

**Holodomor, The Great Ukrainian Famine of 1932–33:  
Responses of the West.  
Excerpts from the Documents**

Selection and English Translation  
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“There is condition of nervousness and fear in the government and public opinion regarding the agricultural question”.

*Lysty z Kharkova. Holod v Ukraini ta na pivnichnomu Kavkazi v povidomlenniakh italijskykh dyplomativ, 1932–1933 roky. Uporiadnyk Andrea Graziosi. Kharkiv, 2007.  
Embassy of Italy in Moscow, USSR.  
Report # 965. Moscow, February 23, 1932.*

Gradenigo analyzes statistics provided by the authorities and concludes: “We can only assume that to avoid a catastrophe, in the last moment the government can block all transfers how it used to do earlier, and give all power of the railroad transport to bring seeds to the villages, taking grain from reserves that earlier were considered untouchable.”

“Anyway, situation has to be considered very serious. Agricultural purchase can be considered to be complete on the level of 85%. Before sowing campaign existing amount of seeds is less of what is needed on 50%. Amount of tractors is not sufficient.” Situation with cattle is also serious because of murrain among horses. That is why “approaching sowing campaign has very morose perspectives”

*Lysty z Kharkova.  
№ 10. S. Gradenigo. March 5, 1932, p. 86.*

“Finally I want to say that Ukraine that now, of no doubt, is a region that the most outspokenly sabotages both collectivization and industrialization (stagnation and regression of production in Donetsk area, in metallurgical and mechanical industry) soon, according to unanimous information, will come in iron hands of HPU workers.”

*Lysty z Kharkova.  
№ 26. S. Gradenigo. January 6, 1933, p. 131.*

“Agricultural production is key industry to save economy and the state”.

*Lysty z Kharkova.  
№ 26. S. Gradenigo. January 6, 1933, p. 131.*

Gradenigo was wondering how world could stay indifferent to the “catastrophe” and why international press was keeping silence on “this slaughter (*bijnia*) organized by the Soviet government”, because “famine continues to massively kill people among inhabitants in such a tremendous scale.” He had no doubts that “this holodomor is first of all caused by organized and conscious steps aimed to “give a lesson to a peasant”.”

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 33. S. Gradenigo. May 31, 1933, p. 158.*

Gradenigo said that one big HPU chief cynically told that **“ethnographic material” must be changed**. And this intention, despite its ugliness, should be interpreted as real and such that is implemented.

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 33. S. Gradenigo. May 31, 1933, p. 158.*

Gradenigo states that with the help of cruel confiscations Moscow government “organized not famine, this is not enough to say, but full shortage of any measures to survive in a Ukrainian village, Kuban and Middle Volga. Such policy was caused by three thoughts:

- Passive resistance by a peasant to collective economy;
- Conviction that this “ethnographic material” will never look the way extreme communist doctrine wants it to see;
- more or less they have admitted necessity or advantage of denationalization of the regions where **Ukrainian and German self-consciousness is awakening, bringing danger of possible political complications in the future**, thus to save an empire it is better that Russian population inhabit these lands, at least in the majority.”

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 33. S. Gradenigo. May 31, 1933, p. 158–159.*

Gradenigo continues that, seeing the first condition, the government has implemented initial “small science” (*nauchku*); second condition resulted into total indifference to the tragic consequences of the “small science” policy. Finally, third point aims to “liquidate Ukrainian problem”, bringing 10 or 15 million.

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 33. S. Gradenigo. May 31, 1933, p. 159.*

A writer Andreyev who 20 days ago came from Moscow told that “Devastation starts behind Kurs’k”.

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 33. S. Gradenigo. May 31, 1933, p. 160.*

Attoliko said that there were several theories that appeared in international circles trying to explain famine. One theory argues that the Soviet government is unable to solve the food supply problem. Thus it decided to eliminate by force part of the population (approximately 3 million). Another theory argues that “organized holodomor” exists because of Moscow that wants to get rid of Ukrainians finally. Their death will open a way to great-Russian despotism.

*Lysty z Kharkova.*  
*№ 34. Attoliko. June 20, 1933, p. 169.*

Dr. Shiller, attaché on the agriculture problems of the German Embassy in Moscow has recently returned from the trip over Ukraine (more than 4500 kilometers). He showed photographs made by him of the villages. One can see there

unburied corps died of starvation; rooms in the houses where abandoned corps of children lie; cut in pieces human bodies. “Ukrainian population has food situation that has reached such minimum that it cannot become lower”.

*Lysty z Kharkova.  
№ 39. Attoliko. July 11, 1933, p. 185.*

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The day before Errio’s arrival Stalin wrote that in the places where Errio will be in the USSR *bilohvardijtsi* are preparing an act of terror. He got this information from Yevdykykov (a representative of ODPU in the North Caucasus). So people to whom the letter was addressed had to warn Balyts’kyj (HPU head of UkrSSR) to visit all places of future Errio’s visit and to take radical measures against possible excesses. So Stalin hid the term famine in this correspondence here.

Errio made a statement after his return that was published under name of “See in USSR [is] beautiful”.

*Letter of Stalin to V. Molotov, L. Kahanovych  
and H. Yahoda about Errio’s trip. Summer of 1933.  
Kulchytsky S. Holod 1932–1933 rr. v Ukrajinii iak genotsyid:  
movoju dokumentiv, ochyma svydktiv. Kyiv, 2008, pp. 31–32.*

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On July 24, 1933 Greek-Catholic episcopate of Halychyna delivered an address to world public about holodomor in Ukraine and dying out of Ukrainian peasants. On July 25, 1933 Ukrainian Public Committee addressed Ukrainian nation with a protest against “Russian Communists-Bolshevik, who with fire and swords had destroyed Ukrainian state over Dnieper, who with bayonets implanted their dictatorship on our land, crucify now Ukrainian people” and “starve to death all population of Ukraine”.

On August 26, 1933 Edward Errio arrived to Odessa on a Soviet ship with a senator and two deputies. Errio visited a kolhosp “Red Ray” in the village Biliajivka, asked about *trudodni*, was among the kolhosp members about 2 hours. At 22 pm he left for Kyiv. He arrived to Kyiv in the morning of August 27. He visited Sofia Cathedral and All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Golden Gate, Kyiv-Pechers’k Monastery and made a trip on a ship by the Dnieper River.

On August 30, 1933 a report appeared of DPU UkrSSR to TsK KP(b)U about Errio’s visit. He visited Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovs’k, Odessa, Kyiv. In Ukraine Errio “was mostly concerned with two issues: 1) whether we have famine, besides, this question he connected, certainly, with a main question about success of failure of collectivization and 2) national question<...>”, but after talks with the authority representatives had “<...> firm conviction that we have no famine and, although Al’fan and Ray stressed that quite recently there was famine in Ukraine, he

received evidence that we correctly inform him about past and now overcome difficulties.” In Kharkiv Errio visited children’s commune , “went everywhere [he] wanted, met with V. Chubar”.

On September 27, 1933 European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad issued an appeal to a minister of foreign affairs of Great Britain D. Saimon about help to starving population of UkrSSR. Expectation were expressed that “English delegates in the League of Nations, in International Assistant Union and in other international organizations, able to provide assistance to victim population, will raise and insist on resolution of a question of organization of help to Ukraine”.

A letter of a head of International Red Cross Committee M. Huber to a head of an executive committee of Red Cross Union of USSR A. Yenukidze. M. Huber wrote that a Council of the League of Nations had examined the issue of the famine on its sessions that “according to having received by the Council news, as though raged in some oblasts of the Union of Soviet Socialistic Republics and in the rajon of the Northern Caucasus.”. He stressed that the head of the League of Nations – a prime-minister of the Council of Ministers of Norway Movinkel’ asked International Red Cross to examine the issue about the famine. He asked to notify him about the necessity to provide with food.

On December 11, 1933 German Consulate-General in Kharkiv K. Val’ter sent a report of about situation in agriculture of UkrSSR. In Ukraine in 1933 there was “big famine” that was the result of “socialization of agriculture” and “taking away” of grain from the peasants. He stressed that tragic events of the Soviet power were called “failures in agriculture” (*proryv*). The famine took in Ukraine millions of lives among the peasantry. According to secretly told official information (*sluzhbova informatsia*), amount of losses is 7 million and this number cannot be considered to be overrated. He stressed that “among peasantry there is a belief that the Soviet power, although not intentionally having caused the famine, but consciously used it as an instrument for realization of its own plans”. He notified that the famine “officially had not been recognized at all”, there was no help to starving, and international help had been declined.

*Marochko V., Movchan O. Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukrajinii: Khronika. Kyiv, 2009, pp. 248–280.*

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January 20, 1933: an excerpt from a report of vice-consul of Italy in Batumi to a minister of foreign affairs of Italy about influx of refugees from Ukraine. TB: full text is given. “During all these months this local port promoted to mass resettlement of refugees from Ukraine to the rajons marked with relative sufficiency of food. Every ship that arrived from Odesa – and three of them come every week – usually brought from one to two thousand of Ukrainians. During summer this event did not much look like resettlement, and sooner, reminded trips in search of food. The majority of those arrivals, about whom I think I have to say in details, arrived

bringing with them items possible to be sold or exchanged, and returned with flour and grain bought for consumption at home, and also for resale in Ukraine where shortage of such products allowed to get incredible incomes.

Many times the authorities prohibited to take out food, and in the end sometimes made concessions. Only lately, it seems, ban is strictly adhered to. But now another event exists that is broader, covering all USSR.

It was clear that the majority of refugees left in search of some stability. They remained the most stricken rajons to settle in local ones, more rich on means for survival, with more possibilities to get food. The consequences of such undesirable growth of population in these rajons did not kept waiting, and shortage of various food reserves became from day to day sharper, simultaneously quickly prices grow on the markets. Various rumors spread around quantity of resettlers from various rajons of USSR in Transcaucasia. Some numbers several million of resettlers, but I believe that this is great exaggeration. Taking into account that Batumi is the most natural and convenient for coming to Transcaucasia from Ukraine and bordering areas, such considerable movement of resettlers cannot take place in a very short term, not giving evidently catastrophic character to actually non-controlled resettlement of crowds of people. Their influx is continuous but limited. I believe that a number will not be far from the truth decreased in comparison to given above to several thousand of people.

But lately in addition to general measures, well known to Y[our] H[ighness], a process of eviction of these masses of people to the places of their origin. This sight is really sad, in spite of the fact that this relatively favorable time separate them from more tragic one that will expect them. Pending a ship resettlers are gathered in the warehouses of a custom-house; those who can pay for a ticket are separated from those who cannot do this. Latter under police escort in several hours before departure are led in formation to a free market where [they] are offered to sell their clothes to gather money for a ticket. Police prevent from approaching those who only takes an interest; only those can do this who has an intention to buy an item – a coat, pair of boots or else. Naturally, limited time does not leave to unfortunate any possibility to bargain, and buyers use this. Everything [P. 607] takes place by order, silently, that does not decrease sad character of a scene, that during some time reminds a market of slaves.<...>”

*Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukrajinі: Dokumenty i materialy.  
Uporiadnyk R. Ya. Pyrih. Kyiv, 2007, pp. 603-607.*

A secret informer sent a report from Kharkiv to German Embassy about the famine in Ukraine on May 18, 1933. P. 847: “The biggest significant example of calamity in rural area in resettlement of peasants-Germans. From May 1 more than 200 people arrived to Kharkiv who were located in German General Consulate, provided with food and sent further. One can count on big groups later... Stories of the peasants from their districts in the details are stunning and are confirmed by their physical condition... They confirm that the famine grow in size that had already exceeded scale of famine of 1921/1922. Harmful for health surrogates, dead cattle serve as food, there are stable rumors about reliable facts that human meat was eaten. In some villages there is neither cattle no birds, cats and dogs. Rows of houses

stay empty, whole families had died out. Corpses are almost not buried. Population is too weak to work, in some rajons even half of spring works had not been made. Often only 10 part of working rates can be made to which scanty payment correspond to. With bad and insufficient processing and insufficiency of seed the perspectives of future harvest are hopeless, also if during favorable weather conditions harvest of winter crops must be good. It is doubtful whether in Autumn there will be enough able-to-work people to gather harvest. Peasants already now have been reported the plan regarding grain procurement and they have been reported how much grain and other fruits they will send from the harvest of this year. Nothing is known about any assistant action of the authorities, at least for nutrition of people who are under threat.

Famous Ukrainian writer Khvyliovyy who wrote various articles from kolhosp life, and a writer Hirniak (Kyveliuk), born in Halychyna, were exiled to rural areas and gave to Ukrainian government and party committee a report about serious situation of starving village population, but they did not find understanding regarding big indigence. In several days they both committee suicide. In a German colony a head of political department killed himself for this same reason.

Also more and more famine is observed in the city [Kharkiv], although the authorities is concerned about keeping as far as possible flow of population from the villages to the extent possible. Everywhere sick of hunger can be seen, many die on the streets; the authorities at most are concerned about help to children, but they also are not subject to placing already...

Regarding situation with nutrition, general mood of population and failure of governmental apparatus, during the last five years such crisis was never observed that had been achieved during these last months. A big amount of population sees in front of their eyes inevitable death if not help will come."

On December 11, 1933 German Consulate-General in Kharkiv K. Val'ter sent a report of about situation in agriculture of UkrSSR (See also above (Marochko, Movchan). P. 984-985: Besides the need of collectivization, another key moment was a question that gained a decisive meaning: "whether 22 million of Ukrainian peasant population together and instead of individualistic outlook will have necessary understanding and wish to work for a new Communist form of economy.". P. 985: Party and the government "completely realized seriousness of situation... authoritative heads travelled all over the state so that locally to examine situation and to take measures.". There is now information that there the party defeated "kulak, White Army and nationalistic elements" in the kolhosps, institutions etc. P. 985-986: "If these aspirations really existed, in any case they stress that in deep strata of population, not only at peasants, but also in created circles of citizens and officials and in the party itself there were serious reflections against former agrarian policy, collectivization and their display in all state."

"End of this struggle between the party and the people, from its side, showed big advantages of party organization that had in its disposal authoritative means of the state and for which millions of human victims were not high price to finally involve peasants into Communist system. Whether it had really achieved its goals, not is not possible to say."

*Holodomor 1932–1933 rokiv v Ukrajinі: Dokumenty i materially.*

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# 56: September 14, 1932, Warsaw - Comprehensive analysis by the head of the Studies Department of Section II of the Main Staff sent to the 2nd Office concerning the situation in Ukraine. P. 190: “The countryside in Ukraine is starving – everything that had grown in the fields is being taken away, either in the form of grain tax or as loan payments. Illnesses are wide-spread.”. “With its decrees [on free trade and lower taxes] the party has prevented as outburst, yet an active rising on the part of the peasants is to be expected in the near future once the food stocks, which can be sold on the market, end... Almost the whole Ukraine is travelling in search of bread, the trains are filled to the highest degree...”.

# 84: January 4, 1933. Letter from the German Consul in Odessa to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Embassy in Moscow regarding the worsening situation in Odesa oblast. P. 249: Content: “Insufficient grain supplies. State organs turning to forceful means. Worsening of economic problems”.

# 97: February 3, 1933. Fragment of a report by the head of the Polish Consulate in Kharkiv addressed to Section II of the Main Staff regarding the deteriorating of food supplies in Ukraine. P. 288: “The situation in Ukraine is getting worse by the day, the famine is affecting the people in ever more disgusting and violent forms, with the number of robberies and murders rising drastically...”.

# 98: February 6, 1933. Letter from the German Consul in Odessa to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin and the German Embassy in Moscow regarding the taking away of grain from the peasants by the “shock brigades”. P. 289: “Despite applying all measures of coercion aiming to fulfill the khlebosdacha, in Odessa the plan was not fulfilled... Kolkhozniki are to return the seeds earned by them under the pretext of “miscalculated, mistaken portioning during distribution”. At best, they are allowed to keep the corn.”. “Endless searches day and night” forced many men to leave their families and escape. “Displacement and deportation continue.. [P. 289-290] the peasants are handing over everything in their possession so as to prolong their existence through food bought in the Torgsin.”.

# 102: February 16, 1933. Kharkiv. Memorandum by an employee of Section II of the Main Staff regarding the difficulties with supplies in Kharkiv. P. 298: “The issue of supplies is getting even more difficult. Nearly nothing is available on the market. People are selling things in secret. The confiscation of goods, and particularly meat, is almost a daily phenomenon... There are constant searches in trains... The lack of most basic goods in the market and on the stores forces people [to] give their remaining silver and gold to the Torgsin, which is full of people. They buy mainly flour and bread. One now often sees people in the front of the Torgsin selling bread which they have just purchased there. A 1 rb. Torgsin coupon is valued [at] 80 Sov[iet] rb.”

# 108: March 17, 1933. Fragment of a report by the Polish Consul General regarding the food shortages in the Dnieprostroj area and the Bardychivs'kyj okruh. P. 310: Regarding situation in Ukraine, "generally everything remained unchanged... be it in the campaign of spring sowing (most important for the time being), or in the metallurgical or coal industry. All the while, the famine in Ukraine is growing day by day. "

# 115: May 20, 1933, [Kharkiv]. Memorandum by an employee of the "East" Bureau of Section II of the Main Staff regarding the situation in Kharkiv. P. 323: "Different from the center of the city [of Kharkiv], the suburbs and the provincial towns are filled with the poor, who are dying en mass from starvation and illnesses. (In the center, there are also corpses on the streets from time to time, and one sees [them] every day in the market)".

# 134: August 2, 1933. Report by the Military Attaché with the Polish Representation in Moscow to the head of Section II of the Main Staff on the situation of Ukrainian agriculture. P. 365: "From the official reports of our consulates, as well as from oral accounts of the visiting persons, it is clear that the supply situation in Ukraine is not improving. Good crops are surprisingly good... Those enormous good crops, unseen for several years, do not yet solve the supply issues, as it is still not known how the harvesting campaign will proceed. This is matter of great importance due to a wide-scale decimation of the countryside population (in some areas entire villages have died and there are no people to clean up the sowed grain), catastrophic state of horses and numerous neuviazki [lack of coordination, disorders] in the area of automotive equipment and deliveries of the necessary fuels. Recently, Soviet authorities began mobilizing ad hoc the population of larger cities (Kharkiv, Kiev, etc.) and grouping them in units of several hundreds of people who are then forcefully sent to the areas where workforce is required to proceed with the harvest. However, the transportation of such groups proves serious difficult with the poorly functioning railways. On the other hand, the productivity of such workers is extremely low and it can safely be estimated that a single peasant is worth more than 10 or 20 inhabitants of the city who are not used to such work. Allegedly in Kiev they have mobilized some 50 th[ousand] such workers, and in Kharkiv even more still. They are dragged in large groups to the train stations where, with the poor functioning of the railways, they sit waiting for a train for days in some cases. The people are followed by wagons loaded with things and [P. 366] pulled by horse skeletons. This makes such an impression that one comes to think that these people are never to return to their permanent homes. There are reports of numerous cases and mass deaths (tens of people) due to consumption of half-ripe grain heads. Numerous groups of people (usually factory workers) are also sent to monitor the fields and supplied with all sorts of weapons (old rifles, shot guns, etc.). In the fields, one sees almost no technical means of harvesting the grain (notes by Consul Sośnicky near Kiev), scythe and sickle are the working tools. The second matter worth noting is the purge which is being carried out at present. It can hardly be said that the moment has been well chosen for a purge. The peasants approach the matter



with great indifference or even intentionally and maliciously make it more difficult. Most often, in order to get back at some communists, they denounce them as being former Petliura or Polish agents, introducing chaos to the procedures by which the purge is carried out. In any case, the purge is carried out quite radically. The number of those removed from the party exceeds 50 %, which, compared to the results of the purge in other regions (8-12 %), constitutes a significant difference.”

# 135: August 2, 1933. Moscow. Report by the counselor with the Polish Representation in Moscow to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the situation in the countryside during the harvest. P. 367: “The opinion-creating circles here are perhaps overly optimistic as to the crop yields, as well as to the capabilities of carrying out the harvests without loss... it seems impossible to fulfill such favorable forecasts. First of all, there are entire areas which were not sufficiently sown or not at all (North Caucasus, areas near Chernihiv, etc.). Then there is the issue of poor sowing and poor quality of seeds, thus grain is sparse and weeded, whereas some was sown too late. However, the key difficulty concerns the shortage of workforce caused by the famine and exhaustion in the countryside, the lack of horses, which have still not recovered from constant work in the fields, and finally, there is the insufficient number of harvesters and tractors, which often fail, the lack of spare parts and fuel. Large scale recruitment has been carried out in the entire country for the purpose of field work.”. P. 368: “I heard that the army received order to take active part in the harvest and that its work – especially that it recruits primarily among the sons of peasants – yields very good results. It is hard to confirm this information. In the Kiev Oblast the army is used rather to guard. Perhaps the cancelling of maneuvers on the Polish border, as announced in the foreign press and having political implications, is related to the harvesting campaigns”.

# 154: 13 October 1933, Kiev. Fragment of a report by the Polish Vice-Council in Kiev to the Polish Representative in Moscow on the situation of the Polish minority in Ukraine. P. 418: “As regards the economic policy, the tactics pursued by the Soviet authorities follow their own line, leading to disintegration and destruction of the Polish minority in Ukraine... In the Polish kolkhozy, of which nearly all have fulfilled the khlebozdacha quotas in due time, only grain waste has remained for distribution [among the people]... It is particularly worth underlining that the level of the designated quota and the amount of vegetables to be obligatory planted, as compared to the Ukrainian kolkhozy, are always unfavorable for the Polish ones. This results in numerous instances in which the peasants leave the Polish collectives for the Ukrainian ones. Particularly severe conditions have been placed on the “individual” [farmer]. The khlebozdacha quota usually exceeds the entire annual crop... Those who are not able to fulfill the khlebozdacha are charged with political sabotage and “Kulak” tendencies.” blamed with a purpose to destroy kolhosp from inside. P. 419: “In fact, the majority of mismanagement is caused mainly by the enormous disorder that is the norm in nearly all of the collectives, CAM stations and managing institutions, the result of utmost indifference and lack of interest of the wide peasant masses toward the outcomes of their work from which they draw no profits. The people are entirely focused on a single thought – how to

survive the day and acquire at least the minimum of stocks for the winter. The Soviet authorities, in fact, do not intend to recognize those reasons in breaking the passive opposition. The severely punish all those linked directly to the carrying out of the agricultural plans, accusing them of political sabotage”.

# 159: 22, October 1933, Kiev. Fragment of a letter from the Polish Vice-Consul in Kiev to the “East” Bureau of Section II of the Main Staff regarding the efforts pursued by the Soviet authorities aimed at covering up the famine. P. 427: “I truly wish for you to believe that the information regarding the possible famine is by no means exaggerated. In my opinion, Berson [from 1932 – Moscow correspondent of Polish Telegraphic Agency and “Gazeta Polska”, expelled from the USSR in 1935] is wrong when claiming that there is a state of war between the peasantry and the state. Except for some rare incidents of individual terror directed towards an activist, usually a person of small influence, there are no grounds whatsoever to claim the “revival of sabotage”. What is interesting, in my opinion, is the entirely concrete attempts by the authorities to create and strengthen patriotism and state ambitions. A number of events, as well as the views and reports in the press related to this issue, seem to give proof to the existence of [coherent] action. Presently, when one talks with a number of doctors who, no more than a year earlier would readily accept having breakfast or lunch at the consulate, readily complaining about all cases of mismanagement and shortages, one sees a complete change in their attitudes: they try to bluff, stating that everything is perfect, even better than everywhere else... In such case, I have only one justification: being too close to the life here, one loses perspective and clarity of judgment.”.

On October 29, 1933 Ukrainians in Poland organized a day of Ukrainian national mourning. This day it was prohibited to have loud gatherings and meetings, and acts of protests. So the Ukrainians had services in the churches. They also were read a letter of a metropolitan A. Sheptyts’kyj about situation in Ukraine (repressions and famine) and were told by the priests or other activists about situation in Ukraine. They also gathered money to send them to Great Ukraine. Attempts to organize meetings were stopped to the police.

# 201. 22 July 1934, [Kiev]. Fragment of a letter from the Polish Vice-Consul in Kiev to the “East” Bureau of Section II of the Main Staff regarding the bad situation in agriculture and the anxieties of the people regarding the next wave of hunger in Ukraine. P. 541: “There can not be the slightest doubt that this year, the defeatist mood among the people is much more wide spread than in previous years. Putting aside all private information and referring only to the official press accounts, one truly finds thousand of cases of various misrepresentations, aimed at one thing alone – to hide as much as possible because extremely difficult times are approaching as far as the supplies are concerned. Among others, what serves to prove the state of this year’s sowings is the fact that a number of spring sows have not survived until the harvests and are presently ploughed again and sown with late millet. This mainly concerns the early oat, barley and vetch.

The cases of theft from the fields have reached a so far unprecedented number. All kinds of “bending” and misinterpreting of the official directives border on artistry.”

# 204: 18 November 1934. Fragment of a letter from the Polish Vice-Consul in Kiev to the “East” Bureau of Section II of the Main Staff comprising, among others, a description of the unrest caused by the famine in the Kiev Oblast and the Chernihiv regions. P. 546: Rethreshing of straw is made for the second time (the first was in August). Gotten in such a way grain is planned to be given to kolhosp members for feeding. Instead of grain for trudoden, peasants were paid 50 kopeeks for a day work. Thus in several places of the Kiev oblast (near Boryspil) and in Chernihiv region (near Bobryk train station) “quite large peasant unrests took place”.

*Holodomor. The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933. Poland and Ukraine in the 1930's – 1940's. Unknown Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services. – Warsaw-Kiev, 2009. – 647 p.*

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On March 1, 1932 Kyiv Oblast Department of DPU UkrSSR reported to DPU UkrSSR about noted by German consulate information regarding situation in the villages of Ukraine. From January 1 to March 1, 1932 the German consulate attached big importance to illustration situation in the villages, particularly, regarding Soviet policy in German colonies. There was information about brigades that moved one by one, What one brigade did not take, was taken by another one. These brigades' members were called under-people who were not touched by mothers' beggings as well as by hungry children. It was noted about resettlement of kurkuls from the villages.

Not earlier than June 21, 1932, a secret informer of DPU UkrSSR Odessa Oblast Department sent a report about impressions of the Japanese consul B. Tanaky from a trip in USSR. The consul was impressed that Ukrainian peasants, in comparison to the peasants from other Soviet republics, made an impression with their ragged clothes, thinness and asking for alms. Even on the big railroad stations Ukrainian peasants, women and children ask for bread. On his way from Kyiv to Odesa the consul was told about horrors of hunger in Ukraine, especially in Kyiv oblasts.

On January 24, 1934 DPU informed about report of Hetman's administration in Berlin about catastrophe of famine in Soviet Ukraine. P. 303: It is stated that while people died in Ukraine, the Soviet authorities transported grain abroad for export. Huge stocks of grain are kept in stocks for foreign revolutionary activity in case of war or internal unrests. P. 303-304: The Soviet power refuses from transporting grain from abroad for giving tit to the starving. P. 304: The famine was organized in Ukraine and the cossack lands of USSR to finally break any resistance

of population to the Communist system. The reasons for famine are solely political ones.

*Holodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukrajinі za dokumentamy HAD SBU:  
Anotovanyj dovidnyk. Lviv, 2010, pp. 277; 281; 303–304.*