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Vol. X—Number 1

Winter, 1954

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█ Ukrainian ethnographic territory

— Boundaries of Soviet republics and satellites

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THE 300th ANNIVERSARY OF THE UKRAINIAN MISTAKE

Editorial

The USSR spent the second half of 1953 in fostering throughout its entire area preparations for celebrating the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of January 18, 1654, which began the enslavement of Ukraine by Moscow. The Kremlin set in motion the entire internal Soviet propaganda system, the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the pseudo-labor unions, the propagandists in the kolkhozes, the Academies of Sciences, the Union of Writers of the USSR, the artistic and musical world to celebrate on a grand scale the greatest mistake of the Ukrainian people, — its link with Moscow, forged by the Treaty of Pereyaslav between Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Moscow Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich in 1654.

On December 9, 1953 not only *Pravda*, the organ of the Soviet Communist Party and *Izvestia*, the organ of the All-Union Council of Ministers but also the entire Bolshevik press in all corners of the Soviet Union contained an appeal to all the peoples of the Soviet Union from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet *"to mark on a wide scale this outstanding historical event, the 300th anniversary of the union of Ukraine and Russia, as a great national festival, to organize lectures, reports, discussions devoted to this important event in the history of our country and the further strengthening of the friendship of peoples in the Soviet Union."*

In honor of the 300 years of the Pereyaslav Treaty, the miners of the Donbas and Kryvy Rih bound themselves to raise their norm of production, the workers on the kolhosps to increase their work on the collective farms, scholars, poets and artists dedicated their creations to show what a great advantage had come to Ukraine from this Ukrainian-Russian agreement and how it produced the *"model and eternally indestructive friendship of the Ukrainian people with the Russian people."*

The display windows of the shops in Kiev, Lviv, Kharkiv and the other cities of Ukraine are full of vases, tea services, kylyms and textiles with portraits of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the Muscovite envoy Buturlin and the Rada of Pereyaslav. All the schools studied the epoch of

Khmelnysky in the official Russian interpretation that "the Ukrainian people had heroically struggled against the Poland of the nobles with only the single thought that it could unite with the Russian people in a single state."

The poets and prose writers poured out a flood of poems and verses, the musicians issued their works to glorify the event which the Ukrainian people themselves consider as the most tragic event in their history.

To glorify the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty the Soviet government planned it on a far broader scale than any other celebration in the 36 years of the existence of the Bolshevik government. With an eye to this, six days before the definite Pereyaslav Anniversary, on January 12, 1954 *Pravda* published its *Ukrainian-Russian Theses*, which cover the entire history of Ukraine with the aim of proving the beneficent role "of the elder Russian brother" toward "the young Ukrainian brother," although that enslaved Ukrainian brother was in fact three centuries older.

At the conclusion of the celebration, Ukraine did receive an unexpected present: by a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Crimea, up to the time a region of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, "because of its geographical and economic connection of the Crimean Peninsula with Ukraine" was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The resolution of the Supreme Soviet emphasized that this was done "because of the friendship with the Ukrainian people on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the union of the two peoples.

This entire anniversary has been full of sentiment and assurances of the Russian-Ukrainian eternal and unbreakable friendship and evokes against our will suspicion as to the sincerity of this anniversary mood. We know that sentimentalism has always been foreign to the Bolsheviks and this entire commemorative parade shows only the one thing, that Kremlin is disturbed by the dynamics of the Ukrainian movement for liberation, that it feels its own weakness, that it is unable to control the national movements and so it wishes to show to the world that harmony and friendship reign between Russia and Ukraine and to its citizens, especially the Ukrainians, it is trying to give a proof of its good will by treating Ukraine as a truly allied state, while in reality it is a colony of red Russia. The transfer of the Crimea was aimed to destroy the suspicions of "the sceptics."

It is clear that among the Ukrainians behind the iron curtain, these Russian sops on the anniversary must evoke a result opposite to that which the Kremlin desired, for the position of Ukraine under the Rus-

sian red yoke, is too tragic for even a child not to notice. Ukraine wants from the Kremlin not words but deeds and in real life Ukraine does not see the latter. So the jubilee celebrations on the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav Treaty will not produce the results that Moscow desires. Even the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine will deceive no one; this under normal conditions between federated nations would be undeniably important for Ukraine and a sign of good will but now every Ukrainian well understands that Ukraine with the Crimea or without it is only a Moscow colony brutally russified and exploited by the Kremlin. Moscow even on this festival day did not try in its well-known *Theses* of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party to conceal the fact it is aiming at the same goal as that of the Tsar, the formation from the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians of a single Russian People, which now only has the new name of the Soviet People. Since the Ukrainian people — in accordance with the Kremlin *Theses* — were only a branch of the one Russian people in the time of Kievan Rus', and were separated as a result of Polish conquest, it is clear that the Soviet period has the task to wipe out the results of foreign slavery and restore again the unity of the Russian people from the White to the Black Sea.

With such a falsification of the old history of Ukraine as the Ukrainian meets every day of his life, the 300th anniversary of the Pereyaslav hypocrisy can only remind him that Moscow has never honored its treaties and that "the solid word of the Tsar, which must be unchanging" meant no more than the word of Lenin or Stalin, based on Bolshevik dialectics.

For 300 years the life of Ukraine under Moscow has been an uninterrupted system of falsifications, the violence of Moscow to a free people and individuals, to the freedom of religion and political convictions. The entire violence and lawlessness of Moscow were coordinated so that 130 years after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Ukraine lost the last traces of her separate statehood, that 200 years after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Moscow could deny even the same existence of a separate Ukrainian people, and as the Tsarist Minister of Police Valuev said in 1863 that "there never was, is not and never will be a Ukraine."

*

The ink on the Pereyaslav Treaty was scarcely dry when Moscow two years later (1656) betrayed its Ukrainian partner by concluding peace with Poland and completely ignoring its Ukrainian ally. After the revolutionary outbreak against Poland, the young Ukrainian nation, exhausted by five years of war with Poland, hoped by the Treaty of

Pereyaslav to secure help in order to preserve the whole of the territories of Ukraine and also to liberate the rest of the Ukrainian people in the western lands whom the revolutionary work of Khmelnytsky had not been able to free. Yet only 13 years after the Pereyaslav Treaty, Moscow (1667) even divided liberated Ukraine with Poland.

Five years had not passed from the solemn declaration of the Moscow ambassador Buturlin in Pereyaslav on January 18, 1654, that "the Tsar's word cannot change" but endures for centuries eternally, yet at the second General Council at Pereyaslav (1659) the Moscow armies in the allied Ukrainian state surrounded the young Hetman, Yuri Khmelnytsky, with a guard and compelled him to swear to the new falsified *Pereyaslav Articles* which limited the rights of Ukraine with the same solemn protestations that they were the original *Pereyaslav Articles* of 1654, a copy of which the surprised Hetman did not have at hand.

Later came the arrest and exile of the Ukrainian Hetmans, Mnohohirshny and Doroshenko who defended the rights of Ukraine; the execution of Samiylovych, Hetman of the independent Ukrainian state and so on to the slow but systematic destruction of all traces of the allied Ukrainian state in the next 130 years.

The breaking of all international agreements by red Moscow in our time, including the cynical post-Yalta actions are not new inventions exclusively of the Soviet government; they are the continuation of the traditional Russian historical political method. The articles of Prof. Alexander Ohloblyn and Andriy Yakovliv in this publication inform the reader in detail of the paths of the political method of old Moscow which differ little from those of the new Moscow.

*

If now the Soviet government recognizes no other faith or political point of view than that of Bolshevik Moscow, dictated by a band of red Moscow imperialists in the Kremlin, the Ukrainian experience during 300 years has shown them that Moscow for centuries has always been intolerant of any other faith and culture differing from that of Moscow itself. Along with the political liquidation of the state status of Ukraine came the violent liquidation of its ecclesiastical and cultural life. The enslavement of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch of Moscow, when it was in its full flower and in brotherhood with the Western religious trends, was achieved by denunciation, bribery and violence which served as a fifth column among the weak types of Ukrainians, who tried to work for Moscow for their own profit.

Meeting with the energetic opposition of the Ukrainian religious circles, Moscow always and constantly was ready to give the most solemn assurances with the definite idea of breaking them the next day, if only conditions became more favorable for Moscow. The Charter of Liberties granted by the Tsar and the Patriarch of Moscow in 1686, to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church meant nothing two years later. The Ukrainian Orthodox were suspected of non-Orthodox beliefs, their highly enlightened works were constantly criticized and placed under Moscow censorship merely because they differed from the style of Muscovite darkness and superstition. After 100 years there was not a trace of the old Ukrainian Kievan Metropolitanate and after 200 years more the second Ukrainian Catholic Church was destroyed by fire and sword, for they both were obstacles in the way of Moscow becoming the one, Third and last Rome.

The Ukrainian Church, the creator of the culture of the Ukrainian people, lost all its influence on the cultural and spiritual life of that people. After the Pereyaslav Treaty Moscow profited liberally from the Ukrainian cultural reservoir and reworked these Ukrainian cultural resources in its own way and for its imperialistic needs. At the same time it destroyed the source of culture in Ukraine by such barbarous acts as the liquidation of the flourishing Ukrainian school system in the XVIII century, the prohibition of printing anything even including the Bible in the Ukrainian language and the ruination of monuments of the Ukrainian past of 800 or 900 years before. The Moscow purpose was the denial of the national identity of the Ukrainian people. The articles on the results of the Pereyaslav Treaty for the ecclesiastical and cultural life of the Ukrainians appear in this issue in detail.

*

Ukraine is one of the richest countries in the world, the breadbasket of Europe, a land where under the imposed economic order the Ukrainian people in only the last 36 years have been twice annihilated in masses by famine thanks to the rule of Moscow. On the altar of the Moloch of the Russian Soviet empire, the Ukrainian people have lost during this time about ten million lives. The Ukrainian people who before 1914 held the third place in the world for their fertility and population growth, have not increased in the last 36 years.

There have emigrated from Ukraine, a rich industrial land, throughout the whole world about six million Ukrainians who could not find work and bread in the rich Ukrainian land. Why is this? Because beginning with the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Ukraine for 300 years has been merci-

lessly exploited by the Moscow centre and its wealth has been used to build the Russian Empire. This was true formerly under the Tsars; it is true to-day. Economically, Ukraine is in the position of a colony of Moscow. The two economic articles of Prof. Goldman and Prof. Chyrovsky will give much information on the economic results of 300 years of Russian rule over Ukraine.

*

The methods which Moscow has used against Ukraine during the last 300 years to achieve its goal to create a universal empire of one Russian people and become the Messiah of humanity have always been the same — the denial of the right of every people to exist physically and spiritually unless it shows a desire to become part not only of a single imperial creation of the Moscow people but also an organic part of the Russian people. The annihilation of the leading intellectual class has been applied in Moscow constantly on the lands which it has conquered, beginning with Vsevolod, Prince of Vladimir on Klyazma, the forerunner of Moscow in the XII century,¹ through the conquest of the citadel of the free republican order in Eastern Europe, Novgorod the Great (1478), through the systematic annihilation of the Tatars after the conquests of the tsardoms of Kazan and Astrakhan to the annihilation of the leading classes of the Ukrainian people, in the last 300 years.

Since in modern times not only the leading classes but also the masses have become bearers of national ideas and national ambitions, the old Moscow traditional methods have now been applied not only as before to the leading classes, who as now have usually fallen victims in the first attack but to the millions of the masses of a self-conscious people. The practices of the Bolsheviks in the last 36 years have not been anything new but a more brutal and a more mass application of the old Moscow practices of annihilating entire nations which were to become either themselves or only their devastated territory a part of the empire of the one Russian people.²

After 300 years of experience in the Moscow political school, the Ukrainian people has secured a basic knowledge of the Ukrainian-Russian relations from which it now draws the logical consequence — a complete separation from Moscow. Between Ukraine and Moscow there now can be no talk of federation, for the experience of 300 years of Ukraine

¹ Peter Struve, *History of Russia*, Paris, 1952.

² The article of Prof. Hryshko in the *Ukrainian Quarterly* Vol. IX, No. 4 and the article of Prykhodko in this issue.

with Moscow has shown it that any regime in Moscow, the reactionary tsardom, the short-lived democracy of Kerensky or the latest Communist Russian regime, each aims finally to the denial of the Ukrainian nation as an independent political factor in Eastern Europe and its complete political and economic enslavement and the russification of Ukraine.

The classical example is the Russian interpretation of the history of Russia and Ukraine. We can count on the fingers of one hand the Russian historians who have not commenced the history of the Russian people on alien territory, the territory of the Ukrainian people who are so different spiritually from the Russians. The exceptions are those Russian historians who have not claimed the old period of Ukrainian history, the history of Kievan Rus' of the IX-XIII centuries and the entire culture formed at that time by the Ukrainian people. No history of any other non-nomadic people has ever started on a foreign territory, that of a neighbor. Russian history is the exception which began on the alien Ukrainian land, for imperialism and cultural conquest has become the essence of Russian political thinking.³

There are undeniably a few Russian thinkers who recognize the true right of Ukraine to its physical and spiritual heritage but they are so few and have so little influence on the political and spiritual life of Russia that we must consider them negligible exceptions.

The Ukrainian people is not only the product of a separate spiritual formation of Iranian-Greek culture, but it is also a part of that spiritual and cultural area which has been formed in Europe. In Pereyaslav in 1654 there was made clear in its full force the spiritual, social and even the economic antagonism of Ukraine and Moscow and this is well emphasized in the article of Prof. Goldman.⁴ So the rapprochement of Ukraine to Moscow in 1654 as the result of a serious situation in the heat of the struggle with Poland, was a great historical error, which should not have been made. Ukrainian historical, ecclesiastical, cultural and economic students now realize this definitely. The whole Ukrainian people now recognize it.

In the situation of that time the only place for Ukraine was in the progressive camp of the then Protestant League — Sweden, England and the German Protestant lands resting on cooperation with Turkey, the the enemy of Moscow.⁵ Bohdan Khmelnytsky, the cooperator in the Pe-

³ *The Kremlin Theses on Ukraine*, by Manning.

⁴ *East and West in the Pereyaslav Alliance* — in this issue.

⁵ Krupnytsky, *The Political Orientations of Ukraine at the time of the Pereyaslav Treaty* — in this issue.

reyaslav act tried to correct this mistake in his own lifetime, although even then it was not easy to get away from the tenets of the Moscow alliance.

Ukraine from the dawn of its history has belonged to that world which was built upon the Greco-Roman classical civilization and so in the first period of its history Ukraine was a part of Europe. In the critical time of the Mongol invasion on eastern Europe Ukraine, unlike Moscow, was oriented toward Europe. On the western European civilization there developed the national and cultural rebirth of Ukraine in the XVI and XVII centuries and also the national rebirth of the XIX and XX centuries and even now spiritually Ukraine is a part of the Atlantic European and American world. Moscow is the essential part of the Eurasian continent.

When now we are speaking so much of the creation of larger political organisms, and federated nations, and concretely think of a federation of Europe, just as in the Middle Ages, Ukraine never declined to be a part of European "Communitas Christiana," so now it wishes the same thing. The separation of Ukraine from Moscow, the full annulment of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 300 years ago which has been brutally broken by Moscow thousands of times is a *ceterum censeo* of the modern Ukrainian political thought and the only way to save the physical and spiritual substance of the Ukrainian people. The separation of Ukraine from Moscow is a matter of life and death for the Western world not only to pacify that part of the earth but also to weaken the Russian colossus which in union with Communized China is now threatening the existence of Western civilization. After the final defeat of red Moscow, the political conception of Pereyaslav will fall once and for all.

A. PLUZHNYK

(A. Pluzhnyk, Ukrainian poet died in exile in Solovki Islands 1937)

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*

As all that lives, the desert sands shift,
Their whisper low like flowing water's murmur,
Enchants the soul. Dreamer, behold!
You hear it best from underneath your roof. —

So do not pack your trunk, nor touch the map. —
Learn how to close your eyes and wait, —
Perhaps your soul is of those rich and rare
That harken to the universe from your own room.

Translated by MIRA HORDYNSKY

“WEST-EAST” ANTAGONISM IN THE PEREYASLAV

By ILYA J. GOLDMAN

300 years ago, at the time of the Pereyaslav Act, the World did not have any kind of international organization such as the present U. N. Such an organization, which is trying to prevent international conflicts and to paralyze forces which aim to destroy nations and their independence, was not less urgently needed in the past than it is now. Even the nature of the conflicts in the XVII century was very much the same; — if the cardinal problem which the U.N. is trying to solve, can be called the contemporary “West — East” controversy, the origin of this controversy can be found in the XVII century, and its development came in the following years.

The concept “West — East” as geographical antipodes, once due to the difficulty of overcoming the distance between the extreme points of both sides, can not have the significance it had several centuries ago. The facilities of air transportation and communication almost annihilate any distances. Instead it has become a cultural conception, — a fundamental difference of ideology, of economics, of spiritual aspiration, of living standards. A study of these differences shows the antagonism between West and East is now sharper and deeper than in any other historical period, and the idea of a junction and a transformation into “One World” is not even thinkable now.

The West is now a symbol of freedom for the human race, of free religion, free labor, of individual property and initiative.

The East means the annihilation of physical and spiritual liberty, slave labor, the collectivisation of property, centralization and bureaucracy.

The West as a progressive movement raises the living standard of the population, — the East lowers it. The West is building and developing democracy, the East inevitably is establishing totalitarian autocracy.

In the XVII century this contrast was not so clear, especially in Eastern Europe. Some elements of the differences were present in embryo only, some had appeared already in advanced form. In the historical picture these were retouched by motives, prevailing at that time, namely feudalism and the personal ambitions of some rulers.

Nevertheless even in Eastern Europe, in the triangle Moscow-Warsaw-Kiev the Western ideology for the first time collided with the Eastern ideology. The West which during the XVII and XVIII centuries had developed a new form of life aiming to give the equal right to freedom for all, while one part of the East (Poland) ripe for the new development but not willing to accept it, tried to prevent the break-down of feudalism, and the other part (Russia) was just starting to introduce feudalism as a new system denying all kinds of freedom and tolerance.

In this collision Moscow for the first time obtained the right to personify the East.

The Pereyaslav Act, announcing the Alliance of Ukraine with Russia, was the result of the West — East collision, and Ukraine became the first victim of Western defeat.

The origin of the contemporary Western ideology was already evident at the closing years of the XV century. Soon after the discovery of America gold began to flow to Europe and revolutionized the economic thinking of the Middle Ages. The natural exchange (barter) of economic relations dominant during the mediaeval period slowly but steadily was being replaced by a money-economy. It was a mortal blow to the feudal system, not only because the new type of economy required more adaptability and flexibility, but because a new ideology arose, which undermined the basis of power the great landowners had exerted for several centuries.

During the first decades of the XVI century a new economic doctrine, known as mercantilism, became influential in England. Attracted by the effects of money-economy it exaggerated the importance of gold; but at the same time the mercantilist school established the conception of the National State and National Economy. It introduced new principles in economic life; — the protection of foreign trade, — the support of national industry and agriculture based on private property and free labor.

The founder of the new school, the noted English philosopher Thomas Hobbes tried to cover the whole doctrine with the umbrella of absolute monarchy.¹ This created many restrictions perhaps very well suited to the international conditions of that time, but it did not stop the general trend toward the liberty of property, labor and initiative, and the liberalization of State power and control. So serfdom in England was practically abolished around 1600.

The new economic ideas penetrated in the XVII century from England to the European continent and found there much interest among the rulers and scientists. The principles of English mercantilism under-

¹ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Chapter 14.

went a profound study and revision in the scientific laboratories in many European countries. The analysis of economic development was combined with the doctrine of natural law, and in this way a new philosophy was created, the philosophy of the XVII century, which influenced the behavior of people in all parts of Europe, as long as it was not located behind closed doors.

The philosophy of the XVIII century had a gifted speaker in the person of Baron S. von Pufendorf, a German scientist, who for many years was an advisor to the Swedish King.² In a comprehensive, still provocative and highly interesting book he presents the first edition of that philosophy, which became the cornerstone of the contemporary Western ideology.

S. Pufendorf pleads for the equality of individuals and of states and opposed as a matter of principle all privileges; he rejected a mystic foundation for such institutions as nobility and kingship, he held that civil society was established by voluntary contract and as a whole entered into a contract in establishing its state and selecting its ruler with a limitation of sovereign power by treaty; he asserted the conception of freedom of the human will, denying the State absolutely complete control over the lives and activities of the citizens.

Another scientist of that same period, John Locke, supplemented the work of Pufendorf with seeds of a genuine democracy. His celebrated doctrine, that the right of property ultimately depends upon labor alone — was revolutionary for that time and is still an operative force in determining the course of judicial review of the regulation of business in the United States.³

The development of economic thought in Europe in the XVII and XVIII centuries had a long and hard way, but always a progressive one. It renounced the feudal system with its privileges and inequality, it proclaimed the principles of mercantile protectionism with liberalizing the individual freedom, it revised mercantilism through the criticism of the physiocrats, who introduced the idea of unlimited liberty under the slogan “laissez-faire, laissez passe”; finally it established a new classical theory of economy, created by Adam Smith. Since the publication of Adam Smith’s book “The Wealth of Nations” in 1776 the principles of individual freedom, of economic liberty, of value of labor, of significance of national consumption and international capital fluctuations — have been indisputable basic principles of Western civilization.

² Samuel von Pufendorf, *De Jure naturae*. English Translation 1934.

³ Encyclopedia of Social Sciences Vol. 9, p. 594.

These principles born in the XVII and developed in the XVIII centuries still represent the main contents of the modern conception — "West".

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The Pereyaslav Act, its preliminary circumstances, its conclusion and its effect during the period of its technical quasi validity (until the end of the XVIII century), can only be properly understood if it is analyzed in the light of European events and ideologies. The contemporary historiography with its extensive research of the past justifies, beyond any doubt, a European, Western approach to the question.

Ukraine during the XVII century was well known in the civilized world, much more than it is at present. This is the direct effect of the Pereyaslav Act which ended in the absorption of Ukraine by Russia and its disappearance of it as an independent State from the official maps.

But before the Pereyaslav Act, Ukraine was not placed behind an Iron Curtain, or impassable forests, or some kind of Chinese Wall. Her capital Kiev, situated on one of the great water-ways of the Middle-Ages entertained continuously commercial and cultural relations with the outside World. It was Kiev which took the initiative of introducing Christianity in the X century and did it not under the exclusive influence of Christian missionaries, but after a long consideration and a profound study of the principles of other religions. The Kievan Monasteries became the center of the cultural life, and their influence in Eastern Europe and the international relations of the Church kept the cultural standards up to date.

The Mongol invasion, succeeded by the political control of Lithuania and Poland, hindered the development of Kiev as a cultural center for a certain period of time, but at the turn of the XV century Kiev regained its traditional cultural significance. The open door policy did not suffer any interruption even in the time of foreign political control. Ukraine had permanent connections with its ecclesiastical Metropoly in Byzance and Jerusalem as well as with many states, i.e. Venice, Sweden, Hungary, the German principalities, etc.

The Ukrainian intelligentsia was well informed of the new ideology in Europe, which was replacing the mediaeval philosophy. The new ideas as to the nature of state power, of equal rights, of free labor etc. influenced Ukrainian thought; the Ukrainians were anxious to apply these ideas to their life, their state.

In the time of Metropolitan Boretsky (1620) the Kievan leaders had lofty political aims for the Ukrainian nation. The idea of a National

State was ripe at that time and it was supported later by the Patriarch Paisius of Jerusalem who made the suggestion to Khmelnytsky.⁴ The Patriarch's suggestions, motivated partly by the interest of the Church, were in line with the modern western philosophy. More than that: carrying high responsibility as the Head of the Church, the Patriarch would not have made any suggestions if he had not been convinced that the conditions of Ukraine's political and social structures corresponded to the requirements of the new time.

Indeed the background of Ukrainian political and economic life in the XVII century made the possibility of further development toward the West unquestionable. The head of the Ukrainian nation, the "Hetman", received the wide power by election. The dominant groups were presented by the armed forces; they were organized in a democratic way by the Zaporozhian Sich, where the members had equal rights and chances, according to their abilities. The population besides the registered Kozaks—inhabitants of cities and villages were called unregistered Kozaks; they did not share officially the privileges of the registered ones, but the division of these two groups was never sharp and never resulted in the division into privileged and unprivileged. Such a division was unconceivable for two reasons: the permanent wars made it necessary to have strong reserves and every "unregistered" Kozak could expect any time to be called to active duty and to register. The second and basically important reason was the evaluation of labor. To the Ukrainian perception of that time labor created the title to property. The peasant who was working on the soil became by working it the proprietor of the soil and the fruits of the soil. This point of view excluded serfdom, which as a matter of fact did not exist in liberated Ukraine.

The Ukrainian gentry originated from the military service in the *Sich* and therefore respected this economic status. The clergy and the intelligentsia, inspired and influenced by the development of the idea of equalization in Western Europe, supported wholeheartedly this system. For the East however, these institutions were strange, the ruling elements met them with hostility and an unhidden effort to destroy this system.

Because of these controversies an inevitable conflict arose between Ukraine and Poland. Poland, having political control over Ukraine, started in the first half of the XVII century to ignore these principles of Ukrainian life. She tried to change the Ukrainian structure by establishing serfdom, by expropriation of the soil and the introduction of the privileges of gentry. This probably was the most fatal mistake in the history of Poland.

⁴ M. Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine*, p. 283.

Poland undoubtedly belonged to the West. She was one of the first countries to adopt many things customary in Europe. She had the best knowledge of European science, art, education; she followed the European methods in foreign relations and trade. She had even introduced the principle of an elected monarch. It seemed that she had the full qualification to represent the West, the western ideology.

However this assumption proved to be wrong. The development and trend of economic thought in Europe in the XVII century was not understood in Poland. Poland could not accept the general idea that the mediaeval institutions must be replaced, that feudalism in Europe was dead or dying. On the contrary she taught that the feudal system, with all its deficiencies, had to remain, it would have only to adapt some external forms, recommended by the mercantile school, and it would continue to exist and rule.

Poland did not want to sacrifice the privileges of the gentry, she did not want to abolish serfdom and permit free labor and equal rights. Sociologically Poland was pulled out from the Western orbit and unconsciously played the role of the guardian of the East, of the Eastern ideology. She had to stop the Westernization of Ukraine in the sense of the ideology of the XVII century, so hostile to feudalism, and to bolster her own system.

The Ukrainian struggle against Poland in the first half of the XVII century had this ideological background. The ecclesiastical aspects and some personal motives of Hetman Khmelnytsky should not be overlooked but they can be considered rather as a pretext than as a cause of the struggle.

Khmelnytsky was very cautious in his actions. He succeeded in his military fight against Poland but he did not exploit his success; he had no aggressive plans. In his mind was the Western idea of the equality of states and he probably thought of a kind of confederation: Poland-Lithuania-Ukraine, and did not insist on full independence. Such a combination was not out of the question. He negotiated with the Polish King Ladislaus IV, who, a Westerner himself, had sympathy with this idea, although no support from the powerful Polish gentry.

But Ladislaus unexpectedly died. Poland ignored the conditions of the recently accepted treaty of Zboriv, reorganized her armed forces, won the upper hand and was impatient to get revenge on Ukraine. These were the circumstances of the birth of the Pereyaslav Act.

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If in the XVII century the World had any kind of international cooperation and arbitration the conflict could have been solved without

ruining of Ukraine and without radical changes in the Ukrainian statehood. Not having such an organization, Hetman Khmelnytsky had to look for assistance from some of his neighbors. He contacted Moscow. He thought in terms of a bilateral contract between the two States with equal advantages and equal obligations on both sides. He presented an extensive program for a contractual alliance; he exactly stated the conditions under which Moscow would be expected to offer help and under which Ukraine would have been able to accept this help. The Moscow Government, after a long discussion, acknowledged and accepted all the conditions and expressed its willingness to enter the Alliance.

As the representatives of the Ukrainian people gathered in January 1654 in Pereyaslav to receive this message from the Tsar, they received their first disappointment. After the message was announced and the representatives of the Ukrainian people took the oath to the Alliance, Hetman Khmelnytsky requested a similar oath from the Tsar's representative. The tsar's envoy refused to give such an oath in his sovereign's name to respect the treaty on the ground that the *Tsar as an autocrat could not give an oath to any subject*.

This was the first business meeting between the West, which reflected the new ideas of a responsible democratic sovereign, and the East, which symbolized the sacred despotism.

Hetman Khmelnytsky, as well as many of his successors, later stood for the Western approach to the treaty as a contract between equal States; he thought of preserving a national State, of securing the equality of all elements of his people, of guaranteeing freedom of labor and property, of protection of the common prosperity.

The real intentions of Moscow's government were of quite an opposite nature; it had in mind first to transform the Ukraine into a subservient State, to equalize the Ukrainian economic conditions and the Russian ones, i.e. to lower the living standards, gradually to dissolve the national State and fully to absorb it in Russia. These were the reasons for the refusal to give an oath in the tsar's name.

This incident with the tsar's envoy was a shock for the Ukrainian leaders. They understood it was not a simple formality; it was a profoundly different approach to the Pereyaslav Act.

As the bad impression became known in Moscow, the tsar tried to dispel it and to convince the Ukrainians that nothing had been changed in the preliminary draft of the treaty alliance. The existence of the Ukrainian sovereignty was not any more discussed and was not questioned. Ukraine retained her Hetman as the Head of the State, as well as the right of independent foreign relations (with very small restrictions) and

of its own Army, and own self-government. For the outer world, it was the recognition of Ukraine's sovereignty; actually it gradually became meaningless. The tsar chose another way — the way of economic pressure. Presumably in order to assure that the help expected from Moscow would not be a financial burden for her, the tsar demanded that "no locally elected officials will be allowed to collect any Ukrainian taxes, and that this job would have to be done exclusively by Moscow officials." ⁵

This regulation meant in reality the condemnation to a slow death of a sovereign State; it deprived the Ukrainian economy of the possibility of developing independently and accordingly to its higher standard; it excluded the right of democratically elected Ukrainian authorities to interfere in cases of tax-hardship; it showed the way for abolishing freedom and of introducing serfdom by imposing fines for the tax arrearages.

Serfdom had only recently been legalized in Russia by the new Alexeyan Code in 1649, and was regarded as a strong basis for a powerful State in the East, and "equalization" in this direction was desirable. The transplantation of this equalization required many many years.

Khmelnysky decoded Moscow's intentions very soon. He refused to accept for several years the tax collectors appointed by Moscow, giving as excuse the war conditions (war against Poland). His resistance was broken and Moscow obtained the financial sovereignty in Ukraine. Already in 1657 the Hetman had witnessed the beginning of the process which substituted Russia for Poland.⁶

The Russian government made the most possible use of her financial rights. It met the vigorous resistance from the whole Ukrainian people — from Hetman to the poorest peasant.

The "equalization" in the eastern sense contradicted the western conception of economy in the Ukraine. The trend in Ukraine was to individual and moderate property, while in Russia the community property as an idea for the future was prevalent, and great landownership was at the time preferred.⁷

The reconciliation of these two systems was impossible in those days as it is now.

Ukraine defended her system with all her means and immense sacrifices. It is undoubtedly a proof of the national strength, that despite the unevenness and the overwhelming force of Russia, it required a long period of 130 years of economic pressure, physical annihilation,

⁵ Hrushevsky, *ibid.* p. 296.

⁶ David Ogg, *Europe in the XVII century*, p. 483.

⁷ Mr. Slabchenko: *Organization of Ukrainian Economy* pp. 23, 50.

of legal destitution, to push back Ukraine to the conditions in which Russia — not Ukraine — was at the time of the Pereyaslav Act. Only in 1783 was Moscow able formally to establish serfdom in Ukraine; the preceding activity of the Moscow government, which step by step destroyed all national institutions, was crowned with the extermination of the last sign of the West — the liberty of human beings. The task planned in 1654, was achieved. The Ukrainian territory was incorporated into the Russian Empire as simple provinces. The "Easternization" of Ukraine was accomplished at the end of the XVIII century; however the people did not forget their Western orientation.

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The ways of the West and the East are diametrically opposed. We have seen that the West used the XVII and XVIII centuries to develop and consolidate the idea of human liberty. At that time A. Smith finally stated the value of free labor as a basic stone of Western culture; Benjamin Franklin raised his voice for abolishing slavery, the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution and the French Revolution proclaimed the immortal principles of freedom and liberty for every human being.

The East used the same period for bloody experiments in the Ukraine to destroy liberty, to establish serfdom, to sever and disrupt the foreign ties, to split the area from the West.

300 years after the Pereyaslav Act we still find Ukraine in the East behind the Iron Curtain, having concentration camps instead of liberty, slave work and not free labor, state collectivisation and not private farms, or individual property.

And disregarding these "Eastern delicacies" or more correctly because of them, the present Moscow government ordered the Ukrainian people to celebrate the Peryaslav Act.

We in this country have recently had the opportunity to celebrate 300 years of an event which is a result of the development in the opposite Western direction: it was the occasion of 300 years of the founding of New York. This is the best illustration what has happened in the same 300 years in the West and what has happened in the East.

THE KREMLIN'S NEW THESES ON UKRAINE

By CLARENCE A. MANNING

On January 12, 1954, in preparation for the Soviet celebration of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Executive Committee of the Communist Party published in Pravda the so-called *Theses on the Three Hundredth Anniversary of the Unification of Ukraine and Russia*. These were intended to set the key for the celebration and they are a highly official and authoritative statement on Russian-Ukrainian relations in the past and present. They are to be followed by all scholars and journalists in the USSR and any deviation from them is a punishable offence.

Of course these Theses are not to be regarded as embodying the results of scientific or historical study. They are purely a political document compiled to suit the needs of the Soviet Union in 1954 and they present a bald combination of arbitrary assumptions, unsupported assertions, deliberate misstatements and half-truths. It would take a volume to analyze them fully and show all the errors in them. It is sufficient to say that they cover the entire field of Ukrainian history both before and after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 and clearly express the old Russian conviction that Moscow is and always has been the elder brother and protector of all the Slavs.

I.

The first thesis section on Ukrainian-Russian relations through the Pereyaslav Treaty offers the most interesting material and deserves some comment. It is important for what it asserts, what it omits and what it denies.

According to it, "*the Russian, Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples descend from the common root of the Old Russian nation which created the Old Russian state and Kievan Rus'*"¹ This is merely a variation of the old tsarist attempt to preempt the entire four century long past of Ukraine and claim the first period of Ukrainian history as a part of Russian history since the history of the Suzdal-Moscow state on the northern colonial area of the old Ukrainian Kievan state — the Kievan Rus' only began in the early part of the twelfth century.

¹ *Pravda*, Jan. 12, 1954.

We must note that the tsarist historians were able to develop a logical theory for their claims, the continuation of Kievan dynasty in Suzdal-Moscow. There is no doubt that Prince Yuri Dolgoruky was the son of Volodymyr Monomakh, the ruler of Ukraine; he received the principality of Suzdal and his successors transferred their seat of government to Vladimir and later to Moscow. Furthermore this branch of the descendants of St. Volodymyr maintained its throne in Moscow nearly three centuries after all the other branches of the family had been deprived of sovereign power. Under the older conceptions of history this was sufficient to prove the right of Moscow to dominate Ukraine but it became impossible to defend, when the ideas of democracy and the right of individual peoples to have their own national states found its way into the general European acceptance. Once the idea of monarchical legitimacy was abandoned, this theory fell of its own weight.

Prof. Michael Hrushevsky, the great Ukrainian historian, then proposed a new historical outline based upon the existence of three separate nations in Eastern Europe. He recognized the differences between Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians as existing in the earliest times. On the basis of these differences in language, culture, temperament and history, he proposed to write the history of three nations which inhabited since the earliest times their own territories and met only on their frontiers. His views were accepted by all Ukrainian and Byelorussian historians and by several Russians as Presnyakov, Lubavsky and some others. Early Communist historians as Mikhaylo Pokrovsky also accepted it and for 15 years it dominated Soviet historiography. Stalin condemned it in 1934 when it was decided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party to glorify and magnify the position of the Great Russians in the Soviet Union.

After the condemnation of Pokrovsky, the Russian Communists decided to find a common origin for the three peoples, and they argued for the existence of a never existing one common Old Russian people that dominated Kiev, as well as Ukrainian, Russian and Byelorussian territories. This was to avoid the difficulties of the legitimist theory but it raised new questions why or how Moscow became the truest and most representative of the Eastern Slavs and how the entire character of the Kievan state and its people was changed to that of Moscow.

The present Theses are very clear on this. *"The social and economic development of Rus' during the feudal period, during the difficult Tatar-Mongolian invasion brought about the individualization of the separate parts of the Old Russian nation but the consciousness of descent from one root always existed"*. They regard the old Kievan Rus' as the an-

cestor and source of Muscovite authority. They speak of an Old Russian nationality (drevno 'russkaya narodnost') and a common Old Russian language which was spoken by the entire population. There is of course no historical or scholarly evidence for this statement or for the view that the division of the Old Russian people came under foreign pressure and that Moscow as a centralized and strong state continued unchanged the old tradition. In accordance with the Soviet view Kiev and the other pre-Tatar cities were Old Russian and Lviv (founded in 1253) was the oldest Ukrainian city. In other words within 13 years after the Tatar-Mongolian invasion, the separation of the three peoples was complete. There is no need to comment further. The theory satisfied Stalin and that was enough and his successors have only elaborated it.

The Ancient Chronicle of Kiev that lists the various Slavic tribes later incorporated into Rus' make it very clear that the population of the IX-XI centuries had very different manners and customs and varied greatly in their stage of civilization. The population of the middle and lower Dnieper, the present Ukraine, were the most advanced. Culture and civilization dropped toward the northeast where the Slavs penetrated Finnic territory, the present area of the Great Russians.

The statement of the Chronicle are amply confirmed by archaeology. Excavations made before 1914 and by the Communist scholars show a rich culture in Ukraine with many Iranian and Greek elements which are markedly lacking in the Muscovite regions which knew influences from central Asia.

We are hampered in our study of the languages of these early Slavs by the fact that the early Christian missionaries from the Byzantine Empire introduced the liturgical Church Slavic language which had been developed by Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the Balkans and Moravia. This language employed wherever the Liturgy was used in the vernacular played the same role among the Eastern Slavs as Latin did in the West and since it was used for all purposes, it gave the appearance of a superficial unity and only slowly did national elements permeate it. By the time we can trace these, the languages are already so diverse that they again disprove the views of the Theses as to the existence of unity of any Old Russian language.

It was this Church Slavic that was the vehicle for the dissemination of Kievan-Ukrainian culture among the other Slavic and non-Slavic tribes but the Kievan state with its many component parts was unable to unify them. The state disintegrated even before the Tatar invasion in much the same way that the Roman Empire did before the coming of the bar-

barians and the resemblance of the Roman and the Kievan state is very striking.

The contrast between Kiev and Moscow cannot be overstressed. Pre-Mongolian Rus' was an integral part of the Europe of the day. Yaroslav the Wise sought far and wide for matrimonial alliances. One daughter married a king of France and others were wed to various rulers. A daughter of Harald, the last Saxon King of England, married Volodymyr Monomakh, the last of the great rulers of Kiev. This tradition was continued by the Ukrainian rulers of Halych and Volyn' as the Kievan centre slowly retreated westward before the advance of the nomads of the steppes. These rulers felt themselves a part of Europe and consistently fought against the Asiatic invaders until they were overwhelmed.

On the other hand these European influences were markedly weak in Moscow which easily accepted the Tatar supremacy, opposed Europe and by its servility and opportunism saved itself for future expansion.

We must note here that the word Rus' is not adequately translated by the term Russia. It was used under the tsars and still is to promote confusion. In its ethnic sense it denotes the area of Kiev and this was extended in the XII century to include Volyn', Polissya and Galicia, Chernyiv, Pereyaslav and Volodymyr Volynsky, in a word the territory now inhabited by Ukrainians. Politically Rus' denotes the whole of the territory under the control of Kiev, the chroniclers were careful to use the phrase the Rus' Land (Rus'kaya Zemlya). That this covered important differences is shown by the fact that when Prince Andri Bogolyubsky of Suzdal attacked Kiev in 1169, he did so not to acquire Kiev as his capital but he sacked it so as to ruin Kiev and transfer the seat of political authority to Suzdal in the northeast.

It would take too long to trace all the differences between the spirit of Kiev and of Moscow. It has been admitted by all Russian writers who have touched the subject. Thus Fedotov in his discussion of the *Tale of the Armament of Ihor* of the XII century emphasizes the sense of personal honor and of dignity in the work and the democratizing trends in Kiev as something alien to Moscow.² Count A. K. Tolstoy in his *Trilogy* and his poems on the past of Kiev stresses the fact that Kiev was a part of Europe from which Moscow had withdrawn. It is implied in the writings of the eighteenth century who sought for pictures of the "freedom in Russia" in the stories of Novgorod and Kiev. We have enough evidence to show that these differences did not arise out of the period of feudalism and the Tatar conquest but that they existed from the very beginning.

² G. P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind*, Cambridge, Mass., 1946, pp. 330, 400, etc.

II.

The second Thesis says: "*The Polish squires with the help of the Vatican by brutal force planted Catholicism in Ukraine, introduced the Church Union and carried on a policy of forcible Polonization, endeavoring spiritually to enslave the Ukrainian people and break its bonds with the Russian people*".

This is a typical Kremlin mixture of truth, half-truths and fabrications for the Russian political purposes — namely to prove that the Muscovite enslavement of the Ukrainian people was done for their own good. It is true that the Poles did persecute the Ukrainians. It is only a half-truth that they wanted to force them into Catholicism which they understood to be merely Latin Polish Catholicism. It is utterly false that the Vatican sympathized with this attitude toward the Ukrainian people or that it established the Church Union for these evil purposes. The question of the Church Union is very complicated. It won a large part of the Ukrainians because it offered them a way to preserve against Moscow their traditional ties with the West and it came after Ukraine had been culturally isolated by the fall of Constantinople.

It is invoked here because the Vatican is at present the most implacable foe of Soviet atheistic Communism also, to apologize for the brutal destruction by the Soviets of the Ukrainian Catholic Uniat Church in Western Ukraine and to argue for the absorption of the Ukrainian Orthodox by Moscow, something desired by neither the Ukrainian Orthodox or the Catholics and as alien to Ukrainian thinking in the seventeenth century as it is to-day.

The same Thesis explains that "*the Russian centralized state played a tremendous role in the fate of the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other peoples of our country*". This is a cynical phrasing of the Russian conception that the subjection to the Russians of other peoples and the destruction of their national states is for the good of the people enslaved. The same arguments here applied are equally apt when the Soviets decide to incorporate their present satellites as "independent Soviet republics".

Twenty years the Soviets had a very different idea of Khmelnytsky and the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Before the period of russification reached its full course, the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*³ says: "*In this policy toward the revolutionary peasantry Khmelnytsky used purely provocative methods with the one aim of destroying the dynamic peasant revolution. Negotiations with Moscow continued for three years and were ended*

³ *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, Vol. 59.

with the well-known Pereyaslav Treaty by which the alliance of the Ukrainian and Russian feudal lords was made. It laid the legal foundations for colonial Russian domination of Ukraine". That was the view of the Russian Communist Pokrovsky school of history until 1934.

To-day the tsar and the boyars of Moscow are the progressive element and Khmelnytsky deserves the thanks and honor of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples for his extension of Russian rule and its benefits. The Kozak officers and the people constantly yearned to become part of the strong, concentrated and centralized state of Moscow. The Communists have grasped at the fact that various Kozak leaders had at times appealed to Moscow for help and been rebuffed. They ignore the fact that the same leaders before and after had appealed in the same way for the aid of other countries.

It is a historical fact that the troubles between the Kozaks and the Poles began even before the Union of Brest in the late sixteenth century. To-day the Theses emphasize that the Kozaks were inspired by the Russian uprising against the Poles during the Troublous Times after the dying out of the old Muscovite dynasty. It was the example of the Muscovite rebel Ivan Bolotnikov, with his proposals to make the peasants boyars, that was the decisive factor in the seventeenth century. It was the inspiration of the Russian patriots, Minin and Prince Pozharsky who took the lead in the overthrow of the Poles and the election of Michael Romanov as tsar that spread the influence of the Russians over the Kozaks. They omit the fact that at the time of Bolotnikov, Minin and Pozharsky, the Ukrainian Kozaks were bitterly anti-Russian. Despite their quarrels with Poland, the Kozak army under Hetman Petro Sahaydachny fought the Russians at the gates of Moscow as bitterly as did the Poles despite the Soviet Theses.

By 1648 in accordance with the new Kremlin Theses — the tsar and the boyars who dominated Moscow were the idols of the Kozaks. The entire war was merely an effort to free the Kozaks from Poland and bring them into the centralized state of Moscow. It was the Tsar of Moscow and his officials who sent all the supplies, the grain (!), the arms to the Kozaks, so that they could win over the cursed alliance of the Poles and the Vatican. They do admit that Khmelnytsky had Moldavian assistance but they omit the aid, weird as it was, of the Khan of the Crimea and the Sultan of Turkey. They pass over the question whether he would have appealed for help to Moscow, had it not been for the death of his son Tymosh in the Moldavia, and the fact that he was hard pressed by Poland.

The Theses ignore the fact that Bohdan wanted the Tsar's envoy to swear on the Tsar's behalf to maintain the Kozak liberties and dwell on the false statement that the Kozaks wished only to rejoin the elder brother from whom they had been separated centuries earlier. They omit the reference to the negotiations at Pereyaslav and to the March articles in Moscow which confirmed to Ukraine its position as a separate state with its own foreign policy and its own administration. They cynically treat the Treaty as an act of submission and not an international pact. "*Fulfilling the several times repeated pleas of the Ukrainian representatives, the Zemsky Sobor (Land Assembly) in Moscow on October 1-11, 1653 agreed to incorporate Ukraine with Russia,*" states the Kremlin Theses. The original Pereyaslav Treaty said not a single word about the incorporation of Ukraine into Moscow. The Theses pass over in silence the fact that only two years later the Muscovites at Wilno by an alliance with Poland broke *de facto* the Pereyaslav Treaty and caused Khmelnytsky to seek an alliance with Sweden before his death in 1657. They do not mention the fact that Khmelnytsky's successor, Hetman Vyhovsky, after defeating the Russians at Konotop in 1658 preferred an alliance with the hated Poland to one with Moscow, after the events of 1656 and that in 1667 Moscow in defiance of all obligations handed back part of Ukraine to Poland. They fail to mention the repeated breaches of the Treaty of Pereyaslav by the Russians and their constant effort to annul all the guaranteed rights and privileges of Ukraine according to the Treaty.

After this shameless rewriting of the history of Ukraine and the events before and after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Theses go on to the case of the Ukrainian Hetman Mazepa who sought to liberate Ukraine from Russia by an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, an attempt which ended disastrously at the battle of Poltava in 1709. Mazepa is regarded by all Ukrainians as their great patriot but Moscow has no words bad enough to condemn him "traitor of the Ukrainian people."

III.

It is next the turn of the great Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko. According to the Theses "*Shevchenko was an implacable fighter against the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and liberalism*". It is obvious that Soviet semantics here regard bourgeois nationalism as a synonym for independence of the non-Russian peoples. The truth about Shevchenko is diametrically opposed to the Soviet statements.

In at least three of his great poems Shevchenko bitterly blamed Khmelnytsky for making the Treaty of Pereyaslav which brought U-

kraine into the slavery of Russia. In *Subotiv*, he says, "So, so, Bohdan, you have brought disaster upon Ukraine". In *The Profaned Grave*, he represents Ukraine as a suffering mother speaking of Khmelnytsky as the author of Pereyaslav, "O Bohdan, Bohdan, unwise son! Look now on your mother, on your Ukraine. . . O Bohdan, Bohdan, had I foreseen all this, I would have suffocated you in your cradle, I would have made you sleep forever under my heart." Then in *The Great Vault*, he goes into even more detail. He shows three souls who are forbidden to enter heaven for their treason to Ukraine. The first is that of a young woman who suffered because she had given a good omen to Khmelnytsky on his way to Pereyaslav in 1654. The second soul, a little girl, had watered Peter's horse after the battle of Poltava and the sacking of Mazepa's capital of Baturyn. The third was the soul of a baby who had smiled at Empress Catherine II as she and Potemkin were sailing on the Dnieper after the final destruction of all the privileges granted to Ukraine at Pereyaslav. But the truth about Shevchenko's attitude toward Pereyaslav Treaty is not to be found in the present Theses of the Communist Party.



THE CITY OF PEREYASLAV AFTER 190 YEARS OF RUSSIAN DOMINATION

Drawing by Taras Shevchenko (1844)

Pereyaslav, the city mentioned already in the 10th century (The Ancient, s.c. Nestor, Chronicle) denotes in Ukrainian "Successor of Glory." In 11—13th cent. it was the capital of a principality; in 1654 a regimental city. During Shevchenko's time it became a miserable town. Near the ancient downfallen Cathedral, swines wallow in mire. (Symbolic consequences of Pereyaslav Treaty).

Then the Theses turn to the foundation of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic on December 25, 1917. This of course is treated as the culmination of all Ukrainian hopes and aspirations. Derision and scorn are heaped upon the men who fought for the democratic Ukrainian National Republic, the Central Rada, Hetman Skoropadsky, Petlyura, the bourgeois nationalists who did their best, as the paid agents of foreign capitalism, to split the two brotherly nations which had come together as in the remote past to find liberty in close cooperation and the protection of the older brother, the founder of the Soviet Union.

Then with admiration and self-satisfaction the Kremlin describes the reunion to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic of the "oldest Ukrainian city, Lviv". It paints in glowing colors the way in which the brotherly Great Russians have transformed the city by bringing it more truly to the high cultural level of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. What has it meant in reality? The destruction of all that was gained under "reactionary Austria and landlord Poland", the driving of eighty percent of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia into exile, the destruction of the national Ukrainian Church of Western Ukraine, the sending of its seven bishops to prison, concentration camps or death, while Western Ukraine continued to be the centre of the most ardent opposition to Soviet rule.

Turning to the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Theses emphasize "*the necessity of a united action of the proletariat of all nations assembled around the Russian proletariat.*" This is the cynical interpretation of Lenin's principle of self-determination. It merely means the necessity of world domination by the Russians, for there is no place according to the Kremlin for any national Communism save that of Russia. "*Only thanks to the friendship with the Russians, the Ukrainian people like the other peoples of the USSR have protected their freedom and independence.*" The Communists of the United States and Western Europe should study this text and see what independence means to the Kremlin.

These are the main points of the Theses for the celebration of the Treaty of Pereyaslav. They form an important document on the present temper and thinking of the men in the Kremlin. From the standpoint of unbiassed scholarship they are another step in the return of Soviet thinking to what has been long regarded as the worst features of the tsarist reactionary regime.

The document is well prepared but from the beginning to the end it is permeated with the opinion that Russia knows best. It breathes in every line the assurance that Moscow is truly the Third Rome, the destined centre of the world and the sole peace-loving nation. At the same time

it is abundantly clear that Moscow is rewriting the past as much as it is trying to mold the present and shape the future.

The most bitter opponent of Ukraine who has any regard for the criteria of science and any knowledge of the rise and fall of governments and cultures can see at once that the hypotheses of Moscow cannot be true. They are so worded that they can easily be extended to absorb into its Old Russia and the Old Russian language the Southern and Western Slavs, whenever it so sees fit.

It is true that a language can break into dialects and that these can either coalesce again or die out. Yet it is clear that the entire theory of an Old Russia which was later split into three nationalities between the foundation of Moscow and that of Lviv is merely a chauvinistic fiction created for a definite political purpose.

The Theses contradict all that has been gained in a couple of centuries in the fields of history, archaeology and ethnography. In creating the Old Russian nationality and the Old Russian language, it postulates an impossible situation. If such had existed in Kiev, it would have been Ukrainian for Suzdal-Moscow did not then exist. It could not have been transported and it can only make sense if the stress is laid not on the people and their characteristics but on those despised and condemned feudal lords who dominated the country and adapted themselves to be the masters of non-Slavic population speaking a non-Slavic language.

From the first word to the last, the Theses breathe an unhistorical spirit. They speak in that Aesopean language in which all words lose their obvious meaning and their main object is to show that all Ukrainian work from the beginning has been inspired by Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. A cynic once defined Ukrainian as "la langue russe, a la polonaise, sauce tartare". The modern Theses in the name of Communist science go even beyond this and with glib assumptions of treason, dishonesty and bribery, they remove all basis for sober and intellectual study. They are another aspect of that curious return of the Muscovite mentality to the ideas of its greatest and most reactionary tsars and are another reason why the world must press on toward making and aiding a truly free and independent state of the Ukrainian people, able to follow their national inclinations and play their part in a free world.

TREATY OF PEREYASLAV AND THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY

By BORYS KRUPNYTSKY

The Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654 appears to us as the turning point of demarcation of two periods of Ukrainian history. Was this agreement inevitable and well calculated by Ukrainian policy or not?

Bohdan Khmelnytsky in general laid the foundation for the policy of Ukraine toward Europe. His foreign policy was based on a conception that had not previously been held in Ukraine. Up to the time of Khmelnytsky the Ukrainian question had been more or less of a local character. The whole of Ukraine belonged to Poland, i.e. it was part of an alien state organism. There is no doubt that the Kozaks had again and again acted independently, had interfered in the questions of neighboring states, had relations with foreign sovereigns, received subsidies from them, supported their own candidates in Moldavia, Wallachia and sometimes the Crimea, received foreign envoys (Komulovych from the Vatican, Lasota from the Holy Roman Emperor) and entered as a military factor into the plans of the European coalitions against the Turks. Yet they still acknowledged the authority of the Polish state. King Wladyslaw even acquired quite some popularity among the Kozaks. This tradition was powerful and the Polish nobles owed to it the fact that by weakening the power of the King, they also weakened the connections of Poland with the border nations as Ukraine.

In time this process of alienation went very far. In the middle of the seventeenth century, Poland was no longer a real monarchy but was only an aristocratic republic, with an elected president at its head, who was of course chosen for life and had the title of King. Under such conditions, the ties between the Ukrainian Kozaks and the Polish royal power continued to grow weaker, while the hostility of the Kozaks as the representatives of the Ukrainian people to the nobles, their methods of enslavement, their boundless egotism and their greed for power, etc. kept growing stronger and stronger.

Up to the time of Khmelnytsky, the whole Kozak foreign policy had been of a sporadic character. But the separation from Poland and the establishment of Ukraine as a state first laid the basis for more or less definite orientations. As a result of the separation from Poland

there arose a mass of new problems — the organization of the army, finances and other problems connected with the ethnographical frontiers of Ukraine, with the social questions (the liberation of the peasants from



**HETMAN
BOHDAN KHMELNYTSKY**
Contemporary portrait from the
Pecherska Lavra Monastery
in Kiev

Polish serfdom). At the same time Ukrainian policy acquired a clearer and more definite character, especially when in the later stages of the Polish-Ukrainian war Khmelnytsky introduced, in modern terminology, the idea of the independence and unity of all territories inhabited by the Ukrainian people.

It was an extraordinarily hard task of anything else. The main dominating structure of the new Ukrainian state was radically different from Poland. The broad masses of the people had taken the trend with the elemental desire for "freedoms" without thinking of anything else and the dominating circles (the new officers and the Ukrainian nobility who had taken the side of Khmelnytsky) had to organize life anew without having any other pattern than the old Kozak organization and the Polish form of government. The course was unknown and it required great efforts to abandon the past. As a result, the treaties both with the Poles (Zboriv and Bila Tserkva) and with Moscow (Pereyaslav) have an unclear and fundamentally improvised character. The old is mixed with the new, secondary questions with primary and basic ones.

We can look with admiration upon Hetman Bohdan for the way in which amid the storms of war and a general uprising of the popular masses, and the pressing needs of the new state, he was able to arrive at a systematic foreign policy. In this there were two lines of orientation: the southern and the northern; Moscow at the moment did not come into the calculation. One looked toward the Black Sea, the other to the Baltic;

one to the southeast, the other to the northwest. On one side the Ukrainian statesman thought of a Balkan-Danubian union, on the other of a Ukrainian-Byelorussian state. Both trends were necessary for the development of Ukraine, especially in economics and trade. One plan has been preserved to us in the Collection of State Writings and Treaties (Moscow, 1822, III) as an outline of a Ukrainian-Turkish convention which scholars assign to 1649 (some to 1648 and others to 1650-1), i.e. the period of the closest relations of Turkey and Khmelnytsky. It shows to us that Khmelnytsky fostered broad political plans for navigation and trade on the Black and Mediterranean Seas. He also attached importance to the acquisition of the neighboring Byelorussian territories. After the capture by the Kozaks of Stary Bykhiv on the Dnieper in 1657, he proclaimed it a "free port" for Dnieper trade.

THE SOUTHERN PLAN OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Let us look at the first, the Southern Plan of Ukrainian foreign policy. By the autumn of 1648, in Kiev after the formal greeting by the population who saw in him the liberator of Ukraine "from the Polish Egyptian bondage," Khmelnytsky had a decision to make. He was greeted by representatives of Moldavia (in the person of Paisios, Patriarch of Jerusalem), Transylvania, Wallachia and Turkish envoys. They wished the Hetman to use his power in behalf of the entire eastern Orthodox world. (Patriarch Paisios planned a union of Orthodox nations which was to include Muscovy, Ukraine, Moldavia and Wallachia). Prince George Rakoczy of Transylvania sought an alliance with Ukraine so that the Hetman would support his candidacy for the Polish throne.

The Hetman wished to profit by these diverse interests in the struggle with Poland and the increased security of his young state. So from the beginning he glanced at Moscow and sent there along with the Patriarch Paisios Captain S. Muzhylovsky, but he sought no more than an "alliance" with it and no "union", not even a protectorate. At the same time he maintained very friendly relations with the Porte and he even came to an alliance with it in 1650-1. This was so close that M. Hrushevsky considered it the acceptance of the position of a vassal state. Turkey was a very important factor, for without its neutrality, it was impossible to create that Black Sea-Danubian policy which in reality the Hetman wished to put into operation. Similarly he entered into relations with the Lithuanian Hetman Radziwill, leader of Lithuanian Protestants, so as to secure Ukraine in the northwest.

There was also another state, that of the Crimea, with which he cooperated very closely in the early years, but this caused him the greatest difficulties by its fickleness (Zboriv, Zhvanets, etc.).

This brings us to the question whether the first steps of Khmelnytsky in Moldavia had an accidental character. When the Khan of the Crimea categorically insisted that Khmelnytsky join him in a war on Moscow and threatened otherwise a break in their friendship, Khmelnytsky made the counter-proposition of a joint campaign against the Moldavian Hospodar Vasyl Lupul, to turn the Khan's attention from Moscow. Khmelnytsky was angry at Lupul for his unfriendly attitude toward the Kozaks in the campaign of 1649. Thus there came the joint Tatar-Kozak campaign in Moldavia in September, 1650.



TYMOSH KHMELNYTSKY,
Hetman's elder son, married to Roksanda Lupul,
daughter of Moldavian Hospodar (ruler).
Miniature in Historical Museum in Lviv.

As a result of this defeat Lupul was compelled to make an alliance with the Ukrainian Hetman and as a guarantee he promised to give his daughter in marriage to Khmelnytsky's oldest son Tymosh. The events of 1652 are a clear proof to us that Khmelnytsky was really seriously interested in the Danubian combination. The sending of his son to the south with an army, the defeat at Batih of Kalinovsky, the Polish suitor for the hand of Roksanda, the entrance into Moldavia and the marriage with Roksanda were all actions that cost blood and money.

In this period it became more and more clear that the Hetman had wide political plans with the object of securing a firm foothold on the Danube uniting the Moldavian and Wallachian states with Ukraine. We may admit that the Hetman thought it possible to place his son Tymosh on the Moldavian throne and to give his father-in-law Lupul the principality of Wallachia and perhaps of Transylvania. Ukraine was to be-

come the centre of the Black Sea-Danubian states, closely connected by friendly relations with Turkey.

But this political combination was needed for the next task, the defeat of Poland. Khmelnytsky's strategy was to surround Poland with a ring of hostile states, especially on the south. These were to be the Crimea, Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania with Ukraine in the dominant role. The kinship with the family of Lupul (the second daughter of Lupul was married to the Lithuanian Hetman Radziwill) offered a chance for the separation of Lithuania from Poland or at least of Lithuanian neutrality in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. On the more distant horizon stood Moscow, from which the Hetman hoped for at least a diplomatic intervention in Poland, and Sweden in the person of Queen Christina, with whom he began conversations.

Events, however, went otherwise than Khmelnytsky had hoped. Wallachia and Transylvania reacted very hostilely to the plans of the Ukrainian Hetman. They merely threw Vasyl Lupul off the Moldavian throne and Khmelnytsky had to fight to defend Lupul's rights in Moldavia. The two campaigns of Tymosh into Moldavia, his wounding and death in Suchava were the finale of Khmelnytsky's diplomatic attempts in the southern policy which ended in a failure.

We think that the death of Tymosh was a terrible blow for the Hetman. On the one hand, the failure of his Moldavian plans as a result of the hard war, the exhaustion of Ukraine as a result of it, and on the other, the death of his capable elder son Tymosh hurt him. This was a devastating blow at the idea of a southern coalition and the Black Sea-Danubian plans of the Hetman, for these were based upon the life of his son Tymosh and the already secured kinship with the Hospodar Lupul.

THE ERROR OF PEREYASLAV TREATY

The faulty Moscow plan of Khmelnytsky in his depressed condition must be ascribed to his haste and the lack of care with which the Ukrainians carried on the diplomatic negotiations with Moscow in January, 1654 in Pereyaslav. The Muscovite Tsar knew how to profit by them. The Ukrainians went to the meeting essentially unprepared, while Moscow knew what it wanted and started with the solid tradition of the Muscovite clever statehood with its developed conceptions of the autocracy and its diplomatic routine.

To put the question in another way, the situation of Ukraine was not so hopeless that it could not have gotten along without Pereyaslav. When we consider the entire development, we see that the northern line of Khmelnytsky was not remote for realization in the next years. The im-

portant decisions as to Pereyaslav and Moscow were on the very eve of new events and new possibilities. The chief factor was the change in the Swedish relations.

In 1654 the Swedish Queen Christina, the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus, abdicated and left the throne to her relative Charles X Gustav (Pfalz Zweibrucken). This militant king (1654-1669) entirely reversed the eastern policy of Sweden and thus gave Ukraine a firm basis for a new northern orientation. The old Swedish Queen Christina had been peaceably inclined and had not wished to get into war but she had kept up for some years active relations with Khmelnytsky in view of the traditionally strained relations with Poland and Moscow. Under the Swedish plans Ukraine was to be the southern anchor of the Swedish East European line of Charles X Gustav.

In his depression Khmelnytsky oriented himself on the centre of the Eastern European area, on Moscow, and this was dangerous for Ukraine. It was a fatal move and that it would be was evident from the first moment of the Pereyaslav negotiations. The Pereyaslav, or rather the Moscow agreement, was an example of the indefinite and chaotic condition under which Ukraine fell after the liquidation of the southern orientation. It galvanized into action that factor which had been long in preparation before its inception and which decided in one blow to utilize the situation in Poland and Ukraine after a long and hard war to realize the ancient Muscovite plans of securing Kiev. By entering the Pereyaslav negotiations, Moscow undoubtedly had in its mind to take over the whole of Ukraine and Byelorussia and through their domination to become the decisive factor in Eastern Europe.

In the beginning of January, 1654, the negotiations began in Pereyaslav. Yet the first act before the carrying on of the real, although preliminary, talks was the administration of the oath of loyalty to the Tsar by the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army; this produced a strange impression. The entire ceremonial was well staged by Moscow as were the later stages of the negotiations. The chief object was to force the Ukrainians by all means into the position of "subjects" by the administration of an oath of loyalty to the Tsar by Khmelnytsky and his officers.

The Muscovite envoys brought with them another thing that was not expected. According to his instruction, Buturlin was to administer the oath to the entire population of Ukraine. By this, after the oath in Pereyaslav, Khmelnytsky, could not turn back and in time this emphasis on "subjection" brought bitter fruits and there were not a few people both among the clergy and colonels but also in the wider circles who refused to swear.

Thus even before the very negotiations, Khmelnytsky and his collaborators showed neither a firm position nor adequate preparation. Previous practice did not offer proper parallels. The long dependence upon Poland, perhaps unconsciously, still continued. The conditions, which the Ukrainians asked from Moscow, were taken on the one hand from the previous treaties with the Polish state and concerned the Kozak army as a separate class in the state, its rights and liberties. On the other hand there were points, made in a detached and unsystematic way, which declared for the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Army as a separate state with a separate regime and organizational features.

It is undeniable that the agreement of Pereyaslav which was finally concluded in Moscow and written down in March, 1654, was something alien to Ukraine which did not know the measures that Moscow intended to introduce into it. The crux of the question did not lie in the treaty which established a special sort of vassal dependence of the Ukrainian state upon Moscow, and on which Khmelnytsky had almost certainly not counted. There was a long series of more or less important details in the treaty, which all too definitely showed the true intentions of Moscow. There were the very negotiations; the ceremonial of the oath gave adequate basis for a suspicion of the partner.

Probably Khmelnytsky, accustomed to alliances with foreign states, did not bother his head about the results which this agreement at Pereyaslav might have for the future of Ukraine. He allowed a Muscovite *voyevoda* with a garrison in Kiev, and from this there developed the whole system of the occupation of the most important cities of Ukraine by Russian *voyevodas* and their armies. Even in Khmelnytsky's lifetime Moscow wanted to have its *voyevodas* in Chernyhiv, Pereyaslav and Nizhen, for which the treaty did not provide and which Khmelnytsky did not permit. He governed Ukraine as a sovereign state even after the treaty of 1654.

Events after the treaty of Pereyaslav brought to the Ukrainians only disillusionments. The Hetman had hoped to receive from Moscow speedy and strong assistance, so that after the crushing of Poland he could occupy all Western Ukrainian lands, including Galicia, and establish an independent state. At the same time Moscow was thinking only of its own interests and directed its main blow against Smolensk and the Lithuanian-Byelorussian lands. This was the more dangerous because in 1654 a new Crimean khan Maghmet Girey came into power and presented Khmelnytsky with the ultimatum of breaking with Moscow or counting on the hostility of the Crimea. After Pereyaslav the international position of Ukraine became worse, and Khmelnytsky could not break

with Moscow. Thus the first result of the accord of 1654 was the turning of the Khan of the Crimea to the side of Poland.

THE BALTIC ORIENTATION OF UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The Baltic-Swedish orientation rapidly became more favorable for Khmelnytsky after his mistaken alliance of Ukraine with Moscow. The chief reason was that Charles XII Gustav began a war with Poland in the spring of 1655. Friedrich Wilhelm, the Elector of Brandenburg, also took the field with his eye on his Prussian interests and so did George II Rakoczy, the Prince of Transylvania. A new coalition was formed against Poland, and Khmelnytsky joined it. In 1655 he signed a Ukrainian-Swedish military convention. This turned the attention of Ukraine to the northwest. The Swedes formed the basic element and were joined by Brandenburg, Transylvania and Ukraine. Likewise the Moldavians and Wallachians who had caused Khmelnytsky so much trouble and sufferings in 1652 and 1653, also joined. Even Turkey became quite friendly and opened serious conversations with the Ukrainian Hetman. This was intended to be a great coalition under the protection of the King of Sweden and the Lord Protector of England, Oliver Cromwell.

At this stage of the international situation the southern plans of Khmelnytsky became secondary, although they did not escape his attention. Sweden was now the prime factor and the negotiations with it (and Transylvania) opened the possibility for a firm occupation of the Western Ukrainian lands and an expansion to the northwest in connection with his Byelorussian plans.

In this situation Ukraine of Khmelnytsky became again an independent entity, despite Pereyaslav. The Black Sea combination ceased to be vital and the northern line was that on which Khmelnytsky acted.

Yet the recent alliance with Moscow on the basis of the Pereyaslav Treaty brought for Ukraine tension with Moscow and an unpleasant situation. From the very beginning there was no good understanding with the Tsar. Wherever the Muscovite military force aided in the struggle (as at Lviv), the Muscovites at once wanted to take over the conquered cities and fortresses for the Tsar. This of course Khmelnytsky could not permit, since he did not allow the steady intrusion of Moscow into his policy and strategy.

An especially sharp clash arose over Byelorussia. Khmelnytsky dreamed of uniting the Ukrainian and Byelorussian lands to form a great Ukrainian-Byelorussian state and was very sympathetic with every movement in Byelorussia that was favorable for the new Ukrainian state, without stressing the fact that Byelorussia lay across the traditional trade

route of Ukraine to Baltic and by seaway to Western Europe. It is then not surprising that he accepted the oath of loyalty of the Pinsk nobility, that he sent his representatives to Volyn, Prypyat and Polissya, that he took under his protection the principality of Slutsk, and that his "Byelorussian colonels", Zolotarenko and Nechay, organized in the Kozak manner the Byelorussian territory, which they held by occupation of such important points as Mohylev, Chausy, Homel, and were unwilling to give them to Moscow.

The relations with Moscow sorely deteriorated, because Moscow in 1655 opened negotiations with the Poles who put forward the plan of electing Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich to the Polish throne after the death of King Jan Kazimierz. As a result there began in 1656 a war between Moscow and Sweden, and a peace conference was held with Poland in Wilno that same year. The Ukrainian delegates were not admitted to this.

There were good grounds for breaking the treaty connection with Moscow, because the Treaty of Pereyaslav, concluded for protection against Poland, indeed ceased to operate. At the same time the Hetman did not formally denounce the alliance with Moscow, although he continued his own independent policy towards Sweden and thus the two sides of the Pereyaslav Treaty found themselves in hostile camps: Ukraine on the side of Sweden and Moscow on the side of Poland against Sweden.

Pereyaslav had not brought what had been expected to either the Muscovites or the Ukrainians. It was replaced by Wilno (1656). At the decisive moment Moscow abandoned her Ukrainian ally. Then for the first time Bohdan saw that Ukraine might become merely an object of booty between two rival neighbors, Poland and Muscovy.

From this time every understanding between Poland and Moscow was made at the expense of Ukraine. The new Kozak state was hard pressed from both sides. Both advanced their claims to it, the Poles with their old traditional demands, and Moscow with the new ones based upon the agreement of Pereyaslav and Moscow. The peace of Andrusovo of 1667, the Eternal Peace of 1686, divided the Right and Left Bank Ukraine into spheres of Polish and Muscovite influences. After this division and the elimination of Ukraine as an independent political factor in Eastern Europe, Moscow secured the dominant position and made itself the protector of the once independent and powerful Poland. It set up that balance of power in Eastern Europe which has continued now for three hundred years.

THE PEREYASLAV TREATY AND EASTERN EUROPE

By OLEKSANDER OHLOBLYN

The Ukrainian revolution for national independence which began in 1648 completely changed the political picture of Eastern Europe. The brilliant victories of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky over the Poles at Zhovti Vody (16. V. 1648), Korsun (26. V. 1648) and Pylyava (23. IX. 1648) gave a severe blow to the Polish Republic not only militarily but also politically and ideologically. They broke the old policy of the Jagiellos, of the cooperation of three peoples — the Poles, Lithuanians and Ruthenians (contemporary common name of Ukrainians and White Ruthenians) in one Republic. The Ukrainian Kozaks who in the second decade of the seventeenth century had taken upon themselves the historical mission of being the national spokesmen of the Ukrainian people became in 1648 the dominant force on the territory of Ukraine, the leading class of the Ukrainian people and the state authority in that territory. In Eastern Europe there appeared a new independent nation — Ukraine and this raised the question whether it could exist between the then rivals for the control of Eastern Europe — Poland, Moscow and Turkey, especially with its ultra-democratic system and the equality of all classes, as the apostle of the future Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century.

I.

The great revolt of the Ukrainian people against Polish domination and the Polish social order came at a time of the political and international isolation of Poland. The Thirty Years War, it is true, was coming to its end but the only true ally of Poland—Austria, had been ruined by the serious and long continued war. Sweden, although it was bound by the Armistice of Stumdorf of 1635, continued to be the leading enemy of Poland. The danger from the Crimea and Turkey hung over Poland. This became threatening after the alliance of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Crimea (and Turkey) in 1648. Also the problem of Lithuanian autonomy, connected with the increased activity of the Lithuanian Protestants headed by Prince Janusz Radziwill, was a very threatening ad-

dition to the constant unrest of the Ukrainian irredentists (Kozak and non-Kozak).

Thus we see that the only real power in Eastern Europe on which Poland could rely at the moment was its old historical adversary, Muscovy. The interregnum which came in Poland after the death of King Wladyslaw IV (20. V. 1648) and the struggle for the Polish throne complicated still more the position of Poland which was really catastrophic when Bohdan Khmelnytsky in November, 1648 reached Zamost, i.e. the frontiers of ethnographic Poland.

That Khmelnytsky already in the first period of the Ukrainian revolution raised the question of the complete separation of Ukraine from Moscow is clear from the declaration which he made to the Polish delegates in Pereyaslav in January, 1649, "I will free from Polish slavery the entire Rus' people. In the beginning I fought on behalf of my own wrong and injustice. Now I will fight for our Orthodox faith! . . . I will not go to war abroad. I have enough in Ukraine, Podillya and Volyn'. In my land and principality are also Lviv, Kholm and Halych. And standing on the Vistula, I shall say to the other Poles: 'Sit and be silent, Poles!'" It was clear to the Polish delegates that Bohdan had freed "Ukraine and all Rus' ". It was true and the Zaporozhian Army of the Hetman was the only real force in the Republic.

But at the end of 1648 the position of Poland changed for the better. The Peace of Westfalia 24. X. 1648, ending the Thirty Years War unbound the arms of Austria and Poland, although in trouble, could hope for political support from that country.

It soon became very clear that the struggle with Poland would last a long time and that with its own resources Ukraine could not defeat Poland. The triple treason of the Crimean Khan (Zboriv, 1649, Berestechko, 1651, and Zhvanets, 1653) and the failure of Khmelnytsky to create a firm alliance with Moldavia and Wallachia brought it about that by 1654 Poland was faced by a Ukraine, not rich in material resources and elated by the thrill of the revolution for national independence but exhausted, bled white, desolated both by its enemies and allies, faced with severe internal political and social conflicts and also weakened by the migration of the Ukrainian population to the south-east across the boundaries of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian revolution created a new situation also for another East European power, the old enemy and the new friend of Poland, the Muscovite tsardom. At the end of the fifteenth century during the time of Ivan III, Moscow took upon itself along with the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, the completely concrete task of uniting to itself under

the Moscow tsars all the lands of the old Kievan Rus' empire. The role of Poland as the leader of Eastern Europe was finished in the first half of the seventeenth century and there began the expansion of Moscow in these areas of Eastern Europe, not excluding the Polish-Lithuanian state. Then on this path Muscovite imperialism met with the new and unexpected fact of the rebirth of the Ukrainian state and the formation of a new political and ideological constellation in Eastern Europe. This was a serious rival to Moscow in its claim to the heritage of Kiev.

Moscow with fright looked at the national and especially the social slogans of the Ukrainian revolution and the freedom-loving Kozak system of the new state and its great military strength. It feared the great flow of Ukrainian colonization in the south of the Muscovite state and was still more uneasy over the alliance of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with Muscovite enemies — the Crimea and Turkey which threatened a speedy attack on Moscow.

Under such conditions the course of Muscovite policy toward Poland and Ukraine was clear. The object was not to permit a complete victory to either Poland or Ukraine but also not to allow them to find any lasting compromise in the Ukrainian-Polish problem. So for six long and hard years Moscow did not give Ukraine any help, rejected all the proposals of Khmelnytsky for a joint attack on Poland yet did not shatter his hopes for future Muscovite aid.

Moscow decided to wait until the two warring sides were exhausted, bled, and then show its readiness to step in and dictate its own will, that is to follow the traditional Moscow policy, especially in the west. This moment in the opinion of the Muscovite government came in the autumn of 1653 when it became clear that there would be another solution of the Ukrainian-Polish question that would not be profitable to Moscow.

II.

On 11. X. 1653 the Moscow Zemsky Sobor approved "the acceptance of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the whole Zaporozhian Army with their cities and lands under the high hand of the Sovereign," i. e. to enter into a military and political alliance with the Ukrainian Kozak state, aimed primarily against Poland and later the Turkish-Tatar world and by the Tsar's protection to guarantee the defence of Ukraine. The Zemsky Sobor also claimed that King Jan Kazimierz "had broken the oath which he swore (to respect and protect the Orthodox Church) and thereby freed his subjects... the Orthodox Christians from their obligations to him".

To carry these resolutions into effect and especially to arrange the promulgation of the alliance of Ukraine and Moscow and to prepare the preliminary conditions of the treaty to be signed by the two states, they sent a diplomatic mission to Ukraine under the Nearer Boyar and Regent of Tver V. Buturlin. The Moscow government wished the negotiations and the administering of the oath to Ukraine to take place in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. But Bohdan Khmelnytsky assigned for the purpose Pereyaslav, a small Kozak city and fortress on the left bank of the Dnieper not far from Kiev. On Jan. 10, 1654 the Muscovite mission arrived at Pereyaslav and the same day the Tsar declared war on Poland. His pretext was that Poland had not kept the treaty of peace with Moscow, had by one diplomatic writing injured the tsar and insulted his honor in his official title and had used of his person insulting words in various private publications. More than a hundred instances were cited, none of them serious.

The Hetman and the members of the Officer's Council (the highest organ of the Ukrainian Kozak state, consisting of the general officers and the colonels) arrived at Pereyaslav only on Jan. 16-17. The first (unofficial) meeting between the Hetman and the envoys was in the evening of Jan. 17 to arrange the program for the formal ceremonies of the next day.

About the progress of the negotiations and ceremonies we know only from the official report of the Muscovite envoys, which were composed, in the usual Muscovite manner, one-sidedly and tendentiously. The Ukrainian state archives have perished and we do not have any official material of Ukrainian origin about these negotiations. But by a careful analysis of the Muscovite report, we can trace the course of the negotiations.

In the morning of Jan. 18 there was another meeting of the Officers' Council at which it was decided to accept an alliance with the Tsar and his protection. Then the Hetman ordered the secretary to call a General Council of the Kozaks and citizens of Pereyaslav, at which he made a speech. He gave a short review of the international situation of Ukraine between a hostile Poland and the dangerous and treacherous and unreliable Crimea and Turkey and Moscow of the same faith, and after speaking of the decision of the Officers' Council, he asked the opinion of the meeting. This was the celebrated Council of Pereyaslav as described by the Moscow envoys (although they were not present at it) and this decided on "the union of Ukraine with Russia" which really did not occur Jan. 18, 1654 in Pereyaslav.

The Muscovite official report speaks of the "great masses of the people" of the "decision of the entire nation", as the expression of the concentrated will of the people, etc. But from the same Muscovite report it is evident that on this day and the next days at Pereyaslav there were only 284 people who signed the oath. In the 1920's Prof. M. Hrushevsky found in the Muscovite archives the list of names of those who signed the oath in Pereyaslav. They were the Hetman, the members of the Officers' Council (not all), part of the officer staff and the captains (about 100) ordinary Kozaks (about 100), of the hereditary nobility (24) and the rest were Pereyaslav clergy and burghers. This was very few even for Pereyaslav, one of 177 cities which the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky governed, not to speak of the whole of Ukraine.

After the meeting of the General Council came the definite moment on which the Muscovite government laid special force—the ceremony of the oath of loyalty in church of the Hetman and his government to the Tsar. But a great surprise was in store for the envoys. When the Hetman with the officers and the envoys entered the church and the Muscovite clergy, specially attached to the diplomatic mission, were to administer the form of the oath "according to the official book" sent from Moscow, the Hetman declared that first the envoys should take an oath in the name of the Tsar, that he, "the Sovereign, would not hand over the Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the entire Zaporozhian army to the Polish King and would stand for them, not destroy their liberties, whether nobleman, Kozak or burgher or in whatever rank he was and had property, that all would be in future as at the present, and that the Tsar should give for the properties his tsarist charter."

When the envoys refused because of the autocratic character of the tsarist government (and this actually corresponded to the conceptions and practice of the time) the Hetman interrupted the church ceremony and went out of the church to discuss the situation with the Officers' Council. The envoys and the clergy remained in the church and waited "a long time". Then the Officers' Council sent its representatives with a second request for an oath. The envoys again refused but gave only the assurance that "the Sovereign's word was never changed". The delegates of the Officers' Council repeated to the Hetman this and only then did Bohdan Khmelnytsky return to the church and with a declaration that he was relying upon the assurances of the envoys of the "Sovereign's favor" and in case of questions the Zaporozhian Army would appeal directly to the Tsar, he took the oath.

Modern Ukrainian historiography, unlike that of the Ukrainian tradition of the XVII and XVIII centuries, to the effect that the Muscovite

envoys did take an oath for the Tsar, believes that there was no formal oath. There was made by the envoys in the name of the Tsar a definite declaration that the tsar would defend Ukraine from all its enemies, would respect its rights, as also all the rites, freedoms, and customs of Ukraine, that this replaced the oath of the monarch and as such it was accepted by the Hetman. At the same time the request of the Hetman that the detailed negotiations would be carried out directly with the Tsar in Moscow emphasized the preliminary and *conditional* character of the conversations and ceremonies at Pereyaslav.

After the oath there was handed to the Hetman the insignia of his office and the tsar's presents for him and his officers.

The conversations of the Hetman and the Officer's Council with the Moscow envoys lasted from the 19 to the 22 of January. They discussed various questions concerning the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance chiefly of international policy and the army. These were conversations of two independent countries, and even from the Muscovite report, all the matters were treated from the view point of "His Majesty's Muscovite realm" and on the other of "the Zaporozhian Army of Ukraine". It was agreed that the Muscovite military assistance would enter Kiev both to protect it from a Polish attack and also to manifest the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance, under protection of the Tsar. But in emphasizing the importance and the need of Muscovite armed assistance, the Hetman clearly did not wish the Muscovite government to interfere in the military and technical details of the defence of Ukraine.

III.

The second and final stage of the Ukrainian-Muscovite conversations took place in March 1654 in Moscow. On Feb. 27 Bohdan Khmelnytsky sent to the Tsar a delegation headed by the General Judge Samuil Bohdanovych-Zarudny and the Pereyaslav Colonel Pavel Teterya (both active participants in the January Pereyaslav conversations). The envoys carried accrediting letters from the Hetman in which Khmelnytsky appealed to Tsar Aleksey in the name of the "Rus' state," and also a Ukrainian outline of a treaty in the form of "23 Articles", which they handed over to the delegation of the Muscovite government appointed for these negotiations. The Muscovite delegation consisted of the Nearer Boyar Prince Aleksey Trubetskoy (the head), the Nearer Boyar Vasili Buturlin (who had been the head of the Muscovite mission to Pereyaslav), the okolnichy Peter Golovin and the dumny dyak Almaz Ivanov, the actual chancellor of the Muscovite state.

On March 21, the embassy reached Moscow. On March 23, they had a formal audience with the Tsar and the same day the negotiations

started with the Muscovite delegation and these lasted several days. The base of the conversations was the Ukrainian outline of the Treaty (the 23 Articles). Prof. A. Yakovliv shows in these articles the three leading themes: the idea of the continued external independence of the Ukrainian state, the idea of internal independence as well as the military and financial questions. The protocols were found by M. Hrushevsky in the Muscovite archives and published in Vol. IX of his great *History of Ukraine-Rus!* They show that the Ukrainian government considered its future relations with Moscow as those between two separate states and took as a pattern for the relations of the Ukrainian state and the Muscovite Tsar those with Hungary, Wallachia and Moldavia on the one hand and with the Turkish Sultan on the other (especially in the question of the annual payment of tribute).

In the meanwhile the Ukrainian envoys were present at a military parade and took part in official dinners with the Tsar and the Patriarch. On March, 28 there was a session of the Boyarskaya Duma which in the name of the Tsar gave the answer to the Ukrainian plan for a treaty. They accepted it in its entirety and in the majority of the individual points. On March 29 the Tsar gave a farewell audience to the Ukrainian embassy after which there was a conference with the boyars to arrange a few connected questions. The embassy stayed in Moscow a few days, waiting for preparation of the copies of the final treaty text. On April 6 they left for Ukraine.

In its final form the Ukrainian-Muscovite Treaty of 1654, known in history as the Pereyaslav Agreement, is composed of a letter of the Tsar to the Hetman and to the Zaporozhian Army dated April 6, 1654 with the addition of the Tsar's letters to separate classes of Ukrainian population, the Tsar's response to the proposed Ukrainian 23 articles and 11 articles proposed by the Ukrainian embassy in Moscow. The Tsarist letter was the basic act of the treaty and also in it was a definite obligation of the Tsar which replaced the oath of the monarch. The 11 Articles proposed by the Ukrainian government through its embassy, and the resolutions of the Tsar corresponding to the Ukrainian 23 Article outline of the Treaty detailed concrete questions both constitutional and essential connected with the military alliance of the two states.

We might have some apprehensions as to the form of the treaty which is so unlike that of the present time but it is fully in accord with the manners and conceptions of the time and also of the dissimilar state form of Muscovy and Ukraine and the different character of the governments of the two rulers: the Tsar an absolute monarch and the Hetman, the leader of the Zaporozhian Army who was elected the representative

of the Ukrainian state. But the main point is that the context of the treaty shows that it was an agreement of two independent states which continued their separate existence. Ukraine although under Tsar's protection even after the Pereyaslav Treaty remained a separate, independent state with its own chief of state a Hetman by the grace of God (*clementia divina*) "our chief and commander", as Khmelnytsky was called by Silvester Kosiw, Metropolitan of Kiev, the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. He was elected for life and with a definite tendency toward an inherited and even a dynastic type of government. Ukraine had its own government, its own army, its own foreign policy (with some limitations on relations with Turkey and Poland), reasonable in a military alliance but in war time these were not called into existence. Ukraine possessed its own legal status, social and economic structure, its own judicial system, its own finances, and its own ecclesiastical and cultural life. More than this. Some of the few limitations of Ukrainian sovereignty listed in the treaty (i.e. in the Tsar's letter and the 11 Articles) were never enforced during the Hetmanate of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and what is more, the Moscow government did not consider this a breaking of the agreement on the part of the Hetman. The only symbol of the Tsar's protection over Ukraine was the new Ukrainian title, "Tsar of Little Ros', Grand Prince of Kiev and Chernihiv" and the presence of Muscovite troops in Kiev.

So the agreement of Pereyaslav of 1654 was a treaty of a military alliance of two states — Ukraine and Moscow to secure the protection of the Moscow Tsar.

IV.

The Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654 created a new political situation in Eastern Europe. The Kiev-Moscow axis directed against Poland and later against the Crimea and Turkey became the decisive factor of Eastern European history in the XVII and XVIII centuries. But in the contemporary position of the two states, Ukraine and Moscow, it did not play the same role. It had neutralized the alliance of Poland and Moscow against Ukraine and the immediate attack of the Muscovite and Ukrainian armies on White Ruthenia and Lithuania opened new possibilities for the Ukrainian state to approach the Baltic but this did not work out because of the perfidy of Moscow. Khmelnytsky trying to unite all the Ukrainian lands as in 1649 he had foreseen the inevitable fall of the Polish state, had said to Adam Kisel in Pereyaslav the same year, "The Polish state will die and Rus' will rule soon;" but this could not be done with the aid of Moscow. In 1656 all his plans were thwarted by a treaty in Wilno between Moscow and Poland, directed against Sweden. This was an open and brutal violation of the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance and of the

Pereyaslav Treaty. Bohdan Khmelnytsky defended the interests of the Ukrainian state and the collective efforts of the Ukrainian people and was compelled to seek other international ways to achieve his goals. A series of alliances and connections in 1656-1657 with Sweden, Transylvania, Brandenburg and other states went by other ways, distant from and often hostile to the Ukrainian-Muscovite alliance. Moscow had to accept it and only in the last month of the Hetmanate of Khmelnytsky did there begin a new and sterner course of Muscovite policy toward Ukraine.

The Treaty of Pereyaslav gave great advantages to Moscow. First it secured the military interests of the Muscovite state; the alliance of Ukraine and Poland which had been a threat to Moscow during the reign of Wladyslaw and the Hetman Petro Konashevych-Sahaydachny, became impossible and there was broken the cooperation of Ukraine and the Crimea and a Ukrainian-Turkish alliance, which Moscow feared.

Further with the aid of the Pereyaslav agreement Moscow achieved important political objects; it solved in its own favor the old rivalry with the Polish-Lithuanian state for the domination of Eastern Europe. By this success Moscow took the first step to secure the Kievan heritage and to carry out its ancient program as the Third Rome. The Ukrainian and White Ruthenian lands of the Kievan Empire passed in the 18th century under the control of the Moscow Tsar. Thus Moscow won every point in her own plan. Bohdan Khmelnytsky at first did not oppose this. But later he saw the danger of these Muscovite schemes and of Muscovite predominance.

From the Pereyaslav Treaty Moscow made certain economic gains, especially in the field of Black Sea trade and transportation to the south and west through Ukraine.

Besides, it had great importance for the internal methods of security in Moscow. The Moscow government understood the danger of the radical social movements in Ukraine for its own system of serfdom. Moscow feared that that air of social freedom which had appeared in Ukraine, would cross the borders into Muscovy. The Tsar's protection over Ukraine gave the Moscow government the opportunity to regulate the Ukrainian colonization in the region of present Kharkiv, Don-bas and the bordering districts of Muscovy. By the treaty with the allied Ukrainian government Moscow had the possibility of receiving back fugitives from Muscovite territories to Ukraine. For this reason Moscow inserted the clause in the March negotiations in 1654.

Moscow in every way made use of this cleverly planned protection over Ukraine to assure its control of Eastern Europe. It gave the Pereyaslav Treaty its own special construction for its own advantage and its

own conception of Muscovite-Ukrainian relations and constantly referred to it but it falsified it in its interests, beginning with 1659. With every new Hetman apparently it confirmed the Pereyaslav Treaty and renewed it, but really it kept adding to it and taking away clauses, depending upon the new political situation and the new turns and possibilities of its policy.

However we define the legal character of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the fact remains that Ukraine after 1654 retained its position of a separate state. Pylyp Orlyk, Ukrainian Hetman in exile and successor of Hetman I. Mazepa, in 1712 in a manifesto to the European governments wrote that "His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory, voluntarily and not compelled by any one, placed the Ruthenian people and the Kozak nation under the tsar of Moscow (a soumis le peuple Ruthène et la Nation Cosaque au Czar Moscovite) and in a formal pact Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich affirmed an oath to guard forever under his protection the Kozak nation and the Ruthenian people. All know that after the death of His Excellency Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky of blessed memory, the Muscovite state broke by various devices the laws and liberties of the Kozak nation which it had confirmed; the Tsar of Moscow wanted to impose slavery upon the free Ruthenian people".

The two views of the Pereyaslav Treaty — the Ukrainian and the Muscovite and the different national and state interests which are at the basis of these views made agreement concord of these two nations impossible. Moscow broke the Pereyaslav Treaty at every opportunity. In 1658 came the first Ukrainian-Muscovite clash. The Ukrainian government in October 1658 issued a manifesto in which after recounting the Muscovite crimes against Ukraine, it formally declared: "So publicly the trickery and fallacy has been unmasked of those who without our guilt brought upon us a civil and domestic war and then have prepared with their own armed forces to place upon us the yoke of slavery. For a proper understading of this we show our innocence and with prayer for Divine help we announce that we have been and are now determined henceforth to stand firmly in our lawful defence and ask our neighbors to aid in the recovery of our freedom".

For Ukraine there remained only one possibility and it was well expressed by a Polish contemporary, the crown officer Andrzej Potocki in 1663; "for the Ukrainians "summa ratio status" — the very sense of the state — requires that it be neither under the Polish crown or the Muscovite Tsar, but they are pressing to that centre around which the entire sphere of their minds revolves — that they may be free".

THE JURIDICAL CHARACTER OF THE PEREYASLAV TREATY AND ITS FATE

By ANDRIY YAKOVLIV

By a national uprising of the Ukrainian people under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukraine on both sides of the middle Dnieper was liberated from Polish misrule (1648). Still the repeated defeats of the Polish army by the talented strategy of Khmelnytsky could not force Poland to yield definitely or even to agree to a broad autonomy for Ukraine and to solve the Ukrainian question within the boundaries of a federated Poland. All the agreements, as that of Zboriv (1649) and Bila Tserkva (1651), were broken by Poland, or contained conditions that made them unworkable from the beginning. It is no wonder that the victorious leader of the Ukrainian armed forces, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, felt himself compelled to find a solution of the Ukrainian question outside of the framework of the Polish Republic.

After abolishing the Polish rule over the Dnieper region, Khmelnytsky commenced to organize a Ukrainian state government and at the same time to look around among the neighboring states for allies on which the young Ukrainian Republic with the most democratic government in the Europe of the time, a totally free peasantry and the equality of all classes, could rely.

Several combinations were possible as an alliance with Sweden, with Turkey, with the Danubian states of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, and lastly with Moscow. The most profitable alliance for Ukraine would have been one with the then powerful Sweden, the mistress of the Baltic, for only this or one with the small neighbors in the Carpatho-Danubian region would have assured the independence of Ukraine. An alliance with either of the two stronger neighbors, Turkey or Moscow, almost certainly would have led to a protectorate and thus the supremacy of the powerful neighbor.

The century long raids of Turkey and its vassal state, the Crimea, into Ukraine had yearly drawn the living blood and thousands of slaves from Ukraine and an alliance here was very unpopular with the Ukrainian masses. The planned alliance with the small Carpathian states broke down in the autumn of 1653 with the tragic death of the talented son of

the Ukrainian Hetman-Liberator Tymosh. The negotiations with Sweden dragged on hopelessly. There was left only the alliance with Moscow which was attractive to the simple masses but very unpopular among the Ukrainian educated class which looked upon autocratic Moscow as a very dangerous and perfidious ally.

When the other combinations failed, there was left the one with Moscow, especially since the earlier talks with Moscow had ended with a resolution in October, 1653 of the Moscow Zemsky Sobor (General Assembly) to accept Ukraine under "the high hand of the Tsar" and to break the peace with Poland. All this was before the conclusion of the so-called Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654. The Treaty of 1654 was prepared in Ukraine and Moscow. The Muscovite envoys, sent by the Tsar to Pereyaslav, did not have with them any draft of a treaty. The Tsar's letter brought by ambassador Buturlin did not show that Moscow intended to negotiate for any treaty with the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Kozak Host. The question relative to a treaty came up at Pereyaslav after Khmelnytsky found out that the Tsar demanded an oath from the Hetman and the Kozak High Command. After long arguments between the Hetman, his officers and ambassador Buturlin it was decided that the oath of loyalty would take place on *the condition, however, that the Tsar would ratify said treaty whereby Ukraine would have to accept the union and protectorate of the Tsar*. After the swearing of allegiance and the investiture of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the Kozak Army the next three days were spent in discussions with the Muscovite envoys which were concluded by an agreement whereby the Hetman would send to the Tsar his envoys with an outline of the treaty. This draft with its 23 Articles was worked out at Chyhyryn after long conferences between the Hetman and his advisors. On February 17, 1654 it was delivered to the Ukrainian envoys: General Judge Samiylo Bohdanovych Zarudny and the Colonel Pavlo Teterya who on that same day left with the envoys for Moscow.

Discussions of the draft of the treaty brought by the envoys and its ratification by the Tsar took place in Moscow on March 13-20 1654 and accepted in form of Articles. Some of these articles were ratified in the suggested form, some demanded explanations which the delegates gave, two or three were accepted in the form requested by the boyars. The treaty thus prepared was approved in three kinds of acts: 1. in the 23 articles of the treaty by placing under each article the resolution of the Tsar or of the Tsar and the boyars (.eg. The Tsar approved and the boyars consented; to be as written) and this showed the acceptance of the Tsar or the changes that he demanded; 2. in 11 articles, composed in

Moscow by the Ukrainian envoys after conversations with the boyars; 3. in a solemn Tsarist charter to the Hetman and the Zaporozhian Army. These acts were first written in Muscovite and then translated into then usual chancery style of the Ukrainian literary language, and witnessed by the Tsar's seal and the date of March 27 (April 6, N.S.) 1654. On that day the acts were given to the envoys Samiylo Bohdanovych Zarudny and P. Teterya to transmit to the Hetman and the Kozak embassy returned from Moscow to Ukraine. Thus the so-called Pereyaslav Treaty (1654) was prepared in Ukraine and Moscow.

In form the acts of March 27, 1654 are a treaty between two states: the Zaporozhian Army in the person of Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Moscow Tsardom in the person of Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich. These acts were considered a treaty by all the successors of Hetman Khmelnytsky and the Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich, and also by foreign states.

In content the treaty of 1654 established a defensive alliance between Ukraine and Moscow against Poland and Turkey and the protectorate of the Moscow Tsar over Ukraine. The conditions of the alliance provided for the limitation of some rights and the establishments of obligations, which arose from the nature of the conditions of the alliance. Thus, since the Kozak Ukraine was then the more seriously threatened state, the treaty contained more articles applicable to the rights and obligations of the Zaporozhian Army and fewer to the rights profiting the protector. Some limitations were placed on Ukraine in the interest of the protecting Tsar; they included the control of the Tsar over the diplomatic relations of Ukraine with Poland and Turkey, leaving free relations with other countries. For military assistance and protection Ukraine was to pay a tribute to the Tsar from the state income but from this tribute was to be taken the pay for the Kozak officers and the expenses for the maintenance of the garrison in Fort Kodak on the Dnieper and the Muscovite garrison in Kiev. The other articles of the treaty contained the confirmation of the full internal autonomy of Ukraine: its free choice of the hetman, his rights as the head of the state, the full independence of the administration, courts, finances, civic order, the rights and obligations of the various classes of the population, etc. as already mentioned. The Ukrainian state had the right to carry on an independent foreign policy with the slight limitation, in relations with Poland and Turkey. The Ukrainian state remained completely separate from Moscow, and relations between Ukraine and Moscow were carried on by the Moscow Posolsky Prikaz (Ministry of Foreign Affairs); there was a definitely defined boundary between Ukraine and the Tsardom of Moscow with frontier customs; there were set up trading relations with reciprocal obligations; and it was forbidden to Ukraine to allow

Moscow fugitives to reside there or for Ukrainians to live in the Moscow state.

In historical and juridical literature the treaty of 1654 has received various contradictory interpretations. The most diverse have concerned the legal character of the relations established by the treaty between Ukraine and Moscow. The views of legal historians have run the entire range of diverse ideas — from those who see in the Pereyaslav Treaty a true international alliance between two independent states — Ukraine and Muscovy for the object of mutual military aid to those who see it as the incorporation of Ukraine in the Moscow state.¹

In the Moscow official records the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654 is called an “eternal treaty”, but this term was used at the time to denote treaties which had no definite, pre-set terminus for their validity. They were probably broken more frequently than agreements for a fixed term. This treaty was first broken by the Tsar of Moscow in 1656 when without the knowledge and consent of Khmelnytsky, he made a peace treaty with Poland in Wilno. Khmelnytsky protested and from that time acted as if no treaty with the Moscow Tsar existed, although he did not formally denounce the treaty of 1654.

Hetman Khmelnytsky died in August, 1657 and with his death the treaty lost one of the contracting parties and thus its formally legal value. During his life Bohdan Khmelnytsky had expressed the hope that he would be succeeded by his son Yuri but the latter at a meeting of the General Rada in Chyhyryn on August 26, 1657, declined the post of hetman. Then the Rada chose as Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, the General Chancellor, who informed the Tsar of his election.

At this moment the policy of Moscow toward Ukraine changed and assumed an aggressive attitude. The Tsar did not recognize the election of Vyhovsky as Hetman, but sent to Ukraine an envoy with a letter which called Vyhovsky Chancellor and not Hetman and demanded that new elections be held for the Hetman and that the newly elected Hetman should then affirm by an oath the “Articles of B. Khmelnytsky”, i.e. the treaty of 1654, and also accept “new articles” supplementing the treaty of 1654. These last contained important limitations on the rights of Ukraine and the Hetman.

The General Rada twice corroborated Vyhovsky's election as Hetman of Ukraine in October, 1657, and again in January, 1658. It confirmed the Treaty of 1654 but refused to accept the “New Articles”, in which Moscow included limitations on the Treaty of 1654. At the same time Moscow commenced among the southern regiments and at

¹ A detailed survey is contained in a study, “The Treaty of B. Khmelnytsky with Moscow in 1654,” by this author, New York 1954, pp. 64-69.

Zaporozhzhye, a propaganda for the union of Ukraine with Moscow. As a result of this there broke out in Ukraine an internal fratricidal war, which Vyhovsky this time succeeded in checking by great human losses, but the threat of a new outbreak as an instrument of the new policy of Moscow was not excluded.

Vyhovsky decided to break completely with Moscow, and he so informed the nations of Europe in a Universal, which contained among other passages the following: "The Tsar from the beginning did not recognize the election of Vyhovsky as Hetman, broke the Treaty of 1654, and created hostility in the Ukrainian Army. . . Moscow is preparing a yoke for us first by a civil war, i.e. with our own arms, and then will openly turn its arms against us without any fault of ours. . . So we are compelled to take up our lawful defence and to turn to our neighbors for help to save our freedom."

This neighbor was of course Poland, with which Vyhovsky signed a Treaty in Hadyach on September 6/16, 1658, after administering a severe defeat to the Muscovite army near the city of Konotop. 20,000 dead Muscovite covered the field near this northern Ukrainian border town. The treaty with Poland in Hadyach formed of the Ukrainian lands held by the Kozaks the "*Grand Principality of Rus'*" as a third part of the Polish Republic, which formerly was composed of Poland and Lithuania. But there was too fresh a memory of Poland as an enemy in Ukraine and the Kozak army and population showed no desire to return to an alliance with Poland; the General Rada summoned by Vyhovsky at Bila Tserkva rejected this treaty. Vyhovsky had to resign his post as Hetman and in his place the Rada elected again the young unexperienced Yuri Khmelnytsky.

From these events during the hetmanate of Vyhovsky we must emphasize the *statual precedent*, which was to play an important role in the later history of the relations of Ukraine and Muscovy. This lay in the fact that in every change of the Hetman (as a result of deposition, abdication or death), the newly elected Hetman affirmed by an oath the basic Treaty of 1654 and at the same time the Moscow Tsar tried to add a supplementary treaty, the so-called "New Articles". The idea of adding to the basic treaty new articles was developed unilaterally by Moscow, which always used these to accomplish its political aims, the destruction or change of the basic Treaty of 1654 and the deprivation of Ukraine thereby of the basic rights guaranteed in that treaty.

After the departure of Vyhovsky for the Right Bank Ukraine, Moscow threw into Ukraine more armed forces which completely occupied the part of Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper. With the army came an embassy of the Tsar headed by Prince Trubetskoy, one of the most

clever of the Tsar's diplomats. It was not yet known in Moscow what had happened at Bila Tserkva and the Tsar's government did not know who was Hetman and whether there was any Hetman. So Prince Trubetskoy had two sets of instructions; in one he was instructed to carry on conversations with Vyhovsky, offer him everything contained in the Hadyach Treaty, even to withdraw the voyevodas and garrisons from Ukraine and a promise of greater aid. The second set was given in case a new Hetman had not been chosen in place of Vyhovsky. In this he was told to call a General Rada to choose a new Hetman and give him for confirmation by an oath the Treaty of 1654 and the New Articles.

On arriving in Pereyaslav with a large Muscovite army, Trubetskoy learned that the right bank regiments had chosen as Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky and so he used the second set of instructions. He invited Yuri Khmelnytsky to Pereyaslav and called a General Rada on October 17/27, 1659. Khmelnytsky for a long time refused to go to Pereyaslav and sent there his assistant Petro Doroshenko with "new articles" and a summons for Trubetskoy to come to him on the Right Bank Ukraine. Trubetskoy refused and did not accept the articles. After long negotiations, Yuri Khmelnytsky went to Pereyaslav.

At the General Rada, after the election of Khmelnytsky as Hetman, Prince Trubetskoy read and gave for confirmation a document called by him the "Treaty of Bohdan Khmelnytsky of 1654" and the "New Articles" composed in Moscow. Surrounded by the Muscovite army, the young Khmelnytsky with only a few colonels was compelled to confirm by an oath the offered document called the Treaty of 1654 and the new articles. Not having with him a text of the Treaty of 1654, the Hetman and colonels could not compare the text given by Trubetskoy with that of the genuine treaty, but when they returned to Chyhyryn and carefully compared the texts given by Trubetskoy with the original Treaty of 1654, they found that the document presented by Trubetskoy contained articles, which did not exist in the original treaty and this "new" material completely changed several important clauses to the detriment of Ukraine.

The new text of the treaty contained an absolute prohibition to Ukraine of foreign relations, the obligation that the newly elected Hetman should go after his election to Moscow to be invested with his office, that the Metropolitan of Kiev should be subordinated to the Patriarch of Moscow. In one word the document brought by Trubetskoy, apparently as the genuine "Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654" was a counterfeit. In the "New Articles" it was added that the Tsar's voyevodas with Muscovite garrisons should be, in addition to Kiev, also in Pereyaslav, Chernyhiv, Nizhen, Braslav and Uman. On finding this type of falsification of the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1654, the Hetman without delay sent to the Tsar in December

of the same year an embassy with a request to correct the text of the falsified Treaty of 1654 as given by Trubetskoy to bring it into line with the authentic text, but the Tsar refused with the answer: "the present Treaty of Pereyaslav remains". By the Tsar's order, the falsification of the Treaty of 1654 under the name of the Pereyaslav Treaty was printed in a special volume and distributed throughout Ukraine. From this time all the later Hetmans were given for confirmation by an oath this text of the treaty which had been falsified in Moscow under the name of the *Pereyaslav Treaty*. This well known incident well illustrates the means used by Moscow policy to attain its ends.

After the hetmanates of Vyhovsky and Yuri Khmelnytsky began that very difficult and ruinous time for Ukraine, which acquired the ominous name of the "Ruin" and to which the Ukrainian people gave "the times of hard weeping". In 1660 war began again between Moscow and Poland and this ended in the Treaty of Andrusovo in 1667. According to this Ukraine was divided into two parts between Muscovy and Poland. The left bank Ukraine and Kiev came under the protectorate of Moscow, and the right bank Ukraine was returned to Poland.

The Ukrainian people definitely rejected this Treaty of Andrusovo which was made about them without their participation and was a cynical breaking of the Pereyaslav Treaty. Ukraine east of the Dnieper, flooded by Muscovite troops, had to submit to Moscow. Ukraine west of the Dnieper, which was returned at Andrusovo to Poland, turned its orientation toward Turkey.

The right bank Ukraine became the theatre of destructive battles; the population fled to the left bank of the Dnieper or were herded there by orders of the hetmans of the left bank. The right bank Hetman, Petro Doroshenko, breaking with Poland, concluded an alliance with the Turkish Sultan who in 1672 declared war on Poland. This was a tragic war for Right Bank Ukraine. The broad plans of Doroshenko for foreign aid did not succeed in saving the country from desolation. To save Ukraine from full desolation, the right bank regiments in 1674 accepted also the protection of the Tsar of Moscow and two years later Hetman Doroshenko followed them. In place of Doroshenko, the Turkish Sultan appointed Hetman Yuri Khmelnytsky who succeeded with a Turkish army in reaching Chyhyryn. Then in 1681 Turkey made peace with Moscow. Moscow retained Kiev and its environs and the rest of the right bank Ukraine up to Chyhyryn remained unpopulated, ruined, a neutral zone between Moscow and Turkey.

All these previous orientations on Moscow, Poland and Turkey proved in their results ruinous for Ukraine. Therefore Hetman Ivan

Mazepa (1687-1709) resumed the orientation toward Sweden, a distant but very powerful state which could secure the independence of Ukraine. The opportunity was offered by the Northern War when Charles XII came into Ukraine. Mazepa made an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, renounced the Tsar's yoke and Muscovite protection. The battle of Poltava, lost in 1709 not by his fault, forced Mazepa to leave Ukraine and seek asylum abroad. After this "treason" of Mazepa, Peter I for political motives allowed the election of another Hetman, I. Skoropadsky (1709-1723) but again greatly limited the Treaty of Pereyaslav. Under this Hetman, Peter confirmed the Treaty in the version of 1659 but refused to confirm the additional articles proposed by the Hetman and in their place appointed for the administration of Ukraine the "Little Russian Collegium" composed of Muscovite officers under the leadership of Brigadier Velyaminov. After Skoropadsky's death this Collegium governed Ukraine until 1728 when the new Tsar Peter II returned to the old system and permitted the election of the Hetman Danylo Apostol (1728-1734) and in place of the Treaty of Pereyaslav, the Tsar issued the "Decisive Points" which not only imposed further limitations on the autonomy of Ukraine but by their form were ordinary tsarist orders and not articles agreed upon by both parties. After the death of Hetman Apostol, Empress Anna did not allow the choice of a new Hetman but handed the administration of Ukraine over to the administrating body composed of three Russians and three Ukrainians under the leadership of a tsarist minister.

This system continued until 1745 and was liquidated by Empress Elizabeth. In 1750 Count Kyryl Rozumovsky, the younger brother of count Oleksiy Rozumovsky, morganatic husband of the Empress, was elected Hetman. Ukraine received back all rights according to the Pereyaslav Treaty of 1659. Yet this was all due to the feeling of the Empress Elizabeth for the brother of Hetman Rozumovsky.

When Catherine II ascended the throne after the murder of her husband Peter III, Hetman Rozumovsky summoned in Hlukhiv in 1763 a council of officers supplemented by representatives of the Kozaks to consider a judicial reform on Ukraine and to review the code of Ukrainian Laws of 1743. The council approved the reforms but postponed a review of the code and devoted itself to composing of a serious and important petition to the Empress, asking for the confirmation of the Treaty of Pereyaslav and the new articles. This petition requested that all the rights, privileges, freedoms and customs which had been confirmed to Bohdan Khmelnytsky, should be eternally continued without breaking and "*in that sense and force as they had been written and confirmed.*" At the end the

Hetman added that the most important needs of Ukraine had been included in the petition for the satisfaction of them; no one then could say that *"the Little Russian people has the right to be free but does not possess its freedoms."*

The Empress an admirer of Tsar Peter I refused the petition and then called the Hetman to Petersburg and under the threat of "punishment for treason" compelled him to resign his post. To administer Ukraine she appointed again a Little Russian Collegium under the leadership of a "Little Russian Governor General", Count P. Rumyantsev. In secret instructions to him Catherine II warned him that it would be hard to govern Ukraine in consideration of the alien laws, privileges, and liberties of the population and their "inward hate for the Great Russians". So he would need "a wolf's fangs and a fox's tail." In 1767 the deputies of Ukraine drawn from the nobles, Kozaks and burghers presented another petition to the new Collegium. This too Catherine rejected. She began to consider Ukraine as an ordinary province of Russia, which did have certain "privileges" but the Tsar could abrogate these whenever he wished and this Catherine did during the next years. Indeed in 1781 Ukraine was deprived of all rights of an autonomous unit.

Thus after 120 years of the common life of Ukraine with Moscow-Russia, Ukraine was deprived of everything which had been set down in the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654, the unbreakable character of which was confirmed by the "word of the Tsar that could not change".

This is a short history of the union of Ukraine with Russia, about which the government of the USSR spoke so vocally on the occasion of the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereyaslav on January 8/18 1954.

MOSCOW AND THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH AFTER 1654

By NICHOLAS D. CHUBATY

The resolution of the Moscow Zemsky Sobor of October 11, 1653 to accept Ukraine "under the high hand of the Tsar" formally was motivated exclusively by religious arguments — the freedom of faith of the Orthodox of Ukraine. It was said there that Poland was carrying on a religious persecution of the Orthodox Ukrainians under its protection. The same apparently religious argument for Muscovite protection was used by Moscow in its propaganda among the simple masses of the Ukrainian people. It was even employed by the cold-blooded strategist, Bohdan Khmelnytsky. He argued for the necessity of a rapprochement of Ukraine and Moscow at the General Rada of January, 1654 at Pereyaslav by urging a choice among three possibilities: the Roman Catholic King of Poland, the Mohammedan Sultan of Turkey and the Orthodox Tsar of Moscow. Khmelnytsky gave the choice to the last because he was of the same faith as the Ukrainians.

The primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Poland, Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv had a different opinion. A month after the Pereyaslav Treaty of January, 1654, the Metropolitan spoke out sharply against the agreement of Pereyaslav with Moscow. He openly stated to the Moscow voyevoda that he did not accept the agreement of Pereyaslav, and if Khmelnytsky did, it could bind him and the Zaporozhian Army but never the Metropolitan nor the clergy who had ecclesiastical laws and lived in accordance with them.

UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH IN PEREYASLAV PERIOD

The majority of the higher clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the pupils of the great predecessor of Kosiv, Metropolitan Petro Mohyla, the founder of the Kievan College and later the Academy, agreed with him. Metropolitan Petro Mohyla was a zealous Orthodox of a very un-Muscovite type. After the extremely stormy period of the religious struggle in Ukraine between the Orthodox and the advocates of the Church union of Ukraine with Rome (1596-1632), King Wladyslaw IV issued in 1632 to quiet the storm the "Articles to Quiet the Ruthenian People" and

these drew a quite proper line of demarcation between the two churches. The quieted religious minds in Ukraine began to think seriously of a complete reconciliation of the two Ukrainian camps by creating a patriarchate in Kiev, which would guard the full ecclesiastical autonomy of the Ukrainian Church in communion with Rome and rebuild the ecclesiastical authority of Kiev, the Mother of all the Cities of Rus', and become a threatening rival for the newly created Patriarchate of Moscow (1589) with its ambitions to make itself not only the Patriarchate of Eastern Europe but the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Christianity, the Third Rome. Mohyla took an active part in formulating the plans for a Ukrainian Patriarchate.¹

When these plans failed not because of his fault but the fault of a small group of clerical Moscovophile extremists, Metropolitan Petro Mohyla organized the Metropolitan province, introduced into it discipline, gave it a modern education modelled on the Western Latin schools at a time when in Moscow, Latin was regarded as the instrument of the devil. He raised the authority of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church not only within the Polish state but in the entire Orthodox world. The *Catechism of the Orthodox Faith* which he prepared was accepted at a sobor in Kiev in 1641. It was later translated into Greek and became the official textbook in theology in the Eastern Church. Until his death in 1647 Metropolitan Mohyla did not lose sight of the idea to make Kiev the seat of a Patriarch.

This is not strange, for the educated classes of the Ukrainian clergy at the time looked at the Orthodoxy of Moscow as a corrupt Orthodox faith, full of superstitions and inhuman acts. "In Kiev," writes the historian of the Russian Orthodox Church, — "were well known the cruelties and the unlimited autocracy which marked the Muscovite institutions. Melety Smotrytsky and Kasiyan Sakovych openly said that slaves lived in the Church of Moscow and that even highly placed persons were flogged and submitted to public punishment."²

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church could not at the time complain of persecution. The religious arguments of Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich and the Zemsky Sobor in 1653 in connection with the Pereyaslav Agreement had no real basis in the actual position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which was best represented by its head, the Metropolitan Sylvester Kosiv.

¹ *Journal of S. W. Russia* 1863/4, p. 8, 1866/8, p. 131, Solovyev, *History of Russia*, Vol. X. p. 102. Sergy Ternovsky, *Archive of Southwest Russia*, Part I, Vol. 5, p. 33.

² *Archive of S. W. Russia*, 1, Vol. 5, p. 31.

Yet the very fact of the Pereyaslav Agreement and the rapprochement of Ukraine to Moscow strengthened the party of Ukrainian religious extremists who had long been seeking the support of Moscow against the educated Orthodox and the Uniats. During the time of Petro Mohyla, the head of this group had been the unsuccessful candidate for the Metropolitanate of Kiev, Bishop Isaiya Kopynsky with his friend Protopope Muzhylovsky. Isaiya Kopynsky had written to Patriarch Filaret that in necessity he was thinking of bowing his head "to your Holiness, in the pious Orthodox Eastern state."³ Now the protection of the Tsar over Ukraine gave them a broad field to explain that the political protection of the tsar over Ukraine logically carried with it the protection of the Patriarch of Moscow over the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which had been previously dependent upon the Patriarch of Constantinople beyond the seas, and this in fact had made it independent.

In the *March Articles* of 1654 Moscow had tried to insert an article which transferred the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from its dependence upon Constantinople to dependence upon Moscow. This was not accepted, thanks to the opposition of the Ukrainian clergy. The article rejected in the *March Articles* for the dependence of the Ukrainian Church upon the Patriarch of Moscow, Moscow inserted in the falsified so-called *Pereyaslav Articles* of 1659. Moscow could not carry this out practically, for both successors of Metropolitan Kosiv, Dioniz Balaban and Yosyf Tukalsky were such irreconcilable opponents of Moscow that the Tsar did not try even to insist upon this article but tried instead to disintegrate the Ukrainian Orthodox Church from within, by using the ambitions of the Archbishop of Chernihiv, Lazar Baranovych, and the help of individuals who sought the favor of the Tsar in Moscow against their own bishops.

THE FUGITIVE BISHOP A TOOL OF MOSCOV

Moscow obtained a good chance to realize its ecclesiastical plan of bringing the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Patriarch of Moscow in 1685. From Poland to the territory of Ukraine under Moscow protection had been transferred the Bishop of Lutsk, Gedeon Svyatopolk Chetvertynsky, who had gotten into a conflict with the Polish Government (1684). There really was no Metropolitan in Kiev but his duties were being exercised by the Bishop of Lviv, Yosyf Shumlyansky, from Poland. A Metropolitan for Kiev was not chosen, so as not to irritate further the Polish government, especially since all the Orthodox bishops in Poland were wavering between the Orthodoxy and the Church Union

³ Journal of SW Russia, 1866/3.

with Rome. The fugitive bishop Chetvertynsky determined to get support in Moscow by becoming fully dependent upon it.

Samiylovych, the Hetman of Ukraine, was interested in the promotion of the fugitive bishop Gedeon Chetvertynsky, because his daughter was married to Prince Chetvertynsky, a relative of the bishop. The Hetman saw the possibility of founding a dynasty and so he decided to dominate the Metropolitan see of Kiev and make Gedeon Chetvertynsky Metropolitan dependent upon Moscow which plan Moscow approved without any reservations.

Attracted by this plausible plan, Moscow agreed to the choice of a Metropolitan and sent to the elections as its delegate Bishop Avraamy of Belgorod, a neighbor of Ukraine on its eastern frontiers, to persuade the members of the electoral sobor not only to choose Chetvertynsky but also to make the Ukrainian Church dependent upon Moscow. Almost all the Ukrainian clergy who boycotted the sobor opposed the plan of the Hetman. Even Archbishop Lazar Baranovych and the most important archimandrites and hegumens failed to arrive. There were more laymen than clergy at the sobor and they elected Gedeon Chetvertynsky as Metropolitan and sent him to Moscow for consecration.

The clerical members of the sobor protested against this choice and the change of the superior. We have the detailed letter of the Muscovite delegate, Bishop Avraamy, who in a letter to the Patriarch showed the motives for the opposition of the Ukrainian clergy to the choice of Chetvertynsky and the acceptance of the Patriarch of Moscow. The Ukrainian clergy asserted that the choice was invalid because of the absence of the clerical electors. The choice of the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church could be made only with the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople and this had to be secured in advance.

Even if this had been secured, there would then have to be an assurance of the freedom of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which had an entirely different system from the Orthodox Church of Moscow. There would have to be guarantees that the Metropolitan of Kiev would have the special prerogatives based on the old traditions of Kiev which the usual Moscow patriarch did not have. Moscow would have to give guarantees that there would not be in the Ukrainian Church those acts of violence as in the see of Belgorod where the priests were flogged on the orders of lay judges; further there would not be introduced into Ukraine the Muscovite service books, and the Muscovite church singing, and whatever the Ukrainians did not like.⁴

⁴ Letter of Bishop Avraamy of Belgorod, 1685. *Archive of S. W. Russia*, Part I. Vol. 5, pp. 55-61.

CHARTER OF LIBERTIES OF THE UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Despite the protest of the clergy, the Hetman confirmed the election and asked the confirmation of the election by the Tsars Ivan, Peter and Sofia and the Patriarch of Moscow, Yoakim. Yet the opposition of the Ukrainian clergy had to be very great, when the Hetman insisted in Moscow on the need of confirming at the same time all the liberties of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church which remained exactly as the Hetman had asked. Moscow was afraid to irritate this religious power of the Ukrainian people. The liberties of the Metropolitan of Kiev which were confirmed provided — 1. that the Metropolitan of Kiev would rank in everything next to the Patriarch of Moscow; 2. that it would be necessary to secure the approval of the Patriarch of Constantinople to the change of jurisdiction over the Ukrainian Church; 3. The Kievan Metropolitan would have the title of Exarch of the Patriarch of Constantinople to satisfy the Orthodox in Poland; 4. There would be no judicial appeals from the Metropolitan of Kiev to Moscow; 5. The system of the Ukrainian church would remain unchanged; 6. The schools would be as formerly with the Latin language; 7. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church would have its own press and Ukraine would not be forced to receive the Muscovite church books.⁵

Although these conditions were very serious, it was decided in Moscow that they had to be accepted to the last item, leaving the Muscovite church reform till later when the Ukrainian church would be well in the hands of Moscow. By a special letter of the Tsars and a special letter of the Patriarch in September, 1685, all the privileges of the Ukrainian Church were definitely confirmed. In the longer letter of the Tsars, it was written: "By the mercy of the omnipotent God and the intercession of the Mother of God the Sovereign . . . our father, there has entered our sovereign state our ancestral, sovereign ancient fatherland the God-preserved city of Kiev and all Little Russia and also the holy church and all the Orthodox people living there from great persecution and oppression of the faith driving them to the Union; they have become free and are now and by the grace of God will be in the Orthodox faith of the Greek law under our sovereign, autocratic high hand."⁶

We have included this full bombastic self-assured formula, confirming the legal status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Only, 30 years after the Treaty of Pereyaslav, Moscow considered Kiev and Ukraine as part of its state, even as its most true "fatherland," i.e. the inheritance

⁵ *ibidem* p. 71.

⁶ *ibid.* pp. 95-96.

of the Tsars of Moscow which was to be forever joined with the Muscovite tsardom.

The confirmation of these broad rights of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by the Tsars and the Patriarch was another Pereyaslav Treaty for the Ukrainian Church, which had previously been independent from Moscow. Its fate we shall soon see.

MUSCOVITE CHURCH TRADE IN THE NEAR EAST

For the full security of the ecclesiastical supremacy of Moscow there had to be an agreement with the Patriarch of Constantinople. Moscow by its machinations in the consecration of Chetvertynsky had risked an anathema from the other Eastern Patriarchs for its invasion of the field of the Patriarch of Constantinople.

An embassy went to the east with letters of the Tsars and the Patriarch addressed to the Eastern Patriarchs and with the very persuasive argument of vast sums of money to buy directly letters from the Patriarchs.⁷

The Moscow clerical businessmen dealt with the Near East quite unceremoniously, for they put the question directly: you give the letter and we'll pay the money—alms. We will not give the money until we get the letter. This cynicism evoked a sharp protest from Dositheos the Patriarch of Jerusalem in April, 1686. He called the consecration of Chetvertynsky by the Moscow Patriarch sinful and uncanonical. He wrote: "Is it not enough for you that the Metropolitan see of Moscow has become a patriarchal throne? But that you still want to seize another diocese? Is this not a shame from people and anger from God? And you bring letters contrary to the Church and God. Your envoy said to us: "I am ordered to give alms, if we give him the letter which he wishes, and if we do not give it, he will not give us alms. Be at least decent and give us a Metropolitan without a blessing rather than send money and ask pardon; this is pure simony."⁸

The Patriarch of Constantinople was apparently less scrupulous, for he accepted the alms and prepared the letter in May, 1686, in which he said: "Since from now on the Metropolitanate of Kiev will be dependent upon the holy Patriarchal Moscow throne."⁹ The tsarist envoy knew in detail his duty as a trader, for he asked from the Patriarch for a receipt for the money which the Patriarch with perfect cynicism filled out. This receipt has been preserved and it tells in detail how much money

⁷ *ibid.* pp. 114-115.

⁸ *ibid.* pp. 144-145

⁹ *ibid.* p. 168.

Moscow paid the Patriarch of Constantinople for the Metropolitanate of Kiev. The receipt reads: "Patriarch Dionisios. I received the alms of your holy tsardom from your envoy, Pan Nykita Aleksiyevich: three forties of skins of sables and 200 chervony. Constantinople."¹⁰ In this way Kiev found itself dependent upon Moscow but with a great charter of liberties which the Tsars and the Patriarch promised to maintain. The differences between the Ukrainian and Moscow Churches came to the surface sooner than had been expected. The Ukrainian Church quickly found in that of Moscow, in its state of slavery as compared with its own cultural and national tradition, a tool of the police state of Russia.

UKRAINIAN HERESIES

Only two years after the guarantee of the rights and liberties of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church by Moscow, the Patriarch of Moscow began to look for heresies in Ukraine as a good means of taking Ukraine into his own hands. In 1688 he sent a letter to Dionisios, Patriarch of Constantinople giving his own view of the history of the Kievan Church, very similar to the recent *Theses* of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of January 12, 1654. "For although," wrote the Patriarch of Moscow, "you voluntarily gave to our Tsars the possession of the throne of the Metropolitan of Kiev, we have no advantage from it. . . we receive only difficulties and unpleasantness. First, before this throne was originally Muscovite (!) and now it is definitely so. Since it fell into the hands of Poland, Kiev accepted for the interests of the rulers and the ruled the blessing from the Byzantine throne (!), and it perverted knowledge by not having any external sign or the virtue of the Eastern Church. Learning from the Latins to twist the dogmas of the Eastern Church, becoming clever and accepting Jesuit dogmas, they have printed many various books completely alien to the Muscovite holy traditions and customs. Their works produced no small schisms in our church daily in practices and sacraments. Especially in the administration of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, they write and preach that the Sacrament of the Eucharist is performed only by the Words of the Lord, i. e. "Receive, Eat" . . . and reject the invocation of the Holy Spirit through the prayer of the priest. Now say if the Kievans have varied from the true dogmas."¹¹

The Moscow Patriarch found very unclear the position of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church on the Council of Florence and wrote in a special letter to Metropolitan Chetvertynsky, to Lazar Baranovych, Arch-

¹⁰ *ibid.* p. 177.

¹¹ *ibid.* p. 195.

bishop of Chernihiv to write "for what reason this Council took place how it commenced, what questions were on the agenda, and which items were proper and which not. What was decided and whether this was in accord with the Eastern Oecumenical Church. . . We wish also to know about your books, for you have many and among them are manuscripts and printed books."¹²

MUSCOVITE BOOK CENSORSHIP

Only four years had passed since the Patriarch and the Tsars had solemnly promised that the Kievan press could freely work without the intervention of Moscow. Yet in 1689 the Patriarch was instructing Metropolitan Yasynsky that books were printed in Kiev without the preliminary approval of the Patriarch, and what was worse, these books also contained heresies and they were from Catholic translations, that the Most Holy Mother of God had been conceived and born without original sin. The Pecherska Lavra did not respect Muscovite customs.

As a centre of Ukrainian culture, the Kievan Pecherska Lavra was an eyesore to the Patriarch. It had its own press, and engraving plant, a school for painters and printers. Under its new, young and highly educated archimandrite Melety Vuyakhevych the Pecherska Lavra was living a new life which could not satisfy Adriyan, the new Patriarch of Moscow. He discovered that in the books printed in the Pecherska press without patriarchal censorship there were crude mistakes of two kinds: ecclesiastical and political. In the books there was "great disagreement in the words and rites" and other serious errors. On the title page there was not a word of mention of the "name" of the ruling Tsars and Patriarch, from whom the Lavra had received the right of Stavropygion. This was "for some reason, unknown."

Archimandrite Vuyakhevych was not frightened and wrote quite freely an answer to the Patriarch, that he did not have a letter from the Patriarch which would justify the censorship of books and which was contrary to the liberties of the Ukrainian Church as confirmed by Moscow. He passed over the omission of the names of the Tsars. Instead he sent to the Patriarch a delegation with the request to confirm his choice as Archimandrite of Pecherska and justified his failure to appear in person.

Perhaps the firm stand of the Archimandrite did more than anything else. The Patriarch agreed in a new letter and did not demand the censorship of the books; he only placed before the Lavra its own financial interests. If the Pecherska press printed church books on the Muscovite

¹² *ibid.* p. 244.

pattern and in the Muscovite dialect, they would circulate in Muscovy; if they printed books with the usual forms of the Ukrainian church in the Ukrainian dialect, they would not circulate in Muscovy. In the first of course should be placed the names of the Tsars and the Patriarch; in the second it was not necessary.¹³

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITY OF THE KIEVAN METROPOLITANATE

At the same time Moscow worked diligently to break the Ukrainian Orthodox Church into pieces so that the traditional Kievan Metropolitanate should be a tree cut off from its roots as an ordinary Kievan diocese. First the Patriarch of Moscow removed the diocese of Chernihiv from the control of the Kievan Metropolitan and placed it directly under the Moscow Patriarch (1688).¹⁴ The year before he had conferred Patriarchal Stavropygion rights upon the Pecherska Lavra and this passed from the jurisdiction of the Kievan Metropolitan.¹⁵

In Poland Bishop Joseph Shumlyansky asked from the Moscow Patriarch the renewal of the Halych Metropolitanate in Lviv. There was no need of this for in 1700 Shumlyansky and all the other Ukrainian bishops in Poland accepted the jurisdiction of Rome.

In 1720 Tsar Peter I issued an order forbidding the printing of all books in the Pecherska press and that of the St. Elias Monastery in Chernihiv in Ukrainian "so that there may be no difference of dialect in them." He also introduced a strict censorship on religious, historical and political books. No copy of a book could be issued if it had not passed the censorship of the religious College in Petersburg.¹⁶

After this violation of the rights of the Kievan Metropolitanate and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church definitely guaranteed by the Tsars and the Patriarch of Moscow, the Kievan Metropolitans of the first decades of the XVIII century Yoasaf Krokowsky and Varlaam Vonatovych protested strongly. Both had the same fate as the Hetmans Mnohohrishny and Doroshenko who protested against the violations of the political rights of Ukraine guaranteed by the Treaty of Pereyaslav. They were arrested and died in Muscovite prisons.¹⁷

¹³ *ibid.* pp. 230, 359, 364.

¹⁴ *ibid.* p. 250.

¹⁵ *ibid.* p. 259.

¹⁶ Order of Peter I to the Archbishop of Chernihiv Antony Stakhovsky Dec. 22, 1720.

¹⁷ *Kievskaya Starina*, 1899, March, p. 398. V. Antonovych *On the Union and the Condition of the Orthodox Church from the middle of the XVII cent. to the end of XVIII cent.*, Kiev, 1871, also *Chtenia* in the Society of Nestor the Chronicler (1871).

As their successor, Moscow bound Rafayl Zaborovsky to carry out its full program for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It was only forty years after the issuing of the great Charter of Liberties of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that that church ceased to exist. The Kievan Metropolitanate, that "true fatherland" as the Moscow Patriarch had written, now became an ordinary Kievan diocese; Rafayl Zaborovsky had only the title of Archbishop. This second fugitive from Western Ukraine became an obedient tool in the plans for russifying the Ukrainian Church. He introduced the compulsory use of the Muscovite service books and slandered the Ukrainian on the ground "that there were many errors and Roman ideas in the holy service books, while the Great Russian true service books should be had in every church." Now all the Churches in Ukraine had to have them.¹⁸

There was now introduced into Ukraine the barbarous custom of seeking for witches and sorcerers, who, it was said, used the Sacred Body of Christ. We are told of the examination of one priest accused of sorcery in 1733 by a letter of Archbishop Zaborovsky where during the examination torture and blows were used. This fate of Ukrainian Orthodox Church was foreseen by the Ukrainian clergy at the electoral sobor of 1685.¹⁹

There appeared also in Ukraine the barbarous custom of not burying a dead bishop without an order from the Russian Holy Synod of Moscow in Petersburg. This often needed a month and more and the body of the hierarch disintegrated. The body of Zaborovsky in 1747 lay for 39 days awaiting the order of the Synod and of his successor Arseny Mohylyansky (d. 1770) for 47 days.²⁰

Under Empress Catherine the property of the Kievan Metropolitanate and monasteries was secularized and the Ukrainian Church as a separate entity ceased to exist along with its glorious Mohylyanska Academy. It became an ordinary Russian ecclesiastical province of dioceses of the Russian type. The Russians turned the Orthodox Church in Ukraine into a tool of Russification and the bearer of the idea of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy and the Fatherland." The Ukrainian Orthodox Church at the outbreak of the Revolution (1917) was so russified that there was not a single bishop in 1919 who was a Ukrainian.

¹⁸ Letter of Rafayl Zaborovsky of 1735. *Kievskaya Starina*, 1904. July-August.

¹⁹ For his blasphemy the above mentioned priest Ivan was sternly examined by beating in the Spiritual Consistory, because he stole the Holy Lamb, but he denied it despite blows "*Kievskaya Starina*," 1904, July-August.

²⁰ Peter Orlovsky, *The Burial of the Kievan Metropolitans. Kievskaya Starina*, 1904, Vol. 86.

WESTERN UKRAINIAN CHURCH AND ITS FATE

The old fortresses of Western Ukrainian Orthodoxy, Peremyshl' (1691) Lviv (1700) Lutsk (1702) and finally the glorious Lviv Stavropygia (1708) became Catholic and formed the strength of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, much larger than the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under Moscow, now severed from all qualities of the enlightened Ukrainian Orthodoxy of the XVII century.

The rebirth of the new Ukrainian Church west of the Dnieper, united with Rome, was a great challenge to Moscow, the Third Rome. Its slogan "The Union must be totally destroyed" as an example of the religious and spiritual unity of the Ukrainian people with the west, was accepted as Russia's church policy to the present day. This program of destroying the second church of the Ukrainian people was carried out by Moscow with utter ruthlessness and without regard to the sacrifices in the divisions of Poland (1772-1795) when all the Ukrainian lands (except Galicia and Carpatho-Ukraine) came under Russian rule. Three periods of a savage persecution of the Ukrainian Catholic Church of the Eastern Rite came under Catherine II, Nicholas I and Alexander II who liquidated this second Church of the Ukrainian people on the lands under Russian rule. The final step in the development of the policy of the Tsars in the XVIII and XIX centuries towards the Church of Ukraine was taken by Stalin when in 1945-48, he wiped out the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, Carpatho-Ukraine and even in the Pryashiv area within the Communized Republic of Czechoslovakia.

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With the same fury, Stalin attacked the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church reborn in 1921 and again in 1942 and following the traditions of the Ukrainian educated Orthodoxy of the XVII century. In a word, the Pereyaslav Agreement and the political enslavement of Ukraine by Moscow, became also the starting point for the enslavement of the Ukrainian spirit and the depriving the Ukrainian people of religious freedom. The Muscovite Orthodoxy imposed upon the Ukrainian people was and is alien to it; it will vanish from the Ukrainian land, when the results of the Pereyaslav Agreement of 1654 will be also wiped from the face of the Ukrainian land.

300 YEARS OF MOSCOW'S CULTURAL POLICY IN UKRAINE

By SVIATOSLAV HORDYNSKY

To understand why the Pereyaslav Treaty (1654) did not function in its political, cultural and other aspects, it is necessary to understand something about the national and psychological differences of the two peoples. The fact that the Ukrainians had a deeply rooted democratic sentiment, and the Muscovites were always autocratic is not enough to explain the failure of this political alliance. For this the racial backgrounds of both nations, and their different ways of life can not be stressed strongly enough. The first clashes came already before the first joint campaign against Poland in 1654. Ukrainian historians of that time mention how the Muscovite jibes at the Europeanized costume and customs, such as the habit of shaving the beard, infuriated the Kozaks. The ruthlessness with which Moscow ruled her own people and trained them to be the tool of her aggressive policy, very soon was felt in Ukraine. Moscow, that was permitted on the basis of the treaty to station an armed contingent only in Kiev, at once began to develop her policy of expansion, and all the typical traits of the Muscovite mentality, developed in the Tatar school, came to light. In politics this meant above all the unwillingness to solve problems, or the solving of them by the simple method of reducing everything to the Muscovite level, and crushing under her boot whatever offered resistance.

The fact that Ukrainian culture, hitherto directed toward the Mediterranean and Western Europe, was compelled to turn northward, was the principal outcome of Pereyaslav. Moscow began to claim all Ukrainian history and cultural achievements as her own national property, on the false ground that Ukraine was once torn away from Russia. The logical defect of this reasoning was obvious: inasmuch as Suzdal-Moscow were once only colonial dependencies of Kiev, Kiev could not have been torn away from them. The title of the "sovereign of all Russians" held by the Moscow Tsars was purely decorative, as was for example the title of "King of Jerusalem" held by the Italian kings. It certainly did not mean that the Italian ruler was actually the king of Jerusalem (A. Saltykov). Not counting the campaigns for booty of the Suzdalians

on Kiev in the XII cent., Moscow never ruled Kievan Rus. After Pereyaslav, taking advantage of the shifting of political power to the north, that is toward her own territory, Moscow hastened to take over all the great traditions of Kiev Rus, including the very name Rus, and for the purpose of creating the "Russian nationality" she even changed her own national name. This shifting of political power became one of the most important and gravest events in the history of Eastern Europe. After the failure of the desperate attempts of the Ukrainian Hetmans, especially Hetman Mazepa, to restore the former balance of power, the new Russian Empire was granted full two centuries to digest at ease dozens of other nations and their cultures, the largest of which was the Ukrainian.



APOTHEOSE OF HETMAN IVAN MAZEPA,
by I. Mygura (1700)

This process of digesting has several phases. First, Moscow as the less civilized partner, strove to absorb everything of cultural value from Ukraine, while at the same time hampering farther cultural development of that country. Later, with the weakening of Ukrainian political power, and the training of her own functionaries in the cultural field, Moscow-St. Petersburg proclaimed the Russian imperial culture as the only one permissible. All Ukrainian cultural achievements sharply differing or unsuitable to be claimed as national Russian were suppressed or simply declared as non-existent. After the final extinction of the last traces of Ukrainian autonomous forms in the third quarter

of the XVIII century, the policy of Russian absorption of Ukrainian culture seemed to have been crowned with complete success.

Since the building of the Muscovite Empire is still in progress,¹ and today it has grown to global proportion, all the previous and present facts regarding Moscow's cultural policy are of importance not only to the Ukrainians, but also to all other nations that have fallen (or will fall) under Moscow's rule. These cultural methods (if the word "cultural" can be used here) are marked especially by the obvious intolerance of all freedom of thought, practically unchanged in all periods of Russian history. The Ukrainians have had the tragic misfortune of experiencing them longer and more deeply than any other nation, and consequently their knowledge of these methods is more thorough than the knowledge of all the scholars and diplomats of the world.

II.

Love of freedom was essentially typical of Kozak Ukraine. Although their wars with the Poles were conducted also for principles of religion (at that time the "Ruthenian creed" was equivalent to the national designation) the Orthodox Kozaks frequently studied in Catholic Polish schools, and books by Latin authors were everyday reading matter in the higher circles of Ukrainian society. In the Points of Hadyach, a treaty concluded with the Poles in 1658, there is a special clause on the freedom of the Ukrainian word. Here we read that "all schools and printing establishments shall freely conduct their teaching and the printing of books, and (freely) dispute matters of creed."

This freedom of thought in Ukraine has been extremely distasteful to the Muscovites for many years before the union. The Muscovites always used a large number of Church-Slavonic books printed in Ukraine, but they regarded them as contaminated by the Western spirit. Even in the beginning of the XVII cent. Filaret, the Patriarch of Moscow, stated that in his opinion all Ukrainians and White Ruthenians "are Christians only in name", because they had lost the "true Orthodox faith". The attitude of Tsar Aleksey or Alexis (the signer of the Pereyaslav Treaty) to cultural problems may be judged by one of his ukazes in which he decreed that "the authors of the books, and also the printers, shall be put to death, and the collected books shall be burned, and a severe ban shall be issued that no subject of Our Tsarist Majesty may print these infamous and vile books under pain of the penalty of death."

To protect the Muscovites from the infiltration of Western ideas a censorship for Ukrainian printed books was established in Moscow. For

¹ There is a Russian saying: "Russia grows larger and larger;" which is quoted in many Russian-English dictionaries to explain to the English-speaking world the meaning of the word "rasprostranyatsya" — to expand.

example, Trankvilion Stavrovetsky's "The Teaching Gospel", a very popular book in Ukraine, was censored by two Muscovite ecclesiastics, who without understanding the Ukrainianized Church Slavonic language of the book, condemned it as heretical. Therefore an ukaz was issued to all the provinces of Moscow to collect all copies of the book and burn them. After Pereyaslav and the political and military weakening of Ukraine, Moscow began a systematic policy of annihilating all Ukrainian publications.



MOHYLIAN ACADEMY IN KIEV (1698).
Engraving by I. Shchyrsky.

Following the reforms of Tsar Peter I, a general ukaze was issued in 1720, which banned the printing of any books not in the Russian language. When in 1769 the Lavra applied for permission to reprint a primer it was not only refused but all former editions of the primer

The first victims of this policy were the Ukrainian printing houses, despite the fact that the edict on the rights of the Ukrainian Church made the printing of books free. But in 1689 when the Kiev Lavra Monastery printed a religious book by Dmytro Tuptalo, the Patriarch of Moscow issued a severe reprimand for publishing the book without first sending it for inspection to Moscow. He sternly prohibited the printing of any books whatever in Ukraine. The Archimandrite of the Lavra objected that no Ukrainian would buy or read books printed in Russian. The affair finally reached the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was prevailed upon by Moscow to order that nothing be printed in Kiev without the former permission of Moscow.

The fact that the texts of Ukrainian authors were Russianized for the use of the Russians was of no great importance, it was their affair. However, Moscow began to enforce the use of these Russianized texts in Ukraine. Fol-

were destroyed. The entire XVIII cent. in Ukraine is marked by the perpetual struggle of the Ukrainian printers with this ukaz. They were forced to pay high fines and often their establishments were seized and transferred to Russia. As a result the works of many prominent Ukrainian authors were known only in manuscript; this was the case of the patriotic Kozak chronicles, of the "Istoriya Rusov", and the works of the philosopher Skovoroda.

This policy aimed directly at the heart of the Ukrainian nation. It strove to dissolve the Ukrainians in the newly constituted and ever growing Russian Empire. One might say, however, that Ukrainians themselves in a way helped to build this empire; for instance, in the XVIII cent. many Ukrainian scholars left home to work in St. Petersburg. Ukraine with her higher cultural standard gave Moscow, and later St. Petersburg, many religious leaders and authors, the first painters in the European style, the first theorists of poetry and music.

This was particularly true of the religious scholars, many of whom worked even with enthusiasm to develop a universal Orthodox culture. As the Russian religious culture was taken not directly from Byzantium, but came to Russia through Kiev, these religious scholars saw no particular objections as to where they developed the Orthodox doctrine. Some of them even hoped that their work would tend to Europeanize the empire, and this in turn would lead to more freedom for their people.

The fate of the Ukrainian intellectuals was very similar to that of the ancient Greeks, who having fallen under the Roman Empire helped to create the Roman classic culture. Although Greece lost her political importance, the Greeks were still unsurpassed as philosophers, artists, poets and singers. The young Russian Empire gave Ukrainian scholars unlimited opportunities to make careers, as long as they conformed to political restrictions, and received them with open arms. But the voluntary or involuntary exodus of Ukrainian intellectuals to the north soon weakened the struggling Ukraine which now stood before two alternatives: to work for the glory of the empire which had devoured their country, or to oppose it and perish in Siberian exile or rot in Russian prisons. This was the case of many Ukrainian political leaders such as Mnohohrishny, Samoylovych, Polubotok, Voynarovsky, Kalnyshevsky and many others.

III.

A similar abolitionist policy to that literature was conducted by Moscow in Ukrainian education. The second half of the XVIIIth cent. saw the period of destruction of the once superb Ukrainian educational

system, headed by the Academy of Kiev. The centralistic policy of Catherine II in particular, whose reign became "famous" in Ukraine for the numerous prisons she had built there, aimed at the complete Russification of the Ukrainian schools, now open only to the aristocratic and ecclesiastic circles. The number of pupils was limited, and the purpose of the schools was primarily to train administrative functionaries.

Schools of the lower type suffered most under this system. When in 1768 there was still one school for every 746 inhabitants on the left bank of the Dnieper, after one hundred years of Russian rule this number "grew" to 17,144. In the XIX cent. all Ukrainian schools were completely Russianized, but even the number of these Russian schools was far from sufficient. In 1902 in the district of Kiev 83% of all Ukrainian children had no schooling at all.² The writer Hrinchenko composed for his child a hand written primer, because there were no Ukrainian schools or books. However, even in this situation the Ukrainians contrived to transform the nominally Russian universities (established in Kharkiv in 1805, in Kiev in 1834) into centers of Ukrainian scientific and political movements, and managed to develop a culture that could compete with others.

In the first half of the XIX cent. no more than 100 books were allowed to be printed in Ukrainian in the entire Russian Empire. In 1847 there was not a single Ukrainian publication, in 1848 only three, in 1849 — two, in 1850 — one etc. In order to understand what these numbers mean it is sufficient to mention that in 1918, the year of the declaration of Ukrainian independence, there were 104 publishers and publishing houses in Ukraine. In 1863, when the number of Ukrainian publications showed a slight tendency to rise, stern repressions followed, and in his infamous ukaz the minister Valuyev declared that the Ukrainian language was nothing other than the Russian corrupted by the Polish. The censor was instructed not to pass anything in Ukrainian. Even the printing of the Bible in Ukrainian was forbidden. All books and publications from abroad were to be confiscated. Even this was not the end. In 1876 a law signed by Tsar Alexander II was issued banning not only all Ukrainian publications, with the exception of belles lettres, which were permitted on the condition that they be printed in the Russian alphabet, but the Ukrainian language was prohibited for all public speaking, and even in subtitles for music notes. Being illegal even under the Russian legal system, this law was never made public. It did not normalize the use of the Ukrainian language in the field of printing, but served as a means for its general suppression.

² These and other statistics are according to the Encyclopaedia of Ukraine, Munich-New York, Vol. III.

In 1880 again not a single book appeared in Ukraine under this system, not even an 8 page brochure. It was not until 1905, following the “little” revolution, that the first Ukrainian newspaper could appear (there were many in Galicia under Austrian rule and abroad), but the hopes that the constitutional Russian Empire would embark on a more moderate policy toward Ukraine proved to be wishful thinking. The Minister of the Interior P. Stolypin was an enemy of the Ukrainian movement, and the repressions started all over again. For example, soon after the revolution, the first complete uncensored works of Taras Shevchenko were published, but after the publication of the next edition the publishers had to appear in court.

It is interesting to compare the verbal equilibristics indulged in by Valuyev and the “constitutional” Stolypin wherever Ukrainians were concerned. Valuyev insisted in his 1863 ukaz that in the opinion of the “Little Russians” themselves (?) there “*was not, is not, and cannot be any Ukrainian language*”, and Stolypin wrote: “*taking under consideration that the three principal branches of the Slavs (. . .) cannot fail to constitute a whole (. . .) beginning with the XVII cent. our Government*



**DOCUMENT OF THE PERSONAL RUSSIAN IMPERIAL CHANCERY
OF TSAR NICHOLAS I**

ordering the exile of Taras Shevchenko to military service in Asiatic Russia with the special remarks “the greater artist of St. Petersburg Academy of Arts, Taras Shevchenko to be enlisted in Orenburg Corps — under strongest supervision with prohibition to write and paint.”

wrestled with the movement known as the Ukrainian. . .” In 1917 Ukrainians answered these dialectics with the statement that they *cannot fail* to be independent, and the Russians officially declared war on Ukraine.


IV.

But let us now turn from books to men. Nothing can be as illustrative of these conditions as the fate of the Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko, and his clash with the forces of the Russian Empire. In 1840 he managed to publish (in St. Petersburg, where the censorship had loopholes) his first volume of poems, which at once made him famous. While a part of the Russian literary press made futile attempts to minimize the book, the leading Russian literary critic V. Belinsky at once sensed in the poet a peril to the Empire. The bare fact that there appeared a prominent Ukrainian poet was for him no less a shock than the death of Pushkin. On one occasion he concluded his remarks on Ukrainian folk poetry with the statement that its prospects were null, because “a great poet can rise only in a great nation, and how can a nation be great without any political significance?” He therefore advised Ukrainian poets to write in the “cultured language” the Russian. Now faced with the fact that a great Ukrainian poet actually existed, he forgot his own critical principles and the democratic ideas, which he championed, and in his annoyance let go with a stream of insults and abuse against Shevchenko’s poems. Even when Shevchenko was already in a Russian prison on his way to his Asian exile, Belinsky wrote in a letter to Paris, that “if he was the judge he would punish Shevchenko no less severely.”

Shevchenko is mentioned here because it was he who stemmed the victorious Russian tide which had flooded Ukraine in the long post-Pereyaslav years. The enemies of Ukraine were not far from the truth when they maintained that it was he who created the modern Ukrainian nation, (a designation once coined by Hetman Khmelnytsky). Although, when living in St. Petersburg Shevchenko had many friends among Russians, who even helped him to buy his liberation from serfdom in 1838, in his writings he suffered no compromise on the point of Ukrainian independence. Here he was truly guided by some providential force, which enabled him to become the unrelenting conscience of his people and an unerring judge of Ukrainian history. From this point Shevchenko could never forgive Hetman Khmelnytsky, for whom otherwise he had a deep veneration, his union with Moscow, and called him the “unwise son of Ukraine.”

Shevchenko’s counterpart, and a real gain for the Russian policy in Ukraine was Nicholas Hohol (Gogol), a writer with the soul of a U-

krainian and the culture of a Russian. He wrote in the Russian language, but what he saw in the Empire were the parasitical bureaucrats and the "dead souls," and with them he contaminated the national Russian literature far into the future. All the idiots, murderers and prostitutes of Dostoyevsky, the abnormal types developed by the Russian system, can be regarded as the product of this contamination by Hohol, the creator of Russian prose.



RUSSIAN POLICE ON THE TARAS SHEVCHENKO HILL IN KANIW (1914)
 posted to prevent the mass visiting of Shevchenko's grave by Ukrainian patriots on the 100th anniversary of the birth of the poet.

V.

Ukraina vera est campus Martius — so wrote the Kozak contemporary L. Rinhuber, the Austrian envoy to Moscow in his reports. Throughout her short independence Ukraine once more was a veritable field of war. But for her culture it was a period of great accomplishments and still greater ideas, that lighted the gloom of the next years. When Ukraine fell once more under Russian domination, the impact of the renewed national forces was such that the old methods of suppression with their blunt policy of prohibition and outright denial became ineffective. Most important was the fact that Ukraine never capitulated officially; she was

overpowered in a war fought to the last. In the twenties this war was conducted in the cultural field with undiminished force, — it was a deadly struggle of two cultures, the Ukrainian and the Russian. The price for many magnificent works of Ukrainian literature, art and science, was the practically total destruction of a generation of the Ukrainian spiritual and cultural élite — the generation which had come into being in the years of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-18.

In the beginning Soviet Moscow could not break the elementary outburst of the national forces of Ukraine. Uncertain as to her own policy (international revolution or the building of socialism in one country?) and torn by the internal feuds of her own ambitious party leaders, Moscow at first seemed to concede wide liberties to Ukrainian culture, under the condition, however, that it would be “national in form, but international in its socialistic contents”. Moscow reasoned that in case of an international struggle it would be better to have the Ukrainian-speaking proletariat with her than against her, and tried to attract it through freedom in the development of cultural values. Ukrainian intellectuals and artists used this situation to build a modern national culture, and its development took a direction unforeseen and undesired by Moscow. Soon there came attacks against “national narrowness”. In the thirties “Ukrainian nationalism” was declared enemy No. 1 of Ukraine, and in 1932 all artistic and literary associations were liquidated, and a single official organization with compulsory membership, under direct orders from Moscow, was founded. From this date, as stressed by the Russian Soviet Encyclopaedia, “Ukrainian culture grew in the direction pointed out by Comrade Stalin”.

Slowly the word “proletarian” disappeared, and “Russian” was substituted. A single task was assigned to Ukrainian intellectuals — to deify Russian culture. This often reached the limits of absurdity. For example, such works as “Belinsky, the Great Friend of Ukraine” appeared, or articles on Shevchenko’s contemporary, the Russian democrat Dobrolyubov were written, where the influence of his ideas on Shevchenko was stressed. The only hitch in this theorizing was that when Shevchenko’s political outlook was fully formed, and he was already a well known poet, Dobrolyubov was four years old. With the shock campaigns of showing Shevchenko — the deadliest enemy of Moscow — as her friend and lover, the dance on the Bald Mountain started all over again.

According to the view on the superiority of Russian culture, everything Ukrainian was censored anew. Everywhere in Soviet Ukrainian editions passages were found, which did not conform to the Russian standpoint, and the outcome is that there now is not a single dictionary

of the Ukrainian language, not a single Ukrainian history, even in the Soviet interpretation, not a single history of Ukrainian literature, that has not been declared nationalistic, and consequently taken out of circulation. It meant nothing that these editions had been prepared by the already dozen times purged Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the cultural institution of the Moscow regime in Ukraine. It was substituted for the liquidated All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and is now under the supervision of the All-Union Academy of Sciences in Moscow.

The result of all this is the complete bewilderment of the Ukrainian scientific world, and Ukrainian science as well as cultural life are losing the last traces of their national individuality and distinction. Moscow's principal aim, however, has been just this, because for Moscow all other national cultures dare exist only as secondary and dependent additions — in other words as provincial cultures. And so the history of Ukraine and all other non-Russian peoples is included in the history of the USSR, but only insofar as they have contributed something to the empire of the Tsars of the Soviets.

Ukrainian literature is reserved strictly for administrative purposes, such as the propagation of the shock harvest campaigns, hog breeding (there are entire poems dedicated to this subject), hate campaigns against England or the USA, glorification of the leaders, or such events as the Pereyaslav Union. The isolation of ideas and styles from the West was and is complete. When during the last war a noted Ukrainian writer and former editor of the State Publishing House managed to escape, he admitted to the author of this article that he never had had occasion to learn anything about western philosophy; all he knew about Henri Bergson was that he was the leading philosopher of the French "decaying bourgeoisie", and he had never even heard such names as Bertrand Russell or Ortega y Gasset. As to technical literature only works dealing with agriculture are published in Ukraine in the Ukrainian, others on industry, transportation, mathematical sciences, medicine etc. are printed in Ukrainian only in exceptional cases. The aim is obvious: Ukrainian is to be merely for laborers; for science only the "cultured language" Russian should be used.

In all these methods used by Moscow in Ukraine, nothing seems to be really new, everything is according to old Muscovite traditions. Let us take literary criticism as an example. It is identical with the system of denunciation, which Tsar Peter I introduced in his laws in 1720. The duty of the critic is to find not only what the author said or tried to say, but first and foremost what he did not say.

The world is today well acquainted with the case of V. Sosyura's poem "Love Ukraine." It was sufficient for another poet, Mr. Rylsky, to mention in one of his poems blue sky and yellow wheat to be denounced for Ukrainian nationalistic deviations, because these are the colors of the Ukrainian flag, forbidden in Ukraine. Still another writer was denounced as a "fascist racist", for writing that a characteristic trait of Ukrainian girls was slender legs. . . The times of the Tsars were still idyllic in comparison with today. Then writing in Ukrainian was sternly forbidden, it is true, and writers were imprisoned or sentenced to exile, but at least they were not compelled to write poems in praise of the tsars. Today it is different; only those are left who can write odes to the regime.

In the last decade before Stalin's death every volume of Ukrainian poetry had to start with a poem dedicated to him; there were no exceptions from this unwritten law. Today at least one poem about Moscow is compulsory. Everything that did not conform with Moscow's policy of levelling was crushed out and declared non-existent. The very names of Ukrainian writers, artists or scholars who have been liquidated, disappeared, or if they were occasionally mentioned they were written not in capitals, but in small letters. — One very characteristic Russian trait: when writing about other Slav nations Belinsky and Dostoyevsky called them "narodishki" — a rather contemptuous diminutive. All works of liquidated authors have been removed from bookshops and libraries and destroyed, "the authors of the books shall be put to death and the collected books shall be burned. . ."

When in 1939 Lviv was occupied by the Soviet Russians, non-Ukrainian teenagers were sent to the largest Ukrainian scientific library to purge it of undesirable books: the process was simple, they threw whatever books were not to their liking on the floor and trampled them with their feet. The destruction of Ukrainian books was conducted not only in Ukraine, for Moscow has managed to destroy Ukrainian publications even in the libraries abroad.

Throughout the long tsarist period Imperial Russia strove unsuccessfully to wipe out the Ukrainian national identity. The same aim is apparent in Soviet Russian policy today. Taught by the futile attempts of the Tsarist regime to Russianize other peoples, Moscow aims today to create an *ersatz* in the "Soviet nation", with a "socialistic" culture directed, of course, by the Russians. To this end Moscow allows the non-Russian peoples to develop their national dances and folk songs, but she does not allow them to possess their own history, philosophy, science, education, political views and all the other features that distinguish a nation from a tribe.

VII.

At present Moscow's traditional looting of Ukrainian art treasures should be underlined. Not long ago a Ukrainian archeologist, Prof. M. Miller, wrote an article on this subject, which was widely reprinted in the Ukrainian West European and American press. Here he reported that in the mid-thirties in all Ukrainian museums not one object in gold was left, and very few in silver.

The golden treasures from the Scythian, Greek and Kievan periods are regarded by archeologists as equal, if not richer than the Aztec-Mexican finds. They were taken from Ukraine soon after their discovery, but even those that for some reason were left in Ukrainian museums disappeared one after another on various occasions. This was a well organized system. The Tsarist regime systematically stripped Ukraine of everything valuable that was found there. As early as 1854 the Hermitage in St. Petersburg had over 2,500 objects from Kerch and Nicopol alone.


Under the pretext of preserving art treasures from the Allies during the Crimean War, an order was issued that everything of value be transferred to St. Petersburg, and this became a convenient tradition. Later during World War I, when Lviv was occupied by the Russians for a short time, Scythian objects of gold found in Galicia were taken from a museum and never returned. The Soviet regime did not change this Russian tradition of possessing themselves of everything of value. As late as 1946 in Simferopol, Crimea, a Scythian mausoleum was discovered, and everything, including 1,300 golden objects, was taken to the Pushkin Museum in Moscow. . .

In 1929 there were 94 museums in Ukraine. Soon, however, came mass arrests of Ukrainians suspected of nationalism, many art historians were liquidated and the museums were "reorganized" as "revolutionary" or anti-religious. Such an anti-religious museum was organized in the Lavra Monastery, one of the great sanctuaries of Ukraine. Gold and silver was confiscated everywhere and sold mostly abroad. In the mid-thirties practically all museums were closed down; the reopening started with the elimination of Ukrainian historical remains, and Russian objects were substituted to demonstrate how dependent Ukrainian art was on Russian.

In the years of 1934-6 many universally known monuments of ancient Kiev architecture were ruthlessly demolished, among them St. Michael's Monastery from the XI-XII cent., the Three Saints Church, the Cathedral of Mazepa and many other churches, — irreplaceable historical and artistic monuments. Priceless mosaics from the XII cent., from the demolished St. Michael's Monastery were partly transferred to a Moscow

museum and exhibited there as specimens of "Russian" art. Russia had no mosaics of her own from that period.

Not one history of Ukrainian art has ever been allowed to be published in Soviet Ukraine. The reason for this is clear; such a history would leave blank spaces in the history of Russian art of the pre-Christian and the early Christian periods, that were centered in Ukraine. All these Russian distortions of art history are accepted by American authors and by American encyclopedias.



**DEBRIS OF THE THREE SAINTS
CHURCH IN KIEV (12th cent.)**

This example of the ancient Ukrainian architecture was demolished in 1935 by the order of Postyshev, at the time the Muscovite governor of Ukraine.

To the looting of Ukrainian art treasures may be added the list of liquidated Ukrainian artists. At the time when the Russian school of Byzantine painting (Palekh) was sponsored by the state and praised as the great achievement of Russian national art, the Ukrainian Neo-Byzantinists under the leadership of M. Boychuk were imprisoned, exiled or killed. This school was constantly attacked for its „nationalistic and ecclesiastical” forms.

Never changing inspite of her temporary coloring, Moscow is heading straight toward the annihilation of the ancient cultures of Ukraine and other nations, which she subdued with brutal police methods. The case of Ukraine and the other subdued nations is not an internal Russian problem any more, but is fast becoming an international problem. Ukraine, the leading anti-Moscow force among the enslaved nations, will be chief witness in the future historical judgement over the Muscovite crime in the destruction of the national cultures of many people.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE UKRAINIAN- MUSCOVITE TREATY OF 1654

By NICHOLAS CZYROWSKI

The Pereyaslav Treaty was important not only politically but economically. Of course, the economic motives for the agreement which actually took place were quite different from the effects, for Eastern Europe soon afterwards went through some fundamental changes in its economic life and economic constitution. The Russians expected from Pereyaslav some concrete economic gains while the Ukrainians failed entirely to comprehend it and soon found themselves economically exploited. This happened because the leaders of Ukraine wanted only a loose political arrangement with Russia and overlooked the economic aims of Moscow in Ukraine. Let us briefly analyze the economic motives which instigated Moscow to enter into political ties with Ukraine.

THE MUSCOVITE ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR THE PEREYASLAV TREATY

The Russian national economy of the 14th to 17th century was predominantly a natural one. Agriculture was backward; the land was cultivated by serfs; the productivity of the land was entirely dependent upon the fertility of the soil, for manure was very little used. Only oxen and horses were raised. The handicrafts were highly primitive as compared with the West. The very weak economic position of the crafts in Moscow at that time was best signified by the fact that no guild system existed to advance the efficiency of industry. Great territorial distances and the lack of roads hampered domestic trade very considerably, and there was no international trade worth mentioning. Economic life was largely confined to a self-sufficient household economy. No wonder, therefore, that under such conditions the Russian national economy was merely at a subsistence level.¹ This was the time of the already emerging

¹ For the description of the 16th and 17th century economy of Russia; S. Harcave; *Russia, A History*, Chicago-Philadelphia-New York, 1952, pp. 41-46, further, P. I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, Chapter X-XI-XII. The different nature of the northern-forest and the southern-steppe economy is indicated by C. L. Day; *Economic Development in Europe*, New York, 1942, pp. 476 and others.

Muscovite territorial expansion and imperialism which could not continue in the long-run with only a subsistence economy as a material background. The Ukrainian economy of that time was more efficient. The crafts were developed and frequently organized in guilds. Agriculture produced surpluses. This was reflected in the political life of the Polish state, of which Ukraine prior to 1648 was a part. The Polish gentry, and particularly those from Ukraine, required the complete abolition of any import abroad and export restrictions and this was exceptionally true of the export of wheat from Ukraine.²

Further, the forest areas were important in the early Moscow economy, and it was highly desirable for Russia and the Russian rulers to supplement the productivity of their forest economy by the products of the southern steppe areas of Ukraine down to the shores of the Black Sea. To supplement its predominantly primitive economy, Moscow politically penetrated in the 17th century various borders and regions incorporating them in its own state organism. The wealth of the steppe areas attracted colonization and the exclusively military seizing of those areas failed. So the Russian government thought of encouraging agricultural colonization by half military, half economic ventures. This method prevailed in the Don area and in the borderlands of Asia.

Ukraine, being a source of wealth for Poland, had developed a strong agriculture with the features of a predominantly steppe economy, and was successful in the colonization of the Black Sea steppes, and so seemed to be eventually a valuable acquisition for the emerging empire. From the economic point of view Ukraine fitted too well into the pattern of the young Russian national economy, the more, because the low level of production and the backwardness of the economy of Muscovy had already generated the idea of the "all-Russian market". Bearing the strong faculties of the self-sufficient tendencies, the "all-Russian market" idea was championed by the serf-holding landlord class, and the developing mercantile class over the 17th and 18th centuries, and called for overcoming the backwardness by economic expansion.³ As a result, various annexations were made at the end of the 18th century to further the new economic doctrine and to work toward building a strong economic basis

² Compare; S. Kutrzeba, *Historia Ustroju Polski* (History of Polish Constitution), Lwow, 1917, pp. 85.

³ Among the various annexations of Russia during the 18th century were: Bashkiria, vast parts of Siberia, Transcaucasia, the penetration of Turkestan, Ukraine east of Dnieper, the Don steppe areas and others. This was the process of taking over by Moscow the heritage of the Golden Horde. For the emerging concept of the "all-Russian market" — compare; Lyashchenko, P.; *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, pp. 266.

for national growth and political imperialism. The Pereyaslav Treaty, the successive violations of its terms, and the final incorporation of Ukraine (1783) were some of the many steps in building the Russian large-space economy of the future, which has been always marked by strong self-sufficient tendencies, and a low interest in international economic cooperation, to avoid dependence upon abroad.⁴

THE IMMEDIATE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE PEREYASLAV TREATY

It was no accident that the economic and financial terms of the agreement of Pereyaslav were among those violated first by the Tsarist government. Among the various clauses of the agreement was one on the financial status of Ukraine. It involved the right of the Ukrainians to collect taxes and to arrange their financial problems as a sovereign state. Russia was to receive only an annual tribute, and otherwise to keep out of Ukrainian financial affairs. Of course, the Russians were very reluctant to accept that particular provision of the agreement. They immediately violated the financial sovereignty of Ukraine. The Russian "voevody" and officials started to levy and to collect their own taxes and to interfere also in the other economic affairs of Ukraine, by giving grants of land something that was entirely outside their authority.⁵ These tactics were in perfect accord with the economic plans of Moscow, commencing her "all-Russia" markets and including the agriculturally efficient Ukraine as a part of those markets.

Later on, when Peter the Great started to develop his huge military machine, he at once placed Ukraine into the position of a colony. Following the Western European patterns of political and economic organization, he adopted the Mercantilist policy toward a favorable balance of trade, the development of crafts and industries, and government subsidies to encourage private economic initiative. The Baltic Sea was used as a window to Europe and the exports were channeled through the Baltic ports. Baltic commercial fleets were started, large workshops like ship yards, metallurgic industry, mining, factories to produce and military

⁴ Russian economic centralism and relative self-sufficiency has been traditional; N. Czyrowski; *American trade and Russian dominated Countries*, New York, 1953, Harry Schwartz; *Russia's Soviet Economy*, New York, 1951, Chapter II and XIV.

⁵ The agreement of Pereyaslav failed to regulate some important matters of the legal and economic position of the urban and rural population of the Ukrainian state under Russian protection. This easily enabled the Russian officials to violate the economic sovereignty of Ukraine. "Ukrainska Zahalna Encyklopedia" (Ukrainian General Encyclopedia), Lviv-Stanislawiv, 1935-37, Vol. III, pp. 607.

clothing were built and developed throughout Muscovite territories. All this was encouraged by considerable financial government subsidies to private enterprises. An attempt was made to develop a system of internal water ways.⁶

In Ukraine at that time, the agricultural character of her economy was retained to keep it as a source of raw material and food supply for the Russian markets. No serious attempts were made to develop any metallurgic industry, mining, ship building, or textiles although there existed the objective conditions for the development of these economic fields in Ukraine. Several small workshops existed in the Eastern part of Ukraine, while in Russia private enterprises for state plants were on a large-scale and employed sometimes 1,000 or even more workers.⁷ Many more plants had been established in the 18th century in Ukraine under the Polish rule. Peter I conscientiously aimed to preserve Ukraine as a colony of Moscow, and therefore her economic progress was purposely retarded by governmental measures. Not much attention was paid by Moscow to commercial fleets in the Black Sea, in order not to create a competition for the Baltic ports, although from the political point of view of the traditional Russian ambitions to conquer some day Constantinople, this would seem very illogical. However, the economic arguments of Mercantilism were stronger at that time than the eventual political expedience of that measure.

It is noteworthy that the plan of Ukrainian navigation on the Black Sea existed in the Ukrainian-Turkish agreements in 1649-53. All that kind of economic policy continued during the reign of Catherine II, and later on as well.

UKRAINE AS A GREAT RUSSIAN COLONY IN THE 19TH CENTURY

Lyashchenko, the official historian of the national economy of Russia and of the Soviet Union, states clearly that Ukraine was during the first half of the nineteenth century, still in the status of a colony. It seems to be a repetition of the statements of Lenin made in his discussion

⁶ The Mercantilist system under Peter the Great and Catherine the Great — S. Harcave; *Russia, A History*, 1952, pp. 76-77. Further, P. Lyashchenko; *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, pp. 283-306.

⁷ Lyashchenko; *ibid.*, pp. 292, further; *Krepostnaya, manufactura v Rossii, (Feudal Manufacturing in Russia), Social Composition of the Workers of the First Half of the Eighteenth Century*, Academy of Sciences (of USSR), 1934, p. xiii. The above documents indicate that large-scale plants existed in Russia. In contrast to that — the agricultural character of the Ukrainian economy (Lyashchenko; *ibid.*, pp. 342-347) was intentionally sustained.

of the economic evolution of the Russian empire.⁸ As for industry, its presence was little felt during the first half of that century.⁹

As a later reflection of the mercantilist policy during the first half of the nineteenth century, a textile industry was developed in Great Russian regions around Tver, Yaroslav, Moscow, and Vladimir; the cotton industry was developed around Ivanovo, Voznesensk, Vladimir, and Moscow; also the metallurgic industry received strong support.¹⁰

At the same time, little attention was paid to Ukraine and to her areas of rich mineral resources, like the Donets-Basin, and the Krivy-Rih district, where mining and heavy industry could really flourish because of the tremendous productive capacity of these territories. But, this and other aspects of industrial growth of Ukraine were absolutely retarded. In the West-bank Ukraine, the former Polish possession, industry developed there in the 18th century by the feudal landlords gradually died and literally no industry was permitted to exist. The production of sugar beets was greatly fostered. Ukraine was to be kept an agricultural colony; peasant serfdom was stabilized to increase agricultural efficiency; heavy taxes were levied to bring in revenue for the Russian empire.

A large latifundia economy was inaugurated in the steppe-Ukraine. The landlords were Russians and foreigners faithful to Russia, and were settled there in order to strengthen the Russian domination in the newly acquired Black Sea areas of Ukraine. When in 1861-66 the peasant reform was carried out, the size of land allotments was arranged in such a way as to injure the black soil areas, and these were mainly in Ukraine. It meant, therefore, that the Ukrainian peasants were to suffer lower soil production as not to become economically too strong and too independent.¹¹

The Black Sea ports and mercantile fleets were not so far developed as it seemed to be necessary for the heavy grain exports of Ukraine. Other than agricultural exports and imports were directed through the Baltic and Far Eastern ports, even if it was not expedient because of transportation costs. When Lyashchenko indirectly states this economic position of Ukraine as an exploited colony, then he is wrong in not ex-

⁸ Lenin; *Sochineniya* (Collected Works), Vol. III, pp. 462.

⁹ Quotation from the "History of the National Economy of Russia", by P. Lyashchenko, pp. 347.

¹⁰ P. G. Lyubomirov; *Ocherki po istorii russkoi promyshlennosti v XVII i nachale XIX v.* (Outlines of the History of Russian Manufacturing in the XVIIth and in the early XIXth centuries), 1930.

¹¹ Skrebitskyi; *Krestyanskoye dyelo v tsarstvovaniye imperatora Alexandra II* (Peasant Affairs during the reign of the Emperor Alexander II), Bonn, 1863, Vol. I-IV.

tending his statement for the whole nineteenth century. Certainly this was not the intention of the Ukrainian leaders making the alliance of Pereyaslav, and it was not the wording of the agreement to make Ukraine an agricultural colony and a source for the Russian economic and political growth. This all happened because of the lack of sincerity of the Moscow government.

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEREYASLAV TREATY SINCE 1861

During the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the traditional doctrine of the all-Russian market developed into the "Eurasian" concept of the Russian economy, according to which the imperial economic life was concentrated on inter-provincial exchange and commerce to lower the rate of foreign trade especially of imports, and to establish the relative self-sufficiency of Russia. Ukraine was still held as a source of raw material and food for the imperial large scale markets. She was forced to accept from the wide areas of the empire three-fourths of her own import of goods produced mostly from Ukrainian raw materials beyond Ukraine and was permitted to export mainly agricultural products, frequently through the Baltic ports despite the nearness of the Black Sea ports.¹² Although the export by the Black Sea ports was more economical for the Ukrainian domestic trade, the Ukrainian ports were neglected and Ukrainian commercial fleets held continuously at the lowest level and confined only to the costal exchange.¹³

The unfavorable position of Ukraine within the Great Russian large spaced economic structure was best illustrated by the following instances. Thus, for example, to stimulate the development of the Russian Eurasian markets, special railroad rates were adopted, like the Chelyabinsk-break, to favor the far-distant shipments of goods between Great Russia and her colonial possessions. Ukraine, being relatively close to the Russian market, and the Black Sea, did not profit from reduced rates at all.¹⁴ Of course, the second half of the 19th century brought the development of the Ukrainian industries like mining, heavy machine industry, textile, and

¹² J. M. Goldstein; *Russia, Her Economic Past and Future*, New York, 1919, pp. 46, has a statistical table indicating the trade volume of various Russian ports prior to the First World War. The unfavorable position of the Black Sea ports in this respect in comparison with other ports is quite evident.

¹³ R. Dymynskyi, II — *Economic Life*, in "Ukraine and Her People," ed. by I. Mirchuk, Munich, 1949, pp. 195-197.

¹⁴ R. Dymynskyi; *ibid*, pp. 127-129, also Lyashchenko, P. "the Chelabinsk-break", *History of the National Economy of Russia*, New York, 1949, pp. 513.

clothing manufacture in such areas as the Donets Basin, the Krivyy-Rih district and the Kharkiv industrial areas. But there predominantly Russian and foreign capital was invested, and this resulted in heavy interest and dividend payments of the Ukrainian economy toward Russia proper and abroad. To retard the development of the Ukrainian owned capital and enterprise, the Russian authorities opposed the creation and growth of the Ukrainian cooperative movement.

Russian gains from the possession of Ukraine have been otherwise enormous; thus the Ukrainian economy contributed about twenty per cent of the imperial gross national production, while about only five per cent was returned to Ukraine for her domestic purposes.¹⁵ It was only due to the heavy Ukrainian export of grain that Russia could maintain prior to the first world war, a favorable balance of trade, and offset her imports. The Ukrainian wheat export for instance, amounted to ninety per cent of the total wheat export of the Russian economy. The production of sugar beets in Ukraine their refining, the Russian consumption of Ukrainian sugar and its export was also a considerable item among the credits of the imperial economics. On the other hand, a negligible per cent of the Russian imports, was allocated to the Ukrainian consumption. Russia received still other revenues from the transportation of the products of Ukrainian origin. (The transportation industry has been always regarded in Russia, predominantly since the fifteenth century, a very profitable one).

Certain Ukrainian industries were deliberately neglected in order to keep Ukraine as a source of raw material, and as an outlet for goods produced in Russia proper. The exploitation of the Ukraine by the communist government of the U.S.S.R. can be indirectly learned from a careful and thorough analysis a recent publication of Harry Schwartz, "Russia's Soviet Economy".¹⁶ The incorporation of the Ukrainian economy into the Russian taxation system (which was against the provisions of the agreement of Pereyaslav) greatly contributed to the Russian internal revenue collections, which were largely used for the development of other Russian areas and eventually for the establishment of rival plants in Russia proper to compete with the eventually emerging young Ukrainian capitalistic enterprise.

¹⁵ R. Dymynskyi; II — Economic Life, compare Note 13, pp. 127.

¹⁶ Only to quote a few works which treat the colonial exploitation of Ukraine by the Soviet government; O. K. Mytsyuk; *Selanstvo i ekonomika bolshevizmu* (Peasantry and the economics of the Bolshevism), Lviv, 1930; A. Kachor, *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy v Systemi SSSR.*, (Ukrainian Economy within the System of the USSR.), Winnipeg, 1953; the economic aspects of the Soviet regime is briefly covered in C. A. Manning's "Twentieth Century Ukraine", New York, 1951.

The struggle for the economic emancipation of Ukraine during the Tsarist time was almost hopeless because Ukraine was divided into several administrative units. But this fight flamed up during the NEP period by the Ukrainian Communists themselves when they demanded the economic independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic from the exploitation of Moscow. The standard bearer of this struggle became the Communist Vololuyev, a naturalized Ukrainian of Russian descent. Vololuyev and his followers, the economic sector of Ukrainian Titoism called this movement because of the leader Shumsky — Shumskism were destroyed in the following years by the general purge of Ukrainians in the Communist Party in Ukraine.

It is almost astonishing how much the Pereyaslav Treaty resembles in its entire scope the modern Yalta agreement. Quite different things were expected from Pereyaslav by the Ukrainians of the 17th century, as different things were expected from Yalta by the Western Allies. However, the Russians in both cases entered the respective international arrangements with many mental reservations and the economic and political plans for the distant future. The Ukrainians of the 17th century like the Western leaders of the 20th century believed in the good will and fair play of their partners and soon became the subject of deception.

By the Pereyaslav Treaty the Ukrainians forfeited their economic and political independence, while the Russians, on the other hand, gained everything. Certainly, the Russians of the 17th century expected by the exploitation of Ukraine to be able to strengthen their primitive agricultural-forest economy. They truly succeeded. But, then under conditions of Mercantilism, progressive Capitalism, and Communism, Ukraine became an even more profitable colony to foster the Russian imperial growth. Without the Ukrainian economy, the Russians would not have been able, probably, to expand to such an enormous empire. The economic reasons therefore, have been responsible for Pereyaslav and the later ruthless political violence directed against any Ukrainian separatist movements.¹⁷

¹⁷ However, a quite different opinion about the role of Russia in the economic life of Ukraine is held by the official Academy of Arts and Sciences of the Ukr. S.S.R., a submissive tool of the Russian rule and supremacy in this very Union Republic. It joins the action to praise the agreement of Pereyaslav, and plans to publish an "Outline of the Development of the Economics of the Ukr.S.S.R.", to stress the "progressive meaning of the agreement for the economy of Ukraine; the flourishing state of the Ukrainian national economy under the Soviets; and the support of the Great Russian People to advance the development of the economics and civilization of the Ukrainian people". *Magazin "Vitchyzna",* *Chronics of Culture and Art*, No. 12, for December 1953.

300 YEARS OF RUSSIAN DEALINGS WITH UKRAINE

By NICHOLAS PRYCHODKO

The month of January has a special significance in Ukrainian history. On January 22, 1918, after a determined and bloody battle with the Russian occupying forces, the Ukrainians proclaimed in Kiev, their capital, a free Ukrainian Democratic Republic, independent of Moscow.

In January, 1654, a tragic blunder was made by the Ukrainians and it brought disastrous results. Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, upon completing a victorious war with Poland to recover the Ukrainian lands, decided to enter into a pact of friendship with Russia.

Russia's persistent diplomatic tactics, during the lifetime of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, her promises of true friendship and respect for Ukraine's sovereignty as a nation led Ukraine to commit a grave historical error—the signing of the tragic Pereyaslav Pact. This opened the door for the Russian entrance into Ukraine and instead of friendship and solidarity they launched a widespread campaign of intrigue, in modern language called penetration and the creation of a fifth column.

Through methods of high handed oratory they stirred up the ignorant elements against the leaders. The Tsarist emissaries used every opportunity to sow distrust and disagreement among the Kozak forces which were at that time the main obstacle to the Russian occupation of Ukraine.

After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky Russia was quick to take advantage of the temporary confusion in the top circles of the Ukrainian government, flooded the country with its military garrisons and gradually tightened its hold.

Finally, at the beginning of the eighteenth century the brutal Muscovite politics in Ukraine impelled Hetman Ivan Mazepa to seek a secret alliance with King Charles XII of Sweden and enter into a decisive struggle with the Russian forces. The defeat of King Charles and his ally Hetman Mazepa at Poltava hastened further Russian conquests in Ukraine.

In 1721, after occupying the Baltic states and Finland, Tsar Peter I issued a proclamation changing the Muscovite Tsardom to a Russian Empire. And in 1775 the immense Russian armies destroyed the last

fortress of the Ukrainian military forces, the glorious Zaporozhian Sich, thus opening the road to the Black Sea and Caucasus, and established on the free Kozak land of Ukraine a feudal and serf system and their own rule of bayonet and terror which lasted until the Revolution in 1917.

Many times during this period larger and smaller flames of insurrection flared up but were always extinguished in the blood of the insurgents. Along the main thoroughfares clanged the fetters of victims being convoyed from Ukraine to the distant, desolate corners of the Russian Empire for slave labor. Along this thorny road also walked our greatest poet and national tribune—Taras Shevchenko.

In one of his poems he describes Ukraine's reaction to Khmelnytsky's blunder in the following insulting words:

“Oh, Bohdan; oh Bohdan;
If I had only known,
I would have choked you in the cradle,
Smothered you under my heart.”

Today Moscow is endeavoring by a powerful propaganda to convince the Ukrainians that the Pereyaslav Pact was a happy event in Ukrainian history because it brought Ukraine under the protection of the “Older brother” who defends her from covetous foreigners.

This “protection” of Ukrainian territories from the time of the fatal Pact until the present day has been marked by the total exploitation of Ukraine's economic wealth and the indiscriminate destruction of all marks of national identity, carried on by boundless terror and genocide.

During the reign of Peter I, whom Communist Russians laud as a “progressive Empire builder,” tens of thousands of Kozaks were arrested because they refused to submit to Russian domination. They died in slavery, from overwork in the swamps building Petersburg, the capital of the Russian Empire. Similar acts of genocide were also committed by Catherine II after she liquidated the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775.

The Sich Commander-in-Chief, Petro Kalnyshevsky, who was then over 80 years of age was imprisoned in the Solovetsky Monastery, on the White Sea. There he spent the remaining twenty-six years of his life, chained in a solitary damp vault under the Uspensky Cathedral. He died there at the age of 110 years. This severe punishment of the Ukrainian knight is by no means an isolated act of that cruelty which characterized the barbaric nature of Tsarist Russia.

From the memoirs of Western diplomats of that period we learn that such “progressive builders” of the Russian Empire as Ivan the Terrible and Peter I took special delight in personally supervising the tortures of their political opponents, in Muscovite murder cells, where the

victims were put on the wheel, burnt with red hot irons, hung by the arms and flogged in order to force confessions from them.

This Russian tradition was also practised in Ukraine by the Red Russian Imperialists after the Revolution of 1917 because the Ukrainian problem always was and still is the most vital problem in the existence of the Russian Empire.

Having seized power in the Kremlin and secured an armistice at Brest-Litovsk, which halted the fighting on the German front, Lenin turned his main attention to the "home front" of Ukraine.

His methods of dealing with Ukrainians were soon apparent when a group of about 300 young students from Kiev, who had volunteered to defend their native country, was surrounded by Muravyov's troops, who outnumbered them a hundredfold, and savagely massacred them with swords and machine-guns.

Accompanying Muravyov's divisions into Ukraine were detachments of the Cheka (secret police) who shot down in cold blood "enemies of the Revolution—Ukrainian nationalists" by the thousands. Following on their heels came detachments from the Commissariat of Food to seize grain, livestock and vegetables from the farmers and ship them north.

It is difficult to estimate the enormous number of Ukrainians who died in the struggle with Russian Bolshevik hordes or at the hands of the Cheka (later the GPU, NKVD, MVD) from a bullet at the nape of the neck or from inhuman torture. In the Russian Empire the murder of a political opponent was not, and still is not, considered a crime and no statistics are kept of such events. In any case hundreds of thousands died—the best sons of the Ukrainian nation.

My cousin, Klement, an officer in the Ukrainian National Army, escaped from a Communist prison during a partisan attack minus all the fingers on his right hand. They had been cut off, one at a time, during interrogations.

The political police also intensively performed still another function. With the aid of the newly formed Communist centres in Ukraine it carefully sought out any hatreds or jealousies among the different social factions of the population and whipped these into open antagonisms so as to weaken a united resistance.

However, all these measures failed to suppress the Ukrainian resistance and the Communists resorted to yet another crime. During the years 1921 and 1922 the first Soviet famine was created and brought death and privation to more than two million Ukrainian farmers. The irrefutable cause of the famine was Russia's appropriation of most of the grain in the country and hauling it away to the north in thousands of

trainloads. The people in Russia did not die of starvation; only on the fertile lands of Ukraine was there famine and death.

Finally when this policy began to show disastrous results the Kremlin realized that such drastic measures would eventually lead to economic ruin. To avert this the Bolsheviks decreed in 1924 an era of the New Economic Policy, known as the NEP period, similar to the recent proclamation in Hungary and East Germany.

The new policy sanctioned private ownership of land or other enterprises, permitted free trade and on the whole encouraged every individual initiative that was conducive to national prosperity. They also promised freedom of religion. Within two years Ukraine was transformed as if by magic. People almost forgot the treachery of Moscow but very soon they were to be painfully reminded of it again.

In 1928, within a few nights, almost all Ukrainians who owned a private business, shop, store or prosperous farm were arrested and their possessions confiscated by the Soviet government. A proclamation advised all and sundry that the NEP had been a temporary trial measure and that henceforth all rights to any enterprise belonged solely to the government. No one dared so much as think of those beguiling promises of individual ownership of business and land.

The ranks of the secret police were so powerfully strengthened and the possibility of any uprising so thoroughly suppressed that it was now safe for the government to speak openly and wield the whip over any still insistent seekers for justice and the rights of free men.

During the years 1926—1927 the *Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church* was desecrated and destroyed in a most barbaric manner. Twenty-seven archbishops and bishops, with the 75-year-old Metropolitan Wasyl Lypkivsky at the head, were arrested and sentenced without a public hearing or trial to slave labor in concentration camps of Northern Russia where they later died.

About twenty years later the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church was almost totally annihilated in Western Ukraine. Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, died mysteriously. Then followed the arrest and deportation of the Metropolitan Joseph Slipy and the seven Bishops because they refused to serve the false Moscow patriarchate, created to conduct false propaganda and espionage abroad.

After the liquidation of the episcopate thousands of priests were shot or tortured and sent to concentration camps in Siberia. All church property was confiscated by the state. The rural churches were turned into granaries, theatres, or clubs or were simply destroyed.

Because the Christian doctrine of moral law and love of one's fellow man clashed with Communist immorality and terrorism the church was uprooted and debased.

Here are the words of A. Lunacharsky, a former Commissar of Education of the USSR and a close friend of Lenin, the prophet of Russian messianism: "We hate Christianity and Christians—even the best of them must be looked upon as our worst enemies. They preach the love of our neighbors and mercy, which is contrary to our principles. Down with the love of our neighbors—what we want is black hatred. We must learn how to hate and it is only then that we shall conquer the world."

At the end of 1929 a new wave of mass terror rolled across Ukraine when Russia inaugurated her plan of forced collectivization. Within a few nights, in the winter of 1929, every Ukrainian village had a few farms confiscated along with all the possessions of the more prosperous farmers. Men, women, children and the aged were driven from their homes half clad and then packed into unheated freight trains and shipped to Siberia. In my native village with close to a thousand farms 108 farmers were thus liquidated. And this proportion was the same all over Ukraine.

Most of the people died from cold and hunger en route to Siberia. Those who survived the hazardous trip were unloaded in the dead Siberian taiga, given saws, axes, some food and told to build themselves shelters. Attempts to escape meant certain death and by spring only about a score or so out of a thousand still lived.

Forced collectivization against the people's will, the liquidation of the better farmers and the peasants' resistance to the new slavery resulted in an abrupt decrease in agricultural production. In reprisal Moscow organized a new act of genocide in Ukraine—the famine of 1932-1933—which took the lives of more than seven million farmers.¹

In the latter part of 1934 Nikolayev, a former member of the Trotskyite opposition, assassinated the Communist leader of the Leningrad district, Sergei Kirov. That Nikolayev shot Kirov by the orders of the GPU was claimed at the subsequent trial of the GPU chief, Yagoda.

In an article in *Life*, A. Orlov, a former NKVD general, disclosed that Yagoda had received orders to kill Kirov from Stalin personally.

I recall the day following the murder. In every factory and government office in Kiev (and throughout all of Ukraine) special meetings were called at which Communist emissaries cried with crocodile tears lamenting the death of the "beloved co-worker of Stalin—Sergei Myronovich Kirov." Torrents of threats and accusations were hurled against

¹ See the article: "Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine" by Nicholas Prychodko. *Ukrainian Quarterly*, Summer 1953.

the "enemies and subverters "who were planning to overthrow the Soviet regime."

We who heard these orations (and all were compelled to listen) knew from experience what would follow. Nor were we mistaken, for shortly afterwards the newspapers in Kiev published the names of 28 Ukrainian writers and cultural leaders who had been shot "in reprisal for Kirov's murder."

It was clearly evident from the beginning that Moscow intended to use this assassination mainly to suppress the discontented opposition in Ukraine.

Following the execution of the writers and other leading intellectuals tens of thousands of other Ukrainians were sent to join them in the next world, this time without an announcement in the press.

It is perhaps difficult for people of this continent to appreciate the tremendous loss of Ukrainian literature in 1934 since they have not had the opportunity to read the highly talented works of the executed writers. The Russians have never permitted the popularization of Ukrainian literature in the outside world. When Ukrainian books have been translated and published in Russian and from that language into English, French or German, the Ukrainian author is always identified as "Russian." This is also the case with composers, artists and scientists.

In 1943, during the German occupation of Ukraine, mass graves were uncovered in two orchards in Vinnitsa, a town with a population of about 40,000. The orchards had been confiscated by the NKVD in 1937 and kept day and night under heavy guard which prohibited anyone from setting foot in the area. 9,642 bodies of workers, farmers and intellectuals were unearthed, with their hands tied behind their backs and bullet holes in the back of their heads. Some bore signs of preceding tortures, exactly as has been revealed in Korea.

An international medical commission asserted that the victims had been shot during 1937-1938. Many were recognized by their families from remnants of clothing.

In one of the orchards the Communists made a so-called "Park of Culture and Rest" over these secret graves, with facilities for games and dancing. Can a more deplorable mockery of man and God be imagined? At this time Stalin issued a new slogan which was repeated endlessly throughout the USSR: "The most precious capital is the human being."

I was an eye-witness of that unforgettable mammoth funeral of those Kremlin victims in Vinnitsa in 1943. I know for a fact that there are, all over Ukraine and in the deep snows of Siberia, not hundreds but thousands of these tragic secret graves. I also know that there are mil-

lions of Ukrainians in Siberian concentration camps. Recently we have read a statement of German prisoners returning from the USSR, that in a big colony of slave labor in Vorkuta, near the Arctic Circle, 80% were Ukrainians.

Leaving everything behind in 1941 in their panic-stricken withdrawal from their late allies the Communists made most certain that they left no political prisoner alive in Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands of them were murdered in cold blood in prisons and ravines along the whole route of the flight of the "invincible" Red Army. In many instances prisons crammed full of living prisoners were set afire.

After the German invasion of the town of Melitopol in Southern Ukraine, 800 bodies of workers, farmers and intellectuals were found in oil tanks with bullet holes in the napes of their necks, their hands tied behind them with barbed wire. The coming of the Germans was so sudden that the NKVD did not have time to set fire to the tanks before they fled.

Similar examples of Moscow's practice during her domination of Ukraine are countless and have resulted in the deaths of millions of Ukrainians. It is therefore plainly evident that the Russian propagandist tales of eternal brotherhood between Ukraine and Russia are shameless.

In spite of the constant Russification of Ukraine and the attempts to uproot by every means the Ukrainian liberation spirit, carried on from the first days of the Pereyaslav Pact until the very present, the yearning of the Ukrainian people for national freedom and independence has not wavered.

In 1945, after the end of World War II, the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) heroically entered into an unequal battle with the Russian occupants.

"The Ukrainians and Georgians have a great hatred for the 'Great Russians.' Also an Uzbek would be offended by being called a Russian," writes Kurt Lachmann, Central European Editor of the U.S.A. News and World Report, on the basis of interviews taken from many German POW's recently released from Russian Communist captivity.

In her articles "I Toured Russia" Perle Mesta writes that Ukrainians whom she met were deeply offended and indignant at being called Russians.

The only sure and effective policy towards the Communist Russian Empire is the Policy of Liberation recently advocated by President Eisenhower and outlined by Professor James Burnham in his book "Containment or Liberation."

PRESIDENT ANDRIY LIVYTSKY (1879-1954)

(A REVOLUTIONARY, STATESMAN, PRESIDENT OF THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE).

By MATTHEW STACHIW



On January 17, 1954 the Ukrainian people lost their leader, one of the builders of the independent Ukrainian Democratic Republic (1917-1920) an indefatigable fighter for its preservation against Red Russian invasion, the best political assistant to the Supreme Commandant of the Ukrainian National Army Symon Petlyura, and upon whose assassination by a Red agent, the faithful bearer of the idea of national independence, and the Head of the Ukrainian Government in exile.

Andriy Livytsky was born in Eastern Ukraine, in the town of Liplava, the district of Poltava, at a time when Ukraine was divided between the Russian and Austrian empires. While the Austrian constitution provided for the equal rights of all component nations, in the Russian empire prevailed the principle "one tsar, one Russian Oorthodox Church, and one Russian nation." The Eastern Slav nations — the Ukrainian and White Ruthenian — were in Russia officially non-existent; the other non-Russian peoples as Poles, Balts, Caucasians and several Asiatic peoples dominated by Russia and recognized at least in theory, were oppressed by all the devices of the Russian imperialistic machine. Three years before A. Livytsky was born the Russian government issued a "law" which forbade the use of the Ukrainian language in churches, schools, communications with the governmental agencies, in the printing of newspaper, books and public notices, at public meetings and even on the stage and in songs at concerts. The target of this barbaric measure, the Ukrainian

people were forbidden even to read the Bible printed in their own language. All this happened in the modern times of human progress and modern civilization in 1876. In the atmosphere of injustice that was created in Ukraine by the Russian occupational regime, the young Livytsky grew up and was graduated from the Law School of the Kievan University.

While studying the Russian laws, the young Livytsky familiarized himself by his own efforts with the laws of the free nations of the West, and came under the spell of the western concepts of justice which emphasize human dignity and the civil rights of man, regardless of his national origin, the color of his skin and his religion, and which proclaim everyone equal in the eyes of the law. These concepts also recognize the self-determination of all nations as the only just way of determining their national existence. Opposed to these concepts were the daily practices of the Russian empire particularly in the Russian dominated Ukraine, where the police were allowed by "law" to arrest, deport and flog at will any citizen deemed unreliable. This was permitted to be done by administrative decisions without a trial and the verdicts of a court which, in Russia too, were influenced by the government. No wonder that the young Livytsky early became a convinced revolutionary.

At the age of 21, he joined a secret society of Ukrainian revolutionists which aimed at the liberation of the Ukrainian people. In 1900, he became a co-founder of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party the slogan of which was to fight for an independent Ukraine based on democracy and social justice. In 1905, this party became The Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labor Party. Andriy Livytsky belonged to this party during his entire political career in Ukraine and for this affiliation was arrested several times. Once he spent in prison almost two years.

What made Livytsky a revolutionist was his profound love for his people and his devotion to a democratic legality that prevailed in his party. These feelings made him immune to the propaganda of Lenin's Bolshevik party that was born from a split within the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party. The terrorist-revolutionary ideas of Bolsheviks did not appeal to Livytsky and his friends.

Democracy, in his opinion meant the abolition of all oppression, enslavement and privileges, and positively — an equal right for all. Hence, while fighting for the liberation of the Ukrainian people, Livytsky championed at the same time equal rights and human dignity for all residents of Ukraine. It is worth while to mention that not only his Ukrainian kinsmen but the national minorities of Ukraine had in him a hearty friend and defender. Especially his attitude toward the Jewish minority in Ukraine, at that time oppressed by the Russian government.

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The numerous Ukrainian Jews had found themselves under the Russian regime in the eighteenth century when Russia seized most of the Ukrainian lands after the partition of Poland. The tsarist Russian government, while recognizing the Jews as a separate ethnic and religious group, persecuted them. They were regularly barred from settling in East of Dnieper and from certain professions. Not only did the Russian government oppress the Jews; it also incited the illiterate masses of the Christians against them. When the revolution of 1905 broke out in the Russian Empire and forced the tsar to grant a "Short Constitution," the police resorted to certain devices in order to weaken the forces of the revolution. The Russian government organized through its police agents in Ukraine and White Ruthenia the so called "tchornaya sotnia" (black hundreds). These were assault groups composed of low and criminal characters who were formed to conduct an anti-Jewish campaign.

Immediately after the revolution of 1905 the Russian police began to plan Jewish pogroms. The Ukrainian patriots were active in opposing this shame from the Ukrainian soil and organized protection for the innocent victims of Russian tsarist barbarity.

Andriy Livytsky was one of the founders of such a Committee for the Protection of Jews in the town of Lubni, in the district of Poltava. Livytsky and his friends found out soon that under the "Short Constitution" the situation in Russia was short of any liberties and no better than before, under the open police regime.

The Russian state prosecutor charged Livytsky and his friends with violation of Article 102 of the then Russian penal code which was concerned with plots against the existing political regime of Russia. This charge clearly implied that the Jewish pogroms were part of the official political order of the Russian empire. The trial of Livytsky and his friends took place before a military tribunal in Kiev and lasted for more than a month. One of their defenders was the well known attorney at law Dr. Arnold D. Margolin, one of the Jewish-Ukrainian leaders. Mr. Margolin gives an account of this unfair trial before the Military Tribunal in his excellent book "Ukraine and the policy of the Entente (Berlin Yefron Publishing Company. The defendants were found guilty of the violation of paragraph 102 of the penal code and sentenced to various terms. It took a considerable time before the defense succeeded in bringing the case to a court of appeals, and it took two weeks of trial to convince the court that after all, it was no crime to protect innocent victims from pogroms of hoodlums.

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When during the revolution of 1917 the Ukrainian people undertook to restore their independent statehood, Andriy Livytsky was one of the leading fighters for the national rebirth of Ukraine. As a commissioner of the Ukrainian Central Rada for the district of Poltava, he was soon elected governor of this district and in this capacity he proved his great devotion, presence of mind, administrative ability and political courage.

On January 22, 1919 almost all Ukrainian lands were united under the banner of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic. However, this great achievement of the Ukrainian people came at a time when dark clouds were gathering over Ukraine. From the north, Ukraine was invaded for the second time by the Russian Bolsheviks; from the south-east, the White Russian armies marched against Ukraine; in the south the French forces landed in the Ukrainian ports to support the White Russian armies in their effort to rebuild the tsarist Russian empire. In the west the Polish army by the order of Pilsudski overran in an aggressive war the young Ukrainian State under such circumstances, that even century-old powers would not have been able to defend themselves, to say nothing of the young Ukrainian Republic which once before at the very moment of its birth (1917) had been invaded by the Russian Bolsheviks. Overwhelming numerical odds notwithstanding, the young Ukrainian Republic did not yield but offered heroic resistance. Its Army lacked arms, munitions, and even medical supplies because all these things were manufactured outside of Ukraine, and the soldiers had to seize them from the enemy in order to be able to continue their fight. No wonder that, deprived of all necessary equipment, the Ukrainian Army was overwhelmed by the physical might of its combined enemies. All appeals to the western powers for help, even for medical supplies and clothes, were of no avail. Virtually, the West drew a blockade around Ukraine.

But even under such terrible conditions the Ukrainian Army did not lay down its arms; it fought desperately and recorded many successes before it finally left its national territory.

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In this second stage of the Ukrainian fight for freedom the Directoriat of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic headed by Symon Petlyura entrusted Livytsky with two important positions; he was appointed Minister of Justice and eventually the Foreign Secretary.

With cruel war raging in Ukraine and with the enemy's fifth column undermining the nation, it was extremely difficult to maintain

order and justice. Bolshevik and White Russian agents, taking advantage of the fluctuation of the fronts were busy in the traditional tsarist methods provoking in disturbed Ukraine riots and Jewish pogroms. As the Minister of Justice, Livytsky was quite successful in providing that justice was administered properly. Those guilty of riots and pogroms were punished and the victims were given help.

He was less successful as Minister for External Affairs, from the third quarter of 1919. The Western blockade of Ukraine closed by the western support of the tsarist Russian forces on one hand, and the pressure of the Russian Bolsheviks on the other, forced Livytsky to look for some allies. He decided to convince the Polish government that peace between Poland and Ukraine would be beneficial for both of them and that they should combine their forces in order to avert the danger from the Russian Bolshevism. This was not an easy job, because the Polish government supported by the victorious Entente felt overconfident. Pilsudski and the Polish military circles were aware of the dangers of the Russian imperialism, but the Polish parliament was dominated by the pro-Russian national democrats under the leadership of Roman Dmowski.

Finally, A. Livytsky was able to convince Pilsudski and his associates that peace between Ukraine and Poland was to their mutual interests and that the two nations should form a military alliance against the Russian Bolsheviks. However, the Polish government decided to take advantage of the critical situation of the Ukrainian Republic. In the treaty of alliance negotiated by Livytsky and signed on April 26, 1920 the Polish side imposed on its Ukrainian partner heavy clauses which made this treaty quite unjust and therefore never accepted by the Ukrainian people. Livytsky saw all the disadvantages of this treaty, but the emergency forced his government to take the chance of a new campaign against the Bolsheviks in alliance with the Poles. The campaign was unsuccessful and Poland contrary to the treaty and without the consent of the Ukrainian side made a truce with the Russian Bolsheviks. This Polish step broke the treaty with Ukraine and made it a state without international obligations. Furthermore this one-sided action of the Polish government made it possible for the Bolsheviks to throw all their forces against the Ukrainian southern front and finally to shatter it. The Riga Treaty between Poland and the Bolsheviks brought peace in Eastern Europe.

The Ukrainian Army was forced to retreat to Poland where it was disarmed by the Poles and interned. Thus the attempt of A. Livytsky to bring about a durable alliance between Ukraine and Poland against Russian Bolshevism failed.

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This failure did not break the spirit of Livytsky. He tried other ways in order to be able to continue the Ukrainian fight for liberation. He sought for the support of Britain and France. Unfortunately, these western nations underestimated the perils of Russian Bolshevism and the significance of the liberation movements of the peoples subjugated by Moscow.

When in September 1939 the World War II broke out, caused by the Soviet-German treaty of friendship, it was believed that the West would finally recognize the equally dangerous nature of both of these totalitarian regimes. The Soviet Union had been expelled from the League of Nations for its aggression against Finland, and the tide of anti-Soviet feelings throughout the western world was high. In that situation the exiled government of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, headed by President Livytsky, declared its solidarity with the West against both Nazi Germany and the USSR. Even a detachment of Ukrainian volunteers was sent to Finland to fight against Red Russia.

However, as soon as Hitler attacked Stalin, the Western World was beset by a confusion over the new unusual situation. The cause of liberation of all nations enslaved by both Berlin and Moscow was put aside, and the Soviet Union became an ally of the Western alliance. Thanks to Western aid, the Russian Bolshevik tyranny secured a dominant position both in Europe and in Asia.

Under such conditions the just cause of the subjugated nations could not find a right understanding. There was needed time and disastrous experience before the Western democracy would detect their own most reliable ally in the democracy of Eastern Europe led by Ukraine. Whatever progress in this field has been achieved, is, to a considerable extent due to the efforts of Andriy Livytsky.

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In the recent internal Ukrainian affairs, the greatest achievement of Andriy Livytsky before his death was the structural reorganization of the Ukrainian Government in exile. He worked to the last days of his life to consolidate the Ukrainian political forces in exile within the framework of the Ukrainian Democratic Republic, in the Ukrainian National Council a *sui generis* Ukrainian pro-parliament in exile.

OBITUARIES

DR. VOLODYMYR KOROSTOVETS (1888-1953)

Dr. Volodymyr Korostovets died after a long illness in London September 29, 1953. He was one of the most interesting figures of the Ukrainian emigration after the two World Wars and his work on the Ukrainian cause abroad deserves a special monograph.

In him we have a classical example of the way in which descendants of Ukrainian nobility who for dozens of years uninterruptedly moved on the Russianized path and enjoyed all the advantages of the highest circles of the Russian upper classes still turned to Ukrainian people with the zeal of converts and became spokesman for Ukrainian independence.

Volodymyr Korostovets was born July 16, 1888 in Peresazha in the province of Chernyhiv, almost on the border between Ukraine and Muscovy.

His family came from an old princely noble family in Lithuania and the founder of his line in Ukraine was a man who went to the Zaporizhzhya and became a general officer under Mazepa and after the latter's defeat at Poltava, accompanied the aged Hetman into the emigration in Turkey. His grandfather, a Russian general, was completely Russianized. His father a Colonel in the Tsarist Army was for almost thirty years Commandant of the Preobrazhensky Guard Regiment; under his direct command the heirs to the throne, including Nicholas II, did their military service.

Reared in such an environment, the young Volodymyr Korostovets, obtained a careful education in the home of his parents who were landowners and especially from his mother, who was at the time one of the very few ladies in Russia who had obtained a university education abroad (in Geneva). He studied in Kiev and later in the Polytechnic Institute in St. Petersburg and received the degree of Doctor of Political Science and International Law. All doors were open for his career. He entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for five years, from 1912 to 1917, he was the personal secretary of three successive foreign ministers, Sazonov, Shtirmer, (Stuermer) and Milyukov.

In this position he had the opportunity to see how the disintegration in the highest circles of Russian society led Russia inevitably to catastrophe and his memoirs on this subject are extraordinarily interesting

to read. Perhaps this is why he realized in all its nakedness the extreme spiritual poverty of the circle in which he lived and worked and this was the reason why he returned to the people of his ancestors. The atmosphere of the court and official circles during World War I repelled him even more from those with whom he worked and perhaps the decisive influence on him was his conversation with Hetman Skoropadsky in Kiev in the autumn of 1918.

In the summer of 1919, he succeeded in escaping from the Bolshevik regime into Poland. There he stayed until 1923; then he went to Danzig and soon settled down in Germany. Here he came into contact with the group close to Hetman Skoropadsky and he worked with them until the end of his life. He did a great deal for the establishment and development of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin. In return he was chosen to the Governing Board and he remained on it until he went to England.

He went there in 1930 to get into contact with influential British circles and to unify British opinion on the Ukrainian question. In 1932 he began to publish in London a monthly, *The Investigator*, and edited it during 1933 and 1934. Since he had a good knowledge of Russia and everything that pertained to it, he could set forth on the pages of his journal an authoritative opinion on all questions which were treated in the British press or publications. Through all the issues of this publication ran the general trend that without the independence of Ukraine there could be no peace in Eastern Europe or in Europe as a whole. At the same time his articles appeared also in various British and American periodicals.

With the outbreak of World War II, Dr. Korostovets was invited by the British government to become a lecturer on Eastern European questions for the British fleet, army and air force. On these missions he visited Germany, Austria and Africa and late in the forties he went on the same mission by special request to Canada and the United States.

In its obituary for Dr. Korostovets, one of the English newspapers the *Eastern Daily Press* mentioned his lectures and added that those who read his articles and heard his lectures would certainly remember with what enthusiasm he championed the Ukrainian national interests.

Beside the large number of articles which Dr. Korostovets published in various British and American journals, he left a number of books and pamphlets, of which the most important are: *Seed and Harvest*, *The Re-birth of Poland*, *Europe in a Melting Pot*, *Quo Vadis Polonia?* (in French), and *Graf Witte, Steuermaan in der Not.*" (*Count Witte, Pilot in Need*) in German.

Beginning with 1949, Dr. Korostovets was for four years without interruption and until his death, a member of the Board of Directors and of the Executive Committee of the Society of Ukrainians in Great Britain, and he helped this Society a great deal because of his wide connections in the British world.

He was a modest person and made few demands on life, and although thanks to his connections, he could have lived well, he did not wish to profit by them. He was an individualist and his uncompromising character caused many disputes about him in Ukrainian circles. Dr. Volodymyr Korostovets deserved well of the Ukrainian Cause.

R. DANYLIW, *London*

PROFESSOR VALENTINA RADZIMOVSKY

Professor Valentina Vasylivna Radzimovsky, Doctor of Medical Sciences, a full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences, died on December 22, 1953 in Champaign, Illinois after a long and severe illness. She left over 60 publications and was widely known as a brilliant researcher with a keen inquisitive mind, broad scientific interests and a rare ability for generalization.

Valentina Radzimovsky was born on October 1, 1886 at Lubny, Poltava district, Ukraine as the daughter of a noble landowner, Vasyl Yanovsky. Her mother was a well known Ukrainian writer, Lubov Yanovska, and the girl grew up in a Ukrainian intellectual atmosphere. She studied medicine in the St. Volodymyr University at Kiev and in the University of St. Petersburg. Her scientific interests awakened very early and, while studying, she spent many hours working in the laboratory of physiological chemistry of Kiev University. Her intelligence was appreciated and in 1913, immediately after her graduation as a Doctor of Medicine from Kiev University, she was appointed an assistant at the chair of physiological chemistry of the same university. The academic career was rather unusual for women at that time, but the ability and purposefulness of the young scholar helped her. In 1920 she became the head of chair of physiology of Kiev University. In 1924 she presented her dissertation "On the Influence of H-Iones on the Life of Tissue Cells of Vertebrates" and subsequently received the degree of Doctor of Medical Sciences.

From 1920 until 1943 she held the chairs of physiology in the University of Kiev and, at different times, in other institutions of higher

education of Ukraine. She was a brilliant lecturer and thousands of Ukrainian doctors and scientists, her former pupils, have been inspired by her talented presentation of her beloved science. Along with her teaching activities V. Radzimovsky carried on intensive research work. Her purposefulness and initiative attracted younger scholars and soon the "Radzimovsky School in Physiology" was formed in Kiev and became widely known not only in Ukraine, but far beyond its boundaries. In 1929 this successful work of Radzimovsky was suddenly interrupted by her arrest by the GPU. She was imprisoned for one year, then released with the label of "Politically unreliable person." After that V. Radzimovsky had troubles in finding occupation and was forced rather often to change her place of work. A few times she was dismissed without any reason. Nevertheless, she continued her research work. She worked alternatively at the Tuberculosis-Research Institute of Kiev, at the Orthopedical Science Institute, and the Research Institute of Psychiatry and Neurology in Kiev. She published numerous papers summarizing her findings and made a number of reports at international and home congresses.

In the autumn of 1943 V. Radzimovsky went with her family to Lvov and in 1944 to Czechoslovakia. After World War II Prof. V. Radzimovsky lived in Western Germany and here took an active part in organizing the Ukrainian scientists in exile. She was elected a professor of the Ukrainian Technical Husbandry Institute (Munich, Regensburg) where she taught physiology in the Veterinary and Pharmacy departments. She helped in the organization of the International UNRRA University in Munich.

In 1950 V. Radzimovsky came to the USA. She cooperated closely with the Ukrainian academic organizations in this country, but her increasing illness prevented her from working as actively as she did all her life long.

The work of Prof. V. Radzimovsky contributed lavishly to the development of physiological chemistry and her numerous papers form her real memorial.

M. VETUKHIV

BOOK REVIEWS

THE WEB OF SUBVERSION. Underground Networks in the U. S. Government, by James Burnham. New York. The John Day Company, 1954, pp. 248.

Once again a subject of momentous public interest and of grave concern to informed persons is placed under scrutinous examination by Professor Burnham who, for power of incisive logic and lucid exposition, is today one of the most outstanding writers in the field of political analysis in this country. This compact work on subversive communist activity in our Government is the product of extensive research into the voluminous files and disclosures of our congressional committees. Some of the data are familiar to the average reader of the daily newspaper, much of it is not. Notwithstanding this, the solid contribution of this work is its synthetic presentation of the accumulated evidence on communist subversion.

The author assembles all the more or less disconnected data into a coherent and meaningful pattern of events that cannot be obtained from diverse and somewhat unrelated newspaper accounts or official reports. His selection of material is guided by basic relevance and essentiality of case instances, and his treatment throughout is brilliantly marked by dispassionate analysis, logical rigor and factual precision. Synthetic and clear, meaningful and significant, a history of communist subversion is unfolded within an established framework of tactical shifts in the points of concentration of web spinning, starting with the area of public economic agencies in the 30's, covering the war units, and extending into the field of post-war international organizations, with the United Nations heading the list.

After having read this book, the reader cannot but be moved by the necessity for continued and expanded congressional investigations. He cannot, if he is open-minded and intelligent about the problems confronting the committees, but agree with the practical conclusions of the author on necessary changes in the law and the attitudes of the general public for a more effective apprehension of the "web dwellers." Legal immunity to honest testifiers and even opportunities for employment are two of the suggested means to uncover further the underground network in the Government. Pointing to the given facts, the author is on secure ground when he states that "On these and on all counts we must infer that the underground, however sunk beneath the surface, is still alive and with us." A few have been caught, but these may be only a small fraction of the many still dwelling in the web.

Our approach to the problem of subversion is, as the author rightly stresses, a function of our understanding of Russian Communism. During the 30's the Communists were coddled, and our understanding of the Soviet Union was dim. With the war in the 40's, the latter was little improved upon, and we revealed in excessive absurdities about the nature of "democracy" in the Soviet Union and the "patriotism" of Communists at home. Only with the inauguration of the cold war in 1947 did most of us awake to the fact that the Soviet Union was a mortal enemy and that native Communists, both on the surface and under-

ground, were traitors to their country. Lenin wrote long ago, "Legal work must be combined with illegal work. The Bolsheviks always taught this... The party which . . . does not carry on systematic, all-sided, illegal work in spite of the laws of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois parliaments, is a party of traitors and scoundrels."

What the author apparently does not appreciate is the fact that subversive activity, as distinct from paid espionage, is not unique or peculiar to Russian Communism. Although executed on a smaller scale and in the more restricted area of Slavdom, subversion was an integral part of traditional Russian imperialism, as none other than Friedrich Engels himself fully recognized. The above statement of Lenin was born of a cultivated environment, and in the same substantial way that many are duped today by the fictional socio-economic ends of Communism, others were taken in by ideology of Pan-Slavism. The point of origin — Muscovy — is the same; the final result — the captivity of nations — is likewise the same. With the next phase of understanding the real enemy, traditional Russian imperialism, there should be scarce inducement for the faith and loyalty of any Alger Hiss or self-respecting American intellectual.

Georgetown University

LEV E. DOBRIANSKY

SUB UMBRA PETRI, by Archbishop Hildebrandus Antoniutti. Ottawa 1953, pp. 392.

This is a collection of addresses by the Canadian Apostolic Delegate Archbishop H. Antoniutti on various occasions. They show the deep spirituality of the author who has recently been appointed Apostolic Nuncio to Spain.

Some addresses deal with the Ukrainians in Canada. On the occasion of the consecration of Bishop Maxim Hermaniuk as Auxiliary Bishop of the Manitoba Exarchate, the Apostolic Delegate told the Ukrainians in Canada to cultivate "the heritage and tradition of their ancestors," "while elsewhere in your beloved native country world famous shrines, which for ages past have been intimately associated with the religious history of your people are becoming the object of profanation." The Ukrainians in Canada have the obligation "to consolidate in this country your old Christian tradition so as to be ready to bring it back to Ukraine when freedom will again be restored there."

On the occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the settlement of Ukrainians in Canada, the Apostolic Delegate reviewed the achievements of the Ukrainians in Canada in the religious, economic and cultural fields. These are, as it were, the providence of God, because "life is becoming day by day more tragic in Ukraine... In the joy of your Congress remember the martyrdom of Ukraine, remember the concentration camps; remember the afflictions of your brethren."

Another address is on the question of the new immigrants, the exiles from Europe. The Archbishop asserts that it is the moral obligation of countries with a small population to admit these people who have no land. The Apostolic Delegate expresses the point of view of the Pope on this matter as follows: "Every man as a living being gifted with reason, has in fact from nature the fundamental right to make use of the material goods of the earth... People without land have a right to till land without people." There are many inspiring thoughts in this volume.

CANADIAN.

MUENCHENER BEITRAEGE ZUR SLAVENKUNDE, Festgabe fuer Paul Diels, herausgegeben von Erwin Koschmieder und Alois Schmaus. Veroeffentlichun-

gen, des Osteurope Instituts, Muenchen, Band IV, Muenchen Isar Verlag, 1953, pp. 329.

This is an excellent collection of studies presented to the distinguished Slavic scholar Paul Diels on his seventieth birthday. Like all such collections, it reflects the manifold interests of the scholar to whom it is offered and there are only a few articles on any one subject. For the Ukrainian there are probably two chief contributions, that of Prof. Mirtchuk on the relations of Rome, Constantinople and Moscow, an excellent study of the political interests of the three capitals, and also that by Adolph W. Ziegler on the Byzantine religious policy and the so-called Caesaropapism, an attempt to present a new picture of the relations of church and state which decidedly influenced early Kievan Christianity.

Other articles which have special interest in part are those by Metropolitan Dr. Ilarion (I. Ohienko) on Hebraisms in the Old Church Slavonic Biblical language which has many references to Ukrainian and that of Alois Schmaus on the epic features of Slavic folk poetry which contains some interesting ideas on the Ukrainian *dumy* as rather avoiding the tendency to adopt an epic form.

We can well thank the authors of this work on the way in which they have carried it out and can only hope that scholars in various fields of Ukrainian will seek out what is of interest to them and incorporate the results in their own work.

C. A. MANNING

DIE UKRAINISCHE LVIV-LEMBERG. Kulturpolitische Betrachtung, by Dr. Gregor Prokoptschuk, Muenchen, 1953.

Many books have appeared in different languages to mark the seven hundredth anniversary of the foundation of Lviv, but this volume edited by Dr. Prokoptschuk in German holds the first place because of its wealth of material and its artistic character.

The volume is a composite work of many well known Ukrainian specialists in the past of their country. We need only mention such names as Peter Kurinny, the Ukrainian archeologist, Volodymyr Sichynsky, the historian of art, the late Ukrainian statesman Dr. Baran, and the editor himself. All the articles on the archaeological past of the city, its architecture and its cultural and political importance in the national rebirth of the Ukrainian nation in the last century and a half, are on a high level. Only the historical article contains several mistakes.

The volume shows clearly that Lviv is the best representative of the spirituality of the Ukrainian people, which has its roots in the Greek classic and Byzantine culture but has for a thousand years retained its constantly close association with the Western world. Lviv has been the ambassador of Ukrainian Kiev, Chernyhiv, Poltava and other districts to Western Europe. It has maintained the most stubborn defense of the Ukrainian national heritage, Western Ukraine, against the century-long attacks by Poland from the west, but it has also been the most unyielding adversary of any connection of Ukraine with Eurasian Moscow. It was the most energetic opponent of the solution offered by Pereyaslav agreement, and this is the main point of Dr. Prokoptschuk's article.

The many highly artistic pictures of Lviv, which are to-day almost inaccessible to western scholarship because of the Soviet occupation, place the book on the highest level of printing.

LEOPOLITANUS

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