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**THE UKRAINIAN
CANADIANS
AND THE WAR**

By **WATSON KIRKCONNELL**



**OXFORD PAMPHLETS
ON WORLD AFFAIRS**

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THE theme of this pamphlet is the heartening way in which the large Ukrainian community in Canada is supporting the country in the present war. National unity is a matter of vital concern, especially in a time of crisis, and it is reassuring to find the Ukrainian Canadians, despite their recent settlement and alien traditions, standing thus firmly by the side of their fellow Canadians. Their intense interest in the problem of Ukrainian nationalism in Eastern Europe is now well enough informed to realize that Adolf Hitler has no intention of fostering a free and independent Ukrainian state, and that the only hope of Ukrainian nationhood lies in a victory of the Allies. In spite of many inveterate political divisions amongst the Ukrainian Canadians, there is today a marked tendency for them to close their ranks, both for the sake of Canada and for the sake of the Ukrainian nationalist cause in Europe.

The author, a native of Ontario, was educated at Queen's and Oxford Universities, and is now Professor of Classics in United College, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg. He has been a close student of the foreign language press in Canada, and in a recent volume, *Canada, Europe, and Hitler* (Oxford Press, 1939), published a detailed survey of this press in its predominantly hostile attitude towards Hitler.

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THE UKRAINIAN CANADIANS AND THE WAR

ON September 9, 1939, the Parliament of Canada resolved by an overwhelming majority to declare war on Germany, in view of the latter's European aggression and its threat to liberty throughout the world. That decision has been duly endorsed by virtually every national group in the Dominion, including Canada's 300,000 Ukrainians, the largest and most dynamic of our Slavic nationalities. Inasmuch, however, as there have arisen in many quarters misgivings as to the sentiment of the Ukrainian Canadians, arising largely out of a misinterpretation of Ukrainian nationalist sentiment, it may not be amiss for an Anglo-Canadian to place on record what he conceives to be the interpretation of better informed Canadian circles.

In the first place, it needs to be kept in mind that the position of the Ukrainians in Canada in 1940 is fundamentally different from that in 1914. During the period from 1900 to 1914, the Ukrainians in Canada had increased by immigration from under 6,000 to over 100,000. They were thus new arrivals. Nearly all of them came from the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovina, and all men of military age had

received training in the Austrian army. Ukrainian national sentiment was as yet imperfectly realized amongst many of them, and these thought of themselves as "Austrians". As a result, there was a great deal of pro-Austrian (*not* pro-German) sentiment amongst them and several thousands of them (often as the result of rash utterances) found their way to Canadian internment camps.

The lapse of a quarter-century has changed all that. The peace treaties of 1919-20 severed all connection between Austria and the Ukrainian-speaking regions of Europe; and as a prelude to the present war, the pitifully truncated Austrian state was the victim of German aggression. Canada's Ukrainians have trebled in number, as a result not only of natural increase but of heavy post-war immigration. The newcomers had had experience of a brief Ukrainian national state in Europe and were intensely conscious of their Ukrainianism. This strong national sense, deepened by the European frustration of their statehood, spread likewise to the earlier arrivals and thousands of these came for the first time to realize that they were Ukrainians. With the passage of time, moreover, a second generation was growing up, which regarded itself as primarily Canadian although its background was Ukrainian.

The outbreak of a new War in September 1939 thus met with a Ukrainian reaction entirely different from that of 1914. From virtually every

Ukrainian organization in Canada, both lay and clerical, there came strongly worded resolutions of loyalty to Canada. Thousands of individuals wrote to Ottawa, offering their services in any capacity, and in the preliminary recruiting undertaken during the first six months the Ukrainians ranked high in the number of their volunteers. In Saskatchewan, for example, the Ukrainian enlistments, in proportion to population, were well above the Canadian average. The appeal of the Canadian Red Cross likewise met with a favourable response. Even a little Ukrainian settlement like Tolstoy, Manitoba, out of its slender resources, gave over \$170. Leaders of Ukrainian churches in Canada, both Catholic and Orthodox, were emphatic in commending the Canadian cause and in denouncing the lawless aggression of Hitler's Germany.

Ukrainian Nationalism

All this is very reassuring to any Canadian observers who had felt that Ukrainian nationalism had left little space in the Ukrainian heart for loyalty to Canada. Some had suggested that these men were Ukrainian nationalists first, Ukrainian party zealots second, Ukrainian sectarians third, and Canadians last, if at all. If this had been the case, and the Ukrainians in Canada had been regarding Canada simply as a convenient boarding-house from which to engineer political

programmes in Europe, then the extreme Anglo-Canadian patriot might have been justified in urging the elimination from our national life of so alien and unsympathetic a community. Happily this disastrous interpretation of Ukrainian sentiment is not justified. Those of the second generation, especially in the towns and cities, are coming to regard themselves as Canadian, and even the foreign-born nationalists have leaders who wisely realize that a Ukrainianism that had no primary loyalty to Canada would inevitably and justly forfeit the good will of all other Canadians and place the Ukrainians in an impossible position—the object of universal antipathy and resentment. The present wide-spread affirmations of Ukrainian loyalty to Canada are an abundant answer to suspicious pessimists.

Further explanation is necessary, however, in order to meet the critics of the Ukrainians. It is pointed out, for instance, that the number of Ukrainian newspapers in Canada, as well as the number of their subscribers, has almost doubled during the past fifteen years, while the German and Scandinavian newspapers in Canada, during the same period, have been losing ground, and Canada's 150,000 Dutch have today no newspaper at all and simply use the English-Canadian newspapers. The critics further point out that the Ukrainians in Canada are far more highly organized than any other group, in societies whose

aim is the perpetuation of their ancestral language and culture; and it is alleged that there are Ukrainian communities in the West which have not only refused to admit the government's youth training scheme but even (in the recent Federal election) to admit any candidates except extreme radicals to their community halls.

There are ample answers to all of these charges and insinuations. Take first the claim that Canadian political parties of the Right and Centre are viewed with hostility. In the election of March 1940, the one striking upset in Manitoba was the crushing defeat of Mr. A. A. Heaps (*Labour*) in North Winnipeg by Col. C. S. Booth (*Liberal*). Mr. Heaps had held the seat almost unchallenged for fifteen years, and the press had generally conceded his re-election as a certainty. The unexpected change came because the Ukrainians of the constituency, headed by a strong committee representing all of the non-Communist groups, transferred their weight of several thousand votes to the Liberal candidate in order to demonstrate their enthusiastic support of the Government's war policy. As for certain rural constituencies that have shown a hedgehog attitude, it will, I believe, be found that these are closely identified with the Farmer-Labour Temple Association, a small but vigorously organized Communist group, which is far from representative of the Ukrainians as a whole. As for the

marked increase in Ukrainian newspaper subscriptions, the post-war influx of Ukrainian population has been so great that the *per capita* number of subscriptions has actually decreased.

There remains to be considered a very definite and obvious nationalist spirit, which, within certain limits, is perfectly natural and perfectly legitimate. Its two main manifestations are (i) an attempt to preserve the language, culture, and traditions of the Ukraine, and (ii) an active interest in the political fate and future of the Ukrainians in Europe.

The effort to maintain a cultural tradition is worthy of praise. A Canadian of Ukrainian extraction is a better Canadian if he realizes that the stock from which he comes has a fine past, incorporated in literature, music, handicrafts, and religious faith. It will give him pride of origin, helping to restrain him from conduct unworthy of his people, and it will at the same time give him confidence in his own ability to accomplish worthy things. Knowledge of English is, of course, essential, and is in no danger of being neglected. On a continent where English is the speech of 130,000,000 people, the economic compulsion to acquire the dominant language is overwhelming. There was recently a *furere* among the Canadian French in the city of Montreal because the young Italian-Canadians were being permitted to begin English two grades earlier

than their French playmates and hence (it was alleged) would ultimately have an unfair advantage in the labour market. The gravest social risk is not that the children of minority groups such as the Ukrainian should fail to acquire English, but rather lest the change should be made so suddenly and completely that the second generation should be estranged from the first. Consequent scorn for the language and tradition of their parents would tend to break down those sanctions of authority and tradition by which the conduct of the youth is most effectively regulated. At the same time, new sanctions in the Anglo-Saxon tradition are not automatically acquired, and the second generation Ukrainian in Canada is in danger of becoming a social orphan, in a limbo between two traditions. In such conditions, the numerous cultural organizations of the Ukrainians in Canada can render invaluable service. The Institute Prosvita, the Shevchenko Society, the Kobzar Society, the Lesia Ukayinka Reading Society, the Shashkevich School, the Peter Mohyla Institute, the Michael Hrushevsky Institute, and many others, are all making an important contribution. Too much tribute cannot be paid also to the traditional churches of the Ukrainians, both Catholic and Orthodox, for their share in keeping the immigrant groups from being completely and disastrously uprooted in a new world.

The persistence of an intense political interest in the Ukrainian Question in Europe bears no such beneficent relationship to the social evolution of the Canadian nation, but it is a sentiment that is apparently inevitable. Most of the Ukrainians who came here after the last War were people who had lived through years of conflict. After centuries of suppression and obscurity, they had seemed, for two or three delirious years, to be on the verge of realizing statehood as a Ukrainian nation. Partly through fatal disunity among the Ukrainians themselves, they had seen that cup dashed from their lips. They thus came to Canada, burning with rage against their national enemies and broken into infuriated groups by the disunity of political parties in the Ukraine. In such circumstances, it would be a miracle if an intense national sentiment did not survive. One might as well have expected the first generation of United Empire Loyalists in Canada to lose interest in the cataclysm that had uprooted them and transferred them to a northern wilderness. Contact maintained with similarly intense Ukrainian groups in Poland and Russia helped to maintain the warmth of such feeling. Leaders of intellectual or revolutionary circles in Europe visited the Canadian communities from time to time amid much enthusiasm. Generous sums of Canadian money were sent systematically to Europe for such purposes as the relief of

Ukrainian war veterans in Poland. Even vaster sums were poured out for the assistance of the Carpatho-Ukraine during its brief existence in 1938-39. It is inevitable that Canadian foreign policy should be viewed by such men in the light of its possible effect on the Ukrainian Question overseas.

The War Fosters Unanimity

As has been already mentioned, forces of environment and historic accident had divided the European Ukrainians into disastrous factions, and these same cleavages had been perpetuated among the Canadian Ukrainians. The unfortunate Ukrainian nation has suffered virtually every possible form of divisive influence—religious, political, and ideological. There is a fundamental cleavage between the Catholic and the Orthodox churches, a cleavage as deep as that between the English Catholics and Protestants of the 16th century. There is war to the knife between monarchists (the supporters of the Hetman, Paul Skoropadsky) and republicans of various sorts, a conflict comparable to that between Cavaliers and Roundheads in 17th century England. There is bitter hostility between Communists and non-Communists. There is even a line of division between conscious Ukrainian nationalists and those numerous Ukrainians who have succumbed to the Tsars' century-old programme of Russifi-

cation and have come to regard themselves as Russians. These lines of cleavage have intersected each other in all directions, producing not two parties but several. All of these animosities have been carried over undiminished into the life of the Ukrainian community in Canada, splitting it into at least six or seven distinct factions.

These distinct groups have tended in this country to assume the following forms:

- (1) The Hetman Party (SHD), who espouse the cause of Hetman Paul Skoropadsky. This group appears to be strongest in Toronto.
- (2) The Ukrainian Nationalist Federation (UNO), with headquarters in Saskatoon. The nucleus of this faction is chiefly made up of veteran units of the Ukrainian republican armies of the period 1917-20. They are radical and republican, anti-Communist and anti-Monarchist. They have in the past given considerable assistance to a Ukrainian revolutionary organization in Europe, whose leader was first Col. Eugene Konowalec and is now Col. Andrew Melnyk.
- (3) The Brotherhood of Ukrainian Catholics (BUK), being the main lay organization of the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church in Canada. While the last federal census credits this church with 72 per cent. of the Ukrainians of Canada, the BUK has not

been as incisive a political force as are some of the smaller shock groups. It is loosely organized and leaves most cultural activities to the Church itself.

- (4) The Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (SUS), being the political counterpart of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church in Canada. A current press report credits this church with 200 parishes and 60,000 members. The significance of the League's name is that it repudiates all association with Ukrainian organizations abroad, claiming rather that its first duty is to perpetuate Ukrainian culture in Canada. It yields to no one, however, in its insistence on the importance of liberating the ethnographically Ukrainian areas of Europe. It is, on the whole, very well organized, with a large paid-up membership in men's groups, women's groups, and youth groups, and with an educational programme associated with the Peter Mohyla Institute in Saskatoon and the Michael Hrushevsky Institute in Edmonton.
- (5) The Ukrainian Labor-Farmer Temple Association (TURFD). This is the Communist organization among the Canadian Ukrainians. For many years, its leaders denied any such classification, but the Russo-Finnish

War brought them clearly into focus as worshippers of Moscow. This is quite the best financed and best organized of all the Ukrainian factions, with active youth groups, schools, choirs, orchestras, athletic clubs, travelling libraries, dramatics, lectures, workers' benefit organizations, and two newspapers (a daily and a weekly). It represents perhaps ten per cent. of the Canadian Ukrainians.

- (6) The League of Ukrainian Organizations (SUO), which began recently as a small anti-Moscow secession from the foregoing, but has now attained a New Democracy—C.C.F. metamorphosis.

It is obvious that any unity amongst such mutually hostile elements will be hard to achieve, and yet the existence of violent disharmonies is a serious obstacle not only to the Ukrainian ideal of national independence in Europe but also to the harmonious integration of the Ukrainians into the national life of Canada. Nevertheless, the conditions under which Canada entered the present war have tended to produce increasing unanimity of opinion. Thus, while Hitler's pose in the autumn of 1938 as the champion of suppressed nationalities in Europe had aroused the enthusiasm of virtually all of the non-Communist Ukrainians in Canada, his "double-cross" on the

Carpatho-Ukraine issue in March 1939 resulted in an exceedingly bitter revulsion of feeling. The outbreak of war thus brought amongst the Canadian Ukrainians an almost unanimous condemnation of Hitler's Germany. The appeal of His Majesty, King George VI, for the backing of his Canadian people brought an enthusiastic response from all the Canadian groups. Every one of the eight Ukrainian newspapers in Canada assured the government of loyal support in repulsing the Nazi aggressor. Quotations from one or two will suffice. For example, the *Ukrayinsky Visty* (Greek Catholic) of Edmonton declares:

“We, Canadian Ukrainians, as loyal subjects of Canada, await the command of our government and stand on guard for our fosterland Canada and the whole British Empire, by the side of other Canadian patriots. All our service—for the King, for Canada, and for the bright future of the invincible British Empire!” (September 5, 1939).

And the *Ukrayinsky Holos* (SUS) states:

“On behalf of the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League of Canada, we are happy to be able to assure everyone that all those many thousands of Canadian citizens of Ukrainian descent who are members or who are in sympathy with the League and its affiliated organizations . . . have never, at any time, wavered in their loyalty and devotion

to the British Crown or to Canada and in their faith in democratic institutions and that, therefore, all of them will without hesitation respond to the earnest appeal of their King and their Government and will faithfully serve and defend the vital interests of Canada and the British Empire side by side with other citizens by all means at their disposal and in every manner which may be demanded of them." (September 6, 1939.)

This point of view has since been consistently reiterated by all of these newspapers and political groups except the Communist ones. The latter executed a *volte-face* after the Russian invasion of Eastern Poland, and became still more anti-British after the Russian invasion of Finland. To the non-Communist majority, however, the issues of the present war are such as are helping not only to unite them with one another but also to develop the sense of friendly co-operation in a great cause along with their fellow-Canadians of other stocks.

The War a Canadian Issue

The leaders of Ukrainian thought in Canada realize, as do most Anglo-Canadians, that the victory of Nazi Germany would affect Canada directly and profoundly. In that event, we should face two probable alternatives. The first would be our active liability for paying part of a

crushing indemnity imposed on the British Empire (payable partly in forced tribute from our mines and our farms) together with possible loss of resources, compulsory immigration of European populations, and the occupation of Canada by German troops to supervise the fulfilment of treaty terms. The bayonets of the army contingent would almost certainly be reinforced by some of Herr Himmler's secret police; and we should have our own taste of the horrors of the Nazi concentration camp. Every attempt would be made to destroy all democratic organization in Canada and to rule the country either by a junta of German-Canadian Nazis or by a puppet government of Canadian fascists of the Montreal "blue-shirt" or Toronto "black-shirt" crews. Meanwhile, all Canadians overseas, both civilian and military, would be held in concentration camps in Germany or in conquered Britain as hostages for our good behaviour, and progressive steps would be taken to organize Canada permanently as a vassal state in the German world-empire. The alternative to all this would be a hasty union with the United States and an ignominious end to all ideas of a Canadian national life. We should scuttle out of the Empire in the hour of its extremity and leave our overseas hostages to their fate. Even in the United States, we should live in a state of siege, overshadowed by the possibility of ultimate conquest by the

masters of Europe's 500 million helots. Recent official reports to Congress by the American national advisory committee for aeronautics assert that within the next year or eighteen months bombing planes will be available that are capable of flying across the Atlantic and back without refueling. The impregnability of the Americas is disappearing before our eyes. It should be remembered, moreover, that while the United States is the richest single country in the world, it is one of the least prepared, in personnel, training, and equipment, for any great war. The same tardiness in preparation that is today so serious a handicap for the Allies is an even more disastrous handicap for the Americans. Canadians cannot afford to indulge in day-dreams of shelter behind a rosy legend of American invincibility. The Nazi ambitions are world-wide in their range, and if we lose in Europe, the likelihood is that in the long run the whole world will be lost to the Nazi aggressor.

The Character of Nazi Dynamism

The nature of the régime which now rules Germany and challenges the world has become increasingly evident during the past few years. It is not merely that very clear statements of Nazi policy and intent have been made by Hitler, Bause, Ley, Rosenberg, and the rest. Actions speak louder than words, and the deeds of Hitler's

Reich are loud in their confirmation of the régime's worst threats.

The movement which swept Hitler into power is a real revolution, seeking to destroy the values and institutions of the past and to replace them with values and institutions of a totally different character. The democratic liberalism which had made some entry into Germany with the Weimar Republic is contemptuously suppressed and reviled. Tolerance is dismissed as weakness, and is replaced by a fanatic racialism that is intolerant towards all non-Germanic races and nationalities. The Christian virtues of mercy, peace, and good will are denounced as slave ethics, and the young men of Germany are urged instead to be hard and merciless towards all other peoples. The truth of universal science is to be prostituted to the service of a nationalistic brothel as "German science", and law is reduced to "German law" and equated with "the will of the Fuehrer". Hitler denounces an intellectual education as demoralizing to the intrepid young savages of the Hitler Jugend, and insists rather that Germans shall "think with their blood".

The whole movement preaches "dynamism", a theory that there is virtue in action for its own sake, that the inheritance of the world must fall to nations that are ruthlessly and indomitably aggressive. Other nations, it is alleged, have had this dynamic quality in past history, due to an

injection of Aryan blood—but Greece and Rome have fallen, France and Britain are falling, and today only Nazi Germany has the requisite Aryan blood enabling it to achieve a world destiny that is at once creative and predatory. With that destiny in view, Hitler has been forging Germany into a terrific instrument of attack, and in order to create the necessary unanimity of spirit in the nation, he has employed the twin weapons of propaganda and fear. Thus Herr Goebbels' radio and press departments have been seeing to it that only the Nazis' poisoned and perverted version of current events is available to the German people. Foreign papers are not admitted, and listeners to foreign radio broadcasts are severely punished. An elaborate system of radio spies (*Funkwarte*) sees to it that such rules are not evaded. The schools and universities are likewise forced to contaminate the intellectual food of young Germany with the narcotics of falsified history and political philosophy. Those elements of the German nation that do not succumb to Herr Goebbels' campaign of infection are dealt with by Herr Himmler's secret police. Since Hitler's desperate achievement of power in 1933, all other political parties have been shattered and their leaders either murdered or consigned to concentration camps. Political and intellectual freedom have been strangled with hands of steel.

All this formidable preparation of the nation as a machine for attack looks to the domination of the world. "Trojan horses" have been sedulously built in all countries, in preparation for a time when these trained and organized agents of Hitler within the frontiers might effectively co-operate with a German onslaught from without. The thoroughness of this preparation has been strikingly revealed in the case of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Norway. Other countries are striving resolutely to cope with similar penetration. Even the United States faces evidence of the most resolute plans for the overthrow of democratic government in the U.S.A. and its replacement by a Nazified régime. The Third Reich is thus an insatiate revolutionary movement that is advancing stage by stage towards a mastery of the world.

Germany and the Ukraine

An independent Ukrainian state in Eastern Europe is the unconquerable hope of Ukrainians in Canada. The bearing of Hitler on that ideal for their fatherland is a question on which they have at last reached painful unanimity.

The original proposals in *Mein Kampf* were plain enough. It was proposed that Germany should appropriate for itself vast territories in Eastern Europe for the sustenance of a greatly

increased German population. Let me quote: "The right to acquire land and soil becomes a duty when without an extension of territory a great nation seems doomed to its downfall. This is especially the case when it concerns not some small hypothetical nation, but the Germanic Mother of all life, who has given the world of today its cultural impress. Germany must either be a world-power or will not exist at all. The future orientation of our foreign policy must be neither to the West nor to the South, but an eastern policy in the sense of gaining the necessary soil for our German people . . . Germany will see in the annihilation of France merely a means, not an end, so that thereafter our nation will at last achieve its possible expansion in another quarter. Today we number 80 millions in Europe. Our foreign policy will be recognized as right only when, in hardly a century, 250 million Germans will live on this continent, not crammed together as factory coolies but as peasants and workmen whose labour will reciprocally vouchsafe life to each other. . . . When we speak today of new land and soil in Europe, we can first of all think only of Russia and the border states subject to it." (*Mein Kampf*, pp. 740-767 *passim*.)

Hitler was not disturbed by the fact that the territories which he proposed, stage by stage, to seize and colonize with Germans were already populated by Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and Baltic peoples. His calmly astounding plan, as

quoted recently by Dr. Hermann Rauschning, is to remove these Slavic peoples, either by deportation or extermination:

“We are obliged to depopulate, as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. If you ask me what I mean by depopulation, I mean the removal of entire racial units. And that is what I intend to carry out—that, roughly, is my task. Nature is cruel and therefore we, too, may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the shedding of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin. . . . It will be one of the chief tasks of German statesmanship for all time to prevent, by every means in our power, the further increase of the Slav races. Natural instincts bid all living things not merely conquer their enemies, but also destroy them. In former days, it was the victor’s prerogative to destroy entire tribes, entire peoples.”

That Hitler meant literally what he said has been confirmed by his treatment of the population of the western provinces of Poland in the winter of 1939-40. With pitiless cruelty, millions of Poles were herded out of regions that had been Polish in population since the beginning of history and were left to perish in the frozen fields of Central Poland, without clothes, without money,

and without food. The Nazi régime has given an appalling first instalment of its projected occupation of the Slavic domain.

For about six months after the Munich Agreement of September 1938, the enduring reality of Hitler's anti-Slav programme was obscured by his temporary pose as champion of distressed nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe. Special encouragement was given the Volosin régime in the Carpatho-Ukraine, and few Ukrainians realized that they were being used as the despised pawns in a perfidious chess-game. Enthusiasm ran high among the non-Communist Canadian Ukrainians. Starting from the major premise that the Ukrainians of Europe were powerless to secure independence by their own efforts and that some external force must first shatter the frozen river of their national life before it could flow again, they added the minor premise that Hitler was prepared to apply that force, and so they deduced the desirability of such German intervention. It was not that they favoured the Nazi régime and its political ideals; on the contrary, they rather condemned its character; but they talked philosophically of being able in time, after Ukrainian national life had been organized, to throw off the overlordship of Germany and carry on as a completely sovereign state. A similar delusion as to Hitler's good faith in invoking nationality problems pre-

vailed in many quarters at that time, and even high circles in Britain were optimistic that all would be well. The dream faded to grim reality in March 1939, when Hitler occupied Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, and handed Subcarpathia over to Hungary. His subsequent treatment of Czechs and Poles leaves no doubt that no Slavic nationality can hope anything from him except brutal extirpation. Ukrainians know that Hitler will give them nothing but horror.

The Allies and the Ukraine

The ideals of the Allies have likewise been made unmistakably clear. Thus Mr. Chamberlain, speaking at Birmingham, February 24, 1940, stated: "We do not desire the destruction of any people. We are fighting to secure that the small nations of Europe shall henceforth live in security. We do not want domination for ourselves, nor do we covet anyone else's territory. We are fighting for the freedom of the individual conscience and for freedom in religion; we are fighting against persecution wherever it may be found." Incidental to this general declaration, Britain and France stand pledged to restore independence to the Czechs and the Poles and certain guarantees have been given to Roumania.

In all this, there is no specific word of the Ukrainian Question. This does not mean, however, that the Ukrainian Canadians have no hope

of the Allies giving aid to a Ukrainian struggle for freedom. It is indeed their last hope in a very dark hour. They realize that the liberation of the Ukraine is in harmony with the principles for which the Allies are fighting. They realize that any future stability in a New Europe after the war may well depend on a solid group of buffer states separating Germany from Russia. They are therefore confident that Britain and France will come to see the importance of the Ukrainian Question in any just and permanent settlement of Europe. Next to the Russians, the Ukrainians are the largest of the Slavic nations. Numbering nearly fifty millions, they occupy in Eastern Europe a rich, compact, and strategic area the size of France. As a strong nation-state, they would be a formidable factor in maintaining the equilibrium of the Continent. It is naturally argued that the Allies will feel an increasing interest in so vital an issue.

The more sober minds in the Ukrainian community realize, however, that the path to their ideal must be long and difficult. The great bulk of the territories that are linguistically Ukrainian are today controlled by Moscow, and the Allies are not likely to challenge voluntarily the additional weight of the Russian forces while they are locked in a life-and-death struggle with Nazi Germany. "One war at a time" has been Mr. Chamberlain's motto; for the loss of the fight

with Hitler would be the loss of everything. The campaign may ultimately spread to Eastern Europe, but at present the Allies are striving desperately to overtake Germany's head start in armaments. Any open declaration of war to free the Ukraine, moreover, would certainly lead at once to a wholesale Communist massacre of all those nationalist leaders in the Ukraine who might conceivably co-operate with a liberating force.

Another sobering consideration is the possibility that the absolute sovereignty of which most Ukrainians dream may be already outdated. The aggressiveness of the Third Reich has shown that nationalism for its own sake can be a devastating anachronism in a world that needs to co-operate or perish. The League of Nations failed largely because it was based on the assumption of absolute sovereignty for every member state; and much Allied thought today is looking forward to the need for smaller or larger federalisms, extending even to a partial United States of Europe. It may be that the Ukrainian vision of nationhood will need to adapt itself to this more advanced trend in world politics, and be content with autonomy in some great European federation with adjacent autonomous areas—Baltic, Polish and Balkan. To many thinkers the day is gone when any completely independent national states can hope to survive,

lying between the colossus of Russia and the giant of Germany, unless they form together a compact co-operative federal system, seeking mutual survival by mutual good will. It is significant that such profoundly different states as Britain and France have already achieved a complete co-ordination of their economic systems during the past six months, and that there is talk of maintaining this union after the war is over.

Many Ukrainian Canadians realize a still further difficulty, which affects themselves directly. Before the Allies ever espouse the cause of Ukrainian nationalism, they will need to be convinced of the capacity of the Ukrainians to maintain a stable and reasonably democratic government. They certainly will not take steps to set up an autonomous Ukraine if the net result is to be anarchy and civil war. In reaching an estimate of the present state of Ukrainian nationalism, they will be inevitably influenced by the behaviour of the Ukrainians abroad.

Canada is the one Allied country with a large Ukrainian population, and the opinion of the Canadian government regarding the Ukrainian Canadians is likely to have an important influence on the policies of the Allies. If these Slavic citizens of Canada show obvious appreciation of liberty and democracy here, and a willingness to co-operate in maintaining Canadian unity in a time of great national stress, it will all

be counted to them for righteousness when they plead the cause of their European kinfolk. If on the other hand they remain hopelessly disrupted by political dissension and if the chief characteristic of their nationalism seems to be hatred for other national groups, then they will do a fatal disservice to the cause they seek to serve, for they will persuade the Canadian nation that the Ukrainian has not yet reached political maturity. Many of their leaders realize that mere patriotic zealotry is not enough and that what distinguishes a mature nation from such peoples as the Afghans and the Berbers is not the fervour of its tribal consciousness but the capacity it can show for civilized political conduct and co-operative institutions and its ability to create and cherish a rich and satisfying national culture. As with the Irish Fenians in the United States during the 19th century, the importation of alien transatlantic feuds into the national life of our country could develop into an incurable ulcer, embittering our national experience and our international relations. It would be a tragedy for the Ukrainian cause if Canadians came to regard their Ukrainian fellow-citizens as incorrigible aliens, capable only of raw political sentiment and of malevolence towards other national groups. Fortunately this tragedy need not occur. While old pugnacities, transplanted from the bitter soil of Europe, have tenacious roots, yet they are being steadily

crowded out by the loyalties of a new land and by a political sagacity that sees the suicidal character of an Ishmael's lot.

Much hope may be placed in the Ukrainian Canadians of the second generation, fine young people who at their best feel that they are Canadians first and yet cherish at the same time a dream of Ukrainian liberty in Europe, not as an ancestral legacy of hate but as an ideal towards which, even in Canada, they can work by cultivating Ukrainian unity and developing a mature appreciation of Ukrainian culture. Whether out of the present war and the breaking of nations there can emerge an independent Ukraine in Europe, remains to be seen; but the Ukrainian Canadians feel that they can help towards that consummation by collaborating, in war as in peace, towards the unity and well-being of Canada.

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