by all Russia. Given all these conditions it is strange to speak of a Kievan Art as though it flowed from a special culture. Ikons, illuminations in chronicles, ear-rings, bracelets, are all of the same type; the language is the same from end to end of the country.

« In the first moments of its existence Russian painting was but a branch of Byzantine art, » says the same Hrabâr. Nowhere was the influence of Byzantine art so exclusive as in the creation of Russian painting. In Italy and in the Mussulman East it met a resistance in the National idea, but in pre-Tartar Russia the National idea was yet too weak; the creative force of the Russian people showed itself in painting much later on, in the XIVth and XVth centuries.

In the frescoes and ikons of the Kiev period there are hardly any national features or peculiarities: church ornamentation, mosaic-styles, — all was Byzantine. How strong Byzantine influence was, is shown by the fact that the « subjects of the frescoes in St. Sophia's cathedral at Kiev are taken exclusively from Byzantine antiquity, and have no reference to the old Russian customs » (1). « The significance of the painting of the pre-Mongolian period », says Hrabâr, « is more important for an historian of Byzantine, rather than of Russian, art: such painting is much more a monument of Byzantine art in Russia than a monument of Russian art » (2). Where does the Ukraine come in?

(1) KONDAKOV: *Frescoes of the Stairs of St. Sophia Cathedral, Kiev*. 1888. These frescoes represent scenes from the Hippodrome at Constantinople.

(2) HRABÂR: Vol. VI, p. 106.

But perhaps this Byzantine art has developed independently in the South of Russia later on? Such has not been the case, and indeed such a thing could not have happened, for with the Tartar program disappeared in the South nearly all the monuments of Byzantine art. Whole cities were reduced to ashes: stone churches were laid in ruins. In this way the Dessiatinnaia church at Kiev was entirely destroyed in 1240. There only remained five churches in Chernigov and the cathedral of St. Sophia at Kiev, though parts of this last were but heaps of stones. St. Sophia remained as a monument of architecture, but the paintings in it were not taken as models; they were not appreciated and, on the restoration of the Cathedral in the first half of the XVIIIth century, the frescoes were covered with whitewash: they were uncovered only in 1848. «No reminiscences of Byzantium (Xth-XIIth centuries) have outlived the historical limit of the Mongolian invasion. The art of the Russia of Kiev seemed a closed circle, an episode that had no direct connection with the following epochs» (1).

Kiev was the centre of Russian art culture for a hundred years, from 1050-1150. After this time the centre of political life passed to the Rostov-Súzdal

(1) HRABĀR: Vol. VI, p. 63.

land, and in the next century Vladímir was the centre of culture which had a predominating influence in Russia. When the East in its turn grew weak owing to Tartar oppression, the centre of Russian culture moved (from 1300) to Nóvgorod, which was sheltered from the Tartars by distance, marshes and forests. « Having led during two centuries one life with Kiev, it continued to live in the same way after the devastation of Kiev » (1). It became, as Klyuchévsky points out, the custodian of many traditions of the culture of Kievian Russia.

Such are the fundamental notions of Architecture and Painting in ancient Russia. The exposition of these, together with the quotations from the well-known historian of Russian art, proves eloquently, that in the pre-Tartar period there was not any independent art in South Russia: they underline once more the sameness of life in the North and the South: they serve moreover as indirect confirmation of the depopulation and decline of Kievian Russia in the following period of its political decay. Nóvgorod, taking as foundation the same brilliant period of Byzantine art (Xth-XIIIth centuries), has raised a finer structure, in architecture and in painting, than Kiev

(1) HRABÂR: VI, p. 156.

ever did; while later on, having imbibed the new Byzantine principles of the Paleologue century (XIVth), she produced a wonderful school of ikon painting. Moscow also showed more of the national spirit in the creations of art, founded on the same Byzantine basis, in the XIVth and XVth centuries. If the South lagged behind the North in the Art domain, that certainly did not arise from the feebler capacity of its people, but from the unfortunate political conditions that prevailed there. Artistic creation flourishes under national protection: it withers under a foreign domination. All Ukrainian art from the end of the XVIth century has been under Polish influence.

« South Russia », says Hrabâr, « was entirely in Poland's power. The stream of art impulse, taking its rise in Western Europe, flowed in broad current through Poland, where advantage was taken of its fertilising passage. These Western influences were in Poland worked out into new forms and thence passed into South Russia ».

The universal Baroque style invaded the whole of Poland and Lithuania, and from there penetrated into Russia, but here (in Moscow as well as in the Ukraine) it took a local character, especially marked in Moscow. A glance at an illustration of a stone church in Little Russia of that epoch (XVIIth century) suffices to prove its foreign origin, so strongly is the Baroque style stamped on it, so alien is every detail from the antique Byzantine forms that took root also in South Russia. Some doubts are roused however by the archi-

ture of the old wooden churches, with their peculiar cupolas and the original construction of the whole building. « Is Little Russian architecture a quite independent production of the South Russian genius, educated under the immemorial influence of Byzantium, or was it a result of architectural influences coming from other nations and countries? » is asked by Hrabâr: and he answers that we must admit the « unquestionable influence of Western models on the development of Ukrainian forms of wooden architecture » (1). The influence of the Baroque style has changed the four-sided shape of the cupolas into polyhedral, has lifted them by several courses, and has complicated the outline of the crowning cupolas. Another current flowed in from the North. Escaping from the persecution of official Moscow, the old believers (*staroviery*) hid themselves in the Ukraine; their style of church building has also impressed itself on the Little Russian wooden architecture. After the annexation of Little Russia to Moscow, stone building was developed under the influence of the architecture of Moscow; thus Mazeppa built his churches with the help of an architect sent him by the Tsars Ivan Alexeievich and Peter the Great.

« The only kind of painting [in the Ukraine] that one can separate from the Polish art » — is the church painting. The little that has survived from the XVIIIth century « shows very few signs of originality » (2). « Until the XVIIIth century Kiev

(1) HRABÂR: Vol. VI, p. 338.

(2) We quote from the chapter « Ukrainian Painting of the XVIIIth century » written for Hrabâr's sixth volume by a person evidently inclined to exaggerate the importance of this painting.

led a most miserable existence, in utter subjection to the influence of Poland who had dominated her». « From the middle of the XVIIIth century one feels the awakening of some new forces ». This awakening is the result of national self-consciousness, which has sprung up from her strife with Poland and her annexation to Moscow. From this time two elements are at strife in the Ukraine, to be traced, not only in the political life, but also in the ikon painting: the Byzantine-Russian and the Latin-Polish. This ikon painting produced nothing remarkable: for Hrabâr some of its manifestations, after the beautiful creations of Nóvgorod, seem a sad decadence, as sad as some of the examples of Moscow ikon painting of the end of the XVIIIth century (1). One may note as a speciality of the Kiev painters, their taste for nature, their admission of secular details in sacred subjects, and their predilection for portrait painting, result of a stronger influence of Western Europe.

We may pass over Ukrainian sculpture and sum up this short sketch. Kievian Russia received Byzantine art with youthful enthusiasm; for a century it was the central point of art in Russia, but it had not time to transform it and stamp the national lineaments upon it: with the fall of political power art also declined, and with the appearance of the Tartars the monuments of the past likewise disappeared. After

(1) HRABÂR: vol. VI, p. 481.

the Tartar invasion the Land, almost entirely wasted, struggled during three long centuries for at least a prosaic existence; the lamp of culture faintly flickered in the silence of the cloister: the nation had no leisure for the beauties of art, nor had it any innate strength capable of calling forth and sustaining art-creation. In the XVIIth century, during the Polish dominion, the wave of Western culture reached as far as the Dnieper. The borrowing of a foreign culture does not necessarily lessen a Nation's worth, artistically speaking, nor does it lessen the worth of the monuments of art which give expression to the borrowed forms. But Southern Russia once again had not time thoroughly to work out Western principles, for soon a new influence came from the North, and the Little Russian artists left their provincial baroque, and through Petersburg reached out towards the vast field of world-wide art. Here, in the capital of Russia, their creative genius, in the XVIIIth century was fused into one with that of the other sons of Russia, and only those who are tainted with the unhealthy political pre-suppositions of to-day can succeed in finding in their creations would-be « Ukrainian national art-lineaments ».

« Ukrainian Art », as such, does not exist. There is no such distinctive painting, no such architecture, no such sculpture. The phrase can perhaps be applied

(Hrabâr does so) to the short Polish art-period in Southern Russia (XVIIth century). The Little Russian artistic influences, in the various localities, can be traced in those things connected with the daily life, such as embroidery, carpets, pottery, and the like. But do the wine-flasks of Tuscany, or the embroideries of the Abruzzi, attest the existence of a separate, un-Italian people in these provinces?

Some beautiful literary monuments have come down to us from the Tartar period, — the Chronicles, Vladimir Monomákh's « Instruction », descriptions of pilgrimages to the Holy Land, some sermons, and that « Song of Igor's Army », already mentioned, which stands on the boundary-line of the national poetry and literature already referred to. That which was created in the South has the greatest artistic value. Here in Kiev, in the intellectual centre of the Kievo-Petchiersky monastery, were focussed the literary rays of light from Byzantium, as well as from the South Slavonic countries, whose culture, in those times of their freedom, stood at a high level. We need not linger on the characteristics of our ancient literature. It is important for us to note that its memorials are written in the Russian language. We all of us, taught in Russian schools, have read them in the ori-

ginal texts, and read them, you may well believe, without a dictionary, for dictionaries to these texts do not even exist. You will meet on a page some three or four archaic words, or names of objects that are no longer used; in such cases you will need an explanation, but it is in Russian, the old-Russian language that stands half-way between our actual Russian and the church Slavonic. When Ukrainophiles assert that « Monomákh's 'Instruction' is a specimen of Ukrainian literature », it is but a shameless subterfuge, meant for a foreign public unaware of the facts.

Hruszévski cites in his book some pages of *Byline* in the Ukrainian language, but we know already that the *Byline* disappeared in the South from the people's memory and maintained themselves only in the North; here in course of time the ancient forms of the language in which the *Byline* were composed could not but change into the Great Russian idiom. Consequently the text cited by Hruszévski is but a translation, an artificial restoration, and a not too successful one; for the original language of the *Byline*, — the ancient common Russian language, — was different both from the Great Russian and the Little Russian idiom.

The mention of *Byline* induces us to make a digression. The Ukrainian party asserts that the South was torn from the North, and did not lead a common life with it; but the voice of the *Byline*, born in Kiev of the South, testifies to the contrary.

Prince Vladímir, the Red Sun, sits at a banquet in his hall of audience in his capital of Kiev: he is entertaining his warriors and mighty men, « the keepers and preservers of the Holy Russian Land ». Who are those warriors? Are they all natives of the South, or do they come also from other parts of Russia? There sits Staver from Nóvgorod, Diuk Stepanovich from Galicia, Dobrinia Nikitich son of a rich Riasan merchant, the boyar Permiata from Perm, Aliosha Popovich the son of a Rostóv arch-priest, and Churila Plenkovich a rich dandy from the neighbourhood of Kiev. The Prince is kind with them all; as he presses the mead on them, he has a friendly word for each. But whom does he treat with especial honour? Whom does he take by the hand and conduct to the chief seat? Iliá Muromets, a modest peasant, the mighty man from near Mourom, — one might almost say from that very Moscow so hated by the Ukrainophiles. He incarnates the best features of the Russian people, — gentle, generous, pious, greedy neither of money nor of power, gracious even to foes: Iliá is a quiet, calm, unboasting, unconquerable force, the favourite hero of the popular epos and the favoured guest of the « kind Prince Vladímir ».

It matters not that some of these *bogatirs* are invented, that Perm in those times was far from the Russian frontier, that Staver is the contemporary of

Vladimir Monomakh and not of his great-grandfather. The important thing is, that in the popular fancy the Kiev *bogatirs* are the common property of all Russia. and that their lives (especially that of Ilia Muromets) are consecrated to the service of the whole Russian land. Nowhere in the *Byline* will you find an inimical expression about the Northern provinces: hatred was unknown to the people: the honour of cultivating it was reserved for the « Ukrainians » of our days. Only one part of the Russian land had evil fortune: poor Galicia, — who knows for what reason? — is spoken of in the *Byline* as « pagan Galicia ». Probably this is a later epithet, provoked by the penetration of Catholicism into Galicia, and of Western culture generally. At all events the epithet is a dis-service to the « Ukrainophiles », who assert that Galicia is the Piedmont of the Ukrainian movement. Look for that Ukrainian Piedmont in the Foreign Offices of Berlin and Vienna, not in dear Galicia, who kept the consciousness of her Russian nationality during five centuries of Polish and Austrian dominion, and whose best sons repudiate with contempt the flattering, but not over decent, Ukrainophile intrigues of to-day.

The voice of the people in the *Byline* testifies to the unity of pre-Tartar Russia. Nestor's Chronicle, « Whence sprang the Russian Land and how she began her

existence », and Monomákh's « Instruction », are both imbued with love for their land and a clear perception of its unity. The rudimentary idea of the « Song of Igor's Army » is also the idea of the unity of the Russian land. The principal aim of the « Paterik » (Lives of the Saints) is to show that Russia was not bereft of Saints and God's servants. About 1110 an « Abbot of the Russian land Daniel » went as a pilgrim to Palestine, and waited on Baldwin, then King of Jerusalem. King Baldwin summoned him graciously and asked him: « What wouldest thou, O Russian Abbot? » And Daniel asked permission to light a lamp at the Saviour's sepulchre, « a lamp for the Russian land ». The King consented. On Holy Saturday Daniel placed the lamp. And the lamp was lit for the Russian land.

CHAPTER VI.

THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE QUESTION.

But it is natural to ask: if there be no basis for Ukrainian separatism in the past, how can one explain its appearance in our days, and what is the probable future of Little Russia in the opinion of one faithful to the idea of a united Russia?

There is no doubt as to the Austro-German origin of the legend of the existence of a separate Ukrainian nation. Tear asunder Russia, weaken her and enslave her economically, — such was one of the motives for Germany's declaration of war in 1914. The plan of creating the Ukraine was worked out in Vienna and Berlin long since; the methods of working up an artificial separatism were elaborated in Galicia long before the war.

From 1772 till 1848 the Austrian Government acknowledged the national unity of the Galicians with the rest of the Russian people; they were called *Russen*. But in 1848 the Galician Governor, Count Stadion, drew the attention of Vienna to the danger of such a

name, and that of Ruthenia was introduced instead of *Russen* for the Russian population of the Carpathian Mountains. There have been people who have tried to develop on the basis of the common local dialect a new learned language different from the Russian literary language. Russian books were tabooed: at the same time those who stood up for the unity of all the Russians began to be persecuted. Trials for high treason were also inaugurated (1). An Ukrainian party was formed under governmental protection: in 1890 this party came to an agreement with the Galician Poles. The Ukrainophiles began to call the population «Ukraino-Russians», and from 1903 they called their political club simply «Ukrainian». This party is noted for an extreme intolerance towards all who consider themselves Russians, and that means nearly the whole of the population: it is continually bringing accusations of high treason against its adversaries. The Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand, protects this party in every way: the thought arose of an independent Ukraine State with a Hapsburg on the throne of Kiev. In 1912 the Government first called the Russian population «Ukrai-

(1) In 1882, against the writer Naumovich, Dobriansky and others, known more as the proceedings taken against Olga Hrabar and others

nians » (1). The pressure on all things Russian grew; the teaching of the Russian literary language or the reading of a foreign Russian news-paper was held a treason; agricultural societies, those for general improvement and others, were suppressed; indictments for high treason became more frequent (2). In 1913 about twelve educational institutions of the Russian party were closed. Then came the war and the Ukrainianophile Austrian activity unfolded all its charms: thousands of innocent victims were hung and maltreated without a trial (3).

Such were the methods. When the war opened Germany could begin her work in the same direction, which had been prepared long before. Her activity was wider: the whole of South Russia was to be torn away, with its coal from the Don and even its rock-oil from Bakú. The first thing to be done towards attaining

(1) The decree of the Emperor Franz Joseph concerning the future inauguration of the « Ukrainian University ».

(2) The trial of the brothers Gérovsky, of Kabalovich and 93 peasants in 1913; the trial of Bendassuk and his companions in 1914.

(3) For instance, the escort used to drive the prisoners like a herd of cattle, hitting them with their swords: fifty men were sabred to death in Przemyśl in 1914. The Hungarian and Polish inhabitants of Misileborch are known to have stoned the prisoners and beaten them to death with sticks and bayonets; nor was this the only case.

this object was to change the name of the Little Russians. No matter that the Hetman Bogdan Chmél'nitsky (XVIIIth century) called the population of his Ukraine « Russian people », they asserted that they were not Russian. It was needful to sunder the tie of language which bound Little Russian and Great Russian together, for it would be easier to impose the German culture after the educated class of Southern Russia had been deprived of the Russian literary and scientific language: so the artificial « Ukrainian language » was brought forward. Action was taken in the true German way, systematically and without loss of time. From the first year of the war Little Russian prisoners were placed in separate camps and subjected to Ukrainian propaganda; a sort of « Academy of Ukrainiasation » was established at Königsberg for the most gifted. About 100,000 who had submitted to this propaganda, became apostles of the Ukrainian idea among the peasants when they returned to Little Russia in 1918. An Ukrainian army had to be created, and so from the first days of the Revolution a request was made that separate regiments should be formed of Little Russian soldiers. This was a most happy move for the parties concerned, as it brought confusion into the Russian army, who were prepared for a grand offensive (timed to come off two months later) on the whole front, from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This move, along with « order

number 1 inoculated the army with the deadly virus of equality: these measures had surely been thought out by the German General Staff, not by the deputies of soldiers and workmen in the soviet of Petrograd. Everyone remembers what happened after that. The Germans shewed an extraordinary readiness for entering into peace negotiations with Ukrainian adventurers; these latter concluded a thrice-treacherous peace, — treacherous towards the Allies, towards the whole of Russia, towards the Ukraine itself. Bound hand and foot, that unhappy country was given over to German control, acquiring but the factitious right of being called an independent State. The Germans helped Skoropadsky to attain the position of Hetman; he was maintained in his place by their bayonets, while they ordered about in the country as though in their own house. Later on the Germans secured the first success of Petlura.

One needs to have that unceremonious brusqueness which is the exclusive patent of the Ukrainophiles, in order to assert that Germany is not their friend. They are much more truthful in the popular songs they have composed, as for instance that one which says:

« The free Ukraine will live in liberty:

Every Ukrainian will serve the Hapsburg ».

or this other one which cries:

« Let God and the very pure Mother help

The German glorious Caesar,

That he may quickly drive away the Muscovites from Galicia ».

But the Germans themselves are the most outspoken of all. « The Russian question », said the Minister Erzberger in the Constituent Assembly, « is only a part of the great dispute which the Germans are carrying on with the English on the matter of their dominion over the world. We want Lithuania and Ukraina, which must be the outposts of Germany. Poland must be weakened. Once Poland is also in our hands we will shut all the roads into Russia, and she will belong to us. Who does not clearly see that only in that direction does Germany's future lie? ».

There you have it: « Germany's future », — here is the key to the Ukrainian separatism.

The victory of the Allies arrested the open work of Germany in the Ukraine, but throughout Europe the German plans won success. The Ukrainian Bureaux, which had already begun to work in the neutral countries in 1915 (obviously with German money), continued their propaganda. European public opinion either believed in this propaganda, or made a show of doing so. However that be, when Lloyd George and Clemenceau, in the Council of Four, spoke of the « Ukrainian people », they simply followed Germany's lead by so doing; for had there not been a German propaganda

these gentlemen would not have known that the word *Ukrainia* existed.

France, who owes so much to us, trod in Germany's footsteps with peculiar alacrity.

It is quite possible that the French public at large believes the Ukrainian propaganda to be genuine, but I cannot admit that the politicians are so deceived. To-day you are made to believe that the Ukrainian nation is the incarnation of republican virtue; three months go by (during which the members of some Ukrainian mission hold diplomatic conversations with one Erz-Herzog or another), and you read that the Ukrainians are born monarchists. There never was in history an army that performed so many glorious deeds as the Ukrainian, never one so omnipresent; to-day it takes Odessa, five days after Kiev, three days later Odessa again. At the time when Denikin was at the height of success, and telegrams announced his capture of towns all along the front, the news-papers suddenly published a telegram of these same towns having been taken by the Ukrainian army. The telegram was dated from... Taganróg, where the Staff of the armed forces of South Russia then was. Then there were illustrations showing the occupation of Kiev by an army of 300,000 men, though in reality this army never came up to more than 45,000. The French papers called Petlura Generalissimo. I am not a Frenchman, still it is

disagreeable for me to hear an obscure adventurer entitled like General Foch. The Ukrainian « Directory », according to the assurances of the propaganda, is the last word of a progressive government. What blessings has it not given its people! A broad democratic programme and a high-souled religious toleration. But what have you as a matter of fact in the Ukraine? You have the nightmare of Jewish massacres, which did not only arise from the violence of masses of peasants, but were organised and carried out by the orders of the *atamans* of the Ukrainian army. It makes one's hair stand on end to read the description of the blood-bath of Praskurovo (1).

And indeed what kind of programme can you expect from a « Government » consisting of half-educated adventurers, who have gained power by virtue of their cunning use of demagogic pass-words, and by the war-cry: « all the land for the peasants »? This war-cry can, for the time being, rally our peasants round anybody, and stir them up to anything. But now chaos reigns all over Ukrainia, as it does in the rest of Russia: every man's hand is against his fellow. Can the French Government, who had agents in South Russia, be ignorant of part of the truth at least? And if so, how is the

(1) See note page 182.

evident sympathy of France for the Ukrainian idea to be explained? It is said that she wants to get back her milliards. But how can a part of one State discharge its debt more successfully than the whole of that State? I am at a loss to understand this. Contemporary political thinking does sometimes present similar logical enigmas. Do we not see people who must be taken for serious, dreaming of building a dam against German aggression out of the conglomerate mass of small States of different nationalities in Eastern Europe? Instead of such child's play, — trying for security against Germany by the fusion of four or five small armies, freshly organised, — would it not be more practical to work for the restoration of a United Russia, to which these States would likewise adhere, naturally and voluntarily?

It is not easy to make out Poland's attitude to the idea of a separate Ukraina. A protectorate is being prepared and schemes are made for further and utter subjugation. Her Government is possessed by an insatiable Imperialistic appetite, but, finding itself between the Devil and the deep sea, — Russian bolshevism and its own, — and having an army much divided in political opinion, it is obliged to steer a devious course also in the Ukrainian question. At present (Feb. 1920) the Government patronizes Petlura, who, in view of this protection, sold with a light heart Galicia to Poland.

The other mighty factor of Ukrainian, and all other, separatism in Russia is Bolshevism. The international forces of evil which begot it, began by making their nest in Central Russia. All the border-territories, in order to defend themselves against the infection, were forced to turn against « Russia ». There were times when a Russian patriot of the purest water could with a quiet conscience serve local Governments; in serving them he defended a part of the Russian land from the bolshevik spiritual and material devastation, with the hope of working in the future for the restoration of Russian unity. Now the rôle of Bolshevism as a disuniting force seems to be at an end; its universal, *not* merely Russian, character is clear to the most blind, and people will soon cease to identify the words « bolshevik » and « Russian ». On the other hand, the policy of the Moscow Soviet Government is undergoing some sort of change, and it sets to the army (sincerely or not) unitarian and nationalistic problems.

What are the inner factors of Ukrainian independence? On what ground are the influences from outside based? What echoes do they find in Ukrainia? *Is* there, when all is said and done, such a thing as Ukrainian separatism?

« We are elected by the will of a people of 45 millions », asserts the Directory; « we are the representa-

tives of the nation », say the various Ukrainian « ambassadors » in the interviews they grant, as well as at the generous banquets offered by them to the representatives of the press. To this we answer that we are living in a time of Revolution, and revolutionary times are times of pretenders. Who chose these « ambassadors », and when? Do these *rada*, composed of some hundreds of workmen, who have received mandates from no one and have voted as instigated by a dozen or so of agitators, — do these *rada* represent the will of the people? Some reader may suspect me of prejudice against so democratic an assembly. Let then the representatives of the Social-Revolutionary party speak for me. In December 1919 that party presented a memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau. « The Ukrainian people », it says, « have not even once expressed their wish in a definite and determined way for separation from the Russian State ». On November 20th, 1917, the *rada*, « not elected by universal suffrage... », declared itself, in its third Universal, in favour of the principle of a federal union with Russia ». Only two months later (Jan. 22nd, 1918) after the defeat of the Ukrainian forces by the Bolsheviki and the loss of Kiev « the remnants of the *rada* proclaimed, in the fourth Universal, the complete independence of the Ukraine ». At that time « the *rada* was already completely abandoned by the population, and was only sup-

ported by the *Samostijnki* (Separatists) and such circles as desired to achieve, by an appeal to the German Empire, the restoration of their class-privileges ». The actions of the central *rada*, the President of which was a twenty-four year old, inexperienced student of the University, Golubovich, « led to the complete submission of all the Ukraine to Germany ». « When, on May 12th, 1918, a German Major dispersed the central *rada* and arrested the Ukrainian ministers, not one hand was lifted in Kiev in defence of this assembly, which had gained general unpopularity » (1). Professor Maillard speaks more briefly and precisely of the hollow pretence of the *rada* in his pamphlet, very happily entitled « The Lie of Ukrainian Separatism » (2). One chapter is headed: « The Ukrainian Delegation tries to delude the Peace Conference ». The author quotes the declaration of the « Delegation » regarding the irrevocable decision of the « Ukrainian nation » to rid itself of Russia; then, having put the question as to how, where, and when this « nation » expressed its wish,

(1) The « German Major » (in reality a military magistrate) did not arrest all the ministers, but only two of them (for capital crime in doing away with the banker Dobry), and did not disperse the *rada*; it dispersed of itself the day Skoropadsky was chosen hetman.

(2) MAILLARD: *Le Mensonge de l'Ukraine séparatiste*. Paris, 1919.

he proceeds to explain that the *rada* in 1917 and 1918 was nothing more than a gang of « comrades », pretenders invested with no power whatever. He winds up with the following words addressed to the « Delegation »: « I have just come back from Little Russia, where I passed twenty years, and which I love as a second father-land, and I tell it to your face: in writing the phrase above cited you have told a mean lie and have tried to deceive the Peace Conference ». Let us leave the « national representation » and go on to speak of the « government ».

In Russia at present the power is in the hands of brute force. Gather together and arm 30 men, ready to acknowledge you as their chief, and you will be lord over your village: you will give out decrees about the cutting down of the forests belonging to the neighbouring village, exacting dues, until the appearance of a band stronger than your own; either that band will get the better of you, or you will join it. Get together 300 men, find a machine-gun, and you will be for some time lord of a district. Petlura collected, not 300, but 30,000 men, and is master of two or three Provinces. He got them thanks to his use of the cry: « the land for the peasants », and his first success was made sure by the Germans. « But as soon as the German rule was overthrown », says the memorandum of the Social Revolutionary party already quoted, « masses

of the peasantry and of the workmen abandoned the Directory (Petlura), in spite of their efforts to surpass even the Bolsheviks in the demagogic character of their programme ». The villages remained without any authorities; the representatives of the hetman Skoropadsky's power were shot, where they had not taken to flight. Nobody replaced them. « At the present time the illusory power of the Directory does not extend one inch beyond the line of bayonets » of its troops. There can be no question of any governmental activity whatever. The Ukraine is in chaos: « veritable bands of brigands are ravaging the cities, one day under the banner of the Directory, the next under the flag of the Bolsheviks, and still another at their own risk and peril, — such as the bands of *ataman* Grigoriev ». These bands require supplies from the villages: the peasants hide what they have, disarm the Petlurians and kill them; another Petlura detachment comes then and opens artillery fire on the rebel village.. All the processes of the Petlura Government are essentially bolshevik. In the eyes of Europe it tries to pass as a shield against Bolshevism; in reality it is only one of its variants. The same lying words about democracy: in deeds the same contempt for the people. The Ukrainian troops never seriously fought with the red army. Not in vain has it been said by some one of Petlura, that his head was Ukrainian, but his tail bolshevik.

The peasants are unmercifully plundered: bribery is no less flourishing among the agents of Petlura than among the bolshevik « commissars ». Petlura is surrounded by adventurers, such as in revolutionary times are always coming to the surface of the troubled waters. Many of these have been taught the Ukrainian language in Austria, and, as nobody in the Ukraine knows this language, a brilliant political career is assured them in case the independent movement succeed; it is pleasanter to be a Governor than to again become a stevedore or a clerk, and of course these men are « convinced separatists ».

« Of all the species of chauvinism the most savage (persecution of language) has been that exemplified during the short time these separatists have held power ». Three languages must be distinguished: Russian, Little Russian, and the pseudo-language Ukrainian.

« Russian newspapers were suppressed; the use of the Russian script was forbidden; in a few administrative departments, where the service could be performed by Ukrainians, as on the railways and in post and telegraph offices, the Russian language was banished ». Russian was also driven out of the schools, and school-books in Russian were abolished. This was the treatment meted out to the language which every Little Russian understood, a language taught to every small

Russian boy, in which nearly all the news-papers were written and all bargains were made, which was spoken even in the family circle by the whole cultured class, of Little Russian or any other origin.

We have already seen (pp. 73-77) under what influence the Little Russian dialect took shape from the old Russian language. It has existed for four or five centuries. Science considered it a dialect (1), and as such it has been recognised by the Academy of the Sciences in the 80's of last century in connection with the translation of the Gospels into the Little Russian language. Only Ukrainophiles regarded it as a language. But on February 20th, 1906, the section of Russian language and Literature of the Imperial Academy of Science acknowledged the Little Russian dialect as a language. This decision was carried only by a majority of one voice out of five (2). Some consider that this decision was called forth by scientific reasons (though there are scholars, such as the Academician Sobolevsky, who contests it strongly); others think that this decision, taken in the days of the general rehearsal of the Russian Revolution, reflected the political protest against the illiberal attitude of the central Government towards the rights of local dialects. At all events the seal of the Academy has been set on this decision; there is no appeal against it, and since the year 1906 we must say « language ». But from the common point of view no one can

(1) The opinion of Mickloshich excepted.

(2) Not being able to obtain the protocols, I am not responsible for the exact numbers.

deny that this language has all the characteristics of a dialect: it is spoken only by the peasants, its literature has the stamp of what in Italy is called *letteratura dialettale*; it consists of dramas, comedies, fairytales and poetry, all inspired and coloured by the peasant life of the region. The Little Russian dialect has not yet developed into a literary and scientific language. Probably the constraint exercised by the Government during the last half century has had some part in this, but that is certainly not the main reason. Every dialect can be developed into an independent language, but for that a genius, such as Dante, is needed, or centuries of independent culture. Until now only one man who can be called a poet, Chevchenko, has written in Little Russian; beloved as he is by the people themselves, a judgment based on wider canons is constrained to place him among the third-rate poets (1). Little Russia had no independent culture: its cul-

(1) Some family recollections are entwined with the name of Chevchenko. He often stayed with my great-uncle, Prince Repnine-Wolkonsky (last Governor-General of Little Russia) at his estate in the governorship of Poltava. Chevchenko was on the best of terms with the Repnine family and enjoyed the entire good-will of his host. The daughter of the Prince had an excellent moral influence over him. He himself thought more highly of his gift for painting than of that for poetry. He conversed with the family in Russian. He often inveighed against the servitude of the peasants, the rigour of which he knew from personal experience, and against the military service which was then so severe; but he never showed any tendency to separatism. It would seem that, thanks to the entreaties of the Repnine family, Chevchenko was permitted to return from exile. In Russian literature he may be placed alongside of Nikitine.

ture has been indissolubly fused with Polish for a century, with Russian for but 250 years. The Ukraine drew from the all-Russian culture and gave back to it her best gifts: the greatest of the Little Russians, Gogol, wrote in Russian. A writer of genius cannot artificially confine himself within narrow horizons, and a great musician cannot of his own will suffer his creations to be marred by being rendered on imperfect instruments (1). The Little Russian idiom naturally gave place to the Russian language, for every provincialism is doomed to disappear before the interests of the whole State and of all the nation. But in any case, whether language or idiom, the Little Russian speech is worthy of being treated by the local Government with at least as much respect as it was treated by the Imperial Power. But what do we see in actual practice?

The democratic Central *Rada*, professedly working for national regeneration, has not hesitated, with regard to the Little Russian language, to follow in the footsteps of the Austrian Government.

(1) The Ukrainophiles permit themselves to assert that Gogol wrote in Russian because of the censorship. Gogol loved his native country (Ukraine), but still more deeply did he love his mother-country (Russia). Only a man such as he, Russian to the marrow of his bones, could have given expression to such an exaggerated idea of the exclusive mission of his people in the world. We refer to his comparing Russia to a *troika* rushing impetuously forward, before which all the other peoples must give way.

The Little Russian language has no terms for expressing the ideas of modern civilised life; it is moreover too like Russian; thus it came about that at Lvov, when the Ukrainian separatism was being manufactured, the Austrian central power and the Polish-Galician one sought to create an artificial « Ukrainian language », spoken by nobody, on the basis of the Little Russian dialect. This language had to be made as different as possible from Russian, and to this end, *a*) three letters of the Russian alphabet were rejected and two were inserted; *b*) serviceable Russian words were cast out in favour of grotesque words invented to supply their place; *c*) as many Polish, German, and other foreign words as possible were introduced. The stodgy language that resulted (if one can call « language » a product on whose words and forms its own creators cannot agree) the Central *Rada* wanted to force on the Little Russian, whose peasant children were tormented with it in the schools. So, for example, for the last year or two, instead of the old Russian word *straja* (guard, watch), the German word *wacht* is used in Ukraina... « Die Wacht am... Dnieper? » And all this work of demolishing the native language is done in the name of « national regeneration ». The peasants protest against this Volapuk, and will never accept it, unless forced to do so from childhood by a despotic Government.

The foreign policy of the Central *Rada* consisted (according to the forcible, if not over elegant, expression of the Socialist-Revolutionaries) in its being « the (according to the forcible, if not over elegant, expressed to Baron Mumm their readiness « to renounce their social programme, if only they can obtain Germany's consent to remain in power ». The *Rada* showed the same absence of dignity, with regard to France: « in the declarations presented to the French military commander at Odessa, in the Spring of 1919, signed by Petlura and the Directory, the latter body consented to put into the hands of the French Generals the control over the internal and foreign policy of the Ukraine, the administration of the finances and ways of communication, — in short, all the branches of the government and of the economic and political life of the country ». Their politics are « nothing else but a continuous treason against the interests of the large masses of the population ». Needless to say that in their dealings with the Peace Conference they appeared under the mask of zealous defenders of the whole phraseology of the contemporary democratic catechism.

« What then is the social basis of the Separatists, and upon which class is the Ukrainian Directory leaning at present? » The question is put by the memorandum of the Social Revolutionary party, and they

reply: « most certainly and above all, it is not leaning upon the workman. For the working-class population of the Ukraine is almost wholly Russian, and is a resolute opponent of ukrainian separatism ». The Separatists « were compelled to admit that in the municipalities they could obtain only minorities, and that in the big industrial centres they formed only insignificant minorities ». « They point to the peasantry. But the peasant class in the Ukraine and the peasantry in the rest of Russia are united by an historic community of interest, economic ties, a similar civilisation and a unity of religion ». « At certain moments the peasants joined the Separatists, only because these were hiding their militant nationalism under a mass of demands for agrarian reform, in common with the entire democracy of Russia. Just as soon as the essence of their nationalism became apparent in all its nakedness, the peasant class turned aside from them and the Separatists lost their entire influence ». And if now, after the revolution you can hear hostile words about Great Russians among the peasants of the Poltava government, it is only because the local landed proprietors are Great Russians, and the peasants want to keep the lands they have snatched from them. The propagandists assure them that the landholders will return as soon as the unity of Russia will be re-established.

« The idea of the creation of a totally independent

Ukrainian State is only shared by a minority of the genuine population of the Ukraine. The nucleus of this group is composed of a handful of « intellectuals », small merchants and manufacturers, and of officials, to whom the prospect of the transformation of the Ukraine into an independent State holds out advantages of power, even if it has to be established at the price of a nationalist dictatorship of privileged classes ».

Thus the opinion of the Socialist-Revolutionaries coincides entirely with what we have stated in the first pages of our book. The Ukrainian separatism, as a national movement, does not exist; there is only the work of a political party composed of the cultured and mostly half-cultured class, whose work (largely for ends of self-interest) became much more intense under the influence of the unhealthy revolutionary atmosphere, of the activity of the Austro-Germans and... the Allies.

The existence of the so-called Ukrainian army, and of the big sums of which the Ukrainophiles can dispose, does not contradict this statement. The Ukrainian army is made up of volunteers; the good pay (300 roubles a month, 5 roubles a day when on the march, and 20 when in action) is a great attraction. Attempts at conscription have utterly failed. In 1919 there was

an order of Petlura, to the effect that Ukrainian officers are not to be trusted, because nearly all of them are for the unity of Russia, and that German officers are needed. It is hardly logical to call such an army national. Nor is it very like a real army; some parts of it can more justly be called bands; plunder and slaughter of the Jews have become their custom (1). Its exact numbers are far below what is asserted in Ukrainophile quarters. At the end of July 1919 there were not more than 12,000 bayonets, and about 130 guns. In that sa-

(1) On March 4th, 1919, the Petlurian *ataman* Semesenko, a youth of 22 years, who was encamped near Proskurovo, ordered his zaparog brigade to massacre the Jewish population. The order contained these words: « as long as we have one Jew in Ukraina we shall have no peace ». On March 5th the whole brigade of 500 men, undisciplined, drunken robbers, dividing into three parties, each under its officers, entered the town and began massacring the Jews; house after house was broken into and often whole families were slain. In one day they killed 3,000 people. Only one man, a priest of the Greek Church, was shot while trying to stop the monsters: all the others were put to death by the sword. (Of such a transformation, — intoxicated by revolutionary passions and the atmosphere of anarchy and lawlessness, led by « officers » of the new « democratic type », — was the Russian peasant capable, who, in the army of the Emperor, gave so many examples of uncommon nobility). A few days later Semesenko demanded 500,000 roubles from the town, and issued an order of the day, in which he thanked « the Ukrainian citizens » for their friendly sentiments to the « national army », which was shown by their voluntary offering of half a million roubles for the necessities of the brigade.

me July the army was reinforced by parts of the Galician army that had crossed the ex-Austrian frontier, and counted about 25,000 bayonets. These men form the best part of the Ukrainian army: they were raised by conscription to fight with the Poles, and they are all soldiers of the former Austrian or German army. It is known that these corps (without the Austro-German officers) went over to General Denikin. Ukrainophiles cite the bands of Mahno as a proof of Ukrainian patriotism, but this is a mystification. It is more than probable that Mahno received money from Petlura, as well as from the Bolsheviks, to attack the rear of Denikin's army; but this band was not called into existence by a national movement; it was the outcome of suffering, war, ruin, lack of work, famine and the destruction of the State. The watch-word of the followers of Mahno now is, «Power to the Tsar: the land to the people». That does not sound Ukrainian, but All-Russian.

In Skoropadsky's time a fund was accumulated by the sale abroad of part of those sixty million pouds (960,000 tons) of corn that were to have been exported according to the terms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty: this fund laid the foundation of the riches of the followers of Petlura. In 1919 the Directory ordered the population to deliver up the money of the Tsarist period, which still had value abroad, in exchange for the new

Ukrainian money, which had no value whatever; the contents of the jewellers' shops were also commandeered. All this was exchanged for foreign money. The sums thus obtained are used for the army and for propaganda abroad, — printing and « diplomatic representation ». In the beginning of this year the sums that had been transferred to Vienna came to an end, and the number of articles appearing abroad in the interests of the « oppressed Ukrainian people », has greatly diminished.

To this characterisation of the state of things in Ukraine is to be added that the idea of separation is a perfectly new one, brought to us by our foes. The leaders of the Ukrainian literary movement in the past century protested against the constraints placed by the Government on the free development of Little Russian literature, but they never dreamed of political separation. It was not thought of either by the « Cyril and Methodius Society » (1846), or by Ukrainian thinkers, such as Kostomarov (d. 1885), or by the political emigrant Dragomanov. The latter was in favour of the decentralisation of the All-Russian state machinery and the creation of local autonomies, but never thought of a future Ukraine otherwise than as a part of the one Russia. Even M. Hruszévski never mentioned separation before the war; this is acknowledged in the

very pamphlets of the Ukrainophile agitators. Thus even in those circles which felt, as did all the « intelligentsia », the iron hand of the Government, the idea of separation was never mooted. The errors of the old regime with regard to the literary movement in the Ukraine are much to be regretted, yet the truth is, that all the constringent measures taken touched but small groups; the great body of the people knew nothing of them. Phrases about the « oppression of the Ukrainian people » do very well for meetings: they will not be used by serious and conscientious persons, who will admit that there never has been the smallest sign of separatist tendencies among the peasant class of the Ukraine.

CONCLUSION.

There is no reason in the past for the political separation of the Ukraine, and there is not at the present time any tendency to separation to be found among the Little Russian people. But what is to be said for the future? Can we face it with tranquil minds?

As to this many Russians have no apprehensions. According to them the falseness and artificiality of the whole separatist movement doom it to failure. We, on the contrary, hold that the danger is manifest and very great. Both our enemies and the Allies wish our dismemberment. The Allies are fond of underlining the old principle of non-intervention, but as a matter of fact we have no guarantee that to-morrow, — at London, or Paris, or San Remo, — the independent existence of the Ukraine or of White Russia will not be declared. The Allies have proclaimed the self-determining right of the nations, but no one has yet asked the Little Russian population whether it considers itself a Russian or an Ukrainian nation. A new ideal has been set up, — Democracy; all the Governments burn incense before it, and the world's press cringingly sings its praises; but, in fact, the sentence of the dismemberment of Russia emanates (and has in part already ema-

nated) from three or four autocrats who, at least for the moment and for some little time to come, will rule the destinies of the world. We shall not speak of the hypocrisy of the politics of our day (who does not acknowledge it in his soul?); we shall not prove to the Allies that they are dismembering Russia for the benefit of Germany and, consequently, for their own ruin; but we would note how this act of arbitrariness, — the acknowledging of the Ukraine, — will react on Little Russia.

The population of Little Russia is worn out; the peasantry have no thought for political parties, but simply want assurance that the land is their own, with the produce that comes from it. They want a power that will ensure them the possession of the land and the fruits of their labour, and when that power is set up, — be it Republican or Tsarist, Russian or Ukrainian, — they will hasten to acclaim it. The proclamation by Europe of an independent Ukraina would, for the people of that district, throw a halo round the self-named Directory; they would believe this government had the support of Europe, without troubling to consider whether independence were for the good of the country, or whether it would not, by that perilous gift, be brought under bondage to Germany. We cannot overlook the fact that, for the last three years, the peasant has been hearing independence talked

about; the word *Ukrainian*, unknown before the Revolution, is now habitual to his ear, and the catch-words of the news-papers, at first strange and unintelligible, have by dint of repetition stamped themselves upon his sluggish brain. So that when a plebiscite is in view, or the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, the literature necessary for propaganda will pour in from abroad, not to speak of a still more powerful means of persuasion, — money. Who will there be in the country able to open the eyes of the people? The cultured class for the most part has been killed, or has fled abroad. The few that remain will find it very difficult to fight against « the general opinion ». I say « general opinion », for all the news-papers will be for independence, for the simple reason that all papers of an opposite tendency will be suppressed. Thus the task of the adherents of unity will be a difficult one; they will have neither money, nor the backing of the press, nor the assurance of personal safety. In Europe, as a matter of fact, public opinion, under the protection of the idol of Democracy, is conducted by a demagogic Oligarchy, although not yet at the pinnacle of power: and in Russia of to-day it is still easier to produce a false impression as to what the will of the nation really is. That is why we say the danger is great.

There is no going back on the past. The future united Russia presents itself to us under the form

of a federal government. But the principle of federation must not be abused. To break up one's motherland into small bits, in the interests of the hour, for considerations of personal advancement: to set up custom-houses in every district, in order to help an ever larger number of officials of the newly-baked states to enrichment; — such things may come naturally at a time of Revolution when moral values are quite upset, but the normal life of the future State demands a sounder foundation. Decentralisation is only justifiable in the case of wide districts having real ethnic and economic peculiarities arising from natural causes. With the mingling of races the ethnographic principle is sure to yield before economic considerations. The boundless wealth of Russia rests on the vastness of its territories: divide these, and each part will become poor. The South will remain without wood, the North without corn and coal, both North and South without the cotton of Turkestan and the naphtha of Bakú. A federation means a customs union, a common army, a common representation of the nation, and, alongside of local representative institutions, a common national parliament. Such a form, truly answering to the conception of a federation, will secure the free development of local peculiarities and will revive the power of the whole. It must not frighten the partisans of the one indivisible Russia. The idea of territorial

decentralisation had been in the mind of the Government in the time of Nicholas II, and no wonder: in itself decentralisation could have harmonised even with the autocracy of Nicholas I. Among these federated states the Ukraine will take an honourable place.

The only sin of the Tsarist power against the Little Russian population as such, consisted in the restraint put upon Little Russian Literature and, thereby indirectly, on the Little Russian dialect. This mistake must not be repeated. In Literature, as in life, a free competition must be established between the Russian and Little Russian languages. Let the latter be allowed to develop freely according to the needs and requirements of the population. There can be no doubt that victory will remain with the Russian language, which, from the point of view of universal culture, is not to be regretted. «The transformation of the Little Russian dialect into a literary and scientific language», as the French Professor Meillet says, «would be a detriment to general culture, which demands that a language (in this case the Russian) serve to unite the greatest possible number of people» (1).

(1) «Le Petit et le grand Russe»: in *Le Monde Slave*: nos. 3 & 4, 1917. We quote from a reference in an Italian journal.

The official language must be Russian. The Ukrainophiles protest that, in the past of Little Russia, education was imparted in Russian. In Italy there are no less than twelve principal dialects, and we see there how, within the limits of a single dialect, the citizen of Milan has difficulty in understanding the mountaineer of the Alta Valtellina. Yet education all over Italy is in Italian. This is made necessary by considerations of the unity of the State and nation, by the interests of culture, and by practical scholastic considerations. For this mode of procedure no one as yet has accused the Italian Government of «barbarity». Why, then, in the case of Russia must the same thing be stamped with all sorts of dreadful names? I repeat again that there is less difference between the Russian and Little Russian languages than there is, for instance, between literary Italian and Venetian or Neapolitan, or between North German (Plattdeutsch) and South German (Ober-Bayrisch). A Little Russian recruit, who had entered a barracks of the Imperial army, spoke Russian freely within a week. Be it remembered, also, that the facility with which a Russian or a Slav generally gets hold of a language entirely different from his own, is well known: to learn Russian has no terrors for a Little Russian child.

The Ukrainophiles, in their eager search for support in the Catholic world, bring forward the repres-

sive measures used with the Uniats in Little Russia as a proof of the necessity of liberating the Ukraine from the yoke of Petrograd. The violation of liberty of conscience was the capital sin of the Imperial Government; but that is a thing of the past. At a terrible cost we have been cured of this malady. It is true that today Bolshevism rages against the Orthodox clergy; it has slain about twenty bishops; it has shot, hung, or crucified hundreds of priests, and has desecrated churches; but certainly this hatred does not come from the *Russian* soul. When this diabolical Bolshevik dance is over, and some sort of authority is established, more or less worthy of the name, freedom of conscience will be guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the Russian land. As to this there cannot be the shadow of a doubt. There is no intolerance in the Russian nature. Russians have been living for a thousand years in daily intercourse with those of a totally different religion, and have done so without any interruption of friendly relations and in perfect harmony (1).

The prejudices of Russian public opinion in regard to Catholicism, are well known; but these are to be found, not only in the North and East of Russia, but

(1) This remark does not apply to the Jews; but the Jewish pogroms are not caused by religious hatred.

all over the country. The Ukrainophile assertion that the « Ukrainian Nation » tends decidedly towards Catholicism, is a pure invention: the very opposite is the truth. In the other parts of Russia the common people hardly know that the Catholic Church exists; in the Ukraine, on the contrary, the defence of the Orthodox faith was for centuries one of the fundamental factors in the strife between the Little Russians and the Poles, while in White Russia it was the bone of political conflict. The Polish conception of religious freedom has not changed in the course of the centuries. In a letter from White Russia, of date 30th December, 1919, we read: « In all the regions occupied the most shameless Polonization is still carried on: the churches are shut, or changed into Catholic churches; priests are arrested (the cases of Father Zabrodny and of Father Levitsky) » (1). Worse was never done by the Russian

(1) The rest of the quotation, which has no reference to the religious question, runs as follows: « All the governmental institutions are turned into Polish ones: all Russian officials were served with dismissal notices, and ordered to clear out of their offices within eight days (and this in the Russian December). All public men who had, in one way or another, been unfriendly to the Poles, and all Russian officers, are searched for and, under one pretext or another, sent to concentration camps. Russophile newspapers are forbidden and Russian sign-boards are destroyed: even the Russian language is declared unsuitable for common use. Shameful mea-

Government, even in the palmy days of Pobedonóstsev, Procurator General of the Holy Synod. Catholicism has two enemies in Russia: one is the Orthodox Holy Synod, which is only in the natural order of things; the other is the Polish Catholicism, — a phenomenon so « out of the natural order of things » that the very juxtaposition of these two ideas (nationalism and universality) constitutes a *contradictio in adjecto*.

A great spiritual movement is going on in Russia. The propaganda of ungodliness and hatred of christianity gives terrifying results; nevertheless at the same time the churches are full. And the crowds that fill them are not those of the past, who went chiefly to fulfil a duty sanctioned by ancestral custom: now the whole church resounds with the sobs of the worshippers: wearied souls seek passionately for the truth that is in Christ, and bodies that shrink in fear from the unknown turn to God for help; when people wish to assist at a religious procession they confess themselves first through fear of being shot by the bolshevist machine-guns. This is the soil the Catholic Church

asures are taken to expel from White Russia those Russians who come from other parts of Russia; no material aid is given to the officials who have been expelled, but they are left to choose between going to Soviet Russia and living in concentration camps. Everything is requisitioned from the peasants and landed proprietors are forced to sell out ».

will find in Russia with the setting up of freedom of conscience.

And in truth the Catholic Church wants nothing but freedom of conscience for its success. For this it is not needful to divide Russia. The Uniates will remain where they are in Volynia and Galicia, independently of the rule under which they would find themselves. It is much more necessary to restrain Polish intolerance, which feeds the Russian hatred of Catholicism. In any case there is no need for that object to support Ukrainian separatism: the reader has surely been convinced that this propaganda is based on ideas and on facts which are untrue, and if he be a Catholic, he knows that the Church has no need to buttress up a lie for the success of Christ's work.

* * *

I am finishing these pages just at the time when you, the arbitrators of destiny, are dividing Russia at San Remo.

It is impossible to understand you. The Russian nation has given two million lives to secure you two years for war preparations; many times it has helped you when you were in a tight place; it has hurled back in disorder the forces of the enemy and prepared your triumph; while you — you have suspected us of traitorous designs against you. The real traitors appeared — Bronstein (*alias* Trotsky) and Co. — who betrayed

Russia and you: you accused *all* Russia of treason and began to settle her destinies without referring to us, your Allies. Then appeared Russian men, who advanced from four sides against those who betrayed you and are ready to infect you with their poison: you left them to their fate, these Russian men, who had remained chivalrously true to you amidst every trial and temptation, and you did so at the very moment when success was so near. You did not resolve on a universal crusade against a danger also universal, — the bolshevist barbarism, — and quietly looked on while those who should have served as vanguard for your crusaders, were perishing. It is now up to you to extricate the situation as you best can. You looked on with Olympian calm at the Russian officers pierced by German bullets, martyrs of the Revolution, and you are ready to acknowledge as a lawful power a gang of monsters, who had betrayed you at Brest-Litovsk. You are ready to abase yourselves so low to provide corn for your people, and operations on the Stock exchange for your business men, but in reality you will not get one grain of corn from bolshevist Russia, powerless to sell anything but pearls filched from their rightful owners; and if you should get it, it will be bread taken from the mouths of the famishing (1).

(1) While saying this we would pay grateful homage to the humane treatment of our refugees (treatment which sa-

One cannot understand you. You are afraid of Germany's re-habilitation, and you thrust us into her arms.


You divide Russia and tear into fragments the Russian people. But have not the years not so long past, shown how the life of a nation persists, even that of a small nation, — persists and asserts itself victoriously after hundreds of years of servitude? And we are one hundred million. We have before now been sundered for several centuries, but we have none the less achieved unity; Galicia, torn from us five hundred years ago, still feels herself to be Russian. Tear us asunder again: we shall again unite. You have decided that the Russian nation is dead, and hasten to plunder its heritage. It is not dead. Its body politic is in grievous sickness, nigh unto death; but that sickness will pass. The nation will summon its strength, will rise to the full height of its mighty stature, and will ask you in threatening tones: « What have you done to my country while I, tearing my flesh in the frenzy of my pain and writhing in the relentless grip of a monster, felt my life-blood ebbing away? ».

Divide Russia, if you will. But remember that your decree is no law binding on us. Happily you did not

ved countless lives) by the sailors of England, Italy and Greece. Our reference is to the whole political attitude of the Allies in our struggle with Bolshevism.

call us to your conferences. When we are strong again we shall be free to settle our destinies as we will. Remember also that example is contagious, and that in our time one cannot with impunity stir up or foment the forces of destruction in a foreign land, remote though it seem to be. You did not pluck up Bolshevism when it was striking its roots among us; two years are not yet passed, and it has sent its dire and hideous shoots into your own borders. You are upholding the centrifugal forces among us; they will begin to operate in your own countries as well. Who knows whether you may not ere long have cause to regret your infringement of the integrity of the Russian land, of the unity of the Russian nation?

APPENDIXES



Appendix 1.

FURTHER NOTES ON THE TERMINOLOGY.

In chapter I we said that the name *Ukrainia* would hardly be found in the documents before the end of the XIVth century. We have not found it either in the documents of the XIVth or in those of the following century. The Ukrainian propaganda affirms that the name *Ukrainia* is constantly to be met with in the pages of the chronicles already from the end of the XIIIth century. The most elementary analysis of the texts, cited by the Ukrainophiles, which deal with this question, is sufficient to prove the incorrectness of this assertion. We have taken up the matter in an open letter to Count Tyszkiewicz, president of the « Ukrainian Delegation » to the Peace Conference of Paris. This letter, in a very succinct form, generalises what we have said in our first chapters concerning the ethnographical and territorial nomenclature, giving also additional information from the chronicles. It was printed in the Roman paper *Corriere d'Italia*, September 25, 1919. We cite it here, translated from the Italian :

Count,

In No. 153 of the *Corriere d'Italia* (June 9th) an interview with you has been published. Speaking of opinions contrary to those of the Ukraine party, you say that such opinions « are based on arguments which are nothing but calumnious and lying insinuations ».

The Ukraine question is too vast to be exhaustively discussed in the columns of a news-paper. In speaking

of it I have no desire to follow the Ukraine methods of propaganda, according to which the name *Ukraina* is given, one knows not to what territory, nor does one know to what century reference is made: the same method is followed with the word « Ukrainians », and the phrases « Russian yoke », « struggle for liberty », &c, without definitely stating the time when or the place where. One does not lay bare the truth by this method, and it is just the truth which I desire to bring to light. Accordingly I am concerned to state the question precisely.

From this vast subject I select to-day the first affirmation of the Ukraine school, viz., that in the pre-Tartar period (IXth to XIIIth centuries) Kiev was not the capital of one whole and united Russia, but only the centre of a State called « Ukraina », inhabited by an « Ukrainian » people. The opponents of the Ukrainian party affirm, on the contrary, that there was neither Ukrainian people nor Ukrainian State at that epoch. Let us hear what the ancient witnesses say; thus we shall know which opinion corresponds to the historic truth, and which — I will not say, represents « calumnious insinuations », — is false.

Tenth Century. — In 911 Prince Oleg (of Kiev) made a treaty with Byzantium: that treaty speaks of « Russian (*rússkie*) princes », of « Russian (*rússkij*) law », of the « Russian (*rússkaij*) stock », of the « Russian (*rússkaia*) land »; it uses the word *rússin* to indicate the individual, in the plural *rússkie*, and as collective noun employs the word *Russ*; altogether, the word *russ* in the ethnic sense is used 18 times, in the territorial sense 5 times; the form *russkij* 7 times, and the form *rússin* also 7 times. In 944 an analagous treaty was concluded by Prince Igor; there we find the

same expressions: land *rússkaia*, *rússkij* princes, *rússin*, *rússkij*, and *Russ*. In the Western Chronicles it is noted that there came to the Emperor Otho I the *legati Hellenae* (Christian name of the Princess Olga of Kiev) *Reginae Russorum*. (Soloviev, I, p. 141: 2nd edn.).

Eleventh Century. — In 1006 the German missionary Bruno, guest of Prince Vladímir the Saint, wrote about him to the Emperor Henry II, calling him *Senior Ruzorum*. The first law code compiled at Kiev was called the « Russian truth » (*Rússkaya Právda*); the daughter of Yarosláv I, wife of Henry I King of France, is known in history by the name of *Anne of Russia*. The credentials of Pope Gregory VII in 1075 call Isiaslav, son of Yarosláv I, *Rex Ruscorum*. In another document the same Pope counsels the King of Poland to restore to Isiaslav, *Regi Ruscorum*, the lands he had rent from him.

Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries. — The term *rússkaia zemlià* (land) was so often used in the Chronicles of Kiev that, as Professor Klyuchévsky says, it has become « a stereotyped expression ». Thus the Prince of Kiev « thought and dreamt of the *rússkaia* land »; the duty of princes was « to care for the *rússkaia* land »; a certain person « will have against him the Holy Cross and all the *rússkaia* land »; another person « gave his head for the *rússkaia* land »; the Metropolitan of Kiev is entitled « Metropolitan of all the *Russ* », &c.

Thirteenth Century. — The Franciscan Plano Carpini, who visited Kiev in 1246, wrote of *Kiovia quae est metropolis Russiae*. So we come to the Tartar period. Leaving the Chronicles let us pass on to the epic poetry.

In the celebrated poem « The song of Igor's army », (XIIIth century) which relates an episode in the struggle between the Russ and the barbarians of the

Steppe (1185), the same expressions are found; further, it is said: « and the brave *russachi* fell ». All the popular epic poetry (*byline*) from the Kiev district and from that of Nóvgorod previous to the XIVth century, is filled with the same expressions.

The Ukraine party affirm that the inhabitants of the State of Kiev at that epoch were Ukrainians, but we see how from century-old tombs there comes the cry: « we are Russians, Russians, *Rússkie* ».

What weapon does the Ukraine party possess to combat these witnesses buried many centuries ago, whose testimony can never more be altered « for all the gold under the moon? » The Ukraine heavy artillery, which is brought to bear as soon as a serious enemy is reported to be present, is made up of two pieces of ordnance: one is the date « 1187 », the other the date « 1213 ». Let us take the range of these pieces, which may appear to a reader little versed in Russian history to be of exceptional strength.

1187. — Under this date one reads in the chronicles of Kiev and Gálic, as quoted in an Ukraine propaganda-sheet, that: « the *Ukraine* bewailed the death of Prince Vladímír Glibovic... ». From the day when Kiev became the capital of that State which you call « *Ukraina* », 306 years had passed, after which alone there appeared the « true » name of that city. Does not that at once seem a little strange? But let us analyze the quotation more closely.

Vladímír Glibovic was Prince of Pereyasláv, which is situated on the left bank of the Dnieper, about opposite Kiev, between the Dnieper and the Steppe of the Nomads, — it was the border Principality. At the end of the XIIth century the Russ of the South was already in decline: the barbarians of the Steppe had gained the overhand. The Principality of Pe-

reyasláv suffered more from the Polovtzi than the other Principalities: the eastern half of it had already passed under the dominion of the Nomads, while the western part became the extreme limit of Southern Russia to the East, and was accordingly for the chroniclers of Kiev and of Gálic the territory of the borders. It is therefore natural that in Russian they say « the ukraina wept »: « ukraina » is not here a proper name, but a common noun. In a scientific book the word « ukraina » (with a small *u*) should in this case not be transcribed, but translated, that is to say: « the border region wept... ». And indeed we read in the second volume of Soloviev, at page 637, « ... the Prince of Pereyasláv, Vladímír Gliébovic, grew ill and died, the famous defendér of the (in Russian) *ukraina* (given in the text with a small *u*) against the Pólovtsi; the inhabitants of Pereyasláv bewailed his death, because... » &c. Of what value then is the quotation of 1187 as rendered by the Ukrainophiles? It is a falsified document.

1213. — In this year it is said (always according to the Ukraine paper) that Prince Danilo (future King of Galicia) occupied « Berest, Ugorsk and all the *Ucraina* ». This is identical with the fore-going: one must read in Russian « ukraina », in English « border territory ». Berest is, according to Soloviev, Brest-Litovsk, which was set where the borders of three States touched: Russia, Poland and Lithuania; Ugorsk according to Soloviev, is probably the present village of Ugrujsk, situated 100 kilometres south-east of Brest.

The artillery is a powerful arm when it is used with explosive shell: it has no value when it sends into the ranks of the enemy only... false documents.

I should be greatly obliged to you, Count, if you would have the courtesy to answer me with a preci-

sion equal to these questions of mine: *a)* Are these above quotations of mine exact or not? *b)* If not, which are inaccurate, and in what part are they inaccurate? In that case I propose that you should choose an expert for instance from the Professors of Russian History in the Universities of Italy: I shall also choose an expert; the two will choose a third one: let these three decide the matter. *c)* If, on the contrary, my citations are exact, do you find logical or illogical, true or false, the following conclusions which flow from them:

1) The State which had Kiev for capital was called *Russ* in the pre-Tartar period.

2) The people which occupied it were called Russian (*russ* and *rusškij*).

3) The Ukraine propaganda, admitting sometimes that the people were called *russ* and denying that they were called *rússkie*, asserts what is false, because as far back as 911 both these forms are found.

4) Neither that State, nor its territory in that period, was ever called *Ucraina*.

5) During that period there is not the most microscopic reference to the existence of people who were called *Ukrainians*.

If you recognise the fairness of these conclusions, you cannot but admit also that I was right, — at least so far as the pre-Tartar period is concerned, — when I said, in the *Epoca* of June 3rd, that the Ukraine party occupy themselves with « political mystifications », and « falsify history ». — I have the honour &c.,

Prince ALEXANDER WOLKONSKY ».

To me this letter seems to state the question with accuracy and precision. But the Ukrainophiles are afraid of punctuality: the answer of Count Tyszkiewicz

wicz appeared on October 30, 1919, in the *Petite République*, under the title «L'Ukraine et la Moscovie». In considering it we shall divide the text into paragraphs so as to shorten our comments on it.

Prince,

a) The *Giornale* (sic) *d'Italia* of date September 25, brought me your open letter which I allow myself to answer. Putting aside such expressions as «falsified documents» and «heavy artillery», which I generally do not use, I shall reply to you as follows:

b) The expression Russians or Ruthenians was without doubt used in the Xth century, and even later, to denote the Princes and their Norman warriors who at that time conquered Ukraina, and was even likewise used in speaking of those people who were subject to them.

c) The chronicler Nestor and the historian Soloviev, whom you cite, speak as clearly as possible on the subject: «By the word, Russian, the chronicler (Nestor) means to denote all the Slavonic peoples who were under the power of the Russian Princes». (*History of Russia*, I, p. 53).

d) Luitprand, bishop of Cremona, witnesses to the identity of the Russians and the Normans; the Arabians testify to their being distinct from the Slavonians. (Soloviev, I, pp. 51-56).

e) They play among them the part that their brothers played in England, Normandy, and Sicily. Any way, whether conquerors or not, they quite disappear in the native elements of each of these two groups that form themselves in the North and the South, and that are divided, not only by the immensity of uncultivated territories, but by a whole world of ethnic and geographical differences.

f) And this so much the more, as both our lands will *always* be called (« s'appelleront toujours ») (1) differently. At the epoch when *Ukrainia* (a popular expression denoting land, father-land, *krai*; used also in the chronicles dated 1187 and 1213) was called *Russia* or *Sarmatia*, the other land was known, — and you know it, — under the name of *Moscovia* ».

Count MICHEL TYSZKIEWICZ ».

The rest of the letter does not relate to the pre-Tartar epoch, and so is not an answer to the questions which I put (2).

* * *

Count Tyszkiewicz has answered the first three questions with a timid « yes », and prudently evaded answering the two latter. Let us examine his assertions.

a) The expression « falsified documents » is used by me correctly, for the quoting of the text of a chronicle that has the word « *ukrainia* » in it, affirming at the same time that the chronicle speaks of the State « *Ukrainia* », is falsifying a text.

b) I know of no occasion when the Ruriks, or their militia, in the pre-Tartar period, were called

(1) The future tense here is clearly a misprint.

(2) Here you read in the letter that the Tsars and Catherine the Great always treated the Little Russians like a strange nation; of the « Russian prison of the peoples », in which there was no place for other religions, nationalities, or any civilisation whatever. There was absolutely nothing in Russia excepting « despotism and Asiatic barbarism ». The letter winds up with a malicious sally against those who love their own, one, Russia.

Rúthenians. The Normans of the Xth century did not conquer Ukraina, for Ukraina did not then exist.

c) The quotation from Soloviev explains the origin of the name « Russian » for a part of the Slavonic races, but in no wise speaks of a heterogeneity of the Northern and Southern population. This name was grafted on all the Slavonic tribes that formed the Russian people: — such is the conclusion to be deducted from this quotation, and I myself say nothing else. But why does Count Tyszkiewicz translate Soloviev, inaccurately? Soloviev says « tribes »: the Count translates « peoples ». Yes, the tribes were many, but the people was one, — the Russian (1).

(1) Here is the precise quotation from Soloviev: « ... In the part of Japhet, says he (viz. Nestor), are settled: *Russ*. Here the chronicler by this name means all the Slavonic tribes under the dominion of the Russian Princes; then he goes on to enumerate the strange people, of the race of the Finns and Letts, which in his time paid tribute to Russia: *Tchud*, *Meria*, etc. ».

The corresponding passages in Nestor read as follows: I) « In the part of Japhet are *Russ*, *Tchud*, and all the tribes: *Meria*... » (here follows an enumeration of the Finnish tribes). II) « For there are only Slavonic tribes in *Russ* the *Po-lians*, *Drevlens*, *Novgorodsies*, *Polotchans*, *Dregoviches*, *Se-vers*, *Bougans* (for they were settled on the Boug), lastly the *Volynians*. And here are other tribes who pay tribute to the *Russ*: *Tchud*, *Meria*... » (Here follows the enumeration of the Finnish tribes).

This expression « in *Russ* » can only be taken in one of two senses: either in a territorial or in an ethnographical sense. In the former sense Nestor would certify that all the Slavonic tribes, the Northern as well as the Southern, formed part of the complex unity of the *Russian land*, and as members with full rights and privileges (the Finns and the other tribes paid them tribute); in the latter sense Nestor would affirm that they, and they alone, composed the *nation Russ*. Count Tyszkiewicz has to choose between these two. The Ukrainophiles have no worse enemy than Nestor.

d) I never denied the Norman origin of the Ruriks. That the predominant race (*russ*) was swallowed up by the native population is a fact. But the crystallization of the Southern population into a character different from that of the Northerners occurred, not at the time when this *russ* race prevailed, — may be as a foreign power (IXth century), — but four to six centuries later. I imagine that the opinion of the Klyuchévskys and the Platonovs has more weight than the words of Count Tyszkiewicz.

e) What « the whole world of ethnographical and geographical distinctions » between North and South in the pre-Tartar epoch consists in, Count Tyszkiewicz does not say. I do not know it either. In my third chapter I tried as conscientiously as possible to set forth the difference between the two parts of Russia, but, I must acknowledge, succeeded badly, — so much have they in common. That enormous forests divided Súdjal-Russia from Kiev-Russia, is a fact, but it is true also that splendid rivers served to unite them and that the population pressed to the banks of the rivers and were thus always in contact.

f) In the matter of territorial nomenclature Count Tyszkiewicz has permitted himself to fall into such incredible mistakes that several pages would be needed for their disentanglement.

1) First of all, it is not true that the word *ukrainia* means « land », « fatherland », *krai*. Count Tyszkiewicz, as speaking Russian, cannot be ignorant of this. The name *Ukrainia* is a manifest reproach to the whole Ukrainian theory; that is the reason why the Ukrainophile propaganda abroad is constantly occupied with this word, giving foreigners an incorrect translation of it. The meaning of the word *ukraina* is defined, not by one word *krai* (territory), but by two words: *krai*

(border) and *u* (near), and thus denotes the territory which is « near the border », near the frontier. In the same connection we may add that the word *krai* does not mean « fatherland ». To say, for instance, « I go to the *krai* » (land) would be meaningless; to express the idea of going to one's fatherland it would be necessary to say: « I go to my *krai rodnoi* » (native land). Count Tyszkiewicz must know this just as well as I do (1).

2) In my letter I proved that in 1187 and 1213 the chronicle does not apply the word « ukraine » as a name. Count Tyszkiewicz ought either to have refuted me, (which in this case is impossible), or to cease making use of this falsified document. Instead of which he, in answering my letter, quotes these dates, very cautiously it is true, but yet in a way that leaves the reader under the impression that in the XIIth and

(1) In the Russian edition of this work the author gives the complete text of Dahl's Dictionary ed. 1865. Here we quote a few extracts. Dahl says as follows: « *Ukrájnij* and *ukráinnij*, adjective: of the border, situated near the border of something; distant, limitrophal, of the frontier, situated at the last confines of a State. The towns of Siberia were once upon a time called ukrainian (*ukrainnie*). The town of Solovetsk (on the White Sea) is a *ukrájnij* place. *Ukráj*, *ukrájna*: region on the border of a State, border-land. The Latins took some villages of the *ukráina* of Pskov (Old). Up to the *ukráina* of our Moldav country (Old). On the *ukráina*, on the cold sea (Old). Actually the appellation of *Ukráina* is given to Little Russia ». (There follows in Dahl a whole series of derivative verbs and words, the enumeration of which would be void of meaning to a foreigner's ear).

Ukráina is but another form of the word *okráina*, substantive feminine, which means « end, border, term, confine. The *okráina* of that board is not straight, cut it by use of a measuring line. Don't walk on the *okráina* (edge) of the ravine, you run the risk of falling in-Border (*okráina*) of a State ».

XIIIth centuries Southern Russia was called Ukraina. I abstain from further comment.

3) «Ukraina is a popular expression». We have met with this assertion, though fully developed, more than once on the pages of Ukrainophile propaganda. Unable to deny that the Kiev territory was called Russia, the Ukrainians look for an escape from this unpalatable fact and declare that pre-Tartar Russia had yet another popular name in common use, — «Ukraina». But where are the proofs? Where the text? In the *byline*, in the literary documents there are none. Have Count Tyszkiewicz and Co. a private letter of the time of Oleg, or a tavern reckoning from Kiev in the XIIIth century?

It is downright dishonest to invent a name for a land and then take advantage of foreigner's ignorance of the Russian language to deceive them, making sport of the French, English and Italian reader. And as to the fairness of duping the simple people in the fatherland, we shall say nothing.

4) The assertion that the North and South «were always called by different names», (and that on the ground of the North having been called Moscovia), is incomprehensible. Count Tyszkiewicz knows well that *in Russian the word «Moscovie» does not exist*. For instance, the words «L'Ukraine et la Moscovie» can't be translated otherwise than «Ukraina and Moscow-Russia». (1) Incomprehensible too the expression: «at the epoch when Ukrainiã was called Russia

(1) The expression «Muscovite State» would not be exact; because up to the XVIIth century this term in the documents signified the district of the town of that name. (PLATONOV, *Course of Russian History*, p. 263).

or Sarmatia », for there was no such epoch; there are *two* epochs, with seven centuries between them!

We leave the reader to decide for himself whether Count Tyszkiewicz says such impossible things by mistake, or knowingly. Let us now unravel the questions of nomenclature: to *what* the name was given, by *whom* it was given, and *when* it was given.

The expanse of the Poland of to-day, of European and (in part) of Asiatic Russia, was anciently given the indefinite appellation of Scythia or Sarmatia. Its Northern and Eastern frontiers were unknown. In the imagination of Herodotus (V. B. C.) Scythia stretched out from the Danube and the Carpathian mountains eastward as far as the Don, and from the Black Sea and the Sea of Azóv northward to the central governorships of European Russia. But further eastward from the Don there lay Asiatic Scythia; according to the geography of Ptolemy (II A. D.) it stretched away to Mongolia, China and India. The Scythians are not a separate nation: the name was a collective one for many barely known races, and dates back to times far remote. The Scythians are mentioned for the first time in the VIIIth century B. C.; in the VIth century they possessed Asia Minor; from the IInd century B. C. their name is supplanted by that of « Sarmatians ». With the IInd century the name of European Scythia disappears: Ptolemy describes it under the appellation of Sarmatia. The Sarmatians also are not a separate people: already Strabo (I B. C. and A. D.) holds their name to be a collective one. It is impossible to make out the relations of the Sarmatians and the Scythians. Are they related nations? Do the Sarmatians form a part of the Scythians? In the IVth century A. D. Sarmatia becomes a part of the Gothic empire and its name, as well as that of Scythia, disappears. The Goths, the Avars and the Huns passed over these lands and prepared the way for the Slavs.

It is clear that the names of Scythia and Sarmatia have no relation whatever to the Ukrainian question;

they can be mentioned only by those who want to confuse the question and amaze the reader with their would-be erudition. On the first page of an anonymous Ukrainophile pamphlet you read: «Les Sarmates (ukrainiens)...»: this parenthesis, including but ten letters, includes an error of no less than ten centuries.

The space which was the South of the Russian Empire in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries, we shall designate by the word «South»; the one where, in the XIVth century, the Grand Duchy Moscow grew up, and the Nóvgorod region we shall call the «North». Then we shall have the following table. We hasten to add that its data are only *approximate*. To draw it up with scientific precision, it would be necessary to go through a mass of documents, literary and historical, with accounts written by travellers. But everything in this world is relative, and those who with a light heart make errors involving seven or ten centuries may profitably acquaint themselves with our table. (See pp. 216-217).

From this table, imperfect as it is, the following incontrovertible conclusions may be drawn: *a)* the population itself, in the South as well as the North, calls its land principally *Russ* and *Russia*. *b)* The assertion that «two countries» were «always called differently», is an invention. *c)* A small portion of the South (Kiev, Chernigov, Poltava) is, at a certain period, called by the population itself *Ukraina*. *d)* The population never gave the name of *Ukrainia* to Galicia, and as for the words *Moscovia* and *Ruthenia*, they were completely unknown to it. *e)* It is absolutely false to say that the appellation Little Russia (Malo-Rossia) was thrust upon South Russia by Moscow: the term was born in the South itself not later than the XIIIth century, for

in 1335 it was already the official denomination of the Galician-Volynia Principality (1).

Russian terminology knows nothing of the word *Moscovia*: all local names (whether in the Nóvgorod territory or the Ukraine) were covered by the generic names of *Russ* and *Rossia*. The different names for South and North (Ukrainia and *Moscovia*) existed only in the language of foreigners; they bear witness not to an ethnographical distinction, but to the different political destiny of « North » and « South ».

The names given to lands and nations are defined, not by the desires of contemporary political parties, but exclusively by citations from historical documents of the corresponding centuries.

5). « Nos deux pays ». For Count Tyszkiewicz there are *two* lands, for me there is but *one*. And it will remain as one, even if the European Areopagus, in co-operation with ambitious adventurers, proclaim that there are two. I know that it is one; I know it, because my reason and my heart tell me so. To Count Tyszkiewicz this is incomprehensible, and naturally so: a Polonified Lithuanian is a stranger to both parts of Russia, whereas to me all the members of my suffering country are dear; and when I look back on its past, I do not know whether the times of S. Vladímír and the Wise Yarosláv, my ancestors, do not touch me more than the ponderous greatness of Moscow.

(1) Hruszévski calls the South Russia of ancient days « Ukraina-Russ », but that is of his own motion. Such a name is not found in the documents.

« NORTH »		
CENTURY	NAMES	GIVEN BY
X-XX	Rouss (Rouss) ¹⁾	the Russians
X ²⁾ -XV.....	Ῥωσία	the Byzantines
XVII-XX	Rossia	the Russians
XIII ⁵⁾ -XX	Russia	Western Europeans
XIV ⁷⁾ -XVII.....	(Ruthenia) *)	
XIV.....	Minor Russia	Western Europeans
XIV ⁸⁾	Μικρὴ Ῥωσία	
XIV ¹⁰⁾	Little-Rouss	the Russians
?-XX.....	Little-Russia (Malorossia)	the Russians
Not before XIV ¹¹⁾ -XX.....	(Ukraina)	the Russians
Not before XIV ¹¹⁾ -XX.....	(Ucraina)	
XVIII-XX	New-Russia* for the most Southern region.	the Russians
Since 1914.....	Ukraina	the Ukrainophile pro- paganda followed by Western Europe.
Since 1917.....	Ukraina	

*) The expression Ruthenia is only used very rarely, especially for the North East, where at first the Princes are entitled from their dominions (see, for example the letter of Pope Innocent IV to Prince Alexander Nevsky, 1248 *Nobili Viro Alessandro Duci Susdaliensi*), later Princes *Russiae*, and, after the XVth century principally Sovereigns *Moscoviae*. The word *Ruthenians*, on the other hand, is often met with; it is applied to Galicia (from the XIIIth century if not sooner), to Lithuania (the usual designation of Gedimin is *rex Letwinorum et Rhutenorum multorum*) and to Moscow (the Pope Julius III gives to John the Terrible in 1550 the title of *universorum Ruthenorum Imperator*). Given a certain confessional sens

« SOUTH »

CENTURY	NAMES	GIVEN BY
X-XX.....	Rouss (Rouss) ¹⁾	the Russians
X ³⁾ -XV.....	Ῥωσία	the Byzantines
XVI ⁴⁾ -XX.....	Rossia	the Russians
XIII ⁵ and ⁶⁾ -XX..	Russia	Western Europeans
?XVII.....	(Ruthenia) [*]	
XVI ⁹⁾ -XVIII....	Moscovia	

1) We write Rouss and (Rouss) to distinguish the use of this word in ancient times, when it was the only name of the country, from its later use (preserved in common parlance or as a poetical expression) parallel with the word Russia.

2) In the regulations of the Emperor Leo the Philosopher (886-911) for « The Metropolitan Churches subject to the Patriarch of Constantinople », one finds in the list of the Churches the Russian Church, Ῥωσία.

3) Con stantine Porphyrogenitus (901-952) calls Novgorod Ἐξω (outer) Ῥωσία.

4) From documents of the epoch of John the Terrible.

5) Bull of Pope Honorius III (1227) *universis Regibus Russie*; it refers also to the Princes of the North, for it speaks of relations with the christians of Livonia and Esthonia.

6) Bull of Pope Gregory IX (1231) to the Grand-Duke George Vsévolodovich of Vladimir (on the Kliázma) *Regi Russie*. (Hist. Rus. Monum; I. doc. XXXIII and p. 9).

7) Writing of King Louis of Hungary of 20th May 1344 to Dmitri Diadka, Governor of Galician Russia.

8) Writing of Yuriij II, last Prince of the entire Little Russia, of 20th October 1335, to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order ^{**}).

9) Here see p. 33, n. 4.

10) Writing of the King of Poland to the Patriarch Philotes (not later than 1370).

1) I write "XIV" as a precaution. I shall be grateful to the Ukrainophile who will give me a quotation from the XIVth or XVth centuries with the name Ukraína in Russian or in a foreign language.

in the term Ruthenians, it is more frequently met with when treating of Western Russia (Galicia and Lithuania), but its use in the title of John the Terrible proves that the term designated all the Russians in general in the ethnic sense and not only the Little Russians and the White Russians.

^{**} The facsimile is joined to the collection « Boleslas-Yuriij II Prince of all Little Russia », edited by the Imperial Academy of Sciences in 1907. Let us note in passing that this collection contains very serious observations directed to M. Hruszévski, proving the wilful bias of his de juctions (see especially pp. 111 and 112).

THE UNITY OF PRE-TARTAR RUSSIA.

Ukrainian propaganda finds pleasure in making the foreign public believe that the Kiev State extended only over the South of Russia, and that the South («Ukrainia») is much older than the North («Russia»). When, say the Ukrainophiles, under Yarosláv I Kiev was already the capital of a powerful State, Moscow (mentioned for the first time in 1147) did not yet exist. For those who are ignorant of history, the demonstration seems plausible; in reality it is an evident mystification.

The *town* of Moscow is indeed 500 years younger than Kiev, but that *territory*, where later the Muscovite State arose, was peopled by Slavs in the pre-Rurik times. Rostóv was a Slavonic town, and gravitated to Nóvgorod before even the Rurik Princes were called (862). Directly the Kiev State begins as such to exist, the Northern territory enters to form part of the Russian land; among the towns to which, according to Oleg's contract (911), indemnities were paid by the Byzantines, Rostóv is mentioned; Vladímir the Saint is Prince of Kiev, and his sons reign with him, — one in Rostóv (north of what was to become Moscow), another in Mourom (to the east of Moscow). Let us not forget that the power of Russia was born in the North; at first the new-born child was put into swaddling-clothes at Nóvgorod, and then brought down to the South where, at Kiev, a suitable cradle was found. Oleg and Olga came from the North. Oleg came on a

war-expedition with warriors of the Northern tribes. Vladímir the Saint, when building frontier towns (strongholds) peopled them with emigrants from the North. Yarosláv I buit the town of Yarosláv on the upper Volga. We have already spoken of the unity of race, language, religion and culture, of all the parts of Russia in the pre-Tartar period. The demonstration of the unity of North and South would be but the narration of Russia's history during this period. We shall but give a list of the Grand-Dukes of the period before Andrew of Súzdal, viz., of the time when the central power passed from Kiev to Vladímir on the Kliazma, and shall point out where each of them ruled before he became Grand-Duke.

	Years of Grand-Ducal reign at Kiev	Where they reigned before
Vladimir the Saint	972-1015	in <i>Nóvgorod</i>
Sviatopolk I	1015-1016	in Túrov
Yaroslav I	1019-1054	in <i>Rostóv</i> and <i>Nóvgorod</i>
Isiaslav I son of Yaroslav	1054-1078	in Túrov and <i>Nóvgorod</i>
Vsévolod son of Yaroslav	1078-1093	in Pereyaslav and Chernigov
Sviatopolk II son of Isiaslav	1093-1113	in <i>Pólotsk</i> , <i>Nóvgorod</i> and Túrov
Vladimir Monomakh	1113-1125	in <i>Smolénsk</i> , Chernigov and Rostóv
Mstislav I son of Vladimir	1125-1132	in <i>Nóvgorod</i> and Bélgorod on the Dnieper
Yaropolk son of Vladimir	1132-1139	in Pereyaslav
Vsevolod son of Oleg	1139-1146	in Chernigov
Isiaslav II son of Mstislav	1146-1154	in Pínsk, <i>Mínsk</i> , Túrov Vladimir of Volynia and Pereyaslav
Isiaslav son of David	} 1154, 1157- 1159 et 1161	in Chernigov
Yuri I son of Vladimir		in <i>Rostóv</i> and <i>Súzdal</i>
Rostislav son of Mstislav	1159-1168	in <i>Smolensk</i> and (during the suspension of the Grand Ducal power) <i>Nóvgorod</i>
Mstislav II son of Isiaslav	1168-1169	in Pereyaslav Vladimir of Volynia and Belgorod

Nine of these fifteen Grand-Dukes had previously been princes in far-off Northern districts. Yaroslav I, the personification of the greatness of Kiev-Russia, had lived in the North for twenty-eight years.

Let us see now where the sons and brothers reigned as princes, while the father or eldest brother was Grand-Duke in Kiev.

1) Sviatoslav I (964-972), before going to Bulgaria, placed his sons thus:

Jaropolk in Kiev

Oleg in the Drevlan's territory

Vladimir the Saint in *Nóvgorod*.

2) Vladimir the Saint placed his sons thus, in the year 988:

Vicheslav in *Nóvgorod*

Isiaslav in *Polotsk*

Sviatopólk in Túrov

Yarosláv in *Rostóv*, and afterwards *Nóvgorod*

Vsévolod in Vladimir of Volynia

Sviatoslav in the Drevlan's territory .

Mstisláv in Tmutorokán

Stanislav in *Smolensk*

Sudislav in *Pskov*

Boris in *Rostóv* (Mourom)

Gleb in *Mourom* (*Súzdal*)

Pozvid in ?

3) After the death of Yarosláv I his sons inherited as follows:

Isiaslav, Túrov, *Nóvgorod* and Kiev

Sviataslav, Chernígov

Vsévolod, Pereyasláv (later Chernígov and Kiev)

Viacheslav, *Smolensk*

Igor, Vladimir of Volynia, (later *Smolensk*).

4) This distribution of territories remains unchanged during the reign of the Grand-Duke Isiaslav I,

while you see that Nóvgorod depends on Kiev; the whole East (from Mourom to Tmutorokán) on Chernígov; Rostóv, Súzdal, Bélgorod and the lands on the upper Volga on Pereyasláv.

5) The grand-sons of Yarosláv ruled as follows: Sviatopólk in Kiev and Túrov, Vladímír Monomákh in Pereyasláv, *Smolensk* and *Rostóv*: (his sons Mstisláv in *Nóvgorod*, Yuri in *Rostóv*), the sons of Sviatoslav in Chérnigov: one of them in *Mourom*.

As the Rurik family increased, the towns all over Russia where they governed grew in number. These Princes had but little affinity with the territories over which they ruled: the formation of a local line began to take shape later (1). For two successive centuries all the Princes considered themselves as members of one Kiev family: they moved continually from one town to another; with them went also part of their war-men; the death of an important Prince necessitated the shuffling of a number of the members of the families; the towns of the future Princedom of Moscow were taken up into this shuffling system.

Can one conscientiously affirm, in face of these facts, that North Russia was not one with the one Russia of the Kiev period?

After the Tartar invasion the break between North and South was not complete. In the beginning the spiritual tie was not severed; the religious life was one. The Metropolitans of Kiev, having moved to the North (1299) are entitled either Metropolitans « of all Russia », or « of Kiev and of all Russia ». S. Peter, Metropolitan of all Russia (1308-1326), who

(1) See p. 45, note 1.

had done so much for the spiritual growth of Moscow, the son of a peasant of Volynia, was born in Volynia and had been Abbot in a monastery there.

Can a precise line be drawn between North and South? Rivers united them. The Oká, then abounding in water, was as though created to be the connecting link between Chernigov and Moscow. The Princedom of Chernigov reached far out to the North; we read that in 1174 Lopasnia (to-day a station on the Moscow-Kursk railway) formed part of its territory, and it lies but 70 versts distant from Moscow. Lubetch, on the contrary, belonged to Moscow in the XVth century; it lies on the Dnieper, but 130 versts higher up than Kiev. In 1500 Prince Semon of Starodub went over to John III and brought with him Chernigov, Starodub, Lubetch and Hommel. Vassili, son of Schemaka, did likewise, bringing with him Rylsk and Nóvgorod-Séversk.

The idea of unity was never lost, as is proved by the literary documents and by the titles of the Princes. Thus in the South the chronicler calls Roman of Galicia-Volynia (1205), « autocrat of all the Russian Land »; in the North the Princes of Moscow, beginning with John Kalitá (1328-1341), call themselves Princes of « all Russia »; with Vassili the Blind (1425-62) we have the title « Grand-Duke of Moscow and all Russia ». The rupture was a consequence of external causes; it was consolidated through the depopulation of the South. When these causes disappeared, unity was naturally re-established.

Appendix 3.

NOTE ON THE ARTISTS OF LITTLE RUSSIA.

It may be well to add some facts which confirm what has been said page 140 as to the supposed existence of an «Ukrainian» school of art in Petersburg in the XVIIIth century.

In the time of Catherine and Alexander the whole Russian school of painting reflected French influence. That the artists came from different parts of Russia made no difference to their manner of handling the gifts of French culture. Whether an artist came from Archangel or from Poltava, his creations are indifferently to be compared to those of such portrait-painters as Duplessis, Roslain, Drouet or Lampi; or to those of such sculptors as Bouchardon and Pigalle. Among the more outstanding artists educated in the Petersburg Academy during this epoch, there were some who were natives of Little Russia. The historical painter Lóssenko (1737-1773) was received into the Court choir in Petersburg at the age of seven; he soon passed as pupil to the painter Argunóv; at the age of twenty he entered the Academy and passed his subsequent life abroad and in the North. The splendid portrait-painter Lévitisky (1735-1822) came of a Southern family, but was entirely Russian in his feelings, free from all provincialism (1); he enjoyed the good-will

(1) We learn this from his descendant, the publicist M. K. Pervukhine.

of three Emperors and was received as an intimate in court society. The portrait-painters Borovikovsky and Venetsiánov came to the capital at a mature age (the first at thirty, the second at twenty-six). Venetsiánov lived afterwards on his estate in the governorship of Tver, where he founded a school of painting. The sculptors Kozlovsky (1735-1802) and Martos (1752-1835) were educated from childhood (Martos from the age of thirteen) in the Academy, and later were pensioners in Paris and Italy; in later life they taught for many years in the Academy. In their creations one sees the influence of foreign masters and of the epoch: in their marbles they glorified Catherine, her high officials and her court, as well as the gods and heroes of antiquity. Their private letters are written in purest Russian, and only one or two of Kozlovsky's letters are in another language; but that language is not Little Russian: it is French, written from Paris in 1791 (1).

(1) We have just learned from the «Times» that in music likewise the Ukrainians are in the first flight. A banquet was got up in London by the Ukrainophiles where it was announced that Tchaikovsky was a Ukrainian. Tschaikovsky was born in the Ural, studied in Petersburg, lived and worked in Moscow, and at his estate in the governorship of Tver. I knew his brother, who was his biographer, but never heard any thing about Ukraina from him.

CHARACTERISTICS OF UKRAINIAN PROPAGANDA.

We give here some examples, taken at random, which show the methods employed by the Ukrainian propaganda. The foreign reader will perceive from these to what pitch that propaganda can come in its *ex parte* statements; the Russian reader will find here material for a counter propaganda.

There appeared at Bern in 1919 a pamphlet, «La Guerre polono-ukrainienne en Galicie», by Dr. E. Levitsky, «member of the Ukrainian soviet». The pamphleteer states correctly that Galicia and Volynia are not lands of the Polish people, but he wishes to persuade us that they are Ukrainian lands. There is annexed to the pamphlet a reproduction of a map of Poland of the XVIIth century. A special note (p. 74) explains that this map was made by the geographer Levasseur de Beauplan, «who knew the country perfectly because he had visited it himself». This map proves, according to Dr. Levitsky, 1) that the territory of Cholm (Kholm, Chelm) is Ukrainian land; 2) that Eastern Galicia of to-day then formed a distinct Ruthenian province (*voyvodie ruthénienne*) with an Ukrainian population (1).

(1) Here are Dr. Levitsky's actual words: «Cette carte a une certaine importance, car elle prouve que la soi-disant Galicie orientale formait une province particulière (*voyvodie*),

We open the map and look for the « Ukrainian Cholm » and the ukrainian *vojvodie* (for it is clear that the writer understands the word *ruthénienne* in the sense of « Ukrainian ») and what do we find? On the parallel of Vladimir of Volynia, over a stretch of 800 kilometres, is written in large letters *Russia Rubra*. (The first *R* on the meridian of Cholm, the last *a* on the left bank of the Sula). Not only that, but to the west of Cholm, on the space between the West Bug and the San, you read, from north to south, the word *Russia*. For normally-thinking people these inscriptions testify that the Cholm territory is Russian land.

Further, the inscription *vojvodie ruthenica* is not to be found on the map at all: everywhere there is the inscription *Russia*. The name *Ukraina* is written only once, and exactly where it ought to be, viz., in the eastern part of the large space occupied by the inscription *Russia Rubra*; here, from the middle course of the South Bug to the Desna one has written *Ukrania* (the first *U* on the right bank of the South Bug, the last *a* on the right bank of the Desna, near Chernigov, to the south-east) (1).

de laquelle relevait entr'autres pays (*terra*) le pays de Cholm ukrainien (!). Cette carte montre en outre que la frontière occidentale de la *vojvodie ruthénienne* [here a marginal note: *Russia Rubra*] était alors reportée beaucoup plus à l'ouest, derrière le San, que ce n'est le cas aujourd'hui, une preuve nouvelle que la population ukrainienne (!) sur la terre de Galicie, était autochtone dès l'origine et que ce n'est que successivement qu'elle fut refoulée du Vislok vers le San à l'est par les éléments polonais, comme nous l'avons déjà fait remarquer au cours de notre exposé ».

(1) The faulty spelling of the name (*Ukrania* instead of *Ukraina*) may be taken as a sign that the word was used but seldom; evidently these lands were generally called *Russia*.

Did Dr. Levitsky assume that his readers would have no time to study in detail an old badly-printed map?

If such be the method of polemic used by Ukrainophiles who put their full names under their writings, what is to be expected from the horde of anonymous pamphleteers?

The Ukrainians existed in the time of Herodotus: Vladimir the Saint was an Ukrainian and baptised Ukrainians: the Ukrainians are a Slavonic people, but of another origin from the Russians: the Ukrainian language (the Little Russian idiom is meant) is « quite another language » from the Russian one: (1) the Ukrainians have been suffering for ages under the Russian yoke. Such and similar *absurdities* are put before the foreigner in dozens of pamphlets and hundreds of articles, which are confidently swallowed down by him.

Let us remark briefly on some of the favourite topics dwelt on by the Ukrainian propagandists.

(1) This last assertion, though, is not anonymous; it is a word of the same Count Tyszkiewicz in a news-paper interview. Take then this Little Russian song, « Angry, angry winds are blowing »: it is very popular, and sung over all Russia. We shall give it in Russian and in Little Russian. Its first line is:

In Little Russian: Viit vitri, viit bñjni,

» Russian: Véiut vétry, véiut bñjni,

Its second line is:

In Little Russian: Aj dérevia hnùtsia.

» Russian: Aj derévia gnùtsia

Its third line is:

In Little Russian: Oy, kak bòlit mòie sértse,

» Russian: Oy, jak bòlit mòie sértse.

Its fourth line is:

In Little Russian: Sàmi sliósi liùtsia.

» Russian: Sàmi sliósi liùtsia.

And these two are entirely different languages?

1) Anthropometry is called in to prove the existence of a distinct Ukrainian race; a comparison of « Russian », « Ukrainian » and Polish skulls, must bring out that Little Russia is inhabited by a separate race. Such evidence can convince only the simple: the anthropometric differences between Brandenburgers and Bavarians do not prove that the latter are not German. The skull of the Tuscans and of the Lombards, of the people of Provence and those of Picardy, may differ; but that does not prove that the inhabitants of Milan and Florence are not Italians, nor that those of Amiens and of Aix are not Frenchmen.

2) A fundamental difference between « Ukrainians » and « Russians » is found in the fact that the Little Russian peasant is nearly always owner of the soil he tills, while the system of communal property still prevails largely in the North. But such a difference does not depend on race; the geographical situation, a denser population, and other secondary reasons have hastened in the South of Russia the inevitable evolution of the system of peasant-proprietorship. That is the whole explanation of the matter.

3: A saying of Peter the Great is quoted: « The Little Russians are an intelligent people ». But ethnographic questions are solved by Science, not by the phrase of a monarch, even though he be Peter the Great himself, — all the more that the Russian word *narod* (people) is not only used in the ethnographic sense, but also to denote the population of a given geographical region (as in the expression: the people of Riasan are remarkable for their laboriousness).

4) One also quotes an Instruction, in autograph, of Catherine the Great to Prince Wiazemsky, in which she speaks of the need of « russifying the Little Russians ». So they are not Russians, conclude the Ukrainophiles in triumph, because they needed russification. But in that phrase the Empress does not speak of the population, but of the provinces, and not only those of Little Russia but also those of Livonia, Finland and Smolensk. It is impossible to russify the inhabitants of Smo-

lensk and, on the other hand, could the talented Catherine have dreamt of russifying the Finns, a people of entirely different origin from the Russian and living in a country which contained but a few hundred Russians? She was speaking of a political, not an ethnographic, russification, of the abolition of local privileges, for the most part of foreign origin (Polish), and of introducing into these provinces an administrative system identical with that of the rest of the Empire (1). The Empress carried out her plans for Little Russia with much circumspection; the abolition of the office of hetman raised no discontent among the people.

5) To rouse the sympathies of the Italian public, so fond of grandiloquent phrases, we are assured, in a certain interview, that Mazeppa « gloriously unfurled the holy banner of liberty ». But liberty was far from the thoughts of Mazeppa, and the banner he unfurled was that of the basest treason. Before the battle of Poltava Peter the Great was within an ace of losing his support, and then it was Mazeppa betrayed his benefactor in passing over to Charles XII. « The hetman Mazeppa, as an historic figure, does not represent any national idea (2). He was an egoist in the full sense of

(1) The letter is as follows: « La Petite-Russie, la Livonie et la Finlande sont des provinces qui se gouvernent par les privilèges qu'on leur a confirmés; il ne serait pas du tout convenable de les violer en les supprimant tous tout d'un coup; néanmoins, les appeler pays étrangers et les traiter comme tels, c'est plus qu'un faute; on peut dire à coup sûr que c'est de la bêtise. Il importe d'amener ces provinces, comme aussi celle de Smolensk, par les méthodes les plus légères, à se russifier et à cesser d'avoir l'air de loups dans les bois. Il est très aisé d'y arriver en élisant des hommes raisonnables chefs de ces provinces; pour ce qui est de la Petite-Russie, quand il n'y aura pas d'hetman, il faudra travailler à faire disparaître le temps et le nom des hetmans et non pas seulement veiller aux personnes promoues à cette dignité ».

(2) Only 1200 Cossacks passed over with Mazeppa to the side of Charles XII.

the word. Polish in his education and way of life, he emigrated to Little Russia, where he had a successful career by worming himself into the good graces of the Russian authorities, never hesitating to use the most immoral means. We may best represent his personality to ourselves by saying that he was a personified Lie ». He betrayed his Ukraine, seduced by the offers of the Poles: they made up for him a princely escutcheon and set plans in motion for ceding him some territory in White Russia. He meditated a third treason against Charles XII to regain the good-will of Peter the Great, but time was not given him to realise his project.

It is not I who speak thus, but Kostomarov (1). Kostomarov is not one of our greatest historians, but in this case his judgment is of special value. Son of a Little Russian peasant woman, he tenderly loved his country and its past, its tales, its popular songs; further, in Science he was on the side of those who study local peculiarities, and he specialised in the history of Little Russia.

6) The Government, say the Ukrainophiles, persecuted the literary movement of last century. This is true. But was that movement purely literary? The basis of the programme of the « S. Cyril and S. Methodius Society » (1846) was the federation of the Slavonic countries, that is to say, the dis-memberment of Austria. The Emperor Nicholas I' looked on himself as the sentinel at the gate of the Holy Alliance, and scented revolution everywhere. Holding such a view, could he refrain from persecuting a society of this nature, without regarding whether it was Little or Great Russian? In this movement Socialist tendencies showed

(1) « Mazepa et les mazelistes », p. 585.

themselves, and protests against the existing *régime*. The underlying theme of the poetry of Chevchenko was a protest against the servitude of the peasants; at that time that meant he was «revolutionary», and when Chevchenko was exiled to Orenburg (1847) that punishment was inflicted because he was member of a secret Society, as well as for the revolutionary tendency of his poetry, but *not* (be it well understood) because he wrote in Little Russian. It was opposition to the Government that was punished, but the Little Russian did not suffer more than the Great Russian.

The liberty to print books written in Little Russian was limited during the three last years of the rule, otherwise so liberal, of Alexander II. Without doubt it is humiliating to confess it, but there are attenuating circumstances. The guiding hand of the Austrian Government was felt behind the Ukrainian literary movement. It was a badly chosen measure of national defence.

7) All the assertions of the Ukrainophile party that Petersburg was the centre of the Russian government (in the sense of being strange to the «Ukrainian people») are without foundation. The Petersburg government was Russian in quite a different sense, in a common sense which comprised within it persons from all the parts of Russia, of different nationalities (1) and

(1) Every one knows how many places in the Government of the old *régime* were held by Germans of the Baltic Provinces. In the reign of Alexander III Count Delianow, an Armenian, was for 15 years Minister of Public Instruction; under Alexander II Count Loris-Mélikov, an Armenian, played the rôle of dictator of Russia. The Rumanian Casso was Minister of Public Instruction under Nicholas II. Prince Chingiskan, a Mussulman, was Aide-de-camp General to the same Emperor, and the Téké General Alikhanov, a Mussulman also, held an important administrative post in Central Asia, and so on.

classes (1). As regards the representatives of the three branches of the Russian people, there was never a moment when one could not have pointed to several Ministers of Little Russian origin. The Counts Razumovsky and Prince Bezborodko in the second half of the XVIIIth century, Prince Kotchubey in the first half of the XIXth century, held the reins of power at Petersburg. In all that was accomplished, the good and the bad, under the old *régime*, the natives of the Ukraine had their part, and bear responsibility for it at the bar of history along with the rest of the Government.

8) The Ukrainian propaganda is impregnated with hatred towards the « Russians », but in fact the population has never shared this feeling. Never has there been any difference or conflict, armed or otherwise, between the three branches of the homogeneous people. During 260 years of a united existence, with the same government, the same religion, the same intellectual and economic interests, the South and the North of Russia have become welded together. The factories, the obligatory military service in force for more than forty years, where the inhabitants of every part of the country rubbed shoulders together; the labourers whom the over-populated provinces of the South sent by hundreds of thousands to the sparsely peopled steppes of the Volga, accomplished the fusion, so that you will hear northern songs in Little Russia and vice-versa. Little Russians of education only speak Russian among themselves, and only employ the patois,

(1) The ex-ambassador at Constantinople, Zinovieff, was the son of a peasant-serf. Count Witte had attracted attention when acting as station-master at some insignificant place. The Minister of Public Instruction, Bogolépov, was the son of a police sergeant; and so on.

if they know it, when addressing the peasants. Government *employés*, officers, members of the liberal professions, in passing from one end of Russia to another, have lost all local colour. « Who is that? », you ask in a restaurant at Milan or Rouen. « A Southerner, beyond doubt », one may answer you; but in the corresponding *milieu* in Russia, it is not possible at first sight to distinguish a Northerner from a Little Russian. And what is more, no one took the least interest in such things before the Revolution: if it were a matter of the promotion of a sergeant, the election of a Bank Director or the nomination of a Minister, no one dreamed of asking from what part of Russia, from Kiev or from Moscow, the candidate originally came; that was of as slight importance as the colour of his hair.

9) The propaganda assures us that the Imperial Duma contained 74 representatives of the Ukrainian people, who valiantly defended their rights. At the elections for the Imperial Duma there existed electoral colleges (*curia*) for Poles and Jews, but there was no Ukrainian college, nor did any one ever dream of setting up one. As to the Ukrainian question, it was never raised in the Duma, whose last President was the Little Russian Rodzianko.

10) Announcing the arrival of an Ukrainian Choir in Rome, one of the papers of the City wrote that the Italian public would have for the first time the opportunity of hearing the songs of this people, who, under the yoke of the Russian Tsars had not been permitted to sing them. There never was a regimental choir throughout the whole Russian army that did not know some Little Russian songs. In several theatres, the Imperial theatres among others, comedies were given in the Little Russian idiom: these finished usually with songs and dances. Ukrainian music, as a separate entity, does not exist, — neither in symphonies nor in chamber music, —

but the charming popular songs of Little Russia have entered largely into the creative imagination of Russian composers; Little Russian popular customs have served as themes for several operas by Rymsky-Korsakoff, Tchaikovsky, Musorgsky, and Kochevoff.

It is interesting to remark that when the Russian Symphony Director, Pomerantzeff, well known in Rome, wished to place the truth as to « Ukrainian Music » before the Roman public in a short notice to the papers, full of names and precise facts and signed by himself, this notice was not inserted, while for a second time the same Roman journal observed that only now could the Ukrainian people sing freely.

11) In an Ukrainian paper the verses of Puschkine on night in the Ukraine were quoted (verses written in Russian): every Russian knows these verses, which are of a haunting beauty. The paper presented them in such a manner as to leave the reader under the impression that these verses were an example of the haunting beauty of Ukrainian literature.

Gogol has written in Russian a very well known tale: *Tarass Bulba*. An Austrian journal informed the world that the Russian Government had forbidden the publication of this story in the language in which it was written by... Chevchenko.

In 1919 General Denikin, say the Ukrainophiles, in his mania for russifying everything, dared to call Kiev « the mother of Russian cities ». Nestor gives the answer by anticipation: In the year 882 « Oleg sat down to reign at Kiev and said: This shall be the mother of the Russian cities ».

12) Reference is made to the scholastic question in Little Russia (the schools are organised by the Minister of Public Instruction at Petersburg and by the local Zemstvos precisely in the same way as in all the rest of Russia) and the facts in the case are so presented as though they were manifestations of a special culture, « our culture ».

The statistics of that part of the railway net of the Empire which is spread over the southern provinces, are taken as proving the high state of perfection of

the communications in the Ukraine, and the statistics of a port of the Empire, Odessa, are given as evidence of the enormous Ukrainian export-trade.

All this, for any person who knows the a b c of Russian life, is «stitched with white threads», yet these pamphlets (often in charming covers) are sent to the Members of Parliament of all countries, and do not fail to make an impression.


13) The Ukrainian bureaux from 1915 onwards began to publish maps on which the name «Ukrainian» is stretched out from central Galicia to the Kuban, so as to occupy exactly four times as much space as it ought (see p. 236). If you lengthen out on the map the word «Italy» four times, it will include France and England, while the first *I* will be on Iceland. These Ukrainian maps are just as fantastic; yet under the influence of the Ukrainian propaganda the words «Ukrainia» and «Ukrainians», not only in the sketch maps of foreign news-papers but also in the maps of foreign general-staffs, are printed over all the length of South Russia, in defiance of Geography, History and Common Sense. The publicists, the diplomatists, the ministers of war of the Allies, work in good faith with maps that are falsified in accordance with the instructions of the Austro-German general staff.

Are we not living in strange times?

One could multiply these examples endlessly. Be it quotations, alleged statements of documents, references to facts in the past or in our own day, be it a translation from the Russian language or a philological explanation of Russian names, — everywhere you will find in the words of the Ukrainophiles, either *ex parte* statements or obvious untruths. And it cannot be otherwise: a lie can only be defended by methods which are far from the truth.

Appendix 5.

THE REAL DIMENSIONS OF THE TERRITORY,
called Ukraine in the XVIIth century,
compared with the extent of the actual « German Ukraine ».




Of the real proportions of the Ukraine see note page 121; the additional territory, here shown by dots, corresponds to the map of the year 1650, which is spoken of in that note. The frontier of the « German Ukraine » is designated according to the map edited by the « Ukrainian Office » of Lausanne; the expanse of the latter is four times greater than that of the real Ukraine. There are ukrainophile maps, where the eastern frontier of the « State » is pushed still more to the east, — as far as the shore of the Caspian sea, and the southern encloses the whole of the Crimea with the all-russian Sebastopol and the Tartar Alushta.

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
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1. COUNT ALEXANDER KOUTAISOFF, « **Ukraina** ». Copenhagen, Jensen & Ronager, 1918. 2 kr.
2. MAURICE MAILLARD, « **Le Mensonge de l'Ukraine Séparatiste** ». Paris, Berger-Levrault, 5 rue des Beaux-Arts, 1919. 2 fr.
3. G. L. B., « **Souvenirs d'Ukraine, 1917-1918** ». Vevey, Klansfelder, 1919.
4. Pce. A. WOLKONSKY, a) « **La Vérité historique et la Propagande Ukrainophile** », 1920. Rome, chez Fratelli Bocca, 26 Via Marco Minghetti. Lire 8.
b) **The same in Russian.** 1920.
Turin, Fratelli Treves. Lire 8.

ETHNOGRAPHIC LIMITS OF THE RUSSIAN, POLISH, LITHUANIAN, LETTISH AND ESTHONIAN PEOPLES.

(According to the data of 1897).



EXPLANATION OF SKETCH-MAP N^o. 1.

We have drawn up this sketch-map on the basis of the *Atlas l'Europe Ethnique et Linguistique* published in 1917 by the Geographical Institute of Novara.

The historical notes (pp.84-88) make it clear that the lands of Polotsk, Vitebsk, Smolénsk, Minsk and Pinsk were ethnographically Russian lands from ancient times; the other lands coloured green, from the Dnieper westward to the southern slopes of the Carpathians, were also inhabited by the Russian people from remote times.

At the "Time of Troubles" (1598-1613) Poland, profiting by the disordered state of Russia, extended her frontiers eastward. During the reign of the Tzar Michel, first of the Romanovs (1613-45) Smolénsk, Briánsk, Nóvgorod-Séversk, Tchernígov, Kiev and Poltava remained in her hands. Under the Tzar Alexis Mikhailovich (1645-76) some Russian lands began to return under the dominion of Moscow. By the peace of Andrusov (1667) the Russo-Polish frontier was drawn back westward to the line marked red on the map, and remained thus until the first division of Poland (1772).

By the three divisions of Poland Russia regained:

in 1772: 1) the region from the frontier of 1667 to the Dvina (Pólotsk); 2) Vitebsk; 3) the region from the same frontier to the Beresina, i. e., Russian and Lettish lands;

in 1793: a broad strip up to the meridian of Pinsk, so that Minsk, Pinsk, Kamenéts-Podolsk returned to Russia. On the map all that strip is situated in the part coloured green;

in 1795: 1) Courland and Lithuania up to the Niemen (Kovno and Grodno)(*); 2) a strip up to the line Grodno-Brest (including the latter); 3) ascending the Bug the frontier moved towards the later frontier of 1914, following it to the sources of the Southern Bug.

As a result of these three divisions Russia has not even touched the Polish territories (coloured rose). (That took place later, at the Congress of Vienna).

To re-build Poland within the frontiers of 1772, as the Poles demand of the Bolsheviks, is as though, in remaking Austria, one should incorporate with it Venice and Milan. It is impossible to imagine a more crying injustice, one more illogical, and a more short-sighted action in the field of international politics: sooner or later Russia will be compelled to eliminate the Polish domination within her borders.

(* *Erroneously printed on the left bank. Another fault: a very small circle, coloured rose, is lacking round Lvov, to indicate the artificial polonisation of that town and its surroundings.*

RUSSIA AT THE PERIOD OF THE TARTAR INVASION (Middle of XIIIth century).

EXPLANATION OF SKETCH-MAP N. 2

The darkened space represents the expanse peopled by the Russians towards the middle of the XIIIth century.

On the direction of the south-eastern frontier of this expanse see pages 108-110. Behind that frontier lay the domain of the Asiatic nomads, the strife with whom in the Xth, XIth and XIIth centuries exhausted the Dnieper Russia, prepared her ruin under the blows of the Tartars in the XIIIth century, and her depopulation in the XIIIth-XVth centuries.

The west ethnographical frontier in the middle of the XIIIth century corresponded nearly with the political frontier of the west Russian principalities. The dotted line drawn near Yuriev and Vilno, shows the limit of the extension of the Russian power to the west about 1100 (see note page 111).

The south-western projection embraces the Holm, Galician and Carpathian Russia: Holm, Lwow and Galitch are from times immemorial Russian towns.

The hatched space on the Donets is the coal-basin. Per. = Pereyaslav.

The scale is in kilometres.

Correction. Archangelsk ought to be marked by a black square, not by a circle.



Towns in existence before the middle of the XIIIth century
 Towns founded later

- of Russian origin.
- of non-Russian origin.
- of Russian origin.
- of non-Russian origin.