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WILL THERE BE A REVOLUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION ?

Data gathered from Original Documents of the National
Underground Movement in Ukraine.

Українська-Делегація
в ЦК АБН

INTRODUCTION

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Introduction

by

JOHN F. STEWART

The present booklet is, to my mind, the most important yet published on the policy and planning to be adopted by the West towards Moscow. These booklets are not the work of the present writer, who only edits them, but the production of men who know the Russians as the West can never know, and who are statesmen in the best sense of the word. Why does the West not listen to them? After both the First and Second World Wars, the West made appalling blunders in their treatment of the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R., and, indeed, they have made nothing but appalling blunders in their Russian and East and Central European policy without a redeeming feature ever since 1939. As will be shown, Hitler made the same mistake and it unquestionably lost him the war; if he had followed the advice of the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, and of high German Army officers, there cannot be a doubt that he would have won the war. If the Germans are given the same opportunity again it is safe to say they will not make the same mistake. If the West now again makes the same mistake the West will lose the coming war with Russia, with all that means—at least the destruction of all human rights and of civilisation as we know it.

I have seen a good bit of Soviet Russia myself, away from the usual track; for I was not a tourist, but on business. But I got even a better idea of the Russians from repeated visits on business to the countries on Russia's western frontiers right up to the war. I had innumerable friends among all classes, and was able to assimilate from them the attitude of men who knew Russia and Russians.

I have long held the belief that, as long as any kind of Russians have sufficient power, no matter what their label (Russians are all the same), war will not cease, nor will ourselves, our children and our children's children be free from the terror and the destruction of all they hold dear. Read Russia's history for hundreds of years and you will find they have never deviated from their policy of world conquest.

After the most criminal folly we are now frantically trying to form defences against an attack on the rest of the civilised world by a savage Russia. We are playing with the matter; I do not believe in the efficacy of the atom bomb, which may well be a boomerang, I do not believe in the efficacy of the plans for Western defence; I do not even subscribe to the idea that all will now be well since General Eisenhower has arrived. All will come to naught without the help of the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R.

From all I have learned, the German army were welcomed by the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe and of Russia itself as Liberators, and thousands flocked to their help. It was only when the Germans sent prisoners of war to the camps in Germany and reports came back of their brutal treatment, and the same treatment began to be meted out to the peoples in their own countries that feeling changed, that the non-Russian peoples became enemies of the Germans, and that the Russians fought fanatically in defence of Stalingrad and Moscow.

Count von Schulenburg produced much the same plan for the future of the nationalities comprising the U.S.S.R. that these nationalities are now fighting for, and he was supported by both the German Army and the ineffable Rosenberg. Had he accepted it instead of throwing von Schulenburg into a concentration camp, my own opinion is that he would have been master of Europe, and, consequently, of the globe.

Whatever else may be said, there is no question that the Western Allies have lent themselves, at every step, to the aggrandisement of Russia and the weakening of their own cause. One of the results is Korea, where it was apparent from the first that, when the time came, Stalin would mobilise the Chinese, who could sweep the Americans into the sea.

We reiterate unceasingly that the military preparations in the West are only for "defence," thus leaving the initiative all the time to Stalin, who is making good use of it. The ineptitude and the refusal to face realities of the West have presented Stalin with bases ranging over thousands of miles, from any of which he can attack either directly or, as in Korea, vicariously. How long is the farce to be kept up that we, or rather, the United Nations, are not fighting Russia?

In this booklet will be found the views of competent military experts, German, American and East European.

They all point to the necessity of obtaining the co-operation of the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R. if the West is not to be overcome.

It should be remembered, however, that no help need be expected from the Russians, even those who hate the regime, if the non-Russian peoples are to be freed. Roughly, the Russians may be divided into two classes, those of the old way of thinking, that all evil (even the oppression of Bolshevism) is sent by God as a punishment for sin and must not be resisted, and those of the young generation who have been indoctrinated with Bolshevism and hatred of everybody but themselves; these last are quite contented to see the extension of Russian power, and they are far more dangerous than the young Nazis ever were—I have seen examples of both in their own surroundings.

There is a group of Russian exiles who want nothing but the restoration, with themselves in Stalin's seat, of the Russian Empire. In the event of war and the defeat of Moscow, the restoration of the Russian undivided Empire would mean that, instead of the Bolsheviks being looked on as the oppressors, it would be the West who would then be responsible for a prolonged and bloody civil war.

I have the honour of being in the complete confidence of all the leaders of the Underground Movements. Although I have no authority for saying so, I am convinced that the West is not trusted, and that an effort will be needed to regain the trust of these peoples, and that effort must be made *now*, before war begins, and not a year or two afterwards. If the West do not consider and provide for the rights of these peoples, then neither will these peoples consider the necessities of the West when the latter face defeat. But I am convinced what they will do is—fight for their own hand and take advantage of the embarrassments of either opponent to gain their own ends and their own freedom, and I think that, in the exhaustion of both major opponents, there will be no one to prevent them.

There is thus an embryo Third Power in existence; is it to be for us or against us?—for even being neutral would mean our defeat.

If those we have put in power still stubbornly refuse to recognise this, is it not possible to reach the ordinary public, whose sons and daughters will be the sufferers?

Will there be a Revolution in the Soviet Union?

*Data gathered from Original Documents of the National Underground
Movement in Ukraine.*

Russians Preparing a Two-Front War

THESE are innumerable signs that the Russians are preparing for a decisive struggle against the "capitalistic" world, a struggle which their hero and prophet Lenin predicted long ago. To-day we can only discuss whether they are in the final stages of their preparations, or whether they need more time still. In this war, which they are preparing with feverish fanaticism and which, for them, according to Lenin and Stalin, is inevitable, the capitalistic world is to be utterly defeated and the whole of mankind gathered into a world-wide Russian imperium.

And, while the West sets all its hopes on its technical superiority, when such statesmen as Winston Churchill praise the atom bomb as alone the decisive weapon—the Russians have other views of the coming clash. Their tactics are at first to disintegrate their enemy with ideas with their communistic ideology and materialistic view of life, and then only to put the armies out of action by technical means. The Russians are staking everything to prepare the ground for a two-front strategy. They want this second front to be right amongst these nations which they count as their enemies, and the members of these nations are themselves to be trained as soldiers to fight for them. They want others to get the chestnuts out of the fire for them.

In every country the Russians find out their sympathisers, organise them and grant them all the material, political and moral assistance they need, thus forming them into a powerful second front in the ranks of the enemy.

The energy and material means which the Russians have expended in this action have, up to now, been richly rewarded. What they have achieved through fellow-travellers has no equal in modern history. The seizure of power in the European satellite states by their Communist elements, the seizure of power in China, war in Korea, are by no means all the successes that Moscow has gained by its far-sighted policy of two-front strategy.

In other European, American, Asiatic and African countries there are millions of trained adherents of World Communism whose leaders declare openly to-day that they will never fight against Russian armies. These millions are ready to form a front in the rear of their national defence forces and to further the victory of the Communist army in all kinds of ways. It must be specially stressed that these forces are strengthened and encouraged by the fact that Russia never attempts to conceal her solidarity with them and promises them all possible help in case of war. Such far-sighted policy by the Politburo forms a world-wide Communist organisation of mutual confidence whose members are faithful unto death and promote Russian interests wherever they happen to be. The smallest Communist cell in the most insignificant country feels strong, knowing that it represents a tiny part in a great army of Communist fighters and that behind this organisation there is a mighty, fanatical Communist power.

This feeling of being a particle in the mighty whole gives Communists everywhere the courage to stand unshaken at some out-of-the-way post and to come forward with the aggressiveness the world has witnessed more than once.

What has the West to put in the Field against Russian Aggression?

It would be wrong to say that the West has not recognised the strategy of this two-front war. An authority in military matters like General Dwight Eisenhower writes convincingly in his book, *Crusade in Europe*, of the second front put up by the French for the Allied Armies.

"During the campaign the free French did us inestimable service everywhere in France. They were especially active in Brittany, but we secured their help, which was of manifold nature, in every sector of the front. If it had not been for them, the defeat of the enemy in western Europe would have been much slower and the casualties much greater. When the forces of the free French even rose in the town (Paris) it became necessary to do something at once for their assistance. Information seemed to imply that there would be no great battle and it was supposed that the town could be freed with two divisions.

"General Bradley gave the second French Division, under General Le Clerc, the honour of marching first into the town. The old guard of this group had been set up three years before at Lake Tchad, and, after an incredible march through the desert, had joined the 8th Army in order to take part in the last phase of the African campaign. And now, on 25th August 1944, their

commander received the surrender from the German general who had commanded the occupation forces in Paris."

Partisans

The "Allies" realised the tremendous importance of this two-front strategy in Yugoslavia and other European countries too, during World War II. But it was only in Korea that they encountered the strength of partisans as enemies. Tens of thousands of Communist-infected Koreans fought in their rear, causing many a retreat and deciding many a battle. They are gathering similar experiences in Indo-China and the Philippines.

A German military expert who studied the problems of partisan warfare in Eastern Europe during the second World War writes in a Munich weekly, *Echo der Woche*, 18:8:50:—

"The partisan war in its modern form is one of the "new weapons" which were tried for the first time in the last war, just like the V-rockets, jet-fighters, etc. The rule that the weapons tried out in one war gain operative importance in the next seems applicable here too. There can hardly be a doubt but that partisans, more especially in combination with air-borne operations on a grand scale, can be of operational and even of decisive importance.

To estimate these possibilities the facts must be clearly understood. First of all, the old idea of wild groups of "bandits" carrying on a small romantic war at their own sweet will, must be got rid of. That was no longer possible in the last war, or it perished very soon. Against such a ruthless adversary as the Soviet, it is entirely senseless. In general, we may speak of two kinds of partisan warfare, which we will call (1) the tactical, (2) the operational. The boundaries between the two are sometimes hard to define. There are transitions and developments from one sort to the other. The division in itself, however, is correct and necessary in order to get a clear idea. Both kinds were in evidence in the last war.

Partisan warfare is preferably waged by small groups of indigenous resistance fighters, who, backed by the population, carry out acts of sabotage and, above all, espionage, attack unaccompanied vehicles and unguarded billets of the invaders, assassinate important persons in the army or administration. But they, too, require leadership and the support of an outside power, especially the supply of munitions and arms from the air. They need, besides, wireless connection in order to direct these supplies and to transmit information.

Under favourable circumstances, when the battle front is near, and when airborne troops are dropped, they can form the basis for an active partisan war.

Operational partisan war—which alone can be included in strategical planning—is carried on by strong, half-regular troops up to division strength. The Soviet partisan brigades might serve as a model. In their formation and tactics they may be called a new kind of cavalry brigade."

Having described the fight of the Polish and the Ukrainian Revolutionary Armies of the U.P.A. as models for guerilla warfare during World War II, the German author goes on in the same article. "The effective use of large partisan units was first systematically developed by the Red Army. That was no accident. Vast regions in European as well as in Asiatic Russia have always offered ideal conditions for a partisan war on a grand scale; great pathless areas with, little or no means of communication, having a widely scattered rural population, showing moreover, in border countries, national and religious differences and cross-currents. In Ukraine, in the Baltic States and some parts of Siberia, the first world war was continued for years in partisan fighting which went on right into 1920, during which the fate of the October Revolution, even the unity of the Russian Empire often hung on a silken thread. Details of this struggle can be found in Trotski's Memoirs. These were partisan fights of Reds versus Whites, and against the "minorities" trying to shake off Moscow's yoke. Not only their experiences in defending the Bolshevik revolution, but also the programme of the World Revolution, caused the Soviet dictators at an early date to consider the possibilities of partisans who could operate in the enemy's rear and even incite revolutionary movement in collaboration with Communist groups."

An American Opinion

The eminent American military expert, Wallace Carroll, an expert in psychological warfare, journalist and head of the Office of War Information Activities in Europe; author of "Persuade or Perish," and former adviser in the National Defence and State Departments in questions of a psychological war, in an article in *Life*, which has become famous (December 19, 1949), "It takes a Russian to beat a Russian," says: "There is an unwritten chapter in the history of the last war which we must learn without delay. We know how the Russians stopped the Germans at Stalingrad. But how were the Germans able to reach Stalingrad in the first place? How did they push forward a thousand miles against the might and manpower of Russia?"

To these questions the German military archives give the answer: the Germans had millions of eager accomplices in Russia.

This fact has been known for a long time to the Russian experts of the State Department, and to a small number of

American officers. To-day, a wider circle in the armed forces is becoming aware of it, and of the psychological blunders which cost the Germans the support of innumerable Russians. (The author, who is otherwise well informed in the national problems of the U.S.S.R., erroneously calls the whole population "Russians." This is by no means the case. The oppressed peoples cannot be called "Russians"). This awareness may give a new impetus to American military thinking and planning. It may, in fact, awaken those U.S. strategists who have been obsessed with the atomic bomb. For the lesson of German experience in Russia is simply this; that the decisive element in war against the Soviet regime can be the Soviet people. Or, to put it still more simply, the lesson is that it takes a Russian (here the name is again used in a collective sense) to beat a Russian. To read this lesson is easier than to apply it intelligently to our own policies. In the tragic event of a third world war the U.S. has the power to drop the atomic bomb on Soviet territory and kill or maim millions of Russians. But can we hope to do something much more difficult—arouse those millions and propel them at the decisive moment against Stalin's regime?

We know now that we can forge an instrument to serve this purpose—an instrument which, unlike the bomb, the Soviets could never copy and use against us. To create this instrument the U.S. must act with great speed, some daring and a minimum of deference to conventional military thought. In a war against Stalin or his successors, this instrument might well succeed where the products of atomic fission would fail. To give this instrument a realistic name in our arsenal it might therefore be called "psychological fission."

Psychological fission goes far beyond what we have known as psychological warfare, for it combines all of the arms of war. It entails the concerted use of our military, political and propaganda skills to unleash all those disruptive forces whose menacing existence within the Soviet Union was uncovered by the German invasion. (For those who have not read the whole article it must be mentioned that the author, when he speaks of German allies, does not mean elements imbued with Nazi ideology, but the national forces wishing to make use of the German-Russian war in their fight for independence.)

The views quoted show that the importance has been realised of collecting those forces filled with a singleness of purpose, into fighting units in the enemy's hinterland. The boldest and most far-sighted conclusions drawn from the realisation of the facts, as far as our knowledge goes, are those of two Americans; Professor Burnham in "The Coming Defeat of Communism," and

Wallace Carroll, who, in the article above-mentioned, gives the following advice to the American government:—

(1) We must have an air force ready to deliver to any part of the Soviet Union any message which the American Government may choose to send to the Soviet people. We must have an air force which will be ready at the very start of a war—and not two years later—to plaster the Soviet Union with leaflets bearing the pledges and promises of the American Government and people. We must have an air force which will be able to deliver not only atomic bombs but anti-Soviet agents and guerilla leaders to any Soviet hamlet.

(2) We must be prepared at the very start, if war should come, to answer the prayers of the peasant millions—a slogan as simple as "Land for the Peasants"—which will set the steppes aflame.

(3) We must have clear in our minds at the very start, and not after months of bungling, a way to meet the conflicting aspirations of the Great Russians and the minorities. (The author, unfortunately, gives no suggestions in this matter.) Our proposals should be flexible, yet sufficiently concrete to carry evidence of our sincerity.

(4) We must have a psychological warfare programme designed to sap the strength of the Red Army in Central Europe or wherever our troops may meet it. We must be ready to win over the privates and the Vlassovs. We must convince our military leaders that when they think of the Red Army they must not merely count noses but also probe the flaws in its morale—the flaws which the Germans uncovered in 1941. We must earmark men now with the skill to exploit the psychological weaknesses of the Soviet soldier and make him worse than useless to the regime.

(5) We must prepare to support guerilla warfare on such a scale as the world has never seen before. We must develop weapons such as guerillas have never used before. We must train men to think guerilla warfare and to plan guerilla warfare.

(6) We must set up a joint staff of civilian and military leaders to devise the plans and techniques which will enable this nation—should the need arise—to bring to bear upon the Soviet Union all of the power of psychological fission.

To all this, air supremacy is basic. If war should come, our air force would be the one sure means of communication between the Soviet peoples and ourselves. The way in which we used that air force would therefore determine, to a great extent, whether the Soviet millions would become our allies or Moscow's defenders.

If we bear that in mind, we shall stop thinking of our air force as nothing more than a delivery boy for the atomic bomb. Then the bomb itself will take its proper place in our strategic plans. The bomb will cease to dictate policy and strategy and it will become one of a number of instruments for fulfilling policy and strategy.

But, assuming that we continue to feel confident of our superiority in atomic weapons, what should we do with the bomb? The answer is that any quick military advantages to be gained from its use must be weighed against the psychological effect upon our potential allies inside Russia. We must also consider the moral and psychological effects upon the countries allied with us and on the American people themselves. Even then, if we feel constrained to use it, we must answer at least two more questions.

(1) Would it not be shrewd, as well as humane, to delimit sanctuaries in areas where potential allies are assumed to exist?

(2) Would it not be wise policy, as well as common decency, to issue advance warning to the inhabitants of the areas which we feel we cannot spare?

These questions bring us to the basic psychological problem arising from our continuing superiority in atomic weapons. If we do use the bomb, we must use it in such a way that the wrath of the afflicted people will be turned against the rulers who brought this catastrophe upon them, and not against us. This problem must be thought out to-day—not after our too eager airmen have levelled Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad and Baku.

These are some of the lessons which we can learn from our study of the German record. But let there be no misunderstanding. There is nothing in the German experience or in subsequent events to encourage the assumption that war against the Soviets would be easy or desirable. There is no easy way to fight Russia, though, as Hitler proved, there is a hard way."

Similar thoughts, going even farther, are expressed by Professor Burnham in his book, the climax being, that for the American Government in the coming world events it is far more important to support the Ukraine national revolutionaries who are fighting against the Moscow centralisation than to help France where atomic research is under a communist, Joliot Curie. The advice given by Carroll and Burnham has, up to now, been only an expression of private opinion. There is nothing to show that the American Government is inclined to accept this advice, or embody it in their preparations. On the contrary, numerous remarks by Government officials make it clear that there is no question of American foreign policy taking this course.

From a purely military standpoint the German expert quoted before says: "A second front based on partisan support is only feasible within the scope of far-sighted military and political planning, after timely and careful preparation in terrain that is suitable, outside the advance routes of the Red Army. Even under such circumstances, partisan units can only be used as a vanguard for the landing of strong, effective air-borne troops. Hereby there are possibilities for a new strategy which may revolutionise the laws of warfare hitherto in force. Any improvisation of a partisan war on its own would be suicidal madness. And, finally, any plan conceived at a distance will be merely dilettantish, until the active forces of all European nations, including the subjected peoples of the East, working together as brothers, contribute their knowledge and experience to its conception."

We do not know in how far these suggestions made by Mr Carroll and Mr Burnham will be taken into consideration by the American Government in case of war (they were only made for such a contingency). We only know one thing, that is, that in the post-war years, in this decisive phase of preparation for war, nothing has been done to form a second front in the Soviet hinterland to match that of the Russians elsewhere. With regret and deep dismay we see that nothing is undertaken, in spite of the remarks quoted, to make a closely welded community out of the democratically-minded people and nations behind and in front of the Iron Curtain. Nothing that has been done is sufficient to counter-balance the forces of world communism. The democratic and anti-communist Ukrainian, Georgian, White-Ruthenian, Polish, Latvian, Turkestanian and other peoples have no intention of being drawn into a democratic world community; they are not even convinced that such a community can be achieved within a reasonable space of time, or that they would be welcome members of it, should it exist. From this standpoint, the way the Ukrainian democratic struggle for freedom was treated by the Western democrats after the last World War was a frightening example. At a time when the Russians were making every effort to pave the way for Communist activity in the West, the western nations have not only *not* welcomed the historic fight put up by the Ukrainians against their Russian oppressors, but they ridiculed it and judged it only through the glasses of Communist propaganda. The same attitude was displayed towards all the subjected peoples. It would seem that the West took no account of the possible psychological reaction such an attitude was bound to lead to. Unfulfilled hopes, and disappointment in hoped-for friends, can drive people in their bitterness into the opposite camp and cause their enthusiasm to evaporate forever. The many errors committed by the Western

Allies in the last war and in the early post-war years with respect to Russia, have undermined the confidence of democratic peoples. Take, for instance, the bitterness felt by the Poles when the Allies sacrificed them to the Russians. Such events have killed all trust in inter-state treaties between democratic states among East European peoples. Individuals and nations have become suspicious and are afraid of being betrayed by their apparently closest friends. Though we have observed in the last few years an awakened interest in consolidating the democratic nations *in front of* the Iron Curtain in view of their common fate, nothing has been done to bring the national democratic elements *behind* the Iron Curtain into this community. The only act worth mentioning in this respect is the radio transmissions in the vernacular to the subjected peoples, but even this is hampered by fear and political prejudice.

The American Government has not had the courage till now to tell these nations clearly that America is ready to make a stand for their freedom and assist them in their struggle. Just how nervous and undecided this policy is may be gathered from the remark of the competent official for the "Voice of America," according to which the announcement of the independence of the Ukrainian people and its separation from the Russian imperium did not fall within the scope of American foreign politics.

In the "Voice of America," democracy is praised, communism is ideologically denounced, it is true, but the national claims of the oppressed peoples to be freed from Moscow and to form national sovereign states are not even mentioned. On the contrary, these transmissions, as expressions of present American foreign policy, are sent in the spirit of a united Russian imperium. This attitude is generally explained by America having to keep the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, and by not wishing to interfere in Russia's "internal" affairs. Apart from the problem of the peoples oppressed by Russia being by no means an "internal Russian matter" the following may be said against that argument: If the recognition of the rights of the oppressed peoples is regarded as interference in Russia's internal affairs, then how is it that the propaganda against Communism as State policy within the Soviet Union is not counted as interference? If the declaration of Human Rights for the Soviet citizen is not regarded as agitation against the dictators in Moscow, then the announcement of national freedom for the oppressed should not be so regarded either. Is defence of human rights admitted in international relationships and self-determination of the people prohibited? Is the right of a people to its own national state not just as sacred as the right of an individual to liberty?

It is fairly obvious that it is not a question of interference or non-interference, but of a false conception of conditions within the Soviet Union, or the fear of facing the facts of the present political situation in the world.

Official American propaganda suggests that the American Government is for a democratic state form within the Soviet Union but against the national sovereignty of the oppressed peoples.

The contradiction between the principles of the Atlantic Pact and the emphasis laid on the self-determination of all peoples is very apparent.

Another argument for the present policy of the American Government in East European questions, though less often heard, is that in reality there are no independent Ukrainian, Georgian, Turkestan, etc., nations, that they are all ingredients in a great Russian people. After such an argument it is futile to speak of nationalities for these people, as they are perfectly satisfied with an all-Russian imperium. The American example of the 48 States living peaceably together is even referred to, and the question is seriously asked why it cannot be the same in Eastern Europe.

It would lead too far, here, to go into historical facts in order to disprove this argument. For those readers who are not familiar with the real state of things, we recommend the numerous books in the English language on the history of the Ukrainian and other East European peoples.

Can a Second Front be formed within the Soviet Union?

Is the will of these peoples for independence and separation from Russia so strong that this problem can be discussed as an issue in current politics; can these aspirations be included in the calculations of international politics and their relative forces, and can the oppressed peoples of East Europe really be counted upon as allies?

In how far a people is mature enough to form its own state is shown by the level of its culture and civilisation, especially, however, by its political and national consciousness; its will to take its own fate in its hands.

We declare, most definitely, that this will is present in all the peoples oppressed by Russia, and from original documents from the underground movement in the Soviet Union we shall prove it. These documents concern the fighting in Ukraine, but are typical for all other subjected peoples. They display a state of political and national consciousness and an activity that is seldom found in our times among oppressed peoples.

The description of their political struggle between the wars, which began with the loss of their political sovereignty in 1920, is so exhaustively treated in books on the subject that we omit it here. We would recommend to the reader: "The History of the Ukrainian People," by Prof. Menning, an American, and Prof. Dymytrow's under the same title, or the book by Oleh Martowych, "Ukrainian Independent Movement of Modern Times," published by the Scottish League for European Freedom, Edinburgh.

We shall only treat the problems of the most recent years, the time during World War II and after it. All the documents reproduced here have been placed at our disposal by members of the Ukrainian Underground Movement. This material came along secret ways, brought by valiant couriers in day and night marches, contending with countless dangers to reach their destination in the West.

According to information given by the head of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, Stefan Bandera, in an interview for correspondents of the Associated Press, United Press and others in 1950, 50 per cent of these brave men lost their lives at the hands of the enemy. From the Ukrainian Western frontier to West Germany they had to cover almost 900 kilometres. It is easy to understand that such illegal material cannot be brought in quantities, or very often. But what we have shows to what extent the fight in Ukraine is being carried on and how it is organized. As to its extent, the author of the before-mentioned article in "Life," Mr Wallace Carroll, gives us an object lesson.

Ukrainian Resistance during World War II

Basing his information on the material of the German General Staff and Foreign Office, Mr Wallace Carroll reports on the Ukrainian Underground Movement as follows:

"The Ukrainian Underground, which had existed before the war, was given a great impetus by German brutality in 1941 and 1942. This Underground, however, did not become pro-Soviet, nor was it entirely anti-German. Its motto was, 'We fight every oppression regardless of its source.' During the German occupation the Underground forces concentrated their attacks on the German police and SS (Elite Guard) units. In general they spared other German troops because they felt that the army leaders sympathised with them.

"The principal Underground organization were the Union of Ukrainian Nationalists (O.U.N.) and its striking force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (U.P.A.). Members of this army joined the Germans to get military experience, then slipped away as the Germans retreated and took up the fight

against the Russians behind the lines of the advancing Soviet troops.

"German intelligence officers who secretly returned to the Ukraine behind the Russian lines reported that in Galicia (Western Ukraine) the Red army could retain control only of the principal towns, highways and rail lines. The rest of the region was dominated by the O.U.N. and U.P.A. Galicia was the cradle of Ukrainian nationalism, and it was somewhere in this area, late in 1944, that a Congress of separatists was convened. It was attended by representatives of most of the minorities. To the Germans they sent word that if the German army succeeded in returning to the Ukraine, the O.U.N. and U.P.A. would not fight against it if Germany guaranteed Ukrainian independence after Stalin's defeat.

"Long after the final defeat of Hitler in May 1945 these Ukrainian forces were active. They probably were partly responsible for bringing on the Soviet purges in the Ukraine in 1947. And as late as last summer (1950) there were unconfirmed reports that several Russian divisions were being kept busy by Ukrainian guerilla forces."

The German and Soviet secret services have estimated the strength of the U.P.A. at 200,000 men.

Besides this purely political and military activity, the population developed unexpected energy in the sphere of cultural life. In spite of all such matters being prohibited by the National Socialist invading Power and the fact that the most terrible battles in the Second World War were fought on this territory, the people on their own initiative accomplished unheard of achievements. To mention only a few figures: 6,000 elementary schools were established, 500 newspapers and magazines were published till the Nazis stopped them. One university was established, hundreds of secondary schools organised, well-endowed material self-help instituted, and also lower offices in state administration taken over.

As Mr Carroll mentions, all political activity was organized underground. In the forefront was the O.U.N., a revolutionary organization (from 1920-1930, its name was U.W.O., i.e., Ukrainian Military Organization) for the Ukrainian State, fighting underground against Russians and Poles. The national U.P.A. was born from the initiative of that organization, then finally, in 1944, there came a general political command for the whole struggle, the Ukrainian Chief Liberation Council (U.H.W.R.).

This structure of the Ukrainian struggle for liberation functions still, and the whole revolutionary element of the people is grouped around it.

As a proof of the strength of this fight during the Second World War, and of the impression made by the general attitude of the oppressed peoples of the Russian imperium on those Germans who preserved a clear head, we refer to the plan which the German Ambassador in Moscow, von Schulenburg, drew up respecting the Eastern European problem. We quote Mr Carroll's remarks, as his evidence appears the most objective, being founded on documents in the German archives, that is to say, on sources by no means prejudiced in our favour. Mr Carroll first speaks of Alfred Rosenberg's plans.

"There were influential Germans who tried to change Hitler's policy (der vollkommenen Vernichtung des ukrainischen und der anderen osteuropaischen Volker—the complete extermination of the Ukrainian and the other East European peoples). One of them was Alfred Rosenberg, the 'philosopher' of the Nazi party, who had been put in nominal charge of conquered Soviet territory. Rosenberg wanted to dismember the Soviet Union and set up a 'sanitary cordon' between the Great Russians and Europe—a cordon composed of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraine, Tatar and other autonomous units under German leadership. But Rosenberg was woolly in thought and ineffectual in action.

"Much more effective opposition to Hitler's programme came from the German Foreign Office and from the German army. Count Friedrich von der Schulenburg, the former German Ambassador in Moscow, had a concrete programme to turn the invasion into a civil war in which the Russians themselves would help to overthrow Stalin. He proposed (1) to announce that Germany had no territorial claims on Russia; (2) to permit the people of the conquered areas to set up their own local governments and (3) to recognize these governments as allies and encourage them to band together in an anti-Soviet government. All the nationalities would be offered self-determination, and he would have helped all of them, including the Great Russians, to set up independent states. If the new national states decided in the long run to form a federation, he would have raised no objection.

Schulenburg's ideas were even more odious to Hitler than Rosenberg's, and he ordered the Foreign Office to keep its fingers out of Russian affairs. But Schulenburg found sup-

port for his plan among the officers of the German Army. For these officers had become convinced that Stalin could be beaten only with the help of the Soviet people.

This conviction had been driven home by the events of the autumn and winter of 1941/42. The Soviet troops, now aware of what happened to those who surrendered, were fighting savagely in defence of Moscow and Leningrad. The peasants were disillusioned and hostile. As townspeople and peasants alike fled from Hitler's slave drivers; the partisans were growing in numbers and audacity.

By the spring of 1942 the German army leaders were convinced that disaster lay ahead unless they could placate the aroused population and draw great numbers of Soviet volunteers into the German forces. Already there were 200,000 of these volunteers, but the brutal treatment of their compatriots in German prison and labour camps was undermining their morale. Back in December and January, Hitler had authorised the creation of units from the lesser Soviet minorities—an Armenian Legion, a Caucasian-Mohammedan Legion, a Turkmen Legion and a number of Tartar units. This was as far as he would go; the army leaders were determined to go much further."

Thus Schulenburg's plan and that of Rosenberg were rejected by Hitler and Himmler. The originator of the plan, von Schulenburg, was cold-shouldered and later thrown into a concentration camp. Instead of state sovereignty, the complete destruction of the Ukrainian Underground Movement was ordered. That was the beginning of the collapse of the Third Reich. The Ukrainians and members of other oppressed nations ceased deserting from the Red Army and National Underground Movements increased and multiplied rapidly.

When things became critical for the Germans, Hitler began to consider that his policy in the East might cost him victory. He sought a way out of the impasse, but then he committed his second inexcusable mistake: he staked on Russia, instead of turning to the oppressed nations, though none of them would have believed in Hitler, the destroyer of nations and a cheat, and no one would have been inclined to join up with Nazism.

In 1943 Hitler began his experiment with the Russian General Andrij Vlassov who had declared himself willing to form an army of prisoners-of-war and lead them against Stalin. As his reward he demanded the retention of a Unified Russian imperium. Honestly or not, Hitler agreed to this plan. Wallace Carroll says that only Alfred Rosenberg opposed the plan.

"Then the first in an endless series of obstacles arose: Rosenberg objected. Vlassov was a Great Russian, and Rosenberg, who had been born in Estonia, did not trust Great Russians.

Several months were lost while Vlassov tried to appease Rosenberg. In some of the statements which he made to German officials for this purpose Vlassov not only conceded self-determination to the minorities but indicated—according to German sources—that in the future peace settlement he would be willing to give up the Ukraine and the Caucasus. At last Rosenberg was reassured, and the propaganda in Vlassov's name was resumed on a broader scale early in 1943."

These promises were nothing but camouflage for the Russian imperial plans.

The Germans and the Vlassov party made every effort to win the representatives of the oppressed peoples for this plan. All their efforts, however, were in vain. The answer from that side remained always the same: the oppressed peoples will not allow themselves to be involved in a struggle aiming at the reconstruction of the Russian Empire. Finally, when on 14th November 1944, a "Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" was organised under the leadership of Vlassov, and proclaimed in Prague, there were no signatures of the representatives of the oppressed peoples on the proclamation. Only a few renegades and bargainers on their own account acquiesced in the plan. There are many documents on their negotiations in the German archives, and upon these Mr Carroll bases his information, saying:—

"As it turned out, only a small number among the minorities accepted the assurances of the manifesto on the minority problems. Many of the exiles from the Ukraine and the Caucasus, though willing to accept Vlassov as the representative of the Great Russians and 'first among peers,' rejected the Committee as an instrument of Great Russian ambitions.

"This was more than an academic dispute between impotent exiles for, back in the Ukraine, behind the lines of the advancing Red Army, powerful Ukrainian forces had sprung up to fight for freedom against the Soviets. The fight of these forces is another of the war's untold stories."

The powerful forces of which Mr Carroll speaks were the U.P.A., fighting under the war-cry "Away from Russia; long live an Independent Ukrainian State, long live the Independent States of all oppressed peoples."

The Vlassov Experiment

It remained to be seen what the Russians themselves thought of the plan, and it turned out that they thought very little of it. They had no enthusiasm for the German proposals. That came from Russian patriotism which forbade them ever, under any circumstances, to ally themselves with a foreign power against their Government, even if it be Communistic. The Vlassov experiment bore out the idea, that a power fighting against Russia can only find allies among the non-Russian peoples of that imperium; but to win such allies there must be the proper policy.

General Andrij Vlassov had only raised three incomplete divisions of real Russians, the whole plan threatened to end in political disgrace, when the Germans decided to force all the military groups of non-Russian peoples into the Vlassov army. These militant groups had been formed under quite different conditions and prospects. It was thus the National Units of the Cossacks, Turkestanians, Tartars, Azerbaijanians, and the rest of the Caucasians who were in the Vlassov Army, by command. That happened, however, a few days before the collapse of Germany, and to-day it is difficult to see how matters might have developed. At any rate, even at the time there was strong opposition to the German plan, which might eventually have led to open revolt. It was only in this way that Vlassov was able to boast of having 800,000 soldiers under his command.

The attitude of the Ukrainians towards the Vlassov plans was so hostile that the Germans were forced to consider forming a separate Ukrainian army. In 1945, serious preparations were taken in hand by the German Government. The Ukrainian National Committee, under General Schandruk, was set up in Berlin, and the first military units under the same general were called into existence. On the part of the German Government serious efforts were made to include representatives of the Ukrainian Underground, and, with this object in view, they negotiated with Stephen Bandera, who had been a prisoner in the concentration camp at Sachsenhausen from 1941 till 1945, and with Jaroslav Stetzko, who had also been a prisoner along with Bandera, these two being the recognised leaders. They rejected the plan. Their reasons for rejection were as follows:—

The leaders of the Underground Movement knew very well that the Germans had gone to the East to obtain land for "The People lacking Land," and intended to settle Germans there. Ukraine was a country with which Hitler associated his plans for "A Thousand Years Old Reich"; that was why, not only the Schulenburg plan, but others made by high-ranking German officers, aiming at the establishment of independent States for the people of the Russian Imperium, were not accepted.

Adolf Hitler was not prepared to allow the formation of a Ukrainian army, as he feared Ukrainian nationalism, and had no desire to commit himself with this people, as it was destined by him for extermination. The alleged *volte face* in 1944 was to be met with extreme scepticism. Besides which, the Ukrainian Underground thought it best to follow a policy independent of either belligerent Power, in the political constellation of the Second World War.

Connection with the Germans was most undesirable, as they had appeared in the East with a programme of colonisation, of race hatred, national oppression, and the overthrow of all democratic freedom for peoples and individuals.

By every means in their power, the Ukrainian Liberty Movement endeavoured to make this clear to the politicians of the other subjected East European peoples, and achieved some success. The documents bearing on this are now available and will be published later.

The Ukrainian Underground Movement was therefore against the formation of national military units in the German army, all the more as the Germans undertook no political commitments towards the peoples in question, with the exception, for some reason, of the Cossacks. However, much bitter experience had shown the advisability of not taking such declarations seriously.

Considering all this, it was no wonder that the National Underground Movement stood its ground against the formation of a Ukrainian army in alliance with Hitler in 1945. That army, as Wallace Carroll expressed it, was a purely emigration affair.

The result was that, after the close of the Second World War, or, to be correct, the ostensible close, the Ukrainian Independence Movement changed from open warfare to guerilla fighting, and this has never ceased to this day.

We have stated that war only ostensibly closed; war, cold and shooting war, has never ceased one day, the only difference is that Russia is the enemy instead of Germany, but we try to pretend it is someone else—losing ground all the time while Moscow is gaining the ground the West loses.

N.B.—Since the foregoing was printed a pronouncement of the highest significance has been made by John Foster Dulles, Foreign Affairs Adviser to President Truman. In publicly putting forward six points he practically adopts the ideas for which the non-Russians are fighting. It is to be hoped they will be applied as Western policy towards U.S.S.R.

