UKRAINE AND POLICY OF THE ENTENTE

Arnold Margolin

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Translated from Russian
by V.P. Sokoloff 1976

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Contents

ADM (1877 - 1956)

I doubt whether Father had ever heard a wise man's admonition to his friends: "You do not have to finish the job, but you are not allowed to stop trying."

Philosophically, Father loved his fellow man. He spared no effort in improving the quality of life around him. With ebullient energy, benevolence and tact, he strove to bring different people together for their common good. In the ominous twilight of the czarist regime, in the decline and fall of the Russian Empire, in the horrors of civil wars, in the tedium and frustrations of the emigre's life, Arnold Davydovich Margolin never stopped trying. His writings are his heritage. Death need not be the end of his work.

Ukraine and Policy of the Entente was written in 1921, shortly after the collapse of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) and shortly before Father's emigration to the United States. It covers a particularly turbulent and important period of his life in Russia, Ukraine, and Western Europe. A lawyer and jurist, a social and political activist, a diplomat in the foreign service of the UNR, an able and experienced observer in positions of responsibility, he relates a multitude of hitherto poorly known or neglected facts and phases of the Ukrainian movement, of the civil wars in Ukraine, of the curiously varied attitudes of the European statesmen towards the Ukrainian problem. As an unbiased observer and partisan of the movement, he analyzes candidly the Ukrainian drive for independence, its recurrent successes and failures.

I wonder why, despite rising interest in the history of Eastern Europe, a book of such value and characterizations, so relevant to the history of Ukraine, has remained untranslated for so long a time. Its title is often included in bibliographies; a few selected passages have been translated into English, to suit the needs of the selectors; this is all. Was it because certain rigid organizations and individuals preferred it that way? Truth is perhaps too uncomfortable for too many narrow-minded people. And

why make it known now, with all its lights and shadows, as the author had meant it to be preserved for generations to come?

The growing intensity of ethnic feelings and demands of tribes, peoples, powers and superpowers compounds the already serious difficulties in any resolution of the burning economic, social and political problems of the world. As an unbiased observer and partisan of the Ukrainian movement, I ponder the future and remember the lesson, the tragic consequences of the UNR's inability to attain the ideals so ardently proclaimed, so bitterly contested—that inability to which the poor judgment of a victorious West contributed significantly in the wake of the First World War. Those who are still unaware that every man is indeed his brother's keeper may learn a great deal from this experience.

It is in this spirit that I undertook the publication of my father's book.

And last, but not least, I consider myself fortunate indeed that in presenting Father's book in English, the translation was carried out by Dr. V.P. Sokoloff, an excellent, intelligent and sensitive translator. To our editor, Mrs. Wendy Cookson, I owe my hearty thanks for advice and conscientious corrections in going over the manuscript.

—L.A. Margolena

Translator's Remarks

I have endeavored faithfully to reproduce the substance and form of the original. Any grooming of the aptly varied style, syntax and vocabulary of the author would be a disservice to the book.

In dealing with the generally clear and effective expression of the text, particular care was given to the few appropriately turgid passages, the occasional "raves," the humor, irony, drama, and the revolutionary bombast of certain documents so typical of the era.

I took the liberty of lifting nearly all the original footnotes out of the "cellar" right into the text where they belong. The appendices were similarly incorporated. The French of the memoranda was not translated.

The USBGN (Board of Geographical Names) system was used in transliteration of geographical names and proper names, as they appear in the Russian original. The only exceptions are names long naturalized in English, such as "Moscow" (Rus. Moskva). Selective Ukrainization, Polonization, Belorussization, etc. of certain names would have impaired the style and spirit of the original.

—V.P. Sokoloff
May 11, 1977

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PREFACE

The story of the Tower of Babel makes sense even today. When people no longer understand one another, when their common language is lost, coordinated work becomes impossible, let alone any constructive creative work. They cannot even live together as a single integrated society within the given political boundaries of the given state.

Intercommunication of peoples is the absolute prerequisite of their mutual understanding. The same applies to intercommunications of political parties, classes, nationalities within the same state, be it San Marino, the British Empire, Swiss Confederacy, Palestine, or the entire planet, as in some future world-wide federation of the five continents.

Social and ethnic extremism, on the part of different nationalities and groups was typical of the Second Russian Revolution and the subsequent decomposition of the Russian Empire after the First World War. The same extremisms accompanied every attempt at reconstruction of the fallen state or at its replacement by several newly conceived political configurations, and characteristically marked the dreams of total restoration among those who persisted in misunderstanding events that had already occurred.

Any common language would be out of the question in such circumstances. The multitude of political and ethnic groupings which had developed in the last fifteen years throughout the Russian state, of highly diversified structure, led inevitably to isolation in every one of the groups. Further growth of such legal "cloisterism" (kruzhkovshchina) could only deepen the breakdown of every mainstay of the society and state of Russia, as an immediate consequence of the First World War. Alongside this paralysis of the state's organism, its social forces were dissipated into a multitude of disconnected cells. Encased in their own ethnic or political shells, the people were unaware of what was happening under their very noses, in

their own cities, and houses—unaware of the ethnic or p)litical life of any other organization or nationality.

The enthronement of the bolsheviks was marked by total abolition of freedom of the oral or printed word and of any kind of unrestricted social intercommunication or travel. Disorganization of transport, posts and telegraph led to failure of intercommunications for a great majority of this population, one sixth of the world, and to their complete isolation from the rest.

There cannot be and is no basis at this time for definite conclusions or appraisals of this Bolshevist epoch and of the associated or concurrent phenomena, in view of the limitless chaos, disorganized tyranny and anarchy, and immensurable ignorance of what had actually transpired and is still going on.

On the other hand, there must be no delay in assembling the facts and recording the evidence of witnesses and eyewitnesses. As to those who were personally active in the political and social life of the epoch, it is their duty to record whatever they know, to preserve data to help in understanding of the Second Russian Revolution, the national movements of different ethnic groups, and the wide variety of recent phenomena.

The author of this book was close to the Ukrainian movement, beginning with the fall of 1917. He joined the Ukrainian Social-Federalists in June 1918. Indeed, for a long time before the Second Revolution, he had been in close and friendly contact with several Ukrainian social and political activists, many of whom were to have very important parts in the fate of Ukraine in later years. As one of the founders of the Jewish Territorial Organization in Russia (1906), the author regarded it his duty to combine his work, aimed at creation of a Jewish autonomous state, with participation in the Russian liberation movement and then, after the decomposition of Russia, in the building of the Ukrainian national state.

In the author's view this sort of combination, this synthesis of the national duty of a Jew to his own people and of his civic duty to the state in which he actually lives and has his civic rights, is the essence of modern Jewry.

The purpose of this book is presentation of first-hand facts which will help in understanding the Jewish-Ukrainian relations in recent years. Characterizations of certain important moments in the Ukrainian movement, of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, and of the principal Ukrainian political figures are presented concurrently, in relation to the main problem.

The author's personal participation in conferences between representatives of the Ukrainian movement and several political and social leading figures of the Entente, in Paris and London, was his opportunity to become acquainted with the general orientation of the Entente's policy in Eastern Europe.

Bernburg, a.S. July 1921.

CHAPTER I

Synagogue. Russian language. Ukrainian village. Pogroms and their image in Jewish psychology

> As soon as we brush against problems in which man is a participant and not an observer or investigator, as in art, ethics, or life itself, we run into a physiological barrier so difficult to cross, while keeping our original mind and blood unchanged, that we simply have to purge them, for the crossing, purge them of every vestige of the songs of our childhood, memories of our native fields, mountains, customs, or the entire order of things in our original environment.
>
> Gertsen, "Byloye i Dumy"
> (Bygone Days and Thoughts).
> Republished in 1921.

My vague recollections of the pogroms of 1881 are probably derivations from what I heard in my childhood from my parents, who saw the Kiev pogrom with their own eyes. I was four years old in 1881.

My early childhood passed in a patriarchal Jewish environment. Rules of the Jewish religion were scrupulously observed in our family and our home was "godly" indeed. Father often took me to synagogue. Is there a Jewish child who does not remember that synagogue garden or yard, where children met children, played and fought? Is there anyone of us who did not hear the abuse from Christian children, addressed to us, the "yids"?

Memories of the synagogue have stayed with me for a long time. Even now the mere sight of a synagogue, concrete and tangible, relates me to my people more closely than all the theories and laws of any personal-national autonomy. Alas! My children, born and raised in other conditions, do not understand these feelings.

My native language was Russian. Yiddish was often spoken in our home, but I was always addressed in Russian; I was accustomed to think and speak in Russian. The language made for my kinship with the Russian culture.

The very word "Ukrainian" was but an empty sound in my environment at that time. The term khokhol ("topknot") was known, but its meaning was not too clear. Khokhol was applied to servants, to country folks who brought milk and vegetables to the house, and others such as these. The term was incorrectly held the same as mouzhik ("peasant"), as distinct from katsap ("billy goat"), who was a carpenter, a drayman, a vendor of kvass, a man in some "unattached" occupation, a comer from the Russian territories.

I loved my native city, Kiev, from my earliest days, loved the Dnepr, the Ukrainian village with its housetops of straw, the cherry trees, and the golden yellow fields of the country. I preferred village life to temptations such as travel abroad or vacation in a dacha, even in my gymnasium years. For some time I studied Hebrew with Weisberg, a well-known journalist. The alphabet and a few words are nearly all that are left me from those lessons, to my regret. The venerable Weisberg visited me two or three times a week. I listened somehow to his lessons, but my attention was elsewhere: the school's curriculum; the assimilating influence of the gymnasium hikes over the wild slopes of the Tsarskiy Sad (Tsar's Garden), and in the beautiful vicinity of Kiev; boat rides on the river. Then came my enthusiasm for atheism and cosmopolitanism, my bar mitzvah at 13, and the end of my Hebrew studies.

And yet the late Weisberg's image is by me even now, as if he were alive. The image of the late Chubinskiy materializes next to that of Weisberg, P.P. Chubinskiy, the well-known Ukrainian activist and good friend of our family during my adolescence, was once exiled for his "khokholmania."

This was how the impressions from three different worlds were interwoven in my consciousness and subconsciousness: Jewish background and synagogue; Russian language and school; Ukrainian village and song . . . and I

was tossing in pain for a long time, trying to find a synthesis of these impressions and feelings . . .

I graduated at the University of Kiev and then, for about two years abroad, attended lectures on philosophy and criminal law. On my return to Kiev I became a practicing lawyer, mainly in criminal cases.

The case of the Gomel' pogrom, in which I was a junior attorney in the fall of 1904, was the turning point of my legal career. From then on I took part in the pogrom cases, as well as in agrarian and political processes, to the best of my capacity.

Among the purely criminal cases wherein Ukrainian peasants were characteristically involved, savage lynchings (samosudy) of horse thieves were common. Serious bodily injuries, often fatal, were common too, as revenge for misappropriation of land. Sharpened sticks, stakes or shafts, and occasionally pitchforks were the weapons employed in such ferocious retributions.

But in Jewish pogroms the peasants were mere looters after the fact. The real perpetrators of these crimes were the criminal elements of the city scum, the canaille, the socially undesirable. It was they who were physically responsible for the atrocious murders, tortures, rapes, demolition of houses and homes. That happened in Kishinev, Gomel', Smela, and elsewhere in the south of Russia, in the pogrom belt of October 1905, when the pogroms passed like a hurricane. Peasants from nearby towns and villages would appear on the scene only later, to steal whatever they could from the ruins.

During the pogrom in Kiev my flat was demolished too, far away as it was from the systematically pogromized district. It was proved afterwards that my name was included in the special proscription list of people to be killed and pillaged. That was the revenge of the local Black Hundred (Chernosotentsy) for my work in the Union of Equal Rights for Jews (Soyuz Polnopraviya Yevreyev) and in the Union of Unions (Soyuz Soyuzov). From a safe point I saw the burglars, led by a policeman, break into my flat. Their business was demolition and wholesale theft of my belongings, inasmuch as my family and I had gone into hiding

with friends, just in time. I was prosecuted for membership in the Union of Lawyers (Soyuz Advocatov) but ineffectually. After my indictment, based on Paragraph 126 of the Criminal Code, my case was dropped.

Gomel', Smela, Krolevets, Kiev, Nezhin, and on . . . . What time and work, what strength of soul and energy was spent in the defense of Jewish honor in these trials at courts! . . . And how clearly did the criminal hand of Pleve show in all of them, Pleve with his cohorts and disciples, the actual organizers of the pogroms . . .

But firm was our faith that pogroms would be impossible, once the czarist absolutism was overthrown . . . None of us, the investigators of the pogroms, would ever suspect how deeply the poison of government-planted anti-semitism and pogrom agitation had entered into the body of the people.

It was evident, just the same, that a long and difficult struggle with the old regime of Russia was still ahead.

Jewish masses began to emigrate to America in large numbers; they could hope no longer for better days in any foreseeable future. Jewish youth rushed to join the Zionist organization, the Bund, and other Jewish national parties developing at that time. A new stage of life and history of the Jewish people had begun after the Kishinev pogrom (1881).

The Zionist organization declared itself a political party at the Helsingfors (Helsinki) Congress. (This was a fatal error which led to confusion, a veritable mess of primitive ideas, with regard to the nature of political parties.) While the Zionist-Socialist-Democrats (Poalei Zion) took the shape of a political party and left the company of the others soon enough, the Zionist rank and file persisted as an agglomeration of persons with diametrically opposite views on politics, economics, and sociological problems.

In the meanwhile the movement of the Jewish people towards creation of their own national-territorial center had acquired so great a momentum that it simply could not be forced into the framework of any political party. It had become a national movement which would fit only a non-partisan organization or union.

Development of the socialist world outlook among the Jewish proletariat was favored particularly by the nascent Jewish socialist parties. The principles of socialism were easily assimilated by the proletariat, with naive trust, when presented in common Yiddish. Alongside this acceptance, national awareness was increasing among Jewish workers. The very fact of the self-contained existence of Jewish political parties (like the Ukrainian parties, Lithuanian parties, etc.) created political barriers between nationalities within one and the same state. The result was their political isolation from each other rather than their combination.

Only a minority of conscious Jewry escaped that turbulent flow, the current which carried the rest, broke the connections of the Jews with other nationalities, and made it impossible for them to participate in the common political life as members of the state-wide political parties. Concurrently, intensive stratification within Jewry itself was well underway. The fashionable Bauer-Springer theory, *the concept of sejm (congress), and national-personal* autonomy were becoming the basis of still another discretely political party. Although the Jewish Zionists-Socialists and the Jewish Socialists (the so-called sejmovtsy) did coalesce eventually, the net result was cloisterism and a further dissipation of effort.

The founders of the Bund regarded the Yiddish language as the means of global recruitment of the organized proletariat. But to me the Russian language was the proper tool for the struggle and defense of my people's rights from oppression by governmental agencies, in the courts and in the press, as well as the means of intercommunication of all the people living together. I believed that Switzerland was the ideal commonwealth of several nationalities in one and the same state and that political parties must be structured on such national-territorial premises.

In my view, strictly national objectives of any given nationality could be attained correctly and effectively through unions and organizations rather than political parties. The dispute between Jew-proletarian and "Jew-

burzhuy"[1] as to whether Yiddish or Hebrew must be taught at schools, was hardly necessary, inasmuch as protagonists of either of these languages can be found in either group.

I was becoming more and more aware that even the broadest personal-national autonomy was only a feeble surrogate of a healthy territorial base. I arrived at this territorialism not from Zionism, as Zangwill, Mandel'shtam and other of its progenitors did, but from the stark fact, the mass migration of Jews from Russia to America after the Kishinev pogrom. The fact of the "Great Resettlement of the Jewish Nation" was manifest: on the average, up to one hundred thousand Jews were leaving Russia annually.

It remained then only to find an uninhabited territory and direct the emigrational flow thereto, be it even a fraction of the total.

Together with the unforgettable M.E. Mandel'shtam, L.A. Lev, A.I. Lipets and L.G. Paperin, I became a founder of the Jewish Territorial Organization, and I have remained a member of the JTO continuously, from the day of its foundation to this day. The JTO program was to be implemented by the Jewish Emigration Society created by D.L. Iokhel'man. Alongside the practical aspects of the emigration, we were studying the suitability of different territories for the resettlement, such as Cyrenaica, Angola, Honduras, Mesopotamia, others . . . Palestine seemed problematic. The JTO decided also to continue its fundamental work, that is, regulation of emigration to America, in anticipation that emigration to Palestine would not become a mass movement, even under the most favorable circumstances.

Recent events in Palestine evoke pessimism and fear once again. Should this pessimism prove justifiable by the reality of the situation, the JTO will have to resume its search for thinly populated areas in the Americas for creation of the Jewish territorial-autonomous center.

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[1] I.e. "bourgeois", but vulgarized and semantically pejorated in the Russian revolutionary jargon. Tr.

CHAPTER II

Elections to the First Duma. Ukrainian peasantry. I.L. Shrag. Reaction begins. The "Kievan Echoes"

Elections to the First Duma gave me a broad opportunity for acquaintance with political attitudes of peasantry in the provinces (gubernii) of Chernigov and Kiev. Even if the provincial elections were in two stages (dvustepennyye) and by the estates (kurial'nyye), all three estates—peasants, burghers, landowners—were in direct contact with each other in the provincial electoral assembly.

It goes without saying that the land problem was foremost with the peasants. The People's Freedom Party (Narodnaya Svoboda) dominated the elections, because the First Duma was boycotted by the socialists. But even then the peasantry gravitated towards the nascent Laborite Group (Trudovaya Gruppa). As the result provincial elections proceeded on the basis of the bloc formed by the KD Party (Konstitutsionno-Demokratischeskaya) with the burghers' and the peasants' estates, joined by a minority of the landowners who were politically close to the KD.

In provinces where Jews were the majority of the burghers' estate, as in the southwest and northwest of Russia, that Parties-Estates bloc was amplified by the Equal Rights Union (Soyuz Polnopraviya), so that a certain proportion of the candidates on the ballot was allocated to Jews.

The number of Jewish electors was negligible in Chernigov province (5 Jews per 100 electors), and there was simply no place for a Jewish candidate on the slate, in line with the proportionality principle. But what actually happened was indeed a surprise. After the speeches at the pre-election meeting, a trial secret ballot was undertaken, a test of the Bloc's slate. All but one of the ten candidates (five KD's and five from the Peasant-Laborite group) re-

ceived the required majority of votes. By way of replacement of the rejected candidate, a KD, I too received the required majority. My pre-election speech was apparently a success with the peasants, the group which was responsible for my nomination, as I found out afterwards. This fact was a meaningful expression of the peasants' confidence in a Jew, as defender of their vital interests.

Nonetheless I declined my accidental candidacy and refused to run for election on the Chernigov slate, for I was already a candidate, one of the two nominated by the Equal Rights for Jews Union of Kiev province.

My candidacy was found to be particularly acceptable to the peasants at the elections' assembly in Kiev too. V.M. Chekhovskiy (the future Chairman of the Council of Ministers under the Ukrainian Directory) and I received more votes than any one of the fifteen candidates at the pre-election meeting.

In Kiev the administrative powers were not napping, however. Our electoral census in Cherkassy district was "clarified," so that neither of us could stand for the final elections. The peasants estate took the initiative in protesting that "clarification." The protest of the Provincial Electoral Assembly was sent to President of the Council of Ministers and eventually transmitted to the Duma.

The Duma was overloaded then by matters of high national importance and had no time for examination of the protest . . . Just the same, the protest retained its meaning and strength, as evidence of the Ukrainian peasantry relations to Ukrainian Jewry, a symbol of their friendly coexistence.

My personal and close friendship with Il'ya Lyudvigovich Shrag began at the time of the elections. He was a leader of the Ukrainian National Movement and Chairman of the Autonomists-Federalists fraction in the First Duma. The entire province of Chernigov knew and loved Shrag, "Father Shrag," as the peasants used to call him.

There were many reasons for such popularity. Straightforward and honest, Shrag never compromised in defending the rights of the oppressed, whoever they were. A gifted orator and experienced lawyer, he was irreplace-

able in the most responsible roles in district councils, as well as in urban work. No court trial of any consequence could proceed without his participation, in Chernigov province. But Shrag's true charisma was in his gentle character, his daily relations with people. Stern with himself, he forgave others all their petty trespasses, so common in ordinary life. He blasted only those who abused their power to harm the people. No snide remarks were ever heard from him on anyone; he had no envy whatsoever. The Shrag' home was famous for the hospitality of Shrag himself, his wife, and all his family. Many were his guests, from his nearest friends to his most virulent political enemies. In Jewish circles of the province the name of Shrag had the halo of righteousness and of the true friend of the Jewish people.

Indeed he was a righteous man, a true friend of the oppressed.

I also remember Vysoven', one of the peasant-electors of Chernigov province, self-taught and eventually a village teacher. Vysoven' had returned from his administrative exile not long before the elections, his back bent by what he had endured in Siberia, and by the calamities of the nation. I had to defend him later in court, in a case which involved storage of illegal literature. He was sentenced to a short incarceration in fortress. I was notified of his death shortly afterwards. And I still see his sad, intelligent eyes, his humped figure; I remember particularly his compassion for Jewish people, deprived of civil rights and in misery.

During the elections in Kiev I made the acquaintance of Baron F.R. Steingel. His first speech in the Duma dealt only with the Jewish problem. Steingel had a high interest and heartfelt concern for the destiny of the Jewish people throughout his active life. He was appointed Ambassador to Germany by Hetman Skoropadskiy and occupied that post until the Hetman was succeeded by the Directory.

Among the strikingly interesting electors "of the first draft" I should mention also V.M. Chekhovskiy and the priest Kramarenko, leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Cherkasy district (Uyezd).

Elections to the Second Duma were under a different set

of conditions. The government and the Right were trying to pressure the peasants. The joint pre-elections session of the three estates was prohibited in Kiev. All the peasant electors were invited to the Laura (monastery of the first rank) where they had to listen to militantly antisemitic propaganda by the Black Hundred. Some of the peasants allegedly swore that they would support the landowners and blackball every Jew. It developed, however, that they kept only the second part of that promise. They blackballed every rightist candidate as well as the two Jewish ones, L.E. Motskin and myself.[2] My census in Chernigov province had been "clarified" this time, and I took part only in the Kiev elections.

There was nothing remarkable about the elections to the Third Duma. The Law of June 3 delivered the majority of the votes directly into the hands of the landowners and so predetermined the results. The people lost interest in the elections[3] because neither of the first two Dumas was in session long enough to be effective and had nothing to show by way of fundamental reform.

Stolypin's evil reaction was on its way. Instead of the long-awaited reforms, repressions were coming thick and fast, political trials in courts, systematic persecution of Jews, their harassment in residence rights, etc.

Since the convocation of the First Duma, my political convictions had not been too different from the programs of the Laborite group and of the Peoples-Socialist party organized later. Officially I was not a member of either one, simply because they had no branches in Kiev. The "Kievan Echoes" (Kievskiye Otkliki), a newspaper, was the political center where my friends and people of similar views were meeting. The late I.V. Luchitskiy, V.V. Vodovozov and M.B. Ratner were there, as well as the well-known Ukrainian leaders N.P. Vasilenko and A.F. Salikovskiy. The newspaper staff included also C.P.

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[2] We received about 100 ballots out of the total of 215.

[3] I have met only one man who complained that the elections were too few and far between. He was the owner of an inn in Kozel'ts, who justified his exhorbitant charges for accommodations by the fact that the elections occur "only twice a year."

Ruzskiy, M.S. Mil'rud, M.S., Balabanov (temporary editor), N.V. Kalishevich, M.G. Gekhter, M.I. Eyshchiskin (eventually editor of the "Kievan Mysl'"). N.S. Mirkin, and others. We lived as friends, a tight, harmonious family, and had no idea that many of us were to go different ways in the future. We often travelled together down the Dnepr, more often than not to Shevchenko's grave in Kanev. My originally vague understanding of the Ukrainian problem was becoming clearer and my knowledge richer, thanks to the companionship of these friends in an atmosphere of mutual trust, representatives as we were of two different nationalities, but citizens of the same country sharing the same public life.

For a while I sought companionship with the KD party, because I shared with its left wing certain views of certain problems. Here I met D.N. Grigorovich-Barskiy, the late Vyazlov, Shol'p, and others. Grigorovich-Barskiy and I were eventually to work together on the Beilis case. But I did not stay very long with the KD as an associate, for there were too many disagreements with their program on my part, particularly because of the bookishness and detachment from reality which pervaded that party.

CHAPTER III

The Jewish Defense Committee in Lubny. Apogee of the Stolypin reaction. The Beilis case.

It happened in 1904-1908 that I had become specialized in pogrom cases, whether as the attorney for plaintiff Jews in civil cases, or as the attorney for defense of Jews defending themselves from pogroms. Once I was both plaintiff and witness, in the case of the Kiev pogrom. The case of the Lubny Committee for Self-Defense, tried in the Kiev Military District Court in 1908, merits particular attention among the multitude of trials of that sort.

Lubny was one of the few cities in Poltava province where no pogroms had occurred. The only reason for that was that G.K. Vzyatkov, the mayor, and the City Council had organized a Defense Committee well in advance. Proper measures were taken, watch posts established, antipogrom detachments activated, etc. As the result the Jews of Lubny were spared the terror of the pogrom.

Vzyatkov was the Committee's Chairman. The members were the Shemet brothers (founders of the Ukrainian Corn-Growers' Party), A.N. Levitskiy (eventually Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government during the Kamenets and Tarnov periods), Zhenzhurist (the tax inspector), Suprunenko, Lobasov (student), and others. Of the Jews I remember Ya.O. Kaganov, owner of the flour mill in Lubny. Names of the other Committee members escape my memory.

Just how the Attorney's Office (Prokurorskiy Nadzor) construed this preparation for the defense of the local Jewish population from pogroms as evidence of a conspiracy to overthrow the existing (rather the *then* existing) regime (Article 102 of the Criminal Code), passes all understanding even of us, the specialist lawyers.

I defended Vzyatkov, Lobasov, and Kaganov in that trial. The court sessions lasted for a whole month, because the prosecution attached the Socialists' case to the Committee's case, in a manner absurd beyond words. Almost all the Committee members were acquitted at the first session, inasmuch as the charges against them were found to be groundless. The organizers (Vzyatkov, Shemet, Levitskiy) were sentenced to negligible punishments. This verdict was appealed through channels and annulled after re-trial, which took two or three weeks of additional time.

In the meanwhile we, the lawyers for defense, had time to become acquainted closely with the defendants. We learned to love and admire the civic courage by which the city of Lubny was saved from destruction. If only all other cities had organized Defense Committees in time, like Lubny, the police would perhaps have had no chance to organize the pogroms.

The twilight of the reaction was changing to darkness. The glamorous political trials, legacies of the First Revolution, were over. The proud fighting call of the defense was heard for the last time at the trial of the Students Council of the University of Kiev. After that the defense began gradually to adapt itself to the composition of the courts. That was the time of the infamous persecutions of the Jews who did not use their names, as recorded in their birth certificates, but preferred to assume certain others (while Christians, named Petr, Pavel, Vladimir, for example, could pass themselves as Pierre, Paul, and Woldemar with perfect impunity), persecutions for the use of counterfeit graduation certificates, attestations of the estate on which the residence rights depended, and so on. The long, drab rigmarole, the epoch of the Third Duma, was dragging on.

Not much may be said about that era of social stagnation, nothing remarkable before the beginning of the World War.

And yet something did happen, a phenomenon dreary and ominous, the most infamous blot on the Russian system of state and justice, which absorbed me, flesh and blood, for three years, to the utmost exertion of all my

capacities, and shattered my once unbreakable health. I refer to the Beilis case.

Early in the spring of 1911 in Kiev there were rumors about the enigmatic murder of a boy, Andryusha Yushchinskiy. In our newspapers the item was flashed: the local Black Hundred, members of the "Two-Headed Eagle," saw indications of a ritual murder in the case. Yushchinskiy's mother and step-father were arrested as suspected murderers. Although the police were on the wrong track, the Yushchinskiy case was entirely forgotten for some time, as a matter of fact, as were the absurd rumors about its Jewish-ritual character.

The summer of 1911 in Kiev passed in feverish preparations for the solemn visit of the Tsar and his family, Stolypin, and every minister of the Empire to attend the unveiling of the monument to Alexander II. No one even suspected that hellish work was underway in the Black Hundred's underground.

The dedication solemnities were barely over when Bagrov's shot resounded in the city theater of Kiev. Stolypin died in a few days.

Soon after that, in August 1911, Mendel Beilis' wife visited me and said that her husband had been arrested and accused of the murder of Yushchinskiy. She asked me to assume the defense of her husband.

The Beilis case is still fresh in the memory of contemporaries. There is also the three-volume stenographic court record which offers a relatively complete view of the development of that case in judicial investigations, the prosecuting attorney's speeches, civic plaintiff's statements, and speeches for the defense, with only negligible and unimportant errors.

Nonetheless much has remained unknown to anyone, very much indeed, except to those who were very close to the case. Alongside the official preliminary investigations there were also private investigations to discover the real murderers of Yushchinskiy. A detailed account of the case, preserved in the documents, records, and memory, is long overdue. I assembled a vast body of data for this purpose. The archive was left in my flat in Petersburg,

unfortunately, when I had to leave everything there to the mercy of fate, in the spring of 1918, and to bring my family to Kiev by circuitous routes. I do not know even now what happened to my library and the archive, my greatest treasures.

When already abroad in 1919, I heard that Vera Cheberyak was executed by the Bolshevik firing squad in Kiev. The possibility of complete reconstruction of the murder of Yushchinskiy, in every detail, was buried with Cheberyak.

Her direct association with the murder was proved incontrovertibly by private investigations, but it was not possible to ascertain the lines which connect that nightmare with the Double Eagle's underground and with the other local and central organizations of the Black Hundred.

"Qui s'excuse, s'accuse," runs the French proverb. In every ritualistic trial, prior to the Beilis case, Jewry confined itself to defense of the accused, refutation of the evidence, and proof that the Jewish religion does not contain or permit any perverted fanatical sects capable of ritual murder. But the ignorant masses, exposed to the appropriate propaganda, remained in doubt regardless of the acquittals, wondering "if so, who was the murderer anyway?" And the acquitted defendent "was left under suspicion," to use the phrase of the times.

The crowd rejects the so-called "method of proof by exclusion." "Get the murderer, show him!", yells the street. For this reason I abandoned the stereotyped defense, from the very first day of my work on the Beilis case, and looked for the murderers. The accusation had to be countered by an offensive, not by defense. It was essential to find the murderers.

The path of action so chosen proved thorny indeed. As we know, Russian laws do not permit the defense to participate in the pre-trial investigations. One had to go against the current, on the whole, and travel companions are not easily found in such instances . . . More often than not I was all alone, in particularly dangerous circumstances, but I was always in accord with my own conscience. The interests of Jewry were dearer to me than all the con-

ventions of the profession. Least of all did I feel myself "an advocate" in this case. I tried only to do my duty, as a citizen and a Jew.

Because of my part in the Beilis case and of the various persecutions to which I was subjected, I received anonymous threatening letters and was forced to move from Kiev to Petersburg. Then came the punishment: my disbarment. The routine of my life was broken. My personal affairs kept me in Petersburg until 1918. I could visit Kiev only from time to time.

After the revolution, in May 1917, that disciplinary punishment was re-examined at the joint session of the Cassation and the First departments of the Senate. The Senate ruled that the Kiev Chamber of Justice had arrived at its decision improperly and by perversion of the facts. The Senate could find no professional infringement in my actions and no basis for the incrimination. The case was closed; my rights were restored. My investigation of Yushchinskiy's murder was declared to have been fully legitimate and proper, in my effort "to clean my people from the slander." Moreover, the Senate demanded explanation from those in the Kiev Chamber of Justice with regard to their perversion of facts and prejudicial attitude. Those who had judged and condemned me were to be judged themselves. But their trial never took place, because everything was swept away and scattered by the storms of revolution. And I too could not return to my profession as a lawyer.

One of my treasured recollections is associated with the Beilis case and happened early in the war. I was on my way from Kiev to Petersburg by train, and struck up a conversation with an old Jew in the aisle of the car. The old man was looking on and off into the compartment, where his place had been taken by a lady sprawled over the whole length of the divan. His feet were aching from standing and so he asked her courteously to let him sit down in his old place. Her reply, rough and ready, was to the effect that her husband was an officer fighting for his country, and that she had the right to travel in comfort. But when the old man tried to defend his right to the seat,

the lady screamed hysterically: "Ah, you Yid! You, Beilis!" The old man answered calmly: "And you, Madame, are the Cheberyachka."

The old Jew's retort showed that the private investigation of the Yushchinskiy case was not in vain. Jewry had a simple, direct, and definite answer to the faulty accusation.

CHAPTER IV

The Second Revolution begins. Conventions in June. Federation and nationalities problem. The fateful offensive

The circle of dedicated proponents of federation, as the essential form of the organization of Russia, developed in Petersburg one year in advance of the Revolution of 1917. Kiev was represented there by the late I.V. Luchitskiy, M.A. Slavinskiy (eventually Ukrainian Ambassador in Chechoslovakia), D.P. Ruzskiy, and myself. We decided then to lay the foundation of the All-Russian Radical-Democratic Party, with the aim of the reorganization of Russia as a federation. K.A. Matsiyevich (eventually Ukrainian Ambassador in Bucharest), V.E. Brunst (Deputy Minister of Agriculture under the Hetman), and others joined us later. But when the trial draft of the program was made I disagreed with the majority of the circle, mainly in regard to foreign policy, and withdrew from the organization committee of the Party.

The revolution began. Events were unfolding with extraordinary rapidity. I felt like going home to Kiev, and so went there in May 1917, with a definite assignment: under the slogan of federation, to attempt unification of the one-time Laborites with the Peoples'-Socialists. My friends and like-minded persons helped me to establish the base for the Peoples'-Socialists Party, the Kiev branch. And yet neither that party nor the Laborite group had any particular opportunity for growth in Kiev or in Ukraine, because of their All-Russian country-wide character and the prevalence of the regional nationality parties: Ukrainian, Jewish and Polish. On top of that the Peoples'-Socialists program was not left enough for the excited minds of the era. Our first meeting in Kiev (May 1917) was pedestrian for that reason, our speeches calm and business-like. The public

and particularly the youth were obviously bored by conscientious explanations of the meaning of federation and autonomy. In our discussion of the agrarian program, a mere mention of the necessary compensation of landowners for their land, be it only the cost-of-living minimum and only for a short time, led to grumbling and indignation.

I was not as embarrassed as my comrades by such responses. This was not the first time for me to go against the current, in company with a negligible minority. Nor was it to be the last . . .

After my return to Petersburg the Party's Organization Committee asked me to help with the convocation of the All-Russian Congress of the Peoples-Socialist party. That was the time of my frequent meetings with V.A. Myakotin and A.V. Peshekhonov, whom I shall never forget, regardless of all past and the possibly future divergence of our views and tactics.

The Committee asked me to present at the Congress a report on the organization of the state of Russia as a federation. A parallel report on the problem of nationalities was to be presented by A.F. Salikovskiy. The Congress accepted the theses of my report as the basis of the new program of the party. The merger of the Peoples-Socialists and the Laborite Group was implemented then and there on the basis of these same theses, into one single "Laborite-Peoples-Socialist party."

There are many interesting and instructive details in the preliminary negotiations of the two parties and in the merger itself, which help in understanding the era as well as certain characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia, such as its abstract and idealistic maximalism alongside total disregard of the characteristics of the environment in which the intelligentsia was reared.

We must not forget that in June 1917 Germany and Austria-Hungary were still regarded as powerful military states. No one could foresee then just how and which way the balance of the Great Powers would be tilted by the war, and what would happen to the old political map of Europe.

The Russian state also appeared to be still in one piece; its collapse and disintegration became inevitable only after the June offensive. They did not seem preordained prior to that. In such circumstances it was evident that any secession of a sizable part of Russia from the whole would assure the victory of the Central Powers and their annexation of the seceded part of the whole, as well as of any other parts of the country, depending on choice.

In utter disregard of this situation, speakers at the Laborite Congress (Shaskol'skiy, Bulat) and supporters of their theses (Vodovozov et al.) insisted on the right of self-determination for all nationalities, up to and including secession from Russia (more exactly, from Great Russia). A significant majority of the Laborite Congress was inclined to adopt that formula.

The same formula was accepted by an overwhelming majority of the All-Russian Social-Revolutionaries' Congress in Moscow at about the same time. Finally, a few days later, the Congress of Soviets adopted exactly the same resolution and demanded of the Provisional Government to proclaim officially the right of self-determination of all nationalities, even up to secession . . .

Quite the opposite, the Peoples'-Socialists rejected unanimously any maximalism of that sort as a solution of the nationalities problem, in full agreement with my report and that of A.F. Salikovskiy. The theses on the reorganization of the Russian state as a federation were adopted just as unanimously. To my regret, neither the minutes nor the resolutions of the Congress are available to me now. But I definitely remember that the resolution adopted by the Congress was motivated by urgency of administrative decentralization, side-by-side with the broadest satisfaction of the nationalities' drive towards autonomy.

The Laborites' and the Peoples'-Socialists' congresses were meeting concurrently and in buildings next to each other. This arrangement facilitated negotiation between the two congresses from the start, in the hope of a merger of the two parties. Cardinal issues were the agrarian problem and the rights of nationalities'. Agreement was

reached on the first one without any particular difficulties. But frictions and obstacles were many indeed in relation to the nationalities' rights vs the reorganization of Russia. The Laborites stood pat on that one and demanded from us acceptance of the formula of secession . . .

It was decided at last to elect the Accord Committee, with representatives of the two Congresses as speakers and with especially appointed persons. V.V. Vodovozov, a member of that committee, was particularly uncompromising. Every remark of Myakotin to the effect that Finland would take immediate advantage of the Laborite formula was countered by Vodovozov as emphatically as it was unconvincing: "The Finnish people will never do that, because Finns are not so stupid and not so base (sic!) as to secede from Russia."

The question naturally arose, Why did Vodovozov and his cohorts fight so ardently for their formula if they were so sure that even the Finns would make no use of it?

The Peoples'-Socialists showed more unanimity than the Laborites in this controversial issue. The latter group decided finally to compromise. Agreement was made then to the effect that every nationality was entitled to have a constituent assembly of its own, but that the ultimate decision on the reorganization of Russia was to be made only by the All-Russian Constitutent Assembly, the next and highest instance in the case.

Is it not remarkable that the future "separatists," Salikovskiy and myself, were against the secession formula at that time, while the Russian Social-Revolutionists and the Laborites, as well as the Congress of the Soviets were all for it?

But when life itself led the nationalities to the enforcement of their right to secede, when the body politic of Russia had actually disintegrated, the very same Russian Social-Revolutionists and Laborites and the very same delegates who once sat in the Congress of the Soviets, not only abandoned their former positions in the issue, but undertook decisively to oppose the nationalities' efforts to disassociate themselves from the universal chaos and

anarchy, to develop some kind of law and order, albeit only within their territorial limits, to establish their own independent existence as nations.

This was how the true nature of those people, the inner side of their character, ran opposite to the loud promises and slogans they had once proclaimed in all sincerity. Whoever may become engaged eventually in detailed studies of the psychology of the Russian intelligentsia in that period may find a great deal of interest in such discrepancy between the existing realities and the theories as to what that actuality ought to be.

The parties merged. In the same days of June, the Provisional Government decided to order the offensive. I remember the enthusiasm of our Congress as if it were today, in acclaiming that decision. My own forebodings were dark. They bordered on certainty that the offensive would be fatal for Russia and lead the country to utter calamity and collapse. However, it was not possible for me to make any statement to the Congress on this subject, to urge caution. My weak and lonely voice would be drowned in the general warlike spirit of the Congress; no matter what, the Government's decision was already a fact.

The June offensive led Russia to Tarnopol', Riga, and the triumph of Bolshevism. Anarchy was growing day-by-day while the disintegration of Russia was deepening. All hopes were centered now on the Constitutent Assembly. All summer and fall of 1917 were spent in preparation for that event.

CHAPTER V

Elections to Constitutent Assembly. Growth of Ukrainian national awareness. Constitutent Assembly dissolved by force

Our Party's Committee on Elections believed unreservedly that the elections to the Assembly must be universal, equal, direct, and by secret ballot. The main argument and the greatest doubt were on suitability of the proportionality system for the elections.

This system was opposed by the minority, consisting of Myakotin, Vodovozov and Bramson, insofar as I remember. All three represented the Laborite-People's Socialist Party. The minority proved to be right, as often happens when revolutionary enthusiasm runs high. On the other hand, the majority's decision pleased the innumerable groups and subgroups, products of the tight political compartmentalization of Russian society in those times. Every 50 or 100 voters (I forget the exact figure) had the right to present a slate of their own candidates.

Large cities and even entire provinces were the electoral districts.

In the Ukrainian provinces with their ethnically diversified populations, that sort of system yielded truly lamentable results, according to my observations.

The peasants and especially their women were simply dumbfounded on suddenly receiving ten to fifteen lists of candidates, as one may readily see . . . Every list contained ten or twenty names of persons whom nobody knew, as a rule, among the vast majority of rural voters.

These voters were dumbfounded still more when they looked at the Polish slates (in Polish) and at the several Jewish slates (in Yiddish). They could not figure out why the Poalei-Zion or the Jewish National Bloc was recommending its candidates to the villagers.

The SR (Social Revolutionists) were naturally the masters of the rural elections. In cities where Jewish populations were large it was the Zionists who had the situation well in hand. The peasants' drift towards agrarian maximalism was conducive to rural strength of the SR. Moreover this party had an old and well-deserved reputation in the country and enjoyed the full confidence of the peasants. As to the cities, the prominence of the Zionists was in line with nationalist maximalism of the Jewry who wanted "deputies of their own" in the Assembly, without any commitment whatsoever to any one of the All-Russian parties.

The Central Committee of the LPS (Laborite-People's Socialist) Party delegated me to canvass Chernigov province, the area of my regional candidacy on the party's slate. I was lucky enough to have covered fourteen electoral districts (out of the total fifteen) notwithstanding disorganization of the railways. I travelled in locomotives, tenders, corridors, freight cars. I spoke in cities and villages, lectured in synagogues, theaters, public squares, in contact with every class and stratum of the people. I learned to appraise the moods and tendencies of the province as a whole.

Soldiers quitting the front without leave, in huge numbers, were already calling themselves "Bolsheviks." When asked what it meant, they would always give the same stereotyped answer: "Bolshevism means no more fighting." They cursed Kerenskiy horribly, asserting that he and "his twelve ministers were all Yids."

They were enthusiastic about Lenin and Trotskiy. When I tried to tell them that Kerenskiy and "his twelve ministers" were not Jews, they did not believe me, adding occasionally that I too was a Yid and therefore stood up for Yids. When I tried once to compare Kerenskiy with Trotskiy and pointed out that it was Trotskiy who was of Jewish origin, the soldiers replied: "So what? He may be a Jew, but he is for peace; this means that he is one of us."

My collocutors supplemented their ideas occasionally as follows: "In case Lenin and Trotskiy betray us, we will string them up too . . .

It was still possible then to engage in argument and altercation with the bolsheviks. I was still able to make my audiences listen to my lectures by threatening to stop the lecture. The soldiers would cease nibbling at sunflower seeds and exchanging remarks with one another.

Peasants attended my lectures willingly. The vast majority of some 3000 at the meeting in Novo-Bykovo were peasants. Just before that meeting in the town square there was a consecration of the newly built school house at which I spoke by invitation from the priest.

In the square, a table served me for the rostrum, and I spoke from the table-top. The peasant audience was obviously bored as I explained autonomy, federation and other concepts, all of which were entirely alien to them, but when I came to the agrarian problem the peasants came to life. There were shouts of approval and satisfaction, as long as I dwelled on the party's program for the ownership of land. But grumbling and disapproval was the response as soon as I passed to remuneration of the present landowners, albeit at the very minimum (the Peshekhonov formula). Such was the invariable reaction wherever I spoke to the peasants.

In synagogues I was received warmly in every place. The Jewish population remembered my appearances in courts, in pogrom trials, the Beilis case and others.

But any adolescent, any gymnasium pupil could demolish all my arguments easily by pointing out that I was a candidate of an All-Russian and not of a Jewish party. The older generation tried to support me but were powerless.

This brings to mind the summer and fall of 1905, when I spoke in city and village synagogues in Kiev province, on behalf of the Equal Rights for Jews Union. I had to clash then with youngsters from the Bund, who saw the Union as merely a bourgeois venture; even anarchists showed up, as in Belaya Tserkov', where they broke up the meeting with pistol shots. Nonetheless I did find then a common language with my audience. In 1917, in the scorching atmosphere of political passions, we had no language in common.

I ran into a small pogrom in Novgorod-Seversk. After

my lecture at the theater I spoke at the synagogue in the evening. I was expecting the usual objections from Zionists and members of other Jewish parties, when someone rushed into the hall and shouted that a pogrom was underway in the square where the shops were. Everybody panicked, ran to windows and doors; the synagogue was empty in a minute.

It developed shortly that a warehouse with alcohol had been plundered by soldiers who got drunk, then began to plunder the shops in the square. The pogrom was indeed spontaneous, unpremeditated by the local authorities, and was easily and quickly stopped with the aid of several policemen or militiamen (I forget just how it happened that the police called at that time).

I visited Kiev before canvassing Chernigov province. The Central Rada's prestige was growing daily in the eyes of the population. The Ukrainian national movement seemed the best counterpoise of the progress of Bolshevism.

Inasmuch as there was kinship between the PS (Peoples' Socialist) and Ukrainian SF (Social Federalist) programs, I suggested a joint slate and a bloc of these two parties to their Central Committees in Kiev. The main issue of the day, i.e. the recognized need of the reorganization of Russia as a federation, was common to both of them. The bloc was agreed upon, with S.A. Yefremov and A.S. Zarudnyy as the slated candidates from the PS and the Ukrainian SF, respectively.

The same bloc was effectuated by my initiative also in Chernigov province, with I.L. Shrag as the SF Candidate and myself as the candidate of the LPS.

This was the first and unfortunately the only experiment in rapproachement and intercommunication between an All-Russian and a Ukrainian political party.

Defects of the proportionality system, unsuited as it was to Russian realities of the time, were showing in every stage. I remember the depressing telegram from Kremenchug in the newspapers, reporting a contest between the Jewish and Christian slates . . . "The Jewish slate wins" was the end of the telegram. It looked as if the elections to the

Constitutent Assembly were the arena for struggles between nationalities rather than political parties . . . But any parliament as an organ of the state's body-politic, stands for community of the state's destinies, for peaceful coexistence of all peoples who live in the state. As to the special problems of any given nationality, they have to be dealt with by that nationality's conventions or the sejms . . .

A decisive electoral victory of the SR (Social Revolutionists) was predictable from the start. It was evident also that the Bolsheviks would receive many votes, under the influence of soldiers returning from the front.

But no one could have possibly imagined beforehand the astonishing success of the Ukrainian SR. The Russian SR slate was headed by Breshko-Breshkovskaya herself, "the grandmother of the Russian Revolution." On the other hand the Ukrainian SR slate featured youngsters in their early twenties. This was the age of N.I. Shrag too, son of the Central Rada's deputy chairman, I.L. Shrag. Nine out of the fourteen seats allotted to the province were won by the Ukrainian SR, one by the Russian SR, four by the bolsheviks. As to the rest of the slates (including Polish, Jewish, KD, ours, Social-Democrats), not a single one collected enough votes even for one mandate to the Assembly. Old Man Shrag and both our parties proved too moderate this time . . . Such was the lot of our party in practically every province. In the whole of Russia only two members of the Laborites-Peoples' Socialist Party were elected. The peasantry soon forgot the Laborites, so amply represented in the First and the Second Dumas . . . And it had only a vague notion of the Peoples' Socialists, who had had a fraction of their own in the Second Duma . . .

The peasantry also showed the same preference for the Ukrainian slates in the provinces of Kiev, Volyn', Podol'sk and Poltava, as shown by the exact data I had. An overwhelming majority of the votes everywhere was given to the Ukrainian Social-Revolutionists.

As to the Jewish national slates, the outcome of the elections was predetermined entirely by the size of the Jewish

population in the given province. Consequently it was evident from the start that there were not enough Jewish votes in Chernigov province to gain even a single mandate to the Assembly. Just the same, three Jewish slates were presented at the elections (National, Poalei-Zion, and United Group). The Bund was voting in a bloc with the Russian Social-Democratic Party, however.

The immense, legendary growth of national awareness among the Ukrainian peasantry was evident to everybody. A simple attendance at the peasants' pre-election gathering was sufficient for us, the intelligentsia, to understand how little we knew the people among whom we lived, how vague was our orientation in the native tongue of that people.

I took the data on the elections to Petersburg and made the Party's Central Committee acquainted with situations and moods in Ukraine. The end of December passed in apprehension of the imminent dissolution of the Constitutent Assembly by force, which was stubbornly discussed even then. In vain I tried to persuade our Committee to transfer the work of our party to Kiev, as well as the work of all other parties in opposition to bolshevism.

All my suggestions for convocation of the Assembly in Kiev were just as futile. M.V. Berenshtam was the only member of our Committee who also favored that move, if I were not mistaken, and continued to do so even after the Assembly was dissolved by force. I still believe that had the Assembly met in Kiev or some other city within the Rada's jurisdiction, Kiev would have become at once the center from which the organization of federalized Russia of the future could be undertaken and not only the organization of Ukraine.

Came the day of opening of the Constituent Assembly. Immense crowds dammed every street leading to the Tauridian Palace. Our committee was in the vanguard of the procession moving down Liteynyy Prospect. The peaceful character of the manifestation was self-evident. Suddenly shots were fired at the intersection with Spasskaya Street . . . They were sniping from roofs and garrets . . . Somebody from our vanguard fell . . . Others

were killed or wounded . . . Further movement of the procession was out of question. It could lead only to more useless victims . . . We went home . . .

The Constituent Assembly was scattered like dust, disintegrated. This "Master of the Land of Russia," which was to rebuild the quondam Russian state on new foundations, ceased to be. A "federation from the summit down" had already become unrealizable fantasy; decomposition of the empire was too far gone. I saw the urgency, under the circumstances, to fortify the nascent discrete states, in places not yet fully involved in the bolshevist chaos and anarchy and which still retained sufficient latent health for the reinstitution of law and order. I believed that it would be reasonable for the Ukrainian leaders to undertake the isolation of Ukraine from Russia, once the Soviet government seized power, so as to protect Ukraine from the fate which the Soviet government was preparing for the rest of the country.

The 9th (22nd) of January, the day when independence and sovereignty of Ukraine were proclaimed by the Central Rada, was predetermined and provoked by the 5th (18th) of January, the day when the Constituent Assembly was dissolved by force. So did the disastrous June Offensive predetermine the Brest-Litovsk Peace, concluded on the 9th (22nd) of February.

Such were my thoughts while I returning to Kiev once again in the middle of February, fully aware of the futility of staying in Petersburg, as well as of the opportunity for political and social work in my native city. Between Moscow and Kiev we saw multitudes of trains at every railway station, packed with bolshevist soldiers fleeing from Kiev. Only a few were still "unevacuated" in Kiev when I arrived. German and Ukrainian troops entered Kiev in a few days.

CHAPTER VI

Central Rada. Grushevskiy. Assimilator Jews and nationally-aware Jewry. The masses

The current political juncture was most unfavorable for the bulk of the Russian territories that fell to the Bolsheviks for torture and ruination. The same juncture, however, afforded every reason and guarantee for law and order as well as the territorial integrity of Ukraine, as it became evident in my very first days in Kiev. It seemed to me that every available strength, every nationality in Ukraine must be enlisted in building the Ukrainian state.

"Through independence to federation" was the only possible program for a gradual reconstruction of the former Russian state as a federation, under the circumstances of the times. This was the path visualized by mature and authoritative leaders of the Ukrainian movement and was the program adopted by most of the Ukrainian political parties. Unfortunately the Russian parties and some of the Jewish national ones continued obtusely to maintain their former theoretically structured attitudes with regard to the organization of Russia, dismissing the fact that Ukraine was at that time already in existence as a discrete state.

Not parties but nations were contending in the Central Rada and this was the anomaly of the situation. There appeared to be two fronts: the Ukrainian, composed of all of the Ukrainian parties, and the anti-Ukrainian, which included the Russian Social-Revolutionists, Social Democrats, People's Socialists, the Bund and others. True, the Zionists and the Volkspartei remained consistently neutral and the Poles behaved ambiguously. Nonetheless the over-all impression was that the very fact of existence of the Ukrainian state was regarded from diametrically opposite sides by the two camps, as here named.

I came therefore to believe that any "branches" of all-Russian parties and establishments must be disestablished in the Ukrainian territory, to be replaced either by all-Ukrainian territorial-national parties[4] or merged with their already established Ukrainian analogues. I believed also that the Ukrainian parties must be reorganized by conversion from their originally ethnic basis to the Ukrainian national basis of the State.[5]

The majority of the LPS Regional Central Committee disagreed with me. They recommended instead to change the committee's name from "Regional" to "All-Ukrainian." We were split on this issue. The minority, my supporters, decided to wait for the Regional Conference, which was delayed in assembling and was opened only in June. As it happened, the Conference supported the majority view of the Committee, whereupon my supporters and I resigned from the LPS party.

My propaganda on behalf of the reorganization of the Ukrainian parties had met with a measure of success. The leaders of the Ukrainian SFs admitted, without hesitation, that state-wide parties must exist in the Ukrainian state. The May conference of the Ukrainian SF sanctioned this reorganization by resolving that persons of any nationality resident in Ukraine might join the SF Party.

The Ukrainian SF was very much like the LPS. S.A. Yefremov, A.F. Salikovskiy and A.N. Shul'gin were contributors to the "Russkoye Bogatstvo." It was permissible to belong to both of these parties at the same time. A.F. Salikovskiy, for example, was concurrently a member of the SF and the LPS, worked creatively in both of them, personifying, so to speak, their spiritual kinship.

Late in June, N.P. Slivko, Dr. Malis, A.A. Blankenstein, and I, all of whom had resigned from the LPS, joined the All-Ukrainian SF Party. This was the first step in the political rapproachment of Ukrainians and other nationalities residing in Ukraine, the beginning of their work in common.

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[4] Of Ukrainian citizens of Russian nationality? Tr.

[5] I.e. to include Ukrainian citizens of any nationality. Tr.

I had discussed that same problem, the reorganization of the nationalities' parties in Ukraine, with M.S. Grushvskiy even back in March. We used to meet earlier, in a tight circle of socially active people in Kiev, participants in the liberation movement.[6] I had no doubt that Grushevskiy would share my considerations regarding the need of broadening the narrow and air-tight cubicles to which the Ukrainian national-political movement was still confined.

I was not disappointed; Grushevskiy, with his intelligent and quick grasp of any idea, understood and immediately agreed with me. But he was so over-loaded with work for the Central Rada that he simply could find no time for promulgation of the reform of the party structures.

The other Ukrainian parties would undoubtedly have welcomed at that time, members of any and all nationalities resident in Ukraine. My friends and I were only the first swallows, however, the kind that do not make the spring, as everybody knows . . . No one but us was knocking on those doors . . .

In my view, community of political life was a matter of vital necessity for the Jewish population of Ukraine, regardless of general considerations on the development of intercommunication and cooperation between the nationalities in Ukraine. Compartmentalization and isolated existence of the Jewish parties were responsible for misapprehensions as to the real attitudes of the nationally-aware Jewry to the Ukrainian problem. In Central Rada it was always Sklovskiy and Balabanov who spoke on behalf of the Russian SR and the Russian SD, respectively; beginning in May, Gombarg spoke for the LPS . . .

The Bund, as represented by Rafes, stood in opposition to the bloc of the Ukrainian parties. The broad Ukrainian audience could not understand that Sklovskiy, Balabanov

[6] This circle was non-partisan, politically. It was there that I met D.I. Doroshenko, the future Minister of Foreign Affairs. D.N. Grigorovich-Barskiy and V.V. Ulyanitskiy, both lawyers and professionally my very good Friends, were then likewise members of the same circle.

and Gombarg spoke for the All-Russian parties but not as representatives of Jewry . . .

On the other hand, Zionists, Volkspartei and the "unifiers" assumed an altogether too cautious and neutralist line of behavior in the Rada, despite their friendly and supportive feelings about the Ukrainian movement, to the point that the overall fundamental impression remained as it was, namely: Jews and Ukrainians fighting each other.

The truth was in the split of Jewry into two camps, from the moment of proclamation of the independence of Ukraine. The assimilator Jews obviously had no sympathy and were in opposition to the very idea of Ukrainian independence as a discrete state. The nationally-aware Jewry, on the contrary, particularly Zionists and Territorialists, striving for creation of a Jewish national state, could only sympathize with similar strivings of the Ukrainian people. It was a dire misfortune that the assimilator Jews, a negligible minority of Jewry, were leaders of the Russian groupings. In this capacity they were making appearances at all times and everywhere, as centers of general attention. Leaders of Jewish political parties, on the contrary, operated almost exclusively in their narrowly circumscribed milieu, so that their stance on the Ukrainian problem remained unknown to the general public, or at best not entirely clear.

The common error with regard to the involvement of Jewry in bolshevism, shared only too often, even by well-educated and thoughtful circles, was due to that particular self-confinement of the Jewish political parties. The entire literate world learned instantly about every appearance of Trotskiy. But speeches by leaders of the Jewish national parties, at Jewish meetings and conferences, were rarely heard outside the pale of Jewry.

Gertsen's words about nationalities' problems come to mind: "Exclusive feelings of nationality never lead to anything good . . . " (A.I. Gertsen, Byloye i Dumy, V.I., p. 40, 1921).

The ordinary citizen finds it difficult to follow the quick sequence of events which lead to shattering and demoli-

tion of old established ideas and habits. As in the German proverb, "der Wunsch ist der Vater des Gedankens." There is also a still more apt one, "privýchka vtoráya natúra" ("habit—the second nature"). Desires, strivings, tastes of people depend significantly upon the complex of their habits. The same, plus the instincts of imitation and gregariousness, accounts for difficulties in the assimilation of change by the average citizen, particularly a townsman. Such citizens had always thought the Ukrainian language was but a village dialect used by moujiks. Inhabitants of the cities of France, raised in the culture and language of Rome, when the territory of modern France was a part of the great Roman Empire, had a similar idea about the language of the countryfolk. And who could believe then, or foresee, that new states and cultures would arise from the ruins of the Roman state and culture? Who could expect then that the barbarian inhabitants of the British Isles would become the nation which gave Shakespeare to mankind?

Lutetia became Paris and many things have changed under the sun. So parochial, so unconvincing are all discourses, such as "Ukraine cannot exist without Russia," that "Russia cannot exist without the Black Sea" . . .

The point is whether it is desirable for Ukraine to be entirely apart from its neighbors—Russia, Belorussia, Don and others—or whether it will become necessary in time to organize all parts of Eastern Europe as a customs union or confederacy, an economic whole, because of their mutual economic interests.

The Ukrainian language used to be a favorite subject for all kinds of jokes among the city or townsfolk. And I remember sneers at the Yiddish. I sensed clearly the humiliation and pain of proud Ukrainians when their language was mocked and abused . . .

The joke-cracking abusers of the Ukrainian language were blissfully unaware of their own ignorance, in their bona fide belief that "automobile," for example, was a Russian word and samoper ("self-pusher") was genuinely Ukrainian. It never occurred to them that Ukrainians have just as much right to use "automobile" and

akusherka ("accoucheuse") as the Russians had the right to adopt these words in their language.

The man in the street treated the serious problem of language as a comedy, a farce. The result was a worsening of interrelations with those to whom the Ukrainian language was a precious symbol. Hence the anger and indignation of certain Ukrainian youth circles and hot heads then undergoing the first ecstasy of their national renascence, their awakening from a long slumber, who could not approach the subject with the requisite understanding and calm. Therein lay the roots of the saddening excesses which were eventually permitted with regard to the Russian language, rewriting the street signs, etc.

The parochial tactlessness of ordinary citizens had no consideration for the ears of servants who were village folks, as a rule. That sort of scoffing at their native language could not endear the master to the servant . . . Gapka, a country girl, suffered fully as much from such talk as Yankel', a local cabby, when he heard his fares make fun of Jewish customs, language, etc.

Those who had assigned themselves to the educated classes were continuously droning the stereotype to the effect that they recognized Shevchenko and his Malorossian language but rejected the alien and unintelligible Galician dialect, "in which the newspapers are published nowadays."

I arrived at the opposite conclusion somewhat later, on a closer acquaintance with the Ukrainian language.

The language of Shevchenko proved far more difficult for me than that in the newspapers of Kiev and L'vov, the language spoken in Dneprovian and Galician Ukrainian villages.

On the whole, language and culture develop and spread by means of a highly intricate process which cannot easily be accounted for and controlled. This development is not at all determined by the size or military might of the state. Goethe and Schiller were writing before the unified German empire came into being. "Bertha," the long-range cannon, and the most powerful tank are carriers of destruction and death, not culture.

CHAPTER VII

Ukrainian Supreme Court. Ukrainian language. Political figures. Ukrainian State Senate

Pravitel'stvuyushchiy Senate, the Supreme Court of the Russian Empire, was factually abolished by the Bolsheviks. Ukraine was proclaimed a separate body politic. Creation of a high court of appeals, the Ukrainian Supreme Court, became a necessity.

Members of that judicially supreme institution were to be elected by the Central Rada. The first nominees were the very same members of the Kiev District Court and Kiev Chamber of Justice whose steadfastness and liberalism had been well recognized in the Shcheglovitov era. Three of them—Achkasov, Radchenko and Butovskiy—had had enough civic courage in the Beilis case to protest and dissent from the resolution to disbar me. Under Shcheglovitov disbarment was the same as disgrace and the end of a career, in the sense of no advancement in the service. The three were elected by a vast majority of the Rada. Others elected at the same time were Shelukhin and Shiyanov, well-known, politically active Ukrainians from the Odessa Court district; Khvostov, attorney-at-law from Moscow and Khrutskiy. This original inner group was made responsible for subsequent nominations, although the official initiative in choice of the candidates was delegated to the political parties represented in the Rada.

My candidacy for the Supreme Court membership was proposed to the Rada by the Committee of the All-Russian People's Socialist Labor Party (of which I was still a member) and seconded by every one of the Ukrainian parties. The elections were held April 2, 1918. Professor Bogdan Kistyakovskiy, N.P. Vasilenko, P.V. Yatsenko and I were elected by secret ballot.

There was no antisemitism at all in the Rada, judging by the votes I received, and judging by the names and the reputations of the newly elected members of the Court, there was a promise of implanting true justice in Ukraine. Thereupon the Rada nominated Greifenturn, a well-known civil lawyer, one time member of the Kiev Chamber of Justice and Deputy Procurer-General at the Imperial Senate, a brave and steadfast jurist who had dissented too with regard to the disciplinary action against me, in connection with the Beilis case. Greifenturn's appointment became effective only under the Skoropadskiy regime, on the receipt of his consent from Petersburg. Greifenturn was sick on his arrival in Kiev and died shortly after.

I pause here on the history of these elections because it is poorly known or forgotten by the general public, characteristic and highly significant as it is.

We elected N.I. Radchenko president of the Supreme Court.

I was enrolled as criminologist in the Criminal Appeals Department. All three departments of the Court (Administrative, Civil, Criminal) were already in session by May. Pending acquisition of our own quarters, the sessions were held temporarily in the Kiev Chamber of Justice, the same building where I used to appear so often as an attorney, and where I had to pass through a great deal afterwards . . .

Among the members of the Supreme Court as initially constituted, I was then the only one without knowledge of the Ukrainian language. And when, still earlier, I had to file the statement of consent to my candidacy (for such was the rule), I was very embarrassed by that circumstance and informed the electors in advance about my lack of knowledge of the language. The answer was to the effect that I could make reports and write decisions in Russian during the first six months or even one year, i.e. during the period sufficient for me to acquire to adequate knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

Indeed, there were no further obstacles for me from there on. My reports were made and my decisions written

in Russian up to the inauguration of the Senate, when our Supreme Court (General'nvy sud) was re-named State Senate (Derzhavnyy Senat) under the Hetman Skoropadskiy regime.

In April and May 1918, I took instruction in Ukrainian and shortly realized how rich and flexible that language is. Scientific terminology remained to be worked out, of course. This was a particularly sensitive subject in civil law, with its multitude of terms, every one of which must be defined rigorously to suit its generally accepted and strictly delimited meaning. The problem was simpler by far in criminal law, material as well as procedural, as its terminology was neither superabundant nor excessively complicated.

General sessions of the Supreme Court were quite frequent. A great deal of work had to be done, organizational as well as purely judicial.[7] The Ministry of Justice was working feverishly at the same time, organizing translation committees to render the laws in Ukrainian. Pending development of Ukrainian legislation, the Russian Imperial laws were recognized as effective, together with all their recent amendments and novellae by the provisional governments, insofar as they did not contradict the new order of the Ukrainian state.

All of us, all judges of the first draft, will remember forever our joint work under pressure and the friendly relations which developed between members of the Supreme Court.

The Attorney General's office (Procurorskiy nadzor), represented by Markovich, Ukrainian jurist and writer (now deceased), Vyazlov, once member of the First Imperial Duma (now deceased), and Tikhomirov, an able and knowledgeable jurist, were members of one closely knit

[7] *Note:* To those who deny the existence of Ukrainian as an independent language, we recommend acquaintance with the Note of the Imperial Academy of Sciences (*Zapiska Imperatorskoy Akademii Mauk*) of February 20, 1906. The Academy proves that the Ukrainian language is by no means a dialect of Russian but is a discrete Slavic language, even as the Ukrainian nation (narod) is not a branch of the Russian but an independent Slavic nationality (narodnost'). ADM.

family, together with us. There was no dissonance whatsoever in the fact that they all spoke in Ukrainian and I, the sole exception, spoke to them in Russian . . . I was already sufficiently familiar with the Ukrainian language to understand it in full. Ukrainian, as spoken by S.P. Shelukhin, a fiery orator, and one of the best connoisseurs of the language, was particularly beautiful.

Our close companionship was doing its job; mutual understanding, mutual trust, heartfelt sympathies were growing.

Specialists in Ukrainian on the Court's Chancery staff were obligingly translating my resolutions into Ukrainian.

Yet the language problem remained my personal struggle, as for anyone accustomed to speak, write and think only in Russian since childhood. I realized that I should never attain perfection in Ukrainian, of the kind attainable by those who absorb the language in their childhood or early youth. I was forced to accept inconveniences and personal deprivations inherent in this problem only because of my awareness that Ukrainian is the language of the countryside, i.e. of the vast majority of the population, of the sea which surrounds us, the city people.

Another personal drama was developing at the same time, namely, my resignation from the People's Socialist Labor Praty. It grieved me to withdraw from the party of which Peshekhonov and Myakotin were the leaders . . . As a Jew and a native of Ukraine, I felt it my duty to leave them, so I submitted my resignations both from the party and the Central Committee.

The problem of personal-national autonomy and its solution by the Rada, ministries for protection of minorities rights, and other developments which are generally known or adequately covered in the press have not been considered so far in this book.

Unfortunately, I have no detailed information on elections to the Ukrainian Constitutional Assembly. I know only that the Ukrainian slates received still more overwhelming support (80 to 90% of the votes) than in the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. This

was the case throughout the country, but not in large cities with mixed populations.

There is no reason here to pause on details of the coup by which the German Military Command dissolved the Rada and transferred the rule to Hetmàn Skoropadskiy. I was merely a judge at that time, not even a member of the Ukrainian Socialist-Federalist Party and not quite in touch with current events. I could not judge them with adequate competence.

Every one of the Ukrainian parties boycotted the new establishment and this was an error, in my opinion. The Ukrainian left refused outright to participate in the new government; the center (Socialist-Federalist) hesitated; Skoropadskiy and the Germans had to look for support among Russian parties. Even Vasilenko and Chubinskiy, in Skoropadskiy's original cabinet, represented the All-Russian Peoples' Freedom (Narodnaya Svoboda) party, notwithstanding their former Ukrainian ties, the party for which the federation itself was still a highly controversial subject.

I enrolled in the Socialist-Federalist party late in June, whereupon I was coopted in its Central Committee.

The elite of Ukrainian intelligentsia was concentrated in the Socialist-Federalist party. It should be enough here to mention Yefremov, Stebnitskiy, Nikovskiy, Prokopovich, Shul'gin, Salikovskiy, Lototskiy, Shrag (now deceased), Matushevskiy, Vyazlov. Yefremov was known as the "conscience of the party"; Nikovskiy, so witty, vivaceous, realistic in thought, was called its "moving nerve." Matsiyevich was the best specialist on agrarian problems of Ukraine. M.A. Slavinskiy, who joined the party after me, was well known in Russian and Ukrainian circles for his social and literary activities and as the late M.M. Kovalevskiy's co-editor of the "Vestnik Evropy" ("Herald of Europe") for many years. Still another member of the party's Committee was Professor M.I. Tugan-Baranovskiy. He died prematurely from angina pectoris.

All these people were well known and highly popular with the Ukrainian as well as with the Russian intelligentsias. The other members of the Committee were just

as steadfast and well tempered, as social and political activists.

Our Committee met twice a week, with everybody in attendance, as a rule.

Everybody would be there at the appointed hour. Late arrivals were exceptional. This was unexpected and new, very much like Western Europe and not like the Russia in which we were reared. Even the very nature of the sessions was serious and businesslike. Everybody spoke to the point and concisely, without rhetoric. S.A. Yefremov, a true chairman, conducted our sessions magnificently. The same may be said about A.V. Nikovskiy, vice chairman, who presided when Yefremov was sick. Nikovskiy was a bit too sharp on occasion, but generally had good reason for cutting short some of the discussions, and no one's feelings were hurt.

The sessions usually lasted for not over two hours.

Problems on each session's agenda would typically be solved at the very same session. It was only on rare occasions that unanimity could not be reached by discussion. Mutual understanding was quickly attainable, without any personal fervor, in the face of a serious and convincing argument. There was no personal petty account to settle, no morbid conceit, no contention of the kind so common in political organizations of the time.

One of the reasons for this unanimity was that the majority of the Committee, like most of the party, was not in its first youth; mainly it was the inherent aversion to demagogy on the part of the Socialist-Federalists, the high moral level of Committee members and the chairman's charisma. A party of such quality could not be particularly successful politically in the stormy days of the revolution. Under the Hetman regime, our party had voluntarily declined to participate. Socialist-Federalists agreed to enter the coalition cabinet much later, not long before the uprising, when the days of the Hetman government were already numbered.

The institution of personal-national autonomy was abolished by the Hetman government from the start, as we know. But when Socialist-Federalists entered the coali-

tion as a substantial minority, the personal-national autonomy law was reactivated on A.V. Nikovskiy's motion and carried unanimously. The government had not time to consider this measure, because the uprising against Hetman and his regime was soon underway.

I was an entirely new man in the Ukrainian movement and my party was the only one I really knew, but I did have acquaintances and friends in every one of the other political groupings. Some of these people I met during elections or in political trials. I was not acquainted then with S.V. Petlyura, had never seen him even, because he had lived in Moscow in recent years. Our first discussion occurred only in November 1919, and our closer acquaintance developed in December 1920, during my three-day visit in Tarnov.

I met V.K. Vinnichenko by chance in the editorial office of the "Novaya Rada," in the fall of 1918 casually; we exchanged only a few words.

Among the other leaders of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic party, I had known Chekhovskiy (since the elections to the First Duma), Levitskiy (since the Lubny defense); I met Mazepa and Shadlun much later and Porsh, Martos and Matyushenko only a short while ago.

Among the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionists, I knew only Grushevskiy and his gifted young associate, N.I. Shrag. Much later, while abroad I met Chechill, who impressed me most favorably from the start by the sincerity of his convictions, youthful and utopian as they were.

On the whole our Socialist-Revolutionaries were mainly youth, except the venerable Grushevskiy, that old ideologue of the Ukrainian movement as well as an outstanding European scholar. These Ukrainian youths were political neophytes who could not yet find themselves. Nonetheless, practically all the Ukrainian peasantry followed them. Such popularity of the party was due to many years of earlier work by the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries, the groups once known as the Zemlya i Volya (Land and Liberty) and the Chernvy Peredel (Black Redistribution).

Among the Independents (Samostiyniki) I knew only

General Grekov, their associate. Our closer acquaintance developed later in Odessa, in February-March 1919.

The language problem rose to the foreground once again, with the accompanying exacerbations, when the State Senate (Derzhavnyy Senat) was inaugurated. The entire membership of the Supreme Court was incorporated in the Senate. But in the Senate we were already a minority, for the number of the newly appointed senators exceeded significantly the number of transfers from the Court, the judges who were originally elected by the Rada.

The senators were appointed by recommendation of M.P. Chubinskiy, Minister of Justice. In his endeavor to employ well-tested and experienced Russian specialists in appeals from the former Imperial Senate and in his feverish haste, Chubinskiy neglected to reach understanding with the invited specialists in reference to the language. He was certain, as he said afterwards, that the senators understood the need of studying the Ukrainian, inasmuch as they accepted his invitations. I have no doubt, on the whole, that he was acting in good faith, albeit carelessly . . . He imagined apparently that things would settle by themselves. Only they did not settle at all! The speeches of Senator Nosenko and Public Procurator Laskarev gave many minutes of hard time to Chubinskiy himself. They sounded like challenges to the Ukrainian movement, omens of a coming change in the policy of Skoropadsky and his entourage.

In the Senate's court sessions the language problem was solved by every senator individually, as he saw fit. Our group, the former Supreme Court, tended to use both languages in its resolutions, Russian in parallel with Ukrainian. We suggested the governmental proclamation to the effect that the senators had to learn Ukrainian in six months to one year. In the meanwhile the Chancery staff would be translating the Senate's resolutions into Ukrainian and those of us who knew the language would be responsible for accuracy of the translations.

The government was marking time with this problem. The senators from Petersburg were confused and saw no way out of the situation, for some of them were very de-

cent people and not merely outstanding jurists. Some had obviously come to Kiev under the bona fide delusion that the old Imperial Senate was being reassembled in Kiev for the duration of the bolshevik rule in Russia, so as to serve the Ukrainian territory outside the Soviet government's rule. Such misapprehensions were entirely understandable, inasmuch as contacts between Petersburg and Kiev were disrupted. The old senators, highly experienced jurists, were entirely apolitical. Chubinskiy had failed to think it over in time, unfortunately.

Among the senators from Petersburg there were also such persons as Nosenko. That one knew what he was about . . . Finally, there was still a different one, also from Petersburg, well versed in Ukrainian, who wrote his project drafts in both languages from the start. He reduced his original zeal, however, and began to write only in Russian, as soon as the new orientation of the government became evident.

My lot was in the Criminal Appeals department, in the division presided over by Senator Man'kovskiy, a veteran of the Imperial Senate. He had no idea of the Ukrainian language and naturally wrote only in Russian. Any politicking was entirely alien to him. He was ready to study Ukrainian and even made the beginning therein, it appears. His case was not exceptional.

We, the younger jurists, benefited a great deal from our association with such specialists in appeals as Man'kovskiy. His exemplary correctness and straight-forwardness made our cooperation particularly pleasant.

CHAPTER VIII

Ukrainian National Union. Directory. Vinnichenko. Insurrection

In July 1918, all the Ukrainian political parties realized the need of a national political union. The absolute necessity of such an organization was indeed evident, in view of the steadily growing influence of the Russian right groupings on the Hetman as well as on the German High Command.

Vinnichenko was elected Chairman of the Union, with Nikovskiy as the Deputy Chairman. M.A. Kushnir, as a delegate of the Social-Federalists, was quite active in the Union too.

No agreement could be reached between the Union and the government or the Germans in any one of their conferences; the gap between the two sides was too wide to be bridged, and mutual accord seemed impossible.

The Union's sessions were held in total secrecy. Even members of Central Committees of the parties were often unaware of the subjects discussed or of the decisions adopted at these sessions. And when the Union elected the Directory and proclaimed the insurrection (November 1918), it caught many people by surprise.

The following three parties were engaged in the insurrection: Socialist-Revolutionary, Social Democrats, and Independents. The Directory and its original government were constituted by representatives of these three parties.

The Center (Social-Federalists, Laborites) and the Right Wing abstained from participation in the insurrection, having no confidence in its success. The Center and the Right feared the possible aftermath of the insurrection, such as bolshevism and other forms of anarchy.

Indeed, the range and early successes of the insurrection exceeded even the most optimistic expectations of the left, and fears of the aftermath proved fully justified.

The Directory's headquarters (Stavka) was already established in Fastov, while in Kiev everything was going on normally. The State Senate continued in session, but nonetheless it was quite evident that a major shock was underway, a radical change one way or the other, depending on the outcome of the insurrection.

In that very time, Hainaut, the French Consul, emerged in Odessa and representatives of the Entente were holding their sittings in Yassy.

The Social-Federalists Committee was then engaged in high pressure work on a plan of action to be taken at this turning point in the country's history.

It was decided to send a delegation from the party to Yassy and Odessa for discussions with representatives of the Entente. The delegates were Matsiyevich, Prokopovich, Feshchenko-Chopovskiy, Yu.Sokolovskiy, and I. A.M. Kovalenko joined us later and enrolled in the Social-Federalist Party eventually.

The Germans, already powerless, remained neutral with respect to current events. The German High Command was hurriedly withdrawing its troops from Ukraine, which was not so easy at that time. Everything was now expected from the Entente. England and France recognized Ukraine as a de facto independent state even before the peace of Brest-Litovsk and actually sent representatives to Kiev in December 1917 (General Tabouis and Consul Bagge), accredited to the Ukrainian government. It was mainly from these two countries that we expected help. They could restrain the extremism of the Russian right coteries entrenched in Kiev, as well as the inevitable drift to anarchy which could and did develop in the wake of the insurrection, with its left slogans.

Our delegation was scheduled to leave on or about November 20, when battles were underway between Kiev and Fastov. We had to make a detour, so we planned to go down the Dnepr River as far as Cherkassy, then to Bobrinskaya.

One week later I was supposed to present my report at the normal judicial session of the Senate; it did not seem proper for me to authorize my own absence as long as I

was still in the service. But time was running too short in Kiev for me to argue with the obstinate Matsiyevich, the appointed chief of our delegation, who demanded of me to go to Yassy and threatened to "go on strike too" and avoid going there himself. I decided to persuade him on the steamboat en route. Indeed, my considerations were taken into account in the allocation of our parts in the mission. It was decided then that Matsiyevich, Prokopovich, Sokolovskiy and Kovalenko would go to Yassy, while Feshchenko-Chopovskiy and I would go to Odessa, a short trip and a lesser responsibility than the mission to Yassy.

The insurrection did not expand to the Dnepr, not yet. Our voyage was uneventful.

In Cherkassy my local comrades in the party told us that the insurrection committee had already formed in Bobrinskaya (about one hour by train from Cherkassy), that this committee would help us, and that we would have no troubles on our way whatever. We too could not imagine any reason why the committee should interfere with our travel, inasmuch as our party was neutral with regard to the insurrection.

The train had barely stopped at Bobrinskaya when soldiers surrounded our car and locked us in. Our car was detached from the train and sidetracked not too far from the railway station. It was ten o'clock in the evening and dark. Lights were dim in the car, and there was no light at all at the siding. Things looked mysterious, even scary . . . Then soldiers with rifles entered the car and the interrogation began: who were we? going where? what for? They took us out of the car and led us to the railway tracks, aiming their rifles at us. They really did not mean to shoot us, but wanted to search us for arms. Matsiyevich, the coolest one, with his hands up, was smoking his cigarette. There was some humor in the situation in these tense minutes. That cigarette brightened the spirits even of our awesome guards. Their search yielded nothing—no arms on us, the peaceful Social-Federalists. They led us to the station and allowed us to go unaccompanied to the buffet.

We imagined that we had been freed and so took to tea-drinking and asking questions about trains to Yassy and Odessa. But we were told to go back to our car, where we were declared arrested "in the name of the Directory and of Petlyura, Chief Ataman," to be forwarded to Fastov under guard. We decided that the Insurrection Committee must have contacted the Directory by telegraph and received the appropriate instructions. This proved to be indeed the case. But why the arrest and the guards, even if they really wished to see us at the Stavka? We were trading our good-natured speculations, all but Matsiyevich, whose humor now turned into anger. He grumbled on and on in the nocturnal darkness, until we all fell asleep.

By eleven in the morning the special locomotive had delivered us in Fastov. Soldiers unhooked our car again, but not for long. The same solemn formula of the arrest was recited to us, but without the "hands up" or the search. It took only a few minutes this time, after which we were invited to leave the car. Matsiyevich was taken straight to the Directory, but the rest of us were detained in a room inside the station. After fifteen to twenty minutes we were declared free "in the name of the Directory and of the Chief Ataman" and were taken to the railway car in which the Directory was holding its sessions.

Three or four railway cars were standing right by the station, occupied by the Directory and its office. In one of them at a large working table we saw Vinnichenko, Shvets, Andriyevskiy and Matsiyevich.

Petlyura was at the army front. Makarenko was not yet a member of the Directory.

After the usual greetings, Vinnichenko offered explanations and apologized for our arrest. We learned that the Directory was confused and alarmed by the name of Kovalenko, listed as a member of our group, in the telegram they received from Bobrinskaya, requesting instructions on what was to be done with us. The point was that, aside from our Kovalenko, there was another one of the same family name, a member of the Corn-Growers' Party, a landowner and a good friend of the Hetman. The Direc-

tory imagined that we had this Kovalenko with us and that he was going to see the Entente on behalf of the Hetman. But when Matsiyevich explained the situation Vinnichenko ordered our release immediately, for he had known A.M. Kovalenko personally, since their common perigrinations as emigrants abroad.

Matsiyevich spoke then about the purpose of our trip. Vinnichenko had no objection to that, speaking for the Directory. A telephone in the car rang on and off during our conversation. The calls were answered by Vinnichenko himself, who, each time shared the news with us, of this or that position or village taken. The fighting had already reached Zhulyany, twelve versts from Kiev. "We will take Kiev in a few days," said Vinnichenko to us, "stay here; you are our future ministers anyway." We declined his invitation courteously but definitely. We remained true to our party's resolution and to our personal decisions not to participate actively in the insurrection.

It may have been a serious and irreparable mistake on our part. We ought to have stayed with the Directory, perhaps, to help these brave people in their difficult and dangerous undertaking, and particularly to influence them to put an end to that endless "drift to the left" which began soon after we met them.

The question is difficult and even impossible to answer right now . . .

All the talking was done by Vinnichenko on behalf of the Directory. I met Shvets then for the first time. Andriyevskiy I had known previously, through lawyers' consultations and in the court at Kiev. He did not seem to be too interesting as an attorney, but was believed to be a specialist in the peasants' agrarian problems. He looked morose and unfriendly. One could however sense a strong and obstinate character behind his sullenness and unsocialability.

Professor Shvets, on the contrary, was a kind and outgoing person. It was immediately evident that neither he nor Andriyevskiy was a prime mover in the insurrection. Vinnichenko-Petlyura, who in Fastov held all the moving threads of the insurrection in his hands, remained the

true chief of the movement, its soul. But the entire executive power belonged to Petlyura, who was at the front on this particular day. We sensed it even in his absence from the Stavka.

We learned that it was no longer possible to reach Odessa, because regiments still loyal to the Hetman were fighting the rebels somewhere near Birzula. It was not clear just who these regiments were, but we understood at last that further travel towards Odessa was out of the question.

As for the road to Yassy, it proved to be open, via Volochisk.

Feshchenko-Chopovskiy and I decided to return to Kiev. I suggested we go by way of Vasil'kov-Tripol'ye, imagining that the Dnepr was still open for navigation, as it had been only yesterday, and that a steamer would take us from Tripol'ye to Kiev.

The Stavka was not yet aware that the rebels had blocked river transit to Kiev on this very day and that all steamers to and from Kiev were being detained right at Tripol'ye.

A paper was then prepared for us, granting passage through the entire belt of the insurrection. In our haste we forgot that each of us needed a pass of his own rather than one single pass to cover us both . . . From then on Chopovskiy and I could not part from each other, not for a minute, like two chained convicts. True, we were bound to each other also by mutual sympathy and not only by a piece of paper; just the same, there was to be much too much togetherness for the duration of the travel to come.

We had no idea at all of the thorns to be strewn by Providence on our path to Kiev. Could we have foreseen even one tenth of the tribulations we had to endure, we would have listened to Matsiyevich and other comrades urging us to go with them to Yassy. But I could not absent myself from Kiev too long, and Chopovskiy had no great desire to go to Yassy and did not wish to leave me alone. Indeed it would have been very rough for me without Chopovskiy, as I learned very soon by experience.

We hurried to leave while it was still daylight and after

our hasty farewells, boarded a military train going to Boyarka. Our former companions took a special train to Volochisk in the evening and arrived at Yassy quite safely.

Our car was packed full of rebels leaving for the front, mostly peasants, and a few youngsters from the intelligentsia. Their spirits were high and so was their faith in the insurrection—for the right cause. The youngsters were blasting everybody who declined to join the insurrection, and the names of Yefremov and Nikovskiy were mentioned . . . We merely listened, thinking that argument would be useless and risky.

By the time we were at Vasil'kov, the twilight of the short, bleak November day was changing to night. There was not a cab by the railway station, and it would be difficult and dangerous to walk ten versts to the city, carrying suitcases across the deserted plain. The tiny station was so overcrowded and filthy that there was no place to sit, let alone spend the night. We barely had time to jump back into our car. So we travelled on to Boyarka.

Soon we found ourselves in the "first and second class" waiting room, well remembered from the past but unrecognizable now. The choice was either to spend the whole night standing or to go with our suitcases to the village and knock on doors, hut by hut, for charity, in the hope that someone would let us in. Chopovskiy insisted on the first option from the start . . . We stood for a long time by the counter, a buffet in normal times.

Suspicious faces were seen now for the first time, here and there, in the crowd at the station . . . I recognized the type which I was accustomed to see in jails and, as a lawyer, in conferences with my defendants . . . In spite of myself I was apprehensive, as it became evident that criminal elements were beginning to join the insurrection, smelling the imminent capture of Kiev and the loot . . .

However such examples were rare at that time, submerged as they were in the mighty upheaval, the groundswell which enveloped the masses of peasantry and urban youth. The masses were advancing bravely and cheerfully to protect, as they believed, the endangered gains of the revolution and the independence of Ukraine.

Fatigue took its own at last and Chopovskiy agreed that we must look for a place to sleep. We found a compassionate soldier who agreed to help us and the three of us took off towards the market place. But no door would open for us, no matter how long we knocked, house after house . . . The citizens were evidently afraid of nocturnal visitors and had barricaded themselves with shutters and bolts.

Sad was our retreat to the station. Suddenly a light flashed in the window of a small house, deep in a farmstead. We came up to the light, knocked, and this time the door was opened. A young technological student welcomed us to his room. His name has not been retained by my ungrateful memory, and yet we were in debt to him for his hospitality and shelter.

The soldier, who took turn with us in carrying the suitcases, refused to take any pay for his services. Such altruism was common with the rebels in the first weeks of the insurrection, when the state of mind and heart was so exalted and solemn.

Útro véchera mudreńéye ("morning is wiser than evening", i.e. "take council with your pillow" or "sleep it off", Tr.) . . . In the morning it occurred to us to leave our suitcases in Boyarka and strike out for Kiev without them, while keeping right of the battle line. The idea proved altogether too smart, and its outcome was almost tragic.

We stumbled upon a peasant with his cart, going from Boyarka to his village, near Demiyevka (name forgotten). He agreed to take us there and demanded 100 rubles for seven or eight versts distance. We agreed to pay him that exhorbitantly high fare and in all probability this made him suspicious, although we reached his village peacefully. Cannonade from the side of Zhulyany was continuous.

Our driver invited us to his hut, gave us tea and food, and we began to plan how to get to Demiyevka. In the meanwhile, he disappeared.

He was back soon enough, accompanied by a mounted patrol of the rebels. I forgot to mention that he had grabbed his fare earlier . . . We showed our pass but it made

no impression whatsoever . . . They dealt with us rudely, arrested us, led us through the entire village to the "Staff." "That's where they'll find out who you are."

The "Staff" was in a fairly large house. We waited there for several hours until our turn. By luck, some people in that place knew Chopovskiy very well, from his appearances at the peasants' conventions. We were warned that the rebels on the road to Demiyevka did not trust any passes and shot to kill on the first suspicion.

It was growing dark. We trudged back to Boyarka on foot, back to our hospitable technologist and our suitcases.

We were stopped by mounted patrols on the road and showed our pass apprehensively . . . But we were not suspected, possibly because we were going not towards but away from Kiev.

I woke up Chopovskiy at dawn and we decided for once to follow our original plan, i.e. to strike for Tripol'ye. In order to avoid a repetition of our deal with the driver-informer, we chose to walk about fifteen versts to Vasil'kov. Walking cross-country through forests and fields, we reached Vasil'kov in three hours, had our dinner, and began to bargain with cab drivers about the ride to Tripol'ye. Not a single one would agree to take us farther than Obukhovo, a small settlement about 25 versts from Vasil'kov, that could be reached before dark.

There were more mounted patrols, more forced delays on the road, even under the muzzle of a handgun . . . But the name of Feshchenko-Chopovskiy, Minister of the Central Rada, would pull us out of trouble every time.

In Obukhovo we found an immense crowd of people on the square. We were led again somewhere for more questioning and explanations, only this time some of the rebel officers happened to be good friends of Chopovskiy and gave us "official" horses, a cart, and a reliable driver for our ride to Tripol'ye.

It was in Obukhovo that I had a chance to talk to the local rabbi and representatives of the Jewish community. The rabbi gave us money, inasmuch as our reserve was practically gone and our experience not conducive to the hope of reaching Kiev without further delay. The Jewish

community had no reason to fear pogroms at that time. Proclamations of the Directory were posted on many buildings and poles in Obukhovo and elsewhere on our road. I read several of them and can bear witness that the proclamations appealed to the people for order, respect for human life and property. "Jews are our brothers," were the words.

Furthermore, the abomination of the pogroms in czarist times was pointed out, and the contempt in which Russia was held by other nations because of these pogroms; equality and brotherhood of all peoples living in Ukraine were proclaimed.

These warm, sincere appeals were convincing in tone, their language simple and easily understood by the common people. The Directory had undoubtedly the best of intentions. It endeavored not only to avert pogroms and anarchy, which would wreck the insurrection, but also by every means to assure the peaceful and friendly coexistence of all nations in full equality.

Tripol'ye is a picturesque village in the mountains abutting on the Dnepr River, built on the mountain summits and on the slopes which descend to the river. The distance from Kiev to Tripol'ye is about fifty versts by the river and about 40 by land.

Plyuty, a small settlement and favorite summer resort of the city people of Kiev, is about seven to eight versts upstream from Tripol'ye.

We approached Tripol'ye at about 10 o'clock in the evening. There are two or three roads from Obukhovo to Tripol'ye. Neither we nor the driver could possibly know that the rebels were blocking all but one of these roads for the night. Naturally we took the very one forbidden to travel . . . Our horses were scudding along, as if they sensed the end of the ride or perhaps the cold wind from the rear was spurring them on . . .

Suddenly there were shots and shouting behind us. We stopped. A mounted Cossack patrol overtook us. Explanations began. We got off the cart and were marched on foot again, under guard, to the Tripolian staff house. But this time my own acquaintances showed up among the others,

including relatives of peasant clients whom I had defended years ago, in trials for lynching, manslaughter, and the like.

They greeted us affably, and it was decided to put us up in one of he best houses of the settlement, owned by Polovinchik, a well-to-do merchant. They proudly announced that every steamer on the river was intercepted and taken to Plyuty to stay there, guarded by a Cossack patrol.

This was a heavy blow . . . We were cut off from Kiev once again.

But to show even a trace of dissatisfaction would be improper under the circumstances. All the while the rebels were overestimating the usefulness of the steamers they had captured. It was cold, the river could freeze any day, and it was no longer practical anyway to raid Kiev from riverboats . . .

But was there any time to think logically, to weigh the pros and cons, during the elemental spontaneous insurrection?

So they led us to the Polovinchiks. Our elderly hosts were charming and hospitable. Some passengers who had been taken off the steamers and held in Tripol'ye were already living with the Polovinchiks. Among them there was also Orlov, a steward or manager of some landowner's estate near Tripol'ye. We have remembered him well ever since.

Thoughtfully they fed us and put us to bed.

In the morning the captain of one of the steamers, kept under guard at Plyuty, came to see me. He had arrived earlier and learned from the village people that I was staying with Polovinchik. He invited Feshchenko-Chopovskiy and me to move to his steamer, but Chopovskiy thought it unwise to move so far away from the Tripolian base, where we were known and safe. I had to agree with him, but we both regretted that on the next day . . .

The next day was Sunday or a holiday. Thousands of people were gathered in the mountain square. Priests also appeared, with icons and gonfalons . . .

The people were swearing allegiance to the Directory.

The next day at about noon there was a general alarm and everybody in the village rushed headlong to the highest mountain, from which the Dnepr and the whole countryside far away could be seen. We too climbed the mountain.

Like white swans, steamers were running smoothly upstream, one after another, they were already far beyond Plyuty . . . This brought to mind the touching descriptions of the last steamships leaving small ports in Norway, before the onset of winter and freezing of the fjords.

The explanation came soon enough. It developed that the "armored steamer," as they called it in the crowd, had arrived from Kiev. This steamer fired a gun volley at the river bank, whereupon the Cossack guard fled. Because of the rebels' oversight, every one of the steamers they were guarding had its lights on and engines running at all times. The rest is self-evident.

I learned afterwards in Kiev that the steamship companies and private owners, trying to protect their property, had hired German soldiers, then unemployed, and it was they who had carried out the rescue operation for very good pay.

Ice was already floating down the river. It would not matter, from the viewpoint of the insurrection, just where the river fleet hibernated, be it Kiev or Plyuty. And yet there was a detail of all this business which was not at all indifferent.

A rumor was spread about that a Cossack was wounded by the volley from the "armored" steamer. I do not know whether this was true or not. But the rumor of spilt blood was exciting and intoxicating the rebels.

Suddenly an airplane appeared in the sky, coming from Kiev. It circled over the village, the crowd scattered, but the alarm was false. The plane left without dropping a single bomb.

At five o'clock in the afternoon we went to the Staff to confer about our future. When Orlov asked me whether he could go with us, I answered in the affirmative, unfortunately.

A huge crowd was swarming at the Staff house. Suspici-

ous types were again in sight, in the rebel ranks, undoubtedly the urban scum, the coat of mud over the originally healthy core of the insurrection.

All at once several men left the crowd and surrounded Orlov, yelling "blood-sucker!" "You had enough of the people's blood!", etc. They were dragging him away.

Whether it was my remorse for the advice I had given Orlov or the professional instinct to resist injustice, I did something rash: I ran after Orlov and stood up for him. The threats were shouted at me. Our friends from the Staff ran up just in time. Someone called from the crowd: "Why, they are our friends, they are on our side, they are the ones on their way to see the French." While we were still in Tripol'ye, the news of the delegation on the road to Yassy must have spread far and wide.

Feshchenko and I were left in peace, but Orlov was taken to the Staff house, a guarantee that he would not be lynched, at the very least. I no longer regretted my interference in other people's business.

The Staff had to mind the mob and Orlov had to be locked up for some time. Much later in Kiev he himself told me about his liberation.

The next night was the dreariest and most frightening part of our luckless travels. Three drunken soldiers broke into Polovinchik's house at about ten in the evening and demanded our identification papers. They studied my passport for a long time, whatever the reason, and wanted to take it away from me. Then Feshchenko-Chopovskiy yelled at them in turn, and demanded their own search warrants and authorization to examine the identity papers of others. The soldiers were taken somewhat aback. They did not take my passport with them, but left, promising to return . . . A thought flashed through my mind: am I suspected of complicity in the incident with the steamers? My father's name had been connected with Dneprovian navigation for 50 years, as a former shipowner and then as the permanent director of the steamship companies. And I too had been a jurisconsult of steamship companies for some time . . . My apprehensions were heavier every hour . . .

We had no way out. Polovinchik's farmstead was far from the staff house. Peaceful citizens were asleep. It was dangerous to go in the streets, to fall in with lawless brawlers and bandits.

Suddenly we heard a cart or carriage pulling up and stopping by the farmstead. It was the officer from Obukhovo whom we knew and who also was directed to Polovinchik's house for the night. This arrival saved us from the impending and very serious danger. We had barely had time to undress and lie down when loud knocking on the door was heard again. The drunken soldiers had kept their threat and returned to continue the "interrogation."

But the officer knew how to get rid of them. In those days officers still had some prestige with soldiers. It blew over . . .

The incident was a mere nothing in comparison with what Jews had to go through during pogroms. I am telling of my experiences in such detail by way of illustration of the turning-point in the insurrection, the sudden change in the rebel ranks which occurred under our own eyes. Disintegration of the army was at hand, with its anarchy and insubordination, authority was slipping from the hands of the chiefs who had inspired and led the rebellion.

I often remembered our experiences in Tripol'ye as a manifest example of the complete impotence of the local Staff in controlling the brawling rebels and of Feshchenko's helplessness in the face of the rowdies—this outstanding Ukrainian leader, only recently a minister of the democratic government.

We firmly decided to leave Tripol'ye the next fay.

A meeting in the village square began early in the morning, our chance to get away quietly. The Staff gave us horses.

We rode back to Obukhovo . . . There were no rebels on the road, and some rearrangements must have been made in the district. We spent the night in Obukhovo. The next day we moved to Vasil'kov, then straight to the railway

station. In the evening we were back in Boyarka, back to the same "shattered trough."

We had our suitcases once again, and at last could don fresh linen.

As we drew farther away from Tripol'ye we were thinking long thoughts about the horrible situation of peaceful citizens in small towns and villages faced with rebellion and revolution. We feared for the Polovinchiks, both of them old, who had had so much trouble on account of their guests, including us, so much suffering, but who stayed in Tripol'ye just the same.

Our old rigamarole began again, the next day: planning how to strike for Kiev. In the evening we learned that a detachment of Germans commanded by a major was in Boyarka. The morning after I parted from Feshchenko-Chopovskiy for the first time. He refused to visit the German major, in his despair to reach Kiev before the rebels took the city. But I had great hopes; no doubt, the Germans would give us a good advice and proper directions. Feshchenko agreed to stay put and go nowhere until my return. So I took our common pass to the major.

As soon as I named to him my acquaintances from the German command, the major showed a great deal of interest in our fortunes. There was an armistice that day along the Boyarka-Svyatoshino-Kiev line, by mutual consent, in connection with the evacuation of Ukraine by the Germans. The major suggested that we travel in company with four German soldiers who were leaving that very morning for Kiev by way of Svyatoshino. I accepted this plan with joy and asked for acquaintance with the soldiers. I found them to be courteous and easy-going. We were on our way in fifteen minutes and stopped only to pick up Feshchenko, as agreed.

One may imagine his astonishment when he saw me accompanied by the Germans. Our host, the technologist, was joking about our returning to him again, in the near future . . . Only he was mistaken this time. A band of rebels stopped us on the road only once, but let us go after they saw our identifications.

We ran into a watch post close to Svyatoshino manned by the Hetman troops still defending Kiev.

Among the soldiers in this watch we met the son of a professor at the University of Kiev, who knew Feshchenko-Chopovskiy personally. They did not even ask us for our papers and we all, with the Germans, boarded the Svyatoshino street car which took us directly to Kiev.

A messenger was sent to fetch our suitcases from Boyarka only after the Directory entered Kiev.

CHAPTER IX

Representatives of Entente expected in Kiev. Directory enters Kiev. Government and policy of Directory. Ministry of Jewish affairs

Even as early as November 1918 everybody in Kiev was expecting the arrival of representatives of the Entente, day after day. The name of Hainaut occurred in every newspaper unrelentingly; from time to time his remarks on all sorts of current events were telegraphed from Odessa. It looked as if Hainaut were someone with unlimited authorization from the government of France. Only later did we find that Hainaut's status was modest indeed and that the real power lay with the French military command who landed in Odessa in December 1918.

In the meanwhile utterly absurd rumors were circulating in Kiev, up to the "fact" that a diplomatic representative of America was already in Odessa with his large staff, and that these citizens of the United States were on their way to Kiev. As to Frenchmen and the Englishmen, many of our people "saw them with their own eyes" at the railway station in Kiev. It remains odd and obscure even now why Italians were overlooked in such expectations, for Italy, one of the Great Powers, was the nearest neighbor of Ukraine on the side of the Black Sea. But the fact is that the public fancied only the French, the British, and the Americans. Committees to welcome them were being organized, the speeches of welcome were already in preparation.

Most of the Kievan public sensed the dangers of civil and internecine wars, in these days of roaring political passions. A peaceful citizen thinks mainly of himself and his fortunes rather than of the destinies of future generations. After the Germans left the citizen became apprehensive as to his own survival and destiny. It must be

admitted, in fairness, that personal life and property were entirely secure during the German occupation of Ukraine, in cities as well as villages, and perfect order was effectively maintained. It was not too easy for the countryside, however, because of the German requisitions of grain, cattle, etc. At that, it was still a paradise for the peasantry, in comparison with what was going on in Russia in the same period.

Fears of bolshevist invasion from the north, demoralization of the Hetman troups in Kiev, surrounded and besieged by the insurrection hosts, uncertainty as to who would defeat whom—this was the heavy atmosphere which enveloped the city in November and the beginning of December 1918.

No wonder that peaceful citizens of Kiev were looking toward Odessa, straining their eyes in fiery expectation of Varangians from beyond the sea.

But there were no Varangians in sight.

In the meanwhile disintegration of the defenders of the city had begun. It was no longer safe for anyone, particularly a Jew, to be seen at night in outlying parts of Kiev. Unrestrained antisemitism of the Volunteer units was out in the open, the units on which the Hetman government relied. Jews were beaten up more and more frequently in thinly populated and isolated parts of the city; their homes were pillaged.

On December 14 the Hetman resigned and vanished from Kiev.

Victorious hosts of the Directory soon entered the city, then the Directory itself, riding in triumph and acclaimed fervently by the population.

On behalf of the Jewish community, N.S. Syrkin welcomed the Directory in an ardent and sincere speech. As an enthusiast of the rebirth of the Jewish nation, he understood the analogous drive of Ukraine toward the development of its national and free state. Alas, that holiday of peaceful rejoicing was a fatal day for Syrkin. He caught cold, went to bed, and died.

The government of the Directory consisted of representatives of the three parties active in the insurrection. V.M.

Chekhovskiy was appointed Prime Minister and also took the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the whole it was the Ukrainian Social-Democrats who now became the principal guides of Ukrainian fortunes. Vinnichenko and Petlyura, the heads of the Directory and of the army, respectively, were members of the Social-Democratic party.

The basic policy of the Directory took shape before long. Vinnichenko was marching to the left rapidly, unrelentingly. He was intensively supported in this course by Chekhovskiy, who still maintained the freshness of his youthful faith in immediate reconstruction of the world on socialist principles, the same faith he had had during the elections to the First Duma.

Petlyura, on the contrary, was thought to be a representative of the right wing of the party, tending to team work and compromise with the bourgeoisie. Only he was absorbed in the army at that time and apparently played no guiding role either in the policy or government of the Directory.

Stabs at the bourgeoisie began to appear in the Directory's proclamations, and this overt campaign against the bourgeois order of things led to very grave consequences. Under the byline of some kind of military organization, flyers were printed and spread, with supplementary explanations of the general term "bourgeoisie," to wit that it applied principally to the minorities: Russians, Jews and Poles. This was outright incendiarism, class hatred as well as ethnic.

Then the compulsory repainting of street signs began. Yefremov in "Novaya Rada" and other sober-minded Ukrainian leaders protested in vain against such extreme and impermissible manifestations of chauvinism. Safety boxes were raided shortly afterwards, with expropriation of gold and valuables. Such were the first experiments in finance by the young socialist government.

All of this maximalism—"rapidity, onslaught"—alienated the bourgeoisie, the majority of Kiev's population, from the Directory. Yet the Directory could have had the support of the entire population of the city, had its

policy been more moderate and calm. As to the peasantry, it was not too interested in the campaign against the Kiev jewelers waged by the Minister of Finance, but waited for resolution of the agrarian problem.

In all, the Directory and the government decided abruptly to part themselves from the bourgeoisie and build the state entirely by the strength of the socialist parties and the proletariat. But this was practically the same maximalism as the Bolshevik program. And this was exactly the aim of Vinnichenko, except that he intended to draw the line between the bolshevism of Moscow and his own program, which presupposed both autarchism and political independence of Ukraine. Moreover, he still believed that the Directory would succeed in maintaining its plenitude of power and would not permit terror of the kind already inherent in the Soviet regime.

It was a vicious circle. It was impossible to put oneself in opposition to Bolshevism while accepting the Bolsheviks' program almost in toto. Vinnichenko was overrating both himself and the strength of the movement. One had to choose between the two alternatives: either to build Ukraine in the image and model of the established democratic states of Europe and America or to declare oneself a partisan of the Soviet system, refuse communication with Western Europe, and reach agreement with Moscow on division of the spheres of influence.

But Vinnichenko was not only an ardent Ukrainian patriot. He inherited from the general Russian culture the most characteristic trait of the Russian intelligentsia: the belief in the messianic predestination of Russia. Vinnichenko transplanted that belief onto his native soil. He expected that the Ukrainian people would organize their state on a socialist basis, bear the burden of this construction on their own shoulders, and finally unveil this miracle for mankind to see. Chekhovskiy also believed sincerely in the possibility of that miracle. His theological-mystic world outlook was fantastically interwoven with dedication to the social-democratic dogma.

Yet any large popular movement can attain its goals only if these goals are clearly defined and uncomplicated.

Slogans must be concise in form and substance. The laconic sayings of soldiers during the Chernigov elections come to my mind, such as "Bolshevism means no war." But here the leaders were calling for simultaneous implementation of national as well as socialist ideals, in all their intricacy, the dreams of armchair theoreticians, but vague and obscure for the man at the plow or lathe and the great body of peasantry, workers, small artisans in cities, i.e. for all those not regarded as bourgeoisie at that time.

The Directory and the government began very shortly to feel the weight of the burden they had assumed. The aim of the insurrection was attained, the Hetman deposed, Kiev taken. The best elements of the army were going home. But those who joined the insurrection for the sake of pillage and loot were very much disappointed . . . They found their employment eventually and smeared the good name of the original core of the Ukrainian army by beastly pogroms of Jews, by robbery, murder and inhuman mockery.

All the while in Odessa representatives of the Entente were coexisting peacefully with the Russian Volunteer Army. The Entente was perfectly indifferent to the idealistic aspect of the Ukrainian movement. The French had entrenched themselves in Odessa and vicinity, showing no evidence at all of any further advance. But in the north the storm clouds of Bolshevism were gathering, ready to spill over into Ukraine . . .

This was food for thought among the leaders. Practically all the intellectual forces of Ukraine had fallen overboard from the ship of state. The Directory remained in solitude, with a handful of people capable of governmental work, all from "the three parties who participated in the insurrection."

The Directory and the government began to confer with parties of the center. There was a shortage of experienced persons in the ministries, in the central as well as local agencies. Ukrainian representation abroad had to be organized and missions sent to foreign states.

However, it was decided even at this time to look for

cooperation from the right only for purely technical tasks. As to the general policy and orientation of the government, they were to remain unchanged. The top priorities were the posts of deputy ministers, department chiefs, etc.

On the other hand the Directory was aware that none of the parties of the center would accept responsibility for continuation of the same old policy, and that the demand for a fundamental and radical change in the entire system and regime would be made the prerequisite of the center's cooperation.

The technical aid began with the appointment of Feshchenko-Chopovskiy as Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade. My appointment as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs was next on the agenda, and so was my trip abroad.

In our party's view the situation was serious enough to make it our duty to help the Directory, albeit only technically to begin with. It was evident nonetheless that a shift in the Directory's position had already occurred and that further shifts to the right would follow.

Work in the foreign service was extremely important in my view because of the influence of Western Europe on current events and the opportunity for contacts between Ukraine and Western Europe. I was one of those peaceful citizens who feared experiments by the Russian restorers just as much as by our home-made socialist movers. My thoughts were heavy, because the ghosts of czarist Russia with her pogroms were still fresh in my memory, and because the mirages of the direct and uninhibited drive toward the socialist state were already looming on the horizon, however vaguely . . . And when soldiers in Bakhmach and Konotop executed, by way of example, the luckless Jews, passengers who dared to go by train on their own bourgeois business, it had become clearer than ever what kind of results would ensue from the "radical demolition of the bourgeois state."

I may have overestimated at that time the value of the aid that might be received by Ukraine from Western Europe. I saw no way to avoid a very long internecine civil war except by influence and interference of the West. The

Entente's aid was absolutely essential, merely to avert the invasion of bolsheviks from the north.

The subject of my candidacy was presented by me for discussion at the Jewish Territorial Organization's Central Committee. There was no question of any mandate, since the J.T.O. has never been a political party. Nor could it ever be construed a party by the order of the political thought of its progenitors, Zangwill and Mandel'shtam. The reaction of my old and tested friends favored the plan.

The attitudes of the party and the organization were already known to me. It was up to me to make the final decision.

I had a great deal of respect and warm sympathy for V.M. Chekhovskiy, regardless of our political differences. Our old relations were our bond. I knew than my work with him would be easy and pleasant.

Another member of the Ministry's staff was Professor O.O. Eykhel'man, then Deputy Minister, close friend of all our family, specialist in international law, popular in all Kiev, known for his Spartan modesty and his life-long unremitting work. The Kievan legal profession was represented in the Ministry by A.I. Yakovlev, my colleague on the party's committee, and M.G. Levitskiy, the Director and Vice-Director of one and the same department.

All of them were my old friends and it should be easy for us to work together, as a team. But when it came to my problem—and this was decisive—I had to be engaged only in the Ministry itself for two or three weeks, so as to become acquainted with the personnel of the missions and to complete their organization. Thereupon I had to go to Odessa to confer with the French Military Command, then to Paris as a member of the Ukrainian delegation at the Peace Conference. The title of Deputy Minister was essential for me as authorization to speak for the government not only in Odessa but also in Paris, London and elsewhere.

This assignment was particularly welcome to me, because of my conviction of the necessity of aid from the West. So I accepted the appointment in good faith early in

January 1919, believing that such aid was obtainable without delay.

The personnel of the foreign mission was already chosen and almost complete when I entered the service. Particular attention had been given to composition of the delegation leaving for Paris. G.M. Sidorenko, the head of the delegation, was completely unknown to me at that time, to my regret. Sidorenko was already in Yassy and planning to go from there directly to Paris. Nor did I know Dr. Paneyko, a prominent Galician public figure and journalist. But from student days I had been very well acquainted with A.Ya. Shul'gin, the former minister of Foreign Affairs at the Central Rada and the third delegate of our diplomatic section in Paris. This acquaintance held every promise of a highly productive and valuable cooperation. Shul'gin was one of the noblest and most sincere and highly cultured of the Ukrainian leaders. That he would make a good impression in Paris was foreseeable from the start.

The following members of our Party were appointed as members of the delegation, not counting Shul'gin and myself: Senator S.P. Shelukhin, jurisconsult; Prof. M.I. Tugan-Baranovskiy, consultant on economic problems, who was also a Committee member of our party. He was our great asset, a power, who left this world prematurely, as I have already mentioned. (Tugan-Baranovskiy had died of angina pectoris on his way to Paris.)

The diplomatic missions to Turkey, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, Finland and Sweden were headed also by Social-Federalists. Our representatives in Rumania, Scandinavia and England were chosen from the ranks of the same party. Indeed, the party contributed most of its Central Committee to the Ukrainian foreign service.

Dr. M.L. Vishnitser, an outstanding Jewish historian and journalist, was appointed Secretary of the diplomatic mission to England, while I was still in the Ministry. I recommended for the foreign service Dr. Zarkhi, a young physician, because of his knowledge of several languages, whom I had known by his work in the Jewish Territorial

Organization. Dr. Zarkhi was assigned to the political section of the delgation to Paris. Finally, Kulisher, Rabinovich and Gluzman, students, all, the Jewish youth, were assigned to the foreign missions.

My efforts and recommendations for foreign service appointments of some of my colleagues in the State Senate were unsuccessful. The mission to Italy, headed by D.V. Antonovich, a well known Ukrainian, was already formed. The mission to Spain and Portugal was delayed and has not materialized at all even to this day.

Ukrainian representation abroad was the all-absorbing problem for me during the short period of my work in the Ministry. Among other things I was trying hard to persuade V.I. Latskiy to accept the Ministry's offer to serve in the Paris delegation. But he could not follow my advice, tied as he was by his party's discipline, for he was the Chairman of the Volkspartei. Were he to accept the offer, the fact could be construed as the party's approval of the entire policy of the Directory. In the meanwhile the breach between the Directory and the Zionists (the largest Jewish party) and other Jewish parties and organizations was widening over the way in which the Minister of Jewish Affairs was to be appointed.

The Zionists and the Volkspartei insisted on parliamentarism as the method and demanded that the appointee must represent the parties with the largest following among the Jewish socialist parties as the Minister.

The appointment of Revutskiy, a Poalei-Zionist, to that post in the Directory's government, and the negative attitudes of the Jewish parties, here named, with regard to such appointment methods, may account for the breach.

CHAPTER X

Trip to Odessa. Negotiations toward agreement between representatives of Ukraine, Don, Kuban' and Belorussia. French Command in Odessa

My departure for Odessa was scheduled for January 26, 1919. I was to be accompanied by S.V. Borodayevskiy, Deputy Minsiter of Trade, and officers of the Ministry of Finance with special assignments. A railway car, in which we intended to live while in Odessa, was placed at our disposal.

Before leaving I called on General Grekov, the newly appointed Minister of War, who had already been to Odessa and was in contact with the French Military Command. He gave me letters to General Anselm and Colonel Freydenberg, Chief of Staff, so as to avoid the impression of a lack of coordination among different representatives of the Ukrainian government.

Something indescribable was underway at the station. These were the first days of the panic, caused by the rapid advance of the bolsheviks toward Kiev. Two or three other missions were on the same train as ours, enroute to their destinations via Proskurov and Galicia.

I met V.E. Brunst, the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture under Hetman. He asked me for space in my car, because the train was packed to overflowing. Several other people demanded the same thing. I could hardly refuse, of course. Later on many more continued to get into our car without so much as a "by your leave." It was apparent that Kazatin was completely demoralized; railway depots were in a state of anarchy. The station master barged into our car. We explained to no avail that our car was restricted to official use; all our documents were ignored. He was determined "to undertake inspection of the car."

When we reminded him that our travel orders were from the Directory and that we would complain about the unwarranted delay (the train had been in the station altogether too long even without him), he replied that he had nobody over him now and that the Directory were comrades too.

Finally he forced me to buy tickets for several passengers (peasants and railway employees) who had climbed into our car at intermediate stations. The vile mess had to be ended somehow, a mess of the same kind as the really tragic exploitation by the "pompadours" (rank-happy petty tyrants) of the railway stations, peculiar to the epoch, with more to come. We simply had to get going, and so I paid him for seven or eight tickets, first class, although only two or three of our passengers were actually without tickets.

The episode I have described was typical of the times. If this was the way they treated members of the government in the evening of January 27, in Kazatin, one could easily imagine the next. The authority of the Directory was recognized only in Kiev and its vicinity even then. Self-appointed persons reigned in Kazatin . . .

Our train was creeping ahead tortoise-like. It was late in the evening of the next day before we reached Odessa.

Colonel P., Ukrainian Service, appeared in our car in the morning. He was a close associate of General Matveyev, the Ukrainian military agent at the French Command. The Colonel offered to arrange our meeting with the French. I gave him the sealed letters from the Minsiter of War, his immediate superior, asked to deliver them at once to the addressees, and to bring me the replies. Borodoyevskiy did the same and asked the Colonel to request the French Command to receive him on urgent business.

The business was urgent indeed. After the Ukrainian troops withdrew from Odessa, the Volunteer Army had seized the printing plates for 50-karbovantsi assignates (banknotes) and were intensively engaged in printing Ukrainian currency. Borodayevskiy and his associates from the Minsitry of Finance had to protest to the French

Command on the illegality of such printing of currency by agents of the Volunteer Army. Several days passed. We inquired daily of Matveyev and his coworkers as to French reaction to the protest, but the answer was always the same: Anselm and the Chief of Staff were very busy; they apologized and asked us to wait a day or two.

At last we learned accidentally that nothing had been relayed to the French concerning our wish for a conference, and that General Grekov's letters had been opened, read, and left undelivered . . . When I tried to find out who was responsible for such incredible malfeasance, each one began to accuse the other.

Aside from the military mission, there was also the so-called special mission in Odessa, headed by Dr. Galip, a Bukovinian, my predecessor as Deputy Minister, who was assigned to the Paris delegation, but arrived there only in the late summer of 1919. It was in Odessa that I met Galip for the first time. Ostapenko and Grekov, ministers and plenipotentiaries, would also visit Odessa from time to time.

Soon, bypassing General Matveyev, I found my own way to the French Command. It was evident that disintegration, intrigue and unauthorized action were already underway in Odessa.

Matveyev was fired before long. Local intrigue ended only with the arrival of K.A. Matsiyevich, Minister of Foreign Affairs and plenipotentiary-extraordinary.

The day after I had arrived in Odessa, S.M. Shemet called on me and suggested I contact representatives of Kuban' and Belourussia, who were in Odessa for the same purpose as our group. This suggestion pleased me, and I went to see them that very day. The Kuban' delegation was headed by L.L. Bych, the well-known territorial leader who was popular also in other areas, particularly Ukraine. The head of the Belorussian delegation was Bakhanovich, an engineer,[1] of whom we knew nothing at all. He seemed capable and intelligent.

We decided at our first conference to prepare a joint

[1] Referred to as "General" later in the text.-Tr.

statement for the French Command with regard to the political aspirations of Ukraine, Kuban' and Belorussia, methods for combating bolshevism, and the expected aid from the Entente. General Cherechukin, representative of the Don, also in Odessa, joined us too.

I was delegated to make a draft of the statement. It was also decided to prepare a memorandum on the economic conditions of these four new political organisms. The work was assigned to S.V. Borodayevskiy.

My draft was accepted without important alterations. Before applying my signature to the statement, I asked representatives of every Ukrainian party in Odessa to organize a special meeting for the exchange of ideas on the substance of our statement. This meeting was held and the following parties were represented: SR, SD, SF, and Corngrowers-Democrats.[2] I listened to all their opinions. Some took exception to certain details, but the general sense of the statement was approved. So I signed the statement with a clear conscience, as a document presenting at that time my inmost thoughts on the means of restoration of law and order on the ruin and chaos in nearly the whole vast territory of Russia.

My cosigners were Dr. Galip, L.L. Bych, General Bakhanovich and General Cherechukin, on behalf of Ukraine, Kuban', Belorussia and Don, respectively. The moment was solemn for all of us. I remember how the venerable Cherechukin made the sign of the cross before signing the statement.

Here is the full text.

> We, the undersigned representatives of Ukraine, Belorussia, Don, and Kuban', assembled in Odessa for our joint conference, resolve to submit the following memorandum to the High Command of the Entente Powers, on the following subjects:
>
> 1. The form of the state-political organization of these territories as well as of the state-political formations adjacent to them.

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[2] Shemet and Matsiyevich, both from Kiev, attended the meeting. Matsiyevich was not yet a minister, but came to Odessa as a political leader. ADM.

2. The means and methods for suppression of anarchy and bolshevism in all states and areas, the products of decomposition of Russia.

1

The most ardent partisans of a direct and immediate reorganization of the once undivided state of Russia, as a federation, must now admit that its federalization "from the summit down" would meet with insuperable obstacles, in view of the events of the last 18 months and in relation to the catastrophy inflicted on Russia by the bolshevist coup of October 25, 1917.

There are very few examples of direct and immediate transition from centralized unitary regime of a state to a federation regime, as known in the history of the origins of political systems. Experiments of that sort were more or less successful in certain South American states (Bolivia, Venezuela, etc.).

The successful models of federation were developed not from the "summit down" but from the "bottom up." Both the United States and Switzerland were formed as combinations of individual states or cantons, respectively. Transition from the alliance to a union of states was the net result of political evolution and of the sequence of events in these instances.

The type of conversion to federation was the outcome of free agreements based upon good and free will of individual states or cantons.

Political parties, who adopted reorganization of Russia as a federation in their programs, were inspired by the example of the South American states.

After the coup of February 27, 1917, the following organizations went on record in favor of the federalization of Russia: Grand Circle of the Host of Don (Bol'shoy Voyskovoy Krug Dona), the Kuban Regional Rada, the Belorussian Rada, and most of the Russian, Ukrainian and other political parties. The All-Russian Constituent Assembly had time enough, in the few hours of its existence, to proclaim the need of the federalization of Russia.

Thereupon Russia disintegrated, as a matter of fact. The central authority vanished, so that parts of

the country which did not recognize the bolshevist regime organized local governments of their own, with the aid of politically healthy elements, and were forced to proclaim themselves as sovereign entities.

There was no centripetal force capable not merely of proclaiming but also of implementing this kind of reconstruction of the old edifice on federal premises.

Federalization "from the summit," at this time would be possible only by interference of foreign powers in force, by compulsion. There is no other way to effectuate federalization "from the summit." The only remaining possibility is federalization "from the bottom up," by voluntary agreement, equal with equal, between state-political nuclei developed on the ruins of Old Russia.

Only this can be the program, healthy and viable, of those federalists who make plans on the basis of the actual power relationships and the overall political situation, and not on the basis of their personal wishes and expectations only.

On the foregoing premises, we, the representatives of Ukraine, Belorussia, Don and Kuban', are profoundly convinced that state-political organization of these four entities may be properly and speedily implemented only by institution of law and order in every one of them separately, as in discrete political bodies.

There are reasons to believe that other state-political formations will adhere to our formula.

We are appealing to the Entente Powers, through the Allied High Command, for possible aid to the national aspirations of our people, for strengthening of the discrete political formations which already exist.

The proper time for clarification of conditions of the agreements, on the basis of liberty, fraternity and equality of all peoples, the principles proclaimed by your great nations, will come only after the suppression of bolshevism and anarchy, when the population in every one of the state-political formations will have the opportunity freely to express its true will.

2

Turning now to the burning question with regard

to the best and shortest ways to liquidate anarchy and bolshevism, we take the liberty of calling the attention of the High Command to a very important and most relevant fact.

Success in combat with bolshevism will be attainable particularly if local populations, the source of live strength, will be made the basis of operations in every area. Defense of one's own house and home, family, people—these are the slogans in the appeals for extermination of bolshevism.

We are applying to the High Command also for technical aid and materials which are in short supply with us or totally unavailable.

The first priority includes rifles, cartridges, mitrailleuses (machine guns), heavy artillery, particularly tanks and armored cars. Military equipment is seriously deficient, such as footwear, clothing, communications apparatus, medical materials.

We believe it unnecessary to complicate the purely military problem of combating bolshevism by striving for organization of a unified army for operations in every area afire with bolshevism.

We admit, however, to the necessity of one single General Staff as the guide of all operations, for a more efficient organization of the war, on the basis of a mutual agreement between the newly formed states which are at war with bolshevism and are in contact with one another and with the Entente Powers. A Staff of this type should not interfere in political and internal affairs of the newly formed states.

This statement was delivered to the addressee as early as February 5. It was published in every newspaper in Odessa, attracted general attention, and was maliciously attacked by those who expected the Volunteer Army to save Russia.

It developed later that Nekrashevich, the Belorussian Consul, was also in Odessa with credentials from the Belorussian government, and that he contested the legitimacy of Bakhanovich's delegation. We could not intrude into other people's affairs and it was enough for us to obtain Nekrashevich's signature under our statement. He reported it to the High Command. The French regarded

Nekrashevich as a representative of a more authoritative movement in Belorussia.

More than two and a half years have elapsed since the presentation of our statement.

The Entente Powers were deaf to the appeals for aid to local forces, appeals we made repeatedly in Paris, London and Rome. The aimlessness and futility of the All-Russian centralist slogans in combating anarchy were manifest to the Entente only after the failures of Kochak, Denikin, Yudenich and Wrangel. Local patriotism, a creative impulse, was the only force that could oppose bolshevism. It was obvious even then that Ukrainians would not fight bolshevism in Siberia, Georgians would not agree to die in the fields of Estonia, Estonians would decline to march on Moscow . . .

As we know, the Allied Command in Odessa was actually represented by the French. In Novorossiysk and Batum it was represented by the British. It was my luck, even back in Odessa, to ascertain the reason for such distribution of roles. I learned from the most reliable sources about the secret treaty between England and France on their spheres of influence in European Russia. I do not know the exact date of that treaty, but it antedates the Peace of Brest-Litovsk in any case.

The treaty assigned to the British sphere the north of Russia (the forest belt), the Baltic territories, Caucasus, Kuban', and the eastern part of the Don. The western part, consisting of the Don, Ukraine, Crimea and Poland, fell within the French zone.

Later on, in Paris as in London, the existence of this secret treaty was attested by facts I encountered at every step. Only in the beginning of 1920 could friction be sensed in this tremendously important political problem. It seemed radical change was possible in the Allied attitude to the fortunes of Eastern Europe.

I am reporting this information here openly, in the belief that the timing is right.

While in Odessa I learned of a strong political current in France favoring the tightest linkage between Poland, Rumania and Ukraine in the near future. Czechoslovakia

had been mentioned too, as the fourth link in the chain, in and out as it was, a possible partner in the anti-German coalition.

The most influential political leaders of France directed this current, as I later found out in Paris. Simultaneously, there was also another current in France, just as strong, in favor of restoration of Russia undivided.

This subject will be treated in detail in a later chapter of the book.

My visit with General Anselm made it plain that he, a combat general, was not particularly interested in politics, a subject he assigned mainly to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Freydenberg. All our sessions and negotiations from then on were conducted only only with Freydenberg, mine as well as Matsiyevich's and Bachinskiy's, the newly appointed Deputy Minister.

My impression of Berthelot, the well-known French general, was entirely different, when he came from his Bucharest headquarters to Odessa for several days. One could feel at once that here was the man really interested in politics, with definite ideas on the future of Eastern Europe. Our second meeting in Bucharest made it clear that Berthelot was a partisan of federalization of the quondam State of Russia.

Kiev was taken by the bolsheviks early in February. The Directory and the government were in Vinnitsa. Interrelations of the French, the Volunteer Army, and the Ukrainian delegates were complicated and confused. The French were wavering, unable to make up their minds. The Odessa police were staffed by the Volunteer Army. But at the railway station, for example, a French Commandant was in sole command. Barodayevskiy and I were hardly settled in our lodgings in the city when the police came suddenly in the night and arrested Borodayevskiy on the Army's warrant. This was the outcome of his earlier complaint to the French on the stereotypes for printing currency . . .

Thereupon I hurried back to the official car at the station. Borodayevskiy was kept in jail over a month until Freydenberg at last harkened to our cares and demanded

his liberation. The French explained their long reluctance in the case by the unwillingness of the Ukrainian government to liberate several people for whom they were interceding, namely Gerbel', Rzhepetskiy, Reynbot (all former ministers of the Hetman' government) and others then incarcerated in Vinnitsa. The French were saying to us: "Do what we ask and then we shall pressure the Volunteers and liberate Borodayevskiy," an insulting and unacceptable approach.

In essence Matsiyevich, Bachinskiy and I disagreed radically with the Ukrainian government on its delay in satisfying the humanitarian request of the French to release people no longer dangerous to anyone.

We repeatedly demanded satisfaction of the French request, even after the liberation of Borodayevskiy. On my way from Bucharest to Paris I had sent again a categorical telegram to that effect, adding that General Berthelot insisted on the liberation of Gerbel' and other prisoners. They were freed at last, because of my telegram or for some other reason.

I pass now to the substance of the projected agreement between the directory and the French Command. Here are the main points thereof:

1) The French demanded transfer of all railways and finances of Ukraine to their own control. 2) Resignation of Vinnichenko from the Directory and of Chekhovskiy from the government, both "leftists", were absolute prerequisites for the deal, but the Petlyura problem was to remain an open question for the moment. 3) Remuneration of landowners, as a principle, was to be incorporated in the agrarian reform.

On the other side, France was to recognize the Directory as a de facto government of Ukraine, pending solution of the Ukrainian sovereignty problem by the Peace Conference. Furthermore, the French Command was obligated to give technical aid to the Ukrainian army in its war with the bolsheviks, technically with tanks as well as personnel, particularly instructors. Greek troops had even made their appearance in Odessa in March for that very purpose;

formation of French and Rumanian batallions was in the planning stage.

Vinnichenko and Chekhovskiy resigned on February 6. A new coalition government was formed with Ostapenko as chief, with participation of the Social-Federalists: Matsiyevich, Feshchenko-Chopovskiy, Markovich and Korchinskiy.

The projected agreement was already in written form. All that remained was to have it signed.

All at once, representatives of the French Command unexpectedly telegraphed from Paris that negotiations of the agreement were to be discontinued . . .

A few days later, on April 3, the French began their hurried evacuation of Odessa and left the city to ruin by the bolsheviks.

There are several versions even now as to the reasons for such evacuation. The time has not yet come; we have no reliable data for disentangling relationships within the Entente during the Odessa period. The actual cause of the evacuation remains a mystery.

CHAPTER XI

Pogroms in February and March. My resignation. Departure for Paris

Disintegration of the Ukrainian army was at its peak in the disorderly retreat from Vinnitsa to Kamenets-Podol'sk, while the successes of the bolsheviks on the Ukrainian front were increasing progressively. Pogroms, frightful atrocities, began in February and March. Arrivals from Balta, Anan'yev, Proskurov and other cities and villages, eyewitnesses of the pogroms, told of cruelties beyond imagination, which brought to mind the saddest days of 1903 in Kishinev . . .

Jewish delegations from sites of the pogroms were turning to Matsiyevich and me. Our situation was a nightmare . . . We dashed from the telegraph line to the French Command, we conferred with Grekov . . . Grekov was truly depressed. Like me, he rushed from place to place, trying to do whatever he could. He hurried off to the front, issued orders to courtmartial and shoot the pogromizers . . . None of that had any effect. It was impossible even to find out whether the government's orders were obeyed in places farther than a few versts from the seat of the government.

In my faith in the hypnotic power of the very word "Entente," still effective for the entire population of the south of Ukraine, I implored Freydenberg to protest in print, in a sharply-worded condemnation of the pogroms, pointing out that Ukraine had compromised and branded herself shamefully in the eyes of the world by such barbarism. My plea was denied. The allies had no desire to "interfere in the domestic affairs of Ukraine" . . .

Meanwhile the French were still masters of communications as far as Birzula. We knew very well that it was not possible either to leave Odessa or to go toward Odessa be-

yond Birzula, where the French control post was situated. Even beyond Birzula, everyone at the railway stations would smarten up respectfully at the merest rumor of a single French officer on a train, either expected or already in the station . . . I saw this myself, on the way for a day's visit in Vinnitsa together with Matsiyevich, to report our negotiations with the French to the government.

A courier from the French Command was on the same limited train with us, with packages for the Directory. This fact was enough to procure our pass and the locomotive for the train from Odessa. Obviously the French could easily occupy the entire line from Birzula to Vinnitsa, as well as from Zhmerinka to Proskurov. It would take only two or three batallions. And then there would be no anarchy, no pogroms . . .

Once again, this time in Vinnitsa, I had no chance for a closer acquaintance with Petlyura who was again hurrying to the front. His looks impressed me favorably. He seemed talented, bold, and yet a gentle and kind person.

Alarming news streamed in from all sides.

Balta, after the terror of two pogroms, held its breath in fear of a third, and Balta was not the only place in such condition.

Dr. M.S. Schwarzman, head of the Jewish community in Odessa and a Zionist leader, was tremendously active in these days. He too was knocking on the Entente's door, directing Jewish delegations of the victims as well as of those who expected pogroms, conferring with Matsiyevich, conferring with me . . .

I could not bear to remain in my post any longer. And yet I was aware that my resignation would be of no use to anyone, that those who could at least sound the alarm would be fewer by one man. I could still use the direct telegraph line from Odessa to Stavka of the Directory, which was controlled by the French and restricted to official persons.

I did telegraph to the government my appeals to their political sense, not only to their emotions. I had no doubt, nevertheless, that over there in Stavka, the people could understand the horror of it all, not only for the sorrowful

victims of the pogroms but for the national cause of Ukraine and for themselves personally. The people in Stavka had lost their bearings; their authority was gone; they were caught and carried by the muddy but turbulent current of disaster.

Understanding to the full my own helplessness, I turned at last to Schwarzman and other Zionist leaders for advice, Kievans who were then in Odessa. I asked them to tell me what to do, resign or carry on. Their advice was to delay my decision.

After several days, the advice was to resign, which I did at once.

On March 11, 1919, I submitted the following statement to Matsiyevich, Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"The burden of difficult and responsible work which is borne by every member of the government at this time has become complicated by the tragic fact of the unending Jewish pogroms and by the realization that the authorities have proved consistently unable to arrest the horrible violence and murders which have taken place in Proskurov, Anan'yev and elsewhere. I know that the government is doing everything in its power in its struggle against pogroms. I know also that the government's helplessness in this struggle is depressing all its members, deprives them of the equanimity and calm so essential in productive work for the benefit of all people who live in Ukraine. My heavy thoughts, as a Jew, are exacerbated further by the realization that this anarchy means death to the Jewish people, while to the rest of the population it leads mainly to economic deprivation.

"In view of these considerations, I feel no longer able to continue my work as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and request release from the duties my official position entails."

Matsiyevich noted on my petition the request that I remain in the service pending his return from Stavka, where he planned to go on that same day.

Matsiyevich had barely reached his destination when the bolsheviks broke through the Ukrainian front. He could not be expected to return soon, obviously. So I said to S.V.

Bachinskiy, who stayed in Odessa, that I no longer considered myself Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The same problem was solved differently by P.A. Krasnyy, Minister of Jewish Affairs at the Ukrainian government. He stayed at his post and has not quit the government even to this day. I do not know which of us was right in those days of horror, whether it was myself, abandoning the ship which had become a plaything of the elements, or Krasnyy, staying on and trying to help the victims of hatred, savagery and unbridled crime . . .

I left the government but remained an ordinary member of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris. The question presented itself again: should I go to Paris or leave the delegation too?

There was nothing left for me to do in Odessa. To go to Crimea, where the Volunteer Army was playing the master, seemed inconvenient.

My former friends and colleagues in our work for the All-Russian liberation movement, now in Crimea, no longer shared the same language with me. They wanted to rebuild the collapsed multifloor building from the roof down; I thought it more sensible to begin with the base, build the ground floor first, be it the only one. They did not believe and did not want to believe in the strength of the Ukrainian national movement, which they identified with bolshevism, but I had already experienced the strength of that movement and saw salvation solely in its opposition to bolshevism.

My closest friends in Kiev were beyond reach. My wife and one of my daughters were also in Kiev . . . When I left them in January I was certain of my quick return together with representatives of the Entente . . .

My old parents were then in Odessa; my other two daughters and son-in-law, E.M. Kulisher, were in Crimea.

The French who knew me insisted on my going to Paris. Once again, as in Kiev, it seemed that only aid from the West could stop the anarchy and pogroms. I decided to go to Paris and determine my relations with the Ukrainian delegation to Paris right there.

As late as March 31 Colonel Freydenberg and other

Frenchmen assured me they would never surrender Odessa to the bolsheviks, would never quit Odessa, for that matter. All these assurances were made in good faith. Odessa and its vicinity were simply flooded with French, Greek and Rumanian troops. Nobody was in a hurry to leave accordingly.

The very next day, April 1, I took an Italian ship and sailed from Odessa on my way to Paris via Galats and Bucharest.

In Bucharest the news was that the evacuation of Odessa was underway . . . I stayed there over a week, in the hope of visiting General Berthelot and contacting the local rabbi and representatives of Rumanian Jewry. It was necessary also to obtain visas from several countries through which I had to travel, and to reserve a place on the Paris express. The latter was quite difficult, because the express left only twice a week and every place in it was booked months in advance. It was only by courtesy of General Berthelot that one of the reservations held for the Allied Command was assigned to me, though I was not one of their members.

I ran into Freydenberg by chance, on the eve of my departure. He related to me details of the evacuation of Odessa. He was on the same train as I, on the way to Paris, and we spent a good part of the trip together. I came to know him better and to learn that the stories I had heard about him in Odessa were largely misunderstandings and plain lies . . . His name was exploited by adventurers and scoundrels who were swarming all over Odessa at that time. Only one thing I could neither forget nor forgive Freydenberg and every Frenchman who was there: their inertia and silence with regard to the pogroms.

We often met in Paris. He admitted openly several grave errors of the French, accusing Hainaut, who was the earliest one in Odessa and from whom emanated the original information. Hainaut had depicted all Ukrainians as bolsheviks and was full of praise for the Volunteer Army. This intelligence had prompted the initial policy of the French in Odessa. Afterwards it was Freydenberg himself who saw that a wholly different path ought to be taken.

In the course of negotiations in Odessa, mentioned earlier in this book, I learned that Freydenberg was indeed in favor of aid to the Ukrainian government in its struggle with bolshevism. He adhered to this same viewpoint in his reports to the French government.

By April 17 I reached Paris.

CHAPTER XII

Paris in spring of 1919. Ukrainian delegation. Jewish delegation. Maklakov, Kerenskiy, Avksent'yev. Project for dispatch of French military mission to Ukraine. Audience with Pichon and Clemenceau. French orientations.

Boulevards, crowds, restaurants, the entire appearance of Paris was utterly unlike what it had been before the war, when the very name of the city meant gaiety and the joy of living. The people were not themselves. Everything would be shut down by eleven in the evening. Striking attire was no more; the so-called vie parisienne was no more.

I was particularly astonished by the listlessness of the city towards the Peace Conference. Its sessions were no longer solemn. Indeed, the image of the conference had tarnished, for all it had assembled originally under the aegis of the noble and just principles of Wilson. He himself seemed spent, his best words already given. Day by day Wilson demolished his own words ruthlessly, and everything the Conference did was their repudiation.

The duel of Wilson with Clemenceau has been brilliantly described in Keynes' book. Wilson was yielding, point by point, but Clemenceau too was destined for retirement before long. Lloyd George, his influence steadily increasing, was the only one of the three principal persons in the Conference who kept his position and power after the Peace of Versailles.

My old acquaintances and party comrades Shul'gin, Shelukhin and Kushnir were members of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris. As to the others, Dr. Paneyko and Dr. Matyushenko were outstanding in their preparedness for the very difficult task, their knowledge of languages, their

tact. Their talents were akin, but their thinking and tactics poles apart.

It becomes necessary here to consider the character of G.M. Sidorenko, head of the delegation, in some detail.

This sincerely patriotic Ukrainian had assumed a burden beyond his capacities, as I sensed after the first of our meetings. Every state and nationality had tried to send its most brilliant, best educated, experienced representative to the Conference, as the head of its delegation. Sidorenko had no such self-evident capacities, the absolute prerequisites of his position and function. He was believed to be a very good administrator and engineer. But that was not enough. A bad engineer or worthless administrator would do, but we needed a strong diplomat, perfectly at ease in French and English, a good speaker, a man of the world.

As a matter of fact, there was no person in our delegation fully endowed with all these capacities. Nonetheless Shul'gin, Paneyko and Matyushenko were far better suited for the job, not to speak of others not there (e.g. Prokopovich).

But Sidorenko proved up to the mark in the field which was of a particular interest to me, i.e. the Jewish problem, which had determined my participation in the delegation. In his view it was plain justice to guarantee equal rights for all nationalities in the state of Ukraine. He was convinced that it would be impossible for the Ukrainian nation by itself to build a state without the participation of Jews, because of the numerical weakness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and an almost nonexistent trade-industrial class in the country. His statements on the Jewish problem, authentic and sincere, won favor with the Jewish leaders (Lucien Wulf and the Jewish delegation at the Peace Conference).

Directly we met, I knew that Sidorenko would go along with me in the defense of Jewish interests and that he would give me complete freedom of action in the case. Indeed, I was not mistaken in Sidorenko. He was consistently beyond reproach in the entire field of the Jewish problem, notwithstanding important disagreements which

developed eventually and which led to an almost complete break between us by the end of the summer. Sidorenko showed considerable energy in establishing the Questionnaire Committee of Jewry to investigate pogroms on the spot. At his invitation I was the delegation's spokesman on the Jewish problem at Clemenceau's reception.

Sidorenko, aware of the importance of contacts with Jewry, was only too glad to meet their representatives. One of these meetings took place in my hotel. The delegation of Ukrainian Jews was represented by Usyshkin, Goldstein and Kaplan. The Ukrainian side was represented by Paneyko and Shul'gin in addition to Sidorenko. The Jewish delegates spoke decisively and to the point, calling attention to the hopeless situation of Jews in Ukraine, inability of the Ukrainian government to defend them from pogroms, and the impunity of the instigators and ringleaders of pogroms. Shul'gin's explanation impressed the audience, tormented as he was by his awareness that Ukrainians (from the refuse of the nation) were responsible for these horrors; we sensed how he took to heart the sufferings of the victims.

Sidorenko spoke convincingly but with less inspiration than Shul'gin, of the innocence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the pogroms, helplessness of the government, future perspectives.

Such meetings continued even after I left. Members of the Jewish delegation had the opportunity to see for themselves how alien antisemitism was to the representatives of Ukraine in Paris. These representatives were by no means exceptions in the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Their views and feelings were the same as those of Feshchenko-Chopovskiy, Korchinskiy and other members of the late government, as well as of Petlyura and Chekhovskiy. None belonged to that high-born "nobility" of Russia who had absorbed hatred and contempt for Jews with their mothers' milk. Children of village school teachers, orthodox priests, peasants, the men I mentioned, had grown up with Jewish youth, taking part together in the liberation movement. The psychology and attitude of the Ukrainian intellectual in relation to the

Jewish problem stand out clearly in the stories of Modest Levitskiy, a well known Ukrainian leader, a physician who traveled throughout Ukraine and understood the Jewish mode of life. Vinnichenko's latest movie scenario, "Kol Nidre" is illuminating in this respect. I came to know Louis Marshall, a member of the Jewish delegation, while in Paris. We stayed at the same hotel and I marveled at his capacity for work, his dedication to his people. As an American, however, he had a rather vague orientation in the Jewish problem. But on the other hand it would be difficult to expect calm objectivity from foreigners with reference to a movement so unknown to them, so poorly understood, and accompanied by revolting phenomena such as the inhuman, ferocious pogroms of a peaceful Jewish population.

I was in contact also with Sokolov and Motskin, members of the Presidium of the Jewish delegation, and reported on the part of my work which would be of interest to the delegation.

Among the Russians I called on Maklakov first of all. I had met him during the trial of Jewish dentists in Moscow, and again in the pretrial stage of the Beilis case, as well as during the trial itself. His quick mind, finesse, capacity to understand friend and foe, made me think that he would grasp at once the scope of the reconciliation wherein the various political groups and movements could work together in their common awareness of the need for the struggle against anarchy and to impose law and order on Eastern Europe.

The gist of my proposal was as follows. The Peace Conference in Paris was being attended by missions and delegations from Ukraine, Don, Kuban', Gruzia, Azerbaydzhan, Armenia, North Caucasian mountaineers, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. But Great Russia (Velikorossia) was not represented, inasmuch as the "Russian Political Conference" and the Russian SR group spoke in the name of the "whole" Russia or of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, respectively. Such power ratios lead to confusion and muddle. A part of the whole cannot negotiate with the whole, if the whole speaks for that same

part too. But were there a group to speak for Great Russia only, it would become easier at once to open the negotiations of that group with representatives of the other parts of the former Russian Empire. I proposed consequently to organize a consulting body at the Peace Conference made up of representatives of Great Russia, Ukraine and other areas, with each one of them represented by five delegates of its own. In view of the large size of Siberia, I amended this plan by allowing a separate delegation from Siberia too.

I suggested the following slogans for such a combination of groups: a) struggle with bolshevism; b) the right to convoke its own Constituent Assembly for each area, every one of the newly formed national states, including Russia and Siberia, as the only competent body to determine the fortunes of the given land; c) peaceful propaganda in favor of a closer solidarity of them all in future, on the basis of their voluntary agreements, i.e. their confederation.

This was but a further development of the projected agreement between Ukraine, Don, Kuban' and Belorussia (in Odessa, Chapter X).

Maklakov was very interested in my plan. We discussed it together on several occasions. It would be embarrassing and even impossible for him, a former ambassador of the whole of Russia, to assume representation of but one part of that same whole, i.e. of Velikorossia ("Great Russia") only. However, he promised to think it over and find someone to fit the job.

Maklakov's search for the right man continued for a long time, but he simply could not find any such person.

Nothing remarkable here, for no Russian will agree to act as a representative of Velikorossia rather than of Russia, as a whole. There are no Russians of that kind in nature, not yet. . .

Sokolov, Slonim and Sukhomlin, all SR members of the Constituent Assembly, were negotiating with me concurrently, thanks to the initiative of R.M. Blank and N.A. Lazarkevich. I acquainted them with the project and for a

time it looked as if we could reach some kind of an agreement. They promised to answer me in a few days.

Soon afterward Kerenskiy and Vishnyak did indeed call on me, as delegates authorized to continue the negotiations. From the very first words of Kerenskiy, it developed that neither he nor Vinshyak was acquainted with the substance of my project. So I had to repeat the whole works from the start.

Kerenskiy then spoke against my project with considerable heat and at length. He was quite carried away and went off on a tangent, saying a Gruzian peasant cannot get along without the Russian language, without Pushkin and Tolstoy. He spoke sincerely, emotionally, but we had to arrive at something tangible; at last I asked him to formulate some kind of counter-proposal, should he find my plan unacceptable.

That was the point where the same old story was repeated again and again. "Russian democracy must reach agreement with the nationalities," was Kerenskiy's stereotyped reply. When I pointed out that the Russians (Velikorossy) were also a nationality and that Russian democracy consisted of the nationalities' democracies he stopped me impatiently and declared that I was "quibbling at words," declaring further, with the same old error in logic, that he was a Russian and not a Velikoross. It followed accordingly that Tseretelli or Matsiyevich or Vinnichenko must speak in the name of the nationalities, while Kerenskiy and Avksent'yev spoke in the name of democracy. In no way could I accept such a statement of the problem, nor could I forget for a second the copybook maxim, i.e., the Tserettelli represents democracy fully as much as Kerenskiy, and that Avksent'yev is not without his own kith and kin, very much like Chkeidze or Pip.

Our tryst had a sequel in characteristically Old-Russia style. As before, their farewell was: "The answer will be given in four to five days". But when we met again at Avksent'yev's, Kerenskiy failed to appear and I had to recite the entire history of our dealings from the very beginning, for Avksent'yev's benefit, since he had not been initiated into that subject at all.

Avksent'yev added nothing new to what had already been said by Kerenskiy. Once again the same formula was sounded on the arrangement between the Russian democracy and the nationalities. Once again the declaration that he, Avksent'yev, regarded himself as a Russian and not as a Velikoross.

This brings to mind autocratic old times when the government of the Czar would condescend occasionally to listen to the nationalities, whereupon that government would determine their fortunes as it saw fit. It brings to mind also the sultan's solemn receptions of representatives of the nationalities inhabiting the Ottoman Empire, a scene well known to everyone who had ever been to the circus and had seem pantomimes of the Turkish or Persian courts.

But now it had to be the representatives of democracy to converse with the nationalities.

Only a short while ago (summer 1917), these very same Russian SRs, including Kerenskiy and Avksent'yev, at their congress in Moscow, were proclaiming the nationalities' rights to full self-determination up to secession, at their own discretion. Now the representatives of democracy were taking back all of that.

A vicious circle . . . I was not quibbling, as Kerenskiy thought. Something was wrong somewhere, if Russia was called a democracy but Estonia or Gruzia were treated as nationalities.

Sluggishness and the timeworn revolutionary phraseology were at the bottom of it all. Well educated, highly intelligent people who would find their way through the most difficult problems of science, civics, politics, could not get rid of their outmoded habits of thinking on this particular problem. Avksent'yev and Kerenskiy spoke in the name of the Russian democracy, L'vov and Chaykovskiy in the name of the Russian people vis-a-vis the nationalities (non-Russian Russians), as constituent members of that people.

While in Paris, I also called on N.V. Chaykoskiy, whom I had known when we served on the Committee of the Laborite-Peoples'-Socialist party. This grand old man, one

of the best in Russia, was utterly saddened by the goings-on in his homeland, the country to which he had dedicated a virtuous life. He had waged deadly war against autocracy, rejoiced to see the fall of autocracy, and saw his joy poisoned so quickly, so irretrievably. . .

Savinkov, whom I met in Paris for the first time, was particularly sober and farsighted in his view of current events and perspectives therein. I have never seen him again, but followed his activities through newspapers and by hearsay.

My visits at the Russian division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, began shortly on my arrival in Paris. Together with Shul'gin, I was directed by the Ukrainian delegation to present the Ukrainian problem to the particular attention of France. Pending discussion of currents and trends in French policies and in keeping with the chronological sequence of events, I am reporting now on a certain immediate problem on our delegation's agenda.

The evacuation of Odessa by the French could not be taken as a decisive factor in their future relations with Ukraine. We had reason to believe that France preferred Galicia and not the Black Sea area the ground for Ukrainian military actions against the bolsheviks. The Ukrainian government was near the Galician border at that very moment. We exerted ourselves to the utmost in trying to induce the French to send their military mission to Galicia, together with any possible aid for the Ukrainian army.

On May 6, 1919 Shul'gin presented to the Ministry his memorandum on this subject. The Ministry's official reply was dated May 19. I am offering here this reply in full, a very important document, representative of the French government's policy at the time:

MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES
Direction des Affaires politiques et commerciales
Service des Affaires Russes

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
Paris, 19. Mai 1919.

A la date du 6 Mai, Monsieur Choulguine a bien voulu remettre un mémoire rappelant des demandes antérieurement adressées au Gouvernement francais, en vue de recevoir de ce dernier l'aide matérielle et morale qui est nécessaire à l'Ukraine pour lutter avec succés contre le bolchevisme russe.

Le Gouvernement français est heureux de constater l'attitude conforme à ses propres sentiments, prise par les Ukrainiens contre le bolcheviks qui sont, avant tout, des ennemis de l'humanité, et il ne peut rester indifférent aux appels faits en ce sens. Il est donc disposé à envoyer dès maintenant en Galicie une mission militaire dont le renforcement dépendrait de la solution des questions en litige, dans un sens conforme aux vues de la Conférence de la Paix.

Toutefois, en raison des nécessites politiques actuelles l'appui de la France doit être subordonné aux considerations générales ci-après.

Il est impossible actuellement au Gouvernement Français d'intervenir d'une maniere quelconque entre Ukrainiens et Polonais pur la possession de Lemberg. Cette question est soumise à l'examen de la Conférence de la Paix. Il serait indispensable qu' Ukrainiens et Polonais s'unissent dans la lutte contre l'ennemi commun, le bolchevisme, fassent taire leurs revendications personelles et cessassent des hostilités qui n'ont que trop longtemps dure. En consequence il devrait être utilisés sur les fronts d'opération galiciens, ni s'occuper de l'organisation de la lutte sur de tels fronts.

En dernier lieu, l'appui de la France ne doit profiter aucunement à un groupement, quel qu'il soit, pour organiser les troupes qui entreprendraient plus tard la lutte contre les éléments stables de la Russie, ou considérés comme tels par le Gouvernement français, notamment contre les troupes des armees Koltschak et Denikine, au cas où, dans leur marche contre les bolcheviks, elles pénétraient sur les territoires ukrainiennes. Les mêmes réserves sont donc faites expressement contre l'emploi des officiers à des buts de ce genre et les instructions les plus strictes leur seront donnés a leur départ pour qu'ils se retirent ausitôt et quittent les territoires ruthéno-ukrainiens si

le risque se presentait de leur entrée en conflict avec les dits éléments militaires russes.

Il en aurait urgence à ce que Monsieur Choulguine voulût bien faire connaitre sa pleine adhésion aux principes cidessus de maniere à permettre l'envoi sans retard de la mission envisagée en Galicie.

Signature (illisible).

On May 20 Shul'gin sent the following letter on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation:

Delegation Ukrainienne
37 Rue de la Perouse, Paris Paris, 20. Mai 1919.

En réponse de la note du Ministere des Affaires étrangères du 19 mai 1919, j'ai l'honneur, au nom de la délégation de la République Ukrainienne à Paris, de vous déclarer, qu'elle le remercie de la décision d'envoyer une mission militaire qui nous apportera son aide matérielle dans la lutte contre le bolchevisme russe.

En ce qui concerne les conditions aux quelles sont proposés les instructeurs français et les munitions, je dois déclarer qu'il n'est nullement dans les intentions du Gouvernement de la Republique Ukrainienne de les utiliser ni contre les Polonais, ni contre les troupes de Koltchak ou de Denikine. Dans le cas exceptionel où les operations militaires amèneraient, sur le territoire ukrainien, les troupes anti-bolchevistes quelconque travaillant avec le concours de l'Entente, il deviendrait absolument nécessaire de faire un arrangement immédiat dans chaque cas avec le Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne.

Délégué de la République Ukrainienne
Ancien ministre des Affaires
étrangères.
sig. A. CHOULGUINE.

Au Ministère des Affaires
Etrangères—Service des
Affaires russes.

The Ministry, entirely satisfed with Shul'gin's response, pursued negotiations on the composition of the French military mission, is objectives, agenda in detail, and the day of the departure. Shul'gin and I worked on this project continuously through the summer. Came the fall, but

the mission could not get off the ground. . . . Not even to this day!

Many hopes were shattered, buried together with that mission. My particular intention was to accompany the mission, to assume responsibility of protection of the Jewish population from the consequences of anarchy.

At the audience with Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, together with Paneyko and Shul'gin, I discussed in detail everything that could be done to counteract antisemitism and arrest the very possibility of pogroms in the future. Pending departure of the French mission to its destination, I appealed to Pichon for official condemnation of pogroms by the French government's declaration. I referred to the British example, the Balfour Declaration on Palestine, the act by which England won sympathies of the Jewish people. . . . I pointed out that we knew of the preeminence of France (accorded by its secret treaty with England) in Ukraine, Poland, Rumania, i.e. in the very territories where the majority of the entire Jewish population of the world lived.

Sympathy and eternal gratitude of these millions of Jews would be gained by France were France to make a declaration on the Jewish problem.

Old Pichon listened intently, nodding approval and taking notes. . . . He promised to do whatever he could. But no declaration was made and no French mission was sent.

My statements on the same subject were just as fruitless at the reception of the Ukrainian delegation by Clemenceau. Seizure of the Ukrainian part of Galicia by Galler's Polish troops was the main topic of discussion at this audience. Paneyko was responsible for the substance of the report; Shul'gin undertook explanations of the Directory and the government; I was delegated to take up the fortunes of ethnic minorities, particularly the Jews.

Clemenceau was extremely courteous, but we sensed a false note in his brief retorts, his desire to conceal his genuine thoughts, sympathies and striving for Poland, Ukraine, and the entire subject of the Russian inheritance. He disapproved of Galler's activities, admitted that Polish intelligensia contained a multitude of antisemites and

reactionaries. . . . And yet we were still in the study of the chief architect of the edifice of the vast state of Poland, to be constructed at the expense of its neighbors, the father of the French plan for Greater Poland. And, no matter how that experienced old diplomat tried to impress us, the unwilling, compulsory amateurs in diplomacy, to make us believe he was truly angry with Galler, we left believing exactly the opposite. . . .

The time has not yet come to relate details of that conference.

As to the interference of France in the "internal affairs," i.e. protection of Jewish people from oppressions and pogroms, Clemenceau, who did nothing at all for the Ukrainian Jews, went on record with his thundering letter on the explosions of antisemitism and Jewish pogroms in Poland. His letter to Paderewski, as I remember, was published in the newspapers, with tremendous impact on the government and population of Poland. The pogroms ceased at once, but mockeries and humiliations of Jews in the streets, on trains, etc., such as shearing of beards, forced removal from trains and the like, continued sporadically. Strong was the language of that letter and France showed herself indeed a defender of the oppressed, standing up boldly against injustices and lynchings of the innocent Jewish population. But this was only for Poland. France could not permit any pogroms in the country under its special patronage. France had to save the prestige of Poland, her newborn protege, in the eyes of England, America and other civilized nations, and not merely to stop pogroms in Poland.

Pictures of slain and tortured Ukrainian Jews, the groans of survivors, their fears for the immediate future, none of that would induce Clemenceau or any of his associates in the Peace Conference to say a word for the Jews in Ukraine as he had done for the Jews of Poland. Whatever it was, France had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Ukraine.

The former reliance of France on Russia, undivided and strong, was definitely recognizable as a trend, in the Russian division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Pichon, Berthelot and Kammerer were nourishing the idea that Russia would ultimately be restored, even if Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenich failed to attain that end. The restoration would occur later, "by itself," as it were. The Ministry was averse to showing any sympathy to the nationalities' self-determination inside Russia, partly because of the fear of this sort of restoration, partly because of the feeling of obligation to a former ally who had helped to save Paris earlier in the war. Pichon and his associates were under the influence of Sazonov's and Maklakov's circles. In line with this influence, they viewed the creation of undivided Russia "with autonomies for the nationalities." As in the past, they saw a physically powerful Russia of the future as the bulwark of France against Germany in the East.

Ministerial circles insisted on our accord with Denikin's army and government, skeptical as they were of his fighting capacities and irritated to boot with his persistent attention only to England, his main protector. The French pointed out that Denikin's strength lay in that obtuse backing by England and they believed that British tanks and artillery might finally help him to succeed.

However, certain influential military and social circles of France had no part in such pro-Russian orientation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These influential circles gave their sympathy and active support to the orientation towards Poland, i.e. to the projected creation of a Greater Poland at the expense of its neighbors: parts of Germany, Belorussia, Lithuania, and a large chunk of Ukraine, so as to counterbalance the German power from the East. Military circles of France and even Clemenceau himself were ardently in favor of this project. In the depths of their souls, they were willing to grant, on paper, an independence to a *little Ukraine,* as a Polish subordinate to be towed by Poland, like a barge, to provide Poland with cannon folder for use against Germany. As a finishing touch, they were planning to append Rumania to the Poland-Ukraine combination and, if luck held, to add Czechoslovakia too.

Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia had ideas and claims of their own. They intended to have and hold cer-

tain areas populated by Ukrainians. The entire plan of the would-be coalition was contingent on these claims, with the understanding that Poland, the truest and most dependable ally of France, would play the leading role in the coalition. Ukraine was visualized as extending only to the Dnepr River in the East, plucked of its western lands for the gratification of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia by the authors of the project. As to the lands east of the Dnepr, they were intended to satisfy the claims of Russia.

Characteristically, the contrast between these two orientations, pro-Russian vs pro-Polish, has never been bared for the whole world to see. Protagonists of these radically dissimilar views and political prognoses, of the desirabilities of either one of the two alternative policies of France, were operating concurrently, as if by tacit agreement. It was as if they were betting on two cards at once, taking insurance on come what may. . . . If a strong Poland did not work out, it would be Russia who would be strong, and contrariwise. Either one of the two would do as a strong ally, a mighty bulwark against Germany in the future. . . .

The possibility of winning several friends in Eastern Europe, winning sympathies of the majority or all of the nationalities of the former state of Russia, simply did not harmonize with the fundamental characteristics of the French way of thinking and sentiment, with the structure and habits of the foreign policy of France. The French are utterly inbued, saturated with the spirit of centralism. France itself, a centralist-bureaucratic state, is a living illustration of the psychology of the French and of their most talented representatives, when it comes to state-political structure. It was not easy for them to accept at the same time, both the loss of one powerful ally in the East and the necessity of replacing that loss by several allies, a group of state-political "neomorphs."

The Ukrainian delegation in Paris was helped in its work, to a degree, only by a small group consisting of Franklin-Bouillon (member of the French Chamber of Deputies), Pelissier (a journalist), and several other sincere friends of Ukraine who actually sympathized with the law-

ful demands of the Ukrainian people. That group was advising us reasonably and in good faith to make the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly the keystone of our program and to postpone the final political settlement of Ukraine until the Assembly convened and voted on this issue. In the meanwhile they recommended that we strive for the de facto recognition of the Ukrainian Directory and government and for obtaining moral and technical aid for them in their struggle with anarchy and bolshevism.

Such was the status of the Ukrainian problem in France, in the spring and summer of 1919. Such were the political orientations of government and social circles of France with regard to the fortunes of Eastern Europe.

It was evident that the expectations of the leaders of Ukrainian policy, in relation to France, had failed to materialize. And yet it was France itself which had once led us seriously to believe that it was ready to support Ukraine and the Ukrainian people in their striving for independence. It is enough to mention that France was the first to officially recognize the Central Rada's government and appointed General Tabouis as official representative at the government of Ukraine in December 1917, almost two months before the Peace of Brest-Litovsk. A few days later, in January 1918, Picton Bagge was appointed as the representative of England.

It was France and England and not the Central Powers who were the first to recognize Ukraine.

Accreditations of Representatives of France and England at the Ukrainian Government of Central Rada [8]

LEGATION DE FRANCE
EN ROUMANIE

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
Jassy, le 29 decembre 1917.

Le Ministre de France en Roumanie à Monsieur le Général Tabouis, Commissaire de la République Française en Ukraine.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que le Gouvernement Français vous a désigné comme Commissaire de la République Française en Ukraine.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir en informer Monsieur le Secrétaire Général des Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement Ukrainien, en remettant entre ses mains la presente lettre, qui vous accrédite en cette qualite.

(Signé) SAINT-AULAIRE.

LE GENERAL
COMMISSAIRE DE LA
REPUBLIQUE

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
21 decembre 1917
Kiev, le 3 janvier 1918

Le Général Tabouis, Commissaire de la Republique Française auprès du Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne, à Monsieur le Secrétaire Génèral aux Affaires ètrangères de la République Ukrainienne.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de la République

[8] Cited from the Societe des Nations, No. 88, Annexe VIII, p. 19–20.—ADM.

Ukrainienne que le Gouvernement de la République Française m'a désigné comme Commissaire de la République Française auprès du Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne.

Je vous demanderai, en conséquence, de bien vouloir me faire savoir quel jour et à quelle heure je pourrai faire au Chef du Gouvernement ma visite solennelle de présentation oficielle.

Veuillez, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, agréer l'assurance de ma haute considération.

(Signé) TABOUIS.

REPRESENTANT DE LA GRANDE-BRETAGNE Janvier.

A Son Excellence le Président
du Conseil des Ministres
de la République Nationale
Ukrainienne.

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Gouvernement de sa Majesté britannique m'a nommé, par la voie télégraphique, la seule possible actuellement, Représentant de la Grand-Bretagne en Ukraine.

Mon Gouvernement m'a chargé de vous donner l'assurance de sa bonne volonté. Il appuiera de toutes ses forces le Gouvernement Ukrainien dans la tâche qu'il a entreprise de faire oeuvre de bon Gouvernement, de maintenir l'ordre et de combattre les Puissances Centrales, ennemies de la democratie et de l'humanité.

En ce qui me concerne en particulier, j'ai l'honneur, Monsieur le Président, de vous donner l'assurance de mon entier concours pour la réalisation de notre idéal commun.

PICTON BAGGE,
Representant de la Grande-Bretagne
en Ukraine.

LE GENERAL
COMMISSAIRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
REPUBLIQUE Kiev, le 20/2 Janvier 1918
no. 11

Le Général Tabouis, Commissaire de la République Française auprès du Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne, à Monsieur le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères du Gouvernement de la République Ukrainienne.

Monsieur,

Le 5/18 décembre, dans une entrevue à laquelle assistaient M. Vinnechenko, Président du Conseil, et les Secrétaires d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangéres, aux Finances, au Ravitaillement, aux Voies et Communications, à la Justice, j'ai eu l'honneur de présenter la demande suivante:

(Suit la répétition du texte de la note verbale du Général Tabouis, du 5 décembre, c'est-a-dire d'une date anterieure à sa nomination comme Ministre du Gouvernement Français auprès de la République Ukrainienne).

Depuis cette date, la France est entreé en relations officielles avec l'Ukraine.

Vu la marche rapide des événements, et pour éviter toute perte de temps, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir me faire tenir cette réponse aussitôt que possible.

(Signature) TABOUIS.

Chapter XIII

England and Denikin. Ukrainian delegation in England. Sidorenko and Lansing. Vasil'ko. I resign from the delegation.

I went to London in May 1919 for a few days, on behalf of the Ukrainian delegation in France. The Ukrainian delegation to England was still in Denmark, waiting for British visas, and reached London only in June.

Mr. Selby was then in charge of the Russian division of the Foreign Office (British Ministry of Foreign Affairs). He declared to me from the start, that his government had supported Denikin and his army in the fight against anarchy, and in their endeavor to introduce law and order in the entire Russian south. After I spoke to him about the character and aims of the Ukrainian movement and the situation in the country, as I had personally observed in Odessa in March, he told me plainly that very little was known in England about the Ukrainian movement, that the best way to fight the bolsheviks was to merge the Ukrainian force with Denikin's, and that in his view the ideal solution for Ukraine would be her federation with Russia.

We met again the same day, and he gave me a copy of the well-shown declaration of the Russian Political Conference in Paris, as of May 9, 1919, requesting my evaluation for his Ministry. I hastened to comply. My comments on the main points of the declaration were sent to Selby the next day.

At our next meeting, Selby thanked me for these comments, on Lord Curzon's and his own behalf. He was keenly interested in whatever I had to say, much of which was entirely new to him. No wonder, for all the Ministry's information was obtained, before my arrival, either from

Russian reactionaries or—at best—from Milyukov, who was in England at that time, or from his adherents.

British visas for the Ukrainian delegation were sent to Copenhagen. As I was returning to Paris, Selby advised me to contact the British delegation at the Peace Conference.

My comments (abridged) were published in Le Temps and other newspapers. Sidorenko and other members of the Ukrainian delegation thought I was too much in favor of the federation and that the will of the Ukrainian people was misrepresented in my conclusions. They argued that my pro-federation stand might interfere with recognition of the Ukrainian government by the Powers, be it only a de facto recognition.

Unconvinced as I was, I was still a member of the delegation and had to reckon with these objections. That problem is no longer acute. I am publishing here the full text of my letter to Selby alongside the text of the Declaration of the Russian Political Conference of May 9, 1919. My present views are exactly the same as stated in the letter to Selby, for there is no other way to exterminate anarchy, prevent paralysis and total collapse of economic life, and begin the state-political reconstruction of Eastern Europe. This way was still open in 1919.

From Russian Political
Conference
Paris, March 9, 1919

To President of Peace Conference:

The problem of non-Russian nationalities in Russia has become acute in the present condition of the country. Abutting on the parts of Russia under the bolsheviks' expanding rule, these nationalities are forced by themselves to wage a regular war with the Red armies. Such situations intensify the drive towards complete independence on the part of the nationalities, the goal they strive to attain on the principle of the "right of self-determination."

Russia, reborn after the Revolution, freed from the centralist tendencies of the old regime, intends

broadly to satisfy the legitimate desires of the nationalities to organize a national life of their own. The New Russia visualizes her reconstitution in no other way but on the basis of a voluntary coexistence of her constituent nationalities in accord with the principles of autonomy and democracy, and by mutual agreement between Russia and the nationalities, in certain instances, on the premises of their independence. In the present circumstances, when the natural course of such reconstitution is impeded by the temporary triumph of destructive forces, the national democracy of Russia is watching with vivid interest the efforts of the nationalities systematically to restore normal conditions of life; their struggles with anarchy, while seeing already recognizable indications of the victory of democracy and civilization.

However, attainment of the ultimate goals of these strivings is now impeded by Russia's critical phase. It is self-evident that problems in political structuring of the nationalities cannot be resolved without consent of the Russian people. Nor is it possible to disregard the multitude of economic interests, financial interests, national defense problems wherein the life of the Russian people and of the nationalities inhabiting the territories of Russia are interwoven into a tight knot, one for them all.

Resolution of these problems without Russia would be in conflict with the fundamental objectives of the Allies, namely, construction of a durable peace on the basis of mutual confidence and in the spirit of mutual friendship of the nations.

In our quest for a workable solution that would satisfy aspirations of the nationalities without jeopardizing vital interests of the Russian people who view sympathetically the nationalities' aspirations, a workable solution which could be also a proof of the new spirit of Russia, we, the undersigned, in the name of the Russian Political Conference, are submitting here the following proposals for adoption by the Peace Conference:

1. The Powers admit that a) all problems relevant to the territories of the State of Russia, in its 1914 boundaries, excepting the ethnographic Poland, as

well as b) problems of the eventual political structuring of the nationalities within these boundaries, cannot be resolved without the consent of the Russian people. There can be no final decision whatsoever in this matter, accordingly, until the Russian people are in a condition freely to ascertain their own will and to take part in the regulatory aspects of the problems.

2. On the other hand, in their desire to aid the strivings of the nationalities to organize their own national life and to protect that life from anarchic decay, the Powers have decided to postpone the ultimate political structuring of the nationalities, while recognizing their provisionally established regimes, in keeping with their current needs, particularly military, financial and economic necessities of the interested populations.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the Powers incline to regard the structured authorities already established by the nationalities as de facto governments, insofar as such authorities are motivated by democratic principles and are trusted by the populations. The Powers are ready to help these populations in their political and economic organizations.

Acceptance of the foregoing resolution by the Powers in itself would be conducive to clarity and simplicity in arriving quickly at the proper solutions of immediate problems, and also to development of a favorable atmosphere for cooperation of forces in quest of coordination of their activities in Russia in their common struggle with anarchy and disintegration. Eastern Europe, now the prey of anarchy, would more quickly return then to normal conditions of life.

S. Sazonov Prince L'vov
N. Chaykovskiy V. Maklakov

From A. Margolin
London
May 9, 1919

To Mr. Selby
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dear Sir:

I have the honor here to present the following considerations with regard to the "Proposal" of the Russian Political Conference in Paris on the subject of the nationalities in Russia, dated March 9, 1919.

1. The project considers the peoples' right to self-determination. Side by side with this discussion, two concepts are consistently counterposed, namely the "nationalities" vs the "Russian people." It is not clear just what the authors mean by the "Russian people"; an explanation of this term would definitely be in order. They do not seem to restrict this term ethnographically to the population of Russia proper, but extend it to the entire population of the former Russian Empire. The issue is complicated and confused by such terminology. As in Austro-Hungary, the population of the Russian Empire consisted not of one but of many nationalities. It cannot be likened to the population of France, for example, which is almost entirely French.

2. Judging by the text of the project, it appears that the authors find it advisable to leave the reorganization of the former Russian Empire for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly to work out, the Assembly to be elected by the entire population of the former empire. As the result, Russia proper would have twice as many representatives as Ukraine, Ukraine four times as many as Belorussia and twelve times as many as Gruzia or Kuban'. The direct outcome of such ratios would be a suppression of the will of minor nations by the vote of the major ones, with Russia proper as the decisive factor in an assembly of that sort.

The Constituent Assembly, so constituted, would undoubtedly be out of line with regard to character and implementation of the self-determination of peoples as proclaimed by the Allies. It is self-evident that not a single nationality in the territories of the former empire would put its fortunes into the hands of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly or even send representatives there, excepting the Russians who are still athirst for hegenomy and preeminence among the other nationalities.

3. The authors of the project, Russians as they are, speak in the name of the undivided Russia as well as in the name of Russia proper. In the meanwhile, other nationalities (Ukrainians, Estonians, Gruzinians, etc.) already have governments of their own, each of which speaks in the name of its own nationality only, not in the name of all the nationalities of the former Russian Empire. And it is only Russia proper that remains without a national government of its own.

This latter fact is highly significant also because Russia proper, the land that produced the largest percentage of Bolsheviks, contains the largest number of reactionaries, those who dream of a restoration of the old czarist undivided centralist Russia. It contains also a multitude of utopists who believe sincerely that a convocation of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly is still possible and that the nationalities will be treated fairly in such an Assembly's resolutions.

As to my personal attitude in the problems indicated, I take the liberty of repeating here some of the considerations I mentioned in our yesterday's conversation. The only remedy against bolshevism lies in strengthening the wholesome national movements amidst the people of the former Russian Empire. The Entente Powers could render them formidable moral support by recognizing the independence of the newly formed state-political bodies: Ukraine, Lithuania, Kuban', others. These new states arose on ethnographic premises, in line with the principle of self-determination of nations. In other words, the new states are ethnically almost homogeneous within their boundaries: Ukrainians are the majority in Ukraine, even as Gruzians are in Gruzia, and so on. After bolshevism and anarchy disappear and order is reestablished, each of these new states must elect its own Constituent Assembly by universal ballot. This is the only possible way to ascertain the true will of the population in every state. Only this kind of election will afford propaganda in favor of this or that constitution of the regime, be it full independence or a federation with the state's neighbors. This would be a freely decided accord, an alliance of equals with

equals, and not the kind of federation enforced by bayonets or by the overwhelming majority vote of the numerically preponderant nation in the All-Russian Constituent Assembly.

However, preliminary consolidation and strengthening of the newly formed states, as independent units, are the prerequisites of the federation here visualized and also outlined in the memorandum from Don, Kuban', Belorussia and Ukraine to the Entente (Odessa, February 1919) which I transmitted to you yesterday.

As to the public sentiments now prevalent in Ukraine, I wish to testify, in conclusion, that there are diversities in orientation and trends among the leaders and the population itself. Nearly all political parties were inclined towards a federation of Ukraine with other nationalities in the former Empire, prior to the emergence of bolshevism. But the progress of bolshevism and the subsequent dismemberment of Russia served to intensify and strengthen the aspirations of Ukraine toward sovereignty and complete independence.

Personally I believe these views are subject to evolution and change, depending on the behavior of Russia proper to the other parts of the former Russian Empire, depending also on attitudes of the Entente.

With your permission, I shall call on you at four o'clock today and it will be my pleasure to clarify further problems, should they arise.

Faithfully yours,

A. MARGOLIN

My call on Sir Howard, a leading member of the British delegation in Paris, was but a continuation of my discussions with Mr. Selby in London, except that Howard had less faith in Denikin and his pro-Denikin bias was weaker than Selby's, as was plain in our first conversation.

A few days later Prof. Simpson, University of Edin-

burgh, came unexpectedly to our office. He was Howard's colleague and a specialist in political science. Speaking for Howard, he asked me to draft a "project of constitution" or a plan of future political organization of territories within the former Russian Empire, for use of the British delegation. His proposal was flattering. But they were expecting of me more than I could give. . . . I did have convictions on how to fight anarchy at this particular moment. I was a convinced advocate of recognition and aid for every newly formed government at war with anarchy and bolshevism, pending restoration of normal conditions and convocation of national Constituent Assemblies. The more distant future looked obscure to me. Which way would the Belorussian Assembly vote, for example? What would become of Armenia? Of Turkestan? I could not work it out in advance. I simply was not competent enough for that difficult and responsible job, and I said so to Simpson.

However, I agreed to draft a resolution for the Peace Conference, with suggestions for pacification of Eastern Europe and for the urgently needed first steps in the process, making it clear that I was speaking only for myself and not for the Ukrainian delegation of the Ukrainian government, which could not be contacted easily at that time.

Project of Resolution
for Peace Conference

Drafted by A.D. Margolin
at Prof. Simpson's suggestion
June, 1919

In view of the facts that:

1. The former Russian Empire has actually disintegrated;
2. New political entities and newly formed states have developed in the territories of the former Empire;
3. The governments of these newly formed states are struggling with anarchy and Bolshevism;

4. Pending eradication of anarchy and bolshevism, convocations of Constituent Assemblies are virtually impossible, in these new formed states, assemblies which could determine the ultimate form of their political organization, in line with the will of the people who live in these newly formed states.

The Peace Conference resolves:

1. To recognize the governments of Ukraine, Don, Kuban', North Caucasian mountaineers, Azerbaydzhan, Gruzia, Armenia, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, which are represented at the Conference, each by its own delegation or mission, as well as their de facto rule over the territories of the aforesaid states, pending restitution of order and convocation of the Constituent Assemblies elected on the principle of universal suffrage in each of the states.
2. To accord material and technical aid to all these governments and armed forces struggling with anarchy, in their endeavor to introduce order.
3. At the Peace Conference, to organize a council of representatives of Russia proper (Velikorossia), Siberia, Ukraine, Don, Kuban', North Caucasian mountaineers, Azerbaydzhan, Armenia, Gruzia, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, with the same number of representatives from each one of these lands, by agreement with their delegations or missions already in Paris and with political organizations of Siberia and Russia proper, which do not have any such delegations.

A. Margolin
Paris
June, 1919

Professor Simpson
British Delegation
Hotel Majestic
Paris

Dear Sir:

Enclosing here my draft of the resolution for the Peace Conference, with regard to political arrangements in territories of the former Russian Empire, I take the liberty of presenting certain considerations which served as the basis of that plan.

Abstract principles and personal desires cannot be employed by practical politicians as the only premises of their organized conclusions. The actual state of things at the given time, the facts of the given day must be taken into account as well.

What is the state of the former Russian Empire?

The empire is now decomposed into several newly formed political bodies. It would be too difficult for the Peace Conference to undertake even a superficial study of the history, culture and customs of the multitude of nationalities who inhabit the territories of the former Russian Empire. There is no need of that, however, inasmuch as only the most populous and nationally conscious ones announced their pretensions and sent their delegations and missions to Paris.

When it comes to Velikorossia (Russia proper) and Siberia, they too are represented in Paris (the Russian Political Conference and certain other organizations). Their representatives, however, speak in the name of the entire territory of the former Russian Empire and of all the nationalities living in that territory. The nationalities object to such a situation. If the Russian Political Conference and other Russian organizations were recognized as representatives of Russia proper and Siberia only, there would be no objection, of course, on the part of the Ukrainian, the Estonian, and other delegations.

In my view, the proposed resolution has the following positive aspects:

1. The Entente Powers should recognize only the situation which already exists, without predetermination of the ultimate political structure of territories

inhabited by the nationalities of the former Russian Empire. Sharp disagreements between partisans of complete independence of the newly formed political bodies and proponents of their federation should be subdued, pending liquidation of anarchy and the inception of quieter times.

2. An equal and uniform attitude of the Entente Powers with regard to every government struggling with anarchy and bolshevism would be conducive to a tight coalition, a bloc, between such governments, with a joint High Command of the forces at war with bolshevism.

3. The council of representatives of the missions or delegations, jointly with representatives of Russia proper and Siberia, assembled by the Peace Conference, would create the opportunity for coordination of all the forces now in Paris. The work of such a council would prove beneficial and conducive to intercommunicaiton of the nationalities of the former Russian Empire, their mutual understanding based on the community of interests and principles.

(Signature)

At this juncture there was no unanimity among the British delegates with regard to my draft of the resolution. Most of the British politicians were still pro-Denikin. Howard and Simpson were in the minority, insofar as I could make out, and in agreement with my views. Shortly after, Howard was appointed ambassador to Sweden and then to Spain. I saw Simpson again in England in the spring of 1920. He left the Ministry and returned to his professional work in Edinburgh. Our conversations convinced me of the correctness of my surmise with regard to British orientations in Paris.

Simpson's keen interest in the fortunes of all nationalities that came to life after the fall of the Russian Empire led him then to invite Dr. Vishnitser to lecture, in public, in Edinburgh and Glasgow, on the aspirations and destinies of these nationalities. His lectures were quite a success, and audiences showed considerable interest in the subject.

Dr. Paneyko, deputy chief of our delegation, was engaged in negotiations with Poles regarding the status and future of Galicia, the field of his competence, and also maintained contacts with the Italian and Japanese delegations. As to the Rumanian delegation, our contacts were maintained by Sidorenko himself and also by Galip, who came to Paris late in June.

Among the Americans, Prof. Lord was particularly interested in our problem, as Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs. We all had sessions with him rather often. He was interested only in facts, never expressing any opinions of his own.

Our situation looked gloomy to Paneyko; he had no faith in any aid from the Entente. Shul'gin too, as well as myself, had no particular hope for the future by the end of June. Only Sidorenko thought our cause was doing splendidly and kept on sending optimistic reports to the government.

A born optimist, Sidorenko believed obtusely in the attainment of all his goals. He was addicted to the so-called counterintelligence data. . . . Various people were milling around him all the time, and it was from them that he was drawing his information. I did not and do not care to know who they were. I saw no reason at all for the very existence of a counterintelligence institute of that sort at our delegation. Sidorenko was being misled by those characters, as a matter of fact.

His special faith was vested in the American delegation, their favor and willingness to recognize Ukraine. So I took advantage of Prof. Lord's courtesy in his arrangement of a meeting of Okunevskiy (a lawyer and well-known politician in Galicia) and myself with Lansing (American Secretary of State).

That meeting, on June 30, was a stunning experience for both of us. Lansing was totally ignorant of the situation. His faith in Kolchak and Denikin was blind. He stated categorically that the Ukrainian government must recognize Kolchak as supreme ruler and commander of all anti-bolshevist armies. When it came to the Wilsonian principles, which were to be applied in settlement of

nationalities of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Lansing declared that he was aware of only one people of Russia and that a federation, like the United States, was the only way to reconstruct Russia. When I tried to argue that the existence of individual states, as entities, was the prerequisite of their federation, as in the United States, Lansing evaded the point and continued emphatically to call for the recognition of Kolchak.

That was indeed the time when American aid to Kolchak was at its peak. Be that as it may, no one had used such peremptory language with us, either the British or the French. And this was how the Wilsonian principles were actually implemented: Kolchak was supported by the United States, Denikin and Yudenich by England, Galler by France . . . Petlyura was not supported by anyone. . . .

Galler's artillery was already turned against the Ukrainian troops who were under unrelenting attack by bolsheviks. Later, in September when the Ukrainians advanced and captured Kiev, they had to fight another war with Denikin. . . . England did not know, of course, that British arms so generously supplied to Denikin for his use against bolsheviks, would be used also against Ukrainians, against the legitimate aspirations of the people who were defending their land and liberty.

I left for Switzerland after our session with Lansing. Rest and leisure were required for me to think it over and decide what to do and how to get our business off the ground. Discord was rampant in our delegation even before my departure. Shul'gin and I told Sidorenko plainly that his methods and tactics were unsatisfactory and that he should be replaced by someone else at this critical moment, someone who could do the job in Paris right now. Candidates for the job were discussed then and there. Paneyko recommended Lipinskiy emphatically. I saw that Paneyko was right, in due time, after my acquaintance with Lipinskiy, that he was indeed the best possible candidate. However, his acceptance of the nomination seemed improbable, since he had resigned his ambassadorship to Austria and was in the process of evolution which trans-

formed him eventually into a laborite-monarchist, a partisan of the future regime of the Ukrainian state.

Shul'gin recommended Count Tyshkevich, the Ukrainian ambassador to the Vatican. Shul'gin did not know his candidate well enough. Were it otherwise, he would not have thought so highly of his candidate's fitness.

I was not acquainted with either one of the nominees and so abstained.

We reported to the government the extreme urgency of the replacement of Sidorenko. He was recalled in August and Tyshkevich appointed directly to replace him.

In turn, Sidorenko accused us openly as arrant promoters of binding Ukraine to Russia by means of federation.

While in Bern I met Baron Vasil'ko, Chief of the Ukrainian mission to Switzerland. The very appearance of that old diplomat commanded attention: magnificent figure, penetrating bright eyes, keen practical mind, energy. Vasil'ko had represented his native Bukovina in the Austrian Parliament for 20 years. A founder of the Ukrainian Political Club in Vienna, he was known as a fierce enemy of the Polish domination of Galicia, in prewar times. Schooled in Austrian diplomacy and flexible as he was, he was now in favor of the Ukrainian treaty with that same Poland, even at the cost of large territorial concessions to Poland. He urged similar concessions to Rumania and a similar treaty, as a matter of urgency, for which he was ready to sacrifice his native Bukovina, not to speak of Bessarabia.

It was not easy to disagree with Vasil'ko in his awareness of the loneliness of idealists who expected a national rebirth of Ukraine right now, when the largest states of the Entente were siding so resolutely with Denikin and Kolchak. This was why he looked for salvation from both bolsheviks and Denikin in Ukraine's immediate neighbors, those most interested in protecting themselves from invasion by the bolshevist horde as well as from any growth of a strong military state in the East, such as the undivided

monolithic Russia. Vasil'ko and many other Ukrainian politicians were willing to agree, for the time being, to confine Ukraine as a sovereign state to a smaller territory than its ethnographic boundaries would allow, as a matter of principle. Vasil'ko pointed out, in this latter connection, that the future was uncertain for any state and that opportunities might develop for Ukraine to enlarge its territory, when the Ukrainian state became stable and strong.

All of that was in line with the French policy, the Greater Poland that France was striving to create. The weakness was that France was alone in her pursuit. It was foreseeable from the start that neither England nor Italy, let alone Germany, would second France in her endeavor to construct this enormous Poland, a new powerful military state in the East, a substitute for the former Russian Empire.

I said as much to Vasil'ko, but his thinking remained the same. My resignation from the Ukrainian delegation followed my return to Paris late in July. That was the time when "letters from Ukrainian soldiers in Paris" began to arrive at our delegation, together with anonymous letters about Shul'gin, Paneyko and myself, "who wanted to deliver Ukraine to Muscovites." The "soldiers" sources of such information remain obscure.

Shul'gin resigned shortly afterwards, but for a different reason. Our resignations were not accepted. Temnitskiy, Matsiyevich's successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed his request for us to remain at our posts, with the expression of this confidence in us both.

The subject remained open, pending our meeting with Tyschkevich. He arrived late in August and began with publication of his program in the Petit Parisien. The interview he gave was supersaturated with hostility and thrusts at Russia and Germany. The interview was hardly a hit with the more responsible public figures of France, for all those thrusts of his sounded as if he meant obsequiously to please the French, to fall in line with the fashion.

I saw plainly that our ways were not at all the same.

All the while our delegation had failed progressively in its efforts to obtain aid from the Entente, wherewith we could fight and overcome anarchy. In my view the Ukrainian army, weakened by its isolation in the unequal war with the bolsheviks, with Galler, with Denikin, but with its healthy core still intact, could not possibly cope with sedition and banditry without aid from abroad. This meant that pogroms were inevitable.

I left Paris on September 1, 1919, in order to hasten my meeting with Temnitskiy and obtain my discharge. I called on Maklakov before leaving. The Ukrainian army was approaching Kiev. Denikin's army was converging on Kiev from the other side. Maklakov foresaw the danger and frightening consequences of their collision. He was looking for ways to avert that disaster just as I came.

I spoke to Maklakov about my resignation, my going to Prague, where Temnitskiy was, and he gave me letters to Rodichev and Chelnokov, who were presumably also in Prague, according to his calculations. He wanted them to go to Denikin and dissuade him from attacking the Ukrainian army.

In Prague I missed Rodichev and Chelnokov, who were in Belgrade. I saw Temnitskiy on the 4th and obtained my discharge from him the same day.

I was a free agent now, but felt it my duty to ask Temnitskiy's advice on the desirability of visiting Rodichev and Chelnokov in Belgrade. His reply was favorable.

My decision was to go via Belgrade and Bucharest to Constantinople and contact Odessa from there, for I had no news at all about my family. This was a long way, but it would give me a chance to see Matsiyevich, who was chief of the Ukrainian delegation to Rumania at that time, in Bucharest.

CHAPTER XIV

Jews and Serbia. Rodichev and Chelnokov. Bucharest. Constantinople. In Denikin's czardom

Before the war, Serbia and Bulgaria were generally regarded as states with strikingly democratic tendencies, in which there was neither antisemitism nor other customary attributes of political reaction. This view was fully sustained by realities. Rumania, on the contrary, could rival even Russia in its totally reactionary policy and persecution of Jews through restrictive laws and other illegalities.

But what I saw in Serbia this time was a very different picture. In trains, on Serbian territory, I saw revolting collisions of Serbs with Hungarian Jews. These peaceful merchant travellers were subjected to mockery, not because they were from Hungary, the enemy country in the last war, but solely because they were Jews. I heard the same abuse of Jews in Belgrade repeatedly, even in educated circles, the result of agitation by the Russian Black Hundred, now entrenched in Belgrade, who had established the center of their propaganda in that city.

Rodichev and Chelnokov were in Belgrade. Chelnokov was definitely against Maklakov's idea of the desirability of his trip to Denikin. On the whole, Chelnokov remained the same inveterate centralist as before, not at all affected by anything that had transpired in recent years. His typically Moscovian hospitality, the amiable tone of the host in an open house, did not prevent him from discharging a barrage of biting remarks addressed to the Ukrainian movement. Rodichev's theme was the same but this tone altogether different. "Try to understand," he exclaimed bitterly, "that Kiev is my native city, like Moscow, and I cannot be an alien in Kiev." Then followed the customary reference to the vital outlet to the Black Sea. He would

recall, on and off, the incident of the repainting of the street signs, the horror of the pogroms. Like Chelnokov, he refused to go to Denikin. Both were leaving for Poland. "Here, in Serbia, we have already fouled it up for you Ukrainians," Chelnokov was saying, "and now we are off to Warsaw, to foul it up too."

I asked Rodichev how it was that Vienna must stay cut off from the sea, but Moscow could not live without the Black Sea? Rodichev replied: "Have you forgotten the articles in Neue Freie Presse in the first days of the war, the invocation of hellfire onto the heads of Russia? Serves them right. They earned it."

It was quite evident that Rodichev was still afflicted by his profound hatred of the Austro-German coalition and was now extending it to include the coalition's peoples too. But I was pleased beyond words recently when I saw Rodichev's brochure on Bolshevism and Jews in which this gentle, noble-hearted man, an old and true friend of the Jewish people, gave evidence of the evolution in his thinking and of a more calm and objective attitude towards the German people.

It was evident also that Rodichev and Chelnokov were far removed from real life, that they did not understand the need of concessions to new demands of the epoch, the need of reconciliation between cognate peoples and neighbors. Maklakov was mistaken in counting on them, as if they were real politicians who could understand him at that time. So he went to Denikin himself. When he got there it was too late. The worst had already happened. The fratricidal war of Denikin's and the Ukrainian armies had already begun in Kiev. Followed the pogroms by Denikin's troops. Their horrors eclipsed the horrors of Proskurov, Anan'yev, others . . .

Bucharest again . . . After filthy Belgrade, this city had every claim for the title of the capital of the Balkan peninsula. They called it "Little Paris" with good reason. But Bucharest failed in comparison with Budapest, the proud city on the picturesque bank of the Danube, with its majestic buildings, its swing of a real European capital.

Matsiyevich was glad to see me, but grumbled, of

course . . . How could Shul'gin and I quit Paris at such a time? How can anyone resign now? . . .

I replied but he was obstinate . . . He too was an incorrigible optimist, not like Sidorenko, in sooth, but a different type altogether. There was a philosophical sense in his optimism. He always remembered that the Ukrainian people could not be erased from the face of the earth by any vicissitudes of life whatsoever. He knew the people would get their own . . . He waited, but demanded that others must wait too.

Matsiyevich insisted on my going to Kamenets-Podol'sk, where the government was, to report whatever I knew about the situation in Paris. Only I could not even consider the trip except after my visit in Constantinople. I had insomnia, for I was cut off from my family and did not even know what had happened to them.

So we agreed that after Constantinople I would come back to Bucharest and together we would go to Kamenets-Podol'sk. According to Matsiyevich, that was my duty to the party.

I took a Rumanian steamer from Constanza to Tsargrad, the Ukrainian name for Constantinople; it was a quick voyage. I called there on K.S. Shmerling (now deceased), my colleague on the Committee of the Jewish Territorial Organization. He was from Switzerland and trying persistently to find a way to reach his relatives in Kiev and Uman'. I found quite a few people from Kiev in Constantinople. All of them had come through Odessa or Crimea long before and no one could tell me anything about my family.

Even before my departure from Prague, I wrote to Paneyko in Paris asking him to assure for my family the right of entry into Constantinople, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I found a very interesting telegram from the Ministry at the French Embassy. They were apparently unaware of my resignation and the telegrams sounded official as well as private. The Ministry requested every possible aid for that trip, both for myself and my family. Furthermore, it is requested support for my mission to Denikin, should I wish to go there. Finally, the

motivation: even if I were a representative of the Ukrainian government, I was a peace-loving person who admitted "more or less," a federation (of Ukraine and Russia), as a possibility in the future.

The hand of the Division of Russian Affairs could be sensed in this telegram.

Yet, the telegram was essentially correct in its characterization of my attitudes. Indeed, I was always an enemy of bloodshed as the method for resolution of arguments between nations or individuals. I did admit, "more or less," a future federation as a way of coexistence of the Ukrainians and their neighbors.

I explained to the Embassy's councillor my resignation from the Ukrainian delegation and the impossibility of my going to Denikin for that reason alone.

There was no answer to my telegrams to Odessa, which was then in Denikin's hands. My telegrams to friends in Rostov-on-Don were just as futile.

Some decision had to be made. Round trip cruises of the Lloyd Triestino were advertised then, Trieste to Batum, with stopovers in Varna, Constantsa, Odessa, Novorossiysk, coming and going. SS "Praga," one of the best ships of the former "Austrian Lloyd," passenger-merchant marine, now Italian, the war trophy, was sailing October 10 from Constantinople to Batum.

I decided to sail on the "Praga" and return on the same ship. A visa from Denikin's representative in Constantinople was required, were I to go on shore in Odessa and Novorossiysk. I could not take it, as a matter of principle, because my passport was Ukrainian and I had no intention of trading it for Denikin's. But while on board my status was extraterritorial, according to the laws of all civilized nations, and I was protected by the country whose flag was flown by the ship.

The French Embassy gave me a diplomatic visa to all ports on the Black Sea and a letter to the French consuls in Odessa and Novorossiysk requesting their help in facilitating my family's departure abroad. My recommendation by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was an important point in the letter. I still had forebodings of

complications with Denikin's police, many of whom were recruited from the old czarist personnel . . . So I asked the French councillor to commend me to the Italian Embassy (the so-called High Commissariat).

He did it, most kindly, adding that the laws of extraterritoriality were observed in Odessa and in Novorossiysk. The Italian Embassy committed me to the particular care of the "Praga's" captain.

Finally, I procured the British and Gruzian visas for Batum.

My remaining few days in Constantinople were spent with the family of Lototskiy, head of the Ukrainian mission in Turkey. I met Dr. Kaleb, representative of the Zionist Organization in Turkey, with whom we discussed the plan for a hostel in Constantinople for Jewish emigrants in transit, via the Black Sea, to Palestine or America.

We sailed on the 10th of October. I.S. Shmerling was on board too, on his way to Odessa.

Everything was in order in Varna and Constantsa. The shore police stood by the gangplank below and no one could go on board or ashore without the appropriate visa. Police made no appearance on board ship.

But in Odessa the police climbed on board instantly, even before we were moored at the quay . . . The sweet old customs . . .

The captain, an old sea dog and a fine fellow, was flabbergasted. His ship was a merchantman, not a navy vessel, and Lloyd's tried to stay on the good side of the shore authorities.

Inspection of the documents took place in the first class dining room. I decided to stay in my cabin. They told me later how one of the police scrambled up to a passenger for Batum who had a Polish passport without a Denikin visa. The passenger was trying to say he had no intention to go on shore in Odessa. The captain interfered then and made his stand for the passenger's legal extraterritoriality.

The captain saw that the good old prewar times were back in Odessa . . . Wine and appetizers appeared. Police officers were refreshed and went on shore, even downtown . . .

Once again, a fine detail! With the police gone, everybody could go on shore and return freely, until the next morning.

Shmerling undertook to find my parents in Odessa. In a couple of hours he sent me the message that my parents had left for Yalta some time ago, and gave me their address. I telegraphed at once, giving the dates of the "Praga" in Novorossiysk, in the hope that my parents would join me there, to sail on the "Praga."

Suddenly, a whiff of rumor; the first train to Kiev was leaving Odessa tonight. Great was my temptation: a letter could be sent with that train to my family in Kiev, asking them to be in Odessa in time for the return arrival of the "Praga" from Batum.

The night was falling. At the late Italian dinner, the Captain's mate and the ship's doctor were saying that I could go with them downtown without fear. They were in uniform and assured me that no one would bother me in their company. Finally I agreed to take the risk, provided we go directly to the railway station where I could send my letter to Kiev.

It was completely dark when we came on shore. It did not take long to reach the city. It was only 9 to 9:30 in the evening but it was perfectly quiet, not a soul in the streets. A shadow of a policeman or an officer was rarely seen. Civilians were evidently afraid to go out. Denikin's regime seemed appalling at first glance.

The train was indeed in the station, ready to start for Kiev. I thought how lucky it was to be in Odessa right when the first train for Kiev was leaving. I picked a passenger who seemed to be civilized and reliable. He gladly undertook the forwarding of my letter. The other letter to Kiev was with Shmerling, but I did not know how long he planned to stay in Odessa.

I learned shortly afterwards that the train failed to reach Kiev . . . Bolsheviks broke through, and communication was disrupted again.

In the meanwhile my Italians declared they had no desire to return to the ship and that it was my duty now to go with them to some cafe or theater, because it was for my

sake they had walked to the station. They were saying it nicely and joked about it, but it was plain they had firmly decided to see the night life of Odessa.

It would have been madness for me to return alone. I had to obey. A cab took us to the "Variety", the only establishment of that sort still open in Odessa, according to the cabman. This establishment occupied the one-time "Home of the Artist." Nearly all the customers were officers of the Volunteer Army. We sat by a small table, spoke in French, and I was probably taken for an Italian by the public, just like my companions.

Several wax figures were on the stage, tagged Skoropadskiy, Petlyura, Makhno, Bolshevik, German. Accompanied by the orchestra, a female singer, dressed as a Ukrainian peasant girl, was screaming couplets about these gentlemen (pointing at each one of the wax figures) who wanted to marry her. A fragment of her couplets stuck in my memory: "German lured me with rum, Makhno with pogrom." But she quickly saw through them all, the scoundrels who wanted to drink her blood, rejected them all, and decided to remarry the fine fellow from Moscow. "As for them," ran the end of the last couplet, "Here's the answer," whereupon she came near the figures and spat at every one of them.

The public was enraptured . . . The Italians understood nothing, of course, and pressed me for explanations. I mumbled replies, feeling rotten . . .

The next number on the program showed a cunning Jew waiting in a queue for water. The Odessan aqueduct was evidently out of order and the queue at the municipal tap was the burning topic of the day for inventors of the Variety programs . . . Many people were standing in lines holding buckets. The Jew called out suddenly: "the sale of steamship tickets abroad is now open at the city station." Everybody dropped his bucket and ran to the station. The Jew collected the buckets and happily ran away. There was no such sale, of course, angrily shouted the victims of the Jewish "gescheft," as they reentered the stage from the sidelines. But the Jew had vanished without a trace.

The public was enraptured again. Luckily, the Italians

were fed up with it all . . . We returned to our clean cabins, far away from banality and filth. We were on board . . . Happy ending.

The next day I looked wistfully from the deck at the buildings and the city theater of Odessa, as they vanished gradually from my field of vision . . . How good it all could have been, how utterly befouled it had become . . .

No one was waiting for me in Novorossiysk. No telegram either, despite the address I gave. Again the same rigmarole with inspection of the documents, again the refreshments . . . Again I stayed in my cabin while passports were being examined in the deck cabin. The captain had asked me to, and he was master of the ship. By the way, he had excluded my name from the passenger list. He had to combine his integrity with the commercial interests of the steamship company. "Must not quarrel with these gentlemen."

Such was his argumentation.

We called at Poti. Finally Batum, an astonishing sight from the sea. Soft green contours of the mountains bathed in rays of the sun. Tropical vegetation, palms . . .

To me, Batum was more dear and more beautiful than the best nooks of the Riviera.

At last I could go on shore without interferences. Bilingual street names on the shingles, Russian and English, struck the eye. A passing thought: why not in Gruzian too? Gruzians were not in a hurry, it seemed, or they were out of paint.

Only one day in Batum. Poti again. Once more in Novorossiysk. None of my family here and no news of them, as before . . . , Passport inspection again . . . . They had appetizers, drinks and went on shore . . .

It developed all of a sudden, that the coal for our further voyage had failed to arrive, the supply that ought to have been waiting for the "Praga" in the port of Novorossiysk.

The captain was beside himself . . . The day passed. No coal.

The coal arrived on the third day. Loading began.

I forgot to mention earlier that passports were

examined in Novorossiysk and Odessa not only when the steamer arrived but also when it departed.

Two hours before sailing of the "Praga", at seven in the evening or thereabouts, the inspectors appeared on board. It was dinner time and the captain invited them to the common table, but I had to eat in my cabin.

I was hardly through with the meal, when an Italian waiter rushed into my cabin. In agitation he muttered hastily that a lot of soldiers had boarded the ship, were looking for me, and the captain wanted me to leave the cabin immediately and follow him.

There was no time to think . . . The waiter led me through the corridor, down a stairway, flung open the door of a closet and invited me to enter. The door slammed shut. Minutes dragged on, heavy as lead . . . The captain's behavior was utterly reckless, I thought. If they found me in my cabin, they would take me on shore and shoot me. This was the worst that could happen to me. But if they found me in this closet, the hunters' malicious joy, their gloating over the discovered hiding place, would cap it all . . . I also wondered what would happen when my suitcases were found in the cabin.

I heard footsteps by the door. Then a commanding voice in Russian: "Did the intelligence look for him in the baggage room?" "Yes, Sir," was the answer. "His case is already on the agenda," someone cut in. The meaning of this statement was clear to me, a former lawyer . . .

All quiet. A soft rap on the door. Enters another waiter, leads me to open deck. Fresh air at last! Dark, cold, drizzly rain. I was without hat and overcoat. But not in the closet!

Not a soul on the deck . . . All loading was over. The first whistle was blowing.

A waiter came after me, the third one, by count. What people! What sympathy! The entire crew knew I was hunted. But they were sons of a free nation. They did not betray.

Another closet, but with electric light. I recognized my suitcases in the corner, my hat, my overcoat. Fine fellows these Italians! They did not forget even my cane . . . .

The second whistle and then the third one . . . The steamer was moving . . . We were off . . .

After five minutes in came the captain's mate and the doctor, my travel companions from Odessa. They congratulated me on my escape and invited me to see the captain. That kind old fellow was brimming with joy. He had fulfilled the assignment of his country's embassy in Constantinople and protected me, his passenger. He treated me with wine and said he expected now to be decorated by the Ukrinian government.

We all settled down at last and then I asked the captain just what had happened.

It developed that during the dinner, a telegram was delivered from the shore to the officer in charge (of the passport inspection). He read, became excited, and sent a courier to the shore who promptly returned with a number of armed soldiers. Only then did the officer declare to the captain that he had orders from Odessa to arrest me. The captain showed him the passenger list by way of answer, and hastened to send a waiter to warn me. All his protests of extraterritoriality had no effect. Every cabin was searched and so were the baggage room and machine room . . . This ship could not be delayed indefinitely. So I was saved.

Odessa was still ahead of us, however, and so was another hunt for a human being, in all probability.

It was decided for me to move into the doctor's cabin for the duration of our time in Odessa. This would not be as humiliating at least as hiding in closets and pantries. As to the captain, he decided to ask the Italian consul in Odessa to come on board directly the ship arrived and to interfere with any further attempts at a breach of extraterritoriality.

We moored in Odessa in the morning. There was no trouble at all. The Italian consul came on board and gave the order, in the name of the Italian government, preventing any armed person from boarding the ship, to nip in the bud any attempt at search. He said he would demand satisfaction for the incident in Novorossiysk.

They brought me a letter from Shmerling, still in

Odessa but afraid to call on me. He described how he had tried to get on the train which left for Kiev the day I left Odessa (this second train failed to reach Kiev like the first one). He had barely entered the car with his ticket, when officers burst in after him and demanded his passport. On the proof that he was a Jew, they dragged him off the train, led him to the "interrogation room" in the station, took all his money and baggage. They split this loot among themselves in his presence and told him to get going to the city, while still in one piece. "Yids have no business going by trains" was their farewell.

Shmerling wrote that the same things had happened to other Jewish passengers too. And this was not somewhere in Zhmerinka or Konotop, but in Odessa, a great city!

He enclosed clippings from Odessa newspapers about my travels. In one of them (I forget the name) it was reported that I was voyaging on SS "Praga," all over the Black Sea, and that it was incomprehensible that "the Volunteer Army government tolerated this fact."

The other newspaper, Odesskiye Novosti (Odessan News), where I had many friends since the Beilis case, was indignant with the first one, because of the item on my travels, because the Odessan press had stooped to become an informer . . .

The "Praga's" passengers who witnessed the search were outraged; their sympathies were with me. One of them, Dr. Granovskiy, a young man in military doctor's uniform, on his way from Novorossiysk to Odessa, said that we had already met in Odessa early in 1919, but I did not remember him. Granovskiy showed friendly concern with my feelings while the dragnet was on. I had no inkling that I would be seeing Granovskiy in time to come, but under entirely different circumstances.

In Odessa, there was no news for me whatsoever about my family. I heard from the passengers from Novorossiysk that my father was seen recently in Yekaterinoslav, while he was trying to leave for Kiev, that my mother was in Yalta, and my wife and the rest of the family were living in Kiev.

This was all I could learn about my nearest ones, at such a high cost. At least they were all alive.

On October 26, after my 16-day cruise, I gave my farewells to the captain and the people with whom I had been through so much, landed in Constantsa, and arrived Bucharest the next day. I sent a detailed letter then to the councillor at the French Embassy in Constantinople, with an account on the interpretation of the extraterritoriality laws by Denikin's agents in Novorossiysk and Odessa.

CHAPTER XV

Trip to Kamenets-Podol'sk. Jews in Rumania. Petlyura and Petrushkevich

Just before our planned departure from Bucharest to Kamenets-Podol'sk, Matsiyevich received certain information which was so important politically that he had to be delayed in Bucharest. I had to go to Kamenets without him.

Direct limited trains were in operation between Bucharest and Chernovitsy; the accommodations were comfortable. The itinerary led from Chernovitsy to Novoselitsa and Khotin, with Kamenets only 20 versts away from the Dnestr River. The railway ended at Novoselitsa; one had to take horses from there to reach Kamenets.

In Noveselitsa and in Khotin I talked to local Jews asking how they were getting along under the Rumanian regime. Their replies were rather favorable; the Rumanian policy was entirely reasonable in Bukovina as well as in Bessarabia. The old traditional repressive treatment of Jews was no longer practiced in these areas. What happened in Serbia on my last trip came to my mind again.

Life in Bessarabia felt like a paradise for Jews, in comparison with what they had endured beyond the Dnestr, first from roving bands and demoralized units of the Ukrainian army, then from Bolsheviks as well as Denikin's army.

The impressions of many socially active Jews who visited Bessarabia were the same as mine, as I learned afterwards. Of course the lower-ranking local authorities did not entirely abandon old customs. Nonetheless the guidelines established by the central Rumainian government were friendly and favorable for Jews. Intelligent Rumanians were making every effort to advance Rumania

from the ranks of a backward agrarian country to membership in the family of civilized West European states.

This was by no means the case in Poland, so far, Ukraine's other neighbor.

Korchinskiy was the first man I saw in Kamenets when I got there in the evening. He was just over a serious case of typhus, which had struck nearly half the Ukrainian army and the population of Podolia. He told me the army was in dire straits: no shoes, no warm clothing, no medicines. Petlyura had not over 15,000 reliable soldiers left. The rest of the so-called Dneprovian army had fled to various places, or were demoralized, turned into hungry bands to live by extortion and pillage. But the Galician troops, perhaps as many as 50,000 then under the Ukrainian high command, were still intact after their retreat from Kiev. Only half of that still disciplined force had arms, however, and a large part of them had had typhus not so long ago.

Korchinskiy at that time, was Chairman of the Committee on Struggle with Pogroms and Relief for the Victims. He said that during the so-called Kamenets period Petlyura and the government had succeeded at last in normalizing the morals of the army still under his command. There were no further attempts at organizing pogroms, and on the whole very friendly relations were developed between Ukrainian and Jewish populations. True, he spoke only about a negligibly small district (in Podolian province) still under control of the Ukrainian government.

His statements were confirmed by Krasnyy, whom I found in Kamenets, as well as by Alter, attorney-at-law, in whose house I stayed, and by many other Jews with whom I spoke during the three days in Kamenets. They told me about Petlyura's addressing soldiers at meetings, pleading with tears in his eyes, that they shun agitators who incited soldiers to evils and pogroms; they said Petlyura always had Kransnyy by his side, wherever he went, as a visible proof of Jewish-Ukrainian solidarity of interests and aims in the eradication of anarchy in Ukraine.

Kiev newspapers seeped into Kamenets occasionally via the "opportunity mail." An issue of Kievlyanin was re-

ceived, carrying V. Shul'gin's article, "Torture by Fear" . . . I read the telegram about my Black Sea voyage in one of the issues of Kievskaya Mysl' and was flabbergasted by its tone. I remembered the Odessa Black Hundred's flyer and the dignified behavior of the "Oddesskiye Novosti." All of that did hurt, not on my personal behalf but on the editor's, who had seen fit to print the telegram . . . .

Certain daredevils were arriving from Kiev on foot, walking through forests by circuitous routes at night. I.A. Feshchenko-Chopovskiy's and D.I. Doroshenko's wives came from Kiev. But no one could tell me anything about my family.

In Kamenets I had meetings with Petlyura, Dr. Petrushkevich (dictator of the Ukrainian part of Galicia), and Mazepa (the new Prime Minister). This was the time of feverish conferences on how to deal with the onslaught from two sides, Denikin's and the bolsheviks'.

Petrushevich, together with Paneyko, who had been to Paris, were inclined to a military alliance with Denikin as a matter of urgency, and to a political accord between the Ukrainian and Denikin armies. Petrushkevish declared, however, that he had no desire to take advantage of the numerical preponderance of the Galician part of the All-Ukrainian army and that he would accept the majority decision of the Directory, wherein he had only one vote.

As to Paneyko, he was fascinated by the idea that Ukrainian Galicia might be saved by alliance with Denikin, which was regrettable. A Galician himself, Paneyko did not know the realities of Old Russia well enough, did not know the higher officers of Denikin's army, nor the people in his inner circle.

Petlyura, Shvets and Makarenko believed that neither the alliance nor the accord could possibly be implemented, because Denikin's government, strong as it was by British support of his army, would wish to dictate the conditions of both to the weaker Ukrainian army, which now lacked the barest necessities.

Later, in Bucharest, I heard that a large part of the Galician army had signed an agreement with Denikin

without Petrushkevich, and was moving toward Odessa, in line with the general strategic plan.

At last I talked with Petlyura person-to-person. We had never had a chance to meet earlier, as luck would have it. And yet he was the man who had been head of the Ukrainian movement for a long time, the same movement with which I too had been associated since the spring of 1918. He was talked about and written about a great deal. In the end he was accused of indulgence during the pogroms. To me, a Jew, this was a most frightening accusation. However, even an indirect responsibility for the pogroms would make any cooperation with the government or the Directory impermissible for V.K. Prokopovich, A. Ya.Shul'gin, B.P. Matyushenko, and others such as these. The very thought of Petlyura's possibly antisemitic tendencies, let alone his permissiveness in relation to pogroms, was completely out of the question, in view of the testimonials I had had from all these respectable public figures, people close to Petlyura and who had known him well for a long time.

However, I knew even then that the Directory was hesitant in terminating the activities of Semesenko and others, despite the proved guilt of Semesenko, Kozyr-Zyrka, et al. I knew that the Directory merely put Semesenko in jail and authorized preliminary investigations of him and other atamans (ringleaders) accused either in organization of the pogroms or in indulgence thereof.[9]

All these insubordinate persons responsible for the Proskurov horrors and other phases of Jewish martyrdom will be discussed later in this book. For the time being it should be enough to remember that, in the atmosphere of anarchy and demoralization which surrounded Petlyura in the days of Proskurov pogrom, all that he and the government could do was to resign. Their resignations would not stop the criminals and could only intensify the anar-

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[9] Semesenko, Kozyr-Zyrka and Paliyenko were kept in the Kamenets-Podol'sk jail until the end of 1919, when the city was taken by Poles and then by bolsheviks. I have no information on their further fortunes.—A.D.M.

chy, but Petlyura would free himself personally from any responsibility for continuation of the horrors.

Neither Kolchak nor Denikin resigned, however, on account of the pogroms which they were unable and did not even attempt to control. Nor did the Russian Political Conference, which was the diplomatic representative of Denikin's army in Paris, resign because of the pogroms.

Petlyura candidly admitted to me the hopeless situation of his army. With ingratiating sincerity, he lambasted himself and others for a whole series of errors in the past. There was no demagoguery in his words, no showing-off, but only common sense and an underlying boundless love for his people. He began to question me about my impressions abroad. By the very manner in which his questions were posed, I recognized his excellent orientation in West European politics and his conspicuous deviation from the utopism of Russian socialist thinking, the environment wherein he had actually been reared.

It was right then that a military-political mission arrived from Warsaw. Petlyura was telling me that any agreement with Denikin was not attainable; any agreement with bolsheviks, out of question. He hinted at possible aid from Pilsudski and Poland against the bolsheviks. His old friendships with Pilsudki might prove an important factor in the case. Aside from that, he had a shadow of hope that the healthy core of the Ukrainian army, "bare-handed," he said, would successfully resist the double pressure from bolsheviks as well as Denikin.

In our discussion I spoke of the course he must adopt in the instance of total catastrophe. I advised him to go to Vienna or Prague and to organize there, or in Paris, a Ukrainian National Committee, as it had been done by Serbs, Poles and others, when their countries were overrun by enemies. Very soon after our discussion he went to Warsaw instead. History will be the judge of his actions. The time for that is still to come.

Petrushevich impressed me most favorably by his chivalrous tone, passionate love of his native Galicia, devotion to the Galician-Ukrainian army which he had led across the Dnestr to save them from the rout by Galler's

French artillery . . . We met again later, in Vienna and London.

Finally, I.P. Mazepa; his serious, thoughtful face inspired confidence in his person, in the well-known worker in the Zemstvo of Yekaterinoslav; he had a remarkable capacity to listen and comprehend what he heard, so rare among people. Mazepa was greedily absorbing whatever I could tell him about orientations abroad, my attitude to the program and tactics of Tyshkevich, the one-sidedness of the ripening orientation so strikingly represented by Vasil'ko, the beginnings of similar inclinations on the part of Matsiyevich, the reasons for my resignation . . .

Regardless of our political differences (Mazepa was a leader of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic party), I felt he agreed with my appraisal of the status of Ukraine abroad and with my choice of the measures to be taken in Western Europe and America for adequate presentation of the Ukrainian problem.

This was the time when disagreements in thought, with regard to orientation and tactics, ran side by side with the uncoordinated actions of people in the state of utter despair. They were dashing in all directions, seeking compassion and support concurrently and simultaneously, whatever the source. A.N. Levitskiy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I missed in Kamenets, was already preparing an agreement with Poland. Bitter opposition to such an agreement was ripening in the Ukrainian rank-and-file at the same time—an agreement which could have, and actually did lead in April 1920 to the renunciation of rights to the Ukrainian part of Galicia by Petlyura and the Ukrainian government.

Mazepa and Krasnyy insisted on my return to active political work. Krasnyy, commissioned by Mazepa and other Ukrainian leaders, spoke to me convincingly and at length, urging me either to join the Cabinet, as Minister of Foreign Affairs (Levitskiy was about to surrender that portfolio, held by him provisionally, for he was also Minister of Justice) or to go to England and be the head of the Ukrainian mission in London. Krasnyy believed that a complete abstinence of Jews from participation in the

Ukrainian movement was most undesirable. He cited his own work as the example of what could be done thanks to the existence of the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, in several instances, by way of protection of Jews from pogroms and other calamities.

Attention should be called to the fact that Krasnyy, as a member of the Cabinet, with the right to vote, took part in the discussion and resolution of every problem of the Ukrainian government, something that would be unthinkable in the governments of Kolchak and Denikin. (He was Minister of Jewish Affairs only, not of General Affairs.) Such was the genuine democracy of the Ukrainian government, its sincere desire always to hear the voice of Jewry, albeit only through the mouth of the modest and retiring, but steadfast and courageous Pinkhas Krasnyy.

It was my luck this time in Kamenets to save a young Jew from the Directory. He was accused of arrant bolshevism and of collaboration with bolsheviks in their war with the Ukrainian army and was to face the firing squad. I knew the family of this young man quite well and only presumed that he was capable of sympathy for bolshevism ideologically. His actual participation in the ranks of militant bolsheviks seemed improbable. I presented these considerations to Makarenko and Shvets. The young man's life was saved.

I do not regret my intercession, even if it was but a part of the case, because of my conviction that hot heads do occur among young bolsheviks, the youthful minds in ferment, many of whom would mature for constructive work, with the return of normal conditions of life.

I rejected emphatically the very idea of becoming a member of the Cabinet in such indefinite circumstances. I told Krasny that, as a Jew, I could not and would not take part in negotiations that might end in relinquishing even one inch of the Ukrainian territory by the government, as in the past. I was ready to give all my strength to propagandizing legitimate claims of the Ukrainian people (the right to complete self-determination), to fighting anarchy, to soliciting aid from Western Europe. I could strive for recognition of the Ukrainian government and for recogni-

tion of sovereignty of the future Constituent Assembly of Ukraine.

As a former member of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris, I did not feel sufficiently competent in the problem of political boundaries of Ukraine vs Rumania and Poland. And I had no intention to assume this heavy burden now or in the future, especially because I did not see myself as a specialist in ethnography, a subject of prime importance in the determination of such boundaries, in this particular case.

The situation was not quite the same in the instance of London, where the post of the mission's chief remained vacant after the resignation of Stakhovskiy. The problem of the Ukrainian boundaries had to be worked out elsewhere. Defense of the principles of justice and right, presentation of legitimate demands for implementation of these principles in regard to Ukraine would be well within the field of action in London. Just the same, I declined to accept this offer too, or to commit myself to any official position whatsoever. I was still shocked thoroughly at what I saw on the shores of the Black Sea, at the goings-on in my native Kiev, Fastov, elsewhere.

On the fourth day of my sojourn in Kamenets, early in the morning, I bade my goodbyes to the Alter family who had given me the comfort of a home, albeit only for three days, something I had not known for a very long time, whereupon I condemned myself to further peregrinations. My decision was to go to Switzerland, to work in science, in literature, and wait . . .

Before my departure, I made every possible arrangement for transmission of letters to my family in Kiev.

Matsiyevich was the principal advocate of my assignment to London. He was the first to suggest it while I was still on voyage in the Black Sea. On my way to Switzerland, when I stopped again in Bucharest, he argued comprehensively in favor of my acceptance of that post. Matsiyevich exaggerated my modest capacities in his belief that my energy would activate the unresponsive English and arouse their interest and concern in the future of Ukraine.

He emphasized the complete independence of the work in England, which would not commit me to any orientation whatsoever or to any responsibility for agreement of the Ukrainian government with its neighbors in the future. Finally, he appealed to my duty to the party.

This time my decision was shaken by Matsiyevich. It began to look as if it would indeed be possible for me to maintain and strengthen the once established contacts with Selby, Howard and Simpson in England. I did not know that Howard and Selby were no longer in London and that Simpson was on leave from his post in the Ministry. My faith that salvation would come from the West, salvation for the East of Europe, petrified in darkness and ignorance, as I had imagined in my student days, became the axis of my spinning thoughts once again. The French had failed us. Perhaps the British would come, passing from declaration of minority rights, as in the Treaty of Versailles, to action, to extermination of the anarchy, the source of past and of possible future pogroms. The British government would soon see through the "saviors of Russia," I thought, would see them as they truly were, like that entourage of Denikin, would shrink away from them and extend a helping hand to Ukraine, to her democratic government. I imagined that England must ultimately undertake a sanitation of Eastern Europe, part by part, a policy already indicated in her dealings with Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Gruzia.

From the viewpoint of purely Jewish interests, after what I had personally seen on the shore of the Black Sea and what was known even then about Denikin's army, all of its inspirers, the "Osvag" (information agency), etc. I had no doubts whatsoever that any return to centralism, any further support of centralist attempts at restoration of Russia would lead to continuation of pogroms and to new and incalculable, immeasurable ruination and disaster.[10] On the other hand, strengthening and stabilization of the Ukrainian government and of the small healthy core of

[10] The subject is discussed at some length in Chapter XXIV of this book. ADM.

the Ukrainian army, with the hegemony of England in the struggle against anarchy, would certainly stop both the anarchy and pogroms.

"Only the mighty thought of the West is able to fertilize the germs latent in the patriarchal ethos of Slavs."[11] This thesis of Gertsen and his followers is entirely valid for me even now, applicable also to the methods for extirpation of the anarchy in Eastern Europe. In my view, only actual force plus moral and material aid from the West may accelerate the introduction of order and normal living conditions in Eastern Europe. It would be enough for the Entente's navy to capture Odessa, for the Entente to entrench itself therein, and to flood the city and vicinities with essential consumer goods. Goods would be far more effective than tanks and guns, as weapons against bolshevism.

I pointed out to Matsiyevich that my family in Kiev would be in peril were my appointment, as a representative of the Ukrainian movement in England, made public. I said finally that the problem could not be solved by myself and that now I was at his disposal and that of my other comrades in the party.

Feshchenko-Chopovskiy was then in Bucharest too, as a councillor for economics and trade at the mission. The military councillor was General Del'vig, a well-known specialist in artillery. Curiously, he was formerly commander of the troops in which Denikin was a division commander. But now they were on opposite sides.

So I left for Lausanne, with my further fortunes in the hands of Matsiyevich. Late in November, in Lausanne, I received the telegram appointing me Ambassador to England.

I replied to Matsiyevich that my duty would be done. However, I wanted to try, for the last time, to look for at least some news about my family prior to my departure for London.

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[11] Gertsen, *Byloye i dumy* (The Past and my Thoughts), 1921 edition, v. II, p. 303. A.D.M.

Many Kiev people were living then in Berlin. They had miraculously escaped from Kiev at different times, by a variety of means, through Warsaw or Galicia to Germany. I went to Berlin by way of satisfaction of my subconscious desire to delay my travel to London and actual assumption of the responsibility of chief of the Ukrainian mission to England.

CHAPTER XVI

Berlin. Documents on pogroms by Denikin's army. Departure for London. The Hague. Zionists in London

I knew Berlin very well, for I had been there many times before the war. My frequent travels in Germany and a sojourn in Leipzig in 1900-1901 had acquainted me with the German people and with many aspects of their life and work, at fairly close range.

I saw Berlin last in the summer of 1918, during the Austro-German occupation of Ukraine. The purpose of that visit was procurement of books for the Ukrainian Supreme Court and also discussions with some members of the German Parliament and other public figures regarding certain errors in policy of the German High Command in Ukraine and the necessity for changes in that policy. Legal work was my sole engagement at that time; I had no part in official doings of the government. The trip and the discussions were entirely on my own.

Among the Jewish leaders I saw James Simon and Paul Nathan. The latter was preparing to go to Rumania on one of his innumerable travels for the Jewish cause. My attempts to establish a branch of the Jewish Territorial Organization in Germany were not successful.

It was then that I met Dr. L. Gass, member of the German Reichstag from Karlsruhe. The Reichstag or the government authorized him, at that time, to investigate the Jewish problem in Poland. Another person also interested in this problem was Gothein, Chairman of the German League against antisemitism. Dr. David, representative of the Social-democratic party, proved very well informed of what was happening in Ukraine. The agrarian problem was particularly interesting to him, a subject on which I

could offer only generalizations; I was unable to acquaint him, as he wished, with details of the problem and of how the peasants themselves viewed the situation in different parts of Ukraine. On my return to Kiev I asked Matsiyevich to answer David's questions in writing.

At this time, December 1919, Berlin was very different from what it had been in the summer of 1918. Real famine could be sensed, with a shortage even of bread, meat, sugar and eggs, as well as of textiles. Yet while Germany was importing large quantities of raw materials from Poland, the Baltic countries and Ukraine, everything still remained short in Berlin, but superabundant in Warsaw. The reason was that the entire German labor force was yet at the western front, where tanks and violet rays were speeding the war to its conclusion. Things were much better now, but the Berlin of past days was no more.

During my stay in Berlin I met Dr. Muller, Minister of Foreign Affairs. One could sense at once that Germany was temporizing and that the German attitude towards Ukraine and Eastern Europe as a whole was still to be determined.

German Jewry was interested in Ukrainian-Jewish relations but dumbfounded by the staggering information on the pogroms; news arrived from all directions, first from the progrom belt, in the spring of 1919, then from pogroms of Denikin's army.

At Prof. Sobernheim's I read my report on Ukraine and Ukrainian-Jewish relations. The audience included representatives of the various currents of Jewish social-political thought, from Dr. Nathan to Dr. Struk, the well-known Zionist. I discussed the subject further with Dr. Gantke after the meeting.

The net result was merely an exchange of information, to my regret. German Jewry was powerless, unable either to help in the fight with anarchy in the East or to render material aid to the victims of anarchy.

Just before the New Year I unexpectedly received a telegram from my relatives in Vienna that my wife and one of my daughters, now in Warsaw, were on their way to

join me. I contacted Warsaw, and early in January my wife and daughter were with me in Berlin.

Then another telegram came from Vienna: a representative of the Committee of Jewish Organizations in Rostov had arrived in Vienna from Batum and was proceeding from there to London, with his data on pogroms. The telegram, addressed to me, was signed by Granovskiy, who requested a visit at my convenience. It did not occur to me that he was the same Granovskiy whom I had seen on the steamer from Novorossiysk. This name was associated in my memory with the old Granovskiy, once prominent in public affairs.

I conferred with Nathan first and then telegraphed Granovskiy inviting him to call on me in Berlin on his way to London. He arrived without delay, bringing the memorandum from the Central Committee on Aid to Victims of Pogroms, addressed to the Zionist Committee in London and also to me.

The documents were signed by Dr. Mezherovskiy, Chairman of the Committee. The committee members included several well-known names. It should be enough to mention Dr. G. Bruk, a prominent Zionist and member of the First Russian Duma, Guterman and Chernikov, both attorneys-at-law and long-time leaders of the Jewish community in Rostov; Bruk, an engineer from Yekaterinoslav, and others.

The document, addressed to Granovskiy, included the statement that the Central Committee was founded by the Jewish Political Collegium; the compositions of the two were identical. The Collegium included representatives of all the major Jewish parties and organizations in Rostov, Poltava, Yekaterinoslav, Odessa, and adjacent districts. The latest session of the committee's presidium had taken place in Batum the week of November 20, because it was dangerous to hold it in Rostov, in view of the character of the local police.

The memorandum and particularly its seven questions to the Directory were edited by experts, and the erudition of the authors was evident in the presentation of the text.

There was nothing significantly new to me in the data on the pogroms by Denikin's army, as given in the memorandum, but it came from an authoritative organ, people who were on the spot and well-informed. But the committee's conclusions were most highly significant and important; it was about to declare solidarity with the policy of the Directory, i.e. to recognize the Directory as the legitimate government of Ukraine. This act was evidence of a great change in the mood of Jewry in the territory subjected to the lawlessness and pogroms of Denikin's army. The unfortunate Jewish population had apparently decided that a purely Ukrainian national rule would be preferable to the bolshevist regime, as well as to the experimentations of the "Denikiad."

I was surprised that my appointment to London, made effective in Kamenets just a few days before November 20, was already known in Batum by that date. It seems that the Batum newspapers were informed by telegraph via Bucharest or otherwise.

Most likely it was the Anglo-Jewish periodicals from London that had found their way to Odessa or Rostov in the summer of 1919, with my published statements, interviews, and the like. They may have given the impression that my work on the Ukrainian problem was in London rather than in Paris.

There could be no doubt that the Directory's answers to every one of the questions would be affirmative, namely: the struggle with the bolsheviks and Denikin would be continued; minorities' rights would be protected; the conquests of the March Revolution preserved; the agrarian problem would be worked out on democratic and judicial principles; pogroms would be denounced emphatically; a Ministry of Jewish Affairs would be established by agreement with the Jewish Political Collegium.

To me it seemed impossible to undertake anything of decisive importance, on behalf of the Central Committee or the Collegium, without informing the Zionist Committee in London, the principal addressee of the documents. Granovskiy seemed too young, insufficiently stable, and

lacking in authority for his assignment. In all probability he was chosen because it was too difficult to find anyone in Batum who would agree to depart right after the conference, without baggage, on such a long journey—just leave everything and go. Be that as it may, Granovskiy ought to have been made responsible to some definite group. And I said that he must go immediately to London and report there to the Committee of the Zionist Organization to which he himself allegedly belonged.

Granovskiy took my advice and left for London, while I remained in Berlin for a few days. After I had seen the documents brought by Granovskiy I decided irrevocably to accept the appointment in London. While still in Berlin I received letters from Petlyura and Levitskiy, containing their views on the problems to be dealt with in London. It was evident from this information that I should have every opportunity in England to promote a policy equally beneficial for the Ukrainian and the Jewish people.

Moreover, my friends and old JTO comrades were in England, where I could always count on the good advice and guidance of a wise politician and Jewish leader, such as Lucien Wulf, whom I had met before the war as well as in the summer of 1919 in Paris. I also looked forward to working together with people such as Dr. Vishnitser, so charming and cultured, then in London.

Together with my wife and daughter, I left for London January 26 [1920].

On our way to England I stopped in the Hague for a visit with Yakovlev, Chief of the Ukrainian Mission to Holland and Belgium. The Ukrainian chorus, conducted by Koshits, was giving a concert in the Hague on the very day of my arrival. It was a tremendous success. The public was enraptured, for the song rose from the depths of the people's soul, swelling in might; savage, tender, sad. The conductor, in full command of the chorus, struck the full range of choral nuances, from barely audible distant echoes to soaring fortissimos. Koshits would tame the song by an almost imperceptible movement of his finger; then muffled sounds of the violin could be heard. Suddenly—a

billowing storm, a hurricane. The conductor's face was illumined as by lightning; he grew larger and taller, like the giant in the fairy tale, his imperious movements drawing forth from the obedient polyphonic instrument all the brilliance and power, living and bubbling in the inmost essence of man.

The chorus and the wizard-conductor had no need to wear the national garb. The song spoke for itself. No diplomacy, argument, or cunning stratagem could have been as powerfully convincing as this saga in music on the sorrows of the people, their captive obedience, their triumphant liberation from servitude. The fragrance of the Ukrainian fields, might of the rich soil and grassland, the very untamed youthful soul of the people seemed audible.

Every newspaper in Holland spoke of this performance as a miracle. The same rapture followed the chorus wherever it sang, in Paris, Prague, Madrid . . . .

The chorus performed successfully many times while I was in London. The University of London honored them by an invitation to sing within its walls, in a concert organized by the students, with introductory speeches by an English professor of Slavic languages, representatives of the student body, and Koshits himself. He proved a brillian orator; even when he spoke in his native Ukrainian, the temper and sincerity of tone enthralled the British. His patriotic speech, translated into English as he spoke, called forth an ovation.

Considerable attention was also given to the concert in one of the largest churches of London, where representatives of the British clergy wished success to the Ukrainian people.

But I am running ahead too far.

Of course I visited the Palace of Justice in the Hague. The Russian czar's concern with the World Peace Conference had left quite a few vestiges there, still undisturbed, including a life-sized portrait of Nicholas II and the furniture which had been his gift. What irony of fate! Was it not he, prompted by his luckless advisors, and unaware of the consequences, who ignited the global fire? However,

speaking of the dead, say only good or nothing . . . . Nicholas II atoned for a great deal by his martyrdom, when it comes to his personal guilt.

Granovskiy materialized suddenly, as I was ready to go to the railway station. He was just back from London, complaining bitterly about his cool reception by the Zionist Organization, who were skeptical of his mission and declined to cooperate. He decided to go straight to the Directory and deal with them at first hand on the seven points.

The whole business seemed odd and incomprehensible to me. Granovskiy's very behavior, his haste, nervousness, the tone of our conversation were not to my liking. I decided to abstain from any judgment in the case, pending my session with London Zionists.

On January 29 I was met by Dr. Vishnitser at the station in London. That same day I saw Olesnitskiy, attorney-at-law from Galicia, a councilor of the mission. Olenitskiy gained my sympathy and entire confidence from the start; I knew that he and Vishnitser would prove my two most outstanding and discreet associates. Indeed, we worked as a team from then on, in friendship and solidarity, without a trace of misunderstanding at any time.

Before relating here the substance of our work, I should finish the story of Granovskiy and his mission.

I was asked to attend the Committee session of the Zionist Organization, where that subject was to be discussed. Dr. Gantke, Goldstein, Goldberg, and others were already there. They explained that the organization knew very little about Granovskiy and that no conclusions could be drawn from his data, pending certification of their authenticity.

While agreeing with the committee's view on the unsuitability of Granovskiy for the task assigned to him, I could not agree with their doubts as to authenticity of his documents, which were altogether too sensibly drafted, in good language, with considerable understanding of the political and national problems of Jewry.

The point was that the documents could easily be verified. The memorandum to Granovskiy from the Jewish Political Conference provided, through the British Mission in Batum, for further contacts with the presidium of the conference. I suggested to the Zionist Committee that they should telegraph at once to that address in Batum, whence the telegram would be forwarded to its ultimate destination, with the customary courtesy of the British.

My suggestion was declined and I felt that the people not only mistrusted the documents but simply did not wish to trust them. Zionist policy in London at that time was tied to the political current in England, wherein the formation of independent states to replace fallen Russia was viewed with hostility. The Zionists had no desire therefore to be involved in any solution of the Russian problem in which the aspirations of nationalities would be taken into account.

Such was my impression. Its correctness was sustained by certain facts soon enough. Then I understood that the Zionist Organization was right and that it could not possibly commit itself to any kind of orientation involving Ukraine.

Strange and contradictory as it may seem, quite a few Zionists still dreamed of a restoration of the former Russia. This rift within the organization itself was naturally not conducive to any definite orientation of Zionists in the Ukrainian problem.

Moreover, from the viewpoint of the Zionist Committee in London, the only legitimate representative of Ukrainian Jewry in Western Europe was the Jewish delegation at the Peace Conference, elected by the well-known Jewish Congress in Kiev. As to the recently organized Jewish Political Collegium and its Committee in Rostov, for territory occupied by Denikin's troops, neither one could be regarded as a sufficiently competent representative of the territorial Jewry.

I was informed very shortly about a whole series of rash and more than flippant actions of Granovskiy, through which he was completely discredited . . . . It was not easy

to admit that the person chosen for a very important job could prove so incompetent . . . . But this fact did not at all detract from the value of his documents. As long as the authenticity of these documents remained unrefuted, they constituted a body of substantial and important data for anyone engaged in studies of the psychology of the Jews in the area where Denikin's army was operating in the fall of 1919.

CHAPTER XVII

London. Orientations. Labour Party. Zangwill. Williams. Harding. Robert Cecil. Asquith. Venizelos and Vayda-Voyevod. Scialoia. Churchill. From top of omnibus

My predecessor in London was holding his post at a particularly unfavorable time. The government, with characteristically British consistency and obtuseness, was supporting Denikin. In such circumstances the problem of Ukraine was at a standstill. It could not be pushed off that dead point even by the most active promoters, no matter how great the effort. The British, awaiting the outcome of Denikin's duel with Lenin and Trotskiy, did not like to break up a fight before it was over, as behooved that nation of pugilism and all kinds of sport. In this particular case their attitude was entirely understandable, more than ever, inasmuch as one of the duelists was under their high protection and they had already invested a great deal of money in his enterprise . . . . The Ukrainian mission in England was compelled to drag on its sordid existence as long as Denikin held out.

The situation changed abruptly when I arrived. Denikin's cause was definitely lost, while Kolchak and Yudenich were not doing too well either.

The British had to think. The fortunes of the White generals, behavior of their entourage, and the reaction of the population were totally different from the picture based on representations and assurances from Milyukov, the Russian Political Conference in Paris, and other sources.

The British were not convinced that even the best of the Russian intelligentsia neither knew nor understood the psychology of the people. Also, there had to be some limit to England's sacrifices in payment of a moral debt to a

former ally in the war. Again, there were doubts as to the identity of that former ally. Was it Milyukov and the emigres or was it the people, who had stayed in place and, more often than not, shown no solidarity with the emigres?

British policy in relation to the Baltic and Caucasian nationalisties had already been outlined. But the vast Ukraine was still there, under the continuous unsuccessful and ineffectual tutelage of France . . . The time had come at last to gaze towards Ukraine and the Ukrainian national movement. It was for this reason I was so well received by Gregory, Referent for Nationalities Affairs of Russia. I wrote a detailed letter to Lord Curzon and received his very courteous reply. A special audience was arranged for me with Lord Harding, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and now British Ambassador in Paris. The interest of England in Ukraine was definitely growing.

On the other hand it was clear that England would hardly intervene in the war with bolshevism. The British were aware that their policy in relation to Denikin and Kolchak was one unremitting and already incorrigible error. They understood the strength of the blow to the fighting capacity of Ukrainian nationalist forces, delivered with their own unwitting aid. But "it was in the past."

As to the present, they were supporting Estonia, on its way to peace with Soviet Russia, most actively. Their policy was the same for Latvia and Lithuania. So the abyss of anarchy, like a huge gaping wound, was skinning over, cicatrizing from the Baltic periphery inwards. The process was healthy, the normal beginning of recovery from anarchy.

The same process was underway in Gruzia, at the opposite rim of the abyss, except that recovery proved unstable there, pregnant with reversions to anarchy and mutual carnage.

The British made it perfectly clear to me that Ukraine must try to take the same path as Estonia had already taken. I hastened to forewarn the Ukrainian government, but no due attention was given to my report, insofar as I could gather afterwards. Be that as it may, no practical

steps in that direction could be taken by the government, because the other side, the bolsheviks, was determined to hold Ukraine particularly, as the granary for Moscow.

The least that could be done in London was to invite the cooperation of the Labour Party, which exercized considerable influence over the Russian bolsheviks at that time.

Correspondence and discussions with the leaders of the Labour Party were begun. Henderson and his associates became interested in the Ukrainian problem and asked us for literature on the subject. Our session with Williams was especially characteristic. Vishnitser and myself were introduced to him by Zangwill after the mammoth meeting of the party which we attended. Up to 15,000 were at this meeting in the Albert Hall, the largest in London. There was organ music; portraits and biographies of Lenin and Trotskiy were distributed while the audience sang. This was the time when British workers were not yet aware of the true nature of Russian bolshevism. Lenin and Trotskiy appeared to them as the apostles of socialism, of future happiness for the working class.

The orators were prominent Labour leaders as well as representatives of pro-Labour groups. Zangwill, one of the guests, gave the best speech of all. Speaking of the bolshevist experiment, he remarked wittily that experiments must be tried first in laboratories. He recommended that the Soviet government confine their experimentation to Russia, somewhat too large a laboratory to begin with, and relieve from such experiments the newly formed states based on self-determination of their nationalities, including Ukraine.

Williams declared to us laconically his sympathy with the Ukrainian movement. "Russia wants Soviets. Let her have them. Ukraine wants a Parliament. Let her will be done." This was how that strong man epitomized his thoughts, the man upon whose decisions all the railway workers in England depended. If Williams wanted a strike, there was a strike. His strength was in not wanting strikes too often and too easily.

Nonetheless, his will could not be a decisive factor in the Ukrainian problem. And the bolsheviks were not napping

but striving to convince the British Labour party that Petlyura was a counter-revolutionary collaborating with reactionary circles in Poland. It was possible to counteract such bolshevik rumors as late as the end of April. As soon as they learned in London about the pact with Poland, signed in Warsaw by the Ukrainian government, the Labour party broke all their contacts with us. The reputation of the strength of the reactionaries in Poland, which persisted in England, was the reason for this alienation. The Ukrainian National Movement itself was compromised in the eyes of the British working class.

In order to heal this break in our relations, at least to some degree, I was then pressing certain Ukrainian leftists living abroad and not members of the government, to come to London. Among other things, I wrote of it to Shul'gin in Czechoslovakia, asking him to persuade Grushevskiy and the Social-Democrats to come. Neither Grushevskiy nor Shrag nor Matyushenko would come, however. We, the official mission, were already allied to Poland, in the eyes of the Labour party.

Even the nonsocialist press was progressively cooling to us after the pact with Poland. In England, Poland was seen as the bulwark of French influence in Eastern Europe. Whosoever was with Poland was in the channel of the French influence by that very fact. The English public did not know and did not want to know about any secret treaties defining the spheres of influence of England and France. British public opinion was outspoken in its opposition to the predominance of Franco-Polish influence in Eastern Europe. Even in official circles there was an obvious groping for revision of the secret treaty with France or for its gradual abrogation.

Heretofore every large organ of the press had turned to us on its own volition, especially in February, March and April. But now even my most talented associates had to do their own walking and talking and worrying in order to place even a miniscule item in the papers.

Industrialists and financiers, who at one time had shown serious interest in Ukraine, reacted in the same way. Directors of the two largest British firms, engaged in con-

struction of port facilities and railways, visited me in February and March, in the cozy little cottage tenanted by our mission. They were especially interested in expansion and complete modernization of the Odessa port and in construction of railways in Ukraine. Everyone who was able soberly to appraise the utter collapse of the national economy in Ukraine, as well as in Russia, could understand that their economic revival was impossible by local exertion, and that rapid recovery could not occur unless the doors were open to capital from abroad.

From the viewpoint of the construction firms and of financial circles in the City, with whom I was in contact, there was definite likelihood of an agreement of Ukraine with the bolsheviks, but not with Poland, very much like the agreements of the Baltic states. Such agreements would be unattainable, however, because the bolsheviks had no intention to leave Ukraine. As to the Polish connection, it became a fact late in April. All negotiations of industrialists and financiers were cut off then and there.

Only the British government, true to form, was not in a hurry to react openly to the Polish-Ukrainian pact. The government was waiting for the outcome of the Polish-Ukrainian offensive against Kiev. Skeptical as they were of the result, they abstained from judgment until the very last. I used very often to see Philip Kerr, chief of Lloyd George's Cabinet and a rather influential person, but could get not so much as a hint from him. "Wait and see," he would say. Robert Cecil and Asquith, both of them outstanding British statesmen, I consistently kept informed of the course of events in Ukraine, through my own contacts.

Cecil had only a vague notion about the Ukrainian movement and could not tell Petlyura from Rakovskiy. As soon as we met, he asked me for all available materials and also for a photograph of Petlyura. From our first meeting Cecil, inquisitive and conscientious, followed attentively all current events in Ukraine and answered all letters promptly. At the same time he was interested in ascertaining the participation of Jews in the bolshevist movement, a thing he exaggerated in his mind. I sent to him certain

data on this subject. R.M. Blank had begun to correspond with him for the same reason.

I met Asquith at the League of Nations Society banquet, where I sat next to him at the table. He asked me about the Ukrainian peasantry and was especially interested to know which of the Ukrainian political parties corresponded to the British Liberal party, of which he was and still is leader. Many at this dinner, intrigued by the fact that I sat next to Asquith, approached me and introduced themselves. Chance is always important in the diplomatic world, and this occasion gave me access to and acquaintance with certain very interesting people. Among representatives of various nations, Venizelos and Vayda-Voyevod were particularly sympathetic with the Ukrainian movement. Venizelos saw Ukraine as a sister nation, because of the community of interest in the Black Sea. Later I met him several times in London, San Remo and Spa, where he was invariably ready to defend the Ukrainian cause in the presence of his powerful friends.

The Rumanian Premier, the exquisitely cultured Vayda-Voyevod, born in Transylvania, who was visiting London, represented most typically the new Rumania. That he was groping passionately for light from the West, could be sensed in his every word. He wanted his fatherland to become like the West. He was not afraid of "foreign dominance." Quite the opposite, he expected only good from it. By chance I heard him argue bitterly on this subject with Prince Sapega, the Polish Ambassador in London. Sapega had very different ideas on such "dominance," although he himself was educated in England and had absorbed literally everything that Western culture could give.

Scialoia, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, appeared in London somewhat later. He received me readily and with good will, and proved a sensitive friend of the Ukrainian people and of all peoples awakening from centuries of slumber, striving for free existence under the sun. A fairly well-known jurist in Italy, his appearance as a diplomat was recent and short-lived. He was succeeded by Sforza, so very active eventually in the problem of Upper Silesia.

It grew daily clearer that England intended to abandon all plans for intervention. The Labour party insisted on agreement with the bolsheviks. Lloyd George, a convinced enemy of bolshevism and, for that matter, of socialism, decided nonetheless that "nonresistance to evil" was the quickest road to the collapse of bolshevism. It was as if he meant to demonstrate to his own Labour party and the entire world that bolshevism, if left alone, would of itself seek logically its own demise. Fighting bolshevism by artillery, even to its defeat, would allow it to enter history with the halo of a martyr strangled by capitalist bandits. That was the reason for the new policy of Lloyd George towards Russia, and of his permitting delegations of British workers, writers and others to visit the bolshevist realm. He wanted them to see with their own eyes the outcome of the application of bolshevist theories and methods, as implanted in real life. The majority of the Cabinet followed Lloyd George.

But there was also a determined opponent of this policy, namely Churchill, Minister of War.

In a diffuse interview on the Jewish problem, which attracted universal interest, Churchill expounded his original classification of Jewry in two categories: Zionists and bolsheviks. Zionists figured in this interview as the best sons of the Jewish nation. Churchill was all sympathy for them, all warmth and best wishes for success in the attainment of their ideals. Bolshevist Jews were represented as enemies of mankind, by way of contrast. His phrase about "Russian bolsheviks and Petlyura's bandits" was thrown in for good measure, as if the two were of the same kind and origin.

The conclusions were entirely clear, namely: 1) Churchill showed himself a great friend of Zionism; 2) he was unaware that the overwhelming majority of Jews were neither Zionists nor bolsheviks; 3) he was definitely against the Ukrainian movement.

Aside from that interview, Churchill was known as a genuine reactionary who envisioned the restoration of Old Russia. His aid and protection were solicited by the former White generals as well as by candidates for such jobs.

Churchill's interview and orientation encouraged those still dreaming of the return of the past, although Churchill himself was but a negligible minority in the Cabinet.

Our mission was running in high gear, straining its energies to the utmost. All correspondence and contacts with the League of Nations were the responsibility of Olesnitskiy. Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General for the League of Nations, was actively interested in Ukraine and distributing our literature. The League had a special Ukrainian section under the chairmanship of Olesnitskiy.

Vishnitser was in charge of the Jewish division, aside from his other engagements in the Secretariat and press. There was also a section of economics, industry and trade administered by Melenovskiy and Shafarenko, the author of the brochure on the natural wealth of Ukraine.

Vishnitser and I would react immediately to the slightest indication of antisemitism among Ukrainians in the service abroad. In such rare instances we could invariably obtain complete satisfaction. For example, it was necessary for me to have an unpleasant discussion with a prominent Ukrainian, in connection with his resignation, and with his friend who was relieved of his duties in the Ukrainian mission in England. Afterward I wrote a letter to Petlyura, as follows:

London, Feb. 12, 1920.

Highly Esteemed Mr. President,

Allow me to call your attention to a very important problem in our inner life. I am doing this not as head of the Mission but as a citizen with old experience in public affairs.

As you know, I have no doubts with regard to the absolute democracy and freedom from antisemitism on the part of those who stand at the head of our entire governmental apparatus.

Unfortunately the same cannot be said about many of our officials and persons in public life, some of whom are in high positions in Ukraine as well as abroad. The stigma of antisemitism has been imposed onto the entire population of former Russia by the old Russian school, particularly within the "pale

of residence." Only time and persistent work may cure the organism of Ukraine from that disease.

However, you are very well aware of all this yourself, Most Highly Esteemed Simon Vasil'yevich. I am referring again to this subject here, because of the disastrous consequences of antisemitism in relation to our strife for the very existence of Ukraine as a state.

Putting it squarely, why was it that the Entente, especially England and America, treated the Baltic and Caucasian countries much better than they treated the Ukrainian nation? In replying to this question, two reasons may be adduced which entail a great deal by themselves: 1) Utopism and excessive leftism of the Directory, while still in Kiev; 2) the pogroms.

There is every evidence to the effect that the pogroms had a particularly harmful influence on the Entente's attitudes to the Ukrainian movement. Not even in Poland was there anything like the Ukrainian atrocities and the number of their victims. Among the civilized nations of Europe and America, the attitude towards the Jewish problem is a kind of litmus paper at this time, as evidenced by a multitude of facts, including the recent article by Churchill, the enemy of the Ukrainian movement, here enclosed. Indeed, pogroms by Denikin's army were even worse than the Ukrainian ones in the spring of 1919. It should be self-evident that we, now in London, are doing everything possible to make this understood in Europe and America. But this is not enough. Our administrative apparatus must be sanitized by your effective declaration with regard to the firm intention of the government, under your supreme guidance, to engage the energy of all peoples who live in Ukraine, in building the state of Ukraine. Aside from such declaration, a much stronger impact would be attained by a circular from the Council of Ministers to all agencies and missions abroad that, in the Ukrainian democratic state, only genuine democrats can be employed in the government service, persons in full accord with the government's views and untrammeled by the reactionary and antisemitic inheritance of the old State of Russia.

I do not know whether the circular here proposed was every issued. Correspondence with the government was quite difficult; the wartime censorship was still in force in several transit countries. Mails had to be sent by the "opportunity posts" through Prague, Berlin, or Vienna, where they lay in Ukrainian embassies pending the next opportunity to Warsaw, Kamenets, or Tarnov.

The persons responsible for all this hue-and-cry were never returned to the service. And I doubt very much whether such treatment could have been administered at the headquarters of Denikin, Kolchak, or Wrangel, other things being equal.

Nonetheless a thick cloud of suspicion enveloped everything that bore the name "Ukrainian," suspicion of everybody and everything, so fresh were the wounds inflicted on Jewry by the hurricane of pogroms in Ukraine. Communications appeared in the Jewish press, for example, stating that Nikovskiy, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, recommended abolition of the national-personal autonomy statute in his proposed new constitution and in his draft of the law of the provisional Parliament. In reply to our inquiry, Nikovskiy telegraphed categorically that he would "personally defend the national-personal autonomy at the Council of Ministers."

When the so-called Federation of Ukrainian Jews was organized in England, headed by Dr. Iokhelman, the Ukrainian government was very pleased. Similar organizations of Jews from Ukraine were established also in the United States, as well as in Palestine, according to my information. The very fact that Ukraine was recognized by the Jews as an independent entity was thoroughly appreciated by the Ukrainian government, as in the letter from the government to Dr. Iokhelman thanking him as the founder of the "Federation."

Calm and objective attitudes of Zangwill and Lucien Wulf to the Ukrainian movement, their capacity to separate the vices of the movement from its pure and wholesome sources, to appraise correctly the bad and the good, made them popular and esteemed by the best representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the government.

The problem of Ireland and of the increasing threat of

strikes in England repeatedly drew the attention of Lloyd George and the government away from foreign affairs. It would have been futile even to try to interest anyone in the Ukrainian problem during these these days.

I used to ride the top deck of the omnibus, sightseeing in the beautiful suburbs of London during these periods of forced idleness. This kind of transport is nowhere so easy and comfortable as in England, understandably, because the omnibus evolved in England from earliest times, figuring prominently in the works of Dickens and other English literature.

Riding from the center to the periphery of the city, looking at facades of houses, architecture and styles of buildings, moving swiftly, seeing pedestrians, hearing their voices—this was how and when one began to sense the tremendous difference between this island and the continent of Europe. Whatever was meant for the use of the general public was advancing here in step with technology. Such excellent pavements, such lighting of streets, even on the far edges of the city, were not to be found anywhere on the continent.

The private houses here had stood, untouched since ancient times, squat and sooty. The conservative British do not like to demolish. An Englishman loves his old mansion and is not tempted by profit to erect a tall building to let, instead of the old mansion with its garden. He favors evolution but his mansion will not evolve into a modern home. It stands as it is, often right next to a new house on the adjacent lot. Should his old home be destroyed by fire, it will be replaced by a modern one, with spacious high-ceilinged, well-lighted rooms.

This would often come to mind when people spoke of the undesirability of demolishing established state-political formations. Indeed, the breakdown and collapse of states result in dire shock and deprivation for the people there.

Radical applications of Wilson's principles to state-political organisms still intact, held firmly by the cement which binds their constitutent members together, are hardly desirable in the interests of their own national minorities, depressed as these minorities may be by the

dominating majority, with regard to their language, culture, and ethnic individualism. This is not at all the case when the old structure is already in ruins, whatever the reason may be, when conditions and principles in the immediate neighborhood of the ruins are already different from what they were. In such circumstances, attempts to restore the old edifice are but expressions of muddled thought and force of habit on the part of the man in the street.

The road to hell is paved by the best intentions, when it comes to longings for the past. No mason or carpenter could be found to rebuild the Old Russian edifice. The rebuilding will begin not from the dome down, but from the basement up. Every one of the nations will start its own building on its own ground, creatively. Local life and initiative will come to bloom. And the future, including sharings, exchanges, accomodations with neighbors, will develop of itself, by free accord and not by subjugation.

Where creative construction by free volition of free peoples, as visualized, is delayed, should some other force like bolshevism succeed once more in subordinating the vast territories of the former Russian empire to one center, one will, the new dominion will be unstable and short-lived. The building, hastily glued together, will collapse again. Its inner bonds will prove just as weak as the existing but barely binding bonds of Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine.

Other idle thoughts came to my mind too, on the top deck of the omnibus . . . . A butcher shop flashed by . . . . Huge lots of carcasses in the window. What an abundance of everything in this London, where steamers bring meat and all kinds of vegetables and fruits from overseas, from the entire world . . . . But over there in Vienna there is near famine . . . . In Kiev, as in luckless Petersburg, total famine . . . . But what does the average Londoner care? He is struggling for existence, lucky to be fed. Try to ask him about Ukraine. He knows as little of it as we know about the Chinese peoples.

The helplessness of our little mission in its task to enter this environment, this limitless sea of population in Lon-

don, plunged me into despair. Ukraine was less known in England than even in France, not to speak of Germany and the nations of the former Austro-Hungary, our very neighbors. Vast resources were needed, our own press was needed.

None of that was at the disposal of our mission. . . .

CHAPTER XVIII

San Remo. Luzatti. Vienna. Retreat from Kiev. Pogroms again

The conference in San Remo was held in May 1920. Scialoia told me while in London that relations with bolshevism and the new state-political formations might be included in the conference agenda. I went to San Remo for that reason, by authorization from the group of Ukrainian ambassadors and certain members of the Ukrainian government who were abroad at that time. Tyshkevich, Galip, Mazurenko and other prominent Ukrainians were already there.

In-fighting between members of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris was now at its most fierce. Nearly all the delegation had long been clamoring for recall and replacement of Tyshkevich. But the government was in no hurry to resolve this truly urgent problem, and this procrastination was their greatest error in foreign policy. Tyshkevich's connections, confined to clerical and reactionary circles, were too onesided, and his thinking completely out of line with the movement he represented at the Peace Conference, in his highly responsible position. Matters worsened with his subjection to impermissible baiting by his colleagues in the delegation. True, he was repaying them in kind. All this dirty linen was washed publicly in front of foreigners, to the enjoyment of enemies of the Ukrainian movement.

I watched with considerable interest the successes of the Palestinian cause in San Remo, but did not stay long at the Conference after Philip Kerr and Scialoia told me about the deletion of the East European question from the agenda, through shortage of time. I hurried to Rome, with several political visits on my schedule.

My endeavor here is to reconstruct every fact which may

be published at this time. Much of what I learned in Paris and in England, as well as in Italy, is not yet publishable. I shall tell only about my meeting with the aged Luzatti, after several days of waiting for an appointment. I had known this name since childhood. Jews were proud of Luzatti and of his status in Italy. Scarcely a post had not been held by him, at one time or another, up to Minister of War and Premier. Even now, old and weak as he was, he was Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime Minister.

"Be not surprised with the time I made you wait," began Luzatti. "Two things sustain everything in the world. God is the first one, yes, God, without whom nothing is done. The next one is money. I am Minister of Finance. Hence I am the busiest man in the world."

Inclination to rhetoric and exaltation, so out of place with modern politicians, was evident in this introduction and in all that was said by this grand old man. Luzatti belonged to the old political school, and his character had been formed a long time ago. It was as if his temperament were a blend of Semitic blood and the fierce sun of Italy. Despite his eighty years and his very small audience (only the two of us in the room), Luzatti was fired with enthusiasm and talked continuously, changing themes and passing from subject to subject. An exuberant worshipper of France, he approved the French policy for Poland, shared the French fears of Germany, and believed in the coorectness of the plan to create a large and very strong Poland. He thought that Ukraine, as a young, barely embryonic state, must cede its Galician part to Poland, to fortify Poland against Germany.

On the whole, he proved to be a great friend of Poland. He was aware of the suffering of Jewish people in Poland, but quick to add that all would be mended. In his view it was idle for Jewry to be taken as a nation; better for them to be regarded as a religion, as in the past. Finally, he regretted that "Litvaks" (Lithuanian Jews) do not get along with the solid body of Polish Jews and asserted that it was the Litvaks' own fault. It was obvious that Luzatti lived entirely in the past. It was also clear that much of what he was

saying was hearsay, picked up as he revolved in diplomatic circles.

I changed the subject and said, among other things, that he was regarded as the father of the Italian cooperatives. "Not the father, but the grandfather," he answered, then went on to tell of many interesting things on the subject, wherein he was indeed a world-famous authority. He wished to know more about the Ukrainian cooperatives and promised to give us his advice and practical suggestions.

In parting he told me again that, next to God, he was the busiest man in the world.

The political views of Luzatti, the substance of which has been given briefly here, were identical with the French orientation on greater Poland-to-be. But Luzatti represented a negligible minority in Italy, for Italian political leaders tended to follow the policy of Lloyd George.

There was no time for me, unfortunately, to meet another Jew, Mortara, Minister of Justice and member of the Cabinet. He was swamped by work and I did not feel right in disturbing him, particularly since I had nothing concrete to offer.

I found many from Kiev in Rome, sunning themselves under the hospitable skies of Italy and away from the cold, loss and tribulation they had had to endure not so long ago. People have short memories. Many were already complaining of the excessive heat of the sun in Rome, in May . . . . And it was hot indeed.

From Rome I was scheduled to go to Vienna, that center of Ukrainian emigration whither everybody was drawn because the Austrian currency was cheap. A gathering of Ukrainian ambassadors and certain members of the government was to be held in Vienna. On my way there I made a survey: stopped in Geneva for a day, where the Social-Federalist group was meeting, and for two days in Baden-Baden, to visit my parents, who had recently escaped from Crimea via Constantinople.

The city of unending gaiety and waltz was still recovering from the privations of the war. Poor Vienna, what had happened to you! In the principal streets of the daytime city it was still possible to feel the onetime capital of a

great country, where many nationalities lived side by side. But in the night the city was stingily lighted; deserted and gloomy were its mansions of stone, palaces, museums, theaters—the "Ring," the only one of its kind.

How quickly was everything forgotten! Where else but in Austro-Hungary, with her contending nationalities, were the slogans of free self-determination of nations proclaimed first, the slogans of minority rights. In Chernovitsy, names of streets were posted in three languages. Of course Austrian Germans were the dominant nationality, the inhibitors of evolution and growth of other nationalities in the country. But how could one possibly compare the situation in Austria before the war, with the oppression of nationalities in Russia? Was it possible for Poles to breathe as freely in Warsaw as in Krakow? And where but not in L'vov did the Ukrainian movement linger on while still alive? Was it possible to dream a Tartar of Gruzian would ever see street signs in his mother language in his own native city?

When it comes to the position of Jews in Russia vs those in Austro-Hungary, any parallel or comparison would be totally out of the question. True, recent generations of Jewish youth were demanding personal-national autonomy for Jews, even in Austro-Hungary. But that novel sprout could not be grafted onto anything anywhere at that time. Just the same, portraits of Franz Joseph could be seen in many old Jewish homes. A religious Jew prayed to the Almighty for Franz Joseph's health in all sincerity.

Ukrainian ambassadors and political leaders were cheerful and elated at their congress in Vienna, for Kiev had been taken by the Polish-Ukrainian troops. People wanted to believe that it was at least possible to overthrow the bolshevist yoke and begin to live normally, even at the cost of concessions to Poland. The Social-Federalists were holding their convention in Vienna at the same time.

The ambassadors' congress decided unanimously to abolish the Parisian delegation and replace it by a mission like those in the other countries. There was no point in maintaining that delegation, since the Peace Conference had become an itinerant institution, assembling here and

there, but no longer in Paris. The ambassadors recommended the creation of a special mission at the Peace Conference, likewise itinerant, made up of chiefs of the missions in France, Italy, England, and the country where the Conference was holding its particular session. The congress suggested appointment of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as chairman of this mission, if necessary.

Matsiyevich, Antonovich and Shul'gin were instructed by the congress to go to Kiev. They succeeded but partially in this assignment, for Kiev was retaken by the bolsheviks before long.

Another retreat (of the Ukrainian army), with the accompanying anarchy . . . . Again pogroms and pillage in Galicia . . . . This time the disorganized soldiers "went on a spree" not only in towns and settlements, but even in villages. Peasants were plundered, their property taken, women and children raped . . . .

We requested information from London. Vishnitser received a telegram from Vasil'ko that forty pogromshchiks had been shot. We insisted on details of their trial, their names . . . . No answer. Execution of pogromshchiks by firing squad, right at the sites of pogroms in several instances, was confirmed to me by Krasnyy and General Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko in Tarnov, in December. But I could obtain no documentary evidence from them to that effect.

Kiev fell, as foreseen in official circles in London, still marking time, even as I have already explained. No waiting now. In conversations with Kerr and other good friends, I was becoming progressively convinced that a radical change in policy of the Ukrainian government was indeed necessary. If not, there was no reason at all for us to remain in England.

In my report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the situation in England, late in June, I wrote that "our entire foreign policy must be reconsidered; a conference of all our ambassadors with the Minister of Foreign Affairs must be held immediately; personally, I was no longer able to continue work in England, pending a radical change in our policy." Aside from that, I telegraphed to

Nikovskiy asking him to confer with me without delay. I wished to become acquainted exactly with the substance of the agreement with Poland, signed in April. I had no doubt as to the high loyalty and noble motives of the authors of that agreement, whose signatures had been given through force of circumstances (coactus voluit). Nonetheless, I believed it was a duty of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to let the ambassadores see the text of that agreement at once. This was not done either by Levitskiy or by Nikovskiy, who had succeeded Levitskiy after the agreement was signed. My resignation was delayed only by the fact that Prokopovich, Nikovskiy, Salikovskiy and other Social-Federalists were members of the Cabinet at that time (in the Kiev period).

Instead of convocation of the ambassadors' conference with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry appointed a collegium for attendance at the Peace Converence, made up of Tyshkevich, Vasil'ko, Yakovlev and myself. The Conference was scheduled to meet early in July. I decided to test my conclusions for the last time in Spa, and not to evade my obligations accordingly.

CHAPTER XIX

Conference in Spa. My statement. Struve and Guchkov. German orientations. News from Ukraine. Entente and Black Sea

The Conference in Spa was busy with the German problem almost to the exclusion of everything else. Everybody and particularly the British were most favorably impressed by Ferenbach and Simons. Dr. Melchior, well-known in Kiev, where he had stayed in 1918, was also a member of the German delegation. Melchior was invariably liked, thanks to his tact and poise, by everyone whom he met, as I heard from the British and French while still in London.

The text of our address to the Peace Conference was prepared by the collegium as a team and delivered then and there, but without result, however. Aside from that first step we conferred while in Spa: Tyshkevich with Foch, Vasil'ko with the Polish delegation, I with members of the British delegation.

They told me about the decision to hold a conference in London with representatives of the bolsheviks, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland to arrange a peace between the bolsheviks and their neighbors, as here listed. The conference failed to materialize, as we know, but talking about it in Spa was the highlight of the day. When I asked the British why Estonia was not invited, they said the invitation was extended only to those who still were not definitely at peace with Soviet Russia. Furthermore, they informed me that the Ukrainian population of the Ukrainian part of Galicia would have the right to send their own delegates to the conference in London. "The future of Ukrainian Galicia will be determined by the desires of the majority of its population," the British solemnly concluded. This was but a continuation of the Galician policy of Lloyd George,

to which he had adhered even in the summer of 1919 in Paris, while protesting activities of Galler's troops more emphatically than anyone else (and far more sincerely than Clemenceau, in our conversation . . . .). "We rejoice in the rebirth of the Polish nation," continued the British, "but we cannot sympathize with Polish aggressions. Polish people must understand that Poland cannot quarrel with its neighbors if it wants to build a state of its own." It was evident that England was in favor of the reconstruction of Poland as a state, but only within its ethnographic boundaries.

When I asked whether representatives of the "Dneprovian" Ukrainian movement would be invited to the conference in London, the answer was negative, for the following reasons: Ukrainian Galicia was part of the Austrian heritage. Liquidation of this heritage, on the basis of unrestrained self-determination by every nationality of the former Austiran Empire, was a problem for the Peace Conference to resolve. Arrangements for the future of the nationalities of Russia, however, were not a problem for the Peace Conference. Errors of intervention, including aid to Kolchak and Denikin, would not recur. England sympathized vividly with the Ukrainian movement. But the Ukrainian people must prove itself sufficiently strong to win its right to independence. So far, Ukrainians were tolerating the bolshevist regime, even as the Russians did.

The British are votaries of individualism. They would never allow anyone to experiment with them the way Ukrainians do. But after the Ukrainian people had thrown off their yoke and succeeded in maintaining their freedom, England would joyfully recognize the accomplished fact.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the British found it improper to invite representatives of Petlyura's as well as Wrangel's governments to the London conference with the bolsheviks. They regarded Wrangel and the relics of his army, still in Crimea, as a mere "police force protecting refugees from Soviet Russia."

Things were altogether too plain. I asked my collucutors whether the Ukrainian mission to England had become

superfluous under the circumstances. Quite the opposite, was the answer, the mission was particularly valuable and desirable at this very time, when public interest in the Ukrainian problem was particularly high in England. Consequently there was no reason to count on quick aid from England in our struggle with anarchy. All the Ukrainian mission could do was keep the British informed of developments in the Ukrainian movement and conditions inside the country.

The British were better informed than we, when it came to those conditions. They controlled the telegraph and had regular diplomatic couriers, while we in London were completely isolated from Ukraine. But with regard to the history of the Ukrainian movement, juridical and historical premises of the Ukrainian right to independence, we had scholars and specialists in these subjects who could inform the British government and public far more thoroughly and comprehensively than I. For these reasons, after that discussion with the British, I decided irrevocably to resign.

Nor was there any comfort in whatever Foch had to tell Tyshkevich. In vain did Vasil'ko try to help the case. All his intellect, practical sense and capacity to find ways out of most difficult situations proved futile now.

Yakovlev and I met P.B. Struve and N.A. Bazili in Spa. In his recent interviews published in the newspapers, Struve, as Wrangel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke about a federation of nations, "equals with equals," the nations' right to self-determination, each with a constitutent assembly of it own, and so on.

I rejoiced on reading his interview. "Here it is," I thought, "We speak the same language at last!" It developed, however, that the interview was apparently obsolete . . . . Just a short while ago, Pilsudski with Petlyura had been on Ukrainian territory. But now, while we talked in Spa, the "actual force ratio," to which Struve had been alluding enigmatically, as the basis of his future policy, was no longer the same . . . . And Struve was merely trying to impress us with the still great strength of Wrangel's army . . . . With Stuve's words a kind of cold wind seemed to

blow. Bazili, sympathetic and sensitive as I had known him in Paris, shrank from that cold, as it were. And I, with Yakovlev, went away saddened by our conversation and by the tarnished image of Struve, whom we had seen in our youth as the personification of liberty and of the strife for the highest ideals of mankind.

At about the same time, whether just before or shortly after the conference in Spa I am not sure, I had a session with A.I. Guchkov together with Kh. A. Baranovskiy and Prof. Smal'-Stotskiy. Comparisons come spontaneously. What a remarkable evolution of Guchkov, so alive, so realistic! Aware of the facts, he was willing now to accept even the full independence of Ukraine. "I am not afraid of that independence," he was saying, "for I am certain that the Ukrainian people will enter federation with the Russian people." Guchkov was apparently the first Russian politician who had begun at last to speak of Russia proper (Velikorossia) as such.

My firm resignation, addressed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sent from Spa on July 16, 1920. I certified therein the grievous fact of the failure of the government's former policy and the urgency of its modification, inasmuch as all the warnings in my earlier reports from London had proved fully correct in Spa. Furthermore, I was convinced of the uselessness of my continued work in England and asked to be relieved from my duties as the mission's Chief. I informed the Ministry of my imminent departure for London and that I had turned over to Dr. Olesnitskiy all factual materials on the internal affairs of the mission, because I was weary and overworked. Finally, I promised formally to remain on my post in London, pending replacement, so that my resignation would not be construed by the British government as evidence of my despair in the very possibility of securing from England any tangible aid for Ukraine.

Nikovskiy postponed his decision on my resignation until our meeting in Vienna, which occurred late in August. I convinced him then that I could not be of any use to the Ministry in the current circumstances. Nikovskiy thanked me with heartfelt sincerity for my work in the past and

asked me to keep in touch with London. My resignation was accepted. On the same day, August 21, I was appointed my Ministry's jurisconsult for the Ukrainian embassies in London and Berlin and at the League of Nations.

This appointment was exactly what I wanted. As jurisconsult I would be useful in London as well as in Berlin. My family was already in Berlin and we were expecting my son-in-law and two daughters to join us before long. They had all escaped from Kiev and crossed the Dnestr under firing from the Rumanian shore. I was willing to continue my work for the defense of the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian people, but I did not wish to be even indirectly responsible for a policy of the Ukrainian government in which I had no part at all.

I then proposed, at the conference of Ukrainian ambassadors and politicians in Vienna, to organize a national committee of representatives of every one of the Ukrainian parties, from Corngrowers to Social-Revolutionaries. This committee would have room enough for those who disagreed with the government's tactics and policies, who refused to take part in the government or serve in its agencies but had no desire to "explode" the government. The idea was to organize the opposition to the government and not to create a new government. My proposal was supported by Nikovskiy, but Vasil'ko and others were against it. Nothing came out of it.

The "Pan-Ukrainian National Rada," headed by Shelukhin and Grekov, was organized somewhat later in Vienna, but on different principles and for a different purpose.

I alternated between Berlin and London during September-October. While in Berlin I had the opportunity to learn about German policy in Eastern Europe.

Together with Smal'-Stotskiy we talked about it with Simons, member of the Cabinet, with Rathenau, minister-to-be, members of the Parliament and public leaders. It became possible for me to develop a view of the principal currents of political thought in Germany, to recognize three different attitudes of the times:

a) Rightist groups dreaming of the restoration of the

monarchy in Germany, with concurrent reconstruction of the Russian Empire, large and powerful, with an autocratic monarch on the throne;

b) Extremists of the left, with visions of Great Russia, like the rightists', in the future, either as an autocratic, reactionary power or as a socialist ally of Germany. Russia loomed in the fantasies of the right and the left, respectively, with the ominous glow of coming war and the regeneration of the entire world on the principles and with the methods of socialism;

c) Liberal democrats and moderate socialists, between the two extremes, trying sincerely to establish a democratic regime and parliamentarianism in Germany, as in the already functioning republic.

This group desired accord and cooperation with the Western neighbors of Germany and solution of the Eastern problem in agreement with their interests.

The government and its central organs were staffed, of course, by representatives of the first and third political currents. Extreme leftists were not sufficiently strong to remain on top. The real contest was and still is between those longing to return to the past and those who want peace with all their neighbors and the concurrent joint growth of all genuinely democratic states towards the heyday of spiritual and material culture.

The outcome of this in-fight, still underway, depended on the treatment of Germany by the Entente, particularly by England and France. Seventy million Germans could not be fed with the products of their native land alone. Germany, a highly industrialized manufacturing country, must have an unimpeded outlet to world markets, particularly at this time, towards the East. Deliberate obstruction of this outlet by the Entente gave every reason to expect a triumph of the right, outbursts of indignation, hunger riots, dangerous mass action of workingmen and extreme leftists. Conversely, if German aspirations on the peaceful conquest of East European markets were not impeded from the outside, the builders of the new democratic Germany would win out.

The strong influence of England on the policy of Germany had become evident even in its recognition of the Baltic states. A clearcut example of this influence was the German-Latvian treaty negotiated shortly before the de jure recognition of Latvia by England (then by Italy and France). Germany promised automatic recognition of Latvia as soon as Latvia was recognized by members of the Entente.

Germany followed England also in dealing with the bolsheviks. As soon as England signed a trade agreement with Soviet Russia, work was in full swing in Germany to arrange a trade agreement with Sovdepia (i.e. Soviet Russia) as quickly as possible.

As always with the loser, Germany was inclined to coordinate her actions with the policies of other states. However, the defeated nation could become the seat of incalculable calamities in Europe and the entire world, were Germany to find itself enclosed on all sides, with no immediate evidence of a changed attitude in its powerful neighbors of the West, from hostility to good will. In the latter case, calamity would burst over Poland with peculiar crushing force, Poland whose neighbor in the East was the tortured, hungry and utterly desperate population of immense Russia.

A general gravitation eastward was common to all classes, parties, and most widely diversified groups of the German population. Bereft of colonies, with its top-rank navy gone (once inferior to the British solely by the number of battleships), with the merchant marine shrunken to the minimum, Germany dreamed no longer of world domination and the sovereignty of the oceans. Die Westpolitik was succeeded by one single drive to the East, in the direction of least resistance, with the widest opportunity for application of labor and the disposal of merchandise. The Drang nach Osten now involved the entire people of Germany with an intensity beyond words. Diminished populations, particularly in Russia proper, and the vast lands lying between Russia and Siberia were the perspectives now revealed to the German nation.

The route to Bagdad and beyond held greater promise,

of course; lower latitudes, a more favorable climate, and domination of marine and oceanic routes were more tempting than transport by land, from Riga and Revel' inland and eastward.

The most recent data on the mood of Ukrainian villagers came to me from close friends who arrived directly from Kiev in the fall of 1920. Some had visited villages and hamlets of Kiev and Poltava provinces, where they were buying food. The countryside eagerly awaited the Ukrainian troops, according to my friends, to liberate the peasantry from the bolsheviks. Peasants were developing a hostility to all Russians, because the bolsheviks were taking their bread and cattle, while Denikin's officers were arrogant and defiant during their short residence in Ukraine. To a peasant, they were all "katsaps," bolsheviks and Denikin's soldiers alike. As to the commissars from the cities, they were all "Yids." Such hatreds would undoubtedly weaken in time. In the meanwhile they served to intensify the peasants' longing for independence from Russia and for self-determination of the Ukrainian state. Disregard of these phenomena would be following a dangerous ostrich policy and conducive to exacerbation of the feelings described here.

In the minds of Kiev and Poltava peasants, the Ukrainian army and the movement were identified with the name of Petlyura. That name had become a household word. Even as grave accusations of Petlyura were being made in certain spheres, and he was held guilty of many things (for some of which he was only partly responsible, if at all) so he was already a legend among the country folk, a hero of storied deeds of high prestige, deeds that either had never really occurred or the actual circumstances of which were misrepresented and inflated to suit the legend. One could easily imagine what kind of oral tradition was growing in the countryside, as it passed from village to village, particularly in places cut off from the world.

My informers did not all share my attitude to the Ukrainian problem, even in January 1919. They had been educated entirely within the Russian culture and language and were not taking, nor had ever taken part in the Uk-

rainian movement. But they had actually stayed in Ukraine and told me exactly what they had seen and heard. Their testimony was fully objective and particularly valuable for that reason.

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Whatever I learned and experienced in England early in 1920, when public interest in Ukraine was running high, was evidence of a significant change in opinion of the leaders with regard to the importance of Ukraine for Britain and future British economic policy. The wartime hatred of Germany was being succeeded gradually by calmer attitudes, with the realization at the same time that, no matter how much care and money were invested by England in the Baltic Sea area and the Baltic countries, they would fall within the German sphere of economic influence sooner or later.

Geographical proximity and the remarkable capacity for work, not to be denied even by the fiercest enemies of the Germans, the ability to produce at lower costs than elsewhere in Western Europe, made the foregoing prognosis a certainty. Furthermore the currency exchange situation, so unfavorable for Germany in the procurement of materials from the West, was still most highly advantageous for Germany when it came to the export of manufactures to the East. Not the Baltic states, not even Poland, Germany's next-door neighbor, could offer to England anything comparable to the vast opportunities which lay quiescent in Ukraine.

The keys to the Black Sea were held by the Entente. The British merchant marine had been overwhelmingly preponderant in the Black Sea trade, even before the war. Ukraine had no common boundaries with Germany. Germany had no merchant marine and would remain cut off from the Black Sea for a long time.

The fact of the secret treaty which put France in a privileged position for exercising economic influence in Ukraine could not encumber England, inasmuch as France was simply unable to assume even one fifth the responsibility for quick and efficient restoration of the Ukrainian economy. By the way, the very existence of that

secret treaty was known only within very tight governmental circles. Outside these circles certain British spokesmen began to talk freely on that subject, alongside their interest in Ukraine. The Ukraine, by Begnal Bull, a very interesting brochure in English, was published recently. The author, a great patriot of England and publisher of several pamphlets during the war, well grounded in the literature on his subject, showed considerable understanding of the Ukrainian problem. He appealed for unity of purpose and close cooperation between Britain and Ukraine.

Colonel Chapman-Houston, member of the Secretariat of the League of Nations Society, became very interested in Ukrainian problems. People of his kind followed current events at this time, with faith in the happy future of Ukraine and in British guidance of the Ukrainian economic renaissance.

Italy too shared the navigation on the Black Sea. Italy was first to organize freight-passenger service for every one of the seaports in the fall of 1919, following the occupation of Odessa by Denikin's army.

American mammoth freighters were belching smoke in every seaport of Rumania. If only some strong power could be found, albeit only in Odessa and the Kherson area, to enforce order, flood the markets with nails, caps, boots, clothing, not to speak of agricultural machinery, so desperately needed. That by itself would put an end to anarchy and bolshevism. The news of such an oasis would spread quickly to the adjacent territories and give pause to anyone tempted to remain in the ranks of bolshevism in order merely to exist, half-starved, on and on. Nails and boots could be more effective than guns.

CHAPTER XX

League of Nations. Congress in Geneva. Radyanskaya ("Soviet") System. Laborite monarchy. Parliamentarian monarchy. Republic

As early as August 25, 1920, the League of Nations notified the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian government, via the Ukrainian mission in London, of the Congress to be held in November in Geneva. Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, also requested in this notification the transmission to him of official statements wherein the desires of Ukrainian people for unimpeded self-determination would be formulated, as well as documents containing recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty by other states.

The work at the League was well within my field of competence, as jurisconsult for the Ministry. The subject in question was indeed the first step in a very serious action. I applied to Grushevskiy for aid, and he reconstructed certain data on the Laborite Congress from memory. Then I asked Shemet for materials which he could obtain from Lipinskiy. Shemet sent nothing to me, unfortunately. Papers on the recognition of Ukraine by Poland, Finland and Latvia were sent to me by the government in London. Copies of the accreditation memoranda for representatives of England and France at the Central Rada government, addressed to Shul'gin (Chapter XII), were also available in London.

However, we had no adequate data on elections to the All-Russian and Ukrainian Constitutent assemblies, the very material we needed most.

Dr. Olesnitskiy was dispatched from London to Vienna to assemble the required data. He too failed to unearth

quantitative information on the exact number of ballots cast for the strictly Ukrainian slates at the elections.

Shelukhin could have helped Olesnitskiy and me, by advice and guidance, but was in Riga at that time.

Regardless of purely juridical considerations, one had to go to the Congress in Geneva arrayed in the panoply of historical data. The government made a clever move, at this juncture, by appointing Shul'gin its permanent representative at the League of Nations. But Shul'gin was still in Prague. In the meanwhile it was essential to answer the League's questions. The answer, signed by Olesnitskiy and myself, was sent October 19, with barely enough time for the League to have it printed and distributed to members of the Congress before the opening session in Geneva.

Shul'gin insisted on my coming to Geneva. I found him there, together with Kovalenko, his colleague and closest assistant. I undertook to introduce representatives of the British colonies to the Ukrainian problem in its present state. My conversations with representatives of Australia, India, Canada and New Zealand served to awaken their interest in Ukraine. They asked me to send them the literature.

South Africa, the fifth British colony, was represented by Robert Cecil, who was already acquainted with the Ukrainian problem.

Curiously, about one third of the nations in the League were Spanish-speaking, a language which was the official as well as colloquial one in their states. Their representatives had mastery of French, of course, and it was in French that Shul'gin explained the Ukrainian problem with his customary energy.

This time I restricted myself to conversations with representatives of the British colonies, juristic aid to Shul'gin, and transmitting to Shul'gin all materials relevant to the League of Nations as well as correspondence between the Ukrainian mission in London and the League. Shul'gin familiarized himself quickly with all these data and situations, despite his having withdrawn from active politics and having spent more than a year in a small Czech village before his emergence at the Congress. I found it possible

to leave Geneva in a few days, feeling that my duty was done and there was no need for me to stay longer.

A session of Nansen's subcommittee, then engaged in drafting a report on Ukraine and the Caucasian states, was the most interesting for us all. Nansen, the well-known Norwegian scholar and explorer of the Arctic, was the chairman. The members were representatives of Rumania, Greece (both of the Black Sea countries), Spain, and Australia. We were invited for oral contributions to the hearings on the boundaries of Ukraine, stability of its government (in the sense of its continuity and succession, in relation to the original government of the Central Rada), and the problem of genesis of that original government.

Shul'gin, as the official representative of Ukraine, answered every one of these questions at length.

Nansen was especially interested in the results of the elections to the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. He knew that the German military command had not permitted that Assembly to open. Nonetheless the subcommittee desired to know the election returns in detail. The principle of parliamentarianism was sacred in the League of Nations, at least among the best representatives of the organization; dictatorships were unacceptable either from the rightist or from the Soviet side. Nansen questioned us closely with regard to the system of the elections; he wanted to know whether Petlyura was truly elected as a member of the Ukrainian Constituent assembly and how many votes he had received.

Representatives of Gruzia presented their evidence at the same hearings.

The group of Baltic states were assigned to a different subcommittee. The Council of the League understood correctly the fact that two new territorial companies of nations and states were emerging: the Baltic and the Black Sea groups. Recent pacts between the Caucasian nations and projected analogous pacts between the Baltic countries were indications of these territorial groupings, of the process already underway.

Ukraine, Azerbaydzhan and Armenia, then under bolshevik rule, were not admitted to membership in the

League at this particular session, nor were Gruzia, Latvia and Lithuania. Only this was not a complete refusal, merely a delay. The main obstacle to the admission of these newly formed states was Paragraph Ten of the League's charter, i.e. the pledge of the League to use armed force in protecting any one of its members from attempts at illegal aggression by that member's neighbors. The League was still without any troops of its own and its constituents, as individual states, declared plainly that they had no intention to fight the bolsheviks. What could the League do by way of protection of Ukraine, under the circumstances? How could it implement Paragraph Ten in the instance of Gruzia, shortly before that country was taken by the bolsheviks?

In its embryonic stage the League was an impotent apparatus when it came to applying its principles to realities. The League was endowed only with impulses . . . . Would it ever become the League's destiny to enforce all those paragraphs in real life? Would it not disintegrate and vanish without a trace? Would it be succeeded by a genuine federation of all nations, victors and losers alike?

Such were the questions which came to mind in Geneva.

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Even before we left London for Geneva, our British friends were telling us to present facts and proofs to the League, showing that admission to the League was desired not only by the government personified by Petlyura, in the eyes of the West, but also by other Ukrainian groups in opposition to Petlyura and his government. The British correctly pointed out that the League was interested in the voice of the people, not in some particular government.

With that purpose in mind, I contacted representatives of different Ukrainian parties and groups. Not a single one did its duty, in that respect, with the exception of Skoropadskiy, the former Hetman. He sent me a memorandum with highly valuable data in support of the recognition of sovereign rights of the Ukrainian people. Analogous notes and declarations from other parties and groups began to arrive only after the end of the Confer-

ence in Geneva, thanks to the efforts of Nikovskiy and others.

Even those who believed it possible right now to establish a great federal state of Russia should welcome admission of the newly formed East European states to membership in the League of Nations. Since British colonies were now full-fledged members of the League, there was every reason to demand individual mandates for Ukraine, Estonia, etc., regardless of whether they become independent in the future or, as constituent members, would enter this or that future grouping.

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The well-known Prof. Ashkenazi was a representative of Poland at the League of Nations. Shul'gin used to see him with regard to the boundaries problem, but I declined so to do, feeling myself incompetent in the subject. I explained to Shul'gin the difference between Ashkenazi's position and mine. Poland claimed territories far beyond the ethnographic boundaries of the Polish nation. As a Polish Jew, Ashkenzai, demanding more than Poland hand any right to claim, would never be criticized afterwards by Poles. But I, a Ukrainian Jew, would be forced to abide by the April agreement of the Ukrainian government with Poland, by which certain rights of the Ukrainian nation were curtailed.

Shul'gin understood and stopped pressing me to join him in such negotiations.

Galician Ukrainians settled in America, but still concerned for their original homeland, were sending telegrams to the League of Nations in Geneva. These telegrams represented one million Galicians in Canada and the United States and petitioned the League of Nations not to permit allocation of the Ukrainian part of Galicia to Poland.

According to Mr. Daughterty, Canadian representative at the League, the spokesman for the Ukrainian clergy was already in Geneva.

At last, after a certain delay, the delegation from Ukrainian Galicia, headed by Petrushevich and Prof. Tomashevskiy, made its appearance in Geneva.

The telegrams from Canada made a deep impression on members of the League, according to my reliable source. They were conducive to further interest and growing sympathy with the lot of Ukrainian Galicia. Argentina took up the whole Ukrainian problem and early recognized Ukraine as a sovereign state.

Lucien Wulf, one of the members of the Jewish delegation, was then in Geneva and we met him there, together with Shul'gin.

Among the League's jurisconsults I came to know Van Hammel, a young jurist from the Netherlands. I had known his father too (now deceased), a famous criminologist, whom I had met at the international congress of criminologists in Petersburg in 1902. The present shape of things in Europe would be beyond the wildest fantasies of those years . . . .

Rigorous adherence to the principles of parliamentarianism was the dominant attitude in Western Europe at that time, as well as in all civilized parts of the world; in Geneva this was represented by Nansen. At this very time Grushevskiy and his party cohorts began to publish in Vienna the Borites'-Poborete ("Fight-Overcome"), a journal in Ukrainian, based on the total negation of parliamentarianism, in which the soviet system of organizing the state was justified. In his turn Vinnichenko, just back from Soviet Moscow to Khar'kov and disappointed in everything he saw in Moscow, continued to advocate the soviet system just the same.

To cap it all, Lipinskiy, who lived near Vienna, was blasting parliamentarianism in his Listy k Khleborobam ("Letters to Corngrowers"), published in almanacs of the Statesmen-Corngrowers' Union, in his belief that only a "laborite monarchy" could save Ukraine. The country must be ruled by classes and not by parties, according to his scheme.

Each class has its share in the government, commensurable with its prominence and usefulness to the state. A monarch, hereditary Hetman, is head of the state. He personifies the supraclass supreme power and cannot be regarded as belonging to any particular class. P.P.

Skoropadskiy, onetime Hetman, was Lipinskiy's candidate for the monarchy.

There were other groups, however, who favored a parliamentarian monarchy of the British type. Their candidate was Vasiliy Vyshyvannyy (Wilhelm Hapsburg) of the House of Hapsburg, a Ukrainian patriot with a splendid command of the Ukrainian language. E. Kh. Chikalenko, a venerable Ukrainian politician, was also clamoring for a parliamentary monarchy in the newspaper Volya ("Liberty"), but looked for a monarch among the Swedish, British, or some other neighboring royalty of Western Europe.

The division into monarchists and republicans developed also among those who endeavored to follow the already functioning examples of regimes in Western Europe and America, rather than to strive for some new utopia. Monarchists of the parliamentarian persuasion invariably referred to England, Italy, Sweden, etc. as proof that things were not worse under a monarch than under a republican regime. They invariably forgot that a republican regime as such was a guarantee of democratic foundations of the state, whereas under East European conditions, monarchy might evolve into absolutism and reaction at any moment. I do not mean to say that such evolution was unavoidable or inevitable. Nonetheless the possibility of this most dangerous trend could not be denied.

Petlyura himself, all parties of the center, and the rank-and-file majority of the Ukrainian socialist parties, adhered consistently to parliamentarianism and to the democratic-republican regime. The majority of the Galician and Bukovinian Ukrainian parties stood on the same platform. However, practically all Galicians were emphatically against Petlyura and against the government which had signed the April agreement with Poland, wherein the future of Ukrainian Galicia was involved.

CHAPTER XXI

Tarnov in December 1920. Vishnitser's dismissal. My resignation

Vasil'ko and I were invited to Tarnov early in December. Petlyura and the government wished to be informed about the situation abroad. Vasil'ko knew a great deal of the French-Polish orientations and I was currently informed on British policies and was just back from Geneva.

It was decided at last to recall Tyshkevich, one year too late . . . . Shul'gin was to be his successor.

Tarnov, a tidy small town, was overflowing with Ukrainians. Petlyura's headquarters and all the ministries were there, and Ukrainian soldiers all over the place. Only Ukrainian speech was heard in cafes and restaurants. Local Poles and Jews had homes of their own, but homeless Ukrainians had to look for food and warmth in restaurants and coffee shops while enjoying Polish hospitality.

The intensity of Ukrainian patriotism could be appreciated particularly in Tarnov, where remnants of the Ukrainian administrative apparatus and representatives of political parties were all assembled. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quartered in a hotel, with at least 20 persons in the largest of the rooms. Most of them were rattling away at their typewriters all day long . . . . Nikovskiy himself was working in the corner and so were directors of the departments . . . . The rest of the Minsitry's staff was packed into the two smaller rooms.

The true nature of people shows better in adversity than at the peak of success. This is an old adage. During the three days in Tarnov, I saw Petlyura three times. His sober political ideas, love of his country, capacity for orientation and clear understanding of the situations

abroad were even more striking than when I saw him in Kamenets-Podol'sk. He seemed to have grown. He was tempered by the sufferings he had had to endure, the accusations of all kinds, and his awareness of immense responsibility. He stayed at his post.

Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, straightforward and openhearted, a true fighting general, impressed me very favorably. There were approximately 30,000 in the Ukrainian army in Polish Galicia. This was the core, kept intact as cadres of the future army, should there be a change in circumstances.

All my old acquaintances and friends were in the government there, and I met them. A.N. Levitskiy, my fellow-lawyer, onetime defendant in the trial of the Jews who organized their self defense against pogroms in Lubny, was Prime Minister. I remembered Salikovskiy, Minister of the Interior, as my close friend among the editors of Kievan Echoes (Kiyevskiye otkliki) and by his part in the All-Russian Congress of People's Socialists. Nikovskiy, Prokopovich and Zaytsev were my party comrades. Korchinskiy, not a member of the government, was also there, heartsick as ever, because of the torment deliberately inflicted upon Jewish people in a country aflame with anarchy. Krasnyy, steadfast as ever, was a joy to see. Inseparable from the government, he saw everything, knew everything. But his information was saddening: during the hasty retreat of the Ukrainian army, he lost nearly all his archives, his data on pogroms, on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, others. He was on very good terms with Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko who, according to Krasnyy, was taking the most drastic measures against pogroms at this time as always, from issuing propaganda and addressing the troops personally, to the execution of pogromshchiks by firing squad, on the spot. Later on, in July 1921, as I was writing this book, certain documents at last reached me on the counter-pogrom measures of the Ukrainian government and the high command of the army. Their substance is discussed in the next chapter.

The government had not a single inch of Ukrainian territory under control while we were staying in Tarnov. Liv-

ing conditions were modest at best in Tarnov, transitional, as one might put it, with utterly indefinite perspectives. Nonetheless, the best sons of the Ukrainian nation, who had gathered in Tarnov, were welded firmly into one single unit, bearing cheerfully their deprivations, steadfast in faith for the future and the realization of all their hopes. Instead of scattering all over the world, as emigrant dust, instead of pursuits of personal happiness and career, they were waiting patiently, close by their native country, for the bolshevist tornado of violence to pass over their native fields, preparing to return there for work, for the rebirth of order and statehood.

I left Tarnov feeling deep respect for all these people, with faith in the ultimate success of their aspirations.

My resignation from the Ukrainian mission to England was resented by certain Ukrainian groups. I was criticized for my alleged preoccupation with purely Jewish affairs while in London, and for my neglect of Ukrainian matters. The Ukrainian press, always fair to me when I was ambassador, had changed its tone. Volya, a weekly newspaper, on October 2, six weeks after my resignation, blamed me editorially for failure of the Ukrainian mission to promote British interest in Ukraine, inasmuch as I "was better informed and more concerned with Jewish affairs rather than with the Ukrainian problem."

Indeed, the interests of my people were my great concern at all times. I never denied it. In the eyes of my Ukrainian friends, my natural attachment to Jewry and straight-forwardness were seen as assets. The Central Rada was aware of my ignorance of the Ukrainian language when I was elected to the Supreme Court. I was then a committee member of a Russian and not Ukrainian political party. My election was motivated principally by my record in the defense of Jewish interests and Jewish honor, the Beilis case, and also to a degree, by my experience in political trials and my modest professional publications. The electors evidently believed that a man so dedicated to the defense of the rights of his own people would defend the rights of Ukrainians with equal zeal, the rights of the people among whom he lived. The electors were

not disappointed in me insofar as the duties I had assumed voluntarily were conscientiously discharged. My share in the construction of the edifice in which both Jews and Ukrainians would have to live would benefit them all, as I believed then and believe even now.

The Volya stab was undeserved, as well as at variance with the truth in its allegation that while in London I neglected the pan-Ukrainian problems because of my predilection for Jewish ones. As a matter of fact it was physically impossible for me to attend to purely Jewish problems, for I was totally involved in the mission's business. Moreover there was not much for me to do in Jewish affairs because the mass emigration of Jews from Eastern Europe in that particular time had been arrested.

The author of the Volya article, sensible and talented as he was, admitted to me afterwards that he had based his writing entirely on hearsay and that he might have been mistaken, after all.

Dr. Vishnitser submitted his resignation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on November 29. His motivations were akin to the mood which was beginning to enfold me. Vishnitser wrote: "My studies in Jewish history and publicity work are now demanding so great an exertion that it is simply impossible for me to maintain them concurrently with my engagement in the diplomatic service. Inasmuch as the enlightenment of the Jewish nation is most urgent now, in this tragic time for Jewry, and my personal participation is my bounden duty therein, I am asking respectfully to be relieved from the duties of Secretary to the diplomatic mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic in London."

Vishnitser wrote further about his lasting sympathy with the Ukrainian people in their fight for freedom and their faith in the peaceful coexistence of the Ukrainian and Jewish nations on the liberated soil of Ukraine, all of which would become reality in the nearest future. In conclusion he wrote of his confidence in the ultimate triumph of the democratic and humanitarian ideals which would serve to make the Ukrainian state prosperous. I read this in Tarnov, when Vishnitser's resignation was already in

force. And I knew that he was right, that the two of us, in London, had done everything humanly possible in the defense of legitimate demands of the Ukrainian people.

The two of us were convinced, after the conference in Spa, that wait-and-see was the British official stance in relation to Ukraine, that they would converse with Krasin rather than with us, at this particular time. We had no resources for propaganda in wider circles.

This dormancy of the British with regard to Ukraine proved deeper than one could have thought. Our "dead season" in England, which began after the Polish-Ukrainian treaty in April, was dragging on. The British-Russian rapproachement continued progressively. The eyes of the Ukrainian government were turning for help to the only country in Europe which did not socialize with Soviet Russia and had the largest army in the world—France. But no help was coming from there either.

It was perfectly clear there was no need even for my humble technical job as jurisconsult for the Ministry, for such were the times. A general calm descended temporarily on our foreign service activities abroad. I gave up my proposed trip to England, with the request to treat me as the Ministry's jurisconsult, retired, effective February 1. I wished to return to direct and active participation in the field of purely Jewish interests, from which I had been cut off in the recent turbulent years. Family duties and the struggle for our mutual existence were calling me.

Retrospectively I feel no regrets for the hard work of those three years of my life spent in the service of Ukraine. I feel that my duties were discharged, both as a citizen of Ukraine and a son of the Jewish nation.

Should there be a recurrence of the appropriate circumstances in the future when my energy would be needed in the building of Ukraine, the country where the best years of my life were spent, and the home of three and half million Jews, I would not evade work once again, would not make excuses that I had already served my time as a citizen.

CHAPTER XXII

Legislative enactments of the Ukrainian government for prevention of pogroms. Nikovskiy's letters to Jewish leaders

Early in January 1919 the Jewish National Secretariat in Kiev called the Directory's attention to the imminent danger of pogroms and hence to the urgency of immediate and decisive preventive measures by the government. The Social-Federalist and National-Republican Ukrainian parties, as well as the Prosvita ("Enlightenment") Presidium, together with representatives of the Jewish National Secretariat, called on Vinnichenko, Chairman of the Directory, urging him to issue immediately the appropriate proclamation. Vinnichenko said that such a proclamation had already been drafted by the government and it was indeed published on January 11, over the signatures of every member of the Directory.

The fact that certain cossack groups had committed acts of violence against Jews in certain places was pointed out in the proclamation.

"According to our verified information," continued the proclamation, "this violence was instigated by provacateurs from the Hetman and volunteer groups who called themselves bolsheviks." This was done in order to cover the Ukrainian republican army with disgrace and promote hatred of Ukrainian cossacks by the population."

The Directory commanded all honest citizens and the army "to intercept such provacateurs" and courtmartial "instigators of violence."

After threatening counter-revolutionaries with most severe punishments for trying to smear the honor of the Ukrainian army by the means of pogroms, the Directory appealed to "democratic Jewry, as a whole" energetically to fight "individual anarcho-bolshevist members of the Jewish nation," those "who come forward, with hostility,

against the Ukrainian state and the toiling masses of Ukrainians." Such hostile elements would prepare the ground for provocateurs, as the basis of "demagoguery and pernicious agitation against the entire Jewry, which has no part in bolshevism."

The Jewish National Assembly, then in Kiev, correctly pointed out the danger inherent in the last part of the proclamation. The mere fact that individual Jewish bolsheviks were mentioned by the Directory would undoubtedly serve further to untie the hands of sundry local commandants and chiefs, who paid even then no attention to the central authorities anyway, and who acted arbitrarily with only their own impulses as guides. Provocateurs and instigators could use that sort of statement by the Directory, the supreme authority, for their pogrom purposes, to pervert and inflate the actual substance of that part of the proclamation.

Unfortunately I have no documents or exact data on the measures taken by the Ukrainian government for the prevention of pogroms in February and March 1919. For example, General Grekov told me about his orders to shoot instigators and physical perpetrators of pogroms on the spot. I have never seen these orders personally, because I left Odessa for abroad on April 1, 1919, and the text of these orders was not published in the press in February or March, while I was still in Odessa.

The earliest enactment of the government in relation to pogroms, among the papers on the condition of Jews in the Ukraine, assembled by the Ukrainian embassy in Germany,[12] is dated April 12, 1919. Prime Minister Martos, in his appeal to the Ukrainian populations, warned that "the government will exterminate bandits and perpetrators of pogroms with the severest punishments. The government particularly will not tolerate pogroms of the Jewish population, under any circumstances, will use every means at its disposal to fight these loathsome and subversive malefac-

[12] I am borrowing certain data from "Die Lage der Juden der Ukraine," the brochure published on N.V. Porsh's initiative, with participation of Dr. V. Levitskiy and Waldman, a publicist.—ADM.

tions which brand the Ukrainian people with infamy in the eyes of all civilized nations." Further on in this appeal, Martos expressed his confidence that the Ukrainian people, once victims of national slavery themselves, who had proclaimed national-personal autonomy in Ukraine, would support the government in frustrating malicious perpetrators of pogroms, recruited from the dregs of the population.

On May 27, 1919 the Directory ratified the law sponsored by Petlyura, Makarenko and Shvets, for the "Commission Extraordinary for Investigation of Anti-Jewish Pogroms." According to the first and second paragraphs of this law, the Commission is endowed with extraordinary plenary powers to subject perpetrators of pogroms to a special courtmartial. The Commission was authorized to investigate not only the pogroms which had occurred but also antisemitic propaganda in the Ukrainian territory. The President of the Commission was to be nominated by the Minister of Justice, certified by the Council of Ministers, and appointed by the Directory. The other five members of the Commission were to be appointed by the Collegium of the Ministers of Justice, War, Labor, Interior and Jewish Affairs. Initiative in the institution of criminal proceedings was vested in the Minister of Justice in contact with the Minister of Jewish Affairs. The same initiative was given to every member of the Commission, together with the right of search and seizure as well as arrest. The full text of the Law of May 27, 1919 was published in the brochure already cited, and in Vestnik Derzhavnykh Zakonov (Bulletin of State Laws), July 17, 1919.

Early in July Petlyura referred by telegraph to the Prime Minister, Chief of the Army, Minister of War and Minister of Jewish Affairs with regard to the urgency of the struggle with pogroms and with all anti-Jewish thrusts of any kind. His telegram was published in the official Vestnik Ukrainskoy Narodnoy Respubliki (Bulletin of Ukrainian Peoples' Republic), July 9, 1919. Petlyura called attention to the sacrifices made by Jewry in establishing the Ukrainian Republic. He told of the facts personally known to him, when Jews who were helping the Ukrainian

army were executed by bolshevik firing squads. He related how Jews were helping wounded and sick Ukrainian soldiers, organizing field hospitals at the front, and that Jewish children were washing the wounds of Ukrainian soldiers and how grateful these soldiers were to all Jews. Petlyura attested joyfully to the appearance of special groups among cossacks, for the protection of Jewish homes and shops from pillage; he hoped that such phenomena would multiply and become routine. His telegram ended "all peoples must live freely and peacefully in the Ukrainian Republic."

By government order of August 15, signed by Martos, 11,460,000 griven (about 6 million rubles) was allocated to the Minister of Jewish Affairs for relief of victims of the pogroms in cities and villages. On August 18 Krasnyy, as Minister of Jewish Affairs, presented his report on pogroms to the Council of Ministers, whereupon a resolution was adopted by the Council regarding the measures to be taken against pogroms and the perpetrators thereof. The Council's resolution recommended to Petlyura, Chief Ataman of the Army, to courtmartial all commanding officers of army units responsible for permissiveness, in the face of pogroms, to have them tried for treason to the State, subject to the most severe penalties, up to and including capital punishment. Furthermore it was proposed to issue proclamations to the guerrillas beyond the front line of the regular army troops, urging them most emphatically to resist the instigators of pogroms and fight the pogrom-minded bands of gangsters and traitors to the army.

Shortly before the Council's resolution, a proclamation was published over the signatures of Martos and Krasnyy and addressed to Jewish workers and citizens, to the effect that a special institute of state inspectors was now established to act against pogrom-minded elements within the army. Several sentences imposed on perpetrators of pogroms by the courtmartial-extraordinary and executions of many perpetrators of pogroms by firing squad were mentioned in this proclamation. Unfortunately neither the dates of the sentences nor the names of the executed

persons were reported. Further on, the establishment of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Committee for Aid to Victims of Pogroms was announced, at the Ministry of Jewish Affairs, with the appropriation of more than 200 million griven from the state treasury. Among the rest of the data in the Martos-Krasnyy proclamation, particularly significant is the appearance of many Jewish soldiers and officers in the ranks of the combined Dneprovian-Galician army. Appeals to brotherhood and equal rights in the coexistence of the Ukrainian and Jewish nations in Ukraine conclude the proclamation.

Order No. 131, signed by Petlyura and his Chief of Staff, General Yunakov, was issued on August 26, 1919. The order makes it plain from the start that Jewry, like the rest of the population, was subject to harsh aftermaths of the bolshevist-communist regime. In their appeal to all divisions, brigades, regiments, garrisons, and squadrons of the army, Petlyurs and Yunakov spoke of the ignominy of the pogroms, as dire crimes against society, the worst type of treason against the state. They point out that perpetrators of pogroms have no place in human society, that pogroms besmear the Ukrainian state in the eyes of the world. "Our cause is pure and only clean hands are needed," exclaimed Petlyura and Yunakov, in demanding trials for all pogrom agitators, as traitors to the state.

In his proclamation to the Ukrainian army of August 27, 1919, Petlyura affirmed that the Ukrainian state must be founded upon cooperation of democratic forces of every nationality in the country. Petlyura reminded the army that capital punishment was in store for all provocateurs and instigators of pogroms.

Bezpalko, a well-known Galician leader, Minister of Labor, speaking for the government at a meeting of the Bund and the Jewish Party of Unified Socialists on September 3, 1919, declared that the anti-Jewish pogroms are a national shame of the Ukrainian people, the obstacle of the people's renascence.

Vasil'ko's telegram to the Ukrainian delegation in Paris, August 1, 1919, was one of the most typical documents of the epoch. Instructed by Temnitskiy, Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Vasil'ko pointed out that pogroms invariably ceased as soon as the government was capable of restoring and maintaining order in the given territory. He offered a clear and objective explanation of pogroms. I am quoting it here almost in full. "Unfortunately," says Vasil'ko, "the army of the insurrection, made up originally of intelligentsia and healthy peasantry, was subsequently enlarged by the accretion of criminal and Black Hundred elements, drawn thither by the success of the insurrection, who enrolled for criminal purposes of plunder and the propagation of anarchy."

Vasil'ko pointed out correctly that such an inflow of antisocial and criminal elements was unavoidable and typical of all revolutionary-volunteer armies. "On the other hand," he continued, "one has to bear in mind that the czarist regime had already prepared the ground for antisemitic excesses by injecting all nationalities of the former Russian Empire with the venom of antisemitism for centuries. These nationalities were accustomed to blame Jews for every misfortune that befell them, every mistake of the government. It should be enough to remember that the pogroms of 1881 were motivated by fairy tales about the exploitation of peasants by Jews. Such inventions succeeded at that time in diverting the anger of peasants and workers away from Russian officials, great landlords and proprietors. The pogroms of 1905 were organized by the Black Hundred, who spread the rumor that the revolution was cooked up by Yids and Kadets (Russian Constitutionalist-democrats), whereupon all Kadets were declared to be Yids. The current agitation for pogroms made use of the fact that Jews were involved in bolshevism. This fact was inflated and distorted by allegations to the effect that practically all bolsheviks were Jews. These slanderers hushed up the fact that the bolsheviks had many Russians in their ranks, as well as representatives of all other nationalities and religions. Such agitation was the cause and mechanism of recent pogroms in Ukraine, when less harm was inflicted upon bolshevik Jews than upon antibolshevik Jewish workers and traders. In any event, the name and views of Petlyura and of all

members of the Ukrainian government were the best guarantee of the use of every means available to the government in the war against pogroms. These available means were to be applied most rigorously in sanitizing the body of the Ukrainian nation, purifying it from shameful antisemitism, that infamous heritage of the old Russian regime, by which the historical growth and development of our nation were retarded, in relation to the rest of mankind."

Analogous explanations of pogroms were repeatedly offered later by Prof. Smal'-Stotskiy, in charge of the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin. Aware of the tremendous importance of the subject, of the gravely damaging effect of pogroms on the reconstitution of Ukraine in the eyes of civilized nations, Smal'-Stotskiy gave and is still giving preeminence to the analysis of pogroms in his work abroad. In one of the recent proclamations edited by himself, he called attention to the three years of unremitting civil war and chaos in Ukraine. The result was "ruination of the last vestiges of the administrative apparatus and annihilation of the moral authority of law, freedom and justice. The danger of pogroms increases in such an atmosphere of shattered values, hatred of all by all, and despair." Later on he developed the thought that intensification of antisemitism was entirely natural in a country where anti-Jewish propaganda was always the favored device of the government, inasmuch as antisemitism is intensified by revolution even in far more civilized places such as Vienna or Berlin. Citing pogroms by Denikin's army and the recent pogroms by the Red army, the author of the proclamation proved that the Ukrainian national movement had nothing to do with pogroms and that self-impelled actions of certain units of the army or bands directly contradicted the principles of that movement as well as the views of its leaders. After that he cited the total absence of antisemitism in programs of every one of the Ukrainian political parties, without exception, Dneprovian as well as Galician, with the reminder that the Ukrainian government tried consistently to attract Jewry "to active participation in the political life of Ukraine." Among the

laws and enactments for promotion of political and national equality of Jews, the author mentions a fact which only a few people know, namely that the chairs of Jewish History and Literature were established at the University of Kamenets-Podol'sk during the residence of the Ukrainian government in that city.

I have undoubtedly obtained but a part of the data on anti-pogrom measures undertaken by the Ukrainian government in 1919. Living abroad, I was unable to assemble a large body of data for this period. My requests for more detailed information from Krasnyy and the government brought the reply that a multitude of printed materials, orders, circulars, etc. had all perished during the hasty retreat of the army.

However, there is enough data in the orders, statements, proclamations already cited, for a view of the general orientation and spirit of Ukrainian policy on the Jewish problem.[13]

I am taking the liberty to consider certain statements by Jewish parties and groups before examining the data which belong to a later epoch.

On July 8, 1919, the laborite group of the Council of Jewish Communities in Kamenets-Podol'sk, at the general meeting of Jewish workers, attested its willingness to fight for the free and independent Republic of Ukraine side by side with the Ukrainian workers. The meeting expressed its confidence in the government, readiness to support the government, and its demand that the government con-

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[13] I received a copy of the report by Ataman Tyutyunik to Chief Ataman Petlyura after this book was already written. Tyutyunik reported the following executions by firing squad, of persons sentenced by courtmartial-extraordinary, as directed by Petlyura's order, for perpetration of anti-Jewish pogroms in the fall of 1919: four bandits in Vakhnovka, Lipovets district; 83 perpetrators at Khristinovka station. Also, five perpetrators of pogroms shot on the spot, in Tal'noye, and their names made public for general information in a special printed order.

Among other things, it must be understood that we are dealing here with the Commander of the Kiev Division, Maksim Tyutyunik. There were several Tetyunyks, his namesakes, atamans too, in the Ukrainian army and in bands of irregulars. One of them, Georgiy or Yuriy, was a notorious perpetrator of pogroms.—ADM.

tinue an energetic and decisive struggle against suspicious characters, provocateurs, who had taken part in the murderous pogroms of Jews, whether directly or indirectly.

On July 17, 1919, in Kamenets-Podol'sk, Petlyura was visited by the Jewish delegation, which included Dr. Kleiderman (community), Gutman (rabbis), Altman (Zionists), Krayz (tradesmen), Bograd (united socialists) and Drachler (Poalei-Zion). The delegation declared to Petlyura that all segments of the Jewish population were ready to defend the independent Ukrainian state, alongside the Ukrainian people, in their firm belief that only a democratic Ukrainian government could assure equal rights to the Jewish people. The delegation asked for protection of Jewry from pogroms caused by "provocation by the various Russian reactionaries and Polish imperialists, in their desire to discredit the entire Ukrainian problem in the eyes of Europe."

At the session of the local Jewish community in Proskurov on August 23, 1919 it was decided unanimously to support the Ministry of Jewish affairs in its work for the benefit of the Jewish workers.

On August 26, 1919, in Kamenets-Podol'sk, the Podolian Provincial and Urban committees of the Poalei-Zion passed a resolution on the desirability of participation of Jews in the Ukrainian government. This resolution stated that "the adverse circumstances, as indicated by Goldelman and Revutskivy in April, are obviated entirely at this time." This evidently referred to the "turn to the right," the change in composition of the Ukrainian government as demanded by the French Command in Odessa, but subsequently nullified by the replacement of Matsiyevich and other Social-Federalists by Social-Democrats, with Martos as head of the Cabinet. This referred also to inadequacies of the antipogrom measures employed by the government in March and April. In any event, Poalei-Zion, in its August resolution, attested that "the government and the High Command are struggling with pogroms energetically."

Still earlier, on July 27, 1919, in Mogilev-Podol'skiy, a conference was held by committees of the following or-

ganizations: Bund, Unified Socialists (Ob'yedinentsy), Poalei-Zion, Cultural League, Democratic Union of Schoolteachers, and several Jewish tradesmen's guilds. This conference expressed its confidence in the Ministry of Jewish Afairs, as well as approval of the Ministry's further cooperation with the Ukrainian government. An analogous resolution was adopted by the conference of the Jewish Volks-Partei and Jewish tradesmen in Berdichev, September 15, 1919.

It should be possible to assemble a fuller body of data on similar declarations by various Jewish groups and parties in due time. There will also be time for a more accurate evaluation of the motives of all such pronouncements. In the meanwhile there is no shortage of skeptics who maintain that all these resolutions were motivated by fear and the desire to solicit the benevolence of the government, together with its protection.

But here at last is the voice of a perfectly free, courageous and objective citizen of England, Israel Zangwill, a well-known Jewish leader and famous writer. In his letter of October 20, 1919 to the Ukrainian government he states his conviction that the government "has been doing much but not everything, perhaps, to put an end to the evil, the cause of which is the unsettled condition of Russia." The Ukrainian government's grant of national rights to Jews was regarded by Zangwill as true statesmanship. In his view, this fact was "a striking contrast with the treatment of Jews by Poland." In conclusion, Zangwill spoke of his apprehensions about the evil effects of pogroms on the organization of the Ukrainian state, inasmuch as the Ukrainian government was not entirely successful even now in its efforts at the elimination of pogroms. He grieved for the unfortunate victims and for the dangers, inherent in pogroms, to the very existence of the Ukrainian state, sympathetic as he was to the idea of that state, as a believer in the self-determination of nations.

This letter will be discussed further, in the chapter on the projected Questionnaire Committee of prominent Jewish leaders.

Anti-Jewish pogroms were taken up again by Zangwill in

his letter to the Federation of Ukrainian Jews in England, March 8, 1920, in connection with the meeting in memory of the victims of the Ukrainian pogroms. Zangwill, in sadness, remarks that such tremendous pogroms had been unheard of for centuries and that Jewry had never been plunged before into the depths of such frightening deprivation.

"I am not fully convinced, nevertheless," continues Zangwill, "that the Ukrainian government should be held responsible, because that government was in control of only one sixth of the country's territory, while the various bands of gangsters and their antisemitic ringleaders were engaged in the ruin of the entire country. It is the general disorganization of Europe that should be held responsible, in this case, and also the defenselessness of our own nation, which could not organize forces of its own during the years of peace."

When it comes to the evidence of the counter-pogrom activities of the Ukrainian government in 1920 and early 1921 our data, sent abroad by the Ukrainian government at the request of the Ukrainian embassy in Berlin, are scarce indeed. These data include several officially notarized and even original orders, executive decrees, announcements by the military high command and the government. All this valuable evidence will be published in due time. I am presenting here only the essential extracts from these documents.

In their orders to the Volynian troops, dated February 28 and March 12, 1920, the Army Commander Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko and the Group Commander, Ataman Nikonov, stigmatize those malefactors who had covered the army with shame by their unauthorized searches and illegal seizures of cattle from peasants and of property from peaceful citizens. Both these orders threatened the pillagers with death.

Ataman Nikonov called a courtmartial-extraordinary for the session on April 29 of the same year, for trial of the case involving plunder of the Sheyfel pharmacy in Yassiki, Kherson province.

Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, Chief of Staff Lipko and

Colonel Tkachuk issued an order dated July 23, 1920 on the appointment of special commandants to be held responsible for suppressing looting and pogroms. The order instructed that disorders should be stopped immediately by shooting looters on the spot. The same order to fire upon looters was in the instruction to the Second Volynian Rifle Division, dated October 25 and signed by Zagrodskiy, Division Commander.

The Gaysino-Bratislavian regiment of the Second Infantry Brigade was disbanded for looting and violence by an order of July 20, 1920, signed by Colonel Dubovyy.

All military personnel were directed to use courtesy and tact in dealing with civilians, regardless of their nationality and religion, by the order of August 27 signed by Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, Lipko, Colonel Gulago and Sotnik (hundredmaster of cossacks) Savchenko.

Later on several orders were available dealing with losses of the right to promotion of individuals, dishonorable discharge, bastinado by ramrods for permissiveness in rapine of Jews or extortion of money by threats.

The order of November 6, 1920, signed by Lt. Col. Sidoryanskiy, Commander of the Kiev Fourth Cavalry Regiment, reported that cossack Novokhatskiy was killed by Sotnik Deshchenko on the spot, for looting. Resolved: delete the name of Novokhatskiy from the regiment's roster. The same fact of shooting of a pogromshchik on the spot, in Chernovo, was reported in the order (date illegible) to the Kiev Fourth Rifle Division.

Finally I have the official verdict by courtmartial-extraordinary, August 22, 1920, in the case of Varivan Vinnik, accused of inflicting potentially mortal wounds on Iosel' Aster. The case was heard in camera. Vinnik's action was found "inhuman" by the court and he was sentenced to death by firing squad. The sentence was certified by Colonel Bulyy, who assigned its execution to a squadron of Mountain Cavalry and ordered the report to be read to all squadrons, batteries, and other units of the army. Vinnik was shot in the evening of the same day. This took place in Zalukivtsy village near Stanislavov, Galicia.

According to General Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, P.A.

Krasnyy and other entirely trustworthy persons, there were many identical cases of shooting pogromshchiks and murderers on the spot. There were several identical cases tried by courtmartial extraordinary, in which pogromshchiks and looters were sentenced to die by firing squad.

Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, Commander of the Army, and his staff called on Krasnyy, Minister of Jewish Affairs, May 30, 1920. They worked out a general plan of drastic methods for prevention of further excesses in the front zone. The Commander reported to the Minister on his preventive work in the first part of the year, with the assurance that every person who tried to engage in pogroms or looting was brought to the courtmartial-extraordinary and executed by firing squad.

The State Inspectors Institute of the Army had a major part in the campaign against antisemitism. The inspectors' work was commended by the Ministry of Jewish Affairs with particular gratitude. V.I. Kedrovskiy, the future ambassador to Estonia, was outstanding in his constant energy and dedication to handling of the problem.

The order of July 18, 1920 to the Special Cavalry Division, then in Galicia, explains in detail the reaction of civilized states to anti-Jewish pogroms. Appealing to discipline in the army, the order calls on the troops to treat all nationalities, including Jews, with equal courtesy and recalls Galician Jewry's sympathy for the construction of the Ukrainian state. The order made the army unit commanders responsible for any disorders in their units and prescribes the organization of reliable police patrols for supervision of the troops.

The order of July 24 to the same division commits Savichenko, cossack, to trial by courtmartial for the rape of Sura M. Curiously, the same order prescribes organization of special guards for protection of the courtmartial.

The order of September 15, 1920 by Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, to the same division, makes the unit commanders personally responsible for any further looting by cossacks under their command.

Spontaneous looting and violence by the so-called Dneprovian cossacks in Galician villages are cited in very

many orders to the army. Open seizures of cattle and grain from peasants went on day after day, regardless of the threats by firing squad in the orders of the army and the unit commanders.

The order of September 6, 1920 to the Sixth Rifle Division tells how Golovchuk, Senior Officer (Bunchuzhnyy) and Garbar, rifleman, arrived just in time to stop looting and raping of women and girls by the soldiers. They turned the looters to flight by force of arms but had time to seize and tie up two Don cossacks from that same group of looters and rapists.

Colonel Bezruchko, Division Commander, commended Golovchuk and Garbar for the performance of duty and ordered the report on their action to be made public as an example for emulation by every unit of the Division.

On September 15, 1920 the Chief of Inspection Branch, General Staff of the Home Front, ordered execution of bandits and marauders on the spot, without trial (paragraph 3 of the order).

Orders of August 23 and December 8, 1920 signed by Ataman Tyutyunik and Chief of Staff Vovk, commanded execution of "scoundrels" by firing squad on the spot, without trial. Permissiveness or failure to report were to be punished bodily by up to 125 lashes. The same Tyutyunik reported to the Minister of Jewish Affairs, June 4, 1920, that he had ordered the execution by firing squad of a cossack who beat and wounded a Jewish boy in Chereno hamlet.

On September 20, 1920 Petlyura appealed again to the army, calling for preservation of order and abstinence from looting and violence.

On October 5 Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko once more ordered that pogromshchiks and bandits be shot immediately.

On October 11 Petlyura issued his order to the army for immediate commitment of all bandits to the courtmartial-extraordinary. Prosecuting attorneys of the higher military courts were directed to supervise strict implementation of that order. Unit commanders, if guilty of harboring bandits, were to be tried by the court.

Among the papers of 1921 there is a lengthy appeal by Petlyura to guerrillas and to the Ukrainian people. Here is the full text:

"To you, the unswerving warriors, who are exerting yourselves to the very last in the defense of your dear homes from the enemy, to you who covered yourselves with glory, worldwide, in the defense of your native land, to you, my precious brothers, this word of mine is here addressed.

"Rumors are spread everywhere by bolsheviks, the butchers of us all, to the effect that the guerrillas are exterminating Jews. I, Chief Ataman of the Ukrainian Host do not believe it, do not believe it, because I know the people of Ukraine, downtrodden as they are by gangster-conquerors, the Ukrainian people who cannot become themselves the oppressors of other people who suffer too under the bolshevist rule.

"Look around, look closely—and you shall see that craftsmen and traders, let alone peasantry, everybody, in short, who is alive and honest, in Ukraine, all are groaning under the communist yoke. Everybody who works honestly for a living, with hands or mind, is to be driven, like cattle, by communists into the cowhouse common to all, the commune.

"Jewish population, small traders, craftsmen, workers, who are earning their bread by their own labor, like all toilers, all are harmed and robbed by the bolshevist regime. Merchandise from traders' shops, tools and lathes from craftsmen are grabbed for the commune. Is this not ruin for the Jewish people? Is it possible for the Jewish people, dying of hunger, to like bolsheviks? The Jewish people, just like you, peasants, can hardly wait for their liberation from the bandits.

"In case you run into Jews, among communists, you must remember that such Jews are traitors to their own people, are fratricides who cast away the faith and law of their fathers, just like our own traitors who string along with communists; it would be unfair to put all the blame for them on the entire Jewish people, just as it is impossible to put the blame on the entire Ukrainian people for our own traitors.

I know that honest Jewish society has stigmatized and rejected them.

"I am certain that you understand it well and that it is not you who exterminate Jews. It is communists who exterminate Jews and so do the bandits who have proliferated all over our country, under communes.

"Bolsheviks are not squeamish, when it comes to bribery and lies, in their struggle with our people. They use stolen gold to finance their emissaries to other countries, they publish newspapers in all languages, they stigmatize our holy cause, the liberation movement of our people, as a pogrom-bound banditism, they scream on every page about anti-Jewish pogroms by Ukrainian rebels, as it were.

"In several countries workers and peasants who had never seen bolsheviks with their own eyes, who regarded bolsheviks as friends of the people, believed their slanders about the Ukrainian rebels and viewed our liberation movement with suspicion.

"But the hearty welcome by the Jewish population of our troops returning to their native land one year ago, the tears of the Jewish population at the sight of our retreating troops, the horror of the Jewish population facing the bolshevik foray, the tens of thousands of Jews trudging in the wake of our troops, saving themselves from bolsheviks, the refugees who are right here, together with us, who are dreaming our dreams, sharing our fortunes, all that has convinced the world that the bandits are bolsheviks but not ourselves.

"It grieves me, my peasant brothers, to hear slanders about you and, just as in the case of some mangy sheep among you, the kind that mar the entire flock by disreputable activities, you must expel those sheep from your ranks immediately.

"As Chief Ataman of the Ukrainian Host, I command you: punish unmercifully bolshevik-communists and other bandits who perpetrate pogroms of Jews and destroy populations, stand up to a man for the defense of poor and tormented folk, use your courtsmartial summarily to deal with bandits at once.

> "I shall be back to Ukraine very shortly, with the Ukrainian Host and the government, and a dire punishment is in store for those who were doing harm to our cause, who joined the rebels for the sake of looting and pogroms. They shall be treated as aiders and abettors of the enemy, as traitors of our people, according to the wartime laws.
>
> —Petlyura."

Alongside the pronouncements of Petlyura and Omel'yanovich-Pavlenko, as spokesmen for the Army, the government was doing everything possible to counteract the pro-pogrom propaganda. The mere fact that socially-minded people such as Prokopovich and Levitskiy, tested and tried, were at the head of the government, speaks for itself.

The government was particularly sensitive then to opinions of those of the Jews who were in favor of self-determination of peoples of the former Russian Empire, without any restrictions whatsoever. Zangwill and Lucien Wulf were especially respected and honored by Ukrainian politicians and public leaders, because both of them went on record rather definitely in favor of the Ukrainian movement as such, but did not identify its best representatives, or the movement itself, with the anti-Jewish pogroms and with the perpetrators thereof. Dr. Iochelman was popular likewise, as founder of the Federation of Ukrainian Jews in England.

In December 1920 Nikovskiy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent letters to Zangwill, Wulf and Iochelman on behalf of the Ukrainian government, with expressions of gratitude and appreciation of their attitudes by the leaders of the Ukrainian movement.

In the letter to Lucien Wulf the Ministry called attention to the fact that Western Europe was uninformed with regard to the Ukrainian movement. In the absence of exact and accurate information, enemies of Ukrainian statehood took advantage of the situation and tried to blame the entire Ukrainian people for the atrocities perpetrated by criminals in the climate which suited them well: chaos and complete disintegration of political and social life. "The

entire territory of former Russia, so reduced by bolshevist barbarism" was now submerged in such chaos. Among the accusations of the Ukrainian people as a whole, the most grave and ignominous is that all Ukrainians are pogromshchiks. Nikovskiy thanked Wulf for avoiding this kind of generalization. "The people and the government of the Ukrainian National Republic believe you will remain their true friend and defender of their legitimate rights and aspirations," wrote Nikovskiy in the concluding part of his letter.

In the letter to Iochelman, his initiative in the organization of the Federation of Ukrainian Jews in England was commended with gratitude.

In the letter to Zangwill, Nikovskiy dwelt on Zangwill's activities at public meetings and in the press, his protagonism of self-determination for all nations, and his interest in the Ukrainian movement, for which Nikovskiy thanked him.

In his reply of January 25, 1921 Wulf underscored among other things his genuine sympathy with the organization of Ukraine on premises of self-determination of nations and Ukrainian efforts to arrest the bolshevist Russian deluge. "However," continued Wulf, "my personal feelings must not be taken for the views of my Committee, inasmuch as the Joint Foreign Committee must remain neutral in all political problems." Whereupon, on behalf of the Committee, Wulf commended the pioneer work of the Ukrainian government and the people, in their recognition of minority rights, and suggested that the government proclaim once again that it was not responsible for the horrifying pogroms. In Wulf's opinion the pogroms were products of the chaos which reigned in Ukraine.

After this book was practically off the press, I received additional data on counter-pogrom measures of the Ukrainian government in 1919. Here is a representative of that group of documents:

Order

To troops of Ukrainian People's Republic
army in field.
No. 77. April 13, 1919

Black Hundreders, bolsheviks, various kulaks, and plain looters are engaged in vicious agitation, in the ranks of our cossacks, for the purpose of plundering and extirpation of the Jewish population, which is allegedly guilty of whatever transpires here in Ukraine, as well as in Muskovy. That clique is trying by every means to incite anti-Jewish pogroms in Ukraine and so to attain their nefarious goals. Blackhundreders and kulaks believe that pogroms and other evidence of anarchy will accelerate the entry of the Allies into Ukraine, who will enthrone a czar so that he will return to them their former estates. Bolsheviks and various looters and gangsters want simply to stuff their pockets with loot and, while robbing the "Yid," are also clawing anyone else who falls into their hands. Such persons are trying to wriggle their way into our army; they weasel in, they feign sincerity, they incite the credulous true defenders of the nation to disorders, in order quickly to slip the noose on the neck of our free Ukrainian people.

Cossacks! Whosoever wishes well for his country, who does not want any foreigners here, such as Chinese, Latvians, Moscovian bolshevik looters, others, who does not want any czar or hetman again, who wants our people to be free and republican, must remember that any anarchy, particularly pogroms of peaceful citizenry, are not the way. Anarchy is more frightening than the armed enemy now converging upon us from all sides. Cossacks, remember that our might can be annihilated by pogroms, for death of the innocents, slain during pogroms, will invoke hate against us and our foes will further increase in number. The cossack's business is to fight armed enemies and not to wage war against women, children, and the aged, the kind of war that our enemies are pushing you into, in order to stain with infamy our nation and our statehood in the eyes of the entire world. From now on, I command: any one who incites cossacks to pogroms must be arrested and committed immediately to courtmartial-extra-

ordinary. Attempts at pro-pogrom agitation in units of the army must be suppressed immediately.

Original signed by:

Acting Deputy Ataman pro tem: Ataman Mel'nik
Acting Chief of Staff, Army-in-field: Ataman Sinkler

CHAPTER XXIII

Questionnaire Committee for investigation of pogroms. Temkin's data on pogroms

A most interesting and striking moment in the history of Jewish-Ukrainian relations in the fall of 1919 was the appeal of the Ukrainian government to individually prominent Jews and to Jewish organizations asking them to establish a committee for on-the-spot investigations of pogroms, in order to determine the actual perpetrators thereof.

On September 8 Temnitskiy and Vasil'ko, Minister, and the Ambassador to Switzerland, respectively, in the name of the government of Ukraine, telegraphed to Count Tyshkevich, Chief of the Ukrainian delegation in Paris, asking him to invite Messrs. Usyshkin, Goldstein, Motskin, Ahad-Haam and Iochelman to membership in the committee for in situ investigations of pogroms. The first three of these people were then in Paris, the others in London. The value of such an investigation for the government and the Directory, as well as the high reputation and known objectivity of the five prominent Jews, particularly trusted by Jewry, were emphasized in the telegram to Tyshkevich. The government promised every kind of aid from the authorities in the committee's work.

On September 9 the delegation transmitted invitations to each of the addressees, the text being identical with the Temnitskiy-Vasil'ko' telegram. The venerable U. Ginzberg (Ahad-Haam) unfortunately had to decline the invitation because of poor health. In his reply of September 12 he praised the noble motives of the Ukrainian government in the projected organization of the committee, which in his view should be conducive to ascertaining the truth and alleviating the misery and disaster inherent in pogroms.

Motskin, Usyshkin and Goldstein wrote to the govern-

ment advising that the project be referred directly to the Committee of Jewish Delegations at the Peace Conference in Paris. Motskin, with warm sympathy, acclaimed the government's proposal to dispatch investigators to the sites of pogroms, thanked the government for their trust in him, and stated confidently that the project would be implemented jointly by the Committee of Jewish Delegations in Paris and the government of the Republic of Ukraine.

Dealing with organizations rather than with individuals was evidently the right course. Vishnitser as well said the same thing in his discussion of the project with publicly active Jews in London. It was decided then to contact six Jewish organizations: the Committee of Jewish Delegations in Paris, the Alliance Israelite Universelle, the Joint Foreign Committee, the Zionist Organization, the Jewish Territorial Organization and the American Jewish Committee.

On October 11, 1919, in the name of the Ukrainian government, Count Tyshkevich sent written invitations to these six organizations to participate in the Questionnaire Committee. Tyshkevich called attention in these letters to past and current struggles of the Ukrainian government with antisemitism and pogroms, to the fact that the government regarded the Jews as friends, that the government of Ukraine was the first in Europe to grant the broadest national autonomy to minorities. Tyshkevich promised in advance a most careful consideration of any suggestion or advice that might be offered by the committee to the Ukrainian government regarding the means for arresting an evil which shamed the entire country. All travel expenses and work of the committee would be paid for by the Ukrainian government, he said. He hoped the government's invitation would be accepted, for the good of both the Ukrainian and the Jewish people.

Zangwill's reply was received October 20. The substance of his letter, as relevant to pan-Ukrainian and Jewish problems, has been presented in an earlier chapter. I shall relate here only a part of his letter, on behalf of the Jewish Territorial Organization. Zangwill thanked for the honor,

referred to his poor health (he was then on a cure in New Wales), and suggested that the Organization would be adequately represented in the Committee by Dr. Iochelman.

L. Wulf, on behalf of the Joint Foreign Committee, said that he found it impossible to accept the invitation, after a thorough study of the proposed travels of the Questionnaire Committee in the field. Anarchy in Ukraine precluded alike the possibility, and the investigations in situ, and the reconstruction of the true pattern of the pogroms. In the name of the Joint Foreign Committee, he thanked the Ukrainian government for its good intentions in determining the causes of pogroms, and for its friendly attitude to Ukrainian Jewry.

In the archives of the Jewish delegation in Paris I could find no evidence of any replies from the other Jewish organizations to the Ukrainian invitation for them to participate in the Questionnaire Committee. I learned only that members of the Committee of Jewish Delegations, who spoke informally to the Ukrainian delegates, were opposed to travel in the field for the same reasons as given by Wulf on behalf of the Joint Foreign Committee.

The energetic attempt of the Ukrainian government thus failed of its purpose to do everything possible to ascertain the truth of that nightmare of the anti-Jewish pogroms, to draw the line between actual criminals, murderers, provocateurs, connivers and the innocent. One could not possibly expect calm and objective judgment of such happenings from Jewry, in the heat of natural anger, sorrow and outrage caused by the staggering atrocities of the pogroms. But when the offer was made to Jewry itself to undertake investigation and moral judgment of the criminals, as in court, not a single Jewish organization was willing to accept it or to avail itself of an invitation made in the spirit of objectivity and trust.

At about the same time (December 1920), Lansing, United States Secretary of State, intended, according to the newspapers, to declare that Ukrainian Jewry was to be considered under the protection of the American government. The Ukrainian government, aware of its own

impotence in the face of the chaos enveloping the greater part of the country, acclaimed this intention of America to stand up in defense of Ukrainian Jewry. The government published a statement of its complete satisfaction, calling attention once again to its grave situation vis a vis the bolsheviks and the armies of Denikin and Galler, with no help forthcoming from outside. In view of these circumstances, Petlyura suggested that all Ukrainian missions abroad inform the American embassies that he, Petlyura, as well as the Ukrainian government, would be ready to put themselves at the disposal of the American agencies entrusted with protection of Jewish interests in Ukraine.

Alas! All of that went no farther than the newspaper items. Lansing's beautiful intentions came to naught. Jewry remained defenseless in the ocean of anarchy and unbridled criminal license. As to the Ukrainian democratic government, it had not enough strength to fight several enemies at once, and for the simultaneous maintenance of order even in the small area still under its nominal rule . . . .

Such is the fate of all new and inexperienced movements. Sluggishness and ingrown attachment to the prewar map of Eastern Europe, agitation by a certain fraction of the sizable body of Russian intelligentsia, centralist in mind, with their command of foreign languages, social graces and fashionable education—all this created the atmosphere of mistrust which enveloped the Ukrainian movement. Its enemies were not too squeamish to slander the Ukrainian political parties and government as bolsheviks and reactionary perpetrators of pogroms, rolled into one. For this reason Denikin and Kolchak were so long supported by Lansing and the British. On the other hand, the sincere devotion to Russia of Rodichev, Chaykovskiy, Breshko-Breshkovskaya and other irreproachable patriots could not help but command respect in Western Europe and America from the start. The erroneous nature of their schemes and reconstructions, their ignorance of the true aspirations of the nationalities within old Russia were discovered much later, when the armies of Kolchak and Denikin, equipped by England and

America, proved to be bearers of the darkest reaction and antisemitism at the very peak of their strength.

Temkin, the well-known Zionist and public figure at the Karlsbad conference of Jewish organizations, in his report on pogroms under the Directory and in Denikin's regime, proved that the cruelest and most frightening pogroms were conducted by Denikin's Volunteer Army. The Jewish people were declared outside the law. "The new rule," as he pointed out correctly, "instituted a clearly defined official antisemitism, annulled civic and national equality, the grants of the revolution, and cashiered Jewish officers and soldiers on all fronts, notwithstanding their conscientious performance of duties."

Further on, Temkin quoted several orders by chiefs of staff, commandants of cities, and other agents of the regime, expelling Jewish members of city and land councils, prohibiting defense of Jewish interests in the press, dismissing all employees who dared to disapprove or protest against pogroms of Jews. Limitations of Jewish rights to secondary and higher education were reintroduced, as the "admission quotas" . . . . Denikin declined to publish a declaration on equality of civic rights of Jews in Russia, when he was asked to do so by the Jewish delegation. "He supported the tendencies of pogromshchiks and he stands responsible in history for shedding Jewish blood, alongside the physical perpetrators of pogroms," was Temkin's verdict in the case.

The existence of a special press corps in Denikin's army, staffed by oldtime Black Hundred journalists, was a valuable bit of information included in Temkin's report. The Osvag ("Information Service") in Kiev had A. Savenko for director . . . . The antisemitic campaign was waged by Zarya ("Dawn"), an official military gazette under the guidance of the High Command.

The fact that officers of the army were personally engaging in looting and extortion was one of the most shocking items in Temkin's report. A commander of a unit declared openly that "we came not to fight bolsheviks but to make war on Jews." Among the soldiers the Chechentsy (Caucasian mountaineers) were particularly cruel.

The pogrom in Fastov was marked by atrocities exceeding everything of the kind that occurred in our times, so rich in pogroms, according to Temkin.

I shall not recount the horrors which Temkin describes, with the pogrom in Fastov as the example, nor shall I dwell on parallels and comparisons of the Volunteer Army's atrocities in Fastov with the horrors in Proskurov and Balta . . . . The point is not the number of victims and the degree of refinement of the atrocities in either case, but who physically "worked" the pogroms and what were the motives of the instigators. I am borrowing here from Temkin only the mention that in Fastov all valuables such as grand pianos, furs, silverware and diamonds were purloined by army officers and their lady companions . . . . One of the officers actually pulled a ring from the finger of Potiyevskiy, a Jew of Fastov.

In Kiev all pogrom atrocities were directed by army officers. Osvag, Kievlyanin and, Vecherniye Ogni ("Evening Lights") invented all kinds of accusations against Jews and rejoiced in pogroms . . . . In Podol'sk province, where Denikin's army was retreating, medieval torture, including the rack, was renewed, according to eyewitnesses. Jews were burned alive in kerosene and oil. Temkin reports names of the colonels who supervised these operations.

Copies of the original documents, which attest the responsibiltiy of many high officers of Denikin's army for baiting of Jews and organization of pogroms, are appended to the Temkin report. Particularly impressive was the system of provocations and Jesuitic devices, running like so many white threads in the texture of the documents. One simply could not imagine the baseness and animal ferocity of the instincts that lay hidden in the milieu which was the bulwark of the autocracy. The sophisticated, pathological, sadistic cruelty of some of these scions of the old regime came out into the open. I am presenting here several representative cases from Temkin's papers.

January 17, 1920. Commanding officer of Belgorod Regiment reports from Tikhoretskaya to commandant of Novossiysk Military District on presence of many Jews, as

soldiers, in the reinforcements just arrived. These Jews talk to other soldiers about the harmful effects of pogroms of Jews and non-Russians on the army. The officer detects indications of "bolshevist propaganda" therein and reports further that ten such Jews had already been courtmartialed and executed by firing squad on his order. He requested that no more Jewish elements be sent to his regiment.

December 20, 1919. General Staff of Odessa District Command issues certificate to Simon Galstein, noncommissioned officer, to the effect that his name is irrevocably expunged from the list of officers subject to mobilization, on account of his Jewish origin. "According to order of Commander of all armed forces in South of Russia, the aforesaid Galstein will be remobilized in due course and under general conditions as private."

The Chief Surgeon of Taganrog Second Hospital orders confidentially that his subordinates not admit to the hospital any Jews, soldiers and officers, under pretext of no available space. He justifies this order by a reprimand received from the High Command, with regard to the impermissibility of flooding the hospital with Jews, who exert a pernicious influence over the soldiers and the wounded.

Chief of Station Sinel'nikovo receives telegram signed by May-Mayevskiy commanding him and other station chiefs on the line to report daily by telegraph the number of Jews killed in trains that passed every given station. Any attempts at Jewish demonstrations related to these murders are prohibited emphatically by the order.

By order of the High Command, the same May-Mayevskiy sends a diabolically conceived official telegram to Kremen'-chug, Poltava and other cities, with the order to "delay the offensive and by every means try to arrange that the troops of Grigor'yev, Petlyura and the Reds would linger awhile in every city with a large Jewish population."

Kalashnikov, Chief of Propaganda in the Don cossack region, issues a circular order of December 22, 1919, which directs among other things the discharge of all Jews from whatever positions they hold, "as the element evasive

of military service and interfering with the liberation of Russia from the foreign yoke."

Yekaterinoslav. Police Commissar, third precinct, reports to the governor of the city, August 12, 1919, that "Jews are yelling in certain streets in the night, only to pretend that cossacks are attacking them, whereas in reality they are signalling the Reds whose positions are near the city; the purport of their yelling is that the Volunteer Army is demoralized and is now occupied in looting. They do it to raise the spirits of the Reds and make their offensive easier." The commissar reports further that he had already put an end to all that yelling and named certain Jews to be courtmaritaled as suspected of bolshevism, so that the guilty ones are now under arrest. The suspected proved to be guilty, right in the next line, which is remarkable.

General Korvin-Krukovskiy relates in his order of October 25, 1919 that as his troops were leaving Yekaterinoslav, many soldiers and even officers were killed by pot shots from windows of houses belonging to Jews. "We marked such houses." The general commands his men to fire on these houses energetically, on his eventual reconquest of the city, and to inflict dire punishments on all males living in that block. He promises further to his "gallant soldiers" the privilege of searching every Jewish block for three days, looking for the criminals who were "shooting at my soldiers and officers."

And here is an example of justice, the verdict of a courtmartial in Voronev, October 22, 1919.

President: Captain Konovalov; judges: three officers; defendant: Sura Weisman, accused of having lured a soldier from Konovalov's unit to her flat and of killing him there with a kitchen knife. Having rubbed off the blood with her blouse, she carried the body outdoors, with the aid of persons unknown, where it was found in the morning of October 8. The body could not be identified, because the unit to which the soldier belonged had already left the city at dawn.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, on hearing the defendant's account that the blood on her blouse was

menstrual, on hearing the army surgeon's report that the blood on the blouse was indeed menstrual, the court pronounced the defendant guilty of murder of the soldier, whose name could not be ascertained, and sentenced her to death. The verdict was read to the defendant one hour after the case was decided. The sentence was executed within two hours.

Signatures of the president and the judges were affixed.

But it is the letter signed "Stepan" on the stationery of General Shkuro's special cavalry division that is the most shattering of all the documents assembled by Temkin.

"Dear Kostya, come to our place at seven tonight for a cup of tea. We are planning something by way of entertainment. Denis picked up a little Jewkins whom he calls 'Komissar' and with whom he is going to have real fun tonight. He prepared a kind of crown with a bamboo stick. He will put it on the Jewkin's head and then will begin to tighten it by turning the stick until the skull of the Jew cracks. Interesting, isn't it? Wonder what kind of tricks will the Yidkin try. By the way, Irina Petrovna and Anna Nikolayevna are coming too. I am counting on you!" . . . .

This perversely refined sadism, "intelligentsia type," dwarfs the exploits even of the "savage zaporgians," such as Kozyp'-Zyrka and others.

CHAPTER XXIV

Pogroms under Directory and pogroms by Denikin's army. Parallels. Peoples and governments

Before me is the report on pogroms presented by the Committee for Aid to Victims of Pogroms at the Russian Red Cross in Kiev, attesting that no pogroms occurred under the Central Rada, Skoropadskiy, or during the first two months of the Directory. They began after the defeat of the Directory's troops by bolsheviks. "The greater the defeats, the stronger the pressure on Petlyura's troops to retreat, the fiercer was the revenge taken upon the innocent Jewish population, which they identified with the communists. The cries "down with Jews and communists!" or "all Jews are communists!" were sounded throughout Ukraine and led to pogroms all over the country.

This explanation of the genesis of pogroms is entirely in line with the Temnitskiy-Vasil'ko telegram of August 1, 1919. The whole of Russia had been hearing from the government for centuries that Jewry was responsible for all the world's miseries. The ignorant believed even the legends about ritual murders of Christian children by Jews; it was only "the experts" who maintained that Jews killed only boys. Karabchevskiy, in the first part of his memoirs Chto glaza moyi videli ("What My Eyes Saw") tells of his childhood, how his mother, reading the New Testament, as it came to the sufferings of Jesus, someone remarked, "foul Yids, so did they torture Christ to death, after all!" (p. 23).

The Kishinev and Gomel' pogroms in the 1880's developed solely on the basis of false rumors and promises of a three-day license to looters. But in our times the participation of Jews in the bolshevist movement was not a rumor but a fact which could easily be inflated. A lie or slander is particularly frightening if it contains the merest

trace of truth. On the other hand the freedom to loot is no longer restricted to three days but is limitless, in the absence of authority. What discipline can avail in the panic of the retreat from "Trotskiy's army" . . . . Such circumstances merely encourage the demoralized soldiery: the bigotry of Semesenko's group, provocateurs of the Russian Black Hundred camp, dedicated pogromshchiks, all desirous of compromising the Ukrainian movement simultaneously. This only explains but by no means excuses the pogroms under the Directory.

A totally different picture unfolds on comparison of this wave of pogroms with their beginning by Denikin's army. No longer was there an excuse in retreat and chaos. Quite the opposite, the more successful the offensive, the more efficient became the propaganda from the top down, the fiercer and more systematic became the pogroms. The regular Ukrainian army began to rot from the tail end, but here it was from the head that the poison of demoralization proceeded. As we have already heard, Denikin's officers declared openly that their war was with Jewry, not bolsheviks . . . . "Beat Yids, save Russia!" . . . .

There were many elements of the pure looter type even in Denikin's army, of course. But the real horror was in the ingrained, sadistic antisemitism of the chiefs in Denikin's entourage. I am not inclined to believe that Denikin himself wanted pogroms. With all his antisemitism, he could not help understanding their disastrous effects on his army. But he was powerless to defend the Jews.

Another difference between the two waves of pogroms is that in Petlyura's army it was sometimes possible to arrest pogroms or prevent them entirely. Temkin cites two such examples. The other two are given in the report by the Committee for Aid to Victims of Pogroms. On March 13, 1919, in Korosten', while soldiers of the Red army were engaged in an anti-Jewish pogrom, Petlyura's soldiers, then on the offensive, arrived just in time to stop it. In Belaya Tserkov', where such pogroms were waged first by Shkuro and then by the Reds, the Ukrainian army, which arrived in August, behaved most creditably during its stay. Next came Ataman Zelenyy, who undertook still

another pogrom immediately. After that the luckless town was attacked by Sokolov, then reoccupied by the Ukrainian army, albeit only for a short time, when order was reestablished.

A pogrom in Lubny was averted by 100 soldiers from the Ukrainian army. Fourteen men were slain, but the town was saved. While reading this part of the report I remembered how Lubny was saved from a pogrom in 1905 by the municipal self-defense committee, organized to meet the emergency.

Nothing like that could be credited to Denikin's army, where anyone "guilty" of intercession or of defense of Jews would be cashiered immediately. Still another difference, not at all to the credit of the army and government of Denikin, is evident when one compares the Ukrainian official declarations on the Jewish problem and its guarantee of the autonomy of Jewish communities, with Denikin's restrictive quotas for Jews in education, civil service and military service. The Ukrainian government had endeavored to attract Jews to all echelons of the civil service, whereas Denikin banned Jewish officers from the army and excluded Jews from city and district councils. In the meanwhile many Jews had volunteered from the very start to serve under Kolchak and Denikin. Many, reared in the Russian culture, had enlisted to die for their foster mother country. On the other side, what a pathetic handful of Jews had joined the Ukrainian movement at the beginning of the Second Revolution . . . . This was not surprising. The Wilsonian principles were so recent, effective self-determination of the Ukrainian people was such a novel phenomenon that it was neither understood nor assimilated by the Jewish intelligentsia, with rare exceptions, let alone by the average man. But the fact stands . . . . Jews were numerous in the bolshevist ranks and also in Denikin's army at first. Only a few Jews were involved in the Ukrainian movement.

Russian and Jewish capitalists and big industrialists went hand in hand with the Volunteer Army of Denikin, with Kolchak and Yudenich. Even after Denikin's pogroms

they heeded the call of his successor, Wrangel, and gathered again in Crimea.

And here is yet another comparison. A pogrom was underway in Kiev, openly, when Bredov and Dragomirov were in the city. Nothing of the sort had ever occurred in the presence of the Directory, whether in Kiev, Vinnitsa, or Kamenets-Podol'sk. The people of Kiev knew the difference between the two regimes from their own bitter experience. But people abroad heard a great deal more about the "Petlyurovist" pogroms than about others, even though the latter were more sweeping. Propaganda of well-connected and well-to-do Russians abroad was not the only reason for such misapprehensions. The fact remained that the earlier wave of pogroms had caught public attention first and caused the greater shock and indignation.

For example, the Kishinev pogrom of 1903 made a tremendous impression throughout the world. The best Russian lawyers took part in the subsequent trial. The pogrom had occurred after a period of calm since the 1880's and was marked by incredible atrocities; the guilt of Pleve and his agents was self-evident. The Gomel' pogrom made an impression too, because the subsequent trial was open to the public, something that had never happened before. But public sensitivity to pogroms was already blunted by 1905, when more than 300 occurred in Russia. Western Europe and America did not react then as strongly as they had responded to the Kishinev affair. Trials were held in relatively modest environments, with preponderantly local attorneys.

When a disastrous fire occurs after a long "fireless" period, and many of the poor are burned out, civic action is taken at once, large sums are quickly collected. When a larger fire strikes soon afterward, or a flood or earthquake, the public response is weaker, even when the disaster is tremendous. The same people who showed such energy after the first fire have become apathetic.

The pogroms of February and March 1919 broke out when the French were still in Odessa. The French telegraph was still functioning, trains were running more or

less regularly. But all communications between Ukrainian cities and villages and between Ukraine and the outside were deteriorating day by day. Information on pogroms by Denikin's army was slow, irregular and unsystematic. Very little was known abroad about pogroms by the Red army, after its discipline had weakened in Ukraine, or about the hair-raising atrocities of Budennyy's Red cavalry. As to those of Wrangel's army, they were only rumors, even to people like myself, who kept records of all such activities.

There is no point here in dealing with pogroms by various bandit groups interested solely in loot, the easy life, and debauch. The ringleaders often changed colors. First they called themselves communists, then supporters of the Ukrainian movement. Some were seeking accord with Denikin. Temkin, for example, reports agreements between Denikin and the bands of Kazakov, Lazarenko, Zakusilo and Prikhod'ko. They told me in Kamenets-Podol'sk in the fall of 1919 about anti-pogrom proclamations by Makhno, even by Zelenyy, in which the shame of looting was actually denounced.

Regular Ukrainian troops as well as those of Denikin would occasionally link themselves to these bands in common actions against the bolsheviks. Even the most tenuous connection between the Ukrainian regulars and Struk's bands, for example, would fill me with despair. It was for that reason that I resigned from the Ukrainian delegation in Paris. It should be borne in mind, however, that the implacable laws of war do lead to unnatural alliances. Was it not abnormal for republican France to ally itself with the Russia of the Kishinev epoch, of Pleve, of Rasputin? Did the Entente Powers break with Russia, after its regular army passed through Galicia like a hurricane, looting and sacking?

The characteristically different attitudes towards the Ukrainian leaders and the generals of the Volunteer Army, on the part of an ill-informed public, were due to a rather interesting psychological detail. Denikin, a professional officer, had been a general in the old Imperial Russian army, and was first of all assumed to be an antisemitic

reactionary. But as for Vinnichenko, a writer, or Petlyura, "an accountant,"[14] the public somehow expected a great deal more of them. Indeed, when it came to a successful bureaucrat of "noble" origin, the common people, awed by such brilliance, were prone to forgive not merely "pranks," but even bestial crimes against an entire nation. Not so the "plebians," liberals, usefully professional persons. Even their slight indiscretions were regarded as criminal; their behavior must conform to the most rigorous standards. A single declaration by Denikin, substantially the same as Petlyura's proclamations, belated though it might be, would have had more impact on the Volunteer Army than all Petlyura's proclamations for the Ukrainian cause. Servility was still imbedded in the nationalities of former Russia. Every gracious word of the master (barin) was valued much more than the sincerest declarations of genuine democrats whose service to the oppressed was attested, not by the epaulettes of a general but by confinement in jails, by the self-effacement of the intellectual and the real worker.

No nation can ever be deemed a prisoner at the bar, a defendant. There are no "good" or "bad" nations; there are simply different levels in the evolution of any nation. Some may be more or less civilized, some may be ignorant or savage. The more ignorant and downtrodden is the majority of people in any country, the more intense its hostility to minorities with their strange religions and customs.

When I lived in Lyons I boarded with a petit bourgeois French family, where a Japanese student at the University of Lyons also lived. His manners and habits were the favorite subject of mockery for the French, behind his back. Yet he was a very intelligent, cultured person. He invited me once to a party where nearly all of the Japanese student colony were gathered. Some of them, actually drunk, forgot my presence and began to make fun of

[14]Petlyura was indeed employed at one time in the bookkeeping department of the Eastern Transport Company in Moscow. He was also the editor of Ukrainskava Zhizn' ("Ukrainian Life") at the same time.—ADM.

Europeans, particularly French customs . . . . A certain level of culture is the prerequisite of tolerance towards the natural differences between nations. This level was not attainable by peoples stagnating under Russian autocracy. All of them, including the Jews, were natural products of the regime under which they were reared. Slaves cannot be transformed into free citizens directly the slave owners are overthrown, for slavery corrupts slave and master alike. "Slaves in revolt" was Kerenskiy's apt phrase, when he was riding the wave of personal success.

They talk about the particular antisemitism of Ukrainians, Poles and Rumanians. The entire point here is reducible to the degree of their culture and to the relative abundance of Jewish populations in these countries; there were fewer Jews in Russia, Siberia, the Don region and the Caucasus. But the essential fact was that antisemitism was propagated from the center, particularly within the pale of settlement, the area where the mass of Jews lived.

According to the Temkin report and other sources, the cruelest pogromshchiks in Denikin's army were Chechentsy (Caucasian mountanieers) and not Ukrainians. As a matter of fact there were not too many Ukrainians with Denikin. Russians served there, as did the Don cossacks and others.

In any case, one must be careful with sweeping generalizations.

Even as all Jews cannot be held responsible for the exploits of Jewish commissars or for the foul actions of Jews who worked in the bolshevist Chekas, so can the Ukrainian nation disown its own pogromshchik scum. Let it be 200, 300 or 500 thousand pogromshchiks among the Ukrainian people, but the fact cannot be expanded to include the rest of some 30 million or more Ukrainians. Saying that "all Ukrainians are pogromshchiks" is the same as saying "all Jews are bolsheviks."

Should the proportion of pogromshchiks and criminals among Ukrainians prove immensely greater than the proportion of sadistic Jews in the bolshevist Chekas, one can only regret it, while feeling relieved that savagery among Jews did show to a lesser degree.

"No bad nations"—but there can be very bad governments, bad laws. Jewish youth was growing up in narrowness, in the suffocating atmosphere of the pale, because Jews had no civil rights in Russia. The longing for enlightenment was generally satisfied by reading demagogic brochures depicting the socialist paradise of the future. The school admission quota led to intense competition among young Jewish children at the threshold of the gymnasium, a sport scarcely wholesome for the young. Then followed the use of a "drag" or even bribery . . . . Jewry, the "people of the book," believed that anything was fair, if only the child could enter the school. But how painful for a youth to realize he had been accepted because of a pull, while his neighbors' sons who had passed the examinations as well as he or better, were rejected . . . . The difficulties in attaining positions, awards and high posts in civil or military service were conducive to the growth of a sickly false pride, easily hurt, in those who rose to prominence despite the obstacles. And all of that was against the hopelessly sordid background, the struggle for survival, the lot of the impoverished Jewish masses, crowded into the filthy hamlets of the pale and subjected to mockery and extortion by the police.

Small wonder that under such circumstances Jewish youth was inclined to exaggerated effort in all aspects of life, in social and nationality problems. It is not surprising that so many Jews turned up later as bolshevik commissars in the towns and hamlets of the former pale, where the Jewish population was so preponderant.

As to the peasants in the Russian state, they were virtually serfs. The right to leave the village, to move and the like required permission from the authorities.

The deliberate retardation of literacy by the ruling classes, the primitive methods of agriculture, heavy taxes and liability to army service were the reasons why the majority of peasants remained savage and ignorant. Those who left for seasonal work in the cities or transferred to the urban proletariat would absorb only the unwholesome aspects of urban culture.

The iron bands which had held the huge wooden barrel of the state together fell away with the collapse of the autocracy, when the army fled home from the front. The barrel fell to pieces; its contents were spilled out.

Whatever was best, honest and strong in the peasantry withstood the intoxication of total liberty which came like a bolt from the sky. Conversely, whatever was latently criminal and evil in city and village rose to the surface. Old legends and stories came back to life, the tales of gigantic rebellions in Russia, of free bands of robbers on the Volga, in Siberia, of haydamaks in the 18th century in Ukraine .... The prime target of the gangster instincts was the Jewish population, of course, the most alien by religion, apparel, appearance and customs. Landlords had time to get away or to go into hiding. So did the pillars of the fallen regime and the police. They had only to dress like an average burgher, laborer, or peasant and to leave their homes, vanishing in the boundless sea of the Christian population. Not so with the Jews, peaceful and defenseless as they were. Appearance and speech marked a Jew at first glance, making it quite comfortable and simple for the pogromshchiks. The thirst for blood, loot, sexual license were excusable then; the Yids were aliens as well as bolsheviks. When the Dneprovian Ukrainian troops appeared in Galicia they quickly saw the new opportunity of distinguishing aliens from themselves. The army was "ours"; the Galicians were the "aliens." So they began sacking hamlets and villages, looting and raping the other Ukrainians, who were "galicians" to them, former subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

CHAPTER XXV

Vinnichenko and Petlyura. Their indiscretions and hesitations during early pogroms

Deeply convinced as I am that every one of the Ukrainian governments—Central Rada, Hetman, or Directory—was beyond suspicion of any complicity or sympathy with any of the pogroms, I am turning now to another important aspect of the problem, namely, whether the Directory governments were sufficiently discreet and competent in their counter-pogrom measures and in the actual suppression of pogroms.

After the slaughter of Jewish passengers, in Bakhmach and Konotop in January 1919, as reported earlier in this book, a Jewish delegation called on Vinnichenko. According to this delegation, Vinnichenko promised to do whatever he could, then remarked on the Jewish support of bolsheviks, adding "don't you enbroil me with the army."

Anyone who had known Vinnichenko in private life would never believe that he, a trusted friend of all oppressed nationalities, could entertain hostility, let alone ill will, to Jewry. In this particular case he may have spoken rashly. But power was still new for him, and he spoke informally, without guile or careful choice of words, yet as a true democrat underneath .... Reports were arriving to him from all sides, that Jewry had no sympathy for the Ukrainian movement in which he was totally involved. His "don't you embroil me with the army" evidently meant that the participation of Jews in bolshevism would strengthen antisemitism in the army to the point where the Directory would be unable to cope with it. Embroilment of the heads of government with the army would result.

One should judge the whole person, not a single careless phrase. The circumstances and the time must always be

taken into account. Many steadfast defenders of the rights of Jewish people were enervated by the participation of Jewry in bolshevism; they lost equanimity and sober objectivity. For example Nabokov in his "Provisional Government," published in Volume I of the Archive of Revolution, found it necessary for some reason to point out that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet of the Russian Republic were Jews, that Uritskiy had an "impudent Jewish" face (as if there were no impudent non-Jewish faces), that the name "Nakhamkes" sounded most inharmonious . . . .

But Karabchevksiy goes farther in the second volume of his memoirs, What My Eyes Saw, page 10. He, the quondam defender of Jewish interests in Kishinev, the defender of Beilis, grown grey in courtroom battles for justice and truth, makes the following statement, verbatim: "On the whole, Jewry tends to corrode every state, to disintegrate it invisibly, unrelentingly" and "If the prophecy of Dostoyevskiy came true and Russia was undone by Jews, it is up to Russians themselves to apprehend this bitter lesson and attempt the resurrection of Russia."

Frightening and shameful it is to read such lines, frightening for luckless Jewry, shameful for Karabchevskiy.

If Karabchevskiy himself, not to speak of Nabokov, could lose perspective and good judgment, his feeling of measured justice, if such preposterous accusations (Karabchevskiy's) and such ineptness (Nabokov's) were actually penned by them, how could one judge Vinnichenko harshly for what he had blurted out at the very beginning of the problem, when the participation of Jews in bolshevism was not and could not be thoroughly investigated and analyzed? There is no more to say about Karabchevskiy. He belongs to the past; the publication of his memoirs is regrettable.

Not so with Nabokov. Much can be expected and demanded of him, even at this time. He must already have realized how inept and unesthetic were his remarks on Nakhamkes and Uritskiy . . . . The man in the street may be excused, should the names "Khayim" and "Leyb"

sound inharmonious to him, but "leybgvardiya" (household troops) or "don Jaime" (the family name of a noble house in Spain) are full of beauty. But V.D. Nabokov is not the man in the street. Everybody knows he is not an antisemite. Whatever lies in the inherited subconscious sphere of his being, he may suppress of course, and he will remain the old Nabokov, the knight of justice and law.

Vinnichenko's own outspoken statement in the second part of his Vidrozhdennya Natsii ("Rebirth of Nation"), p. 216, explains the origin of pogroms far better than his illchosen remark. He writes: "Under the General Secretariat,[15] the building in which the government was holding its sessions was often guarded by soldiers whose mood was essentially bolshevist. Had they been endowed with sufficient enterprise, they could have arrested all of us at any time, any evening, could have taken us out into the field, and shot us dead right there."

But people remain people . . . . The same Vinnichenko, the implacable enemy of Petlyura (whom he regarded as a compromiser, a representative of petit bourgeois currents), condemns Petlyura, who failed to execute Semesenko by firing squad, after the pogrom in Proskurov, but simply put him under arrest. Vinnichenko was doubtless right, that Semesenko's crimes were grievous atrocities. The question arises: was it possible for Petlyura to execute Semesenko[16] at that particular time? Petlyura himself could have been killed by fanatics under the circumstances, by Ukrainian chauvinists who exaggerated and perverted the participation of Jewish youth in bolshevism as an attempt at bolshevist insurrection "from within." The Proskurov pogrom was essentially a bigoted revenge for Jewish partisanship in bolshevism, whereas nearly all the pogroms under the Directory were motivated mainly by the thirst for loot and for senseless, bestial slaughter. Such was the evidence given by the Jews of

[15] I.e. under the Central Rada, when Vinnichenko was both Premier and Secretary of Interior. A.D.M.

[16] Semesenko, known as one of the fiercest fighters against bolsheviks, was popular with his subordinates because of the thirteen wounds he had received in battle. A.D.M.

Proskurov and in the report by the Committee for Aid to Victims of Pogroms at the Russian Red Cross in Kiev.

The ultimate judgment of that beastly Semesenko and the trials of all others such as he are still ahead, come as they will. Then only will the circumstances and motives which saved him from the firing squad come to light.

Vinnichenko usually showed too much passion in his appraisal of Petlyura's personality. He could not forgive Petlyura for having prevented conversion of the Directory to the Soviet system. Vinnichenko's irritation with his principal political opponent definitely colors his characterization of Petlyura in this particular case.

As to himself, he begins with a vivid representation of the impotence of the Directory. Commanding officers were not supervised (Vidrozhennya Natsii, v. III, p. 144). Large numbers of the Russian Black Hundred were absorbed into the army; the Directory and government were far away in Vinnitsa; screenings on the spot were impossible. Furthermore (p. 185, ibid.), Vinnichenko offers proof to the effect that Russian officers were demoralizing the army, provoking pogroms and banditry, and inciting soldiers to "have a good time" (p. 187). Every senior officer had an automobile for himself, his family, his friends, but ministers of the government had to walk. Any officer could commandeer a car from a minister, regardless of protests and certifications (p. 239, footnote). "The powerless Council of Ministers had even less authority than the Directory" (p. 239). Indeed, Petlyura remained a member of the Directory during the entire period of its existence, as well as serving as "Chief Ataman" of the army. But what was that army anyway and who were the atamans commanding army units?

Vinnichenko recognizes "two kinds" of atamans (p. 365-366), "the turners-on of the hydrant of pogroms." One of these kinds consisted of "Russian officers, Black Hundred-minded, counter-revolutionary provocateurs, making up a sizable percentage of senior officers in the Ukrainian army." This "atamania" functioned as instigators and organizers of pogroms. It was interesting and desirable for them to discredit the Ukrainian

state . . . . Concurrently "they were stuffing their pockets with loot."

Another kind of atamania was strictly Ukrainian. "The nationalist movement was prevalent here. Sons of shopkeepers, kulaks, priests, and ordinary villagers, they were poisoned with the spirit of antisemitism from childhood. Exacerbated conflict between nationalities and the proclivity of Jewish workers to bolshevism loosened the hands of these unenlightened souls, endowed them with the imagined right, as it were, to give way to their baser emotions. Of course such people were robbing, stealing, blackmailing during pogroms, depending on opportunity and their own free will."

Having certified his own impotence and lack of authority, something I had known only too well since the insurrection in Tripol'ye and my trip to Odessa in January 1919, Vinnichenko, a member of the Directory, accused Petlyura of negligence in the face of pogroms. He reports his conversations with Petlyura, who said: "And why did Jews fail to join us when we were fighting the Hetman regime?" (p. 187). Vinnichenko forgets his own indiscretions, his reply to the Jewish Delegation in Kiev (see above).

Speaking of Petlyura, Vinnichenko qualified (p. 387): "I do not mean to say that Petlyura had any particular hatred of Jews. He was but an ordinary petty burgher with a thin veneer of the 'liberal' burgherish antisemitism, the kind who admits in principle that Jews are people too, is ready to grant 'all' rights to them, but who has had a deep-seated antipathy to that race since childhood. This antipathy was given free rein, in the soul of our 'hero' by the exacerbation of struggles between nationalities and the proclivity of the Jewish proletariat to bolshevism . . . . " Vinnichenko asserts that his personal demands for punishment of the pogromshchiks were disregarded (p. 372). His characterization of Petlyura differs radically from what I had heard repeatedly from Shul'gin, Prokopovich, Matsiyevich, Mazepa, Matyushenko and others who were close to Petlyura and knew him well.

Vinnichenko wrote his book in the honest conviction

that the Ukrainian movement came to a halt because of its "petit-bourgeois" character, in his belief that the Directory ought to have taken the soviet-Ukrainian (radyanskaya) line from the start. It was the "petit-bourgeois" who interfered and Petlyura headed that interference.

Opinions of Petlyura by Vinnichenko and by other highly respectable persons differ so radically that his final appraisal must be delayed, pending the return of normal conditions. In my view neither Vinnichenko nor Petlyura appeared in the least like antisemites. Both were indiscreet in the period of January to March 1919, however, in their snap judgments with regard to Jewish bolshevism. When the disintegration of the army began, Petlyura lost his head and had no will to act resolutely and ruthlessly against the pogromshchiks. Had he acted in this manner, he could have been rejected by a large part of the already antisemitic army, could have been killed perhaps, like the fourteen heroes slain in protecting the city of Lubny from a pogrom. Petlyura decided not to take that obvious risk, in his apparent belief in the preeminence of his national ideal. He was afraid to "embroil" himself with the army, which he deemed indispensable for defense from the bolsheviks. In Petlyura's view, bolsheviks were a double threat: social as well as national. However Vinnichenko, hailing the social-economic program of the bolsheviks and the Soviet system, saw the need of fighting bolsheviks as "moscovites," in their advance from the north. Such was the psychological difference between the two.

As head of the Directory, Vinnichenko could have done a great deal. In any case, had he found it necessary to act resolutely against the pogroms, he could have issued the appropriate proclamation. He could have given an ultimatum to Petlyura, Chief of the Army, in an order to fight the pogroms ruthlessly. He could have publicly disassociated himself from the confused inertia of the army chiefs during those first months of the pogroms. He did nothing of the sort. He resigned from the Directory in February 1919. The criteria he applied to the subsequent period are much more rigorous than those he applies to the period when he himself was in power.

Vinnichenko bitterly criticizes Petlyura's "Order of July 20, 1919," calls it "double-edged," and so on. Yet that particular order was far more effective than whatever was spoken or published in the first months of 1919. Here is its text, as printed in the official Vestnik UNR (Bulletin of the Ukrainian People's Republic), July 26:

"Chief Ataman directs all unit commanders as well as all agents of the State Inspectorate, on their personal responsibility, to prevent any kind of pogrom agitation in the dislocation areas of their units. Chief Ataman further directs broadly to inform the civilian population and the cossacks that Jews are actively helping us in the war and in structuring the independent Republic of Ukraine, that any violence will only harm us, will demoralize our ranks and result in the ruin of our cause."

Vinnichenko (ibid., p. 369, footnote) quotes also the article from Vyzvolenne ("Liberation") of July 20, by a member of the Pogroms Investigation Committee, which explains the Law of May 27 whereby a Special Investigatory Committee is created "for comprehensive investigation of persons guilty of anti-Jewish pogroms, or of malicious anti-Jewish propaganda, and for bringing them to trial in criminal courts." The author concludes: "And, if Themis was tongue-tied heretofore, she will now speak with the entire might of her awesome voice."

Vinnichenko's surmise is correct: there was no such committee prior to May 27, 1919. He forgets to mention that he too had no time to create that committee when he was head of the Directory.

To repeat: people must not be judged by a single phrase. When Pleve said that Jews were revolutionists, one could sense his massive hatred of revolution as well as of Jews. This statement was not only an explanation but also a justification of pogroms. When Denikin was advising Jewish delegations to restrain the bolshevist "Jewish youth," the same Denikin who refused publicly to recognize equality of rights of Jews, his antisemitism could be sensed definitely. But when Petlyura and Vinnichenko spoke of the participation of Jews in bolshevism, both were calling attention to the fact which was an incentive to

pogroms. Let then the guilt hang over their heads too, inasmuch as they were indiscreet in their ardor and overinvolvement in the attainment of the goal of the Ukrainian movement. They shall have to answer for that in the court of judgment of their contemporaries and in the court of history. And yet the democratic world outlook of these two people is often enlightened toward Jewry and its natural claim for complete equality with others.

But when it comes to Denikin and associates, as well as the other leaders of centralism, only black clouds of dismal reaction spread unrelentingly overhead. No light breaks through, but only torrents of disaster rush down upon the luckless Jewry.

After my years of participation in political and pogrom trials I was accustomed to be an accuser of government and its agents in the matters of pogroms and antisemitic propaganda. These accusations had to be made under very unfavorable conditions, inasmuch as the police and the entire investigatory apparatus, even the court itself, were dominated completely by the very same government with its trusted servants and obedient bailiffs everywhere. As attorneys for the defense, all our exposures in political trials made us odious in the government's eyes, the targets of persecution and revenge. In return, we developed a discipline: our accusations were made with facts in hand, not as unsubstantiated statements, and always in the presence of the government's representatives, i.e. of public procurators, and never behind the back. We were contending not with someone who was down, but with the all-powerful apparatus of the state, which held the fortunes of all the people of the vast empire in its hands and could crush us at a moment's notice.

In the summer of 1906, after six years of service as assistant attorney, I was certified and confirmed in the rank of attorney-at-law (prisyazhnyy poverennyy) by Shcheglovitov. The six-year probationary service was but a short term for a Jew in those times. Many Jewish lawyers had to remain assistants for twenty years and longer, prior to 1906 as well as later, when Shcheglovitov's short streak of liberalism came to an end. Curiously, the same Shcheg-

lovitov who had certified my full admission to the bar was striving later for my disbarment, because of my disclosures in the Yushchinskiy murder case. Ultimately he succeeded in disbarring me.

The situation is not the same now, with the former chiefs of the Ukrainian movement or those who are still members of the Ukrainian government. They can be criticized with impunity by anyone so inclined, and accused of all kinds of crimes. For that reason I found it necessary to defend them, on the basis of considerations and arguments presented in this chapter and elsewhere in the book.

I undertook this unpopular task now that I was uninvolved and retired. I was a member of the Ukrainian government for only a short time, merely as a technical assistant minister for some two to two-and-a-half months. But I had had the opportunity to see a great deal. I was opposed to the November insurrection in 1918 and was a witness of it purely by accident. I was like Zangwill's fly in his Without Prejudice, who sat on the rotating wheel, did not rotate it, but saw everything.

I shudder to think even now about the martyrdom of Jewish people, and the lot which has befallen them in recent years. Regardless of the anger that fills me at the thought of executioners and murderers of the innocent, I find it essential to abstain for the time being from dangerous generalizations and wholesale accusations of the Ukrainian people, its leaders and representatives. We shall preserve our right to demand from the other nations abstention from similar generalizations based on the atrocities of individual Jews, as commissars, to forbear from holding all Jews responsible for the guilt of but a few members.

When life becomes normal once again, when the apparatus of justice has resumed its functions, with every guarantee of the rights of all, the old and tested veterans of the war for truth will show no mercy to those whose hands are red with the blood of pogroms, to those who were direct participants or aiders and abettors of pogroms, to those who sympathized with pogroms overtly.

Only then will it be possible, arrayed with all the facts and from around the corner, to confront enemy and antagonist, thoroughly to sift and screen every detail of the pogroms, ascertain their true origin, and draw the line between the innocent and the guilty.

In his latest book Karabchevskiy tells about his advice to Kerenskiy to bring Nicholas II to trial in court, adding that he was willing and able to be attorney for the defense. Personally, I would refuse to defend Nicholas II, would decline to defend Denikin too, although I do not regard him as an organizer or an inspirer of pogroms. Nicholas Romanov and Denikin were the carriers of antisemitism, arrant reactionaries.

But I would never decline the defense of those who stood at the head of the Ukrainian movement.

CHAPTER XXVI

Russian Imperium and imperialism. Bryce. Stankevich's book

The character of young people in Russian universities was developing, as a rule, as a quest for new principles and ways to establish a future socialist state, rather than a study of already established examples of state-political organizations. As to the minority interested only in careers and personal affluence, their interests were confined to the political structures of their own country, with its table of ranks and the like.

Even the relatively mature generation, with rare exceptions, was far more interested in Karl Marx and in the theories of other apostles and harbingers of the future than, for example, in the constitution of the United States, already in operation for a whole century and a half. The best of the Russian intelligentsia had dedicated themselves to the liberation of the peasantry. They were fully aware of the peasants' economic servitude in the face of the unfairly privileged classes: landlords and nobility. But only a few of the intelligentsia gave serious thought to another injustice, the oppression of non-Russian nationalities by the dominant Russians. Yet numerically the Russian people were less than half (somewhat over 40%) of the empire's total population. Was it not indeed oppression, when these nationalities were ruled by one nation, when their languages were forced to yield to Russian, so that the Russian people and language acquired a privileged status, to the detriment of other languages and nationalities?

The "Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen," proclaimed at the end of the 18th century, the undying glory of France, had established equality of civil and human rights of individuals within the boundaries of any given state. However, equality of rights of nations remains to be

implemented. The Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, the great declaration of the 20th century, remained to be assimilated even by the most civilized and best educated of our contemporaries. Milyukov, for example, wanted Russia to take Constantinople, a city totally alien to Russia by both population and language, away from Turkey, yet did not want to give Finland to the Finns. Rodichev found the secession of Czechoslovakia from German Austria entirely natural, but could not even imagine the secession of Estonia and Gruzia from Russia, not to speak of Ukraine, its slavic kin. . . .

And yet the entire past history does not at all justify the tutelage of Russia over the rest of its empire. Stankevich, the author of Destinies of Nationalities in Russia, a recently published book, says there were more schools per capita in Poland in 1828 than in 1900. Literacy in one's native tongue is the easiest to acquire, as we know. This accounts for the breakdown of the literacy data, by provinces, as reported by Stankevich. Wherever the population could establish illegal private schools, with all teaching in the local language, the percentage of literacy was high. Conversely, wherever only state schools were enough for the population, literacy was low indeed.

Literacy flourished in the Baltic lands, of course, under the influence of the civilized West, their next-door neighbor. But in Ukraine the people stagnated in ignorance, because publication of books in Ukrainian, even the Gospels, was forbidden . . . . As late as 1863, Valuyev, Miniter of the Interior, declared that "there was not, there is not, and there cannot exist any Malorussian (Ukrainian) language as such." In the meantime the Imperial Academy of Sciences admitted that Ukrainian literature was far more advanced than the literatures of many other Slavic peoples.

The long coexistence of Russian and Ukrainian, notwithstanding all prohibitions, "intensified the original dialectical differences between the languages spoken by their forefathers at the dawn of our history," attests the Committee of the following members of the Academy: Zelinskiy, Korsh, Lappo-Danilevskiy, Oldenburg, Faminit-

sin, Fortunatov, and Shakhmatov. They deny the existence of any pan-Russian language.

The former rulers of Russia failed to understand that the edifice of state may endure only on a firm foundation. Instead of deriving the strength of the empire from its roots, from the inner depths of its multitude of nationalities, they were trying systematically to reduce to the same official common denominator the entire polymorphism of historical-cultural life of the nationalities.

Even now the Russian intelligentsia remains unaware of the need not merely to proclaim but actually to implement the equality of rights of Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and soon, with regard to culture, language, and state-political organization. When a Russian intellectual speaks of the advantages of the Russian language, its wealth, and the high level of development already attained, he brings to mind a landlord discussing the advantages and profits of a great farm as compared with a small one . . . . Both are right, in a way. Be it a language or a form of land use, either one may attain the degree of development commensurate with the degree of propitiousness of the environment in which that attainment occurred.

In Denmark small farms yield more profit per unit area than large ones. The Hungarian and Czech languages have attained high levels of development. Serbs and Bulgarians have developed scientific and juridical terminologies in their own languages.

Bryce, in his American Republic,[17] tells of a case in the Protestant Episcopal church, by way of example of the understanding of "equal rights for all," in the United States: "The American Protestant Episcopal Church, at its congress several years ago, was considering revision of the liturgy. It was thought desirable to add a prayer for 'all the people' to the already established supplications. A well-known theologian proposed the following formula:

"O Lord, bless our nation.

[17] I quote the French edition, 1911, Vol. I, p. 34. A.D.M.

"This formula was offered impulsively at the post-prandial session, but was reconsidered on the following day. The word 'nation' was protested by many members of the congress, as an altogether too emphatic expression of oneness, to the point that the original formula was rejected and replaced by

"O Lord, bless the United States."

Bryce is correct in saying that the United States is the republic of republics, a body politic which is a kind of whole and yet but a combination of discrete states more essential for the existence of the whole, than the whole body is essential to its own constituent parts.

Such is the true meaning of the term "federation." Federation as a concept is by no means the opposite of autonomy; it is but a form of voluntary union of autonomous states motivated by their common interests, as I pointed out in 1917 in the article published by Narodnoye Slovo ("Word of the People"), the organ of the Laborite-People's Socialist party. Conversely, autonomy is the substance, contents, core, the sum-total of rights of the population, which are guaranteed to the inhabitants of the given canton or state. In British usage "autonomy" implies even full independence of a body politic; this is entirely correct also, in relation to a genuine federation whose constituent members are entitled to enter agreements with each other, as equals with equals. The utterly confused and erroneous understanding of "autonomy" and "federation" by Russian political parties was always astonishing to me.

For reasons unknown, "autonomy" was popularly regarded as a lesser thing than "federation," by way of juxtaposition. But the concept of autonomy is not something semantically petrified and exact, for it varies in substance and scope; autonomy may be "threadbare" or all-embracing. The reason for that muddled thinking and conceptual mess, for the opposition of autonomy to federation, is the desire of the Russian intelligentsia, including its most aware and enlightened members, in relation to the problem of nationalities, to grant autonomy to the nationalities, as if it were a gift, provided it could be a "threadbare" or an "autonomiette," in the apt Moscoviam

words of Chelnokov. Such an autonomiette would be very much weaker, of course, than the independence of states in genuine federations wherein the population of every state bargains for its own rights.

Once, in Paris, by way of testing the sincerity of the federalist mood of my Russian collocutors who deemed themselves federalists, I said to one of them that we ought to begin by changing the name of Russia into the "United States of Eastern Europe." He was touched to the quick, felt himself insulted by the mere possibility of such an idea, although he was one of the brightest and most talented Russian intellectuals. Our conversation took place in the summer of 1919, after the disintegration of the Russian state, when he was quite willing to admit sincerely that federation should be the basis of the future reconstruction of Russia.

Among the many things spoken and written recently by Russian intelligentsia on the nationalities problem, in relation to federalism, I found only one book where these subjects were treated intelligently and in depth, with insight and clarity. I refer to Destinies of the Peoples of Russia, the latest of Stankevich's books. The past history and modern characteristic features of Belorussia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Transcaucasia, Finland and Poland are presented concisely and brilliantly. Each of these countries and populations has a chapter of its own. Stankevich himself, steeped in the culture of Russia, treats his subjects with uncommon warmth, sympathy, and understanding. His discussion of the languages, beliefs and customs of these nationalities sounds like a hymn to equality of all nations. He envisions a reconstructed federated state, as large as the fallen Russia, but powerful in its inner strength, pointing out correctly that a comprehensive new treaty between the nationalities is the only possible start for the attainment of the ideal. "The problem is the reduction of polymorphism to unity and not a development of variety from unity . . . .

Russia may be built only from the bottom up. (p. 347). It is not the independence of small peoples but the Russian nationalism, the levelling steamroller, that has now be-

come the destructive idea (ibid.). How is it that small Finland is not demanding Petersburg from Russia for its own security, whereas vast Russia is demanding the whole of Finland to protect itself from Finland? (p. 348). It would be a rather original theory to maintain that a good seaport, situated in some people's territory, predestines that people to servitude and is of no advantage to them accordingly" (p. 350). Stankevich reminds us that centralism was responsible for the collapse of Russia. He appeals to the justice of history, to the mutually beneficial unification of peoples who had already proclaimed themselves independent. In his view, it is they and only they, the people of the former state of Russia, who can create a federation by mutual agreement. "The best and indeed the only guarantee for them against Russia is to build Russia by themselves," he says (p. 370). "A total liberation of the peoples, even their state-political isolation from each other, for the time being, would be far more in line with the spirit of the times than some other enslavement (p. 354).

This noble federalism of Stankevich is not at all based on military considerations. Stankevich is an enemy of war, since he was in a war himself not so long ago. He appeals for general disarmament. His premises are economic and cultural, and he indicates correctly that "the world is evolving towards broadly inclusive groupings" (p. 365).

It will take a long time for all these wholesome and correct ideas to penetrate even the thin veneer of the intelligentsia which has survived the crushing defeat, the ruin, the afflictions which were the lot of Russian intellectuals. Nationalities who have only just arisen from their slumber and are not in quest of their national and political self-determination will take a long time to develop a clear understanding of national-political interrelations. For example, I have met Ukrainian chauvinists who simply could not imagine the need for federalization of Ukraine itself, because of its large size and population (40 million). Like Russian centralists, they wanted Ukraine to be one single, monolithic, centralist nation.

They were not at all convinced by the example of Switzerland, a rigorously built confederacy. Some of these

chauvinists (very few indeed, rarest exceptions) dreamed of expanding Ukraine to the Caspian Sea, even to Turkey and Constantinople and the notorious Straits, as the future colonies of Ukraine . . . . This was the bad legacy of Russian imperialism, the influence under which these persons grew up.

The legend of Moses comes now to mind, as he led the Jews out of Egypt, to roam in the desert for forty years before they could enter the Promised Land . . . . The forty years was essential in order to shed the old generation, steeped in Egyptian servitude to the marrow of its bones. A slave acquires inevitably his master's customs, habits, and attitudes. He may hate his master, but he imitates him just the same.

Can it be that we too may need forty years for our recovery or for liquidation of the slaveowner and slave psychology of old Russia? One may wish and hope for a much shorter time, in the peaceful coexistence of the liberated peoples.

There is yet another people, not destined to partake of the benefits of its territorial-national autonomy within the confines of the former state of Russia, who had to endure the worst torments and afflictions after the fall of Russia and enthronement of anarchy. This people is a national minority everywhere, homeless in every state, tolerated at best, but often not at all; these are the wanderers, the people of the Bible, the Jews, who gave so much to mankind in world culture, sciences, arts, and in the development of the ideas of freedom and humanism.

CHAPTER XXVII

Destinies and immediate problems of Jewry in Eastern Europe

Anyone who has read "Torture by Fear," an article by V. Shul'gin, must admit that it expresses the acme of hate and bigoted fury directed at all Jews. The same hatred of Jewry exuded from the orders and correspondence of higher officers of Denikin's army.

But whom do they love, these people, aside from themselves? What nation are they defending? On whose altars are they sacrificing the Jews?

I am not speaking of the Zamyslovskiys, the kind of people who are antisemites by cool calculation, not emotion. Zamyslovskiy, Chaplinskiy and Boldyrev made their careers by climbing over Beilis and the Jews. This does not apply to Shul'gin and his type.

To repeat: whom does Shul'gin love?

His paper, set for publication in the Kievlyanian, was circulated as a manuscript in Kiev in the spring of 1918, but was taken off the list and never published. In that paper Shul'gin proves, with his customary talent, that the Russian peasantry constitutes one massive thief, that the Russian gentry is a totally slothful, worthless class, that the Russian intelligentsia consists of flabby, nihilist troublemakers. This indictment of the entire indigenous population of Russia was just as skillfully composed, just as full of the cruelty and malice of a ruthless procurator as are Shul'gin's writings about Jews. What then is the reason why Shul'gin is so ardent in his defense of the indivisibility of Russia, what are the values so precious to him in the cast, in the substance of Russia as such?

In remembering the bright eras of his public life, his letters in the Beilis case, his one or two inspired, honest speeches in the Duma, his personal role in pressing the

abdication of Nicholas II, it becomes difficutl to avoid the conclusion that Shul'gin is not only neurotic but also is an outstanding partisan of semi-enlightened absolutism, a mixture of principles of the indigenous Russian serf-ownership and of a certain honor code of the ruling estate. Like Pikhno, now deceased, Shul'gin hated Jewry and was ready and willing to persecute Jews. But the authority of those on top is dear to him; rulers and judges must be unblemished knights. As to the people, they are the rabble, reigned over by the knights. A reconstituted great Russia is needed for that elite of the noble knights, as Shul'gin sees it. He lives with the ghosts of the feudal regime. In those feudal structures Jewry's assigned place was quite narrow and definite: shopkeepers and middlemen, a base estate, useful withal and tolerated accordingly.

Jewry cannot go along with Shul'gin and his ilk. A triumph of centralist principles and restoration of monolithic Russia would accord neither peace nor salvation to Jewry. Neither Rodichevs nor Grigorovich-Barskiys can stand by and protect Jewry from the Zamyslovskiys and Savenkos, the species not yet extinct but actually teeming.

There are only two ways to salvation. Some Jews, whoever are willing and able, will migrate from Eastern Europe to America. Some will be inbibed by Palestine. But those who stay in Ukraine, Poland, Russia must emerge from their habitual state of passivity, "participate in rebirth and restructuring of life, arising now from chaos, springing up from under the heavy load of servitude, creating new modes of living and new realities," in N.S. Syrkin's words (Jewish Life, 1918, No. 17). In the same issue of the Newspaper Syrkin remarks correctly that "national self-determination . . . is absolutely impossible, as a fact, without a thorough and systematically implemented autonomy." He appeals to all national-democratic circles of Jewry to "abandon their anemic benevolent neutralism and extend their full-blooded active support" to the Ukrainian movement.

Syrkin did not know and could not foresee at that time

the long duration of chaos and anarchy, the new servitude under the bolshevist regime. He died in blissful ignorance, lucky indeed not to see the forthcoming horrors of anarchy and pogroms. Syrkin's ideas will prove to be modern ones when chaos is ended and reconstruction begun. The "fullblooded participation of Jewry" in the creative structuring of life by its host nations will entitle Jews to regard themselves as partners in the new state, like the indigenous majority, rather than aliens or guests.

Team work in building a new life is contingent upon closer intercommunication of the builders . . . . The Zionist organization to which Syrkin belonged, alongside all other Jewish political parties, must realize that past and current errors must not be allowed to recur, that they must not shut themselves up in their national party shell, isolated from activities of the statewide parties, whether Ukrainian, Lithuanian, or even Russian, in due time, if at all. Let them forget the sanction of Zionist tactics by the Jewish population in Russia and Ukraine, i.e. forget the majority vote for the Zionist slate in the general as well as in the Jewish elections. The majority of peasants voted for the Social-Revolutionists' program and tactics. But is it not evident that such returns were only a tribute to the revolutionary times, the outcome of the ecstatic spirits of the masses, of adventitious, short-lived maximalism?

The whirlwind of nationalist maximalism captured the Jewish masses in exactly the same way. They brushed off and practically forgot the very fact that strictly Jewish problems were not the only ones on the agenda, for there were statewide problems too, which were important for all nationalities, indeed for the entire population.

Appropriation of land without compensation to landlords, or the guarantee of personal-national autonomy are not the only things that count in the state-political life of nations . . . . Taxation, railways, bridges, aqueducts (in one's own city), and a multitude of other vital subjects are equally important to Jew and gentile. They demand common political activities of every one of the statewide territorial parties.

Personal-national autonomy, be it ever so comprehen-

sive, will never replace what Jewry really needs, a state of its own. Germans, Italians, others live not only in their own countries. They live also in other states, e.g. in America, to which they came as immigrants, and where they have become citizens, with full rights. The future of Jewry must be worked out accordingly, in two different ways: a) development of its own lawful refuge in some sparsely populated country, in Palestine or elsewhere, by becoming gradually the majority of its population, or b) as a minority, with acculturation to all the civic duties and rights of the host states of the diaspora. One has to accept life as it is, rather than try impertinently to drag it along behind oneself. One has to be cured of megalomania, from the belief that truth is vested only in one's own particular, tenacious group. Jewish people, like everyone else, cannot be tied to any single view of any subject. Not every Jew is going to emigrate to America or Palestine, regardless of what he endured in Ukraine and Poland. In my personal view, every Jew who emigrates to the United States is lucky indeed, for he comes to the country which is nearly a century ahead of Eastern Europe in its levels of culture and civic life. I can envy sincerely the Jews who are paving roads under the burning sun of Palestine. No question, it is better to die under an Arab's knife in one's ancestral land than become a victim of a pogrom in Ukraine or Poland. Nonetheless not everyone can leave the home of many years. The majority simply cannot go, but there are others too who have no desire to do so . . . .

Maximalism of the orgy of revolutions will be followed by humdrum days of peaceful, slow construction, with day after day of prosaic work. The natural laws of gravitation whereby minority is drawn to majority, as by a magnet, will overcome all the newest contrivances in the national-personal autonomy which have taken the place of religion with the modern Jewish youth of Eastern Europe. "The actual" deals heavy blows to "the proper" in everyday life. In the 1860's they talked a great deal, in Yiddish, about the need for assimilation and of learning the Russian language. In the last fifteen years, at Jewish meetings in large cities (Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa) Jews talked much, always

in Russian, about the need for their national rebirth and of learning Yiddish . . . . So did "the actual" digress from "the proper." Whether the uptake of customs, habits and ideas of the majority by the minority was voluntary or forced is irrelevant. In the 1860's Jewish youth was absorbing greedily the fluid of assimilation, albeit by spoonfuls. Later on, when Jewish youth was on the path to national rebirth, under new and resounding slogans, it was imbibing assimilation by the bucketful, oblivious of its original aims.

National rebirth is truly realizable only in the nation's own country. Jewry is in need of its own independent action and of leaders too, who can transform the emigrant host into citizens of the Jewish state to come. Jewry must discover also the best and shortest ways to peaceful coexistence with other peoples in the lands of the disaspora. The urgency of the latter objective is not in the least obscured by the glamor, glory and heroism which the rebirth entails. Zhabotinsky, jailed by the British for having organized Jewish self-defense against pogroms in Jerusalem, and the Jews who were sent to Siberia for their part in the All-russian Liberation movement, were protagonists of the same cause.

In my view of the political life of Jewry in Eastern Europe, the following constitutes the agenda of the day:

The "Bund," as a matter of top priority, must ponder the reasons for continuing as a tight and exclusive body as well as the timeliness of its merger with the countrywide social-democratic parties in every state. Times have changed and there is not much sense now in talking about the pioneer character of socialist propaganda among the Jewish proletariat or about conducting it only in Yiddish, because the first steps are so difficult. The Jewish proletariat today is steeped in socialism fully as much as any other, and the obverse of the medal shows plainly, thanks to the lessons of bolshevism and the interpretation of socialism by the Soviet leaders and satraps.

The Unifiers (Ob'yedinentsy) party, still hanging onto the sejm and personal-national autonomy as the hits of their program, should realize by this time that they have

had enough propaganda already, not only among Jews but also among the others, including even certain governments (Ukrainian, Lithuanian) and political parties. The quondam Zionist-Socialists and such as they ought to remind themselves about "the territory", the issue which they have pushed so far into the background.

As "sejmists" and territorialists they can cooperate with the multitude of Jewish circles who endorse the sejm and the territory as parts of their program. As socialists they may no longer treat the land problem as "controversial" and may join the statewide socialist parties, whichever one suits them best.

When it comes to the Volkspartei, with whom I was negotiating in 1918 in Kiev, regarding their merger with opposite numbers among the statewide parties,[18] without any tangible results, the importance of that action was fully appreciated even then by several persons in the party's rank and file. Some of my collocutors were very much in favor of the eventual merger, provided national fractions or curiae could be established within the statewide parties and each one of the fractions represented in the party's Central Committee.

The Zionist organization in Eastern Europe should be structured outwardly just as it is in Western Europe and America. The time has come for the return to the pre-Helsinki era, to cease pretending that the organization is a party. This would implement the ideas of Syrkin on the participation of Jews in statewide constructive work. Every Zionist would then have the opportunity to work for the country of his citizenship[19] as well as for the good of Jewry.

On the other hand there is a recognizable need for creation of comprehensively large national Jewish organizations. There was a time when the "union for attainment of equal rights for Jews" had to be organized urgently, but

[18] Such a merger was regarded sympathetically by leaders of the Ukrainian Social-Federalist party at that time.—ADM.

[19] In Russia the Zionist party statutes required permission from the Central Committee for every Zionist desirous of joining some other party. Certain Zionists were also members of the KD, NS, or SR.

now, after the Peace of Versailles, when the rights of Jews are assured by international treaties, the need is for a "union for implementation of equal rights for Jews." All classes of Jewry, regardless of their political affiliations, would then have a chance for intercommunication in unions and organizations of the type. The fullest and broadest solutions of cardinal problems would be worked out within the radically restructured national and political-public life of Jewry, the problems of emigration, Jewish schools, language of the curriculum and others.

As to the substance of that "national equal rights" item, a provision in the institution of the personal-national autonomy, the subject and certain theses of the institution itself must be thoroughly and thoughtfully reexamined. For example, there is a serious contradiction between the demand for the percentage appropriation from the state's budget for Jewish schools and other educational purposes, and the simultaneous request of the right of compulsory self-taxation (of the Jewish community). It should be borne in mind that the state treasury, in financing the education of Jews with appropriations based upon the percentage of the Jewish population of the country, was simply returning to Jewry the school taxes they had already paid, as part of the total national tax. Therefore we are dealing here with a double taxation for one and the same purpose. Will the taxpayers agree to that?

Aside from this example there are many other problems in the national-personal autonomy, but I am refraining from discussing them, because of their highly specialized character.

Finally, there must be a major and radical shift in the very psychology of Jewry, in the field of its interrelations. There has to be an attack upon mutual intolerance of parties, groups and persons which corrodes, disunites and hamstrings Jewry in Eastern Europe. Let Vinaver, Sliozberg and Pasmannik himself, the Zionist, contend with the separatism of the "borderlands of Russia." One has to respect the opinions of others, not only his own. Let the Jews who believe in the restoration of a monolithic Russia, who are striving for that goal, merge their efforts with the

work of the best elements so engaged, of the Constitutional Democrats, Russian Social-Revolutionists and others. But those who think differently, believe differently have the right to demand the same calm and objective treatment from the others. It would be a great disaster, were all Jews thinking and feeling alike. They would become only a party, no longer a nation.

Jewry can be held together only by mutual tolerance, the only cement. Jews have enough problems of their own, common enough to unite protagonists of monolithic Russia, federalists, separatists. Even as Ukrainians or Gruzians, for example, do not break up or disintegrate as a nation, when Zionism, territoralism or Jewish sejm are the divisive issues, so must alienation and disruptions be avoided by Jewry simply because its constituent members feel differently about the new map of Europe.

The high feeling of mutual tolerance, unity in its own milieu, alongside close contacts with the peoples among whom Jewry lives—these are the slogans that must become universally adopted by all Jews. The voice of my appeal is lonely now, but the time will come when it will resound in the soul of every Jew. I believe firmly that this time is not too far away, that the hour of its advent is at hand.

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