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THE GREAT MAN-MADE FAMINE
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EDITOR'S NOTE: Noted scholar Dmytro Solovey, who has devoted a number of years to the study of the tragic depopulation of Ukraine, here discusses one of the main causes, one which is also the most heartrending one. In 1932-1933 the Kremlin deliberately inflicted a famine on the Ukrainian lands which claimed, in round numbers, seven million victims. Mr. Solovey delves deeply into the reasons for this most heinous example—in the twentieth century, at least—of man's inhumanity to man.

1. POPULATION LOSS IN UKRAINE FROM 1926 TO 1960 UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

Academician M. V. Ptukha, noted Ukrainian demographer who died in Kiev in 1961, read a paper at the 19th session of the International Statistical Institute¹ in Tokyo in 1930. Entitled "Ukraine's Population to 1930," the text was published in French in *The Bulletin of the International Statistical Institute*. In it Ptukha estimated that in 1960 Ukraine would have 46.1 million people in its territories as of 1926. He was guided in his estimate by the December 17, 1926 census as well as by current statistics on population movements.

The natural increase in Ukraine's population from 1924 to 1927 averaged 2.36 per cent annually. In the years 1928-29, which saw the start of the brutal attack on the villages by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (CC ACP[b]), the natural growth of population in Ukraine declined to 1.92 per cent annually. Academician Ptukha took into consideration this lower natural increase of 1928-29.

The extrapolations of Ptukha, who at that time was president of the Demographic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, were officially accepted and used by the government for its five-year plans.

As a result of the Second World War, the area of the UkSSR was increased by the addition of Ukrainian ethnographic territories which hitherto had belonged to other states. The additional territories included: a) the Western Ukrainian lands which had been

¹ Vol I, No. 3; The Hague, 1931; pp. 59-88.

under Poland, with a population of 8 million; b) parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina, which had been under Rumania, with 1,565,000 and c) Carpatho-Ukraine, formerly under Hungary and Czechoslovakia, with 725,000 persons.² A little later (1954) the Crimea was added to the Ukrainian Republic. That peninsula's 1939 census had recorded 1,127,000 inhabitants.³

Altogether a total of 11,417,000 swelled the population of the UkSSR. Thus when to Ptukha's estimate for 1960 of 46.1 million population (for Ukraine's 1926 terrain) are added these 11,417,000, then in 1960 Ukraine should have had, in its enlarged area, at least 57,517,000 inhabitants—even without taking into account any natural increase. But the official statistics issued by Moscow in 1960 indicate the actual population of Ukraine to be only 43,091,000.⁴

The population of Ukraine in 1960, therefore, falls short by 14,426,000 of the figure conservatively predicted by Academician Ptukha—a shortage of 33.5 per cent of the country's population!

The figure of 57,517,000 does not take into consideration any natural increase in the course of almost twenty years in the population added as the result of the Second World War. At a growth rate of 0.5 per cent a year, the 11,417,000 added population should have yielded at least an additional million people. With this natural increase Ukraine's population should have been between 58.5 and 59.0 million instead of 43 million. Moreover, we did not deduct from the actual 1960 figure of 43,091,000 the number of Russian colonizers sent into Ukraine in the years 1926-60 by Moscow's occupational regime, which boosted the population count of the country.

This intensive colonization of Ukraine went hand in hand with the mass deportation of the ethnic Ukrainian population to outlying areas of the USSR. According to the 1926 census there were 2,670,000 Russians in Ukraine; this number adjusted to the enlarged area of today would be 3,055,000,⁵ or 8.1 per cent of the then population of Ukraine. The 1959 census, however, shows there are now twice as

² *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia)*, Vol. USSR, Moscow, 1948, p. 1810; *Strany Mira (Countries of the World)* Second Edition, Moscow, OGYZ, RSFSR, 1946, p. 194.

³ F. Lorimer: *The Population of the Soviet Union*, 1946; p. 162.

⁴ *Narodnoye Khozaystvo SSSR v 1960 Godu (State Economy of the USSR in 1960)* Moscow, 1961; p. 8.

⁵ Vol. Kubyovych: *Natsionalnyi Sklad Naselennia Ryadianskoi Ukrainy v Svitli Sovyetskykh Perepysiv z 17. XII. 1926 i 15. I. 1959 (National Composition of Population of Soviet Ukraine in the Light of Soviet Censuses of December 17, 1926 and January 1, 1959)* *Zapysky NTSh*. Vol. CLXIX; Paris 1962, p. 3.

many Russians in Ukraine, or 7,091,000—16.9 per cent of the country's population.⁶ Whence, then, so many Russians?

Between December 17, 1926, and January 16, 1959, the entire population of Ukraine in the present-day area increased (using an adjusted 1926 figure to correspond to the larger area) from 37,870,000 to 41,869,000—an increase of 10.6 per cent.⁷

When this percentage increase is applied to the Russians living in Ukraine, their 1926 figure of 3,055,000 should increase to 3,379,000 in 1959. But their actual count in 1959 was 7,091,000—3,712,000 higher. We conclude, therefore, that almost four million Russians were brought into Ukraine one way or another, replacing a like number of the autochthonous population which Ukraine lost in some manner.

Hence if the CC CPSU had not brought to Ukraine these 3,712,000 Russian colonizers, then the loss of Ukraine's population between 1926 and 1960 would have been seen not as 14,426,000 but a figure greater by 3,712,000, or 18,138,000—without taking into account the already mentioned natural increase in the population of the added territories. The 18,138,000 shortage in population now represents 42.1 per cent, and not 33.5 per cent, of the 1960 Ukrainian census.

What, then, are the reasons for this tremendous population loss suffered by Ukraine that these calculations reveal, calculations all the more shocking because of their conservatism? There are several:

1. A bloody, nation-wide series of waves of terror, resulting from the Ukrainians' opposition to the alien occupation regime of Moscow;
2. Massive and inhuman deportations of the Ukrainian people from their native land;
3. The heinous man-made famine of 1932-33, resulting in a loss of life running into the millions, followed by another famine in 1946-47;
4. Huge casualties suffered in the Second World War;
5. Another reign of terror, inflicted because of real, as well as imaginary, collaboration of Ukrainians with the Germans (briefly viewed as liberators by the oppressed Ukrainians) and the voluntary surrender of Ukrainian soldiers to the German military authorities;

⁶ *Chyslennost, Sostav in Rahzmeshchenye Naselenya SSSR. Kratkyye Ytogy Vsesoyuznoy Perepysy Naselenya 1959 goda (Numbers, Composition and Distribution of the Population of the USSR. Short Conclusions of the All-Union Census of 1959.) Gosstatysdat, Moscow 1961, p. 29.*

⁷ We are using calculations cited by Kubyovych, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

6. The resettlement of Ukrainian youth in the virgin lands and at new construction projects in Kazakhstan, Altai, Siberia and elsewhere;

7. All the foregoing made in turn for another factor of population decline: a catastrophic disproportion of men to women, which over the course of 30 years dwindled to 3 to 7;

8. A severe decrease of the number of births in Ukraine, as for example, during the great famine, which could not offset the number of deaths.⁸

All these factors, with the exception of the Nazi *Schrecklichkeit* policy during Hitler's administration in the Second World War, stemmed from a planned colonial policy on the part of Communist Russia in Ukraine and its desire to exterminate the Ukrainian nation, which kept striving for its independence.

Here we shall discuss only the man-made famine of 1932-33, which was organized by the CC CPSU as an instrument of vengeance, and the forced collectivization of the First Five-Year Plan (1928-33).

2. GOAL AND METHODS OF COLLECTIVIZATION

Towards the end of the 1920's, the CC ACP (b), headed by Stalin, launched the five-year plans for the development of industry, the first encompassing the period 1928-33. Without the development of industry, especially heavy industry, the dictatorial regime of the Communist Party would not have been able to stay in power in a country ravaged by war and revolutions. The party authorities, therefore, decided to take under their direct control all of the country's material resources and to accelerate the development of industry. But such development entailed considerable capital. Where was this capital to come from?

In his speech summarizing the first five-year plan at the composite plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, January 7, 1933, Stalin said:

The party knew how the industries of England, Germany and America had been built. It knew that heavy industry in those nations was developed either with the aid of heavy loans or through the exploitation of other nations, or through both these ways at the same time.

He added that both these means were closed to the party, saying:

⁸ For more details see Dmytro Solovey: *Liudnist Ukrainy za Sorok Rokiv Vlady CK KPSS u Svitli Perepysiv (Ukraine's Population during the Forty Years of the CC CPSU Rule in the Light of Censuses)*, Detroit, 1961. (The facsimile from *Vilna Ukraina*, Nos. 24-27).

On what, then, did it (the party) count? It counted on our country's own resources, it counted on having the Soviet form of government:: basing our policies on the nationalization of the soil, industry, transportation, banks, and trade, we can conduct the most austere economic policy in order to stockpile resources sufficient for the rebuilding and development of heavy industry. The party openly stated that this matter would entail serious sacrifices, and that we had to go along with these sacrifices openly and in full awareness if we wished to reach the goal. The party counted on our ability to do so with the country's internal resources alone, without enslaving credits and loans from the outside.⁹

As was not unusual, Stalin was saying here not quite what he was thinking. Although he dismissed "enslaving credits and loans from the outside," he did not, however, discard a means he had mentioned earlier—exploitation of the colonies.

To Stalin and CC ACP(b) these colonies consisted of: a) the peasantry, which as the petit bourgeoisie, had to be destroyed according to the Bolshevik program); b) the non-Russian republics, occupied and annexed to the USSR by force of the Red armies. Among those non-Russian republics Ukraine caught Stalin's special attention because of its rich natural resources and the developed agriculture, on the one hand, and her struggle for independent statehood during the 1917-22 period, on the other.

The party organ *Proletarskaya Pravda* explained in its January 22, 1930 issue that the goal of the collectivization of agriculture in Ukraine was:

The destruction of Ukrainian nationalism's social base—the individual land holdings.¹⁰

The fact that the industrial development of the RSFSR—then as now—was realized at the expense of the non-Russian republics can be shown from official statistics. They clearly indicate the colonial principle operating in the distribution among the republics of the capital resources of the state. Thus over 38 years (1918-1955), according to the CC ACP(b) plans, the capital investments (using July 1, 1955 prices) were made as follows: ¹¹

⁹ Stalin: *Pidsumky pershoyi pyatyrichky (Summary of the First Five-Year Plan)*. *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 1-2 for 1933, p. 10.

¹⁰ Quoted from F. Pihido: *Ukraina pid bilshovytskoyu okupatsiyeyu (Ukraine Under the Bolshevik Occupation)*, Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956; p. 107.

¹¹ Compiled from *The National Economy of the USSR, The National Economy of the RSFSR* and *The National Economy of the Ukrainian SSR*.

| REPUBLICS: | Investments in Billions of Rubles | Percentage of USSR Total | Population % in April 1956 | % Investments Higher (+) & Lower (-) Relative to Population |
|-------------------|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| RSFSR ----- | 968.4 | 67.1 | 56.5 | + 10.6 |
| Ukraine ----- | 236.8 | 16.4 | 20.3 | — 3.9 |
| Other | | | | |
| 13 Republics ---- | 238.8 | 16.5 | 23.2 | — 6.7 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| Total for | | | | |
| USSR ----- | 1,444.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 0 |

The percentages in this table speak for themselves. To be added is the fact that the manner of distribution of capital investments has not changed in the decade following. Thus for a half century the CC CPSU has been developing the industry in the RSFSR at the expense of the non-Russian republics, since the latter do not get their fair and needed share of capital investments from the supposedly common state coffers.

Let us now go back to Stalin's speech of January 7, 1933. The terrible consequences of the famine had by then become evident, which was the reason why foreigners were no longer allowed to visit Ukraine. His words about the accumulation of capital for the development of industry—of calling for "serious sacrifices" and a willingness to accept these sacrifices—take on, in this context, an eloquent and evil meaning.

In their plan to gain the needed capital from the internal resources of the country, the CC ACP(b), led by Stalin, began its destruction of agricultural holdings by tearing away tens of millions of peasants from their soil, livestock and agricultural equipment. In the place of individual land holdings, the government established fictional collective farms—*kolhosps* (*kolkhozes* in Russian—D. S.). These *kolhosps* came under the complete control of the party and its state machinery. The production of the *kolhosps* was maximized through quotas established by the party center for the foreign trade (which provided the party with currency) and for the feeding of the urban population. The *kolhosps* were managed by party functionaries, sent down expressly for that purpose. These collective farms were called co-operatives, and their establishment was achieved on a seemingly voluntary basis. In actuality, the peasants resisted, realizing the forceful nature of their establishment and their threat.

Stalin, along with the CC ACP(b), decided to "liquidate" millions of peasants—that section of the population that the party called

the useless and backward "petit bourgeois masses"—in order to make their possessions instantly available to the state and the party

In creating a psychology of terror among the peasantry in order to paralyze any desire to rebel against the party, the CC ACP(b) decided to destroy first of all the prosperous layer of the peasantry. This segment was given the label of *kurkuls*, regardless of whether they used hired labor on their land or not. In other words, it made no difference whether they were exploiting another man's labor or were using members of their own family to cultivate the land. On the secret orders of the party center, all possessions of this category of the agricultural class—including their better clothing—were confiscated. They themselves, along with their children and the older members of their families, were deported during the cruel winter months to their deaths in the far, harsh and uncultivated corners of the USSR.

Control figures for the accomplishment of the genocidal action were handed down by the party center to each *oblast*, *rayon*, and village council. And it was in vain that some local administrators (party men), as the case in Kaharlyk near Kiev in the autumn of 1929, tried to convince the center that "there are no *kurkuls* (*kulaks* in Russian—D. S.) in our area, only peasants."¹² They were enjoined "to find" those *kurkuls*. What eased the task was the center's order to place in this category all opponents or persons who were politically unreliable as regards the Soviet rule. A documentary example of such deportation of non-Russians is provided by the "Smolensk Documents" (after the Byelorussian city of Smolensk) which fell into American hands after the Second World War.

In order to push the rest of the peasants into the *kolhosps* and to force them to hand over to these collective farms their land, cattle and farm implements, a whole system of "convincing" arrangements was worked up.

For unmarried landholders who balked at joining the *kolhosps*, wholly unreasonable income taxes were established. Also, they were assigned individual production quotas that were impossible to fulfill. For ensuing non-fulfillment of quotas the peasants were then tried by the party courts, which branded them "little *kurkuls*," "enemies of the state," "saboteurs," and "evil breakers of state plans." All their possessions were confiscated, and they themselves were exiled to concentration camps or the virgin lands. This led to spontaneous but uncoordinated peasant revolts, insurrections and "old wives' rebellions." These proved no match for the GPU forces.

¹² *Pravda*, October 9, 1929.

A high Soviet official, G. Tokayev (an Ossetian by birth), for a long time was associated with persons close to the party directorate and himself was familiar with the backstage affairs of the CC ACP(b). Leaving the USSR in 1949, he wrote as follows about L. M. Kaganovich, whom he called "a classic example of a talented tyrant-dictator":

During the period of collectivization and liquidation of the *kurkuls* in a number of Northern Caucasian, Central Asian and Western Siberian *rayons* (*rayons* settled primarily by non-Russians, in some cases by a majority of Ukrainians—D. S.), a number of armed uprisings broke out against the Soviet rule, and the regime appeared to hang by a thread. Some secretaries and responsible workers of the CC ACP(b) quickly dissociated themselves from the Stalin-Molotov line, making declarations in which they absolved themselves of responsibility for its results. At that time Kaganovich appeared at the head of the CC. He directed a gigantic organizational and political work which shortly "brought order," ruthlessly dispersed the "squeakers" and saved the oligarchy from a catastrophe.

A little later new uprisings broke out in the Chechen, Ingush, Northern Ossetia and Kuban areas. In some cases the Soviet authorities were deposed; in other *rayons* passive resistance in the *kolhosps* in the form of intentional slowdowns of work took on threatening proportions. The Politburo decided to punish the rebels with a man-made famine. Kaganovich himself came to the Northern Caucasus (the Ukrainian Kuban was part of it—D. S.) at the head of twenty members and candidates of the CC ACP(b) and a mass of NKVD men. On his orders the peasants' remaining provisions were taken away from them, tens of thousands of them were arrested and convoyed to concentration camps, whole settlements and villages were exiled to Siberia; and, in this way, it was possible to compel the free land to "like" the *kolhosp* life.¹³

By use of terrorism the CC ACP(b) was able to push the major part of the peasantry into the *kolhosps* as early as 1931. In the official *History of the ACP(b)*, published in 1945, one may read:

The year 1931 produced new growth in the *kolhosps* movement. Among the main grain-producing *rayons* more than 80 per cent of the peasant holdings were consolidated. By then collectivization had been basically completed.

The expropriation on a national scale of the holdings of tens of millions of peasants served to give the state, which was under the complete control of the party, the needed capital. But this was merely the beginning. The peasant lands, cattle, and farm equipment taken over by the state had to continue producing maximum profits for the state.

To make this possible the peasants had to be paid the minimum in wages. But since the *kolhosps* were called co-operatives, the state was relieved of concern over what the workers—the peasants as

¹³ Hr. Tokayev: *Kremlevskie Dyktatory: L. M. Kaganovich, K. E. Voroshilov (Kremlin Dictators), Obyedynennyi Kavkaz*, No. 1-2 for 1953, p. 13.

members of the collective farms—were paid. At the same time the state took virtually all of the *kolhosps'* production by assigning them extremely high quotas. Most collective farm workers, finding themselves on starvation rations, lost all incentive.

In order to compel the millions of collective farm members to work for almost nothing, and so that capital could thereby be accumulated, the Party, headed by Stalin, turned to more terror and deportations, directed this time against the collective farmers.

Consequently, during the first five-year plan several hundred thousand families were exiled from the Ukrainian SSR alone. Some estimate the total number of people deported as lying between 1.5 and 2.5 million. Khrushchev, who could supply a fairly exact figure, has kept silent about it to this day.

At the XXth and XXIInd Party congresses Khrushchev exposed a good many crimes of Stalin. He especially made it known that many innocent members of the Bolshevik Party had been tried, exiled and done away with. After these revelations many thousands of these victims were rehabilitated; the good name of the majority could be restored only posthumously. But the rehabilitation affected only Party members (their number has not reached the 10,000 mark). Many other Party members who fell in the purge still have not been reclaimed from the ranks of the damned. Why? Either because those who died have no relatives or friends to raise the question of redemption with the CC of the CPSU or because those who survived remain ideologically at odds even with the present leadership of the Party.

On the genocide perpetrated during Stalin's regime Khrushchev has said little, and nothing at all that is concrete. In his secret speech before the XXth congress he touched only on the deportation in 1944 of all the Chechens, Ingush and Balkars from their homelands and the liquidation of their autonomous republics. Khrushchev also revealed Stalin's intention to deport all Ukrainians from their ancestral lands, adding that this proved impossible since "there were too many of them and there was no place to which they could all be sent." Later he spoke about Stalin's plan to destroy the Ukrainian intelligentsia—the brains of the nation. But at the same time Khrushchev to this day has said nothing about the millions of Ukrainian victims who died as a result of the deportations, political terror and many other acts of mass genocide committed in 1929-32. Thus the all-pervading collectivization terror of 1929-32 and the heinous man-made famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine officially still remain unknown. And why? Obviously because Khrushchev feels that they cannot quite be swept under Stalin's carpet; the responsibility of the Party and of himself, as its functionary, cannot be concealed.

He evidently considers the acts of genocide against millions of Ukrainians as something quite in order, necessary, and lawful: they were committed in the interests of the Bolshevik Party. Otherwise, his silence in these matters cannot be explained.

Speaking in Moscow, however, at the March 7-8, 1963 meeting of Party activists, writers and artists, Khrushchev called on the young writers to emulate the "boldness and directness" of an older writer, Mykhail Sholokhov. Unexpectedly, he read an excerpt from a letter written by Sholokhov to Stalin in 1933. (This letter has never been published and its complete text is unknown.) In it Sholokhov wrote how in Vyeshensky and other *rayons* on the Don *kolhosp* members by the tens of thousands had disappeared. Khrushchev quoted the following:

If everything I have written merits the attention of the Central Committee then send to the Vyeshensky *rayon* true communists, men who would have enough courage to disregard personalities, to uncover all who are responsible for dealing the death blow to the *kolhosp* economy of the *rayon*; men who would really investigate the matter and uncover not only those who used the repulsive 'methods' of tortures, beatings and abuses, but also those who directed them to do so.

Stalin did not, of course, order any sort of investigation, knowing full well who had inspired the whole thing. Although he thanked Sholokhov for the letter, he also reproached him for seeing only one side of the matter, that is, for not seeing that the "honorable peasants" (Stalin wrote sarcastically) "actually conducted a 'silent' war against the Soviet authorities—a war for its destruction."

All this sheds a ray of light, this time an official one, on what took place in the collectivization and grain production of the First Five-Year Plan.

As Khrushchev publicly admitted, the state machinery, directed by the Party, used moral and, more often, physical pressure in order to wrest from the collective farmers as much produce as possible—produce which was supposed to be their wages in kind for their hard labor on the *kolhosps*.

The loose but greatly overestimated plans for the surrender to the state of grain and other agricultural products and the "hideous methods" of grain consignment—all became in the hands of the Party dictatorship a terrible political and economic weapon. At the same time, this weapon was wielded mainly in the non-Russian republics, especially Ukraine. Here this Party weapon became not only a means to force people into collective farms, not only a means to push them toward harder work in the *kolhosps*, not only a means to persuade individual *kolhospniks* to hand over to the state their justly earned "remnants," it also provided a weapon which the Party used

to revenge itself on the rebellious elements; a device to strangle potential opposition; a method which could paralyze the striving towards independent existence of the non-Russian nations, particularly the Ukrainian nation.

3. UKRAINE—SOURCE OF TROUBLES FOR THE IMPERIALISTIC RUSSIAN CHAUVINISTS AND TARGET OF THEIR VENGEANCE

With its Third *Universal* (November 20, 1917), the Ukrainian Central *Rada*, the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine created in the spring of 1917, established the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR), located within the boundaries of the democratic Russia. But after Lenin's brutal ultimatum demanding Ukraine's complete subordination to the Bolshevik rule and after the Bolshevik armed attack on Ukraine, the *Rada*, while conducting a defensive war, declared the Ukrainian National Republic to be independent of Russia (the Fourth *Universal*, January 22, 1918) and signed a peace treaty with Germany and its allies.

The armed defensive war of the UNR against the Red Moscow forces lasted several years. Finally, in 1920, the Bolsheviks defeated the young Ukrainian army. The Ukrainians had fought on fervor alone, for they had had no peace-time in which to organize the army properly, and had felt the need of armaments, ammunition and medical supplies. Overrunning the Ukrainian territories in 1921-22 the Bolsheviks were able to disperse the uncoordinated insurgents who had continued to spring up from among the Ukrainian peasantry.

In the following years (1923-30), with the final complete loss of Ukrainian political independence and the establishment at the end of 1922 of the centralized USSR, the main energies of awakened Ukraine quickly returned to the fight for Ukrainian national and cultural independence. A clear echo of this fight was heard even at the XIIth congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), convening April 17-25, 1923, where the nationality question was raised.¹⁴

After the 1917 revolution, the Ukrainian national and cultural renaissance, which had been checked and throttled by the Czarist government, took giant steps forward. This mighty process of awakening in Ukraine seriously disturbed all the Russian imperialists, ex-

¹⁴ See *Dvenadtsatyy syezd Rossiyskoy Kommunisticheskoy partii (bolshevikov)*. *Stenograficheskoy otchet*. (The 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolsheviks]. *Stenographic Report*.) Moscow: 1923. See also *VKP(b) v rezolutsiakh i rishenniakh zyzidiv, konferentsiy i plenumiv Ts. K. (ACP[b] in Resolutions and Decisions of Conferences, Congresses and Plenums CC)*, Part II; Kiev: 1941.

pansionists and chauvinists. It also disturbed the upper echelons of the Party, including Stalin. It was this ruling Bolshevik clique in the Kremlin that planned the cruel *pogrom* of Ukrainian life, especially of the Ukrainian peasantry during the collectivization. This peasantry was the backbone of the Ukrainian nation; it never let itself be affected by Russification and assimilation to the extent that, unfortunately, the educated strata of the Ukrainian populace did.

From the very first days of the 1917 Revolution Ukrainian schools began to spring up—first through the resources of the citizens, co-operatives and local assemblies (*zemstvos*), later through the state. Also appearing in the cities and villages of Ukraine were community enlightenment organizations—the *Prosvitas*. These bodies organized Ukrainian libraries, courses, amateur dramatic and choral societies, and even publishing houses in the larger centers.

At that time, too, Ukrainian orthography and the Ukrainian literary language were made official under the Ukrainian National Republic. The language quickly seeped through all the forms of community and state life: the schools, churches, theaters, scientific institutes, government, courts, diplomacy, post office, railways, army and navy. Intensive effort was put into the development of scientific and technical terminology. Up to the revolution all this had been forbidden by the Czarist authorities. And although after their occupation of the Ukrainian territories the Bolshevik authorities had relegated the Ukrainian language once more to a second-class status, they were unable to halt the development of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian literature and writings, for example, continued to grow through new works of fiction, technical books, textbooks, scientific publications and publicistic pamphlets.

The national consciousness of the Ukrainian people at large, severely repressed until the revolution, began to crystallize. This whole great process of rebirth also touched the then small urban population and the denationalized educated layers. Awakened by the February, 1917 revolution, the Ukrainian people quickly turned from an ethnographic mass into a modern nation.

By the end of the first decade after the revolution, the Ukrainian peasantry had furnished thousands of the youth to the new Ukrainian intelligentsia who with great swiftness and ardor acquired a secondary and higher education and technical training and began to take over the leadership in the flowering of their national culture.

This process was clearly reflected in the numbers of Ukrainians attending the "technicums" (vocational high schools) and the universities of Ukraine. (Unfortunately, exact data for the early 1920s are unavailable.)

PERCENTAGE OF UKRAINIANS IN UKRAINIAN TECHNICUMS,
UNIVERSITIES AND INSTITUTES

| Year | Technicums | Universities and Institutes |
|------|------------|--------------------------------|
| 1924 | 57.0 | 30.0 |
| 1933 | 68.0 | 55.0 |
| 1934 | 70.0 | 60.0 |

In order to brake to a stop this process of the Ukrainian national renaissance, the CC of the ACP(b), led by Stalin, formulated a plan as early as 1920 which would destroy all the cultural achievements of the Ukrainian nation and kill off a significant portion of the population:

1. An attack was launched on all the Ukrainian linguistic work. Publication of the basic, multi-volume Russian-Ukrainian academic dictionary was stopped in 1924. The same fate befell the publication of the historic dictionary of the Ukrainian language, whose first two volumes appeared in 1930-32, as well as the publication of numerous terminological dictionaries. The use of dictionaries already published was forbidden. The Institute of Scientific Language at the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (VUAN) was closed.

2. In 1930 all the work of VUAN, especially its humanities branches, was totally destroyed.¹⁵ The work of the other Ukrainian cultural and national organizations met the same end.

3. A massive physical destruction of the Ukrainian scientific and cultural cadres was started. Its beginning was marked by the trials, specially set up by the GPU, of members of the "Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (SVU)," trials which were followed by a host of others.^{15 a}

4. Last but not least in the plan was the horrible annihilation of millions of Ukrainian peasants through a man-made famine.

These limitless and ruthless terroristic actions were part and parcel of Bolshevik rule from the very start. Let us recall, for example, the order, dated September 3, 1918, of Soviet Russia's internal affairs minister about which Steinberg wrote in his *Workshop of the Revolution* (New York: 1954, p. 148): "There must be neither hesitation nor doubts in the utilization of mass terror."¹⁶

¹⁵ See Prof. N. Polonska-Vasylenko: *Ukrainska Akademia Nauk. Narys istorii, Ch. 1 (1918-1930) (The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. An Outline of History No. 1 (1918-1930) No. 2 (1931-1941)*. Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955 and 1958.

^{15 a} See, for example, Hryhory Kostyuk: *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine. A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror (1929-1939)*, Munich, 1960.

¹⁶ *Narodna Volya*, No. 22, May 30, 1963; p. 6.

In order to make everything concerning the peasant appear normal from the outside, Stalin and the CC ACP (b) made especially flagrant use of such methods in the 1931-32 and 1932-33 agricultural years. The Party organs purposely estimated high yields for the still unharvested grain. From those unrealistically high estimates the Party established maximal supply quotas. According to statistics compiled by P. Berlin, the authorities took from the Soviet peasants the following proportions of the harvest (after accounting for the sowing): in 1928—17.6 per cent; in 1929—27.3 per cent; in 1930—(after collectivization) more than 30 per cent and in 1931—more than 40 per cent.¹⁷ (He was unable to determine the exact percentage of the grain taken in 1930.) But these statistics apply to the whole of the USSR. In Ukraine, where the pressure on the peasants was incalculably greater, these percentages could not but be far higher. When the collective farms and the few remaining private holdings inevitably were unable to meet their quota of grain and other agricultural products, the peasants were accused of stealing, hoarding, sabotage, and so forth. Then, as punishment, the authorities confiscated all the food that could be found, leaving the peasants and their children to face certain death from hunger. This was a conscious, planned pogrom of the Ukrainian nation, with overriding political aims.

4. MASS PARTY AND GOVERNMENT MEASURES DURING THE STARVATION IN UKRAINE

The planning for the 1932-33 action was a thorough affair. First of all, in order to lay the ground for the most austere economic regime possible, all sales of food and other staples on the open market were forbidden at the beginning of the first five-year plan. Monthly rationing for families was instituted for the distribution of food products. But it would be a mistake to infer that the rations were allowed all citizens. Far from it.

The individual holders, the *holhospniks*, the unorganized craftsmen in the state-approved unions—these did not get any ration coupons. Among the villages only Party members, government officials and employees of the machine-tractor stations (MTS) could receive the state-supplied products.

Even city-dwellers did not all receive ration coupons—favored only were those who worked in the state factories and those who were government employees. But even with these there was no equality. Most of the citizens received only very dark rye bread. (White

¹⁷ *Narodnaya Pravda*, No. 6 for 1949, p. 2: P. Berlin: *Vo chto Stalin oboshelsya Rossyy. K semydesyatyletyu J. V. Stalina.* (Of What Use Was Stalin to Russia. On the 70th Birthday of J. V. Stalin.)

bread, made from well-milled grain, is more expensive and rare in the USSR—translator's note.) Some received 125 gr. of this bread per day per person, others 250 gr., and heavy industry workers received 400, 600 and even 800 gr. Members of their families received less, or the minimum set for the locality. Scientists and engineers were entitled to much more than the average. As an added diabolical touch, one was required to buy the bread every day. Those who were financially unable to pay for their ration of bread on a given day and those who were not fortunate enough to get to the counter before the shelves emptied were those who were not allowed to receive rations the following day. This led to constant, unnerving fear and the need to wait in bread lines for hours in order not to miss the day's ration.

Besides bread, other food products and staples were distributed on a strict ration basis. These, too, were distributed unequally. Nor did acquiring the coupons mean that a person would be able to afford the food; they conveyed merely a right to buy. Many could not exercise it.

To make this matter of uneven distribution more palatable, the government established "closed stores" in which only certain categories of customers were able to shop. There were separate stores for the employees of the people's commissariat, the Central Committee and the *Oblast* Party committees, and the members of the GPU-NKVD (state police) and the local gendarmerie. The other privileged classes to whom these stores were open were the military staff officers, managers of state factories, engineers, scientists, etc. These stores had better supplies, with larger centers having correspondingly greater quantities. Thus the whole population of the country was deliberately divided into many socio-economic groups with varying privileges. One's position could range from the comfortable to one of destitution. There were millions in the last category.

These measures were adopted to forestall the development of a dangerous all-pervading discontent. With this system in operation, certain social groups which were important to the state tended to be on the side of the Party. Moreover, this system was calculated to create antagonism between city dwellers and rural people—the so-called petty bourgeoisie. Party propaganda added fuel to the flames by loudly proclaiming that some villagers did not want to work, that they wanted to destroy Soviet authority, that they were deliberately creating food supply shortages, and so on.

Knowing well that the terrorist action directed against the peasants would result in shortages of food in the city, the CC ACP (b) hit upon a happy scheme. Throughout the country they had stores opened with the deceptive name "Torgsyn" (*torgovla s inostrantsamy*, or

“trade with foreigners”). In these stores any citizen was at liberty to buy, in unlimited quantity and without ration coupons, complete selections of the best available food products, clothes, and other goods. But all payment had to be either in gold, silver or foreign currency. Moreover, every customer had to give his name and address.

By this method the government garnered the precious metals. It was done inexpensively, for the Torgsyn prices were high, and the precious metals were given a low valuation. On top of this, the GPU-NKVD swooped down on the premises of those who had been able to buy in the special stores and would confiscate any remaining valuables.

In order to take from the Ukrainian peasants the maximum amount of grain, and yet seemingly do it “in a legal way,” the CC ACP (b) began to hike up the harvest estimates at the very beginning of the five-year plan. Just how this was done is told by an expert planner who worked on the executive committee of Novo-Sadzhariivsky *rayon* for many years:

Up until the time of the first five-year plan, or 1928, each *rayon*, drawing on the help of its agricultural experts, would compile a balance sheet of grain harvest, in which the general harvest was listed as well as the liabilities, such as the needs of the population, the cattle, the seeding, and so forth. The People’s Commissar for Lands would hand down the norms required to feed the people and the cattle. The harvest estimate was calculated on the bases of crop observation and actual trial threshing, with more weight given to the latter. This scientific method gave the actual state of the crops and reliable estimates for the harvest yield of *rayon*, *oblast* and republic. But with the development of the “socialist attack on the villages” this realistic method was deemed undesirable and things took on a much simpler form through the “proletarian estimate.”

Here is how this was done in my *rayon*. In 1931 the general harvest of the eight grain crops—spring wheat, winter wheat, rye, oats, barley, buckwheat, millet and corn—stood at approximately 20,000 tons. But the grain supply quota for the Kharkiv *oblast* was set at 30,000 tons. The *rayon* executive committee directed me, as an expert, to write up the argument that the plan for 30,000 tons was without any grounds and wholly abnormal. We received an immediate reply by wire to our complaints: “You have not calculated the grain the peasants left over from previous years.” And the *oblast* planning commission wrote me a separate letter charging me with trying to confuse the presidium of the *rayon* executive committee.¹⁸

The Novo-Sadzhariivsky *rayon*, which was assigned a quota higher than the actual harvest yield, was no exception to the rule. It reflected a general trend resulting from a CC ACP (b) directive.

¹⁸ H. Sova: *Do istorii bolshevytskoi diysnosity (25 rokiv zhyttia ukrainskoho hromadianyna v SSSR) (On the History of the Bolshevik Reality—25 years of a Ukrainian Citizen’s Life in the USSR)*; Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955, p. 14.

As early as the fall of 1931 the shadow of famine had begun to fall upon the Ukrainian villages. The people began to glean the already harvested fields. Their diet soon consisted chiefly of potatoes, beets, and pumpkins: those less fortunate had to be satisfied with substitutes. The people also began to travel in masses to neighboring *rayons* in the RSFSR, where the state robbery of the peasants was far milder and thus where some food products could be bought or traded. In the spring of 1932 people began to die. When the spring plowing and planting started, the peasants began stealing the seeds, stowing them away in their pockets to take home to their children and, being famished, chewing the grain on the spot. When the grain in the fields ripened, the hungry people began eating the heads of the wheat for nourishment.

The CC ACP (b) and Stalin knew about all this from information and reports received from the grain-growing areas, and they used this intelligence before the harvest of 1932. How?

1. The 1932 state grain supply quotas were increased over those of 1931.

2. As soon as the grain began to ripen in the summer of 1932, the Party ordered watch towers erected in the fields. Armed guards selected from the privileged classes of the village—Party, *Comsomol*, and *Komnezam* members—kept constant watch for pilfering.

3. On August 7, 1932, the government of the UkSSR passed a law which stated:

a. The possessions of the *kolhosps* and co-operatives (the crops in the fields, community surpluses, cattle, co-op stores, warehouses, etc.) are to be considered as state-owned, and watch over them is to be increased.

b. The penalties for thievery on *kolhosps* and of co-op property are to be increased in the interest of social protection—execution by firing squad and confiscation of all possessions, and where greater leniency may be advisable, loss of freedom for at least 10 years along with confiscation of all possessions.

Behind this harsh law was an attempt to find some means of coping with the hungry populace, which was driven to steal from the state itself. For after taking away all the grain and food products from the peasants, the authorities did not supply them with any rations, not even with the minimal allowance given the lowest echelons of city workers and state employees. In practice, the August 7, 1932 law was invoked not only against petty thieves, but even against those who gleaned already harvested fields. Andrei Vyshynsky, then attorney general of the USSR, himself admitted the stupidity of these penalties.¹⁹

¹⁹ See: *Revolutsyonnaya zakonnost na sovremennom etape (Revolutionary Justice in the Present Stage)*. 1933, pp. 102-104.

There were enough victims of this heinous law in Ukraine, because the famine affected a million peasant families and because the Party demanded that this law be applied without exception. Here is an example of its application. In order to insure plowing and sowing in the spring of 1933 Stalin ordered the *Zahotzerno* (grain supply houses) to send a quantity of fodder grain (oats and barley) to Ukraine for the *kolhosp* horses. In connection with this, on January 20, 1933, the CC ACP (b) in the person of Stalin sent a secret memorandum to S. V. Kossior, secretary of the CC CP (b)U, party secretaries of the *oblast* commissariats, city party committees, the people's GPU commissar, and the attorney general of the republic. It said in part:

Pay special attention to this fodder grain in the *kolhosps*, so that it be not used for any other purpose. All those guilty of stealing, selling or using it for any other than the assigned purpose, shall be ruthlessly brought to trial by you and charged with the August 7, 1932 law.²⁰

To Stalin and the CC ACP (b) the *kolhosp* horses were more valuable than the *kolhospniks*, who at that very moment were dying of famine.

4. In order to shut off starving Ukraine from those regions of the USSR where the CC ACP (b) was not inflicting such drastic measures and where the food shortage was not as severe, various means were adopted to make movement difficult for the Ukrainians. Train tickets were sold only to those who had written permission to travel. GPU border guards, stationed at border terminal points, checked travellers' documents, detained all those travelling "unlawfully," and confiscated any food products carried by those returning to Ukraine. Even carrying loaves of bread was illegal, being branded as "speculation" by a decree of August 22, 1932. Numerous sworn statements by eyewitnesses testify to such confiscations and the suicides of the hapless victims of the wanton dictatorship.

5. The first signs of the climbing death rate in Ukraine appeared during the collectivization terror of 1930. But what was the reaction of the CC ACP (b), headed by Stalin? They forbade the publishing of statistics on the natural growth of population—the number of births and deaths. These vital statistics became a closely guarded secret for the next 25 years, both for citizens of the USSR and foreigners. The Party leadership alone had an idea of what they were.

When the deaths due to famine took on major proportions in Ukraine in 1932-33, physicians certifying the cause of death were

²⁰ Quoted in *Ukrainsky Zbirnyk (The Ukrainian Collection)* Book 2, Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1955, p. 97.

forbidden to name the killer—starvation. The very word *holod* (hunger) was decreed a counterrevolutionary rumor, and no one valuing his own life and those of his relatives dared use it publicly.

When news of the famine reached Canada in the summer of 1932, Ukrainian-Canadian farmers approached the USSR Red Cross with an offer to send grain free of charge for distribution among the starving people of Ukraine. The offer was rejected by Moscow.

Early in 1933 the Ukrainian National Women's League sent a memorandum on the famine to Congressman Herman Copleman. The Congressman in turn submitted it to Soviet Minister of External Affairs Maxime Litvinov, who coolly replied that the memorandum "was full of lies spread by counterrevolutionary organizations."

The CC ACP (b), and the government dependent on it, did all they could to maximize the results of the famine at the same time they strove to hide the fact of the genocide from foreign eyes.

6. In his speech on January 11, 1933, before the joint plenum of the CC ACP (b), Stalin stated that in 1932 "there were some crop losses in the Kuban, Terek and also some *rayons* of Ukraine owing to climatic conditions," but that they were not of decisive importance. On the contrary, he said, in general the grain harvest was good, with more grain in the 1932 than in the 1931 harvest.²¹

S. Kossior told the CC CP (b)U plenum in February, 1933, that the general grain harvest of Ukraine in 1932 had to reach 807,800,000 poods at an average yield of 7.3 cwt. per hectare. Of that harvest, Kossior said, 255,000,000 poods had already been collected, but this was not enough for the Party, which required much more. In addition, 145,000,000 poods had to be collected for seeding, because the seeding supply of grain had been taken away from the *kolhosps* by the Party in order to fulfill the quotas set.²²

Along with this from Kossior's speech at the February 1933 Plenum of the CC CP (b)U and with P. Postyshev's speech at the June 4, 1933 Plenum of the CC CP (b)U, we have learned that local Party officials reported the 1932 harvest to be poor in many areas, and the grain supply quotas set at the center to be wholly unrealistic. We now know that after the drought of 1932 a catastrophic shortage of food developed right after the grain was collected by the state in some *rayons* of Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava. The local Party workers fell into a panic. Some of them, confronted by the horrors of famine, felt morally responsible and took their own lives.

²¹ J. Stalin: *Pro Robotu na Seli (On the Work in the Village) Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 1-2, 1933, p. 29.

²² A Metric cwt. equals 100 kg. or 2.84 bushels. A ton equals 10 cwt.; a pood—16.38 kg.; a hectare—2.47. acres.

But the CC CP(b)U, as Postyshev reported, forbade in a circular the removal from the *kolhosps* of seeding grain in order that quotas be fulfilled.²³ It lashed out at the "rotten liberals" with mass purges, arrests, jail sentences and executions. In his speech of January 11, 1933 (as the scourge of famine spread) Stalin read his "commandments":

... do not let your attention wander with worries about funds and provisions of various kinds; do not stray from the main task; work on the grain supply from the first day, expedite it, because the first commandment is—fulfill the grain supply quotas; the second commandment—store the seeding grain—for only after the completion of these conditions can you begin to develop the *kolhosp* trade.²⁴

But Stalin made no mention of payment for the starving collective farm members for their labor. And from S. Kossior's speech at the February 1933 plenum of the CC CP(b)U we learn that "profit" distribution among the collective farm members amounted to only 5.2 per cent in the Odessa *oblast* and 18.4 per cent in the Kharkiv *oblast*. Only in the Vynnytsia *oblast* did it reach as high as 31 per cent. (There was no information about the other *oblasts*.) It was of little interest to the Party what, if anything, the *kolhospniks* were paid. The Party was interested solely in the grain supply.

Any talk among Party members on the exaggeration of the calculated general harvest and the impossible-to-realize grain supply plans was described as inventions of the counterrevolutionaries. And Kossior, at the February, 1933 plenum of the CC CP(b)U, echoed the words of Stalin:

We now have new forms of struggle with the class enemy as regards the grain supplies... When you come to the *rayon* on business to talk about the grain supply, the officials there begin to show you statistics and tables on the low harvest which are compiled everywhere by enemy elements in the *kolhosps*, agricultural branches and MTS's. But these statistics say nothing about the grain that was in the fields or that which was stolen or hidden. But our comrades, including various plenipotentiaries, not being able to understand the false figures thrust on them, often become champions of the kulaks and defenders of these figures. In countless cases it has been proven that this arithmetic is purely *kulak* arithmetic; according to it, we would not only not get the amount of bread as set in the quotas, but we would not even get half the estimated amount. False figures and blown-up statements also serve, in the hands of the enemy elements, as covers for thefts, for the wholesale stealing of bread."²⁵

²³ P. Postyshev: *V borotbi za leninsko-stalinsku natsionalnu polityku partii. (On the Struggle for the Lenin-Stalin National Policy of the Party)*; Party publishing house CC CP(b) Ukraine, Kiev, 1955, p. 24.

²⁴ *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 1-2, 1933, p. 30.

²⁵ *Hospodarstvo Ukrainy*, No. 3-4, 1933, p. 32.

The cynicism and deceitfulness of all these statements and accusations in the face of the then existing reality needs no commentary.

Thus in the spring of 1933, at a time when the people in the villages of Ukraine were dying by the tens of thousands under the inexorable pressure of the CC ACP (b) in Moscow, the estimate of the general harvest of Ukraine of the 1932 crop was raised (according to the statistical collection *UkSSR in Figures*, Kiev: 1936) from the fictitious figure of 807,800,000 poods (at 7.3 cwt. per hectare) to an even more fictitious figure of 894,000,000 poods (or 8.1. cwt. per hectare), with the grain supply quota being set at 385,000,000 poods.

These blown-up figures of the crop at the height of the general famine were needed by the CC ACP (b) to justify the fantastically over-estimated grain quota of 385,000,000 poods.

By collecting in Ukraine—with the help of armed force and heavy repressions—255,000,000 poods from the 1932 harvest (according to Kossior's statement made in February, 1933), and an additional 145,000,000 poods from the grain set aside for seeding, the Party rulers actually took away from the peasants at least 130,000,000 poods of grain which had been destined not for sale but as provisions for the peasants. Kossior himself revealed this indirectly when he stated that, based on reports sent in from the grain-growing areas, the state apparatus would not have been able to collect even a half of what it did manage to collect.

With the above-mentioned methods the Party leaders from the CC ACP (b) consciously and premeditatively created the heinous famine in Ukraine.

5. RESULTS OF CC ACP (b) ACTION IN DESTRUCTION OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION

Many articles and books have been written in the past 30 years about the Ukrainian famine of 1932-33, which saw whole villages and countless farms erased and widespread cannibalism and the eating of cadavers. Many have been written by foreigners who then lived in the USSR. Others were later written abroad by Ukrainians, those who witnessed it and those who lived through it. This writer himself saw the famine and its victims with his own eyes.

In fulfilling his duty to nation and humanity, he did something towards collecting the evidence of the famine and projecting the various phases of this awesome tragedy. Unfortunately, all the factual evidence published by various authors at various times has not as yet been fully collected, researched and published in one critical and capital scientific work, which would serve as a reminder to future generations and as a fitting memorial to the dead.

Ukrainian refugees who witnessed the famine or whose relatives succumbed to it are now scattered over the whole free world. They are not forgetting this national tragedy. From time to time, as now in this year of 1963, they recall it to the world. But they are unable to provide the actual number of persons who died in Ukraine as the result of this inhuman, vengeful and terroristic action of the CC ACP (b). The occupation authorities have covered up all the evidence in Ukraine and have kept it so for more than 30 years. Hence it is possible to give the number of the dead only approximately.

In his book on Stalin,²⁶ Boris Souvarine says that the American socialist Harry Lang returned from his stay in the USSR completely despondent. In *Forward* (New York) Lang wrote that he had heard from a high Soviet official about a famine in Ukraine that had claimed at least 6,000,000 persons. He did not specify, however, as to what period of the famine this figure referred. The writer himself learned of the death of 6,000,000 persons in Ukraine from the Derzhplan (state plan) of the UkSSR (which was made secretly by unknown persons) back in the spring of 1933, a time when the famine had not yet run its devastating course.

Souvarine also writes that former American communist Adam T. Long, while in Ukraine, was told by Mykola Skrypnyk that 8,000,000 persons had died of famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (part of which was the Ukrainian Kuban). And Balytsky, head of the GPU (state security police) in Ukraine, calculated the number of famine victims in Ukraine alone to have been between eight and nine million persons.

Skrypnyk and Balytsky, holding top posts in the Soviet administration of Ukraine, had access to the most reliable information. But at the same time it must be remembered that the registration of deaths was quite disorganized between 1932 and 1933 because of the desperate movements of the hungry throughout the country who frequently died in the woods, in the fields, and on the highways; because of the disorganization of the administrative apparatus (in some cases entire villages and settlements were wiped out); because of the concealment of statistics on the orders of the CC ACP (b).

It may be noted here that Mykola Skrypnyk was greatly moved by these events. He found himself in constant collision with Stalin's and the CC ACP (b)'s policy toward Ukraine. Despairing, he committed suicide on July 6, 1933.

²⁶ Boris Souvarine: *Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism*. Translated by C.L.R. James, New York: Alliance Book Corp., Longmans Green and Co., 1933.

Taking the official population data according to the December 17, 1926 census (29,494,800), the January 17, 1939 census (30,960,200), and the average natural increase before the collectivization terror of 1924-27 (2.36 per cent per year), it can be calculated that Ukraine (within its former area, or aside from Kuban, the Crimea, the Ukrainian ethnographic territories of Voronizhchyn, Kurshchyn, etc.) lost 7,500,000 persons between the two censuses. This loss is accounted for by the number dead of famine, the number killed and exiled during the repressions, and the decrease in the number of births.

But this figure of 7,500,000 would be more or less accurate only on the following conditions:

1. The figure of 30,960,200 for the population as of January 17, 1939 be completely reliable, and not inflated. We ourselves have little confidence in it. We recall that soon after the completion of the census, a much lower figure was given (in the *Kommunist*, we believe), a figure which was subsequently increased. No breakdown for the individual territories of Ukraine was ever printed. As for the possibility of the inflation of the January 17, 1939 census, the following may be meaningful: the data of the 1937 census, which reflected the ravages of the Party terror, were termed "harmful" by the CC ACP (b), the people in charge of the census were repressed, and the figures were forbidden to be published. Unfortunately, there is no way now to determine the degree of inflation of the January 17, 1939 census (inflated in order to conceal the results of terror and famine).

2. Similarly, the 7.5 million figure could be accepted for the population of the UkSSR if between these two censuses colonists from the RSFSR and other republics had not been brought into Ukraine. The influx of colonizers was well marked in those years. At the beginning of this paper we established that between 1926 and 1959 at least 3.7 million Russian colonizers were brought into Ukraine. How many of this number came between 1926 and 1939? Probably no less than a million and a half.

Thus the actual loss of population on the territory of Ukraine probably reached 8.5 to 9 million, and of that number at least 6.5 million human beings died of hunger.

P. Postyshev, sent to Ukraine by Stalin and the CC ACP (b) in 1933 to administer its death blow, summarized the reasons and results of this action thus:

In past years our enemies more than once have tried to organize a separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union...

During two years of this period—1931 to 1932—Ukraine suffered an acute breakdown in the basic streams of economy and cultural development. Ukraine

successfully overcame this breakdown in 1933 and stepped out on the broad path of the victorious building of socialism...

The year 1933 was the year of the destruction of the nationalist, Petlura, and other elements of the class enemy who took root in various areas of the building of socialism...

There is nothing to add to these cynical statements of Postyshev. They clearly indicate just why Stalin and the CC ACP (b) organized the mass genocide in Ukraine. It was a colossal pogrom inflicted on a nation which strives to emerge from colonial dependence on Moscow, which eternally wants to organize its own life freely and independently.
