



Mimeographed Series No. 69

The Fall of Postyshev

by

Hryhory Kostiuk

Research Program on the U.S.S.R.

New York City

1954

Mimeographed Series No. 69

THE FALL OF POSTYSHEV

by

Hryhory Kostiuik

Translated by

Mrs. Lois Weinert

RESEARCH PROGRAM ON THE U.S.S.R.
401 West 118th Street, New York 27, N.Y.
1954

Pages: 25
Price: \$0.35

This memorandum was written under the joint sponsorship of the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. (East European Fund, Inc.) and the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R. It constitutes a section from a longer study by the author on the history of communism in the Ukraine now being prepared for publication by the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. The material is published by the Research Program in preliminary form without critical editing. The author is responsible for its contents. Any inquiries concerning the manuscript or its author should be directed to the Research Program on the U.S.S.R.

Copyright 1954

by

Research Program on the U.S.S.R.
(East European Fund, Inc.)
401 West 118th Street
New York 27, N.Y.

No part of this manuscript may be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the Research Program on the U.S.S.R. (East European Fund, Inc.), except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief passages in connection with a review written for a magazine, newspaper, or radio broadcast.

No. 69

The Fall of Postyshev

by

Hryhory Kostiuk

For over two years Mr. Kostiuk has been preparing a historical study of Ukrainian Communism covering the period 1930-1938. The present article, dealing with a significant episode in that history, constitutes a section from the longer work.

Mr. Kostiuk has studied and analyzed the various clues to Postyshev's downfall given in the Soviet press and in émigré publications. Part of the explanation, he believes, lies in Postyshev's reaction to the Ukrainian milieu. In addition to the generally available data Mr. Kostiuk has made use of information on high-level intra-Party strife which he learned from fellow-inmates in a Soviet forced labor camp. Combining all these sources, he presents a new and suggestive explanation of Postyshev's fall.



No. 69

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
The Official Facts	1
Postyshev's Death	5
Three Versions	7
Postyshev and Ukrainian Reality	9
The Plenum of the Central Committee	13
The Vorkuta Version	18
General Conclusions	25

The Official Facts

One of the most mysterious episodes in the Ukrainian terror which raged during the period 1933-1938 was the unexpected fall and swift and complete disappearance of the "faithful companion-in-arms of Comrade Stalin," the inspirer and leader of the terror and dictatorship in the Ukraine for four years - Pavel Petrovich Postyshev.

The first official announcement concerning Postyshev's disgrace appeared in Pravda for March 19, 1937 in the form of a short news item:

P. P. Postyshev has been chosen to fill the office of secretary of the Kuibyshev Oblast Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

On March 20 of the same year Pravda made another announcement:

Kiev, March 19. On March 17 a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine met. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine listened to the message of Comrade Kossior* on the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and considered a number of questions. The plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, in connection with the transfer of Comrade Postyshev to other work, released him from the duties of second secretary of the Central Committee. Comrade M. M. Khatayevich was chosen as second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine.

And that is all. No other official announcements followed. But enough had been said. The very fact that one of the most powerful Moscow satraps and Stalinists of the previous five years had been removed and demoted, the fact that a secret shuffling was taking place at the top of the terrorist apparatus, testified to feverish preparations of some kind, to new plans, to the continued internal struggle and the ruthless purging of the ranks before the decisive battle.

*The Russian spelling of the surname of this Polish-born Communist leader is Kosior.--Tr.

Approximately two months after the downfall of Postyshev, the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, meeting for the first time in three and a half years without its recent and still awesome leader, shed some light on the secret behind the move. Sharp and even devastating accusations against Postyshev resounded from the platform of the Congress: he had created an atmosphere of servility, he had dulled class consciousness, he had enrolled in and supported "a Trotskyite group" of nationalists and right Bukharinites, which was located in the very apparatus of the Kiev Oblast Committee and the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Party.¹

A situation which had nothing in common with Bolshevism reached its apogee [during the time] when Comrade Postyshev was the head of the Kiev organization. 'Instructions of Postyshev,' 'Appeals of Postyshev,' 'Postyshev's Kindergarten,' 'Gifts of Postyshev,' etc. Everything began and ended with Postyshev,

wrote a certain Nikolenko with malicious irony.²

-
1. Visti VUTsVK [News of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee], Kiev, June 3, 1937.
 2. Pravda, May 30, 1937, [Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, debates on Kossior's report]. About this Nikolenko, who apparently played a provocational role in the fall of Postyshev, we know only that she was a rank-and-file member of the Party, listed in the Kiev organization. Her systematic squabbling and her numerous unjustified denunciations of other members of the Party provoked the anger even of Postyshev himself. Near the end of 1936, he decreed her exclusion from the Party. After this ouster had been affirmed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, the matter went to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Stalin, in the period of the February-March plenum, used Nikolenko against Postyshev, restored her to the Party and (without naming Postyshev) pointed to the inadmissibility of the bureaucratically formal relationships between some leaders and the rank-and-file members of the Party.

Kossior asserted in his report that "Even now we must not forget about the danger of nationalism," that the Communist Party of the Ukraine, unfortunately, during the past had weakened its vigilance against nationalists, Bukharinites and Trotskyites, and that the Ukrainian Party organization was badly choked with nationalists and Trotskyites. The Kiev organization was especially full of them. "Here the Trotskyites are the most firmly entrenched. They have seized the responsible posts for themselves. And the one to blame for this is primarily the former secretary of the Kiev Oblast Committee, Comrade Postyshev."³

We shall see later to what degree these official accusations against Postyshev corresponded to reality. For the present we shall pursue, according to the accounts given in the Soviet press, the development of the events leading to his downfall.

Having accused Postyshev of tolerating Trotskyism and nationalism, of dulling Chekist vigilance, and of creating an atmosphere of servility and paternalism, and having demoted him from the leadership of the local oblast organization, the Kremlin offered him the opportunity to "recant."

In January 1938 there was a regular meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. The plenum considered the question "On the mistakes of Party organizations in excluding Communists from the Party, on the formal, bureaucratic relationship toward appeals of those excluded from the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and on measures for the elimination of these faults."⁴

In A. A. Andreyev's report on this subject, the Ukraine occupied the center of attention. Andreyev pointed to countless acts of wrongdoing in the Party organization of the Ukraine which had occurred with suspicious regularity during the final period of Postyshev's

-
3. Ibid., May 29, 1937, [The Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine in the struggle for a socialist Ukraine] (From the account of the report by Kossior at the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine). My italics.--H.K.
 4. Informational announcement on the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Pravda, January 19, 1938.

rule in the Ukraine. But neither he nor the plenum was apparently satisfied with these vague allusions to the rather obscure consequences of Postyshev's leadership of the Ukrainian Party organization. Andreyev therefore went on to the more recent facts of Postyshev's leadership of the Kuibyshev Oblast organization of the Party. It seemed that for a short time Postyshev, instead of exercising constructive leadership, had ruined more than thirty Party organizations. His crimes at this stage were not indulgence, not dulling of Party vigilance, as had been noted earlier, but, on the contrary, an exaggeration of his power, anti-Party excesses, tactlessness, provocational buttressing ("reinsurance") of his position, and "repressive measures against Party members."

The resolution of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party said, in a general statement on this subject:

It is time to unmask and brand as careerists all Communists, if we may call them that, who try to gain promotion to the positions of those excluded from the Party and who try to buttress their positions with the aid of repressive measures against Party members.⁵

We do not know whether or not Postyshev rose to his own defense. His speeches and articles were no longer published, and even his name was not mentioned at the plenum. But as a result of the decisions of the plenum, Postyshev was gradually removed from membership on the Central Committee and was deprived of the title of Candidate of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party.⁶

Upon his return to Kuibyshev, the final blow, which had already been prepared by the appropriate agency of the Kremlin, awaited him: he was ousted from the Party. After this action, Postyshev's name disappears without a trace from the political life of the U.S.S.R.

-
5. Decree of the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in ibid.
 6. Informational announcement concerning the regular plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), in ibid.

Postyshev's Death

It is still difficult to establish exactly how Postyshev's life came to an end. A. Avtorkhanov in his series of sketches Pokoreniye partii, [The Subjugation of the Party] asserts that he was shot.⁷ A. Svetlanin makes the same statement in his sketch "Taina sobytii 1937-1938 godov" [The Secret of the Events of 1937-1938].⁸ However, a writer identified only by the initials B.N.O., in a letter to the editor of Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik [Socialist Courier], denying that Postyshev was shot, has written: "Postyshev fell into disgrace and was ousted from the Party; however, he was not officially arrested, but died of tuberculosis in the Kremlin hospital."⁹

Another version of Postyshev's fate is offered by "B.Z." in the Journal of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R.¹⁰ Quoting "the rumors in the Kiev prison at the time of the Yezhov period and afterwards" and the story "of an acquaintance who had been in Soviet concentration camps for more than ten years," who told the story of his campmate, "an important Party member," the article asserts that "Postyshev died of tuberculosis, but during his imprisonment." This assertion is supported in this manner: "The atmosphere in 1936-1938 was such that the important Party leaders who fell into disgrace for one reason or another could not escape arrest, and Postyshev, naturally, was no exception to the general rule."

The story is unconvincing and the logic is weak. The sensational announcement of the Soviet press not long

-
7. Posev [Sowing], Munich, No. 51, December 17, 1950, p. 14.
 8. Sotsialisticheskii vestnik [Socialist Courier], New York, Paris, 1949, No. 3, p. 48.
 9. Ibid., No. 8-9, p. 164.
 10. B.Z., "O sud'be P. Postysheva" [On the Fate of P. Postyshev], Vestnik instituta po izucheniyu istorii i kul'tury S.S.S.R., Munich, No. 1, 1951, p. 145.

ago about the "rehabilitation" of Georgii I. Petrovski,¹¹ one of the victims of the terror of 1938, demonstrates that there were "exceptions to the general rule." Such an exception could have applied particularly to Postyshev, who played a black enough role in the last act of his life drama.

We find more plausible information, corresponding more closely with the statement by "B.N.O.," in the memoirs of Arkadi Gayev, a man who had some opportunity of knowing Postyshev personally and of remembering facts connected with the last years of his life. Gayev writes,

Very little information was given out about his death, and at that only in one newspaper. Only Vechernyaya Moskva [Evening Moscow] noted on the last page, amid reports of fires, trials and street brawls, that "after a long illness, P. P. Postyshev, a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks), died in the Kremlin hospital."¹²

Unfortunately, Gayev does not indicate the exact date of Postyshev's death, nor is it clear whether this is a direct quotation from Vechernyaya Moskva or whether he has merely relied on his memory. But in any case it seems to us that the last statement, based on a number of indirect facts (of which we will speak later), in general corresponds to the truth, and that the death of Postyshev, announced by Vechernyaya Moskva, occurred in the fall of 1939.

Postyshev was not formally arrested, nor was he shot. He was forced to die in the Kremlin hospital. In the political sense, it makes little difference whether he lived out his days in prison in the Kremlin or whether he was shot immediately. What is important is that he was irrevocably removed from political life.

-
11. "Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR: o nagrazhdenii tov. Petrovskovo G.I. ordenom Trudovovo Krasnovo Znāmeni" [Decree of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet: On Awarding Comrade G.I. Petrovski the Order of the Red Banner of Labor], Pravda and Izvestiya, May 6, 1953.
12. Gayev, Arkadi, "V chom vinovat Postyshev?" [Of What Was Postyshev Guilty?], Manuscript in the archives of the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., New York.

But why was he not shot with Kossior, Chubar, Sheboldayev, and the others? Why was he made an exception and given some kind of privilege? We shall try to answer this question.

Three Versions

What was the real reason for Postyshev's downfall? It does not seem possible to answer this question on the basis of a complete analysis today, in the absence of the objective facts. But we feel that it is our duty to appraise critically the existing hypotheses and present our personal suppositions on this matter.

At the present time there are three versions of the reason for Postyshev's fall: the official Soviet pronouncement, the version by Gayev and the version by Avtorkhanov. Which of these versions is closest to the historically justified and objective truth?

Let us look at the official Soviet version. To anyone who has followed Postyshev's day-to-day activity at least since 1929, or who has studied the materials connected with his activity as secretary of the Moscow oblast Committee of the Party and as organizational secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, three things are clear:

1. Postyshev was one of the cruelest and most consistent executioners of Trotskyites, Bukharinites, and Ukrainian national oppositionists;
2. He was one of the most vigilant watchdogs of the Stalinist dictatorship in the Ukraine;
3. He held the dubious honor of carrying out the new imperialistic Russification policy in the Ukraine after 1933.

This being so, how is it possible to talk of his dulling of vigilance? No, this is naturally not the point.

None of the accusations advanced from the platform at the Thirteenth Congress of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine had any reference to Postyshev. His real abuses against the Ukrainian people were of another order. The most terrible punishment could not make up even a thousandth part for all of his inhuman crimes. But nobody mentioned these crimes at the

Thirteenth Congress. Of course, this was not because they did not know about his crimes. No. Such things were decreed from Moscow; such things had been ordered by the preceding February-March plenum of the Central Committee of Party.

Is it possible that the atmosphere of flattery, servility and reverence for Postyshev was really so pronounced? Could it really be that this atmosphere, "which had nothing in common with Bolshevism," was the very grave crime for which yesterday's all-powerful ruler had to fall?

Naturally, all this existed. But nevertheless, to every sensible man it was clear that such phenomena made up the vital climate of the Stalinist epoch and were the necessary, organic components of the Stalinist dictatorship. Without them the dictatorship could not have existed and could not have had such power. Stalin understood this. Therefore he not only created and strengthened the cult of "an earthly god" which grew up around his person; he also consciously imparted this cult to a certain degree to his closest associates. He understood very well that in the eyes of the masses the glitter of greatness from his closest comrades was only a reflection of his own majestic and unique radiance. It was all the more natural to allow this to Postyshev, the tried and true servant of the Party apparatus, who was always distinguished for his ability to hold himself at a necessary and respectful distance from his leader.

No, the reason for Postyshev's downfall was not the atmosphere of servility and slavery, nor was it the growth of imitative authority.

Perhaps the misuse of his power, the destruction of thirty organizations in Kuibyshev Oblast, the tactics of making his position secure ("reinsurance") were the real reasons for his downfall?

We admit that these things took place; nevertheless, Postyshev's downfall did not begin with Kuibyshev. Kuibyshev was already the "exile" for Postyshev, his own special "corrective labor camp." His first and most important crimes were committed in the Ukraine. But in essence they were, as we know, directly opposite to those which he allegedly committed in Kuibyshev.

No, from all the above-quoted official explanations and materials of the Soviet press it is clear that the real reason for Postyshev's fall was hidden from public opinion. The official version about his "tolerating Trotskyites and nationalists," about his "Party excesses" and his "reinsurance" is the usual smoke screen which is set up to hide the truth from the people.

The second version--the explanation of Arkadi Gayev that the reason for Postyshev's downfall was his wide popularity, his growing authority "as a powerful successor to Stalin," his "simplicity, straightforwardness, and artlessness"--is too subjective, too superficial an explanation, and entirely unproved.

But one point in Gayev's sketch merits attention: he states that in the year before his downfall, Postyshev began to feel somewhat like a man apart in the milieu of a bureaucratic Party elite in the process of establishing itself. Postyshev began to have doubts and to manifest a critical attitude toward the events which were taking place. This completely new and unexpected trait in Postyshev's character was actually apparent in his Ukrainian policy in 1936, his last year in power, and in the fact that he was one of the "doubting ones" at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, a circumstance which played a fateful role in his downfall.

The third version, the more serious and profound explanation of the reason for Postyshev's downfall given by Avtorkhanov, should be examined in greater detail. Avtorkhanov correctly attributes Postyshev's downfall to two circumstances: the Ukrainian political situation, with which until a short time before Postyshev had been connected, and intra-Party conflicts at the top of the ruling oligarchy, especially in the Central Committee of the Party and the Politburo beginning in the autumn of 1936. But although he correctly points out the sources of the reasons for Postyshev's downfall, Avtorkhanov's argument is not always convincing and does not always correspond to historical truth.

Postyshev and Ukrainian Reality

According to Avtorkhanov, a number of Ukrainian Party leaders decisively rebuffed Molotov, Khrushchov and Yezhov when the latter came to the Ukraine in the autumn of 1937 in connection with the purge of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine and the government of the Ukraine. According to this account Postyshev was among these Ukrainian Party leaders and was also a member of the Ukrainian delegation which went to Moscow to eliminate the growing conflict. Postyshev's part in this affair is said to have led to his downfall.¹³

The general picture of the circumstances given by Avtorkhanov is true, but it in no way applies to Postyshev. We know that as of March 17, 1937, he had been dropped from the Central Committee and the Politburo, that he was in Kuibyshev, and that he did not have any influence on policy in general or on Ukrainian policy in particular. Consequently, while Avtorkhanov correctly describes the dramatic events in the Ukraine in the fall of 1937, he quite erroneously connects Postyshev with them and tries to find in them the reason for his downfall.

The basic reason for Postyshev's fall lies, of course, in his Ukrainian policy. So much is true. But the Ukrainian basis for the downfall of Postyshev is not explained by Avtorkhanov's statements.

First of all the reason lies in the objective Ukrainian political situation, which carried more weight than the subjective intentions of Postyshev. Ukrainian political and cultural reality, the historically formed and completely crystallized cultural-economic and psychological communality of the people, consisted of elements against which both the directives of the Kremlin and the cruel terror of its deputy were powerless. Moreover, this Ukrainian reality, this communality of the people had a powerful effect upon their conquerors too. To the economic and agricultural life of the Ukraine, Postyshev brought the policy of collectivization and grain requisitions, slaughtering whole generations and paralyzing the remnants of the organically national forces in the Communist Party of the Ukraine. But he proved incapable of erasing the idea

13. Avtorkhanov, A., "Chistka partii" [Purge in the Party], Chapter VIII, Part II of his Pokoreniye partii [The Subjugation of the Party], in Posev, December 10, 1950, No. 50, pp. 14-15.

of Ukrainian statehood, of Ukrainian historical, economic and cultural individuality, and could not instill anew in the minds of the people the conviction of the necessity and inevitability of their status and dependence on the Russian center.

Gradually, despite his personal sympathies, Postyshev became a part of Ukrainian reality and probably began to feel some responsibility for the fate of the Ukraine. Only in this way can one explain his active interest in Ukrainian cadres in the last year of his power, 1936. It was not accidental that beginning with the year 1936 a new note appeared in his publications on the Ukrainian question.¹⁴

He began to make malicious fun of those leaders of Party and Soviet life in the Ukraine who considered that the question of Ukrainization "for the present consists of mastering the language." He considered this to be a false and mistaken concept.

It is necessary for a Party member to know the history of the Ukraine perfectly, its economics, the history of its culture, the history of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, [it is necessary] that all Party members know and understand the processes of the building of Ukrainian culture which are now being completed.¹⁵

Such an attitude was clearly not to the taste of the Moscow bosses. Postyshev had not been sent out in order to abolish an entire generation of leading specialist in the history, economy and culture of the Ukraine, only to turn around and order, on the strength of his authority, that the new cadres, who were unacquainted with these questions, should study them all again. According to the plan of the Moscow centralists, the general history of the Ukraine, its economy, its cultural history, and even the history of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine were not

14. See Postyshev, P., "Pidsumki perevirki partiynikh dokumentiv u KP(b)U i zavdannya partroboty (chetverte i P'yate zavdannya)," [Results of the Verification of Party Documents of the CP(b)U and the Task of Party Work (Fourth and Fifth Task)], Bil'shevik Ukraïny [Bolshevik of the Ukraine], No. 3, 1936, pp. 9-33; see also his speech at the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, Pravda, December 9, 1936.

15. Postyshev, op. cit.

to be separate, independent, and specifically Ukrainian subjects of study but were gradually to be buried in oblivion. Clearly Stalin was already on the road to the historical restoration of the scheme of the former Russian Empire, applying it in its totality to the U.S.S.R. He had long ago circulated his Jesuitical formula of enslavement, the formula of "the lesser evil."¹⁶ Based on the imperialistic, centralistic theory of history, which was restored and adapted to Soviet conditions, and on the Stalinist theory of the "lesser evil," the Istoriya VKP(b), kratkii kurs [History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Short Course] as well as the Kratkii kurs istorii SSSR [Short Course in the History of the U.S.S.R.], edited by Professor Shestakov, were finished at that time, awaiting the approval of the government. The rehabilitated heroes of Russian imperialist centralism--Aleksandr Nevski, Minin and Pozharski, Peter the Great, Field-Marshal Kutuzov, and other symbols of the unity, military might, and invincibility of Russian arms and the Russian nation--all appeared on the movie screens. Under the guise of a struggle against Ukrainian nationalism, which proclaimed as the chief danger, Russification was implanted. There was a gradual increase in the number of Russian newspapers in the Ukraine, which had almost completely disappeared in previous years.

Given this state of affairs, was it possible for one who was ordered by the Kremlin to deepen and strengthen this "new course" in politics to speak of a separate history of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine? Was not this to cultivate and revive an ideology of decentralization, fraught with dangerous consequences? Did this not strengthen the position of the adherents of Ukrainian political and economic independence? To this period probably belonged the wavering of spirit, the criticism, doubts and distrust in the consolidating force of the Party bureaucracy, all of which Gayev observed in Postyshev. No, definitely--this

16. [Remarks of Comrades J. Stalin, A. Zhdanov, S. Kirov on the outline of a textbook on the History of the U.S.S.R. and the textbook New History], August 8, 1934, in Bol'shevik, 1936, No. 3.

[Decree of a jury of the government commission on the competition for the best textbook on the history of the U.S.S.R. for the third and fourth classes of the middle school,] Bol'shevik, 1937, No. 17, p. 12.

unexpected viewpoint of Postyshev was undesirable, dangerous and hostile to the official, although undecreed, line of the Kremlin.

Let us comment on the legality of the views and policy of Postyshev. Everything that he said was basically derived from the Soviet constitution and the lawful rights of each Union Republic. But neither the essence of this constitution nor the legal rights of each Republic ever corresponded to the practical policy of Stalin, and it was always necessary to understand them in the opposite sense. Postyshev tried, probably intentionally, in his practical policies to make use of the constitutional rights in their literal meaning. This attempt went contrary to the practical policy of the Kremlin. Therefore, when Postyshev clarified his position at the time of the "agreement among the doubting ones," all this was studied by the "boss," and Postyshev's fate was sealed.

The Plenum of the Central Committee

The second reason for Postyshev's downfall, as it is implicit in Avtorkhanov's version of the facts, is as follows: in November 1936, during a plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, less than one-third of the Central Committee members voted in favor of a Stalin-sponsored resolution by Yeshov concerning Bukharin and Rykov, which was put to a secret vote on this occasion. Postyshev was among those who contributed to the scandalous show of self-will.¹⁷ Developing his narrative, Avtorkhanov states that Stalin pretended to agree with the adverse decision of the Central Committee majority.¹⁸ He even allowed the publication of a notice in Pravda and Izvestiya a few days later which stated that the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. was discontinuing the investigation of Bukharin and Rykov "for lack of evidence against them."¹⁹ Avtorkhanov observes that Stalin subsequently

17. Avtorkhanov, A., "TsK golosuyet protiv Stalina" [The Central Committee Votes Against Stalin], Chapter IV of his Pokoreniye partii, in Posev, November 5, 1950, No. 45, pp. 14-16.

18. Ibid., p. 16.

19. Avtorkhanov, A., "Napoleon - Tukhachevski i Danton - Mdivani" [Napoleon-Tukhachevsky and Danton-Mdivani], Chapter V of his Pokoreniye partii, in Posev, November 12, 1950, No. 46, p. 14.

took his vengeance against the members of the anti-Stalinist "conspiracy" in the Central Committee, and by autumn 1937, all but 15 of the 140 members and candidates of the Central Committee as of November 1936 had been purged.²⁰ Among those purged of course was Postyshev.

Does this complicated picture of intra-Party conflict, as a result of which Postyshev fell, correspond to the truth? In general,--yes. As to concrete motives, events and dates--no. Without any doubt Avtorkhanov, preserving in his memory a huge mass of material which he had read and heard during the period of the terror, in reproducing that material in his study, under the general limitations of human memory could not help confusing dates and the sequence of events.

It is true that the beginning of Postyshev's downfall was connected not only with his political practices in the Ukraine, which dissatisfied Stalin, but also with his behavior at the historic plenum of the Central Committee where the fate of Bukharin and Rykov was decided. But if we set this true situation and those dates and events which Avtorkhanov points out against actual reality, if we check their historical consistency, then the following picture emerges:

1. There was no November plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in 1936. At least there are no traces or hints of such a plenum anywhere in the Soviet press of that period.
2. Therefore, Stalin could not have suffered any defeat in secret voting at a plenum of the Central Committee in November 1936.
3. The practice of secret voting in elections and decisions in the Party organization was formally introduced only after the promulgation of the new constitution (December 6, 1936), that is, after the resolution of the February plenum of the Central Committee on February 27, 1937, which was made on the basis of the report by Andrei Zhdanov.²¹

20. Avtorkhanov, A., "TsK golosuyet. . . ," op. cit., p. 16.

21. ["The preparation of Party organizations for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. according to the new elective system, and the corresponding reorganization of Party political work," Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the basis of the report by A. Zhdanov, adopted on February 27, 1937], Pravda, March 6, 1937. Zhdanov's report of February 26, 1937 was published in Pravda, March 2, 1937.

4. There are no traces of a notice from the Procurator about the discontinuance of the investigation of the case of Bukharin, Rykov, or even Tomski, in Pravda or Izvestiya at the end of 1936.

Avtorkhanov's picture of the struggle for and against Bukharin, depicted so absorbingly and in such a talented manner, does not, unfortunately, correspond to the truth. The facts given in the Soviet press of that period and the sequence of events create the following picture:

1. On August 21, 1936, at the trial of Zinov'yev and Kamenev, the Procurator of the U.S.S.R., Vyshinsky, after examining the accused at an evening session, made the official announcement that he had given an order to the Procurator to begin an investigation of the cases of Tomski, Bukharin, Rykov, Radek, Pyatakov, and others.²²

2. On August 22, Tomski committed suicide at his dacha in Bol'shevo, near Moscow, after having heard, probably on the radio, that his name stood first on the list of state criminals.²³

22. Izvestiya, August 22, 1936. The text of the announcement by Vyshinsky was as follows:
 "In the preceding sessions several of the accused (Kamenev, Zinov'yev, Reingol'd) in their testimony pointed to Tomski, Bukharin, Rykov, Uglanov, Radek, Pyatakov, Serebryakov, and Sokol'nikov as people who took part in one degree or another in their criminal counterrevolutionary activity, for which the accused in the present case are now standing trial. I consider it necessary to announce to the court that yesterday I ordered the beginning of an investigation of these statements of the accused in reference to Tomski, Rykov, Bukharin, Uglanov, Radek, and Pyatakov, and depending on the results of this investigation, the procurator will present the legal procedure for this case. As far as Serebryakov is concerned, data already in the possession of the investigative agencies testify to the fact that these people are accused of counterrevolutionary crimes in connection with which Sokol'nikov and Serebryakov are being brought to trial."

23. Ibid., August 23, 1936.

3. By a decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. on September 26, 1936, Rykov was relieved of his duties on the People's Commissariat of Communications of the U.S.S.R. and was not appointed to another office.²⁴

4. No longer were there places for Bukharin and Rykov either at the Eighth Extraordinary All-Union Congress of Soviets (November 26-December 6, 1936), or on its thirty-man Presidium. Furthermore, their names were reviled and mentioned among those of enemies, spies and murderers.²⁵

5. On January 16, 1937 the name of Bukharin as the responsible editor of Izvestiya appeared for the last time. On January 17, the paper was signed by an "editorial collegium." Consequently, Bukharin's fate had already been decided at that time.

6. By a decision of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party which sat from February 25 to March 5, 1937, Bukharin and Rykov were excluded from membership on the Central Committee and from membership in the Party.²⁶

Consequently, Avtorkhanov's November 1936 plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party was really the plenum of the Central Committee at the beginning of 1937, a plenum lasting a suspiciously long time--more than ten days (according to unconfirmed information, from February 25 through March 5, 1937).

According to all the facts available it was at this plenum that Stalin put the strongest, most dangerous and most authoritative of his ideological opponents on trial--Bukharin. It was here that a dramatic scene took place, deciding the fate not only of the already doomed Bukharin and Rykov, but also of the great majority of the members of the Central Committee who were present at this plenum.

What, then, happened at the plenum? Why did the majority of the participants meet their end as a result of it?

24. Pravda, September 27, 1936.

25. Bol'shevik, 1936, No. 4.

26. Pravda, March 6, 1937.

Perhaps, as Avtorkhanov points out, the plenum of the Central Committee, having established the principle of secret voting, "voted" in the majority against the dictatorship and in defense of Bukharin and Rykov? This assumption is very tempting, but all the facts speak against it.

Stalin gave his famous report, written in special phraseology the meaning of which is accessible only to initiated participants in the action, toward the end of the plenum, and he made his concluding speech, after almost three days of discussion on his report, at the end of the session of March 5.

As early as March 6 Pravda printed an "informational notice" on the plenum of the Central Committee which had recently taken place, in which it was announced that along with other decisions, the plenum had excluded Bukharin and Rykov from the ranks of the Party. Consequently, no secret reversal by Yezhov and Stalin had taken place. What, then, did take place at this fateful plenum, following which the heads of Stalin's most important adherents began to fall, those who had the reputation of being his staunchest followers, the leaders of the Party and the Red Army?

We would find the best and most authoritative explanation in the materials on the plenum, if they had been published. But, unfortunately these materials have from that time to the present been concealed. Not one line has been printed on the character of the discussion on the reports. According to unconfirmed information, four reports were heard at the plenum: one by A. Andreyev on intra-Party struggle; one by V.M. Molotov on the social origins of the opposition and methods of combatting it²⁷; one by A. Zhdanov on the preparation of Party organizations and elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; and one by Stalin on the shortcomings of Party work and measures for liquidating Trotskyites and other double-dealers. Of the resolutions which were taken on the reports, only the one on the report of Zhdanov was published.²⁸ Neither the decisions on the

-
27. This report, entitled [Lessons of wrecking and espionage of the Japanese, German, and Trotskyite agents], in the form of an article in an altered and reworked form, about which the author himself speaks in a note, was published in Bol'shevik No. 8, 1937, that is more than two months later.
28. Pravda, March 6, 1937. [Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on the report of Zhdanov, adopted on February 27, 1937].

main report by Stalin nor the material on the three-day discussion of this report have been published. Furthermore, even the texts of Zhdanov's and Stalin's reports were not published until almost a month later,²⁹ under the supervision of well-versed persons and in a completely changed form, "edited" for the outside world. Consequently, we are deprived of any documents which could shed light on the dramatic essence of the February-March plenum.

Until the archives of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for that period become accessible to researchers, if we wish to understand the events at this important plenum, we must carefully study all the guesses and explanations of contemporaries who in some degree had a relationship either to this plenum or to its participants.

The Vorkuta Version

We set forth here an unofficial, but, it seems to us, very plausible, explanation of the character of this plenum which we obtained in the Vorkuta concentration camp at the end of 1940.

The account was obtained from several of the highest officials of the Stalinist oligarchy and from Moscow scholars and professors who occupied important positions but who fell into disgrace after the first half of 1937 and who came to Vorkuta at the end of 1938, in most cases with terms of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 25 years.³⁰

Sitting for several years in isolation, deprived of newspapers, living only on official radio broadcasts and rumors, we prisoners were mystified by the events which were taking place. We could not understand either the terrible shooting of the generals of the Red Army (the affair of

29. Zhdanov's report was delivered on February 26, 1937; extracts in ibid., March 2, 1937. Stalin's report was delivered on March 3 (the concluding part on March 5), and was published in ibid., March 29 and April 1, 1937.

30. Among the individuals referred to, it is now possible to mention Stadnik, a professor at the First Moscow State University and an outstanding specialist in *mining chemistry*.

Marshal Tukhachevski, I. Yakir and others on June 11-12, 1937), or the general massacre of all, it seemed, of the most faithful servants of the Stalinist terror machine who served him, as in the case of Postyshev, faithfully and truly and never seemed to doubt him or to belong to any opposition group. We plied every new prisoner who came to us, especially those who were in some degree connected with the most recent events in the political life of the U.S.S.R., with hundreds of questions. And they told us stories, each in his own way, without artfulness, fear or maneuvering, completely sincerely, often themselves not understanding much of what had happened. Of these numerous and many-sided tales the following remains in our memory:

After the trial of Zinov'yev and Kamenev, after Vyshinsky's "announcement" of August 21, 1936, about which we already know, on the beginning of the investigation of the case of Tomski, Bukharin, Rykov, Uglanov, Radek, Pyatakov, Serebryakov and Sokol'nikov, there took place first of all mass arrests of the closest associates of the above-mentioned former leaders of the Party. These arrests, the top secret documents which came mainly from the Special Commission of Security of the Central Committee of the Party, explaining the seriousness of the situation and the responsibility of exposing all "enemies of the people," the well-planned moves and the discrediting of all the above-named people at innumerable especially inspired lower-level Party meetings, the sudden overhaul in the leadership of the NKVD,³¹ the removal of People's Commissar of Communications Rykov³² without giving him a new office, and a number of instructions from the same Special Commission of Security on purging "the enemies of the people" from the Red Army--all this very clearly told all Communist Party officials that the fate of all former theorists, publicists, Party leaders, and oppositionists had already been decided without their consent. It told them, too, that Stalin, using the state of panic, numbness, and confusion in the ranks of the Party after the execution of Zinov'yev and Kamenev's group and screening himself with propaganda over the ratification of

31. The replacement of Yagoda by Yezhov took place, according to the decree of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., on September 26, 1936. See Pravda, September 27, 1936, No. 267.

32. Ibid.

the "most democratic constitution in the world," was preparing a new, unprecedented massacre. Many of the members of the Central Committee even the members of the Politburo (Rudzutak, Chubar, Postyshev, Kossior, Eikhe, Petrovski) saw in this turn of events a threat to their own personal safety, inasmuch as they had more than once taken Bukharin and Rykov under their protection in the past.

The incriminating materials which allegedly convicted Bukharin, Rykov and the others of anti-Party activity (and which were not once presented at the previous plenums of the Central Committee by its former chairman Yezhov) were in no way convincing or serious to the majority of members on the Central Committee and leaders of the Soviet state, who had in the past always rejected them as groundless. Nevertheless, at the beginning of January 1937, immediately before the second trial of the "Trotskyite center" of Pyatakov and Radek, Bukharin was removed from the last of his official positions as editor of Izvestiya. The ousting of Bukharin and Rykov from the ranks of the Party was made one of the central questions at the February plenum of the Central Committee. The information and announcements about the character of the forthcoming plenum, which were kept secret and intended only for the members of the Central Committee, convinced everyone that something more was in the wind than the simple exclusion of Bukharin and Rykov from the Party.

All this taken together created an extremely strained and alarming situation in the highest spheres of Party and government leadership in the U.S.S.R. The members of the Central Committee, the leaders of the national communist parties and of the governments of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the leaders of the krai and oblast committees, the commanders of the Red Army, the officials of industry and agriculture, at least all those who had never joined any opposition and who had always been adherents and supporters of Stalin, got together beforehand and decided to place before Stalin at the forthcoming plenum a number of questions concerning the strained and dangerous consequences of the intra-Party situation. The methods and measures of liquidating Trotskyites, Bukharinites and other double-dealers were, in their opinion, outside the law and threatened with death every leading member of the Party who might be suspected of disloyalty.

This agreement, unfortunately, was ^{NOT} one directed toward the liquidation of the Stalinist dictatorship. It was only an agreement of adherents and participants in this dictatorship whose goal was to correct its mistakes, to dispel the atmosphere surrounding intra-Party relationships,

which was heavily charged as a result of these mistakes, and, finally, to remind Stalin that the master of the country was not Stalin alone, but all of them together.

This agreement was made in the greatest secrecy, in order to avoid any idle talk. Its participants were sure that no one knew of their intentions. Even at the plenum it was to have appeared as a regular result of the usual discussion. The task of beginning the discussion of this plan was assigned to Postyshev, the man closest to Stalin and most trusted by him. In his opening speech Postyshev was to have remarked critically on the situation that had arisen, to have questioned the justice and practicability of the case of Bukharin and Rykov and to have introduced a number of propositions which had been worked out by all the group. The planned speeches of the majority of the participants of the plenum were to have developed even more firmly and were to have supported Postyshev's propositions and at the same time to have placed before the "boss" a definite demand and the decision of the majority.

This is what the majority of the important officials thought, in their confidential (as they thought) agreement, as they went to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party at the end of February, 1937.

But they were deeply mistaken. From the beginning of the plenum Stalin knew not only the participants in the agreement, but even the basic propositions in Postyshev's declaration. At this critical moment, when he was on the point of destroying all his ideological opponents, Stalin saw in this agreement not only a dangerous conspiracy of his closest colleagues, but also a treacherous about-face of his adherents. Apparently frightened, he reverted to his old and tried methods. He based his report at the plenum entirely on the fundamental ideas in Postyshev's proposed speech. He mobilized all his Georgian craftiness, all his Machiavellianism, duplicity, flattery, servility, threats, references to the great ideas of socialism, to the difficult, but grandiose mission of the participants at the plenum in contemporary history. In a word, he mobilized all that was available to him both in method and in materials in order to bring to naught the basic propositions of Postyshev.³³ But this was done cleverly, diplomatically, without

33. Here, by the way we shall remark that the report, published almost a month later (Pravda, March 29, 1937) and the concluding speech (Pravda, April 1, 1937) of
(footnote continued on following page)

This was a bomb-shell, unexpected and stunning. It is difficult to say what the other participants in the agreement thought and felt. But one thing is apparent: immediately after Postyshev's speech, all of them, as at the wave of a wand, in turn ascended the platform. Some confessed in a cowardly way, condemning their own intentions. Others - Rudzutak, Eikhe, Chubar and one of the military men - on the other hand, declared that they did not understand at all and saw no reason for such a fit of self-criticism. Doubts, the desire to convince oneself of the correctness of the policy being carried out, self-control and responsibility before the people - this was no crime, but the duty of every leader of the Soviet Union. Chubar is said to have made an especially brilliant speech in this respect.

Stalin seemingly took this whole drama with complete indifference. He sat with a dispassionate look, blowing puffs of smoke from his pipe, and wrote something from time to time in his notebook. When, after the three-day discussion (or, more precisely the Party confession and self-criticism of the majority), Stalin was given the concluding word, the hall froze. All awaited the judgment. But to the general surprise, Stalin spoke calmly, without his usual bitterness and rudeness, about external and internal enemies, about capitalist encirclement, about the danger of Trotskyism and other oppositionist trends, joining with interventionists and Fascists in their struggle against the Soviet state. He mentioned Trotsky, Ruth Fischer, Maslov, Max Eastman and others, opponents who were outside of his power. He spoke of the shortcomings in Party work, of tactlessness toward the rank-and-file members of the Party, and lightly, as if by chance, presented a striking example of tactlessness and losing contact with the masses, in the Kiev Party organization. He pointed to the victim of this tactlessness, "the rank-and-file member of the Party, Comrade Nikolenko," and spoke further of a number of very practical, but third-rate questions of Party and Soviet life, which had nothing in common with the problem which was disturbing all and which had been disclosed at the plenum--the problem of the agreement among the doubters. No censure, no tone of malice, no threats--none of these were in his speech on the address of the majority of those who had criticized themselves. Only toward the end of his speech did he mention them, condescendingly and even in a flattering way. He mentioned them among other things, as an episode which interested him very little, but nevertheless, a characteristic one. He expressed deep gratitude to all those comrades who displayed alarm for the fate of the Soviet state. And if, before the plenum, many had distrusted and had doubts about some practical action of the Party leadership, now, in the process of

discussion, they had arrived at complete mutual understanding and trust, and their unity and strength were all the stronger.

The plenum thus closed happily and seemingly in full agreement. Decrees were promulgated on excluding Bukharin and Rykov from the ranks of the Party, on "internal Party democracy," on "secret voting," and on the reorganization of Party work in accordance with the new constitution, and finally, detailed orders were established on "measures for liquidating Trotskyites and other double-dealers."

The plenum closed. The delegates scattered throughout the country.

Did the decisions of the plenum satisfy the doubters? Were they convinced in the process of discussion at the plenum that the murder of Bukharin, Rykov and their followers was an act of political wisdom and moral purity? Were they sure that Yezhov's method of destroying thousands of people would not remove them this time from the face of the earth? Did they trust the peaceful tone of Stalin? Did they accept as sincere his thanks for their rightful concern about the fate of the people? We know nothing about these questions.

It is known only that following this plenum Stalin lost no time in cruelly and treacherously avenging himself on all direct and indirect participants in the agreement. Whoever had dared to question the justice of the terror, or to display concern, whoever failed to believe Yezhov's charges against Bukharin and Rykov, whoever demanded guarantees of legality--all these were annihilated.

This, then, was the Vorkuta explanation, as we shall call it, of the reason for the purge of the majority of the members of the Central Committee after the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in February-March 1937. We do not insist on its absolute authenticity. Future studies will either affirm or reject it. But it seems to us the most credible explanation available at the present time for the mysterious death of the majority of Soviet officials of that time, first among whom was Postyshev.

General Conclusions

The fall of Postyshev was due to his political practices in the Ukraine toward the end of 1936, which were unsatisfactory to Stalin, and to his active participation in the agreement of the doubters at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party in the spring of 1937.

Postyshev was one of the most trusted, obedient, attentive, and devoted civil servants of the Stalinist oligarchy. For such a person to display hesitation, distrust, and even more, to participate in a secret agreement of doubters, was in the eyes of Stalin a grave and treacherous act. The culprit had to be punished -- slowly, strictly and decisively. Therefore, despite the almost traitorous role of Postyshev in relation to the participants in the agreement, despite his swift and unconditional capitulation, the vengeance of Stalin destroyed him first of all.

Within eleven days after the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937 he was removed from the post of organizational secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine, removed from membership in the Central Committee and the Politburo, accused of the mortal crimes of tolerating Trotskyites and nationalists, demoted to the leadership of a provincial oblast organization, and within a year, excluded from the Party and removed from political life altogether.

The only reward Stalin gave to his accused satrap for his traitorous role in connection with the participants in the agreement, which to a very great degree facilitated Stalin's victory at the plenum, was that he was not formally arrested, was not shot ("an exception to the general rule"), as were most of the participants in the plenum; Postyshev was merely deprived of all official Party rank and regalia and was sentenced to die, dishonored and forgotten by all, in the Kremlin hospital.

"The agreement of the doubters" was the occasion for the mass annihilation by Stalin of all who had up to that time been his adherents and comrades-at-arms, but who had dared to question the correctness and expediency of his politics and the rationality of the terror.

Only after these great terroristic operations (at the end of 1937 and during the whole of 1938) was the authoritative dictatorship of the leader, and the domination of the Party's imperialist and centralistic bureaucracy which obeyed him, completely and fully established in the U.S.S.R.

TITLES PUBLISHED IN THE MIMEOGRAPHED SERIES, JUNE 1952 - MARCH 1954

(Numbers 11, 14, 17, 19, 21, 29, 32, 41, 48, 52, 55, 56, 57 and 59 in English; others in Russian)

- No. 1: "Army Requisitions in Soviet Russia," 12 pp., \$0.25
* No. 2: "Soviet Requisitions in Occupied Germany," 17 pp., \$0.25, out of print
/ No. 3: "Administration of Azerbaijani Industry," by Andrew Naidenov, 19 pp., \$0.25
No. 4: "Kamchatka: Survey and Recollections," 93 pp., \$1.00
No. 5: "Conditions of Research in Soviet Biology," 123 pp., \$1.00, out of print
* No. 6: "Soviet Economic Administration in Postwar Germany," 37 pp., \$0.50, out of print
No. 7: "The Moscow Literary Museum and Archives," 21 pp., \$0.25
No. 8: "Political Work in the Soviet Army," 74 pp., \$0.75
No. 9: "Electrification Plans and the Deficiency of Electric Power for Industry in the Soviet Union," 48 pp., \$0.50
No. 10: "Party and Administration in the Leningrad Agricultural Institute," 33 pp., \$0.30
* No. 11: "Soviet Operation of Uranium Mines in Eastern Germany," 14 pp., \$0.25, out of print
No. 12: "Lenin School for Training of Political Officers of the Soviet Army," 15 pp., \$0.25
No. 13: "The Shelter-Belt Project: Postwar Forestation in the U.S.S.R.," 47 pp., \$0.50
No. 14: "Soviet Military Intelligence: Two Sketches," 24 pp., \$0.35
No. 15: "Notes of a Political Prisoner," 52 pp., \$0.50
No. 16: "The Operation of a State Farm," 28 pp., \$0.30
No. 17: "Soviet Security Agencies in Postwar Poland," 12 pp., \$0.25
No. 18: "Soviet Generals: Personalities, Attitudes and Conflicts," 46 pp., \$0.50
No. 19: "The Cost of Construction of Metallurgical Plants in the U.S.S.R.," by Sergei Koptewski, 76 pp. with tables, \$1.20
No. 20: "Construction Materials of the Northern Caucasus," 73 pp., \$1.00
No. 21: "Herbs Used in Ukrainian Folk Medicine," by Natalia Ossadchanata, 114 pp., \$1.25, out of print
No. 22: "An NKVD Sovkhoz in the Altai Region," by S. Belosor, 28 pp., \$0.35
/ No. 23: "Prospects for Oil Output in the U.S.S.R. by 1960," 22 pp., \$0.30
No. 24: "Some Aspects of Soviet Price Policy," by Peter Uranov, 80 pp., \$1.00
No. 25: "Soviet Forestation: Agricultural and Social Significance," by Vladimir Lindemann, 57 pp., \$0.70
No. 26: "Technical Institutes in the U.S.S.R.," by Jakow Budanow, 30 pp., \$0.40

- No. 27: "Soviet Political Personalities: Seven Profiles," 23 pp., \$0.35
- No. 28: "Some Aspects of Kalmyk History and Society," 30 pp., \$0.40
- No. 29: "The Soviet Urban Housing Problem," 16 pp., \$0.25, out of print
- No. 30: "Political Indoctrination in the Soviet Postwar Army," 29 pp., \$0.35
- No. 31: "The Soviet Movie Industry: Two Studies," by Paul Babitsky and Martin Lutich, 83 pp., \$0.95
- No. 32: "The Law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania: Background and Bibliography," by Leo Okinshevich, 53 pp., \$0.75
- No. 33: "Kolkhoz Mechanization," by S. Belosor, 81 pp., \$0.90
- No. 34: "Byelorussian Communism and Nationalism: Personal Recollections," by S. Krushinsky, 81 pp., \$0.90
- No. 35: "Soviet Population Trends, 1926-1939," by Basilius Martshenko, 41 pp., \$0.50
- No. 36: "Party and Political Organs in the Soviet Army," by I. Dmitriev, 59 pp., \$0.65
- * No. 37: "Soviet Dismantling of Equipment in Postwar Germany," by Vladimir Alexandrov, 28 pp., \$0.35
- No. 38: "The Science of Fertilization in Ukrainian Agriculture," by Gregory Makhiv, 97 pp., \$1.05
- * No. 39: "The Administration of the Coal Industry in Soviet-Occupied Germany," by Mikhail Mab, 19 pp., \$0.25
- No. 40: "Pereval: The Withering of Literary Spontaneity in the U.S.S.R.," by Gleb Glinka, 110 pp., \$1.20
- No. 41: "The Introduction of New Plants in Soviet Agriculture: Supervision and Control," by Nestor Korol, 16 pp., \$0.30
- No. 42: "Higher Technical Training in the U.S.S.R.," by Nicolay Ivanov, 38 pp., \$0.50
- No. 43: "The 1952 Plan for the Draining of the Pripet Marshes," by G. Kazakov, 27 pp., \$0.40
- No. 44: "Religious Communes in the U.S.S.R.," by K. Petrus, 73 pp., \$0.85
- No. 45: "The Pushkin Edition of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences," by L.L. Domherr, 110 pp. plus photostats, \$1.50
- No. 46: "The Concise Philosophical Dictionary: A Critical Review," by Alexander Philipov, 58 pp., \$0.70
- No. 47: "Urban Construction in the Soviet Union," 33 pp., \$0.45
- No. 48: "Lespromkhoz as an Administrative and Production Unit," by P. Nikitin, 82 pp., \$0.95
- No. 49: "Cultural Life in the Tatar Autonomous Republic," by T. Dawletschin, 45 pp., \$0.55
- No. 50: "Soviet Military Tribunals," by P. Zorin, 30 pp., \$0.40
- No. 51: "Consumer Cooperatives in the Soviet Union," by Peter Uranov, 180 pp. plus appendixes, \$2.00
- No. 52: "Arbitration in the Soviet Union," by Leo A. Yaresh, 149 pp., \$1.60
- No. 53: "Elements of Disloyalty in Turkmenistan," by Jan Dubicki, 49 pp., \$0.60
- No. 54: "Solonetz and Chestnut Brown Solonetzic Soils in the U.S.S.R.," by Peter Kolymsky, 104 pp., \$1.15

- No. 55: "The Principle of Analogy in Criminal Law: An Aspect of Soviet Legal Thinking," by Jurij Starosolskyj, 91 pp., \$1.00
- No. 56: "The German Occupation in Northern Russia During World War II: Political and Administrative Aspects," by Oleg Anisimov, 37 pp., \$0.45
- No. 57: "Soviet National Literature in the New Soviet Encyclopedia," by Peter Yershov, 11 pp., \$0.20
- No. 58: "Civilian Life Under the German Occupation 1942-1944," by Vladimir D. Samarin, 90 pp., \$1.00
- No. 59: "Soviet Shipping in the Spanish Civil War," 22 pp., \$0.30

✓ Available in English in Materials on the Soviet Petroleum Industry, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, July 1953.

* These papers have been published by the Research Program in English in its STUDIES ON THE U.S.S.R. No. 3, Soviet Economic Policy in Postwar Germany, 184 pages: \$2.25. Nos. 37 and 39 are still available in Russian in mimeographed form.

Note.--Author's names are listed above only when they appear on the printed manuscripts.

Orders may be placed with the Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 401 West 118th Street, New York 27, N.Y. Standing orders will be accepted for automatic shipment of all publications as they become available. No discount is granted on mimeographed materials.

