

UKRAINIAN RESEARCH AND INFORMATION

INSTITUTE, INC.

**UKRAINIAN-
POLISH
DIPLOMATIC
STRUGGLE
1918 - 1923**

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1918-1923**

**Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, Inc.,
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I

INTRODUCTION

The Ukrainian-Polish War of 1918-1919, and the subsequent diplomatic fight for the Western-Ukrainian lands (in particular, for Galicia) which provisionally ended with the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 14, 1923, represented only one chapter in the century-old tragic history of Ukrainian-Polish relations.

This concise work was not meant to stir up old wounds. The need to discuss this problem is based on the fact that within Polish society beyond Polish boundaries, especially in the Polish-American community, voices still often are heard advocating turning backwards in history and beginning anew from the year 1939.

This work was also meant to remind all other advocates of the 1939 order that already at the time of peace negotiations after World War I, sober-minded statesmen and prominent historians anticipated tragic results from the Peace Conference's failure to heed the solemnly proclaimed right of peoples to self-determination.

In order to be as objective as possible in our presentation of the subject, we have adopted the method of quoting mainly foreign statesmen and scholars, letting them, as outside observers, appraise particular historical decisions of those times.

II

SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES AND THE WESTERN UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC

President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, proclaimed on behalf of the Allied Powers, included the right of peoples for self-determination as the basis on which the future peace and the program of European reconstruction — in particular, that of Eastern Europe — would take place. His words came to the knowledge of the peoples of Austro-Hungary long before the end of the World War I.

The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and other regions of Austro-Hungary accepted Wilson's program as the basis for their own liberation, since it contained a point having a direct bearing on those Ukrainian lands which for a long time had been occupied by Poland and, after 1772, had been incorporated into Austria under the Polish rule sanctioned by Vienna. Wilson's Thirteenth Point is as follows:

"An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish population."

Wilson's later declarations revealed the moral grounds of his program. He declared that peoples could not be dealt with in treaties as inanimate objects; their fate should be determined by their own free will and only by this. In an address delivered on February 11, 1918, before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Repre-

sentatives, President Wilson said that "self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril."¹)

This attested to the decision of the American President and the Entente Powers to recognize the right of self-determination on the Ukrainian lands that were under the domination of Austro-Hungary. More reason for them to do so was provided by the fact that, at the time Wilson was proclaiming his doctrine, the Ukrainian people were realizing this right on the ruins of the Russian Empire where, on January 22, 1918, they created an independent state: the Ukrainian Democratic Republic.

At the time Austro-Hungary was disintegrating, on October 18-19, 1918, representatives elected by the Ukrainian people of Galicia and Bukovina gathered in Lviv and constituted the Ukrainian National Council. This Council proclaimed the creation of an independent Ukrainian state on the territory of Eastern Galicia, north-western Bukovina, and Transcarpathia, that is, entire ethnic territory inhabited by the Ukrainians living within Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

On November 1, 1918, on order of the executive body of the National Council, the Ukrainian national army took Lviv, the capital of Eastern Galicia, and with it control of territory of Eastern Galicia and northwestern Bukovina. The new state was named the Western-Ukrainian National Republic.

Administration procedures, order and law were immediately introduced on the territory of the new state. Civil liberties and national-cultural and religious rights were guaranteed for the national minorities, the Jews and Poles, who constituted some 30 per cent of the population.

¹) Robert Lansing, *The Peace Negotiations* (Boston-New York, 1921), pp. 95, 96.

The powers of the Entente were informed of the creation of the Western-Ukrainian National Republic. Prime Minister David Lloyd George mentioned in his memoirs that the British government as early as December 1918, took into consideration the memorandum of the Foreign Office which stated that:

"The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia have also formed a National Council at Lwow (Lemberg) and National Militia.... The only logical principle upon which the Governments of the Entente can act in their relations with the former Dual Monarchy, is a recognition of the duly accredited National Assemblies of each of the above nations (German-Austrians, Magyars, Czecho-Slovaks, Jugo-Slavs, Poles, Roumanians and Ukrainians)... and of their National Councils as possessing mandates from them... The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Northern Hungary must either be admitted as a distinctive national unit, or treated as identical with the Government of Kiev"²)

Having realized its right for self-determination on the territory of former Austro-Hungary, the Western-Ukrainian Republic was united by virtue of the solemn act proclaimed in Kiev on January 22, 1919, with the independent Ukrainian Republic which had come into existence one year before on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

However, the status of the Ukrainian lands which formerly had been under Austria became complicated as a result of the Saint-Germain Treaty which transferred the sovereign rights over these lands to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. Thus, legally these lands were provisionally put beyond the boundaries of both Ukraine and Poland.

"But by the treaty with Austria of Saint-Germain of September

²) David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven, 1939), II, pp. 589, 590, 591.

9th, 1919. the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in Paris reserved for the Entente Powers the sovereign rights with regard to Galicia as the former Austrian territory and with this the right to decide on her future political status. Thus Galicia remained legally outside the frontiers of Poland as defined by the Treaty of Versailles."³)

Having laid the foundation of their own state, the Ukrainians of Galicia waited in the hope that peace negotiations in Paris would confirm its right to exist. They were sure that their action were in accord with President Wilson's principles, and they had confidence in the representatives of the victorious Entente. The statement of President Wilson declaring that the newly formed Polish state should include only territories settled by an indisputably Polish population implicitly solved the problem of the future status of Galicia to the benefit of the Ukrainians.

On October 29, 1918, before the war had ended, Colonel M. House, key Presidential advisor, telegraphed to President Wilson, "Eastern Galicia is in large measure Ukrainian and does not of rights belong to Poland."⁴) This recommendation with regard to the status of Eastern Galicia was approved by President Wilson and published in the "Official American Commentary to Fourteen Points," late in October of 1918.⁵)

Secretary of State Robert Lansing, in his memorandum dated September 21, 1918, in which he wrote in detail on the practical plan of action of the American delegation to the Peace Conference at the end of war, clearly recognized the right of the Ukrainians

³) Ukraine and Poland, A Memorandum of the Ukrainian National Council to Mr. Dean Acheson (Augsburg, 1951), p. 7.

⁴) Elie Borschak, *L'Ukraine à la conférence de la paix*, *Le Monde-Slave* (Paris, 1937, VI), p. 397.

⁵) *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*, Arranged by Charles Seymour (Boston and New York, 1928), IV, p. 198.

in Eastern Galicia to be united with the Ukrainian state on the Dnieper River. In the sixth paragraph of this memorandum he wrote:

"The Ukraine to be a state of the Russian Confederation, to which should be annexed that portion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in which the Ruthenians (Ukrainians*) predominate."⁶)

It should be noted that at the time of the Peace Conference the question of the status of Ukraine was still being disputed for many reasons and that the solution had not yet been determined by President Wilson. However, the right of Eastern Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia to belong to the Ukrainian state no longer was in question in American foreign policy.

The American attitude toward Eastern Galicia was shared by the British government. In Lloyd George's opinion, Eastern Galicia with its predominantly Ukrainian population should not be joined to Poland. During a debate at the Peace Conference in Paris, on June 5, 1919, Lloyd George said to Polish Premier Ignacy Paderewski: "You are demanding population in Galicia which is not Polish. You are demanding all this from us."⁷)

This major problem of nationality relations in Central and Eastern Europe later became a subject of study of the world-renowned historian Arnold J. Toynbee. He was particularly interested in the territories which had belonged to historical Poland and which, in 1772, were divided among three great powers. He said, in part:

"In A. D. 1918 the larger part of this area (East Poland) was

*) In order to designate the population of Eastern Galicia, besides the generally accepted term "Ukrainians", some authors occasionally use an appellation utilized in Austria, "Ruthenians", or simply a geographical "Eastern Galicians". To avoid misunderstandings even in these infrequent cases we added in parentheses the name "Ukrainians".

⁶) Lansing, p. 194.

⁷) Charles Phillips, Paderewsky, the Story of a Modern Immortal (New York, 1934), p. 407.

occupied by populations whose mother tongue were Lithuanian, White Russian and Ukrainian and these populations were duly claiming the right to possess sovereign states of their own, embracing the territories, in which their respective languages were prevalent."⁸)

The well-known historian of the Peace Conference in Paris, H. W. V. Temperley, similarly stated about the condition of ethnic relations in Eastern Galicia:

"There had been disputes for centuries between the Poles and the Ruthenes (Ukrainians), which latter people formed the majority of the population in East Galicia, and had connexions with the Ukrainians over the border."⁹)

It should be noted also that before Wilson's proclamation of his Fourteen Points, the Russian Provisional Government, while formulating its opinion on the necessity of the creation of an Polish independent state, stressed in its declaration in May 1917 that this state should include the territories with predominantly Polish population. This excluded the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland.

III

POLAND AGAINST SELF-DETERMINATION, FOR "HISTORICAL" RIGHTS

The newly formed Poland resisted President Wilson's principle of the right of peoples for self-determination. For the Ukrainian lands, this principle left no room for doubt. The previously quoted

⁸) Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History* (Oxford University Press, 1954), VIII, p. 538.

⁹) H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris* (London, 1920), I, p. 335.

Thirteenth Point stated that the future Poland should include only the territories with "an indisputably Polish population." Also, the official commentary on Wilson's Fourteen Points contained a paragraph concerning Point thirteen: "In the East, Poland should receive no territory in which Lithuanians or Ukrainians predominate."¹⁰)

Not waiting for the authoritative decision of the Peace Conference, the Poles began an armed aggression against the Western-Ukrainian National Republic. The Galician Army resisted the Polish advance over the Ukrainian lands for nine months; at the same time this army sent military units towards the north-eastern frontiers of Ukraine to fight the Russian Bolsheviks.

Representatives of the western part (Eastern Galicia) of the Ukrainian National Republic and of the government in Kiev at the forum of the Peace Conference in Paris vigorously protested against the Polish aggression.

The Polish representatives at the Peace Conference in Paris (Ignacy Paderewski and Roman Dmowski), were well aware of the fact that the Ukrainians made up some 70 per cent of the population of Eastern Galicia and that they did not wish to come under Polish rule. Therefore, to justify their aggressive plans in regard to Eastern Galicia, they raised the idea of the restoration of the historical frontiers of former Poland, that is, of Poland prior to 1772.

In his memorandum on the territory of the Polish state presented to President Wilson in Washington as early as October 8, 1918, Dmowski admitted that the Poles in Eastern Galicia made up only 25 per cent of the entire population¹¹) (it should be noted that even this number was exaggerated). Therefore Polish represent-

¹⁰) Papers of Colonel House, p. 200.

¹¹) Roman Dmowski, *Polityka Polska: Odbudowanie Państwa* (2nd ed., Warszawa, 1926) p. 513.

atives openly expressed their dissatisfaction with Wilson's Thirteenth Point. Dmowski, in his book, *Polish Policy*, opposed the application of the principle of "an indisputably Polish population" to the settling of the question of Poland's frontiers because "the Polish national extent is larger than the Polish ethnic extent."¹²) Thus he considered the national extent of Poland to be not the territory predominantly populated by Poles, but the historical space which centuries ago had been conquered by Polish imperialism.

In his speech at the session of the Peace Conference on January 29, 1919, Dmowski promoted the historical pretensions of Poland and opposed the plan that would include in Poland only territories with a predominantly Polish population.

"Mr. Dmowski suggested that in reaching the settlement of the territory to belong to Poland, we should start from the date 1772 before the first partition... In settling the boundaries of Poland, the principle of including within those boundaries only those territories where the Poles were in large majority must not be accepted altogether ..."¹³)

When Paderewski was asked: "Does Poland claim the whole of Galicia?" He answered: "Historically, yes."

It should be said in all fairness that there were voices of warning among the Poles. Professor Stanislaw Witkiewicz declared obsolete the old historical Polish policy on Ukrainian lands with its religious and national expansionist tendencies. However, Dmowski and Paderewski, the official representatives of Poland, did not understand the new historical trends that were developing at that time (resulting today, in the liberation of — in modern terminology — underdeveloped nations). At the meeting of the Peace Conference, Paderewski outlined the following grounds for Poland's claims to Eastern Galicia:

¹²) Ibid., p. 321-330.

¹³) Lloyd George, p. 631.

"There cannot be a Polish State without Eastern Galicia. Untiringly, bravely, patiently we built up that section of our country after innumerable wars... We put it on its present level of civilization. Cultivated by us, this land has produced men famous in literature, learning and art... The most decisive battles in the defense of Western civilization have been fought there, and fought by Poland and the Poles... Are we to leave it to mercy of foreign intrigues? Are we to resign our right to this land?..."¹⁴)

This argumentation of Paderewski clearly revealed a tendency to substitute for Wilson's ideas and their moral-legal principles, historical "rights" which no longer had any significance. It should be noted also that at this same time the Poles were rejecting the historical "rights" of the Germans in the west, in Silesia, and demanding a plebiscite there — that is, self-determination for the population.

A sharp criticism of the unjustness of the Polish demands came from Lloyd George, who said to Paderewski at the June 6, 1919 meeting of the Peace Conference:

"I say that you want to annex peoples against their will... We have given liberty to Poland, Bohemie, Jugoslavia; and those are the countries that kick against the plebiscite. They are much more imperialistic than the great nations themselves."¹⁵)

Lloyd George systematically supported the principle of plebiscite as opposed to armed aggression. He wrote in his memoirs:

"He (Paderewski) challenged the justice of the plebiscite and he also entered into an elaborate defense of Polish aggressiveness in Galicia. Here the Polish Army was taking steps to annex by force the whole of this province against the obvious wishes of the

¹⁴) Phillips, p. 424.

¹⁵) Ibid., p. 407.

majority of the inhabitants, who resisted the advance of the Poles by every means at their disposal. By race, language and religion the people were Ukrainian. Mr. Paderewski explained to me that the action of the Polish Army was not an offensive but "defensive" advance."¹⁶⁾

Toynbee, analyzing the Polish demands for historical territories, qualified them as "megalomaniacally imperialistic Polish aspiration to reestablish the frontiers of A. D. 1772 as park-walls for a privileged Polish nation's Lebensraum." Then he said:

"The Polish thesis that a nation, which had come out on the winning side in the world war 1914 — 1918 was entitled to the frontiers of 1772 would have made a contemporary Englishman first rub his eyes and then burst out laughing when a consultation of Spuner-Menke's historical atlas had reminded him that in 1772 one of the frontiers of the British Empire ran along the thelweg of the Mississippi. Yet, on the fantastic principle of Linguistic Nationalism, the Englishman's title was a better one than his Polish contemporary's since in 1918 the Englishmen's mother tongue was current in the Unites States not merely up to the line of the Mississippi but right across North America up to the Pacific coast..."¹⁷⁾

The Italian Prime Minister Francesco S. Nitti, decidedly opposed the aspirations of the Poles, foreseeing that they would bring about the ruin and decline of Poland. In his well-known work, *Peaceless Europe*, he wrote:

"The new patriots dream of an immense Poland, the old Poland of tradition, and then to descend into the countries of the Ukraine and dominate new territories... The most characteristic examples of nationalist violence have arisen out of the war, as in the case of Poland and other newborn States, which pursue vain dreams of

¹⁶⁾ Lloyd George. p. 644.

¹⁷⁾ Toynbee, p. 538.

empire while on the verge of dissolution through sheer lack of vital strength and energy, and becoming every day more deeply engulfed in misery and ruin."¹⁸⁾

In their diplomatic fight against Galicia, the Polish representatives exploited the fact that the Western states were poorly informed on the affairs of Eastern Europe. They supported their "historical" arguments by slandering the Ukrainian liberation movement and the Ukrainian government. Both in their propaganda in the press and in the official statements they presented to the leaders of the Western powers, they pictured the fight of Ukrainians defending their state, and the Ukrainian state itself, as part of a German intrigue aimed at weakening Poland as an ally of the Entente. They also pictured the Ukrainian liberation movement as being inspired by the Bolsheviks.

As an example, we quote one of the first diplomatic statements Paderewski issued after he returned to Poland on January 1, 1919. As early as January 12, 1919, after learning of failures of the Polish forces in their aggressive advancement over Eastern Galicia, he wrote to Colonel House asking for assistance. He wrote, in part:

"But could anybody ask them (Poles) to remain quiet when brutally attacked and not to defend themselves? Surprised by the murderous Ukrainian Bolshevik army the women and children of Lemberg took up arms and defended the city. At the present moment a force of about 80.000 Ukrainians, armed and equipped by the Germans, led by German and Austrian officers under the command of an Austrian Archduke Wilhelm of Habsburg, is at the gate of Lemberg and the number of Polish soldiers, lacking food and munitions, does not exceed 18.000 men... Poland cannot defend itself. We have no food, no uniforms, no arms, no ammuni-

¹⁸⁾ Francesco S. Nitti, *Peaceless Europe* (London-New York, 1922), pp. 144, 23.

tion... If this action is delayed — our entire civilization may cease to exist..."¹⁹⁾

The document was unworthy of a famous artist and head of a state. The Austrian Archduke Wilhelm Habsburg never commanded any Ukrainian unit in the war against the Poles; he never saw the Polish front, and when he came to Galicia later, he was interned by the Ukrainian government. Paderewski wrote about the Ukrainian "Bolshevik army" which fought for Lviv; however, just at that time best Ukrainian military units of Galicia, the so-called *Sichovi Striltsi*, were engaged in heavy fighting against the Bolsheviks who were advancing at the northern frontiers of Ukraine. By attacking the western Ukrainian lands, the Poles actually helped the Bolsheviks in their advance into Ukraine. It is unfortunate that Colonel House and some leading participants in the Peace Conference took such misinformation seriously. Lloyd George made the following comment about some of Paderewski's information: "This charming artist beguiled the Council of Four."²⁰⁾

The Peace Conference in Paris proceeded under peculiar conditions, mostly by way of personal confidential talks. Wilson's principle of open diplomacy, proclaimed in his Fourteen Points, was ignored. In Lansing's words, important peace negotiations were carried on "behind closed doors, with mystery and uncertainty, through a small group who passed final judgment on the mass of articles which entered into the Treaties of Peace. The method of personal interview and private conclaves has given every opportunity for intrigue, plotting, bargaining and combining."²¹⁾

Under these circumstances and in that atmosphere, representatives of the Polish side had the advantage over the Ukrainian dele-

¹⁹⁾ Papers of Colonel House, pp. 262, 263.
Phillips, pp. 375, 376.

²⁰⁾ Lloyd George, p. 645.

²¹⁾ Lansing, pp. 212, 218, 219.

gates who had neither the international connections nor the support, enjoyed by the Poles, of French Premier George Clemenceau, the most influential figure at the Conference.

In addition to the argument of historical "rights," Polish delegates also raised the question of military security — strategic arguments, aimed at exploiting the allies' fear of Russian Bolshevism — and claimed that, from this point of view, the annexation of Eastern Galicia was absolutely necessary. In this campaign they were actively supported by France. "France supported the Polish claims for greatness; it wanted a strong Poland which would serve as a rampart against Bolshevik Russia and a potential restraint on Germany."²²)

Ray Stannard Baker, biographer of Wilson, revealed both France's plans with respect to the Poles and Poland's aggressive tendencies hiding behind their words on the Bolshevik threat: "I regard this largely as camouflage. Each of the three states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Roumania) named has aggressive designs upon the surrounding territory, and each is determined to get by force, if need be, as large an area as possible."²³)

He said the following about Poland's role as a satellite of France:

"Poland has ever been a tragic figure in history, much used, never served, by her greater neighbours. Again and again in the Conference, the French were perfectly frank in speaking of this use of Poland, not to help the Poles, but to serve the interests of the allied Powers."²⁴)

At the meeting of the Peace Conference on June 2, 1919, Clemenceau spoke openly of the grounds underlying the French policy aimed at the creation of a great Poland. He said:

²²) Raymond Leslie Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe* (New York, 1939), p. 69.

²³) Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (Gloucester, Mass., 1960), I.

²⁴) *Idid.*, p. 398.

"When we spoke of establishing Poland, it must be remembered that this was not done merely to redress one of the greatest wrongs in history. It was desired to create a barrier between Germany and Russia."²⁴)

Stannard Baker commented:

"The Poles were to be used to hold back Bolshevism, to weaken Germany, to balance the power of the Czechs — everything in the world except to build up a sound Polish State."²⁴)

The same strategic-defensive reasons were used by Professor R. H. Lord, well-known as a friend of Paderewski, who supported Poland's designs against Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference. Contrary to Wilson's principle, this American expert stated openly that Poland aspired for territories in the East "which were needed in order to carry the frontier east from Warsaw for defensive purposes."²⁵)

Professor Samuel L. Sharp was of the opinion that dangerous results could be anticipated as a consequence of the aggressive policy of the Poles. He stated:

"This identification of security with more extensive frontiers produced solutions which carried in themselves the seeds of constant tension and future dangers... the incorporation of millions of Ukrainians and Byelorussians within Poland was a standing invitation to irredentist activities and claims from across the border."²⁶)

"The victorious Allies abandoned the principle of self-determination for strategic considerations. In some instances, as in the case of the seizure of Wilno and in Eastern Galicia, Poland forced the West to accept solution imposed by force."²⁷)

²⁴) Robert Howard Lord, "The Russo-Polish Boundary Problem", Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. LXVIII (Boston, 1952), p. 417.

²⁵) Samuel L. Sharp, Poland: White Eagle on a Red Field (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. 127.

²⁷) Ibid., p. 88.

A French author, Count Olivier d'Etchegoyen, major in the French Army and a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor, wrote that "the Allies have considerably aggravated this inherent danger by permitting the government of Warsaw to take advantage of the temporary weakness of her two formidable neighbors to increase her territory at their expense under conditions likely to result in terrible reprisals."²⁸)

The same author foresaw the future role of Poland as an aggressor with two great powers as her neighbors.

"At this painful juncture is it of vital interest to know who will conquer her, and whether it will be Germany or Russia who will gain the larger portion? Are we passionately anxious to know whether Poland, a victim to her undisciplined greed, will succumb to indigestion because she has been unable to assimilate the numerous irredentist populations, she has endeavoured to absorb?"²⁹)

The Italian Prime Minister, Francesco Nitti, also was skeptical in his appraisal of the results of Poland's imperialistic dreams. He said:

"Poland has, besides, vast dreams of greatness abroad, and growing ruin in the interior. She enslaves herself in order to enslave others."³⁰)

Then Nitti goes on: "The most characteristic examples of nationalist violence have arisen out of the war, as in the case of Poland and other newborn States, which pursue vain dreams of empire while on the verge of dissolution through sheer lack of vital strength and energy, and becoming every day more deeply engulfed in misery and ruin."³¹)

²⁸) Olivier D' Etchegoyen, *The Comedy of Poland* (London, 1927), p. 230. In French: "Pologne, Pologne..." (Paris, 1925).

²⁹) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

³⁰) Nitti, p. 137.

³¹) *Ibid.*, p. 23.

A. J. Toynbee, having in mind Poland's aggression against the Ukrainian land, sharply criticized the annexation of foreign territory, seeing in it great danger for the temporary conquerors. He wrote:

"The ex-victor countries in Eastern Europe were weakened morally and politically by their forcible acquisition of territories inhabited by alien minorities that were their unwilling and resentful subjects. Every such minority that they had insisted on including within their swollen post-war frontiers brought upon the ex-victor countries the nemesis of finding themselves between two fires."³²)

IV

UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR AND ATTEMPTS TO CONCLUDE A TRUCE

The Supreme Council of the Entente wanted to end the Ukrainian-Polish War with a peaceful settlement. The Poles, however, being supported by France, rejected this proposals of the Supreme Council. The Polish army was being trained on French territory with the assistance of the military French staff. Officially, this was being done for Poland's defense against the Bolsheviks; actually, however, the Polish army was used only against the Ukrainians in Galicia. This decided the fight, which became unequal at that time.

"When the Polish troops began to move against the Ukrainians, the Peace Conference endeavoured to arrange an armistice, but Poland declined to accept it unless its territorial demands were recognized."³³)

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, in a dispatch

³²) Arnold Toynbee, *The Eve of War 1939*, Part I, Introduction (Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 8.

³³) Buell, p. 269.

of March 19, 1919, appealed to both sides to suspend hostilities and to begin negotiating a truce. In response to this appeal the Ukrainians proposed to the Poles that they suspend fighting. The Poles rejected the proposition.

Then the Supreme Council created "The Inter-Allied Commission for the Conclusion of a Truce" between Poland and Ukraine, headed by General Louis Botha. The Commission made one more attempt to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict.

H. W. V. Temperley said: "unanimously approved, the draft of an Armistice Convention... was presented to the representatives of Poland and Eastern Galicia (Ukrainians) on the 12th May. The Convention was accepted by the East Galician (Ukrainian) delegation, but was rejected by the Polish delegation on the general military grounds that the safety of the Polish state precluded the acceptance of any armistice which did not allow of a Polish military occupation of East Galicia."³⁴⁾

The same historian of the Peace Conference mentions the especially stubborn attitude of Poland with regard to Eastern Galicia. He writes:

"The young Poland, perhaps because of her extreme youth, proved occasionally refractory. However, the only case in which the Supreme Council found it really difficult to enforce its will on Poland was with regard to Eastern Galicia."³⁵⁾

The Poles sent to the Ukrainian front divisions which were well-armed and had been thoroughly trained in France which the Supreme Council had intended to use to defend Poland's frontiers against the Bolsheviks.³⁶⁾

A telegram of the Supreme Council sent to Pilsudski on May

³⁴⁾ Temperley, pp. 336, 337.

³⁵⁾ Ibid., p. 335.

³⁶⁾ Phillips, pp. 423, 448, 449.

27 with an appeal to cease the armed aggression was fruitless. Somewhat earlier, Polish Prime Minister Paderewski, in his speech in the Polish Seim on May 21, justified the Polish aggression, saying: "Our Polish expedition is against bandits from whose oppression the population must be set free before law and order can be set up on this immemorially Polish territory."³⁷) This is a typical statement for imperialists who qualify all the liberation movements of enslaved peoples as the action of "bandits."

The American historian briefly discusses the attacks of Polish army on the Ukrainian land: "Pilsudski launched an offensive against Eastern Galicia, inhabited largely by Ukrainians, and Volhynia, despite the remonstrance of the Peace Conference, which was unwilling to allot these territories to Poland."³⁸)

A. J. Toynbee, taking notice of Poland's lawless annexation of Eastern Galicia against the will of the greatest part of its Ukrainian population, stated that this action laid the groundwork for the new partition of Poland in 1939 between Germany and Moscow.

"The Uniat Catholic Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia as the Orthodox Christians of Volhynia were annexed to an inter-war Poland, by the same ephemerally victorious Polish force of arms, as subject and penalized minorities. Through the deadly feuds engendered by these tragic coups de force that compromised the future of both Eastern Europe and the Western Civilization in the critical years A. D. 1918-1921, the evil spirit of Linguistic-Nationalism prepared the way first of a fresh partition of the historic patrimonium of Poland-Lithuania in A. D. 1939 between a Third German Reich and a Moscovy disguised as Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."³⁹)

The same author also stated:

³⁷) Ibid., p. 449.

³⁸) Buell, p. 75.

³⁹) Toynbee, A. Study of History, VIII., p. 538.

"The Principal Allied Forces had also been reluctant, and perhaps powerless as well, to restrain their friends, when these had taken the law into their hands. The Poles for example, had done this in forcibly annexing Eastern Galicia, against the will of the Ukrainian majority of its population."⁴⁰⁾

John S. Reshetar outlined President Wilson's attitude toward the aggressive action of the Poles as follows:

"Wilson was willing to agree in taking measures against Poland... asking the Poles to withdraw from the Peace Conference unless they ceased their military operations on the Ukrainian front. On June 12, he joined Lloyd George in advocating a plebiscite for the territory, but it was decided to refer the matter to the Council of Foreign Ministers for further study and consultation with experts..."⁴¹⁾

Wilson's proposals failed because of the pressure from Clemenceau. The Supreme Council did not stop the advance of the Polish divisions over Ukrainian lands, but even sanctioned this aggression. In a decision of June 25, 1919, the Supreme Council allowed the Polish government to occupy Galicia, but promised to give the population a chance to apply the right of self-determination in the near future. The autonomy of that territory was promised also, religious, political, and personal rights for the population were guaranteed. None of these conditions were observed by the Polish government.

After the military occupation of Galicia had been completed, the Ukrainian people strove stubbornly for their right for self-determination, standing on the postulate of their own statehood and resisting all Poland's efforts to replace the military occupation with annexation. The government-in-exile of the Western-Ukrainian

⁴⁰⁾ Toynbee, *The Eve of War 1939*, p. 8.

⁴¹⁾ John S. Reshetar, jr. *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920. A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 281.

National Republic continuously reminded the Allied Powers of their obligation to give the Ukrainian people a chance for self-determination.

The Supreme Council, however, accepted instead, on November 20, 1919, a statute for Galicia which decreased considerably the territory of Eastern Galicia, limited to a great degree the promised autonomy, and took from the population of Galicia the right of self-determination. It was decided that, after twenty-five years of Polish administration, not the population but the League of Nations would decide the future fate of the country.

Poland, however, again did not agree. Not satisfied with the temporary inclusion of Galicia, it strove for permanent annexation. Due to Clemenceau's active efforts, the Supreme Council discontinued the fulfilment of its previous decision.

V

THE TREATY OF RIGA

The Polish-Russian war of 1920 was ended with the Treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921. Again without determining the will of the population, both sides wilfully dealt with the Ukrainian territory. The northwestern territories populated by Ukrainians which had formerly belonged to Russia and Galicia were allotted to Poland.

Professor S. L. Sharp analyzes the substance and political importance of the Treaty of Riga as well as its fatal after-effects, not only for the enslaved Ukrainian people but also for Poland itself. He says that this Treaty led to "a partition of predominantly Ukrainian and Byelorussian territories between Russia and Poland." Then he says: "The peace treaty with the Soviet Union actually amounted to a partition of the Ukraine and Byelorussia between Poland and Russia, without consulting the native population that was neither

Polish nor Russian and, on the whole, was hostile to both the Poles and the Russians."⁴²⁾

The peace concluded in Riga was merely a result of the interrelation of forces at that time — that is, between Russia and Poland supported by France; it presented an open negation of the right of peoples for self-determination. The treaty could function only so long as the interrelation of forces did not change radically. This is underlined by Professor Sharp:

"The Peace of Riga had little to do with justice or magnanimity on either side; it was the expression of a certain relation of forces. Two decades latter it collapsed, when ballance was upset... The incorporation of millions of Ukrainians and Byelorussians within Poland was a standing invitation to irredentists activities and claims from across the border. The Peace of Riga had turned the wheel back, but — for how long?"⁴³⁾

At first the Allied Powers did not approve the Treaty of Riga because it negated Wilson's basic principle on self-determination. Only two years later, however, in March of 1923, Poland compelled the western powers to accept and sanction the Treaty.

"Within the boundaries allowed her by the treaties of Versailles and Riga, Poland was an entirely different sort of political unit from the "undisputably Polish" state advocated by Woodrow Wilson. The victorious Allies abandoned the principle of self-determination for strategic considerations. In some instances as in the case of the seizure of Wilno and in Eastern Galicia, Poland forced the West to accept solutions imposed by force."⁴⁴⁾

R. L. Buell expressed the following opinion on the Treaty of Riga:

⁴²⁾ Sharp, pp. 88, 123.

⁴³⁾ Ibid., pp. 123, 127.

⁴⁴⁾ Ibid., p. 88.

"Riga Treaty gave Poland a large White Russian and Ukrainian population who were not guaranteed any political rights apart from individual minority guarantees... Thus ended Poland's Battle of Frontiers. Ethnic Poland had an area about 90,000 square miles and a population of 20,000,000 people, but, as a result of Poland's arms and diplomacy, the boundaries of the new state, by 1923, reached 150,000 square miles and included 28,000,000 inhabitants. This achievement was the more remarkable because it was won against the opposition of the Peace Conference... As a result of these gains, Poland obtained a world-wide reputation for unbridled imperialism..."⁴⁵⁾

In this connection, Prime Minister Nitti pointed out that the expansion of Poland over the Ukrainian territory had a military character:

"In reality a Polish state has been formed with populations undoubtedly non-Polish, having a markedly military character and aiming at further expansion in Ukrainian territory."⁴⁶⁾

Professor A. J. Toynbee denounced the Treaty of Riga and regarded it as the beginning of an inevitable downfall of Versailles Poland, qualified by him as a "season state." He says:

"Poland, in the act of forcing the Riga frontier upon the Soviet Union had condemned herself to be a *Saisonstaat*. She had, in fact, insisted on signing in advance copy of her own death-warrant."

"In the flock of East European inter-war *Saisonstaaten*, Poland was the representative of the type which displayed the typical characteristics in the most extreme form."⁴⁷⁾

After the Peace Treaty of Yalta was concluded in 1945, sharp protests were raised by the Poles, and these protests still continue. The Poles complain that eastern territories of Poland populated

⁴⁵⁾ Buell, pp. 79, 80.

⁴⁶⁾ Nitti, p. 57.

⁴⁷⁾ Toynbee, *The Eve of War 1939*, pp. 9, 11.

by Ukrainians and Byelorussians were taken away. Some Polish historians even characterize this treaty as the fifth or sixth partition of Poland⁴⁸) and as "the rape of Eastern Poland by new Russian partition."⁴⁹)

Professor Lord, the defender of historic Poland at the Peace Conference of 1919, qualifies the decisions of the Treaty of Yalta as "the worst international crime that has been perpetrated in modern Europe."⁵⁰) He suggests the following as a just solution of the problem of the former eastern territories of Poland populated by the Ukrainians and Byelorussians:

"From a democratic standpoint the best way to settle the question would doubtless have been to let the population of the disputed territory decide for themselves, if there were any possibility of having an honest popular vote."⁵¹)

It appears that Professor Lord has changed his principles. In 1919-23, representatives of Poland, at the Peace Conference, supported by Professor Lord, fought with every possible means to prevent the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population of those territories from being given the right to express their free will. They even refused to listen to voices of representatives of this population, and finally resolved the situation by armed annexation of the territories. Today, however, the same Professor Lord proposes a plebiscite as the democratic and just method of solving the same problem.

⁴⁸) Oskar Halecki, *The Sixth Partition of Poland*. University of Notre Dame (Indiana, 1945, IV) Vol. 7. p. 142.

⁴⁹) Edward Rezek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy, a Pattern in Poland* (New York, 1958) pp. VII-X.

⁵⁰) Lord, p. 415.

⁵¹) *Ibid.*, p. 421.

VI

ACT OF MARCH 14, 1923

The Polish government was much concerned with the prolonged provisional nature of the status of Eastern Galicia since, despite severe persecution, political activity of the Ukrainian national movement in that area continued to increase. The Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia boycotted the 1922 elections to the Polish Seim. A clandestine Ukrainian University was organized in Lviv. The underground Ukrainian revolutionary organization aroused a spirit of resistance among the population of Eastern Galicia. At the same time, the Ukrainian government-in-exile engaged in intensive diplomatic activities.

In order to secure from the Allied Powers their approval of the annexation of Galicia — on September 26, 1922, the Polish Seim accepted the law on the autonomy of three provinces of Eastern Galicia: Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil "voievodstvos". This autonomy had been decided three years before (1919) by the Supreme Council, but had not been put into effect by Poland. The same law forbade the colonization of Eastern Galicia by the Poles and foresaw the foundation of a Ukrainian University. Now the law had been especially prepared to win the support of the Council of Ambassadors and to placate world public opinion.

By the decision of the Council of Ambassadors in Paris on March 14, 1923, Eastern Galicia was fully incorporated into Poland; its eastern frontiers corresponded to those outlined by the Treaty of Riga in 1921.

The decision of the Council of Ambassadors violated President Wilson's principle of the right of peoples for self-determination and contradicted the well-defined obligation of the Supreme Council with respect to Galicia. It legally sanctioned Poland's armed occupation of the Ukrainian territory and temporarily terminated the four-year long international process involving the fate of Galicia. Critical thoughts of Italian Prime Minister Nitti referring to the peace treaties of 1919 and later years seem well suited as a moral and historical evaluation of this particular decision. He writes:

"The Peace treaties are the most barefaced denial of all the principles which the Entente Powers declared and proclaimed during the war, not only so, but they are a fundamental negation of President Wilson's famous fourteen points..."⁵²⁾

"The recent treaties which regulate or are supposed to regulate the relations among peoples are, as a matter of fact, nothing, but a terrible regress, the denial of all those principles which had been regarded as an unalienable conquest of public right..."⁵³⁾

"The problem of Europe is above all a moral problem."⁵⁴⁾

"The actual treaties... are a perversion of all the Entente had repeatedly proclaimed: they break into pieces President Wilson's fourteen points which were a solemn pledge for the American people."⁵⁵⁾

Lloyd George's comments on this decision of the Council of Ambassadors are as follows:

"In March, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors assigned Eastern Galicia to Poland in full sovereignty, this decision, however, being prefaced by a clause stating "that it is recognized by

⁵²⁾ Nitti, p. 22.

⁵³⁾ Ibid., p. VII.

⁵⁴⁾ Ibid., p. XII.

⁵⁵⁾ Ibid., p. 125.

Poland that as regards the Eastern part of Galicia, the ethnographical conditions necessitate a regime of autonomy.

"By that time, it should be observed, Poland was also bound by the provisions of the Minorities Treaty 1919. Nevertheless, she has since had recourse to the most oppressive measures for Polonising the Ruthenes (Ukrainians), the persecution in their case extending even to the religious domain. For the majority of the Ruthenes (Ukrainians) belong either to the Uniate Church or to the Orthodox, whereas the Poles are, of course, Roman Catholics. Needless to say, no attempt has even been made by Poland to fulfill the pledge of local autonomy which conditioned the cession to her of Eastern Galicia."⁵⁶)

VII

THE WARSAW REGIME AND THE UKRAINIAN COMMUNITY

Poland achieved a diplomatic victory in Paris in 1919-23. Six million Ukrainians were included into the Polish state. The results of this victory, however, were disastrous, not only for the Ukrainian community under Poland but also for Poland itself.

Above quoted Olivier d'Etchegoyen writes:

"This situation has caused Poland to rely mainly on force to maintain under her rule all those different peoples, who have no other thought than to escape from her."⁵⁷)

"Poland restored in the interests of peace, has, owing to her policy of annexation, become a constant menace to it."⁵⁸)

"Of all the European States, Poland alone is in conflict with all her neighbours. And why? Because she has aspired, with the

⁵⁶) Lloyd George, p. 901.

⁵⁷) Olivier D'Etchegoyen, pp. 231, 232.

⁵⁸) Ibid., p. 232 (Revue Internationale, 1922, IX).

support or connivance of the allies, to annex a piece of every one of them."⁵⁹)

The excessive military budget necessary for the maintenance of a permanent armed force of 300,000 men as well as of large police forces was economically disastrous for young Poland; it kept the people in poverty. Francesco Nitti writes:

"The whole system of the Treaty of Versailles has been erected on error of Poland. Poland was not created as the noble manifestation of the rights of nationality, ethnical Poland was not created, but a great State which, as she is, cannot live long, because there are not great foreign minorities, but a whole mass of population which cannot co-exist."⁶⁰)

In the American official publication "Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945," Washington, 1949, Department of State Public., 3580, General Foreign Policy Series 15, released February 1950, on page 500 — the 20 years period of Polish rule in Western Ukraine is being described as "record of bitterness and failure."⁶¹)

By the decision of its Seim on September 22, 1922, Poland undertook the obligation of granting autonomy to the eastern Galician provinces. The Council of Ambassadors referred to this decision when allotting Galicia to Poland on March 14, 1923. The decision, however, was never carried out.

The following fact shows how vigorously the Polish government opposed Ukrainian autonomy. Ukrainian representatives to the Polish Seim introduced in 1938 a draft of the law on the autonomy of the Ukrainian lands in Poland. Not only did the Polish officials keep silent at the introduction of the draft, but that same night, on telephone order from Warsaw, police in Galicia searched the homes of prominent Ukrainians, looking for copies of the draft.

⁵⁹) Ibid., p. 231 (Revue Parlementaire, 1923, I).

⁶⁰) Nitti, p. 142.

⁶¹) Ukraine and Poland, p. 10.

The Polish press was warned in would be confiscated should it print any reference to the draft.⁶²⁾

Instead of granting autonomy the Polish government began an intensive campaign to Polonize the Ukrainian territories. As part of this procedure, the historical name "Galicia" was replaced by the name "Eastern Little Poland." An attack was launched on all the Ukrainian cultural institutions developed during the course of several decades. Instead of founding a Ukrainian University as decided by the Seim, all the Ukrainian chairs at the university in Lviv which had existed at the time of Austrian rule were abolished. The police destroyed the clandestine Ukrainian University, which had been active for several years under very unfavorable conditions, having more than 60 chairs and 1,500 students. The Polish Seim passed a school law in 1924 aimed at Polonizing the Ukrainian public schools. Many obstacles were placed in the way of Ukrainian private schools. Only a limited number of Ukrainians were admitted to universities. Ukrainians were actively hindered from entering civil service. All educational and co-operative activities of the Ukrainians were systematically restricted.

The Seim decision of September 22, 1922 also forbade the colonization of Galicia. But when large estates were parcelled, it was forbidden to sell land to Ukrainian peasants, and Polish colonist were settled in already overpopulated rural areas.

R. L. Buell says in part:

"Following the military occupation of Eastern Galicia in 1919, Poland did its best to disrupt the Ukrainian national movement, and Polish colonists were settled on lands which the Ukrainians regarded as their own property."⁶³⁾

The prominent Ukrainian politician, Vasyl Paneyko, once a rep-

⁶²⁾ Dr. Stepan Baran, *Lipshe pizno jak nikoly, Sto lit ukrajinsko-polskykh vzajemyn v Halychyni, Problemy* (Muenchen, 1947. № 2) p. 8.

⁶³⁾ Buell, p. 276.

representative of Eastern Galicia at the Peace Conference in Paris, in his paper published in a well-known French magazine outlined the colonization policy of Versailles Poland as follows:

"Poland applied to Eastern Galicia and Volhynia, a "colonial policy", utilizing such well-known imperial methods as military, industrial and agrarian colonization. Poles monopolized all public employment, undermined instruction in the Ukrainian language, imposed numerus clausus in higher education, took measures against the cooperatives and prosecuted all sorts of Ukrainian associations, going so far as to dissolve the Ukrainian Boy Scouts, and imposing prison sentences totalling not only hundreds but thousands of years."⁶⁴)

Professor Sharp also discussed the problem of the Polish colonization policy. He says, in part:

"The attempts of Polish governments to colonize the eastern confines of the Republic with ex-servicemen of Polish nationality helped to fan Ukrainian resistance and kept alive old feuds, going back to the time of Austrian rule in Galicia and strengthened by still older historical memories."⁶⁵)

The purpose of all these measures was clearly outlined by the prominent Polish scholar and political figure, Professor Stanislaw Grabski, who stated that in twenty-five years there would be no Ukrainian problem in Poland.

When it became apparent that the above-described steps were not breaking down Ukrainian resistance, Warsaw employed pure brute force against the entire Ukrainian population. Military and police units raided villages and towns, beat innocent people including priests, destroyed personal property as well as that of Ukrainian

⁶⁴) W. Paneyko, "Autour du Problème Ukrainien", *L'Esprit International* (1939, I).

⁶⁵) Sharp, p. 89.

cultural institutions and enterprises. This was the notorious "pacification" of 1930 mentioned by many foreign authors.

William Henry Chamberlin writes:

"Some brutal reprisals were inflicted pretty indiscriminately on the Ukrainian population by Polish troops and police, especially in the autumn of 1930. Libraries and cooperatives were destroyed, Boy Scouts organizations with Ukrainian membership were dissolved, and Ukrainian high schools were closed."⁶⁶)

Raymond Leslie Buell sharply denounces the method of collective responsibility applied by the Polish government against the whole Ukrainian population. He writes:

"In 1930 the government, using the army, embarked on a policy of "pacification", punishing entire villages in which terroristic acts had occurred. The punishment not only fell on innocent and guilty alike, but in numerous instances took a particularly brutal form,⁶⁷) although few if any Ukrainians were killed. Not only the Ukrainian leaders, but liberal opinion in Poland and elsewhere protested against this application of the primitive principle of collective responsibility, regarding it as one blackest pages in Poland history."⁶⁸)

Lloyd George refers in his memoirs to these events which, under pressure of English public opinion, were considered by the League of Nations.

In 1930 the Polish persecution in Eastern Galicia took so violent a form that the problem of the so-called "pacification" of that country was brought up before the League Council, owing to the pressure of British public opinion. But the Japanese *rappporteur*

⁶⁶) William Henry Chamberlin, *The Ukraine, a Submerged Nation* (New York, 1944).

⁶⁷) *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, published by the United Ukrainian Organizations of the United States, (New York, 1931). The volume summarizes the debate in Parliament, newspaper articles and other materials.

⁶⁸) Buell, p. 277.

to the Council delayed consideration of the problem for over a year, when a supine resolution was passed, which left the situation in Eastern Galicia exactly where it was before, if not little worsened.⁶⁹⁾

Parliamentary representatives of the Ukrainian people often introduced complaints and protests to the League of Nations in Geneva. To free itself of any control by the League of Nations, Poland, in 1934, through a statement of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, renounced the treaty on the protection of national minorities signed in Versailles. In this connection, Professor Sharp wrote:

"The problem of national minorities offered Polish statesmen ample opportunities for making silly sallies on the international arena, in their quest for prestige victories. Such a step was the declaration made by Beck in 1934 to the effect that Poland would not recognize the so-called Minorities Treaty signed at Versailles."⁷⁰⁾

By his declaration in the League of Nations on September 13, 1934, Mr. Beck, the then Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, unilaterally cancelled the obligation to protect the national minorities, though such an obligation was registered in the League of Nations and had been imposed on Poland by the Treaty of Versailles.⁷¹⁾

R. L. Buell thought this to be funny:

"In practice, the League of Nations, which was to guarantee Poland's independence, was prevented from acting in Polish minority questions."⁷²⁾

Lloyd George also sharply criticized this step of Polish policy. He said:

"Poland is one of the worst offenders. She actually repudiated the Minority Treaty at Geneva in 1934, by a unilateral declaration,

⁶⁹⁾ Lloyd George, p. 901.

⁷⁰⁾ Sharp, p. 92.

⁷¹⁾ Ukraine and Poland, pp. 8, 9.

⁷²⁾ Buell, p. 244.

in which her delegate laid it down that the provisions of the Treaty would no longer be regarded as applicable to Poland."⁷³)

From their own state, founded in 1918 on the basis of self-determination, the Western Ukrainians had been forced into the position of defenseless colonial slaves denied the right to speak before the forum of the civilized world.

Between the two World Wars the religious policy of the Polish regime was brutally enforced on the Ukrainian territories which previously had belonged to Russia. In 1938, Polish colonists protected by the police, destroyed property of the Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox population. This terroristic action was to compel the Ukrainian communities to abandon the Greek-Orthodox creed and to join the Roman Catholics. Many churches were closed by the Polish government. In 1938 about 120 Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox churches, some of them unique examples of sixteenth-century architecture, were burned or destroyed in the Kholm Area and Podlachia. New modest homes of prayers were built to replace the destroyed churches, but then Greek-Orthodox priests were arrested and convicted to months in prison or were fined for conducting divine services. Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox and Catholic hierarchs protested against this violence in pastoral messages. A protest by the Ukrainian Parliamentary representatives was rejected by the Polish Seim.⁷⁴)

Attempts are being made even now to justify Poland's violation of its obligations towards Galicia in regard to its autonomy. Professor Oscar Halecki writes:

"The territorial autonomy that had been announced was very difficult to carry through, for it was precisely where the Ukrainian population was highest in culture and national consciousness,

⁷³) Lloyd George, p. 900.

⁷⁴) Record of the Seim in Warsaw, 1938-1939; "Svoboda" — Daily (Jersey City, 1938-1939).

namely, in the former eastern Galicia, that it was most mingled with the Polish population."⁷⁵)

Professor Halecki tries to support his position by arguments based on ethnic relations in the area. His arguments, however, are predicated on data of the Polish census of 1931, which was especially contrived to show that Poles predominated in the western Ukrainian lands. Thus, the Ukrainian population was subdivided into several groups: "Ukrainians," "Rusyny," and "local people"; the last-mentioned group, a unique invention, actually consisted of some 580,000 Ukrainians. A large number of Ukrainians of Greek-Catholic creed and some Jews also were recorded as Poles. As a result of these artificial subdivisions, the Polish 1931 census showed that Poles allegedly composed 40% of the total population. However, a scholarly analysis of all the Austrian and Polish censuses and a comparison of them with ecclesiastical schematisms and data secured from special questionnaires indicate that in 1939 — that is, after twenty years of intensive Polonization — the population of Galicia consisted of 64.2% Ukrainians, 16% Poles (which, together with the so-called *Latynnyks* — Ukrainian-speaking Roman Catholics — made 24.8%), 10.2% Jews, and 0.8% others.⁷⁶)

The dubious quality of the Polish census of 1931, particularly with respect to ethnic relations, was pointed out by the American scholar Kulisher.⁷⁷) Similar doubts concerning the data of this census were expressed by Professor Sharp.

"The quoted figures naturally do not tell the full story, official

⁷⁵) O. Halecki: "A History of Poland", Roy Publishers (New York, 1961), p. 297.

⁷⁶) A concise analysis of this census and its reliability can be found in the booklet of Prof. V. Kubijovyč, scientist-demographer: "**Western Ukraine within Poland 1920-1939**, Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, Inc. (Chicago, 1963).

⁷⁷) Mykola Chubatyj: *Ameryka ta Zakhidno-Ukrainski Zemli* (America

Polish sources tended to play down the number of people who did not consider themselves Poles."⁷⁸⁾

It is strange therefore that some scholars⁷⁹⁾ refer today to the census of 1931, thus confusing the world press and serious scholars who sometimes quote these tendentiously prepared data.⁸⁰⁾

VIII

EPILOGUE

The Ukrainian people never recognized the Polish occupation as legal. Immediately after the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 14, 1923, many thousands demonstrated in protest in Lviv, the capital of Eastern Galicia. At the demonstration on March 24, 1923 at St. George Place, the masses of protestants swore a solemn oath:

"We, the Ukrainian people, swear that we shall never recognize Polish rule; we shall use every chance to throw off the hated yoke of Polish slavery and to unite with the great Ukrainian people in an independent Ukrainian state embracing all the Ukrainian lands."

At the plenary session in the Polish Seim, representatives of the Ukrainian parliamentary clubs delivered official statements

and Western Ukrainian Lands). "Svoboda" (Jersey City, Apr. 5, 1952) p. 2.

⁷⁸⁾ S. Sharp, *op. cit.* p. 88.

⁷⁹⁾ Olgierd Górka: *Outline of Polish History*, London, 2nd ed. 1945), p. 117.

Oskar Halecki: *The Sixth Partition of Poland*, p. 151.

⁸⁰⁾ Bertram D. Wolfe: *Communist Totalitarianism. Keys to the Soviet System*. Beacon Press. (Boston, 1961), p. 200.

presenting the attitude of the Ukrainian people towards the Polish occupation. We quote two statements of 1928:

"The Ukrainian people have been autochthonous from time immemorial on lands which were included in Poland. These lands formerly had belonged to the Ukrainian Kiev state, then to the Galician-Volhynian state. Later, although under foreign rule, the Ukrainians never lost their ethnic individuality and never renounced their aspirations for an independent state. In 1918-20, seas of blood were shed by the Ukrainian people fighting for their statehood. An independent, sovereign, and united Ukrainian state including all the Ukrainian territory is our supreme and inviolable ideal. We hold as invalid and not binding all the international acts which violate the right of the Ukrainian people for self-determination by implying that the areas which from time immemorial have been parts of the Ukrainian land, such as Eastern Galicia with Lemky Land, Kholm Area, Volhynia, Podlachia, and Polisia, are allotted to Poland. These acts are, namely, the Peace Treaty of Riga of March 18, 1921, and the decision of the Council of Ambassadors of March 14, 1923, which violate the right of the Ukrainian people for self-determination. Entering these lawmaking chambers, we shall seek here to attain the realization of the supreme right of the Ukrainian people."⁸¹)

The statement of the member of the Ukrainian Socialist-Radical Representation delivered at the same session:

"The Ukrainian working people are of the opinion that the present victory of foreign imperialism and the forced occupation of Ukrainian lands by Poland, Moscow, Roumania, and Czechoslovakia is of a temporary nature. The Ukrainian working people do not recognize, and will never recognize, the so-called legal foundations of this occupation outlined in several treaties concluded without

⁸¹) "Ukrainska Zahalna Encyclopaedia" (Ukrainian General Encyclopaedia), Lviv, 1930-1933, vol. III. p. 670.

consulting the Ukrainian people and contradicting the right of peoples for self-determination generally accepted in the civilized world."⁸²⁾

Thus the Ukrainian population regarded Poland as a hostile occupant. This attitude has remained unchanged: the Ukrainian people have never recognized the sovereignty of Poland over their ancient lands.

World War II, the Treaty of Yalta, and later Soviet-Polish border agreements returned the Western-Ukrainian lands again to Ukraine — not to the free Ukrainian Democratic Republic, however, but to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic which only formally is an independent member of the USSR. In accord with a treaty, Ukraine and Poland exchanged their ethnic minorities. The Ukrainians who had remained on the Polish side were moved to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and the Poles were transferred from Ukraine to Poland. The lands on either side of the boundary are now almost homogenous. The population of Galicia today is 90.6% Ukrainian, of Volhynia 94%; there remain 2.2% Poles in Galicia, and 0.4% in Volhynia.⁸³⁾

The hope should be cherished that voices still often heard in the Polish community beyond Poland demanding the return of the frontiers of 1939 will cease calling for a change that could be fatal for both the Ukrainian and Polish peoples. Then neighborly co-operation between these two peoples equally threatened by imperialistic Moscow could take the place of age-old tensions, hate, and wars.

⁸²⁾ Dr. Ivan Makukh: *Na narodnij sluzhbi* (in Ukr.) (Detroit, 1958), p. 377.

⁸³⁾ Census of Jan. 15, 1951.


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