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Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe

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POLONIA.



Montibus ex Slavina ad Sarmata rura recepta
Albentes alas regis tollit avis.
Ingenuo atque Fide generosa Polonia pollet:
Prupeit ampla Scloni, concepit alia Polium.

K.A.

RUSSIA.



Esculis rapae fulvo candente Leone
Ornavit scutum Rufia rubra fenum.
A teneris apertae duris se Rufia rebus,
Ut luxa cstringat, mollis aut tolereat.

ICE.

MOSCOVIA.



Bicipiti aurato Jovis Alite Moakus gaudet,
Hofibus & populi invigilando fas,
Vincens ferro brutes, populi & jure gubernans
In populo obsequium Lux habet, hoste metum.

PAN.

BOHEMIA.



Ipse convosant mihi fata dedere Leonem:
Sunt ferus & rubescens candida oplet agrum.
Bellaci genis cor est & forma Leonis:
Candor at in sacrum fas sine labe Fidem.

ICE.

UNGARIA.



Uta sui primam Cruce simplice, post duplicata:
Christicolae fuisse sic pietatis amor.
Fata cruces, Hactenus, mihi post multiplicarunt:
Una saluta erat Cruce: dolor in reliquit.

ICE.

VALACHIA.



Per niveum nigrae Corvus campum explicat alas:
Rubeo crucem, pedibus sed diademata prement.
Principibus prior est hic vita monastica loeptra:
Sed plures debet quique labere cruces.

VE.

CROATIA.



Candidas & rubens color hoc varietur in agro,
Invitant fores ad sua fasa vagas.
Scilicet hic jacitur dubii alae lepe Gradivi:
Vulneror: at nullo vulnere candor abit.

CHUL.

SERBLIA.



Signa Cruces, calybeq; rubro fert Serblia campo:
Pro Cruce non paucos Serblia pulsa fecit,
Nunc Cruce prolata, tamen alio suffinit ictus:
Hinc fato & factio sevia dicta venit.

SI L E.

BULGARIA.



Erigit in rubens fulvus mihi se Leo campo:
Sittant P'obos, qui flatusse nigrum.
Et propriam servo Bulga de flamine nomen,
Et pecudam in prada ingeniosa feror.

CA.

Preface

Most of the studies collected in this volume were presented at the International Conference on Concepts of Nationhood in Russia and Eastern Europe in the Early Modern Period, held at Yale University, 5–7 November 1981. The conference originated as the idea of Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch, professors of history at Yale. Alexander M. Schenker, professor of Slavic languages and literatures at Yale, was instrumental in charting the proposal and the strategy that led to the conference's realization.

The Council on Russian and East European Studies of the Yale Concilium on International and Area Studies hosted the conference. Funding was provided by the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS, Joint Committee on Eastern Europe), the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS). We are especially grateful for the encouragement of Allen H. Kassof, executive director of IREX, Jason H. Parker, executive associate at the ACLS, and Brian D. Silver, chair of the AAASS Research and Development Committee. The Yale NDEA Center for Russian and East European Language and Area Studies, then chaired by Piotr S. Wandycz, also provided financial and organizational support. The assistance of Hana Demetz, the center's administrative assistant in 1981, is gratefully acknowledged.

A number of colleagues and students worked together to make the conference a success. Howard R. Lamar, Dean of Yale College and distinguished historian of the United States, generously agreed to open the conference with an overview of the role of nationality on both sides of the Atlantic. Professors Wandycz and Bushkovitch provided English summaries for two articles written in Russian and Polish. Sessions were chaired by Professors Victor Ehrlich, Keith Hitchins, Omeljan Pritsak, Alexander M. Schenker, and Piotr S. Wandycz. Several graduate students, notably Denis Crnković and Neal Pease, helped with arrangements.

As a co-sponsor of the conference, the Ukrainian Research Institute of Harvard University agreed to publish the conference papers as this special issue of *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. The majority of conference presentations are included, and two essays (by Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel and Hugh L. Agnew) have been added. The publication of this issue would not have been possible without the steadfast support of Professor Omeljan Pritsak, director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard. The papers of Professors Ivan Golub and Radovan Samardžić were ably translated by

C. Wendy Bracewell, and that of Professor Jerzy Ochmański by Bohdan A. Struminsky. Eva S. Balogh helped to improve the translation of Professor László Benczédi's paper. The craftsmanship of Uliana Pasicznyk, who has edited the manuscripts, is evident throughout.

We thank all these organizations and individuals for their contributions, and now present the result of our joint efforts to the wider intellectual community.

I. B. and F. E. S.

Introduction

Distinctions between “West” and “East” have long been accepted in studies of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism and nationbuilding in Europe. Although the distinction is by no means clear-cut, the two regions of the continent followed different patterns of development. In the nineteenth century Western Europe was the home of nation-states (France, Denmark, Holland, Portugal, etc.), and Eastern Europe, of empires (the Ottoman, Habsburg, Romanov) and national movements (Czech, Polish, Ukrainian, etc.). Though the twentieth century has brought many new nation-states to Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia [at least according to widespread contemporary theory], and inter-war Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and renewed national awakenings to Western Europe (Basque, Breton, Catalan, Welsh), the divide remains. Independent nation-states still prevail in the West, whereas imperial systems (the Soviet Union) and multi-national states (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia) dominate in the East. National movements remain a more important part of the East European political landscape because of dissatisfaction with multi-national states or with incomplete independence.

Historians and social scientists have responded to these differences by developing separate models of nationbuilding for Eastern and Western Europe (Chlebowczyk, Hroch) and by specializing in nationalism in their study of Eastern Europe. Their work has concentrated on the “modern” national idea developed by the French Revolution and German Romanticism, as well as on the socioeconomic changes (modernization, industrialization, urbanization, etc.) furthering nationbuilding.

In discussing “modern” nationbuilding and nationalism, three elements are usually emphasized: the state, social strata, and intellectual currents. The state is seen as an active agent in the breakdown of regional and social barriers and in the promotion of a national identity and culture. Social strata are depicted as having combined into a national community in response to economic developments, which strengthened the influence of the bourgeoisie and, later, the proletariat. Intellectual currents are seen to have emerged from the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and Romanticism to foster the creation of a national ideology and worldview, which, later, were propagated to the masses.

Much of the discussion of nationbuilding and national sentiment is plagued by semantic difficulties. Qualifiers such as “proto-” are used to ensure that the differences between the modern and pre-modern age are

maintained, with 1800 as the accepted dividing line. Like all such divides, this one both clarifies and distorts the issues at hand. The eighteenth century, particularly in Western Europe, was a period of political, socioeconomic, and intellectual innovation that changed fundamentally the structure and function of nations and national consciousness. Nevertheless, the early modern period, too, contained elements of nationbuilding and national consciousness. Indeed, some peoples were further advanced in the process of nationbuilding in the sixteenth century (Poles, Czechs) than others were in the early twentieth century (Macedonians). Hugh Seton-Watson dealt with the national communities that emerged before modern nationalism through a division into "old" and "new" nations; clearly his specialization in Eastern Europe shaped his understanding of those categories. The existence in Eastern Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of a vibrant nation that had lost its state (the Poles) and of national communities that adhered to "pre-modern" concepts (religious demarcations as defining nationality—e.g., Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia; medieval historical entities as defining national territory—e.g., the Czech *Staatsrecht*) points out the artificiality of any rigid chronological divide.

Just as the notion of the division between East and West is useful, albeit not clear-cut, for studying nationbuilding and national consciousness in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, so too it can be of service in understanding these developments in the early modern period. Certainly the differences among the peoples to the east of the Germans and Italians were numerous, but, as aggregates, the two halves of the European continent did differ substantially enough to justify examining the general tendencies of concepts of nationhood in Eastern Europe. This, however, should not be construed to suggest that an Eastern European "model" existed, since the differences between Bohemia and Muscovy, for example, were certainly fundamental. Regional similarities should be discussed without ignoring differences.

In the medieval period it seemed that Eastern Europe would follow a course similar to that of Western Europe. The major division in European civilization was not on a west/east, but on a north/south axis, with the Mediterranean culture more advanced than the northern one. During the Middle Ages, when Christianity came to Eastern Europe, kingdoms and principalities were established that became the cores of national communities (Croatia, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bohemia, Poland, Rus', Hungary, Lithuania), and national cultures emerged. Economic and social developments were transforming many of these national entities into more complex societies. Still, even in the Middle Ages, most of Western Europe developed more rapidly than Eastern Europe in political, social, and intellectual affairs.

From the fourteenth to the seventeenth century most of the emerging national entities were annexed to foreign empires and dynastic conglomerates (the Ottomans and the Habsburgs), whereas two others (Muscovy and Poland) were transformed into vast multinational states. After 1500 the early-modern state did not serve as an instrument for nation-building in most of Eastern Europe, partially because it sought to bind together territories too vast and cultures too diverse to form national communities.

Eastern Europe also differed in its economic and social patterns. During the early modern period, cities did not develop rapidly in some areas (in Serbia, in Bohemia after the sixteenth century) and in others they declined (in Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in Poland in the seventeenth century). Instead of disappearing, serfdom spread to all regions outside the Ottoman Empire, and until the nineteenth century peasants continued to render labor services to noble landlords. The trends that had been bringing the economic level of Eastern Europe close to Western Europe's were reversed: cut off from the Atlantic's trade, the East became primarily a supplier of agricultural goods and raw materials to the West. Economic stagnation forestalled development of the forces that in the West were propelling Italian and German nationbuilding, particularly in cultural affairs, even though no Italian or German state existed. The landed nobilities remained dominant in political and national life, unchallenged by the bourgeoisie. In many instances (parts of Poland, Hungary, Bohemia, the Ukraine, Croatia) the towns were enclaves of a non-indigenous culture and religion (German, Italian, Jewish, etc.), which eliminated them as potential centers of national cultures. Economic and social patterns often favored the retention of cultural and religious diversity by segments of the population.

Whereas in political and socioeconomic terms the early modern period essentially retarded nationbuilding, in the intellectual sphere it proved to be formative. In the political and socioeconomic spheres, fundamental changes would have to occur before these factors became conducive to the development of modern nations. In the intellectual sphere, early modern conceptual frameworks (religious, social, historical) would prevail into the nineteenth century, and, indeed, continue to exert influence even to the present day. Western influences such as the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and German Romanticism affected East European traditions, but did not obliterate them. These traditions provided a link with the medieval past. They also reflected the social and political realities of the early modern period. While the political entities of Eastern Europe failed and their economies stagnated, the intellectual traditions endured. Roman concepts such as *gens*, *natio*, and *patria* that had developed during the

Middle Ages and the Renaissance were refined in early modern Eastern Europe. Political ideas emerged within the political structures of Eastern Europe and then outlived them, allowing national communities to survive into the modern age.

What was the framework that shaped concepts of nationhood throughout early modern Eastern Europe? First, with the exception of Muscovy and Poland (Lithuania was a more ambiguous case), rulers propagated ideas of society and political loyalty that worked against the evolving self-perception of East European peoples as nations. Second, the national idea was usually propagated by an elite or political nation that believed it represented an extinct polity or embodied the existing polity. Among the Orthodox Slavs this elite was composed principally of the clergy, whereas in the Western Christian world the laity not only embodied their Christian nation, but also produced the intellectuals who furthered the national idea. Third, during the early modern period national cultures emerged that provided a linguistic and historical base for the national idea. Beginning with Croatian and Czech in the late Middle Ages numerous national literary languages emerged. Political, social, and economic factors might prevent these languages from spreading to all social strata or even from developing uninterruptedly in the given region; nonetheless, future national awakens were given a linguistic base. Finally, East Europeans wrote histories of communities of people, tracing the origin of their peoples to the ancient world, explaining their relations with other peoples, discussing their former states, and linking their nation with its past. Thus it was in the early modern period that the intellectual bases for modern East European cultures and national identities were established in language and in history.

When early modern East Europeans (laymen and clerics) conceived of nation, three sets of issues dominated their thinking. These can be called genealogy, philology, and history.

Intellectuals questioned what their people's origin was, and how it related to biblical history and to the works of Greek and Roman historians. They sought to establish the genealogy or mythical origin of their peoples by the same methods that they traced the genealogies of individuals. The preferred ancestors were, of course, both ancient and glorious. Medieval chroniclers looked to legends and biblical origins, whereas the Renaissance sparked a search for classical roots. Philology, archaeology, and critical thought were brought to bear on these questions between 1500 and 1800. The search for the genealogies of individuals, states, and peoples provided material that could be incorporated into political programs and national identities.

Intellectuals also asked what languages their peoples spoke and what languages they should write. They investigated how their tongues related to those of their neighbors and the languages of the past. Grammar dominated early modern education, with Latin predominant, Greek secondary, and Slavonic important among the Orthodox and Uniate Slavs and Romanians, and in the northern littoral of Croatia. Native languages emerged as a major element of national identity. Questions about orthography, lexicon, and dialect developed into political and national debates.

Finally, the intellectuals asked what events had occurred since the Middle Ages to their peoples and polities, and what had happened recently to their states and societies. History was used to bolster the dignity of peoples and cultures. History also affirmed the privileges of corporate orders and ecclesiastical institutions. In particular, political nations struggling against sovereigns (Poles, Hungarians, Croats, Bohemians, and Ukrainians in the Hetmanate) sought to assert and reconfirm their “ancient rights.” They were not alone, for “national” churches—the Metropolitanate of Kiev for Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belorussians) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Patriarchate of Peć for Serbs, the Orthodox and Uniate churches in Transylvania for Romanians—also sought to preserve or reestablish their past rights and status. In existing political entities official historiographers chronicled the events of the present, modeling their work on the classical authors. They explored the establishment of medieval states and the development of institutions and social groups in later times. They also followed Renaissance models in writing the history of their own time. Polities increasing in power, such as Poland in the sixteenth century, sought to bolster their position through history writing; beleaguered polities, such as Lithuania in the late sixteenth century, Hungary and Croatia in the sixteenth to eighteenth century, or the Cossack Hetmanate of the eighteenth century, did so as well.

In genealogy, philology, and history, many concepts established during the early modern period in Eastern Europe have survived even into the “socialist age” after World War II. Some of these developments were, of course, the same as those in Western Europe. Some, however, were peculiar to the eastern half of the European continent, and it is these that deserve attention here.

First, unlike Western Europe, which derived its culture from Latin Christendom alone, Eastern Europe was divided into Latin and Byzantine spheres of influence. Some historians (e.g., Jaroslav Bidlo) argue that the proper divide between Eastern and Western Europe is between the Orthodox and Catholic world. That divide, of course, separates Serb from Croat

and Ukrainian from Pole, despite the numerous historical, cultural, and linguistic links between them. Still, the importance of the religious divide that brought Catholic and Protestant into close contact with Rome, Paris, and Jena, and that linked Orthodox to the Byzantine tradition, should not be underestimated. As a result, it was the Latin Christian peoples who first developed the concepts of *natio*, political nation, and privileges, as well as the use of modern vernaculars. The Orthodox peoples, on the other hand, invested their identity in “national” churches and inherited supranational cultural-linguistic traditions (Slavonic). The overlapping of Eastern and Western Christianity also resulted in Uniate churches, or groups of Eastern-rite Christians united with Rome. Their establishment unleashed vehement polemics (among Ukrainians and Romanians) over which church, Orthodox or Uniate, was the national church, and whether religious or national identity would be primary. Religious diversity—Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish—both retarded and advanced the evolution of concepts of nation. In some cases, religious affinity provided supranational loyalties (e.g. *Slavia orthodoxa*). In others (e.g. Magyars and Czechs) religious loyalty divided national communities and united religious factions with other national groups (e.g. Germans) on the basis of faith. Yet in others, however, religious institutions served as “national” churches, even if they did not include all of the members of the national community (e.g. Calvinism as the “Magyar faith,” or Orthodoxy in seventeenth-century Ukraine, or Uniatism in eighteenth-century Transylvania). Vitriolic debates about religion within a national community could foster consciousness of that community’s national distinctiveness.

The second singularity of Eastern Europe was the predominance of the Slavic linguistic group. In contrast to Western Europe, which had two major groups, the Romance and the Germanic, in Eastern Europe the Romanians and Magyars were no real counterbalance to the Slavs in numbers. National states, which clearly divided the Scandinavian and the Iberian linguistic communities, did not play an equally important role among the Slavs. While religious and political divisions produced separate Slavic national identities, certainly by the early modern period, traditions of reciprocity, as well as philological studies and practical observation, gave rise to a loyalty to “Slavdom.” In particular, the weaker or besieged Slavic peoples, confronting the Germans, Venetians, Turks, or Magyars, could view themselves as part of a greater Slavdom, with some thinkers (Križanić) looking for help to the great Slavic empire of Russia.

A third characteristic of East European developments was that the national idea was propagated by the traditional political nation rather than

the dynasty or national state. The frequent confrontations between the Hungarian, Croatian, and Bohemian nobilities and the Habsburg rulers or the Ukrainian elite with the Romanovs, and the triumph of the nobility over the monarch and other corporate orders in Poland-Lithuania, meant that in a large part of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Muscovy and the Orthodox peoples of the Ottoman Empire) it was the political nation—the privileged corporate orders—that embodied the national idea. This corporate national tradition provided the intellectual basis for resistance to imperial rulers and states in the nineteenth century. In Eastern Europe, French concepts of the rights of nations and opposition to tyranny were used to defend traditional political nations. When German Romantic thought revived philological interest in Eastern Europe, the new definitions of nation, too, were often used merely to buttress the traditional early modern political nations (Poles, Magyars, Croats). Some modern nations grew out of these roots, whereas others (Lithuanians, Slovaks) rejected them. In either case, the East European nations invoked their early modern intellectual traditions in their resistance against imperial states and cultures.

Finally, in the early modern period, certain concepts of community and society emerged that hindered the formation of modern national communities in Eastern Europe. Sentiments of Slavic unity would prove to be one of the most enduring, for they emphasized linguistic issues, the essential category of modern East European nationalism. Concepts of Illyrianism or South Slavic unity and “All-Russian” or East Slavic unity also sought legitimacy on linguistic, as well as on cultural or religious grounds. By contrast, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sarmatism sought to bind peoples of diverse language, culture, religion, and history on the basis of mythical historical origins and contemporary nobiliary privileges. It reflected the assimilation of non-Polish elites into the Polish linguistic and political spheres (a process similar to that occurring in Hungary). This process would leave Polish-speaking elites dispersed through most territories inhabited by Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Lithuanian speakers, just as Magyarized nobles would live among Slovaks, Romanians, and Ukrainians. In the intellectual sphere, the national identity of the Sarmatian Polish nobility or the Hungarian political nation would prove remarkably resilient, even in the face of the loss of statehood and the challenge of modern concepts of nation.

The articles that follow treat many of these issues within the context of specific national cultures. They examine political, social, and cultural concepts that emerged in the territories of continental Europe lying to the east

of the German and Italian linguistic zones. In doing so, they help to define national consciousness in Eastern Europe between 1500 and 1800. No less important, these essays present abundant material and diverse viewpoints for the further exploration of this question.

Ivo Banac and Frank E. Sysyn

Kiev and All of Rus': The Fate of a Sacral Idea

OMELJAN PRITSAK

I

A sense of Kiev's uniqueness, its pride in its often exaggerated antiquity, and its status as "being chosen" constitute a distinctive feature of Ukrainian political mythology through the ages. It was first manifested in the Rus' "Primary Chronicle" (*Pověst' vremennyx lét [PVL]*, ca. 1115–1123), and later elaborated in the *Kievan Synopsis* (1671–1681). The longevity and vitality of this myth can be seen in its two instances in our century.

In 1919, after the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire, the Ukrainians of Galicia had a good opportunity to consolidate their independent state, the Western Ukrainian National Republic. But influenced by the myth of Kiev's centrality to Ukrainian nationhood, the leaders of this nascent state sent their well-disciplined, 70,000-man strong army to the east to save "the Golden Domed" Kiev. The slogan "Through Kiev to Lviv" proved unrealistic. The enterprise ended in disaster for the heroic Ukrainian Galician Army, and with the Polish occupation of Galicia.

In 1982, the sesquimillennial anniversary of Kiev (proclaimed in 1980) was celebrated in the Soviet Union. This need to express pride in antiquity came at a time when archaeologists had proven beyond any doubt that Kiev as a town did not exist before the last quarter of the ninth to the first half of the tenth century.¹

This essay is an attempt to analyze the manifestations of the Kiev myth, and to uncover the real reasons behind them. Leaving aside the clearly apocryphal story of St. Andrew's voyage through Kiev, I begin with the myth of Kiev as the "mother of (the) Rus' towns." This well-known phrase is to be found in the *PVL*, where it is attributed to the "conqueror" Oleg under the year 6390/882. Although Oleg (Helgi) was indeed a historical

¹ Johan Callmer, "The Archaeology of Kiev ca. A.D. 500–1000: A Survey," *Le pays du Nord et Byzance: Scandinavie et Byzance*, Figura, 19 (Uppsala, 1981), pp. 29–52. See also Omeljan Pritsak, "Za kulisamy prohološennja 1500-littja Kyjeva," *Sučasnist'* 21, no. 9 (September 1981):46–54.

personage, he could not have ruled in Kiev in 882, since until ca. 930 Kiev was still in Khazar hands.² But there is another difficulty with the notion. Even by the end of the tenth century, Kiev's size was rather modest in comparison with neighboring towns. While Bilhorod covered 52 hectares, and Perejaslav as many as 80 hectares, Kiev extended over a mere 11 hectares.³ Finally, archaeological data prove that Old Ladoga/Aldeigjuborg was the oldest town in Rus', founded sometime during the second half of the eighth century.⁴

II

In 1037/1038 the first "jubilee" (the fiftieth anniversary) of Christianity served as a stimulus to the ruling elite of Rus' to undertake decisive measures toward the transformation of the formerly pagan kaganate into a Christian polity, or to be more exact, into a member of the Byzantine Commonwealth. This is not the place to discuss details of the process,⁵ which have not as yet been adequately researched. One thing is clear however: the Rus' rulers gave up their imperial title of Khazar origin (*kagan*) and after some conflicts (one may mention here, for example, the last Rus' naval expedition against Constantinople in 1043)⁶ accepted the universalistic and patrimonial ideology of Byzantium, happy to be admitted as associates (*proxenoi*) of the "basileus and autokrator of the Romans—that is, of all Christians."⁷

As part of their program to elevate their dynasty the Rus' rulers sought to canonize two members of their house. The price for the canonization of Boris (Borys) and Glěb (Hlib) in 1072⁸ was, politically speaking, very high. The canonization led to a complete fragmentation of political power. The

² Norman Golb and Omeljan Pritsak, *Khazarian Hebrew Documents of the Tenth Century* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), pp. 60–71. See also O. Pritsak, "The *Pověst vremennyx lět* and the Question of Truth," *History and Heroic Tale: A Symposium* (Odense, 1984), pp. 151–52.

³ Boris A. Kolčín, ed., *Drevnjaja Rus': Gorod, zamok, selo* (= *Arxeologija SSSR* 15) (Moscow, 1985) p. 53.

⁴ See, e.g., Vasilij A. Bulkin, Igor' V. Dubov, and Gleb S. Lebedev, *Arxeologičeskie pamjatniki Drevnej Rusi IX–XI vekov* (Leningrad, 1978), esp. pp. 85–90.

⁵ This will be treated in vol. 4 of my *The Origin of Rus'* (in preparation).

⁶ George Vernadsky, "The Byzantine-Russian War of 1043," *Südostforschungen* 12 (1953): 47–67.

⁷ Dimitri Obolensky, "The Relations between Byzantium and Russia (11th–15th century)," in idem, *The Byzantine Inheritance of Eastern Europe* (London, Variorum Reprints, 1982), no. 5, p. 5.

⁸ See *PVL*, ed. Dmitrij S. Lixačev, 2 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), 1: 121. Concerning the canonization see Evgenij E. Golubinskij, *Istorija kanonizacii svjatyx v russkoj cerkvi*, 2nd ed. (Moscow, 1903), pp. 43–49; George P. Fedotov, *The Russian Religious Mind* (New York, 1946), pp. 94–105.

fate of Boris and Glëb's murderer, the "Cain" Svjatopolk, and the church's popularization of the princely martyrs Boris and Glëb, were clear warnings to any ambitious prince who intended to rule alone.

A special type of *Symphonia*⁹ developed in Rus': on the one hand it meant the fragmentation of political power, and on the other, centralization based on the *ad hoc* concept of the *indivisibility* of the Metropolitanate of Rus', a subordinate component part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.¹⁰ Since there was never any successful attempt at a separation, or even strict division, of the functions of the ecclesiastical and secular "swords" (as occurred in the West), the former (the patriarch) was usually dominated by the latter (the emperor). Byzantium had found a way to prevent the formation of a rival empire.

As a result, from the Orthodox-Christian and Byzantine political point of view, Rus' ceased to be an independent structured polity. It was regarded as a Byzantium-subordinated system of principalities, ruled by co-equal archons (= barbarian chiefs) under the "spiritual" leadership of the metropolitan of Rus', who at first had no fixed city of residence,¹¹ and was, significantly, a subject and agent of the political interests of the Byzantine Empire. The metropolitan and his bishops had a special status in Old Rus'; they remained foreigners in language and culture, and generally did not nationalize, i.e., did not emerge as the missing elite for the potential local polity.¹²

⁹ Heinrich Gelzer, "Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche in Byzanz," *Ausgewählte kleine Schriften* (Leipzig, 1907), pp. 57–141; Georg Ostrogorsky, "Otnošenje cerkvi i gosudarstva v Vizantii," *Seminarium Kondakovianum* (Prague), 4 (1933): 121–32.

¹⁰ Francis Dvornik, "Byzantine Political Ideas in Kievan Rus'," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 9–10 (1956): 265–76; Dimitri Obolensky, "Byzantium, Kiev and Moscow: A Study in Ecclesiastical Relations," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 11 (1957): 21–78. See also Ludolf Müller, *Zum Problem des hierarchischen Status und der jurisdiktionellen Abhängigkeit der russischen Kirche vor 1039* (Cologne, 1959).

¹¹ In 1299 Metropolitan Maksim, in fact, deserted his see and transferred his residence from Kiev to Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma (*Lavrent'evskaja letopis'*, ed. Evfimij F. Karskij, *Polnoe sobranie russkix letopisej*, 2nd ed. [hereafter *PSRL*], vol. 1 [Leningrad, 1927], col. 485). See also *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani 1315–1402*, ed. Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, 2 vols. (Vienna, 1860–62), 1, no. 158: 391.

¹² Contrary to the West, where the Latin sacred language was the precondition for entering into Roman Christianity yet was also a vehicle for upward mobility (the barbarians of yesterday could join the higher Latin language culture as equals), the Byzantine culture had two levels. The high-brow culture, using Greek as a literary (and sacred) language, was reserved exclusively for the Grecophone residents of the empire (basically Constantinople), while the barbarians were allowed to use their vernaculars for their low-brow culture, among others the Church Slavonic. They were preordained to retain forever their status of barbarians (even if Christian barbarians) and that of non-participants in the high-brow Byzantine culture. See, e.g., Ihor Ševčenko, "Byzantium and the Slavs," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8 (1984): 289–303.

This dichotomy—foreign higher clergy and local lower clergy, usually “not on speaking terms”—was the legacy of the Kievan period in the Ukraine.¹³ In short, from a political entity, *Rus'* emerged as an entity in the church geography of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In such a situation the role of the Metropolitanate in *Rus'* was quite broad, and its see of Kiev acquired a special place.

Hence a unique feature of the Metropolitanate of Kiev came into existence: its official title during the medieval period was styled not after the see (city), but after the people—the *Rus'*. While the bishops of all other provincial centers used in their seals the name of their see city, e.g., Novgorod, Smolensk, Halych, the metropolitan used in its place the name “*Rus'*”: He was “Metropolitan of *Rus'*,” and not “Metropolitan of Kiev.”¹⁴ In reaction to the political fragmentation, mentioned above, the Kiev metropolitan in the second half of the twelfth century restyled his title into “Metropolitan of all of *Rus'*” (πάσης Ῥωσίας = *vseja Rusi*).¹⁵ By the first quarter of the twelfth century, the oneness of *Rus'*, Kiev, and the Kiev-centered and Byzantium-subordinated Slavonic rite, as well as the merger of the “Varangian” military-economic elites was an established fact. The Kievan hegumen Sil'vester records this as follows (in the *PVL*): “The Slavonic rite and the *Rus'* are the same, because of the Varangians that called themselves *Rus'*, though originally they were Slavs. While they called themselves Poljanians (= Kievans), their language was still Slavic.”¹⁶

In consequence a dichotomy was developing between the secular and the sacral usages of the term “*Rus'*.” In the secular sphere, *Rus'*, also called *Rus' skaja zemlja*, referred to the core lands of the kaganate, where Jaroslav had settled his (until then itinerant) retinue (*družina*). They included Kiev, Černihiv, and Perejaslav, and were in principle *indivisible* but under the joint rule of three dynastic seniors (*triumviri*),¹⁷ in contrast to the *divisible* marginal lands. The Ljubeč council of the *Rus'* princes (1097) invalidated the *indivisibility* of the *Rus'* core territory. As a result, from two to five

¹³ When in the sixteenth/seventeenth centuries the Greeks were replaced by prelates of local origin, the division between the higher and lower clergy persisted, and led to partisan decisions, such as the Union of Brest (1596), or submission to the Patriarchate of Moscow (1686), which had tragic consequences, especially from the point of view of identity.

¹⁴ Valentin L. Janin, *Aktovye pečati drevnej Rusi X–XV vv.*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1970), 1: 174–79.

¹⁵ Alexandre Soloviev, “Metropolitensiegel des Kiewer Russland,” in idem, *Byzance et la formation de l'Etat Russe: Recueil d'études* (London, Variorum Reprints, 1979), no. 9: 292–301, pl. 4–5.

¹⁶ *PVL*, ed. D. S. Lixačev, 1: 23.

¹⁷ That is, Izjaslav Jaroslavyč (d. 1078), Svjatoslav Jaroslavyč (d. 1076), and Vsevolod Jaroslavyč (d. 1093).

Rus' dynasties on the core Rus' territory were in competition for rule over Kiev and Rus' from that time until the Mongol invasion.¹⁸

The sacral usage of the term *Rus' / vsja Rus'* encompassed the notion of an *indivisible* Metropolitanate of Rus', regardless of "barbaric" political allegiances. In this structure the name Kiev was used as a kind of synecdoche for "all of Rus'."

In 1204 the unthinkable happened. The Holy Roman Christian Byzantine Empire collapsed. The ruler in Constantinople was now a Latin Frankish emperor, and Saint Sophia was the seat of a Latin patriarch. The story of the empire's end was related matter-of-factly by a Rus' eyewitness, and preserved in the Novgorod I Chronicle.¹⁹

Deprived of both secular (emperor) and church (patriarch) overlordship, the Rus' princes had to act. At the time there were three powerful princes in Rus': the senior of the dynasty, Prince Vsevolod Jur'evič ("Bol'soe Gnězdo") of Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma; Roman Mstyslavyc, prince of Halyč; and Rjryk Rostyslavyc of Kiev. In addition there was also the king of Hungary (for Old Rus' he was *korol'*, i.e., the king *par excellence*), Andrew II (1205–1235), who was very much involved in East European affairs. What was their reaction?

Vsevolod arranged a very elaborate ceremony for the investiture of his oldest son Konstantin (Vsevolod himself had been exiled to Constantinople by his autocratic brother Andrej and spent several years there) as ruler of Novgorod the Great; Vsevolod decided that Novgorod was to have precedence over all principalities of the Rus' land.²⁰ It may be noted here that until that time Novgorod had not been included in the concept of *Rus'skaja zemlja*. Vsevolod's wife, who before her death became a nun, also gave her blessing, and the Trinity Chronicle stresses that through her agency Konstantin obtained charisma not only from Saint Helena (the mother of the Roman emperor Constantine the Great) but also from Ol'ga (the first Christian ruler of Kiev, d. 969) and Volodimer.²¹ In this way the newly proposed center of Rus' was to gain acceptance by (the historical) Kiev.

¹⁸ There were originally two: the Monomaxovyči and Ol'hovyči. In the mid-twelfth century the Monomaxovyči branched into two lines: the older (Mstyslavyci) and the cadet (Jurijeviči); the former soon separated into two subdivisions—the Volhynian and the Smolensk branches. In the second half of the twelfth century there were also two branches of the Ol'hovyči.

¹⁹ *Novgorodskaja pervaja letopis' staršego i mladšego izvodov*, ed. Arsenij N. Nasonov (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), pp. 46–49.

²⁰ Mixail D. Priselkov, *Troickaja letopis': Rekonstrukcija teksta* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1950), pp. 287–98.

²¹ *Troickaja letopis'*, p. 290.

Unfortunately, no detailed reports about Roman and Rjuryk (the latter was the former's father-in-law, but by this time they had become competitors and foes) have come down to us. But the data of the Hypatian Chronicle allow us to suppose that the two princes now assumed—for the first time in the history of Rus'—the Byzantine imperial title of αὐτοκράτωρ (*samodržьсь*).²² Like Novgorod, Halyč until then had never been included in the concept of *Rus'skaja zemlja*. Now Roman of Halyč became *samodržьсь vseja Rusi*.²³ In his title are subsumed two Byzantine concepts, that of the secular emperor (*autokrator*) and the sacral idea of "all Rus'."

Andrew II made an attempt (between 1214 and 1223) to establish—in cooperation with the leading Polish prince, Leszek the White, and Pope Innocent III—a Latin Kingdom of Galicia under his dynasty (as a secundogeniture). Not surprisingly, the term *Rus'*, redolent of sacred Byzantine Orthodox concepts, is missing from the title of the Catholic king of Galicia, Koloman, Andrew's son.²⁴

After the revival of the Byzantine imperial and church establishments in Nicaea, the Byzantines soon regained their influence over the non-Greek Orthodox, first among the Serbs and later also among the Rus'. Byzantine ties with the khans of the Golden Horde, the de facto sovereigns of Rus', made this task easier.²⁵ A new compromise was now elaborated. The Rus' princes of Halyč, Kiev, and Novgorod-Suzdal' surrendered their recently acquired title of *autokrator* in exchange for canonization of their progenitor, Volodimer the Great, the baptizer of Rus'.

Just as the name "Kiev" became a kind of synecdoche for "the Metropolitanate of all of Rus'," the name of the baptizer of Rus', Volodimer the Great, developed from the mid-twelfth century into a symbol of the political charisma of the dynasty, now with no recognized senior. Jurij Monomaxovyč, the perennial pretender to the Kievan throne, is called by the chronicler (under the year 1149) an offspring of "Volodimer the Great, who baptized the whole land of Rus'."²⁶ The same style is used with reference to Jurij's

²² *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, ed. Aleksej A. Šaxmatov, *PSRL*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), col. 715. On the title *samovlastec' / samodržьсь* = Greek αὐτοκράτωρ see A. S. L'vov, *Leksika 'Povesti vremennyx let'* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 182–84.

²³ See A. N. Nasonov, "Russkaja zemlja" i obrazovanie territorii drevnerusskogo gosudarstva (Moscow, 1951).

²⁴ On the Szepes (Spyš) agreement and the coronation of Koloman, see Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajiny-Rusy*, 10 vols. (rpt. New York, 1954–57), 3: 31–36 and 510–513.

²⁵ George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven, 1953), and Mixail D. Prisel'kov, *Xanskije jarlyki russkim metropolitam* (Petrograd, 1916).

²⁶ "Načalo kn[ja]ženiija v Kievě kn[ja]zja velikago Djurgja, s[ly]na Volodimirja Monomaxa, vnuka Vsevoloža, pravnuka Jaroslavlja, praščjura velikago Volodimera xr[is]tivšago vsju zemlju Ruskouju," *Ipat' evsakaja letopis'*, cols. 383–84.

son Hlib (Glěb) in 1172,²⁷ and Danylo Romanovyč of Halyč in 1229.²⁸

Until the 1250s, the Byzantine government had its reasons not to allow the canonization of Volodimer the Great (or that of Ol'ga). At that time, the Byzantine government in exile was based in Nicaea, whereas Rus' had become a part of the Golden Horde. It seems that it was Cyril III, the long-lived metropolitan of Kiev (and formerly a diplomat in the service of Danylo of Halyč), who succeeded in persuading the Nicaean government that this was the appropriate time to canonize Volodimer. The exact date of the canonization is unknown, but it must have taken place before 1254.²⁹ At that time (1254) Danylo was involved in a war of succession in Austria. The chronicler wrote in this connection: "Before this time no one from Rus' had made war upon the Czech land, not even Svjatoslav the Bold or *Saint Volodimer* (emphasis added)."³⁰

In the eulogy to Alexander Nevskij, Danylo's rival in Rus' affairs, the Suzdal' Chronicle (under the year 1263) refers to "Saint Volodimer," as well as to the martyrs Cyricus (Kjurik) and Julitta (Ulita).³¹ A church dedicated to St. Volodimer, in Novgorod the Great, is first documented in 1311.³²

Constantinople refused on principle to divide the *indivisible* Metropolitanate of Rus' (Kiev), even when this demand was made by Andrej Bogoljubskij (d. 1174), powerful ruler of a new political center in Rus'—Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma.³³ And this was despite the fact that Andrej used, in his peculiar way, the charisma that attached to Kiev through the sack of the city in 1169. He adopted as his palladium the *Theotokos* ("the Mother of God") icon, which he took north from the Kiev suburb of Vyšhorod.

²⁷ "v tož[e] lět[o] čjudo stvori B[og]" i s[vja]taja B[ogorodi]ca c[e]rk[ov]' Desjatinnaja v Kyeve juže bě sozda[la] Volodiměr" iž[e] kr[']stil" zemlju i dal" bě desjatinu c[e]rkvi toi po vsei Rus'koi zemli," *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, cols. 554–55 = *Troickaja letopis'*, p. 247 (s.a. 1169).

²⁸ "inyi bo knjaz' ne vxodil" bě v zemlju Ljad'skou tol' glouboko proče Volodimera Velikago iže bě zemlju krestil," *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, col. 758.

²⁹ On some reasons why Volodimer's canonization never happened in the pre-Mongol period, see, e.g., Stepan Tomašivs'kyj, *Vstup do istoriji cerkvy na Ukrajinu* (Žovkva, 1932), p. 88.

³⁰ "ne bě bo v zemlě Rouscěi pervee iže bě voeval" zemlju Č's'skou ni S[vja]toslav" Xorobry ni Volodimer" S[vja]tyi," *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, col. 821.

³¹ "na pamjat' . . . s[vja]toju m[u]č[e]n[i]ku Kjurika i Ulity i s[vja]t[o]go kn[ja]zja Volodimera kr[es]tivšago Russkiju zemlju. . .," *PSRL*, vol. 1, col. 479.

³² "Togo že lěta arxiepiskop" Davyd" postavi cerkov' kamenu na vorotěx" ot Nerev'skogo konca svjatogo Volodimira," *Novgorodskaja pervaja letopis'*, p. 93; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 334, 343, 350, 405.

³³ See A. V. Kartašev, *Očerki po istorii russkoj cerkvi*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1959), pp. 177–81. Andrej's violent death stimulated efforts to canonize him. Although he sponsored the destruction of Kiev in 1169, his "Life" had to be written in Kiev by a Kievan, Kuz'myšče; see *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, cols. 580–93.

This was also despite the fact that the “miraculous” victory of Andrej over the Muslim Volga Bulgars in 1172 was attributed to this icon.³⁴

In the fourteenth century, however, Constantinople changed its policy three times—twice in the creation of the Metropolitanate of Little Rus’ with its see in Halyč (ca. 1300,³⁵ and again in ca. 1370),³⁶ and in the further formation of the Metropolitanate of Lithuania (ca. 1316;³⁷ in 1356³⁸ the bishoprics of Little Rus’³⁹ were added to that Metropolitanate).

The permanent division of the *indivisible* Metropolitanate of all Rus’ occurred in 1448–1458. The former date marks the creation, without the blessing of the patriarch of Constantinople,⁴⁰ of an autocephalous Metropolitanate of “Kiev and all Rus’” with its see in Moscow; the latter is the date of the decision by Pope Calixtus III, with the concurrence of the Uniate patriarch of Constantinople and the Kiev metropolitan, to establish the “Metropolitanate of Kiev and all Rus’” with its seat in the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius.⁴¹ In 1461, the autocephalous Metropolitanate changed its title to “Moscow and all Rus’,” leaving the title “of Kiev” to the metropolitan who presided over the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands.

Two comments are necessary here. First, the names Kiev and Rus’ now functioned merely as symbols, devoid of reality. Until 1620 no Orthodox metropolitan resided primarily in Kiev. The second, and this must be emphasized, is that Moscow, which until the erection of its own

³⁴ *PSRL*, vol. 1, cols. 352–53.

³⁵ See M. Hruševs’kyj, *Istorija Ukrajinj-Rusy*, 3: 269–75, 543–45.

³⁶ Documentation in *Acta Patriarchatus Constantinopolitani* 1, no. 318: 577–79. See also *ibid.* 1, no. 120: 267–71, and 1, no. 121: 271.

³⁷ Heinrich Gelzer, “Beiträge zur russischen Kirchengeschichte aus griechischen Quellen,” *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, vol. 13 (Gotha, 1892), pp. 261–76; Aleksej S. Pavlov, “O načale galickoj i litovskoj mitropolij i pervyx tamošnix mitropolitax po vizantij’skim dokumental’nym istočnikam XIV veka,” *Russkoe obozrenie* (Moscow), 27, no. 5 (May, 1894): 215–28.

³⁸ *Acta Patriarchatus* 1, no. 183: 425–33, esp. p. 426: *περὶ μέντοι τοῦ ἱερωτάτου μητροπολίτου κυρ Ῥωμανοῦ ὡς χειροτονηθέντα καὶ αὐτὸν Λιτβῶν, διωρίσατο ὁ κράτιστος καὶ ἄγιός μου αὐτοκράτωρ συγκαταβάσεως λόγῳ καὶ ἅμα διὰ τὴν ἀνενοχλησίαν καὶ εἰρήνην τοῦ ἐκεῖσε τόπου ἔχειν σὺν ταῖς οὐσαις τῇ τῶν Λιτβῶν ἐπαρχίᾳ δυσὶν ἐπισκοπαῖς, τὸ Πωλότζικον καὶ τὸ Τούροβον μετὰ καὶ τοῦ Νοβογραδοπουλίου, τοῦ καθίσματος τοῦ μητροπολίτου, καὶ τὰς τῆς μικρᾶς Ῥωσίας ἐπισκοπᾶς;* “As for the most holy Metropolitan Lord Romanus, inasmuch as he was ordained for Lithuania, my most mighty and holy sovereign (= Byzantine emperor) condescended, in order to remove the obstacles to peace in those parts, to command that he should possess in addition to the two bishoprics Polotsk and Turov in Lithuania, along with Novogrodek, the Metropolitan seat, the bishoprics of Little Rus’ as well.”

³⁹ See Excursus II below.

⁴⁰ Kartašev, *Očerki*, 1: 364–66.

⁴¹ See *Documenta pontificum romanorum historiam Ukrainae illustrantia*, vol. 1 (Rome, 1953), pp. 138–39 (no. 78). See also Kartašev, *Očerki*, 1: 364–66.

Patriarchate in 1589 was in schism from Constantinople, never recognized the partition of the Kiev Metropolitanate. Thus the quasi-secularized Muscovite concept of "all Rus'" was, in fact, never secularized. Rather, it developed into a kind of fundamentalistic theory and later still was simply transformed into an imperial (not national!) political slogan of official nationality, that of "one and *indivisible* Russia."⁴²

In the Ukrainian territories of the thirteenth century, the designation "Rus'" came to take on a new meaning. There are two characteristic features of the mid-thirteenth-century Galician chronicler's ideology that contrast with that of his Volhynian counterpart. First is the chronicler's pride in Danylo's title of king *korol'* (= *Rex Rusciae*), which he adds at each mention of Danylo's name. In the Volhynian chronicler's view, on the other hand, Danylo is merely prince (*knjaz'*) or just Danylo.⁴³ Secondly, the Galician chronicler consistently substitutes for the "local" name "Galicia, Galician(s)," the "national" (in modern terms) designation "Rus'." (As is well known, the Kiev Chronicle of the twelfth century never used the term "Rus'" in reference to Galicia.)⁴⁴ Moreover, having appropriated this now both political and secular term, the chronicler seems to show special delight in using it wherever he can.⁴⁵ Danylo's council with his brother and sons is called *snem' ruskim' knjazem* (col. 857); Danylo's warriors are called *Rus'* (and not Galicians);⁴⁶ their standard is *ruskaja xorugov'* (col. 505); their battle is *ruskyj boj* (col. 505); Danylo's castle is *krěpost' ruskaja* (col. 539); Danylo acts according to the Rus' custom (*ruskyj obyčaj* [cols. 539, 541]), etc.

The Volhynian chronicler applies to his land, people, and princes only the regional term, e.g., *zemlja Volodimer'skaja* (col. 893). Vasyľko is "Grand Prince of Volodymyr" (cols. 848, 867); the ruling elite is styled as "the best men of Volodymyr" (*lěpšii mouži Volodimer'stii* [col. 920]). Even the Galicians are not referred to as Rus', but by their regional name (Galician; cols. 724, 743), or subsumed under the general regional term Volhynia. Thus, it is related that the khan of the Golden Horde, Telebuga, sent orders in 1283 to the Trans-Dnieper (*zadněprěiskym*) and the

⁴² Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1895* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), esp. pp. 73–183. See also the articles by Paul Bushkovitch and James Cracraft in this issue.

⁴³ *Ipat' evskaja letopis'*, col. 830: "Potom že Voišelk' stvori mir" s Danilom" . . . i pride Xolm" k Danilou. . . ." But cf., e.g., col. 827: "korolevi že Danilou . . .," col. 828: "Danilou že korolevi," . . . "se že ouvědav' Danilo korol'," . . . "Danilou že korolevi. . . ."

⁴⁴ Nasonov, "Ruskaja zemlja," pp. 127–44.

⁴⁵ The columns of the *Ipat' evskaja letopis'* are given in parentheses.

⁴⁶ See the interesting study by Anton I. Hens'ors'kyj, *Halyc'ko-volyns'kyj litopys: Proces skladannja, redakciji i redaktory* (Kiev, 1958).

“Volhynian” (*ko volyn'skim'*) princes; included in the latter category is the prince of Galicia, Lev Danylovyč (col. 892).

Between 1199 and 1340 Galicia and Volhynia were ruled by the Volhynian branch of the Rurikides. Sometimes one person ruled in both lands, e.g., Roman, Jurij I, and Jurij II. But Galicia differed from Volhynia in a very important way. While the latter strictly adhered to the Byzantine concept of *Symphonia* and used the name *Rus'* only for the sphere of sacral terminology analogously to the Patriarchate's usage, Galicia, with its close connections with Catholic Hungary, had adapted the term to secular use, especially after Danylo's acceptance of the crown from Pope Innocent IV (1253). Galicia was in the process of becoming a “national,” Western-style sovereign kingdom (*regnum Russie*), while Volhynia adhered to the concept of patrimonial, presecular Byzantine universalism. This opposition is clearly demonstrated in the inscriptions on the seal of Jurij I (1300–1315), ruler of both Galicia and Volhynia. As ruler of the former he is styled *Rex Russiae* “King of Rus’,” but as prince of Volhynia his seal was that of *Principis Ladimeriae*.⁴⁷ It is clear that the designation *Rus'* is connected with the concept of kingdom (*regnum*), while *Ladimeria* (*Volodymyr*) is tied with the notion of principality.

It is now understandable why during the period of direct Polish rule only Galicia of all the Ukrainian lands retained its “national” name and was officially styled as the “Rus’ Palatinate” (*Województwo Ruskie*, ca. 1434–1772). A comparable development can be observed for the territory of the Hetman State (the Zaporozhian Host) which, after the demise of its autonomy, was given (in 1796) the designation “the Little Russian gubernia” (*Malorossijskaja gubernija*).⁴⁸

III

In Kiev's ecclesiastical life, in addition to the Metropolitanate there was another religious institution, often at odds with it—the Kiev Monastery of the Caves.⁴⁹ In various periods, it was the breeding ground of clerics and church elites for Eastern Europe. The second half of the twelfth to the first half of the fourteenth century adumbrated the seventeenth and eighteenth

⁴⁷ See the facsimiles of the seal in J. Řežábek, Arist Kunik et al., *Boleslav-Jurij II, knjaz' vsej Maloj Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1907), pl. 1, 2a (A.D. 1316), pl. 3b (1325), pl. 5a, b (1327), pl. 6 (1334) and pl. 9 (1335).

⁴⁸ On the fate of the Little Russian identity, see the article by Z. Kohut in this issue.

⁴⁹ On the relations between the Metropolitanate and the Caves Monastery during the Kievan Rus' period, see M. D. Priselkov, *Očerki po cerkovno-političeskoj istorii Kievskoj Rusi X–XII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 1913), esp. pp. 184–190, 339–41, 358–60, 400–405.

centuries, in that the clerics from Kiev (and mainly from the Caves Monastery) played the role of enlighteners—and frequently made good careers—in the North. In consequence of a dialogue between two monks, one of whom became bishop of Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma, there came into being the famous “Kievan Patericon” (ca. 1222), a compilation of the lives of Kievan saints. This *Paterik Pečers'kyj* remained the most popular book in the Ukraine until the nineteenth century. In times of political and cultural restorations the Caves Monastery would be used to revive people's allegiance to the Kievan myths. Thus was conceived the so-called Kassijan versions of the Patericon during the brief revival of Kiev as a cultural and political center under the Lithuanian Kievan dynasty (1440–1471). This policy was also important in the cultural rebirth of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁵⁰ At that time three editions of the original Patericon (1661, 1678, 1702) as well as a Polish version (by Metropolitan S. Kosov, 1635) were published.⁵¹ There Volodimer the Great is styled as *samodrǫžec Ruskya zemlja*.⁵²

The first attempted history of Eastern Europe, though naturally still in a universalistic, presecular perspective, was produced at the Caves Monastery. The very title is a summary of the interrelations among Rus', Kiev, St. Volodimer and the presecular notion of “all Rus'”: “*Synopsis*, or a brief compilation from various chronicles on the origin of the Slav-Rosian (*rosijskoho*) people and the original (*pervonačalnŭx*) princes of the divinely-protected city of Kiev; on the life of the Orthodox Saint, Grand Prince of Kiev and of all Rossija (*vseja Rossiy*) [and] the very first Autocrat, Volodimer; and on the successors to his pious Rus' *dominion* (*blahočestyvŭja Deržavy eho Rossijskija*), up to the most serene and pious Lord our Tsar and Grand Prince Alexis Mixajlovič, Autocrat of all Great, White and Little Rössija” (five editions between 1671 and 1681).⁵³

⁵⁰ On the Smolensk rebirth see Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istoriya ukrajins'koji literatury*, vol. 5 (Kiev, 1926) pt.1: 157–73.

⁵¹ Sylwester Kossow, *Patericon abo żywoty SS. Oycow pieczarskich* (Kiev, 1635).

⁵² “V” knjaženie samodrǫžca Ruskŭja zemlja. . . .” *Kyjevo-Pečers'kyj Pateryk (Vstup, tekst, prymitky)*, ed. Dmytro Abramovyč (Kiev, 1929) p. 16.

⁵³ *Sinopsis. Kiev 1681*, Facsimile mit einer Einleitung von Hans Rothe (Cologne, 1983), p. 399 (ed. 1674); p. 141 (ed. 1680). A vision of Rus' history after 1240 is absent from the *Synopsis*. Instead there is, significantly enough, only a list of the Kievan *voevody*. The list of the metropolitans is missing, although lists were compiled in the Ukraine in 1617–1627, one result of the revival of historical consciousness. I have in mind Krevza's *Obrona iednošci cerkiewney* (Vilnius, 1617), pp. 55–66, and Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj, *Palinodija* (manuscript at the University of Michigan Library), fols. 482v–485v. A facsimile edition, as well as English translations of both texts, is being prepared for the *Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature*.

Kievan history is divided here into three periods, each marking a step down: the period of the autocrats, initiated by St. Volodimer, was followed after 1240 (the Tatar invasion) by a Grand Principality, which in 1471 was degraded to a palatinate.⁵⁴

Because of its universalistic, presecular orientation, the *Synopsis* ignored the existing secular Ukrainian Cossack State of the Zaporozhian Host. Its creator Bohdan Xmel'nyč'kyj and his struggle with the Poles are not mentioned.⁵⁵

All this happened because, among other things, the Kievan church elites between 1654 and 1685, when they were still subordinated to the patriarch of Constantinople (and despite the Nikon controversy in 1667), never undertook to define exactly their status with relation to the hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, on the one hand, or to his new suzerain, on the other. The tsar of Muscovy was also the protector of the patriarch of Moscow (and hence independent of the patriarch of Constantinople). Unwilling to submit

It is worth mentioning that the 1680 edition of *Synopsis* introduced a fictitious woodcut portrait of *Car' Vladimir* (fol. 46b = Rothe reprint, p. 232).

⁵⁴ "Po prestavlěny Blahověrnaho knjazja Simeóna Olělkovyča, Koról' Pólskij, Kazýmír'' Carstvėnnj Hrád'' Kíev'' i Knjažėnie ehò v'' voevódstvo premínj, Martýna že Gaštólta Lytvýna, Voevódu v'' Kíeví predložj y outverdj, Róku ot Rož. Xva, 1471. Y ot tohò vremeny Preslávnoe Samoderžavie Kíevskoe, Bohu táko hríx'' rády čolovíčeskyx'' popustývšu, v'' ounyčyženie toljko prijde, jáko ot Carstvija v'' knjažėnie, a ot knjaženija v'' Voevódstvo premínj'sja," *Synopsis*, ed. Rothe, p. 358.

An almost identical text is to be found in the introductory chapter added to the "Krojnika Litovskaja i Žmojtskaja": "After the righteous Prince Semen Olel'kovyč passed away, Casimir, the Polish king, transformed the royal city of Kiev (*hrad carstvennyj*) and its Princedom (*i knjazstvo eho*) into a palatinate (*voevodstvo*). He proposed and confirmed in the year 1471 the Lithuanian Martin Gaštold as the palatine (*voevoda*). And from that time on the kingdom of Kiev (*carstvovanie kievskoe*) and the autocratic rule (*samoderžavnoe knjaženie*), which because of mankind's sins God yielded to happen, became such a laughingstock, since it changed from kingdom (*ot carstvija*) into princedom (*vo knjaženie*), and from princedom into palatinate (*v voevodstvo*)." See *PSRL*, ed. N. N. Ulaščík, vol. 32 (Moscow, 1975), p. 214.

It is noteworthy that the author of the "L'vivs'kyj litopys" (ca. 1649) regarded it as crucial to begin his chronicle with information about the following two events:

"Roku 1339. Król Kazimierz polski Lwów wziął, poddali się sami; skarby wielkie pobrał, srebra, złota, kamieni drogich, bławatów, 2 krzyże złote, kamieniami sadzone, w jednym drzewo krzyża ś., 2 koronie, krzesło drogo robione, szatę szczerym złotem przetykaną i drogim kamieniem sadzoną; zamki obadwa, Wysoki i Niski drewniane pali, Kroniki 263 list, księga XII.

1471. Król Kazimierz polski przerobił księstwo Kijowskie na powiat i za wojewódstwo za radę litowską 1 starosta litwin Gosztold." Oleksander Bevzo, *L'vivs'kyj litopys i Ostroz'kyj litopyssec': Džereloznavče doslidžennja* (Kiev, 1970), p. 99.

These two essential events are described in Polish; thereafter follows the chronicle proper (1498–1649), written in Middle Ukrainian.

⁵⁵ See Excursus I, below. Strangely enough, the *Synopsis* does not even mention the Union of Brest of 1596 and the ensuing Orthodox-Uniate controversy.

to the authority of the hetman, they aimed rather to obtain a special position within the Muscovite political and church structure, as the enlightened custodians of the sacred idea of "all of Rus'." Hence in the critical years 1685–1686, the Kievan church elites proposed to the Muscovite government an unrealistic solution—that the Kiev metropolitan, even after his submission to the patriarch of Moscow, still remain as before the metropolitan of "all of Rus'" and the "Exarch of the Patriarch of Constantinople." The Muscovite bureaucrats simply ignored the demands of the Kiev ecclesiastics and the matter ended with the practically unconditional transformation of the Kiev Metropolitanate of "all of Rus'," a fully autonomous body within the Patriarchate of Constantinople, into a mere diocese (with no suffragans) of the Patriarchate of Moscow.⁵⁶

IV

The third Kievan spiritual institution of great renown was the Kiev Collegium, later the Mohyla-Mazepa Academy, founded by Petro Mohyla in 1632.⁵⁷ Although still presecular in nature, it was too closely linked with Western developments to ignore the secular world. Feofan Prokopovyč, one of the academy's professors, in the prologue to his "tragicomedy," *Vladymyr* (1705), acknowledged Hetman Ivan Mazepa as the successor to the rule of St. Volodimer in Kiev.⁵⁸ Prokopovyč's choice of St. Volodimer as the hero of his work was certainly not accidental.⁵⁹ As Myxajlo

⁵⁶ On these developments see Konstantin V. Xarlampovič, *Malorossijskoe vlijanie na velikoruskyi žizn'*, vol. 1 (Kazan', 1914), pp. 218–49.

⁵⁷ See the special issue of this journal *The Kiev Mohyla Academy*, = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8 (1984), no. 1/2.

⁵⁸ *Vladymyr* begins as follows: "Vladymyr vsix slavennorossyjskых stran knjaz' y povelytel', ot nevirya tmy vo velykij svit evanhelskij duxom svjatym pryveden v lito ot roždestva Xrystova 988; nyni že v preslavnoj Akademii Mohylo-Mazepovyanskoj Kievskoj, pryvyststvujuščoj Jasnel'možnoho eho carskoho presvitloho velyčestva Vojska Zaporožskoho Oboyx Stran Dnepra Hetmana y slavnaho čynu svjatoho Andreja Apostola Kavalyera Yoanna Mazepy, prevelykaho svoeho kytora, na pozor Rossyjskomu rodu ot blahorodnyx Rossyjskых synov, dobrī zde vospytuemyx. . . ." *Feofan Prokopovič: Sočinenija*, ed. I. P. Eremin (Moscow and Leningrad, 1961), p. 149. See also fn. 56.

⁵⁹ In the "Prologue" to his work, Prokopovyč acknowledges that his aim is to show that Kiev was the eternal city of Rus' and Hetman Ivan Mazepa, the living St. Volodimer: "Se že y dom Vladymyrov, se y Vladymyrova čada, kreščenyem svjatym ot neho roždennaja (čo pače vsix yzjaščnīe na tobī javljaetsja, Jasnovel'možnyj Pane, kytore y dobrodīju naš [= Mazepa], emu [= Mazepa] že y stroenye seho otčestva Vladymerovaho po carju ot Boha vručeno est, y Vladymyrovymy ydajj ravnymy emu pobīdamy, ravnoju v Rossyy ykonomyeju, lyce eho, jako otčeskoje syn, na tebī pokazueš). Ubo seho yzobraženye pryjmy ot nas, jako toho ž (= Volodimir) velykij naslīdnyk, vmīsto pryvystvyja. Zry sebe samaho [= Mazepa] v Vladymerī, zry v pozorī sem, ak y v zercalī, tvoju xrabrost, tvoju slavu, tvoej ljubvī sojuz s monaršym serdcem,

Hruševs'kyj noted, it was Prokopovyč who in his "Rhetoric" (bk. VI, chap. 3) "insisted on the need to devote more attention (in the curriculum of the Kiev Academy) to the 'history of the fatherland,' particularly to its most recent period."⁶⁰ In fact, this direct involvement of the Kiev Academy in local, secular matters ended soon after the defeat at Poltava (1709).

Indirectly, however, the Kiev Academy can be given credit for the appearance of a stratum of Cossack military chancellors (*soslovije vojskovýx kanceljarystov*) who developed an interest in Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj's revolution and turned their attention to history. Sons of Cossack officers from the time of the insurrection, they were also alumni of the Kiev Academy. Actively engaged in the administration of the Hetmanate, they carried out the secularization of the sacral term "Little Russia" in reference to their polity. But without the necessary support of the churchmen the secular idea of Little Russian statehood⁶¹ was too abstract for the common people, who for centuries had been taught universalistic, religious, fundamentalist concepts. Hence the secular idea of Little Russia remained the intellectual property only of the Little Russian elites, surviving the abolition of its autonomy to be revived during the period of Enlightenment (*Istorija Rusov*, ca. 1818–1824).

tvoe ystynnoe blaholjubye, tvoju yskrennuju k pravoslavnoj apostolskoj edynoj kafolyčeskoj vîry našoj revnost y userdye" (ed. Eremin, p. 152).

The *trahedokomedyja* ends with a monologue of St. Andrew, where again Hetman Mazepa is hailed as the successor to the rulers of Rus' and Kiev (although Mazepa's capital was, of course, Baturyn):

se toj est svît, eho že, duxom zde vodymyj,
 obiščax ty, Kyeve, hrade moj ljubymyj! . . .
 No hdî esm? čto se vyždu? Kyja ešče lîta
 otkryvaeš mnî, carju víkov? . . .
 Ot vsêx že krasnjšoe pozoryšče sye:
 Zyždetsja dom učenyj (= Kievan Academy). O dnej tyx blažennyx,
 Rossye! Kolyko bo mužej soveršennýx
 Proyzvedet ty dom sej! Nad všimý že symý
 xramynamý zyždytel' Yoann slavymyj (= Ivan Mazepa)
 Načertan zrytsja. Bože dyvnyj y velykyj,
 otkryvyj mnî tolyku radost i tolykyj
 Svêt na mja yzlyjavyi. Dažd krêpost y sylu,
 dažd mnohodenstvye, dažd ko vsjakomu dílu
 Pospîx blahopolučnyj, bran' vsehda pobídnu!"
 (ed. Eremin, pp. 203–206).

⁶⁰ Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, "Ob ukrainskij istoriografii XVIII veka. Neskol'ko sobraženij," *Bulletin de l'Académie der Sciences de l'URSR, Classe des Sciences Sociales* (Leningrad, 1934), pp. 215–33; English translation by Zenon E. Kohut in *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, pt. 1, ed. O. Pritsak (Munich, 1972), pp. 9*–16*.

⁶¹ See Zenon E. Kohut, "The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding," in this issue.

V

The wholesale transplantation of West European secular culture into the Russian Empire can be dated to 1804–1805, when universities of a new type were established there. For various reasons Kiev was endowed with a university only thirty years later (1834). Significantly, it was named “St. Volodimer’s University.”⁶²

Ten years later, there appeared in Kiev the greatest Ukrainian national poet, Taras Ševčenko, born near Kiev, but a cultural product of the Imperial St. Petersburg variant of Western Romanticism. His role was critical in forging the Ukrainian vernacular into a medium for secular literature of the highest order. Ševčenko abandoned the presecular terms Rus’/Little Russia for his native land, and linked his creativity with the secular name *Ukraine*.⁶³ (However, he never used the term “Ukrainian” in reference to himself or his countrymen.)⁶⁴ His legacy was the transformation of Kiev from the center of East Slavonic Orthodox piety (Metropolitanate, Caves Monastery) into the focal point for a Ukrainian secular national identity. Since the populist intelligentsia in the Eastern Ukraine was basically agnostic, in this system the secular figure of Ševčenko replaced St. Volodimer as the symbol of Kiev. Ševčenko, a secular hero associated with Kiev, became and remains to this day the symbol of modern Ukrainian nationhood, due to the continued influence of nineteenth-century populism which stressed ethno-cultural rather than political categories.

I do not know if it was an understanding of Ševčenko in this context that prompted the Soviet government in 1939 to rename Kiev’s “St. Volodimer University” as “Ševčenko University.”⁶⁵ Apparently the government officials felt that this was at least a logical conclusion to an irreducible intellectual development.

Thus, the sacral idea of “Kiev and all of Rus’ ” was introduced in Kiev during the eleventh–twelfth centuries by the Greek metropolitans, who were also political agents of the Byzantine Empire.

⁶² On the *Istoriia Rusov* and the transplantation of Western secular culture to the Ukraine, see Omeljan Pritsak, “Lypyns’kyj’s Place in Ukrainian Intellectual History,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9 (1985): 245.

⁶³ Ševčenko’s participation in the clandestine political Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood during the period of his activity at the University of Kiev (1846–1847) should be stressed. See George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol’ and Ševčenko* (Munich, 1971), pp. 162–95; Dennis Papazian, “Kostomarov and the Cyril-Methodian Ideology,” *Russian Review* 29 (1970): 59–73.

⁶⁴ *Slovnyk movy Ševčenko*, ed. V. S. Vaščenko et al., 2 vols. (Kiev, 1964), has entries only for *Ukrajina* (2: 359–60) and for *ukrajins’kyj (jazyk)* (2: 360).

⁶⁵ See *Istoriia Kyjivs’koho universytetu*, ed. O. Z. Žmuds’kyj (Kiev, 1959), p. 364.

All local attempts to secularize this idea of “all of Rus’” or/and “all of Little Rus’” in the Ukrainian lands failed. We can advance two reasons for this failure. First, in contrast to the North, in the South there was no enduring polity between 1340 and 1648, which would have been necessary for the establishment of common ties. The changing local political elites and the (also changing) foreign church administrations, especially since the idea of “all of Rus’” itself was not “national” but rather sacral and universalistic, were too disparate. The second reason was the original split between the higher foreign-born prelates and the lower clergy of local origins.

By inertia both splits continued into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, despite the facts that the church administration in the Ukrainian lands had been taken over by the local churchmen and that a native polity (the state of the Zaporozhian Host) had been established. This lack of cooperation prevented the creation of a basis for a well-defined Ukrainian secular national identity before the impact of Romanticism (see Excursus I, below). As a result, the *sacral* idea of “all of Rus’” simply vanished in the Ukraine soon after 1721, before the *secular* concept of “(all of) Little Rus’” could take firm root.

Excursus I: *Ideological Tampering with Historical Consciousness*

Why did the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle stop with 1291 and not continue through the 1340s? The Kingdom of Galicia and Volhynia remained an independent, economically and politically healthy polity. But a historian of Rus’ is confronted with a strange situation when he turns to the period following 1290. It is reminiscent of the chronicle’s description of the period prior to A.M. 6367/A.D. 859. After 1290 we are not told when Lev Danylovyč or any of his successors died, what happened to the senior member of the dynasty, Mstyslav Danylovyč, or how and through whose agency Jurij L’vovyč was crowned King of Galicia. Not a word about the Jurijevyči and Boleslav Jurij II. The period is a blank page. Why did this happen? What accounts for such an instance of national amnesia in a highly eventful epoch?

The answer is simple:⁶⁶ it was a “terrible vengeance” on the part of the Orthodox Rus’ Church leadership directed against a dynasty that dared act according to a political vision that rationalized their cooperation with the Roman Catholic world. In ca. 1307, Jurij I of Galicia dethroned his uncle Mstyslav of Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, at that time the senior of the dynasty,

⁶⁶ My monograph devoted to this question is being prepared for publication. These are the results of my research in capsule form.

and, having appropriated Volhynia for himself, initiated relations with the pope. Soon he was crowned King of Rus', and thereafter he showed no intention of patronizing the traditional Orthodox institutions. This coup d'état surprised both the newly named metropolitan of Halyč, who had not yet left Constantinople for his see, and the patriarch of Constantinople. The fortuitous death of the Kiev metropolitan provided the patriarch with an opportunity for an ingenious solution. The metropolitan of Halyč was now consecrated as metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus' and was dispatched to Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz'ma, then the seat of the Kiev Metropolitanate. Peter of Rata, the Galician now turned North-Rus'ian ("St. Peter of Moscow"), not only initiated a policy of cooperation between the Kiev Metropolitanate and the rising powers in Moscow, but also expunged his former native country from historical memory. The fate of the "traitor" Galician dynasty was henceforth not to be mentioned in Rus' chronicle writing, as it subsequently developed in the North (since ca. 1300) under the metropolitan's auspices.⁶⁷

In 1395 the Lithuanians conquered Smolensk, a province which from the 1160s until the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols in 1240 was very closely connected to Kiev through dynastic ties. When Vitold (Vytautas) succeeded in establishing himself in Lithuania, he was initially confronted with two Rus' uprisings, one in Smolensk (1401–1404) and another in Pskov (1404–1408). In 1416 he appointed a Ruthenian "patriarch" in Lithuania (the Bulgarian Gregory Camblak), and sponsored a Rus' Orthodox literary revival in Smolensk. Although a Catholic and a Lithuanian "chauvinist" (if one may use modern terminology), Vitold—in his struggle with Jagiello (Jogaila) and the Catholic Poles—had to coopt the only higher cultural stratum in his realm, the Ruthenian Orthodox.

Between 1420 and 1440, scholars in Smolensk completed a historical compilation known as "The Chronicle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania," and a panegyric to Vitold. This represented the first revival of chronicle writing in the western Rus' territories after the events of 1307. Naturally, the Lithuanians were represented there as the legitimate successors of the Rus' princes. The great problem that the Smolensk scholars (perhaps aided by Camblak) faced was the lacuna of fifty years (1291–1340), for which there was no information in the existing northeastern Rus' chronicles (controlled by the northern metropolitan). The Smolensk scholars solved the problem by introducing at this point—anachronistically, of course—the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gedymin (Gediminas) (1315–1341) as the main

⁶⁷ See Aleksandr E. Presnjakov, *Obrazovanie velikorussskogo gosudarstva* (Petrograd, 1918), pp. 106–109.

actor. He supposedly had undertaken two expeditions of conquest, one against Volhynia, the other against Kiev. The annalists had difficulty with the chronology of events; therefore they are vague about two dates: 1285, i.e., 30 years before Gedymin became ruler of Lithuania, and 1321/1322.⁶⁸ All the Rus' princes mentioned under these dates either do not belong in this period or were invented.⁶⁹ Lev I Danylovyč ruled 1264–1300 in Halyč and Xolm, but not in Luc'k in Volhynia (as reported in the Lithuanian Chronicle). Volodymyr, Prince of Volhynia (d. 1289), was not the son of Lev I but of Vasyl'ko Romanovyč (d. 1269). Lev I's son was King Jurij I, who became anathema to Metropolitan Peter, with the result that—as mentioned above—he and his kin were expunged from Rus' Orthodox memory. Apparently the Smolensk annalists did not attempt to fill the gap by referring to Polish sources. Whether this oversight was intentional is difficult to say.

Another instance of national amnesia, artificially produced by the ecclesiastical elites of Kiev who wrote history, occurred as late as the sixties of the seventeenth century: this was the publication of the *Synopsis* (1671–1681).

The great victories of Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj, Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, over the Poles in the spring and summer of 1648 were soon interpreted by the Kiev churchmen as a victory over Catholicism. But they mistrusted Xmel'nyc'kyj, who was an alumnus of a Jesuit college (rather than of the Orthodox Kiev Mohyla Academy). In order to find out more about him, they invited Xmel'nyc'kyj to Kiev at the end of 1648, possible at that time because the Kiev Orthodox hierarchy had been strengthened by the visit of the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Paisius. The ensuing discussions between Xmel'nyc'kyj and Metropolitan Kosov (1650–1651) failed to produce agreement. Kosov demanded joint rule over the Ukraine by the hetman and the metropolitan. Xmel'nyc'kyj, who was raised in the

⁶⁸ The chronological information of this "chronicle" posed problems to the historians of the sixteenth to seventeenth century. While Maciej Strykowski in 1582 synchronized the events around the years 1320 (conquest of Volhynia) and 1321 (conquest of Kiev) [see *Kronika polska, litewska, żmódzka i wszystkiej Rusi*, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1846), 1: 362–68], the author of the *Hustyn' (Hustynja) Chronicle* chose other dates: 1304 (conquest of Volhynia) and 1305 (conquest of Kiev), see "Gustinskaja letopis'," in *PSRL*, vol. 2 (pt. 3) (St. Petersburg, 1843), p. 348. Gizel's *Synopsis* condensed the two alleged events into one and dated it to 1320 (ed. Rothe, p. 351).

⁶⁹ The alleged prince of Kiev, Stanyslav, contemporary with Gedymin, was freely invented. Cf. *PSRL*, vol. 32, ed. Ulaščik, pp. 37–38.

political culture of Poland, refused to yield power from the noblemen (*szlachta* = Cossack *staršyna*) to the churchmen.⁷⁰

The response of the Kiev churchmen is reflected in their attitude toward Xmel'nyc'kyj's name and his state. The author of the *Synopsis* ignored their very existence. This attitude certainly contributed to the political "Ruin" of the Cossack state in the Ukraine after Xmel'nyc'kyj's death. Paradoxically, it also contributed to the ruin of the Kiev Metropolitanate.

Had plentiful contemporary Polish and Russian documentation not existed, and if—after the catastrophe at Poltava (1709)—the new secular history writing elite (*soslovije vojskovŷx kanceljarystov*) had not looked for inspiration to the "glorious" revolution of Xmel'nyc'kyj, the modern historian, looking only to the authority of the Kievan historical presentation as reflected in the Kievan *Synopsis*, would not know that Bohdan Xmel'nyc'kyj had ever existed.

One can understand the ire of the "retired" scribe of the Zaporozhian Host, Samuil Velyčko, who in 1720 wrote:

But I saw that the chivalrous and heroic deeds of our Sarmatian-Cossack ancestors, which equal those of foreign nations, have been left unrecorded and unexplained by our writers and have been covered with a mantle of obscurity and forgotten due to the sloth of the authors. . . . If any praise and glory for our forefathers is to be found in writing, it is not found with our *lazy* [emphasis mine—O.P.] historians, but in works of foreign historians: Greeks, Latins, German, and Polish historiographers. . . .⁷¹

Excursus II: *Little Rus'* and *All of Rus'*

The name "Little Rus'" (ἡ Ῥωσία μικρά) first occurs in Byzantine terminology ca. 1300, when it was necessary to erect a second Metropolitanate in Rus' after the Kiev metropolitan left that city (see fn. 11). The northern Rus' Metropolitanate received the designation "Great Rus'" (ἡ Ῥωσία μεγάλη), while the new "Little Rus'" Metropolitanate, with its see at

⁷⁰ See Oleksander Ohloblyn, "Problema deržavnoji vlady na Ukrajinі za Xmel'nyččyny j Perejaslavs'ka Uhoda 1654 roku," *Ukrajins'kyj istoryk* 2 (1965), pt. 1–2: 5–13, and pt. 3–4: 11–16.

⁷¹ "Našyx že sarmato-kozackyx" prodkov," podobnije inostrannym" v" voinskyx" slučajax davnyx vremen" y vŷkov" byvšije rycerskije otvahy y bohatyrskije dŷjanija bez opysanija y objasnenija črez" jix" vlasnyx pysarov" ostavlennije, y vsehdašnoho zabvenija nŷkčemnym" lŷnasty jix" plaščem" uvydŷx" pokrytije. . . . Ašče-že čto onym" prodkom" našym" kozakoruskym" poxvaly hodnoho y obrŷtysja možet", to ne v" našyx lŷnyvyx", ale v" inostrannyx, hrečeskyx, latynskyx, nŷmeckyx i polskyx hystoryohrafax". . . ." *Samijla Velyčka Skazanije o Vojni kozackoj z Poljakamy*, [ed. Kateryna Lazarevs'ka] (Kiev, 1926), p. 2

Halyč, embraced the dioceses Halyč, Volodymyr-in-Volhynia, Xolm, Peremyšl', Luc'k, and Turov (in that order).⁷²

But although the deserted see of Kiev was theoretically subordinate to the metropolitan of Great Rus', the city of Kiev was regarded by the Patriarchal Synod (*endomusa*) as being located in Little Rus'; this was substantiated by the decisions of the *endomusa* from ca. 1354: εἶχε μὲν ἡ ἁγιωτάτη μητρόπολις Ῥωσίας μετὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κάστρον καὶ χωρῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν ἐνορίαν ταύτης τελούντων καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ Μικρῇ Ῥωσίᾳ κάστρον, τὸ Κύεβον ἐπονομαζόμενον, ἐν ᾧ ἦν ἄνωθεν ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία τῆς μητροπόλεως, ἠύρισκοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ἱερώτατοι ἀρχιερεῖς Ῥωσίας τὴν οἴκησιν ποιούμενοι ἐν αὐτῇ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ καιροῦ συγχύσεως καὶ ἀνωμαλίας καὶ τῆς τῶν γειτονούντων Ἀλαμάνων δεινῆς ἐπιθέσεως ἐφθάρη, καὶ εἰς στενοχωρίαν κατήνησε. . . , i.e., "Among the other places and villages which have been the subject of the jurisdiction of the most holy Metropolis of Rus' was the place in Little Rus' called Kiev. In this place the cathedral church was located from the beginning, and the most holy hierarchs of Rus' made their residence there. But during the period of confusion and disorder and the terrible attacks of the neighboring Alamans⁷³ the place was ruined and reduced to a wretched state. . . ."⁷⁴

The Metropolitanate existed between 1300–1347 and 1371–1400 (?). It was Boleslav Jurij II (poisoned in 1340 at Volodymyr-in-Volhynia)⁷⁵ who first applied this terminology to his polity (Galicia and Volhynia): *Nos Georgius, Dei gratia natus dux Totius Russiae Minoris*, i.e., "all of Little Rus'."⁷⁶

After the demise of the Galician-Volhynian state the term "Little Rus'" fell into oblivion until it was rediscovered by Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj (d. 1627), who used it again in its sacral meaning, namely, in referring to the restored (in 1620) Kiev Orthodox metropolitanate. Soon the phrase became part of the official title of the Kiev metropolitan, used side-by-side with

⁷² *Acta Patriarchatus* 1, no. 158: 351.

⁷³ Here the Byzantine devines used the Turkic (Oghuz) designation for "bands; bandits" with relation to the Tatars. Concerning the etymology of the word *aleman / alaman* 'bandit', see È. V. Sevortjan, *Ètimologičeskij slovar' tjurkskix jazykov*, vol. [1] (Moscow, 1974), p. 134. The Turkic word Ἀλαμάνοι was not recognized as such by Gyula Moravcsik, *Byzantinoturcica*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1958). Sometimes this word is confused with the Ottoman designation (< French) for "Germans."

⁷⁴ *Acta Patriarchatus* 1, no. 158: 351.

⁷⁵ It is important to investigate whether the extraordinary activities of the Moscow-oriented Greek metropolitan of "all of Rus'" Theognost (1328–1353) in Western Rus', especially in Volhynia (see *Analecta Byzantino-Russica*, ed. W. Regel [St. Petersburg, 1891–1898; rptd. New York: Ben Franklin (s.a.), pp. 52–56]) were crucial in the conspiracy of 1340. The poisoning of a ruler was not typical for Medieval Rus' mores.

⁷⁶ Řežabek-Kunik, *Boleslav-Jurij II* (see fn. 47), no. 8, p. 154.

another more traditional phrase, “all [of] Rus’ ”; noteworthy is the fact that Ukrainians preferred to use the “learned” form *Rossija* (written with *o* or ω), whereas Muscovite Russians styled the name as “vernacular” *Rusija* (written with a *u*).

In the middle of the seventeenth century the Muscovite chancery began to distinguish the two originally sacral terms “all of Rus’,” which they had applied indiscriminately both to their patrimonial polity and to the Patriarchate, and “all of Little Rus’,” their new designation for the contemporary Kiev Metropolitanate. This terminology was used consistently by the tsar and the patriarch in their correspondence with the Kiev metropolitan even before the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654.

On the other hand, Metropolitan Syl’vester Kosov and even the patriarch of Constantinople, to whom the Kiev Metropolitanate was still subordinate, usually ignored this Muscovite usage and preferred to keep the title “all of Rus’ ” (rather than “all of Little Rus’ ”) for the Kiev Metropolitanate. Some instances of that usage follow.

(1) Tsar Alexis Mixajlovič to Metropolitan Kosov in 1650: “Velikomu gospodinu preosvjaščennomu Seliverstu, arxiepiskopu, božieju milostiju mitropolitu Kievskomu i Galitckomu i Vsea Malye [sic!] Rusii.”⁷⁷

(2) Kosov to the voievoda of Belgorod, B. Repnin (1 August 1650): “Božyjeju mylostyju apxyjepyskop mytropolyt Kyjevskyj, Halyckyj i Vseja Malyja [sic!] Rossiji. . .”; but Kosov’s title in his signature is styled differently: “Sylvester Kosov, mytropolyt Kyjevskyj, Halyckyj i Vseja [sic!] Rossiji.”⁷⁸

(3) Kosov’s circular letter of 7 May 1652: “Selvester Kosov mylostyju božyjeju pravoslavnŭj arxyjepyskop mytropolyt Kyjevskyj, Halyckyj i Vseja Rosiji ekzarxa svjatoho apostolskoho fronu Konstantynopolskoho.”⁷⁹

The patriarch of Constantinople, Parthenius, styled Kosov’s title in the same way (18 February 1651; the letter was written in Latin): “Sanctissime, eloquentissime metropolita Kiovensis, Galicki et Totius Russiae domine Sylvester.”⁸⁰

Both the tsar of Muscovy and the patriarch of Moscow appropriated for themselves the form “Rusija”: “car’ i velikij knjaz’ Aleksej Mixajlovič

⁷⁷ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1954) 2: 345.

⁷⁸ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej*, 2: 380.

⁷⁹ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej*, 3: 215.

⁸⁰ *Dokumenty ob osvoboditel’noj vojne ukrainskogo naroda 1648–1654 gg.* (Kiev, 1965), p. 383.

vsea Rusii samoderžec,” and “svjatejšij Nikon, patriarx Moskovskij i Vsea Rusii.”⁸¹

It was Ivan I. Kalita (1328–1341) who (following the advice of Metropolitan Peter) appropriated for himself, on the model of the metropolitan’s title, the sacral formula *vseja Rusi*.⁸² The patriarchal chancery in Constantinople soon recognized that usage. Thus Simeon Ivanovič (1341–1353) was styled by Emperor John VI Cantacuzenes (1341–1354) in 1347 as μέγας ῥήξ πάσης Ῥωσίας (= *knjaz’ velikii vseja Rusi*), on the pattern of the title of the Kiev metropolitan ἕξαρχος πάσης Ῥωσίας.⁸³ The final adoption of these two parallel formulae of *vseja Rusi*, one for the “Kiev” Metropolitanate and the other for the Muscovite polity, was the work of Metropolitan Aleksej (1353–1378),⁸⁴ a scion of the Černihiv boyars.

After the Perejaslav Treaty, following the tsar’s “secular” usage of the title “Tsar... of Little Rus’,” the Moscow patriarch was illegitimately styled (in April 1654) the patriarch “of Little Rus’,”⁸⁵ despite the fact that the Kiev Metropolitanate was still a part of the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

After the liquidation of the Halyč Metropolitanate (ca. 1400), the Kiev metropolitans (first the Orthodox and after 1596 the Uniate) added “of Halyč” to their official title. This interrelation between Kiev and Halyč (later replaced by Lviv) was never terminated. In 1807 the Uniate Metropolitanate of Halyč (with residence in Lviv) was restored, following the death of the last Uniate metropolitan of Kiev, Theodosius Rostoc’kyj (1788–1805). The Metropolitanate was abolished in 1795 by Catherine II, and the metropolitan was exiled to St. Petersburg, where he died.

The Cossack chroniclers of the eighteenth century combined the two terms: “Little Rus’” and “Ukraine.” Hence, Samuil Velyčko (1720; quoted above) used the following phrases to designate his *patria*: *Malorosyjskuju Ukraynu*; *Ukrayno-Malorosijskije polja*; or *otčyzna naša Ukraynomalorosyjskaja*; *zapustînyy tohobočnom’ ukrayno malorosyjskom’*; or, simply, *o tom’ zapustînyy ukraynskom’ vîdenijje*.⁸⁶ The concept of “Little Rus’” had begun to be shelved.

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⁸¹ *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiej*, 3: 406, 407.

⁸² E.g., *Gramoty Velikogo Novgoroda i Pskova*, ed. S. N. Valk (Moscow and Leningrad, 1949), pp. 142–43 (nos. 84, 86).

⁸³ *Acta patriarchatus*, vol. 1, pp. 261 (no. 117), 263 (no. 118); p. 267 (no. 120).

⁸⁴ Presnjakov, *Obrazovanie velikoruskago gosudarstva*, pp. 371–373.

⁸⁵ Xarlampovič, *Malorossijskoe vlijanie*, p. 164.

⁸⁶ Velyčko, *Skazanie*, p. 3.

The National Idea in Lithuania from the 16th to the First Half of the 19th Century: The Problem of Cultural-Linguistic Differentiation

JERZY OCHMAŃSKI

The Development of the Lithuanian Nation up to the Mid-Sixteenth Century

The Lithuanian nation was formed during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when the early feudal Lithuanian state came into being on the basis of the class society that took form under Mindaugas (1219–1263); the state was consolidated under his successors, Traidenis (1269–1281), Vytenis (1269–1315), Gediminas (1315–1341), Algirdas (1345–1377) and Kęstutis (1345–1382).¹

The Lithuanian ethnic group, divided among a number of “lands,” i.e., tribal territories—Lithuania (Lietuva), Deltuva, Naššia, and the Samogitian lands of Karšuva, Medininkai, Šiauliai, etc.—had long shared a common agricultural structure and been closely related linguistically; from the ninth to the eleventh centuries it had also been united culturally.² Joined under one ruler, this group gradually started to lose its tribal diversity and to develop a common national consciousness. The ancient lands—Lithuania, Naššia, and Deltuva—united into one region, which was called Aukštaitija (Upland) from at least the fourteenth century. Samogitia (Žemaitija, Lowland), although it preserved some peculiarities in a separate administrative

¹ Among the fairly rich literature concerning the history of Lithuania in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the following four monographs are the most authoritative: H. Łowmiański, *Studia nad początkami społeczeństwa i państwa litewskiego*, 2 vols. (Vilnius, 1931–32); H. Paszkiewicz, *Jagiellonowie a Moskwa*, vol. 1: *Litwa a Moskwa w XIII i XIV wieku* (Warsaw, 1933); idem, *O genezie i wartości Krewa* (Warsaw, 1938); V. T. Pašuto, *Obrazowanie litovskiego gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1959); cf. H. Łowmiański, “Uwagi o genezie państwa litewskiego,” *Przegląd Historyczny* (Warsaw), 42 (1961): 127–46; J. Ochmański, “Uwagi o litewskim państwie wczesnofeudalnym,” *Roczniki Historyczne* (Poznań), 27 (1961): 143–60. The problem of the formation of the Lithuanian nation under feudalism has not as yet been studied.

² R. Jablonskis-Rimantiene, “O drevnejšix kul’turnyx oblastjax na territorii Litvy,” *Sovetskaja etnografija* (Moscow), 1955, no. 3, pp. 3–19. See also *Lietuvos archeologijos bruožai* (Vilnius, 1961), p. 516; the author of that section, R. Kulikauskienė, believes that the Lithuanian nationality (*tautybė*) started to take form in the ninth to the twelfth century.

organization,³ also underwent an internal integration; the inhabitants of Samogitia called themselves Lithuanians and stated that Samogitia was an inseparable part of Lithuania.⁴ The name “Lithuania” is first attested to by sources in 1009. Originally referring only to a tribe which probably occupied the territory between the Nemunas (Neman), Neris (Vilija), and Merkys,⁵ and which would become the basis of the Lithuanian state, it was generalized and applied to all Lithuanian lands in the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries. The spread of the words for “Lithuania” and “Lithuanians” reflects a growing sense of internal ties within the Lithuanian nation, and manifests a national identity that developed and consolidated during a fierce struggle against the Teutonic Order and during an expansion into the Ruthenian lands. As a result of that expansion, the national Lithuanian state started to transform early—from the first half of the thirteenth century—into the binational, Lithuanian-Ruthenian Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in which Lithuanians constituted a privileged and ruling part of the nation and Ruthenians formed a legally and politically dependent part.⁶ The inability to battle successfully against the Teutonic Order while continuing to expand into the Ruthenian lands forced Lithuania to adopt the Polish concept of the Polish-Lithuanian union of 1385–1386.⁷ After the capture of the vast Ruthenian territories, the union with Poland, and the Christianization of Lithuania (Aukštaitija, in 1387) and of Samogitia (in 1417),⁸ Lithuanians

³ O. Halecki, *Litwa, Ruś i Żmudź jako części składowe W. Ks. Litewskiego* (Cracow, 1916); B. Dundulis, *Lietuvių kova dėl Žemaitijos ir Užnemunės XV a.* (Vilnius, 1960), pp. 73–77; cf. J. Ochmański, review in *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Warsaw), 58, no. 3 (1961): 788–90.

⁴ *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi, magni ducis Lithuaniae (1376–1430)*, ed. A. Prochaska (Cracow, 1882), p. 1018, entry for the year 1416; cf. Dundulis, *Lietuvių kova*, pp. 78–79.

⁵ The Lithuanian land is placed within the confines of the Nemunas, Neris, and Merkys by Łowmiański in *Studia nad początkami*, 2: 108–111. But A. Šapoka holds the view that the Lithuanian land was the later Vilnius region; see his *Vilnius Lietuvos gyvenime* (Toronto, 1954), pp. 6, 11, 32.

⁶ The situation of Ruthenians in the Lithuanian state was recently described by H. Jablonowski, *Westrussland zwischen Wilna und Moskau* (Leiden, 1955); he also cites the earlier literature on this subject.

⁷ The literature concerning the union of 1386 and its history, but by Polish scholars only, was presented by S. Zajączkowski in “W sprawie badań nad dziejami stosunków polsko-litewskich za Jagiellonów,” *Studia historica w 35-lecie pracy naukowej Henryka Łowmiańskiego* (Warsaw, 1958), pp. 199–217. The problem of the union was examined from the Lithuanian point of view by A. Šapoka, *Lietuvos ir Lenkijos valstybiniai santykiai Jogailos laikais* (Kaunas, 1935); cf. also an evaluation by a Belorussian researcher, V. I. Pičeta, “Litovsko-pol’skie unii i otnošenje k nim litovsko-russkoj šljaxy,” in his collection of studies, *Belorussija i Litva XV–XVI vv.* (Moscow, 1961), pp. 525–50 (the cited article was first published in 1909).

⁸ Concerning the Christianization of Lithuania, see J. Fijałek, “Uchrześcianienie Litwy przez Polskę i zachowanie w niej języka ludu,” in *Polska i Litwa w dziejowym stosunku* (Cracow, 1914); M. Andziulaitytė, *Žemaičių kristianizacijos pradžia* (Kaunas, 1937);

faced a crisis—this despite the Grünwald victory over the Teutonic Order (1410)—as a result of close contacts with the more developed Polish and Ruthenian cultures. This was to be expected, because the clash between two separate cultures usually leads to the domination of the one that is more highly organized and to an intensive absorption of its elements by the lower culture, which then begins to lose its national character.

Surprisingly, the adoption by the Lithuanian state and by the Lithuanian higher orders of the Ruthenian language as the official (chancellery) language in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Christianization, superficial as it was, of Lithuania at the turn of the fourteenth to fifteenth century, and the subsequent gradual adoption of Western culture coming through Poland did not have any serious destructive effect on the self-identification of Lithuanians for a fairly long time, until the mid-sixteenth century. In a sense the Polish-Lithuanian union even had a positive effect on the Lithuanians, because the religious differences which had divided the “pagan” Lithuanians from the Orthodox Ruthenians before the union became even sharper as a result of the Lithuanians’ adoption of the “Polish faith”—Catholicism. Moreover, the class privileges granted to the Catholic—i.e., Lithuanian—boyars in 1387 and 1413 elevated the Lithuanians, juridically and politically, above the Ruthenian boyars. This filled Lithuanians with a sense of superiority vis à vis the Ruthenians, whom they called by the pejorative word *gudai*. Aware of being the dominant nation, Lithuanians jealously defended their position. They reluctantly acquiesced to the equal rights given to Ruthenians in 1434,⁹ and tried to prevent Poles from assuming high state posts in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, treating them as foreigners.¹⁰

The developing national consciousness of Lithuanians in the fifteenth century was voiced by Vytautas in 1420, in his well-known statement that Aukštaitija and Samogitia are “unum ydeoma et uni homines” (one

V. Gidziunas, “The Introduction of Christianity into Lithuania,” *Lituanus* (Brooklyn, N.Y.), 1957, no. 4, 13.

⁹ W. Czermak, “Sprawa równouprawnienia schizmatyków i katolików na Litwie (1432–1563),” *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności. Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny* (Cracow), vol. 45 (1903); A. Voldemar[as], “Nacional’naja bor’ba v Velikom Knjažestve Litovskom v XV–XVI vv.,” *Izvestija Otdelenija russkogo jazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoj akademii nauk* (St. Petersburg), 14 (1909), no. 3.

¹⁰ P. Dąbkowski, *Stanowisko cudzoziemców w prawie litewskim w drugiej połowie XV i w XVI wieku (1447–1588)* (Lviv, 1912).

language and one people),¹¹ i.e., one Lithuanian nation. In that period Lithuanians were able to absorb foreign linguistic and cultural (Ruthenian, Polish, Latin and German) influences to their own advantage, and even to use them as instruments to spread Lithuanian national consciousness. Foreign influences awakened and positively affected intellectual life in Lithuanian society and in its ruling strata, and aroused interest in Lithuania's own historical past. A number of chronicles about the history of Lithuania were written in Ruthenian, Polish, German, and Latin. The most outstanding works, the so-called Lithuanian-Ruthenian chronicles—such as the *Genealogy of Lithuanian Princes* (ca. 1398), the *Eulogy of Vytautas* (ca. 1428), and the *Chronicle of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Samogitia* (between 1565 and 1573)—speak well of the level of Lithuanian intellectual life and efforts to learn their own history.¹² In approximately the third quarter of the fifteenth century, a theory about the Roman origin of Lithuanians, based on the similarity of a number of Lithuanian and Latin words, was developed, probably within a circle of Lithuanian students at Cracow. It was noted by the Polish chronicler Jan Długosz.¹³ The theory had an obvious political purpose, for it supported the claim of the antiquity and noble origin of Lithuanian boyars, which had been under Polish-Lithuanian dispute since 1447. The emergence of the theory reflects the historical interests of educated Lithuanians who wanted to elevate the status of their nation.¹⁴ The theory itself enjoyed tremendous popularity among the Lithuanian boyars; some of them believed in it so sincerely that they sought to return to the “language of our ancestors,” i.e., classical Latin, and renounced their native Lithuanian as corrupt because of its deviation from the language of ancient Romans.¹⁵

Although the Ruthenian language, along with Latin, dominated in society and in the Grand-Ducal chancellery and state institutions, particularly in their documents, the Lithuanian language, too, resounded, and not only in everyday life. It was used even in diplomatic negotiations with representatives of foreign states: for instance, in 1492 the Grand Duke's council conducted negotiations with envoys from Gdańsk in Polish,

¹¹ *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*, p. 467.

¹² J. Jakubowski, *Studia nad stosunkami narodowościowymi na Litwie przed Unią Lubelską* (Warsaw, 1912), p. 16ff.

¹³ J. Długosz, *Opera omnia*, vol. 12 (Cracow, 1876), pp. 470–75; Michalon Lituanus, *De moribus Tartarorum, Lituorum et Moschorum* (Basel, 1615), p. 23.

¹⁴ Jakubowski, *Studia*, pp. 30–35.

¹⁵ Jakubowski, *Studia*, pp. 63–64, 69.

Lithuanian, and Ruthenian.¹⁶ Also, ordinances issued in foreign languages must have been made accessible to the population in a Lithuanian version by the boyars who directed the state administration. During the entire feudal period, dealings pertaining to peasants and boyars were carried out partly in Lithuanian, although records were taken down in Ruthenian or Polish. Judicial oaths taken in Lithuanian by witnesses (the so-called *priesaikos*) have been preserved, although their number is small.¹⁷ Lithuanian texts of judicial oaths date as late as from 1624, although their language shows that the formulary was established much earlier. Lithuanian also influenced the state languages, Ruthenian and Polish, in the form of a goodly number of loanwords (over 400 terms).¹⁸

The religious Reformation, which was spreading in Lithuania in the mid-sixteenth century, preached the idea of using the national language in church, and thus helped the development of Lithuanian culture considerably. It forced the Catholic clergy to increase their use of the Lithuanian language in teaching the Gospel and in sermons. In 1547 the first book in Lithuanian, “Catechismusa prasty szadei” (The simple words of catechism), appeared anonymously in Königsberg. Its publisher was Martynas Mažvydas Vaitkunas, an expatriate from Greater Lithuania.¹⁹ Mažvydas used Lithuanian translations of Polish and German church hymns made by well-known European humanists, including Abraomas Kulvietis and Stanislovas Rapolionis (both of whom died in 1545).²⁰ His “Catechismusa” represents a work of the Lithuanian intellectuals who

¹⁶ K. Jablonskis, “Mažvydo gyvenimas ir aplinka,” in *Senoji lietuviška knyga* (Kaunas, 1947), pp. 89–108, cf. p. 99; Z. Ivinskis, “Lietuvių kalba viešajame Lietuvos XVI–XVII a. gyvenime,” *Aidai* (Kennebunkport, Me.), 1953, no. 8, pp. 360–68; no. 9, pp. 408–417.

¹⁷ V. Biržiška, *Senųjų lietuviškų knygų istorija*, pt. 2 (Chicago, 1957), pp. 52–55; V. Abramavičius, “XVII–XVIII a. priesaikos lietuvių kalba,” in *Bibliotekininkystė ir bibliografija*, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1961), pp. 332–36.

¹⁸ K. Jablonskis, “Die offizielle Urkundensprache des litauischen Grossfürstentums als kulturgeschichtliche Quelle,” in *Pirma Baltijas Vėsturnieku Konferencija* (Riga, 1938), p. 270; idem, *Lietuviški žodžiai senosios Lietuvos raštinių kalboje*, pt. 1 (Kaunas, 1941), cites about 300 Lithuanian words that entered the Ruthenian and Polish chancellery language of old Lithuania (15th–18th centuries). Professor Jablonskis showed me, in Vilnius in February 1960 (shortly before his death), a list of ca. 125 new words (“nauji žodžiai”) which he found after the publication of *Lietuviški žodžiai*.

¹⁹ Cf. a photoprint edition, *Pirmoji lietuviška knyga* (Kaunas, 1947).

²⁰ V. Biržiška, *Martin Mažvydas und seine Mitarbeiter* (Heidelberg, 1948), p. 31; V. Mykolaitis-Putinas, “Literatūriniai elementai Mažvydo ir jo amžininkų raštuose,” in *Senoji lietuviška knyga*, pp. 128–29; Ch. Stang, *Die Sprache des litauischen Katechismus von Mažvydas* (Oslo, 1929).

emigrated from Greater Lithuania to Lesser (Prussian) Lithuania to escape religious persecution by the Catholic clergy.²¹

The Lithuanian nation flourished until the mid-sixteenth century. Though permeated with foreign linguistic and cultural influences, the higher social strata maintained and solidified their national consciousness.²² Serfdom was not yet completely established, and thus Lithuanian boyars did not lose their cultural links with the people. They used the same language as the masses did. The peasants, only superficially Christianized, kept their pagan beliefs en masse, and observed the ancestral customs until the sixteenth century. It was only from the second half of that century²³ that, under the influence of Catholic Counter-Reformation, the peasantry turned to the cultural values of Christianity and started to assimilate and adapt them to their psyche and culture.

*The Disintegration of the Lithuanian Feudal Nation
under the Influence of Polonization, Ruthenization, and
Russification from the 16th to the 19th Century*

By the mid-sixteenth century, as the class structure of Lithuanian society solidified, the nobility subordinated the peasants, imposed serfdom,²⁴ and started to limit the development of the burgher class. Sensing their strength, the Lithuanian boyars strove, after the model of the Polish nobility, to break the magnates' oligarchic control and to participate in governing the state.²⁵ Thus, the conditions for the disassociation and fragmentation of the Lithuanian nation appeared and found fertile ground. The nobility became disassociated from their natural ethnic environment, that is, from the Lithuanian people. The individuals who held a privileged position in the state and who oppressed the peasants did not perceive attractive values in the people's culture and drifted away from it, creating their own, noblemen's, culture. Lacking their own accomplishments in the arts and sciences and spurning the cultural values developed by their subjects (*vel-damai*), the Lithuanian nobles turned to foreign models. These were in

²¹ Cf. the collection of articles *Senoji lietuviška knyga* (Kaunas, 1947).

²² S. Kot, "Świadomość narodowa w Polsce XV–XVII w.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (Lviv), 52, no. 1 (1938): 24.

²³ L. Kolankowski, *Zygmunt August, wielki książę litewski do r. 1548* (Lviv, 1913), pp. 223–34.

²⁴ The problems created by serfdom in Lithuania were discussed by J. Jurginis, *Baudžiamosios Lietuvos Lietuvos* (Vilnius, 1962); cf. Z. Ivinskis, *Geschichte des Bauernstandes in Litauen von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Anfange des XVI. Jh.* (Berlin, 1933).

²⁵ M. K. Ljubavskij, *Litovsko-russkij sejm* (Moscow, 1900), pp. 513, 734.

large measure those of Polish culture and of the nobiliary ideology of its renaissance of the "Golden Age."²⁶

The assimilation of these models was made possible by the Polish-Lithuanian union at Lublin. The example of the Polish nobles, who had started to set the tone and the direction of social life and state policy in Poland from the mid-sixteenth century, attracted Lithuanian boyars irresistibly. First, they assimilated the main ideological values of the Polish nobility, namely, the ideals of noble status and of nobles' equal rights.²⁷ Those ideological principles led to a program of struggle to break the superiority of magnates and to govern the state logically. Implementation of the program was possible only through a closer consolidation of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania with Poland. For this reason, as well as the threat from Muscovy, Lithuanian-Ruthenian noblemen supported the Polish strivings for a union.²⁸ The Lublin Union of 1569 held that from that moment on, Poland and Lithuania formed "one joint Commonwealth which was united and coalesced from two states and nations into one nation."²⁹ It also confirmed the previous principle of a joint rule by one monarch, and introduced a joint Diet for Lithuania and Poland and joint legislation in the form of "constitutions" (Laws) endorsed by the Diet after 1569. Lithuania preserved its governmental singularity, however, because it retained a separate administrative system with the central offices of chancellor and hetman and maintained its own treasury, army, judiciary, and legal codes, in the form of the Lithuanian Statutes of 1566 and 1588. The national separateness of Lithuania was also upheld by establishing the principle of "both nations," Polish and Lithuanian, which would persist almost as long as the Commonwealth itself.³⁰ Thus, despite the resistance of magnates who fiercely opposed the union because it threatened their dominant position in the Lithuanian state, the class interests of Lithuanian nobility as a whole predetermined the fate of the union in favor of a closer association with

²⁶ A. Brückner, *Dzieje kultury polskiej*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. (Warsaw, 1958).

²⁷ A. Zajączkowski, *Główne elementy kultury szlacheckiej w Polsce* (Wrocław, 1961), pp. 49–59.

²⁸ Ljubavskij, *Litovsko-russkij sejm*, pp. 635, 700, 734; O. Halecki, *Dzieje unii jagiellońskiej*, vol. 2: *XVI wiek* (Cracow, 1920), pp. 151–54; Pičeta, "Litovsko-pol'skie unii," pp. 543, 545; S. Kutrzeba, "Unia Polski z Litwą," in *Polska i Litwa w dziejowym stosunku*, pp. 599–652.

²⁹ *Akta unii Polski z Litwą*, published by S. Kutrzeba and W. Semkowicz (Cracow, 1932), no. 148, p. 344 (act of the Polish side) and no. 149, p. 385 (act of the Lithuanian side; the two texts are identical).

³⁰ A. Šapoka, *Lietuva ir Lenkija po 1569 m. Liublino unijos* (Kaunas, 1938); V. I. Pičeta, "Pol'sha na putjax k kolonizacii Ukrainy i Belorussii: Ljublinskaja unija i ee političeskie posledstvija," in his *Belorussija i Litva v XV–XVI vv.*, pp. 556–92 (the article was first published in 1940).

Poland.³¹ They also affected the preeminent place that Polish culture and language would occupy in Lithuania soon after the union of 1569. The Polish language became the language of the privileged and enlightened strata and, from 1696, was officially recognized.³² Polish also became a political factor in bringing closer together Polish noblemen and the Ruthenian-speaking Lithuanian boyars.

The process of the Lithuanian nobility's loss of national character and of its Polonization began in about the mid-sixteenth century.³³ At that time the Polish language, which had previously been rarely used in Lithuania, began to play a greater role not only in social, but also private life. The years 1544–1548 were a turning point for the spread of the Polish language in Lithuania; following the example of King and Grand Duke Sigismund Augustus and his Polish court in Vilnius,³⁴ the Lithuanian nobility began to use the Polish language widely. That segment of the nobility which succumbed to cultural Polonization most quickly had a good, and sometimes brilliant, command of the literary Polish language already during the Vilnius period of Sigismund Augustus's rule.³⁵

Polonization did not affect all the nobility equally. It progressed faster among the wealthy nobility than among the middle nobility. Augustinas Rotundus, the historiographer of Lithuania, maintained already around 1576 that only peasants used the Lithuanian language, whereas the nobles had adopted the language of the Poles.³⁶ The ardent Lithuanian patriot and Samogitian canon, Mikalojus Daukša, wrote in 1599 that "our Lithuanian nation itself, because of its knowledge of the Polish language and fluent command of that language, has reduced its own language to an extreme neglect, oblivion, and almost rejection; everybody can see it well, but I do

³¹ Šapoka, *Vilnius Lietuvos gyvenime*, p. 36.

³² The Diet resolution of 1696 decreed that from that moment "the scribe of the palatinate land court" should "write in Polish, not in Ruthenian," and that "all kinds of decrees should in the future be issued in the Polish language" (*Volumina legum*, vol. 5 [St. Petersburg, 1860], p. 418). This order merely legalized an actual state of affairs, because, after the union of 1569, the Polish language became within a few decades the dominant, but unofficial, chancellery language in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

³³ W. Pocięcha, *Królowa Bona*, vol. 8 (Poznań, 1958), p. 189, maintains that Bona promoted the influx of Poles to Lithuania (in the historical sense, i.e., Lithuania and Belorussia) and entrusted them with responsible state offices.

³⁴ Concerning the Polish court of Sigismund Augustus, see Kolankowski, *Zygmunt August*, pp. 316–19.

³⁵ Cf. J. Jasnowski, *Mikotaj Czarny Radziwiłł, 1515–1565* (Warsaw, 1939).

³⁶ A. Rotundus, foreword to the second Lithuanian Statute of 1566, *Archiwum Komisji Prawniczej*, vol. 7 (Cracow, 1900), pp. xviii–xxi, especially p. xx. Regarding Rotundus, see M. Baryczowa, "Augustyn Rotundus Mielecki, wójt wileński, pierwszy historyk i apologeta Litwy," in *Ateneum Wileńskie*, vol. 11 (Vilnius, 1936), pp. 155–56.

not know whether anybody will praise this as being fair.”³⁷

The Lithuanian petty nobility seemed to become a Lithuanian-Polish hybrid, speaking a Polish saturated with Lithuanianisms and Ruthenianisms, and regarding the Polish language as a mark of good manners and high culture. That hybrid type was linked to everything Polish by ideological-political circumstances, but in its cultural traditions it gravitated towards everything genuinely Lithuanian. Generally speaking, political Polonization encompassed the entire nobility, whereas cultural Polonization left a lesser imprint on the petty nobility.³⁸ The greatest susceptibility to Polish cultural and political influences existed in the Vilnius region, followed by the Kaunas region. As a consequence of many centuries of proximity to their Slavic neighbors, these two regions were less resistant to foreign influence and better acquainted with the Ruthenian language, a knowledge of which made it easier to learn Polish. Polonization proceeded with much less intensity among the middle and petty Samogitian nobility, who, with the exception of those in the Liaudė brook area (“the Liauda nobility”), long remained loyal to the language and customs of their ancestors and maintained close contacts with the common people. Samogitia, cut off geographically from direct contacts with Slavs, was long distinguished by a strong instinct for self-preservation. Also, in the Suvalkai land, which had a small noble population (because of the peasant character of colonization there), Polonization did not make much headway.

The linguistic, cultural, and political Polonization of the Lithuanian nobility led to a reevaluation of the Lithuanian national idea and to its transformation into a local patriotism within the framework of the Commonwealth.³⁹ This process was deepened during the partition period of 1772–1795 and by the Great Diet’s reforms (1789–1792), set in motion by adherents of the Patriotic party in an effort to save and strengthen the Commonwealth. It was then that the idea of a monolithic noble nation within

³⁷ M. Daukša, *Postilė: Fotografuotinis leidimas* (Kaunas, 1926), “Przedmowa do czytelnika łaskawego,” p. [1].

³⁸ M. Römer, *Stosunki kulturalno-etnograficzne na Litwie* (Cracow, 1906); Šapoka, *Vilnius Lietuvos gyvenime*, p. 39, maintains that the Polonization of the petty Lithuanian gentry started only in the early nineteenth century; this is contradicted by Rotundus and Daukša. Also cf. K. J. Čeginskas, “Die Polonisierung des litauischen Adels im 19 Jh.,” *Commentationes Balticae* (Bonn), 4/5 (1958): 21–42.

³⁹ Kot, “Świadomość narodowa w Polsce,” p. 24, argues that after the union of 1569, the foundation for a monolithic nation (of nobles, of course) composed of Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians started to develop. This process was also going on in Lithuania: see Šapoka, *Lietuva ir Lenkija*, pp. 267–68; K. Avižonis, *Bajorai valstybiname Lietuvos gyvenime Vazy laikais* (Kaunas, 1940); S. Ehrenkreutz, “Separatyzm czy ciężenie Litwy ku Polsce po Unii Lubelskiej,” in *Pamiętnik IV Powszechnego Zjazdu Historyków Polskich*, vol. 1 (Lviv, 1925).

the multinational Commonwealth started to crystallize and, subsequently, to crowd out the historical principle of “both nations.”⁴⁰ In Polish and Lithuanian society, the conviction formed that within the framework of one state, there existed a single noble Polish nation. Events after the partitions, especially the popular uprisings of 1794, 1830–1831, and 1863, consolidated that conviction, as the Lithuanian nobility and common people joined the armed struggle together, in the name of the Polish Commonwealth. “Dābar lenkai neprapuolė kil žemaičiai gyvi” (Poles have not perished yet, as long as Samogitians are alive) was the song of the Lithuanian insurgents of 1831. In the consciousness of the national prophet-cum-poet who came from historical Lithuania, Adam Mickiewicz, and in that of his contemporaries, the conviction lived that “Lithuanians and Mazurs are brothers; do brothers quarrel because one is called Władysław and the other Vytautas? Their family is the same, it is—Poles.”⁴¹ Lithuanian noblemen were proud of their Lithuanian origin, and although most did not know the language of their ancestors, they called themselves “gente Litvani, natione Poloni.” Thus Mickiewicz’s apostrophe. “O Lithuania, my fatherland!” remained in complete accord with the feeling of belonging to one Polish nation.

The Polonization of Lithuanian towns and townsfolk proceeded through the influx of Polish elements to the more developed urban centers of Lithuania and through the elements’ absorption of Lithuanian burghers. The Polonization of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, started early—after the union of 1386, in connection with the Christianization. Polish clergy arrived there first, followed, in the fifteenth century, by merchants and artisans. They came to Vilnius in larger numbers in the middle of the sixteenth century, following the Polish court of Sigismund August.⁴² Already in the

⁴⁰ W. Smoleński, “Sprawa stosunku Litwy do Polski na Sejmie Wielkim,” in his *Studia historyczne* (Warsaw, 1925), pp. 60–74; B. Leśnodorski, *Dzieło Sejmu Czteroletniego (1788–1792)* (Wrocław, 1951), pp. 234–42. A. Šapoka has noted, with bitterness, that Lithuania was not even mentioned in the Constitution of 3 May 1791, nor was the term “Commonwealth of Both Nations”; see his “Gegužes 3 d. konstitucija ir Lietuva,” first published in *Lietuvos Praeitis*, vol. 1 (Kaunas, 1940). Šapoka’s view is not fully accurate, because the Constitution of 1791 was “a mutual guarantee of both nations”; also, in detailed laws—e.g., about dietines, the royal council, and towns—the name Lithuania appears alongside that of the Crown Land; see *Volumina legum*, vol. 9 (Cracow, 1889), pp. 235, 266, 291, 316. The “both nations” principle was maintained in the resolution of 1793: *Volumina legum*, vol. 10 (Poznań, 1952), p. 111, article 4.

⁴¹ A. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (1832), *Dzieła* (Warsaw, 1955), vol. 6, p. 37.

⁴² Kolankowski, *Zygmunt August*, pp. 329–30; M. Łowmiańska, *Wilno przed najazdem moskiewskim 1655 roku* (Vilnius, 1929), pp. 84–91; J. Morzy, “Geneza i rozwój cechów wileńskich do końca XVII wieku,” *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. A. Mickiewicza w Poznaniu/Historia*, 1959, no. 4, p. 27.

early sixteenth century, around 1521, sermons at St. John's parish were delivered in Polish as well as in Lithuanian.⁴³

Vilnius, which had been a multinational city for a long time, inhabited by Lithuanians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews, Germans, Tatars, and small numbers of Armenians and Italians, was saturated with everything Polish faster and to a higher degree than other Lithuanian cities and towns. From the second half of the sixteenth century, Lithuanians must have begun to be a national minority in their own capital, in light of the situation in the seventeenth century, when Polish and Polonized elements achieved not only a cultural, but probably a quantitative superiority in the city.⁴⁴ The next two centuries, the eighteenth and nineteenth, and in particular the period when the university at Vilnius was founded and flourished (1803–1832), saw the city become a center of Polish culture, spreading its influence through the entire former Commonwealth. The historian Joachim Lelewel and the poet Adam Mickiewicz were among the many outstanding scholars and writers who lived there.

The Lithuanian nation's loss of its separate identity to Polonization may have started as early as the fifteenth century, when a network of parish churches operated by Polish priests developed in Lithuania. Later, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, owners of feudal manors, now denationalized, heightened the Polonization process by speaking to their peasant serfs in Polish. The process was accelerated by the schools, especially during the time of the Commission for National Education (1773–1803) and in the years prior to 1863, when instruction was given either in Latin or in Polish, rarely in Lithuanian. If anything was said in schools about the history of Lithuania, it was only within the context of the history of Poland.⁴⁵ The loss of Lithuania's national character proceeded primarily in its southeastern linguistic territory, where a knowledge of Ruthenian helped considerably in the population's mastery of the Polish language.⁴⁶ Polonization was highly successful among Lithuanians only from the seventeenth century on, when Lithuanian noblemen on the peripheries of Lithuania were

⁴³ Jablonskis, *Mažvydo gyvenimas*, pp. 98–100.

⁴⁴ V. Merkys, "Lietuvos miestų gyventojų tautybės XIX a. pabaigoje–XX a. pradžioje klausimu," *Lietuvos TSR Mokslų akademijos darbai* (Vilnius), ser. A, 2 (1958): 85–89. Concerning relations between national groups in Vilnius, see Łowmiańska, *Wilno przed najazdem*, pp. 85–90.

⁴⁵ V. Maciunas, *Lituanistinis sąjūdis XIX a. pradžioje* (Kaunas, 1939), pp. 213–15. The influence of schools on Polonization during the time of the Commission for National Education is described by A. Šidlauskas, *Prosvěšćenie v Litve v poslednej četverti XVIII v. (Avtoreferat kandidatskoj raboty)* (Vilnius, 1962).

⁴⁶ H. Turska, *Powstanie polskich obszarów językowych na Wileńszczyźnie* (Vilnius, 1939), p. 53 (the work was printed but not distributed, due to the outbreak of war).

already considerably Polonized and when the Catholic church, under the influence of the Jesuit Counter-Reformation, intensified its pastoral activity and began to uproot the people's pagan beliefs. It operated with the help of Polish priests, who frequently did not know the Lithuanian language at all. Another important element in precipitating Polonization was the low level of national consciousness among the masses. The peasantry, which lived in an increasing bondage from the fifteenth century, could not develop its culture through education. Higher schooling and the related knowledge of one's own historical past were accessible, in principle, only to the nobility. Sons of peasants only exceptionally reached higher schools, where in any case the Polish language and culture dominated. The nobles and priests who might have supported the peasants' national self-identification were themselves vehicles of Polishness in towns, manors, churches, schools, and even taverns. Because few priests were Lithuanian,⁴⁷ the masses learned religion in Polish,⁴⁸ and said their prayers (*poterius*) in Polish, sometimes without fully understanding them.⁴⁹ They spoke the prayers in a foreign tongue because they thought that it represented the foundations of the faith.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ S. Bednarski, *Upadek i odrodzenie szkół jezuitkich w Polsce* (Cracow, 1933), says that in 1740, of 695 Jesuit priests in the Lithuanian province, only 128 had a command of Lithuanian. Cf. A. Rukša, "'Diarium Societatis Jesu' ir lietuvių kalba Vilniuje (1710–1723)," *Tautos Praeitis* (Chicago), 1, no. 3 (1960): 409–423; L. Piechnik, *Początki Akademii Wileńskiej* (Cracow, 1961; typescript of a doctoral thesis), points out that the following was repeated in Jesuit reports sent to Rome at the end of the sixteenth century: "In their overwhelming majority priests are of Polish origin, know no Lithuanian language, and therefore neglect the teaching of the people; the simple Lithuanian people have not renounced their old beliefs and continue to cultivate pagan customs." Fijałek, "Uchrześcijanie Litwy," p. 258, too hastily jumped to the conclusion that "In general, during the whole period of the Polish state, the Lithuanian nation had its religious needs met in its own language."

⁴⁸ Turcka, *Powstanie polskich obszarów językowych*, p. 53, says: "Church services here were sort of lessons in the Polish language, during which peasant masses learned."

⁴⁹ M. Römer, *Litwa* (Lviv, 1908), p. 23, cites an interesting case that he himself witnessed. A priest touring his parish at Christmas visited an estate where he started to review a laborer about his daily prayers. The Lithuanian laborer, who had been taught his prayers by his mother, a poor noblewoman, began: "I believe in God, the Father, Poisoner (*Truciciela*, instead of *Stworzyciela* 'Creator') of Heaven and Earth." This episode took place in Römer's (Römeris, in Lithuanian) village of Bagdoniškis (near Obeliai in Zarasai county), and the surname of the laborer was Lasinskis; see M. Römer, *Dziennik*, vol. 26, under the entry for 11 March 1920. Römer's diary (for the years 1911–1933) is now in the manuscript division of the Central Library of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences in Vilnius. Other examples of the rote learning of daily prayers in Polish, which Lithuanians misunderstood and distorted, were given in *Aušra* (Tilsit [Tilžė]), 1884, no. 10/11, p. 373.

⁵⁰ See the collection of reminiscences by the Reverend Jan Misiurewicz (Jonas Misiurevičius) about Suvalky Kalvarija county and the Suvalkai governorship for the years after 1871: *Ze stosunków litewsko-polskich: Głosy Litwinów* (Warsaw, 1907), pp. 14–15.

Although Polonization was neither deliberately organized nor carried out by coercion, there was a moral pressure on Lithuanian villagers to Polonize. The Catholic clergy and the Polish-speaking noble owners of serfs intimidated to, or even persuaded, their subjects that their vernacular was vulgar, deriding it as a language of country bumpkins and ruffians.⁵¹ The Lithuanian peasant felt that the Polish-speaking lords and priests held his language and his Lithuanian identity in general in contempt. Therefore he tried to divorce himself from that nationality, to renounce and to shed it. Yet in the depth of his soul the peasant preserved a grudge and took offense against those who tried to humiliate him and make him feel inferior due to his national, social, and cultural background.⁵² In part, especially after 1863, the Polonization of Lithuanians occurred voluntarily. The richer peasants who sent their children to schools viewed with satisfaction their youngsters' assimilation of the Polish language (privately, because schools were then Russified) because they were speaking in the language of lords. Ecstatic about the grandeur of Polish culture, especially literature, young Lithuanians proudly demonstrated their acquired Polishness as proof of good education and cultured behavior.⁵³

The disintegration of the feudal Lithuanian nation from the sixteenth century on occurred under the influence of another factor, opposed to Polonization—that of Ruthenization. Evidence of that phenomenon, which historically preceded Polonization, can be found as early as in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, among Lithuanian princes who settled in the Ruthenian lands seized by Lithuania.⁵⁴ Ruthenization also influenced considerably the development of the Lithuanian nationality. The Ruthenian language in Lithuania, before it gave way to Polish, was a vehicle for spreading the Lithuanian statist idea, to which most boyars in Lithuanian Rus' succumbed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.⁵⁵ Although the Ruthenian language started to be customary among the Lithuanian ruling classes from the thirteenth century, the differences in religion that divided

⁵¹ "Every noble person speaks in Polish, whereas peasants use the barbaric peasant language," said landlords in Lithuania: see *Aušra*, 1884, no. 10/11, p. 367; also cf. *Ze stosunków litewsko-polskich*.

⁵² See *Ze stosunków litewsko-polskich*, p. 14ff.

⁵³ Cf. the reminiscences of the outstanding Lithuanian linguist J. Jablonskis, *Iš atsiminimų vieno iš daugelių: Dvidešimtmetinės "Auszros" sukaktuvės, 1883–1903* (Tilsit, 1903), pp. 48–49.

⁵⁴ A. Brückner, *Litu-slavische Studien*, vol. 1 (Weimar, 1877), pp. 5–7; E. Karskij, "Kul'turnye zavoevanija russkogo jazyka v starinu na zapadnoj okraine ego oblasti," *Izvestija Otdelenija russkogo jazyka i slovesnosti Rossijskoj akademii nauk*, 29 (1924: Leningrad, 1925), pp. 3–4.

⁵⁵ Jakubowski, *Studia*, pp. 25, 42, 61.

pagan and Catholic (from 1387) Lithuania from Orthodox Rus' effectively countered the large-scale acceptance of Ruthenian culture by Lithuanians within the limits of ethnographic Lithuania.⁵⁶ The influence of Ruthenian did, however, weaken the resistance of Lithuanians to foreign cultural and linguistic influences, and made it easier for Lithuanians knowing the Ruthenian literary language or the Belorussian vernacular to accept the Polish language in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁵⁷

The most noticeable effect was the demographic rise of the Belorussian population at the expense of the Lithuanian. As late as the sixteenth century, the Lithuanian population occupied the counties of Trakai and Vilnius, the northern part of the Ašmena county (Ašmiana in Belorussian) and most of Švenčionys county. After the wars of the second half of the seventeenth century and the early eighteenth century, the Belorussian population started to move into those devastated territories and only a few Lithuanian settlements were preserved, surrounded by *gudai*. Even Vilnius was almost completely surrounded by Slavs by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁵⁸ The Vilnius region then acquired an exceptionally mixed Belorussian-Polish-Lithuanian ethnic character. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century, the Ruthenian influence on Lithuania had manifested itself—first, in the considerable Belorussification/White-Ruthenization of the southeastern part of the Vilnius region, and then, in the borrowing of some elements of Ruthenian culture, e.g., through loanwords.

After the partitions of Poland-Lithuania, Russia and Russian culture also influenced the Lithuanians. The capture of the Lithuanian lands of Aukštaitija and Žemaitija by Russia in 1795 and of the Suvalkai region (Polish Suwałki) in 1815 (in 1795–1807 the region belonged to Prussia, in 1807 it was included into the Warsaw Principality, and in 1815 it became part of the Polish Kingdom subordinated to Russia) initially did not worsen everyday life for the Lithuanians. Although Repnin, who administered Lithuania for Catherine II in 1794–1797, tried to introduce Russian administration in the captured territories,⁵⁹ a change in Russian policy in Lithuania occurred under Paul I (1797–1801). Paul granted amnesty to the insurgents of 1794, preserved the Lithuanian Statute of 1588, and reestablished the noblemen's dietines. His successor, Alexander I, went even further: he allowed the transformation of the Vilnius Higher School into a university (1803), agreed to the organization of state schools on a Polish

⁵⁶ Jakubowski, *Studia*, pp. 12–13.

⁵⁷ Šapoka, *Vilnius Lietuvos gyvenime*, p. 37.

⁵⁸ Jakubowski, *Studia*, pp. 3–4; Šapoka, *Vilnius*, pp. 40–44.

⁵⁹ L. Żytkowicz, *Rządy Repnina na Litwie w latach 1794–1797* (Vilnius, 1938).

basis, and appointed Prince Adam Czartoryski superintendent of the Vilnius school district. All three measures favored the rebirth of social and intellectual life in Lithuania. But the situation of the peasants deteriorated. As in Russia, they were burdened with the *corvée* and military conscription, something previously unknown in Lithuania. Under Catherine II, all the resolutions concerning the improvement of village life adopted in the Commonwealth during the Great Diet (1788–1792) and the 1794 uprising had been, of course, abandoned.⁶⁰

A radical turn towards Russification came after the suppression of the uprising of 1830–1831. The tsarist regime reacted to this patriotic manifestation for the independence of Poland-Lithuania with reprisals against the insurgents and by closing the university at Vilnius, in 1832, as a center of revolution. The university's medical section, renamed the Medical-Surgical Academy, existed only until 1842, when it was abolished after secret Polish student organizations were uncovered there. An attempt by Szymon Konarski in 1838 to spread democratic insurrectionist propaganda was cruelly suppressed, and acts of Russification only intensified. In 1840 the very name "Lithuania" was banned in bureaucratic practice and was replaced by the term "Northwestern March." At the same time the still binding Lithuanian Statute was abolished and replaced by Russian legislation.⁶¹ The administrative reform of 1841 introduced a new administrative division, replacing the Vilnius governorship that had been formed in 1801. The reform divided Lithuania into two governorships, with centers in Kaunas and Vilnius, respectively. The Suvalkai area was transformed into a separate governorship in 1867.

The constantly intensifying Russification of Lithuania by police and administrative measures did not severely hamper the cultural development of Lithuania, however, until 1864–1865. It was the radical policy of Russification begun after the uprising of 1863, instigated under the slogan of "restoring the Russian nationality and Orthodoxy in Lithuania" as an "originally Russian land," that had exceptionally hard repercussions on the fate of the Lithuanian nation.⁶²

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⁶⁰ H. Mościcki, *Pod znakiem Orła i Pogoni* (Warsaw, 1915), pp. 12–15.

⁶¹ K. J. Čeginskas, "Die Russifizierung und ihre Folgen in Litauen," *Commentationes Balticae* 4–6, no. 2 (1959): 97, 119.

⁶² M. N. Murav'ev, *Pamiętniki Wiesziela*, as published by W. Dębowski (Kiev, 1917), pp. 9, 37; cf. Čeginskas, *Die Russifizierung*, pp. 108–113.

Polish National Consciousness in the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century

JANUSZ TAZBIR

The period of the Renaissance and humanism did not bring any essential changes to the concept of national consciousness that prevailed in Poland at the close of the fourteenth century and during the fifteenth century.¹ The feeling of national identity was, no doubt, stronger during the Renaissance, and the number of people who regarded themselves as Poles was greater, but this did not alter the concept itself. Up to the sixteenth century the Polish nation was still conceived as a community inhabiting the same territory and embracing population groups sharing the same customs, history, and language. It was only late in that century that substantial changes in national consciousness among the nobility came about, due to a new political situation and developments in social and economic, as well as in cultural and religious life. Of special significance were the Union of Lublin and the supremacy that the nobility, especially the magnates, gained over other classes in society and, more importantly, over the monarch himself. Then came the victorious Counter-Reformation, which aimed at restoring religious unity within the state.

The main factors shaping the national consciousness of the nobility now became quite different. First, in terms of territory, until the second half of the sixteenth century the Polish ethnic group inhabited a rather compact region where they made up the majority, if not all, of the population. Also, most territorial acquisitions before the Union of Lublin, with the exception of the Ruthenian Halych principality, comprised areas with at least some substantial number of Poles. These included not only the Duchy of Oświęcim, incorporated into the Crown in 1456, the Duchy of Zator, in 1494, and Mazovia, in 1526, but also Royal Prussia, unified with the Crown after the Toruń Peace of 1466. It followed that any appeals to defend the Polish state at that time identified that state with territory inhabited by people of Polish descent speaking the Polish language.

¹ This has been shown by many scholarly publications, among which Stanisław Kot's "Świadomość narodowa w Polsce w XV–XVII w.," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 52, no. 1 (1938), deserves particular mention.

Many publicists and historians, from Jan Długosz to Andrzej Ciesielski and Stanisław Łubieński, claimed Silesia, Western Pomerania, and the Lubusz region for the Polish state. Their arguments conspicuously omitted one: that the lands in question were inhabited by countrymen of the townsfolk of Cracow, Poznań, and Lublin. That argument occurred, almost exclusively, in the works of Silesian burgher authors, e.g., Szymon Pistorius. The single exception was Łubieński, who, in addressing the reclamation of Silesia, vaguely mentioned a "blood relationship." It should be borne in mind, however, that in the feudal period ethnic unity was rarely a decisive element in supporting the right to a given territory. Such claims were, as a rule, made on the basis of certain legal commitments, that is, that the region was once under the rule of the Polish king or had been his fiefdom.

In the second part of the sixteenth century the cultural and ethnic bases for national consciousness changed completely. The sixteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, along with the Habsburg realm and the Ottoman Empire, was a territorial expanse of great ethnic and religious diversity. After the Union of Lublin, inhabitants of the Commonwealth shared neither a single language nor the same religious convictions or customs. The term "Poland" was used interchangeably with "Commonwealth," but there was no question that one's country could no longer be identified solely with Mazovia, Great Poland, or Pomerania. The new territorial entity, which at its height (1634) embraced an area of almost a million sq. km., had in common a layer of nobility that in the seventeenth century became ethnically homogeneous, partially through Polonization. This was not true for other orders. The fate of peasant colonists in Prussia and the Ukraine illustrates just how different the processes were among non-noble orders. On the one hand, the Mazurian settlers in Prussia preserved their language and customs, distinct from those of the Germans up to the twentieth century. On the other hand, Polish peasants who settled in the Ukraine were fairly soon Ukrainianized, through assimilation to the religion and language of the local population. This occurred despite the fact that the Mazurians settled Prussian territories outside the boundaries of the Polish state, whereas the Polish peasants who went to the Ukraine were on territory that had for years been an integral part of that state. The discrepancy in assimilation may have been due to an animosity against the German gentry in Prussia or against the Polonized gentry in the Ukraine. Other reasons, however, were responsible for the different course of events in the north and the east. The rather compact Mazurian colonization took place on a sparsely inhabited territory, whereas Polish peasants in the Ukraine found themselves in the midst of a well-established community

using a language that they could understand and that was much more similar to their own than German was. The two groups of Polish colonizers did act in common on one important issue: they both renounced their original religion. The Mazurians accepted the Lutheran faith, whereas the Poles settling the steppes became adherents of the Orthodox church.

In the seventeenth century it was the nobility that shared the same customs, language, and religion throughout the state. As a social group, they had some common historical traditions. In Polish historiography writers from Długosz to Maciej Miechowita, Marcin Bielski, Aleksander Gwagnin, Marcin Kromer, and Stanisław Sarnicki upheld the view that in the first centuries of the Christian era Sarmatians inhabiting the Black Sea steppe between the Don and the lower Volga Rivers left their abodes to settle in the region between the Dnieper and the Vistula, and turned the local population there into serfs. In the sixteenth century this belief gradually spread among the nobility, to become, in the next century, its leading ideology, called Sarmatism.

As Tadeusz Ulewicz has pointed out, the notion of "Sarmatia" originally had a clearly integrating function, for it comprised "in se in un tutto unico gli elementi etnici così eterogenici e linguisticamente diversi della Repubblica."² The historical tradition of the nobility was simultaneously enriched and disassociated: heroic deeds of old, drawn from the chronicles and vivid only in the ethnically Polish environment, were combined with tales of conquest by the Sarmatian sword in times prior to the reign of the first Piasts. This genealogy played an important role in the consciousness of the Polish nobility. While the Polish noble myth influenced Ruthenian and Lithuanian nobles, these groups also had their own traditions. The Ruthenian nobility could readily trace its traditions back to the grandeur of the Kievan Rus' period and its glorious ancestors, the Riurikid dynasty. The Lithuanian nobles also remembered their past glory: it was for their benefit that Maciej Strykowski revived and developed a medieval legend of the Lithuanian nobility's Roman descent. This legend traced the Lithuanians' origin to the great family of European nations, and through an ancient genealogy offered Lithuanians a place equal to that of the Poles.

It is the existence of diverse national and historical traditions in the Commonwealth that made calls for integration so important. One integrating element was the concept of Sarmatia itself: it was defined as comprising

² T. Ulewicz, "Il problema del sarmatismo nella cultura e nella letteratura polacca: Problematika generale e profilo storico," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 8 (1960): 137.

all lands belonging to the Commonwealth, whereas Sarmatians were considered to be above all Poles.³

At the same time, however, all of Eastern Europe was sometimes referred to as Sarmatia, and the term Sarmatians was applied to all Slavs. The idea that the Polish nobility were descendants and heirs of those who possessed the lands in the region between the Oka, the Volga, and the Don Rivers provided a historical argument for the Polish state's eastward expansion to the steppes and beyond. Similarly, Muscovy, assuming the idea of the Third Rome, tried to justify its westward expansion and wars with the Ottomans. In this sense, Sarmatism created a historical base on which to support the existence of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which in the mid-seventeenth century failed to accommodate (because efforts were made too late) the third partners, i.e., the Ukrainians. Tracing a nation's origin to tribes that had once inhabited the territory where the nation now lives was not an original idea at that time: Franco-Gallism was then enjoying great popularity in sixteenth-century France, as was Nordism in Scandinavia; also, Dutchmen were regarding themselves as ancient Batavians. But only in Poland, it seems, did this kind of historical argumentation help form the concept of a noble nation. Sarmatism gave rise to the conviction that only the ruling class made up the Polish nation, whereas the other orders, necessary for the proper functioning of society, had, in fact, no place in the national community. As a specialist in these problems, Ulewicz observed that "it happened sometimes that a burgher, occasionally and hesitatingly, could be ranked among Sarmatians, but it could never occur in regard to a peasant, unless he managed to abandon his class [to become a clergyman, e.g.]"⁴

During the Renaissance, the main feature that distinguished a nation was language. Thus no one, from Długosz to Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, denied that peasants were an integral part of the nation, based on one common language. The eminent lexicographer Jan Mączyński, in his Polish-Latin dictionary, defined the word "natio" as a "nation using the same language."⁵ The significance of a national language in the development of a national culture was underscored by the Cracow printer Hieronim Wieter, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, and Szymon Budny, who maintained that everyone loves his country's customs and detests any speech that he is

³ See S. Cynarski, "The Shape of Sarmatian Ideology in Poland," *Acta Poloniae Historica* 19 (1968).

⁴ T. Ulewicz, *Sarmacja: Studium z problematyki słowiańskiej XV i XVI w.* (Cracow, 1950), p. 107.

⁵ J. Mączyński, *Lexicon latino-polonicum* (Regiomonti 1564; rpt. Cologne and Vienna, 1973), p. 482.

unable to understand. Advocates of the election of a Piast to the Polish throne also emphasized the need to protect the national language: if someone from the Habsburg dynasty were elected, Polish could be threatened by an onslaught of the German language, as had happened to Czech.

The triumph of the Polish language during the Renaissance period was due in part to its firm foundations. At that time Polish was already a literary language, that is, a language used by educated people throughout the state. Also, in legal and social documents, words associated with everyday life, such as names of domestic objects and tools, were set down in the vernacular; at the same time, Latin terminology was preserved in scholarship where precision was required. The first textbook of geometry and mathematics, by Stanisław Grzepski, appeared in Polish as early as in the sixteenth century. By contrast, theological treatises were written in Latin and in French up to the eighteenth century. The reluctance to use Polish in theological disputes came about not only because of the hermetic tendencies of the clergy; it also sprang from a belief that Polish terminology, which had not yet been approved by Rome, might give rise to various heresies that could become dangerous to the church.

Of some significance was that speech and writings on domestic economic matters and measurements were by their very nature designated for people whose level of education was far below that of those who dealt with philosophical or theological treatises. Also, by the eighteenth century Latin had come to play a different role. In the Renaissance period, when Polish terminology was very poor, Latin was in some cases indispensable; but by the Baroque era Latin expressions (like French ones later) became a language incrustation. They served to ornament speech in the same way that a belt adorned clothing. This linguistic "macaronicism" would to a great extent emphasize the separateness of the intellectual elite, that is, the nobility. Linguistically it was tantamount to limiting the concept of nation to the noble class.

The exclusion of peasants from the national community was undoubtedly a consequence of that estate's deplorable economic and legal situation. Similarly, the nobility's achievement of dominance at the expense of the burghers and the peasants fostered the concept of a noble nation. Various social and national conflicts were reflected in the attempts of specific estates to establish their own particular genealogy. It is widely known that the nobility as a whole pretended to have different ancestors than the peasantry, but it is not so well known that the magnates, during the period of their greatest importance, also tried to separate from the nobility in this respect. Some magnate families maintained that they were descendants not of Sarmatians, but of Roman patrician families. This tendency was expressed, in

some instances, in classical palace architecture (e.g., the Krasieński Palace in Warsaw), interior decorations, and sculpture.⁶

The concept of a noble nation contributed greatly to the nobility's integration throughout the whole territory of the Commonwealth. Within several decades, noble privileges brought about a community of language and customs, which in turn caused the relatively rapid Polonization of the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian nobility. This was accompanied by the influence of oriental material culture (affecting clothing, decoration of homes, etc.) among the nobility in Great Poland and Little Poland.

In no other country in Europe at that time did a set of privileges, forming a kind of legal and political institution, seem to exert such a strong influence on the shape of national consciousness among the ruling class as it did in Poland. There the nobility had a strong sense of the distinctiveness of their language and customs, as well as an awareness of the unique character of the Polish political system. The share that they had in this political community—a state having an enormous area, of which they felt themselves to be the owners—created a certain link among all noblemen throughout the country. That led, in turn, to their common commitment to defend the republic against external enemies as well as against internal opponents of their “golden liberty.”

In other European countries, the feudal principle of loyalty to the dynasty remained an integrating factor. In Poland, the extinction of the Jagiellonian dynasty weakened this principle. Elected kings were comparable to presidents-for-life who could be deprived of office—i.e., the throne—if they transgressed the limits of their competence. In the trying years of the Swedish invasion, conflicts developed between loyalty towards one's superior (e.g., officer), who was often a magnate and served as protector, and loyalty towards the state and its political institutions (not the dynasty per se). Even then, anyone who negotiated with the Swedes, the Brandenburgians, or the Transylvanians was regarded as a traitor. At first, advocates of foreign intervention maintained that their intention was only to change the person of the monarch (Karl Gustav for Jan Kazimierz). In 1655, the majority of the nobility accepted this kind of reasoning and did not regard it as high treason. Consequently, the inhabitants of Royal Prussia did not support their elector, and, similarly, the Lithuanian nobility opposed the party of Janusz and Bogusław Radziwiłł. That the provisions of the Peace of Toruń and the Union of Lublin were maintained was due presumably to the fact that the political freedoms the nobility secured under

⁶ See the study by M. Karpowicz, *Sztuka oświeconego sarmatyzmu: Antykizacja i klasycyzacja w środowisku warszawskim czasów Jana III* (Warsaw, 1970), p. 174.

the reigns of the elected kings of the Commonwealth turned out to be more attractive than the prospective rule of semi-absolute monarchs.

These freedoms also ensured that in the mid-seventeenth century, in the period when the Counter-Reformation was gaining ground, Warsaw was supported by the nobility of Ducal Prussia, who were Lutherans by religion and Germans by birth. These nobles also expressed admiration for certain symptoms of political anarchy in the kingdom. It is no surprise that the Prussian nobility, called upon to develop a modern state by organizing a strong army at the expense of personal privileges, by filling its treasury, and by providing effective administrators, looked with envy at their counterparts in the Commonwealth, where a squire on his manorial farm was his own lord and potentially a candidate for the throne. Economic ties, and the resultant profits, might have been other reasons why Prussian towns (especially Gdańsk) remained loyal to the Commonwealth in the years of the Swedish invasion. At the close of the sixteenth century, W. Bruce, who traveled around the country, pointed to this attractive force “of the Polish liberty, immunities, privileges, honors, and security against forreyne power, by the union which they [the provinces] should never enjoye under another government.”⁷

The Commonwealth’s reluctance to grant Cossack officers the privileges that the Polish nobility themselves enjoyed sparked the Cossack revolts. If the Treaty of Hadiach had been concluded some twenty years earlier (i.e., in 1638 rather than in 1658) and the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia established, another generation of the local social elite—like the Ukrainian magnates and nobility in general at the end of the sixteenth and in the seventeenth centuries—might have become Polonized.

What national identity was characteristic of the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian nobles who were being Polonized, and of the German or Armenian burghers who were being influenced similarly? One bond uniting the nobility with the Polish state was, as already mentioned, noble privilege; from that bond a type of “political Pole” emerged—that is, the noble citizen who considered himself to be, first, a member of the all-noble political and social community, and, then, a member of a certain linguistic-cultural community. As the scholar Stanisław Kot rightly notes, it is exactly in this sense that the sixteenth-century Ruthenian gentry regarded themselves as belonging to the Polish nation.

⁷ “Relation of the State of Polonia and the United Provinces of that Crown Anno 1598,” in C. H. Talbot, ed., *Elementa ad fontium editiones*, vol. 13 (Rome, 1965), p. 135.

The paths leading to Polonization were various and sometimes convoluted. Lithuanian nobles rarely spoke their own language, so they substituted Polish for Ruthenian rather than for Lithuanian. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Janusz Radziwiłł wrote to his brother Krzysztof that although he was Lithuanian and would die Lithuanian, "it is necessary to use Polish idioms in our country."⁸ Similarly, Polish was used in Lithuanian institutions at the end of the seventeenth century.

The problem of religion, closely associated with the question of national identity, was complicated, too. The Orthodox Ukrainian or Belorussian nobles, who during the Reformation period had adopted Calvinism, Lutheranism, or even joined the Polish Brethren, gradually renounced these faiths and converted to Catholicism as they became assimilated. In the sixteenth century, these nobles had been distrustful of the Latin (Catholic) faith, which was so fully connected with Polish culture and customs; at that time the gap between the nobles living in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and those living in the Crown had been wide. Whatever specific form it took, the Reformation had, in the interim, brought acceptance of Western culture.⁹ Contact with some other aspects of Polish culture and thought also smoothed the way for Catholicism in Lithuania.

In seventeenth-century Royal Prussia, a new Prussian nationality, analogous with the Belgian or Dutch, was being formed. This development was, however, checked by neighboring Ducal Prussia, as well as by the growing concept of a noble nation, which excluded the townfolk of Toruń, Gdańsk, and Elbląg.¹⁰ Lutheranism in Royal Prussia was gravitating, instead, towards Ducal Prussia. It is not surprising, then, that the most ardent adversaries of the Concord of Sandomierz, which decreed cooperation among Protestant groups, came from towns in Royal Prussia. These towns did not, however, seek any contact with other towns of the same faith or with Lutheran nobles: indeed, there was no community of interests or action among the third estate in the Commonwealth. This lack of solidarity may have stemmed from the differing ethnic origins of the burghers. Yet, ethnic diversity did not prevent the nobility, place of birth or language notwithstanding, from sharing the same ideology and, finally, from becoming Polonized. The assimilation of the inhabitants of the towns of Prussia and Great Poland was impeded by a lack of solidarity among the burghers, and

⁸ Kot, "Świadomość narodowa," p. 25.

⁹ Attention to this fact is drawn by S. Kot in his study *La Réforme dans le Grand Duché de Lithuanie: Facteur d'occidentalisation culturelle* (Brussels, 1953).

¹⁰ S. Herbst, "Świadomość narodowa na ziemiach pruskich w XV–XVII w.," *Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie*, 1962, no. 1 (75), p. 10.

by the ever stronger social barriers that limited marriages between Polish nobles and women of German burgher origin; the latter eventually retarded the Polonization of the patriciate in particular. Nevertheless, the burgher Lengnich, writing in German, frequently manifested his loyalty to the Polish kings. Also, anniversaries of Pomerania's integration with Poland (1466) and elections were celebrated with works in Latin and German praising the Commonwealth and emphasizing the authors' warm affection and loyalty to Poland.

A type of "political Pole" also existed in Royal Prussia, and it was of no importance what language he spoke. Similarly, in the multinational Habsburg Empire, a large proportion of Germans, Czechs, and Hungarians regarded themselves as Austrians. They were able to maintain both a loyalty to their culture and people and to their state. There can be no doubt that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, language itself had minor significance for the concept of national identity, as compared with that ascribed to it in the nineteenth century. The same phenomenon exists even today: the citizens of the German Democratic Republic, Austria, and Switzerland speak the same language, but they do not consider themselves to be countrymen. Three to four hundred years ago, German-speaking burghers from Royal Prussia—by the mere fact of linguistic affinity—did not feel related to Saxonians, Bavarians, or Prussians. Furthermore, at that time Germany itself was not identified with any territorial or national entity;¹¹ antagonisms between the provinces presented obstacles to the state's unification as late as the nineteenth century.

In addition to the new Prussian national consciousness, certain symptoms of Estonian and Latvian identity became apparent in the northern regions of the republic. This was due in large measure to the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, which undertook to propagate their religious views in the vernacular. In the Ukraine, a similar function was performed by the Orthodox church. (The emergence of Ukrainian and Lithuanian national awareness is, however, beyond the scope of this study.)

Religion affected the growth of the concept of national identity in a specific way. Not long before the advent of the Reformation, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, all ethnic communities inhabiting Poland's territory adhered to a specific church. Poles were followers of Catholicism, Ruthenians (Belorussians and Ukrainians) belonged to the Orthodox church, Armenians were Monophysites, Jews professed Judaism, Tartars professed Islam, and many Lithuanian peasants believed, albeit secretly, in

¹¹ The problem is examined in depth by J. B. Neveux, *Vie spirituelle et vie sociale entre Rhin et Baltique au XVII siècle* (Paris, 1967).

pagan gods. There was, however, one exception to this rule—namely, Germans, who had assimilated in the Crown but preserved their national status in Royal Prussia. It took Lutheranism to bring about a confirmation of their ethnic separateness, which, living within the same religious community with Poles and Lithuanians, they had lacked. Affirmation of ethnic identity may have been one reason for the wide accession to the new faith by German townsfolk in Silesia, Prussia, and Great Poland.¹² Similarly, the Orthodox brotherhoods in the seventeenth century were not only defenders of Orthodoxy, but also propagators of Belorussian and Ukrainian culture.

For Poles, it was with the Reformation that a split in religion occurred. It is not surprising, then, that in fighting against the Reformation, the Catholic church appealed to a sense of national unity and accused the reform movement of foreign provenance. The charges of novelty and of alien origin could easily be turned against the Reformation's adversaries themselves: one need only point to the Italian sources of papal ideology. The term "Catholic" was gradually replaced by "Roman" (pope, bishop, faith, etc.), in its negative connotation. The new Counter-Reformation model of how relations between religious denominations should be conducted was regarded as contradictory to the national character of Poles, by nature mild and hating bloodshed, as well as to their historical past.

In the fervent disputes of the time such juxtapositions as national versus foreign, Pole versus Italian or German, "our" character and "our" tradition versus those foreign nations, etc., were made frequently. Obviously, the terms are indicative of various elements of national identity. Yet, despite all the efforts made by propagators of the Counter-Reformation, religion (at least with respect to Poles) and nationhood remained two separate problems in the sixteenth century. Those who became religious dissenters did not form a group isolated from society, just as those who dissented for political reasons did not create a political party of their own. Calvinists and Socinians, together with Catholics, constituted one nation, beyond any doubt. By contrast, the situation of Mennonites, the Unity of Czech (Bohemian) Brethren, and Anabaptists of German origin (who settled in the Żuławy region) was quite different.

With the advance of the Counter-Reformation, the number of Protestants among the Poles decreased. This helped to propagate the thesis that Catholicism was the only true confession in Poland. For instance, during the Swedish invasion the term "Lutheran" could mean someone speaking an incomprehensible, foreign language. In such a situation, the majority of

¹² For more detail, see J. Tazbir, *Polska w epoce Odrodzenia: Państwo-społeczeństwo-kultura*, ed. A. Wyczański (Warsaw, 1970), pp. 199–200.

Catholics believed, anyone who dissented excluded himself from the national community. The Counter-Reformation thus attempted to place religious dissenters outside the community, as an element alien to the Polish historical tradition. This was done successfully in the western borderlands of the Commonwealth. Lutheran clergy and Bohemian Brethren who had settled in Great Poland sought the protection of the Brandenburg elector. Ducal Prussia became the host territory to a large number of migrating Lutheran nobility. Along with them came Protestant ministers and students. These developments were, together, responsible for the Germanization of those regions and communities. The slogan "Pole-Catholic" also loosened the ties of community within the state.¹³ A gradual decline in religious tolerance—both in theory and in practice—caused the dissenters to seek support among Poland's political enemies, which, in turn, made their national affiliation still more suspect.

In the seventeenth century the coexistence of various religious denominations was accepted within the same state, but not within the same nation. At the same time that the Socinian Academy in Raków was closed and the Polish Calvinists were being persecuted, the Polish nobles were free to encourage Lutheran settlers to immigrate from Germany and Silesia to Great Poland and the Lublin region and to offer them their protection. The newcomers were looked upon with a great deal of hostility by Polish townsmen and peasants. Yet the ruling class treated the ethnically alien adherents of a faith other than the Catholic with more tolerance than their own dissenting countrymen. The concessions to the German residents of Prussian towns raised some suspicion and discontent among the Polish dissident patricians of Cracow or Lublin. Analogously, in Royal Prussia, Poles who were Catholics or Socinians were tolerated, whereas Germans who became Calvinists were persecuted.

This thesis appears to be contradicted by the Union of Brest, which, one should remember, was desired by Rome and did not win unqualified enthusiasm in the Commonwealth. The union was undertaken with the intent of gaining the support of the nobility, which in the seventeenth century was regarded as part of the same national community. Fellow countrymen, however, were blamed for propagating an alien faith. In 1613, Jakub Zawisza noted that "Neither the Jewish nor the Tatar sects can bring any harm to the true faith," since for centuries nobody had been converted to those confessions, whereas "heretics" deprived the Catholic church of be-

¹³ See J. Dworzaczkowa, "Sprawa dysydencka w drugiej połowie XVII w.," in *Dzieje Wielkopolski*, vol. 1, ed. J. Topolski (Poznań, 1969), p. 734.

lievers' souls.¹⁴ A dissenter-compatriot was a potential rival in political and professional affairs, and thus should be removed on the pretext of combating "heresy." One assumption that can be made is that if the Socinians had been a religious minority of foreign origin, they would not have been expelled from Poland. Their actual banishment, not only theoretically but physically, left them wholly outside any national community. This method of treatment was operative during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, although it differed in specific cases. During the Renaissance era a growing sense of national identity anticipated the Reformation movement, whereas in the next century the same concept of national consciousness would favor tendencies that helped eliminate any alien (in the social and religious sense) elements.

In the seventeenth century, then, the nobleman's understanding of nation was enriched by two criteria: the community of privileges (or lack of them); and religion, which at that time, as never before or later, was decisive in shaping the concept of national identity. If the first criterion was clearly associated with Poland's political system, the second was to some degree dependent on the international situation. Wars with Muslim Turkey, Protestant Sweden, or Orthodox Muscovy/Russia strengthened a feeling of national identity on the basis of religious separateness. In the Middle Ages, the cult of national patrons had helped to develop a sense of nationhood; now similar sentiments were directed instead toward the glorification of magnates and nobles.

The concept of the Polish ethnic community as being limited exclusively to the Catholic nobility provoked strong objections from religious dissenters. They often emphasized their loyalty to Poland, as did Lutherans in Silesia or Pomerania, and the Socinians in exile, who praised the glory of the Polish sword in victories over the Turks and celebrated the elections of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki and of Jan III Sobieski. Likewise, representatives of the non-privileged classes, such as the poet Jan Jurkowski, the professor of the academy in Vilnius, Aaron Aleksander Olizarowski, and the founder of the Congregation of Marist Fathers Stanisław Papczyński, maintained that the peasant was a member of the same ethnic community. They also maintained that the peasant should be protected by law against excessive social exploitation, because he was as good a Pole as his lord. Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski and, later, the distinguished Calvinist writer at the close of the sixteenth century, Andrzej Wolan, condemned laws by

¹⁴ J. Tazbir, "Il problema dell'intolleranza religiosa in Polonia nei secoli XVI e XVII," *Rivista storica italiana* 88, no. 2 (1976): 276–77.

which Polish peasants were treated more harshly than slaves in Rome.¹⁵ Similarly, Skarga reminded his readers that peasants are "Poles of the same nation."¹⁶ When, in the sixteenth century, appeals were made at Socinian synods to abolish serf labor, references were primarily made to Holy Scripture. In the arguments of the Polish Brethren, the peasant was considered a member of the same religious, but not ethnic, community.

The non-noble writers had no doubt about the participation of their class in the Polish national community. To them, it was the king who personified that community (many burghers supported a strong monarchy), and not corporate privileges, which were almost all enjoyed by the nobility. The most enlightened representatives of the third estate regarded themselves as Poles, in a sense similar to the one in which the word is understood today, and confirmed this attitude in the years of the "Deluge" (1655–1660). One might even attempt to see in the content of national consciousness distinctions other than social ones, namely, a consciousness different among the enlightened part of society from that of the common people. This did not change the fact that a simple, uneducated squire felt himself to be a member of the same nation as a magnate, and that he did not hesitate to exclude from that nation professors of the Cracow Academy because of their burgher origin. Simultaneously, writers from the burgher class demanded that all religious dissenters be expelled from Poland, whatever their social position. It must be remembered that Protestant nobles, like their Catholic counterparts, excluded peasants and townsfolk in their concept of the Polish nation. Both groups were guilty of close-minded selfishness, and the latter, of fanaticism. All this would result in a deplorable state of affairs: at the time of the Swedish invasion, peasants attacked manors belonging to Calvinist and Socinian nobles.

The question of national consciousness among the urban poor and the peasantry is a separate problem. The situation in this respect seemed to be more positive in the sixteenth century, when peasant sons could more easily obtain an education, not only at parish schools, but also at universities. One indication of this is that, whereas in seventeenth century writings peasants emerge in literary texts only in expressing complaints about their difficult social position, in the preceding century the peasant character freely took part in disputes on various general issues. The Calvinist writer Mikołaj Rej, in his *Krótką rozprawą między panem, wójtem a plebanem* (Short discourse

¹⁵ A. Wolan, *O wolności Rzeczypospolitej albo szlacheckiej*, ed. K. J. Turowski (Cracow, 1859), p. 22.

¹⁶ P. Skarga, *Kazania sejmowe*, ed. J. Tazbir and M. Korolko, Biblioteka Narodowa, ser. 1, no. 70 (Wrocław, 1972), p. 196.

between three persons: The nobleman, the bailiff, and the parson), and the Catholic writer Wit Korczewski, in his *Rozmowy polskie łacińskim językiem przeplatane* (Polish Colloquies interspersed with Latin), cast peasants as their spokesmen in a debate about religious reforms. Indeed, in Korczewski's work, a young peasant studying in Wittenberg tries to convert his father to the Lutheran faith.¹⁷

In the next century, the peasants' situation deteriorated. Poverty, more difficult access to higher schools, the nobility's contempt toward him—all these inevitably made the peasant think that he and his lord must be of different ethnic origin. Up to the turn of the twentieth century, the term "Pole" was used mainly to apply to the nobility. In 1846, Polish-speaking Galician peasants maintained that they were obliged to defend the Austrian emperor against the "Poles"—undoubtedly the consequence of an understanding of the nation as limited to the class of nobles.

Seventeenth-century countryfolk identified, above all, with their place of birth and residence, that is, their neighborhood or parish. This union with one's region substituted for ethnic bonds. Not surprisingly, peasants rose up to resist an enemy only when their own or neighboring farms had been invaded. Examples are the struggle of peasants from the Kashub district against the German army that marched in support of the Habsburgs in 1520 and the uprising of mountaineers and inhabitants of the Kurp region against the Swedes. The need to defend one's house, village, or neighboring district became indisputable when the invaders were alien in language and religion. This was proved in the years of the "Deluge." How this trying period affected national identity among peasants is still, due to limited documentation, not well known. Another interesting case were the so-called "loose" people (*ludzi luźni*) outside normal social groups, often representing a higher cultural level, who traveled around the country and had a clearer understanding of the general national situation.

The concept of ethnic separateness was taking form through confrontations with the customs, language, and historical traditions of other nations. This related above all to the Germans: a strong Polish-German antagonism was evident at the close of the Middle Ages. The famous couplet

... Póki świat światem
 Nigdy Niemiec nie będzie Polakowi bratem
 (... As long as the world is the world
 A German will never be a brother to a Pole)

¹⁷ W. Korczewski, *Rozmowy polskie łacińskim językiem przeplatane* (1553; published Cracow, 1883), p. 31.

dates back to the mid-sixteenth century.¹⁸ The antagonism would grow sharper during the Reformation, when national status was raised as an issue by both parties.¹⁹

Yet, the sixteenth century was characterized by a certain lessening of military strife between Poles and Germans. The act of homage made in 1525 in Cracow, whereby Albrecht Hohenzollern recognized the suzerainty of the Polish king, put an end to the long period of wars with Prussia; hostilities were renewed for a time, however, in the years 1655–1657, when the Brandenburg elector proclaimed his support of the Swedes. Along the western borderlands of Poland, no military strife took place at the time. Polish-German antagonism became mainly an internal, domestic issue, which resembled the Polish attitude towards such inhabitants of the Commonwealth as Jews, Armenians, and Tatars.

The Poles' feeling of national separateness grew as they confronted attacks by Turks from the south and by Tatars from the southeast. The frequent military conflicts of the seventeenth century fostered a feeling of solidarity among allies. This was accompanied by a belief in the distinct character of the West European nations whose culture and customs could be studied on foreign travels or even in Poland itself, where foreigners (Italians or Frenchmen) appeared at the courts of electors or as itinerant craftsmen, tradesmen, or preachers (Scots, Englishmen, Dutchmen). It was mainly for export that *mos Polonicum*—special clothing, customs, or tastes—was demonstrated; this distinctiveness should not be overestimated. Foreign fashions were readily imitated by the Polish upper classes. Indeed, there were substantial differences in customs within the country itself; for instance, the habits of the Mazovians or Lithuanians made them objects of ridicule to their neighbors. Also, customs were not an integrating factor, because they differed with each social group's culture, wealth, and foreign contacts.

On the whole, the seventeenth century, which ushered in a florid and specific Sarmatian culture, in which noblemen were the main participants, brought a substantially increased sense of the separateness of the noble class. This change was associated with the fact that the previous Baroque culture, contrary to Renaissance developments, was mainly a native product. The century also witnessed stronger tendencies to contrast Poles with

¹⁸ *Pisma polityczne z czasów pierwszego bezkrólewia*, ed. J. Czubek (Cracow, 1906), p. 33. Cf. also G. Labuda, "Geneza przysłowia 'Jak świat światem, nie będzie Niemiec Polakowi bratem,'" *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza, Historia* 8 (1968): 18.

¹⁹ See the studies by M. Koch Hillebrecht, *Das Deutschenbild: Gegenwart, Geschichte, Psychologie* (Munich, 1977), p. 282.

West Europeans and a more intense xenophobia, which would develop into a pathology from which the nobility long suffered. They came to believe that everything foreign was a potential threat to their language, traditions, and, what was most important, their class liberties.²⁰

As a result of the growing sense of separateness from the sixteenth century on, works appeared that tried to portray the Poles as an entire nation. These were closely connected with attempts to describe national character (in which mainly virtues were perceived). There were also depictions of inhabitants of other Polish provinces, sometimes malicious in nature, such as those of the Mazovians. An interest in the national past was awakened, and Renaissance historiography became a school of patriotism. This was forcibly expressed by Joachim Bielski, who maintained that historiography should regard peoples of the past with due respect, since they sacrificed their lives to extend the boundaries of the state. Love of one's country is, in Bielski's opinion, the main impetus for writing a history. As Kazimierz Dobrowolski expressed it: "memories of the lives and deeds of past generations linked the past and the present history of our country."²¹

In seventeenth-century historiography, in works by such historians as Paweł Piasecki, Wespazjan Kochowski, and Szymon Rudawski, historical events were viewed pragmatically. Great consideration was given to the efforts of the nobility to preserve and enlarge their class privileges, and to their struggle against the foreign monarchs who, sitting on the Polish throne, tried to curtail these privileges. Besides actual conflicts, fictitious rebellions in defense of noble liberties—for instance, the Rebellion at Hlyniany (1377, in the reign of Louis d'Anjou)—were sometimes described. In this way, the noble nation created its own historical genealogy. That genealogy had two distinct layers: a sense of a common historical experience dating back to the mythical Sarmatians, which was shared by the Polish nobility as a whole; and recollections of a relatively recent history, which differed for nobles depending on whether they lived in Great Poland, Mazovia, or Little Poland. In the latter case, oral tradition, side-by-side with literature, fulfilled an important function. Poetry became a specific school of patriotism. Such poets as Waclaw Potocki, Samuel Twardowski, and Zbigniew Morsztyn glorified the military successes of the Polish army. Values established at that time became an intrinsic part of Polish

²⁰ See J. Tazbir, "L'attitude envers les étrangers dans la Pologne au XVII^e siècle," *Il Pensiero Politico* 6, no. 2 (1973).

²¹ K. Dobrowolski, *Studia nad kulturą naukową w Polsce do schyłku XVI stulecia* (Cracow, 1933), p. 72.

culture up to the nineteenth century, or even later.²² Some personalities then presented as historical models (Stefan Czarniecki, Stanisław Żółkiewski) are still honored today. Others proclaimed traitors by their contemporaries (e.g., Janusz Radziwiłł and Hieronim Radziejowski) bear that label in present-day Polish history textbooks.

How were these basic concepts concerning the growth of national consciousness understood? The term "Pole" was understood to refer to a member of a certain ethnic community as well as to an inhabitant of a certain territory, especially Great Poland and Little Poland, that is, the two lands that made up one state organism as early as the fifteenth century. Simultaneously, "Pole" would soon designate any citizen of the Commonwealth, whatever language he might speak: it sufficed that Poland was his place of habitation and that he was a subject of the Polish king. It is in this sense that Hieronim Wietor, who was of German origin, spoke about himself as "a resident Pole" and that Sigismund Augustus admonished Albrecht of Prussia to become "a good Pole." A century later, Maciej Sarbiewski applied the term "Pole" not only to Polish-speaking people, but also to those "who, with time, were admitted or attached to the organism of that great state."²³ This understanding was distantly echoed in the national anthem, proclaiming that "we shall be Poles" once the country's independence is regained. The inhabitant of Prussia was additionally called "Prussian," and of Lithuania, "Lithuanian." Kościuszko and Mickiewicz regarded themselves as Lithuanians in this sense. The "Prussians," as they called themselves, strongly opposed an influx of "foreigners" and "strangers"—that is, of inhabitants from other lands of the Commonwealth—to their territory.

In the fifteenth century and the first part of the sixteenth century, when Latin terminology was still in use, such notions as *gens*, *populus*, and *natio* had at first no strict definition (e.g., in the *Psalterz Floriański* or *Biblia Królowej Zofii*); the word *natio* was taken to mean *generatio*, i.e., tribe. This term continued to be ambiguous up to the sixteenth century, when, as already shown, the *natio* came to denote, on the one hand, an entity with one language, and, on the other hand, a group with a common origin and social status. The juxtaposition of people belonging to a "common nation" and of Poles as a "noble nation" or "knightly nation" can be encountered in constitutions and Diet records. The term was still vague in Mączyński's dictionary, where the Latin *natio* was translated as *genus*, or generation. In

²² See J. Tazbir, *Kultura szlachecka w Polsce: Rozkwit—upadek—relikty* (Warsaw, 1978), p. 179.

²³ M. K. Sarbiewski, *De perfecta poesi, sive Vergilius et Homerus* (Wrocław, 1954), p. 203.

addition, the word for nation could denote the inhabitants of a certain state territory, irrespective of ethnic differences. In that case (which happened particularly in documents) two nations were distinguished, namely, the Polish and the Lithuanian, and the Crown was identified with Poland, as can be seen in Rotundus's *Rozmowa Polaka z Litwinem* (Dispute between a Pole and a Lithuanian). Furthermore, the "Prussian nation," as generally understood, included both the Polish and the German inhabitants of Royal Prussia.

What happened in the seventeenth century was a kind of disassociation in the nobleman's understanding of the word for Pole and his definition of the Polish nation. It is noteworthy that the resolutions of dietines and, especially, decrees issued during the Swedish invasion use the term "fatherland" rather than "nation of nobles" and emphasize the necessity to defend one's country.

For a great many years, the term "fatherland" was understood as land inherited from ancestors. Also, Kochanowski used the word in two meanings: as one's homeland and as patrimony. Other writers (Łukasz Górnicki, Orzechowski) were inclined to use *patria* to mean a certain territory in the political sense. It was with Skarga that the word "fatherland" eventually obtained its present meaning.²⁴ Still, up to the close of the eighteenth century, the notion of one's native country was identified with that of the state. This ambiguity may have had three causes. First, it reflected the general vagueness in thinking about state, society, and country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Second, at that time language itself, particularly Polish, was not capable of expressing certain terms precisely. It is pertinent that even today controversy exists about the differences in meaning between "nation" (*naród*) and "nationality" (*narodowość*). Third, those who comprehended the nation as limited to the nobility had a completely different understanding from those who included the whole population.

A fundamental social tie was an identification with one's place of birth and habitation. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries there first appeared works which testified to that tie. Writings on Warsaw by Adam Jarzębski, on Cracow by Piotr Pruszczyński and Zygmunt Jan Zaleski, and on Żywiec by Andrzej Komoniewski expressed much local patriotism.²⁵

²⁴ K. Górski, "Zagadnienia słownictwa Reformacji polskiej," in *Odrodzenie w Polsce*, vol. 3: *Historia języka*, pt. 2 (Warsaw, 1962), p. 235.

²⁵ J. Bieniarzówna, *Mieszczanństwo krakowskie XVII wieku* (Cracow, 1969), p. 95.

The sense of ethnic community extended over a much greater territory than did that of regional identity. But whereas the latter was common everywhere, a sense of ethnic identity existed only among parts of the population. The number of people having a strong sense of national identity was constantly increasing; yet, in about the year 1870, they were, according to Tadeusz Łepkowski, not more than "30 to 35 percent of Polish-speaking people."²⁶

A much smaller proportion of people identified themselves with any broader ethnic and religious community, such as the Slavs. Indeed, people understood "Slav" in two ways: as a group of countries inhabited by this tribe, and as a group of human communities using a similar language. Slav consciousness made itself felt during the Renaissance period and in religious conflicts associated with the Reformation. Many Polish historians and polemicists believed in the historical unity of all Slav nations. In literature from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century there also occurred "so many hints and so many problems that can be encountered nowhere else, in no other Slav literature of that period . . . no Slav nation wrote so much about things Slavic and other Slav nations as did the Poles."²⁷ Emphasis was placed on Slav solidarity in the struggle against German invaders, and during the reign of Władysław IV calls were made for the liberation of the Slav Balkan nations from the Turks. It was commonly believed that Providence had revealed the true faith to the Slavic peoples earlier than to the Germans. The existence of a common Slav ethnic community was also a weighty argument in supporting the pretensions of the Muscovite tsars to the Polish throne. In the sixteenth century, the terms for "Slav" and "Sarmatian" were used interchangeably; in territory, Poles were believed to have inhabited a vast region of northeastern Europe, also called Sarmatia.

In the second half of the eighteenth century, the phrase "Polish nation" again embraced all social classes, including peasants. This development was, however, slow and gradual: as late as in disputes during the Confederation Diet (*Sejm Wielki*) or even over the Constitution of May 3rd, the concept of nation was limited to the "knightly" estate (*ordo equestris*) and citizens were as a rule identified as nobles. Yet in the last section of the May 3 constitution, which referred to the national army and which said that all citizens were obliged to defend their country, the term "nation" had its modern meaning. Similarly, the more radical representatives of the

²⁶ T. Łepkowski, *Narodziny nowożytnego narodu* (Warsaw, 1968), p. 508.

²⁷ Ulewicz, *Sarmacja*, pp. 145–46; and B. Kürbisówna, "Kształtowanie się pojęć geograficznych o Słowiańszczyźnie w polskich kronikach przeddługoszkowych," *Slavia antiqua*, 1953, vol. 4.

patriotic party—e.g., Franciszek Salezy Jezierski—consistently included burghers and peasants in their concept of nation.

“In my opinion,” wrote Jezierski in his *Niektóre wyrazy porządkiem abecadła zebrane* (1791; Some expressions collected in alphabetical order), “common people should appropriately be called the first estate in this nation, or, to be more precise, the nation itself.” Likewise, Kołłątaj maintained that the nation was made up of “many millions of Polish-speaking people.” For both writers, peasants were the core of the nation; this estate, said Jezierski, “makes use of the maternal tongue, observes customs, and follows the same way of life.”²⁸ The Age of the Enlightenment, like the Age of the Renaissance that had preceded it, witnessed a revival in the significance of Polish speech for the growth of national culture and the strengthening of the state. The use of the Polish language was defended and fostered by Stanisław Konarski and Franciszek Bohomolec. Kołłątaj maintained that “a native language, in its perfect form, adopted in education and employed in all government activities, determines the nation’s character to a much greater extent than clothes do, and is an agent that binds together all the country’s provinces.”²⁹ A campaign was mounted against Latin, which was then gradually removed from official use, as well as against French. Writers used the spoken language, with its popular vocabulary, and went back to the traditions of Sigismund’s times.³⁰ The linguistic campaign was accompanied by efforts to organize national schools adopted to the country’s needs, guided by the Committee for National Education.

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²⁸ J. Kowecki, “U początku nowoczesnego narodu,” in *Polska w epoce Oświecenia: Państwo-społeczeństwo-kultura*, ed. B. Leśnodorski (Warsaw, 1971), pp. 161–62.

²⁹ H. Kołłątaj, *Listy anonima i Prawo polityczne narodu polskiego*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1954), p. 370.

³⁰ Rich materials on this subject are included in the collection *Ludzie Oświecenia o języku i stylu*, 3 vols. (Warsaw, 1958).

Orthodox Slavic Heritage and National Consciousness:
Aspects of the East Slavic and South Slavic
National Revivals

HARVEY GOLDBLATT

1. In the study of nationalism among the East Slavs (Belorussians, Ukrainians, Russians) and a large part of the South Slavs (Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians) two main components have generally been singled out: (1) a supranational tendency based on the awareness of belonging to a larger spiritual and cultural community, which corresponds to Orthodox Slavdom;¹ and (2) a more restricted type of patriotism by a particular ethno-linguistic community which aspires to national statehood. For the past two centuries these two components have been identified with the marked political and cultural movements of Pan-Slavism (or Slavism) and Slavic national revivals, respectively.² Because the nineteenth and the twentieth century completed the process of formation among Slavic nations, it is not at all surprising that the ideological schemes connected with the terms "Pan-Slavism" and "national revival" have held sway over our historiographic vision. Yet by concentrating on these two conceptions, both of which were given definite form in the Romantic age, scholars have tended on occasion to overlook or minimize the importance of other equally well-established ideological systems which operated before the nineteenth century. The goal here is to show that it was an earlier period—that is, the seventeenth and, above all, the eighteenth century—which established a new relationship between supranational trends and national sentiments in Orthodox Slavic

¹ On the community and cultural tradition of "Orthodox Slavdom" (*Slavia orthodoxa*), see R. Picchio, "La 'Istorija slavēnobilgarskaja' sullo sfondo linguistico-culturale della Slavia ortodossa," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 6 (1958): 103–118; idem, "Die historisch-philologische Bedeutung der kirchenslavischen Tradition," *Die Welt der Slaven* 7 (1962): 1–27; idem, "A proposito della Slavia ortodossa e della comunità linguistica slava ecclesiastica," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 11 (1963): 103–127; idem, "The Impact of Ecclesiastic Culture on Old Russian Literary Techniques," in *Medieval Russian Culture*, ed. H. Birnbaum and M. Flier, California Slavic Studies, 12 (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 249–54.

² On the connection between these movements and the birth of Slavic philology, see R. Picchio, "Tradizione sarmatica e slavismo polacco," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 2 (1953): 155–58; idem, "Questione della lingua e Slavia cirilometodiana," in *Studi sulla questione della lingua presso gli Slavi*, ed. R. Picchio (Rome, 1972), pp. 7–13.

culture. I also seek to demonstrate that this new ideological synthesis was realized first and foremost in the “language questions,”³ that is, in the debates which took place in the East Slavic and South Slavic lands concerning (1) the status of the older supranational linguistic patrimony, and (2) the connection between national language and national identity. In many instances, these language controversies not merely reflected but actually helped create the rules which would govern the development of Orthodox Slavic civilization.

2. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the patterns established by a cultural tradition which was common to both the East Slavs and a large part of the South Slavs still provided the most effective source of ideological nourishment for the peoples of Orthodox Slavdom. Nevertheless, the feeling of Orthodox Slavic spiritual unity had been not only shaken, but considerably transformed by the confessional and political struggles which had convulsed much of Central and Eastern Europe throughout the seventeenth century.

The roots of this transformation are to be found in the religious, cultural, and ethnic confrontations connected with the church union declared at Brest (Berestja) in 1596.⁴ The area most directly affected by intense rivalry between “Orthodox” and “Catholic” culture was Rus’ or Ruthenia, that is, the Ukrainian and Belorussian territories in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth inhabited by members of the Eastern Christian church. After the Council of Trent (1545–1563), and especially during the long reign of King Sigismund III Vasa (1587–1632), the revitalized Catholic church sought to put an end to the spirit of humanistic tolerance in Poland. As early as 1577, under the impact of the revised system of post-Tridentine Catholicism, the great Polish Jesuit Piotr Skarga launched a frontal attack on Ruthenian Orthodoxy and its cultural traditions with his polemical work *On*

³ On Slavic “language questions,” see R. Picchio, ed., *Studi sulla questione della lingua presso gli Slavi* (Rome, 1972); R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 2 vols., Yale Russian and East European Publications, 4 (New Haven, 1984); H. Goldblatt, “The Language Question and the Emergence of Slavic National Languages,” in A. Scaglione, ed., *The Emergence of National Languages* (Ravenna, 1984), pp. 107–156.

⁴ On the confrontation between Catholicism and Orthodoxy before and after the Union of Brest, see P. N. Žukovič, *Sejmovaja bor’ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorjanstva s cerkovnoj uniej (do 1608)*, 3 pts. (St. Petersburg, 1901); idem, *Sejmovaja bor’ba pravoslavnogo zapadno-russkogo dvorjanstva s cerkovnoj uniej (s 1609)*, 6 pts. (St. Petersburg, 1901–1911); E. F. Šmurlo, *Rimskaja kurija na rusckom pravoslavnom vostoce v 1609–1645 godax* (Prague, 1928); K. Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934).

the Unity of the Church of God under One Shepherd.⁵ Two years later, Skarga helped found the Vilnius Academy, the first of the new Jesuit schools which aimed to conduct an organized propaganda campaign against the institutions of the Eastern Orthodox faith. Yet the Ruthenian Orthodox elite found itself confronted with not only the intellectual challenges of the Counter-Reformation, but also the increasingly successful assaults of Protestant propaganda. As part of the multinational “Commonwealth of Two Nations” (*Rzeczpospolita obojga narodów*), which had accepted persecuted Calvinists, Lutherans, and Anti-Trinitarians within its borders, the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands were subjected to intense pressure from heterodox missionary activity and the ideological schemes of the Protestant Reformation.

The insistence by King Sigismund III and the Polish-Lithuanian government that the Union of Brest be binding on all Eastern Christians in the Commonwealth elicited a powerful Orthodox reaction, which was soon paralleled by a Uniate response. The ensuing struggle to preserve a Ruthenian consciousness and cultural tradition is perhaps most evident in the language debates which took place in the late sixteenth and initial decades of the seventeenth century between the defenders of Ruthenian Orthodoxy and its adversaries. One should note that the “Ruthenian language question”⁶ was influenced directly by both traditional Orthodox

⁵ Piotr Skarga, *O jedności Kościoła Bożego pod jednym Pasterzem i o greckim od tej jedności odstąpieniu* (Vilnius, 1577). A revised version of the work was published in Cracow in 1610.

⁶ On the Ruthenian language disputes of the late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, see P. I. Žyteckij (Žytec'kyj), *Očerki literaturnoj istorii maloruskogo narečija v XVII i XVIII vv.*, vol. 1: *Očerki literaturnoj istorii maloruskogo narečija v XVII veke* (Kiev, 1899), and its Ukrainian translation: *Narys literaturnoji istoriji ukrains'koji movy v XVII vici*, ed. L. A. Bulaxovs'kyj (Lviv, 1941); M. Weingart, “Dobrovs'kého Institutiones,” pt. 1: “Crkevenšlovanské mluvnice před Dobrovským,” *Sborník Filosofické fakulty Univerzity Komenského v Bratislavě* 1 (1923): 637–95; A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans les pays Ruthènes: Ukraine et Russie blanche, 1569–1657*, *Travaux et mémoires de l'Université de Lille*, n.s.: *Droit et lettres*, 20 (Lille, 1938); N. I. Tolstoj, “Vzaimootnošenie lokal'nyx tipov drevneslavjanskogo literaturnogo jazyka pozdnego perioda (vtoraja polovina XVI–XVII v.),” in *Slavjanskoe jazykoznanie: Doklady Sovetskoj delegacii, V. Meždunarodnyj s'ezd slavistov* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 230–72; R. Mathiesen, “The Inflectional Morphology of the Synodal Church Slavonic Verb” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1972), pp. 50–63; I. K. Bilodid, *Kyjevo-Mohyljans'ka akademija v istoriji sxidn'oslovjans'kyx literaturnyx mov* (Kiev, 1979), pp. 48–84; G. Y. Shevelov, *A Historical Phonology of the Ukrainian Language* (Heidelberg, 1979), pp. 566–80; R. Picchio, “Church Slavonic,” in A. Schenker and E. Stankiewicz, eds., *The Slavic Literary Languages: Formation and Development*, Yale Russian and East European Publications, 1 (New Haven, 1980), pp. 28–32; B. A. Uspenskij, *Jazykovaja situacija Kievskoj Rusi i ee značenie dlja istorii russkogo literaturnogo jazyka* (Moscow, 1983), esp. pp. 55–84; B. Struminsky (Strumins'kyj), “The Language Question in the Ukrainian Lands before the Nineteenth Century,” in Picchio and Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 2: 9–47; H. Goldblatt, “Language Question,” esp. pp. 139–43; D. Frick, “Meletij

Slavic language beliefs and the major sixteenth-century intellectual trends of Western Europe. In particular, as Riccardo Picchio has pointed out, “the intellectual life of the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands came into contact with the theories of both the partisans of the vulgar tongue and their Latino-phile opponents, that is, theories which echoed the ideological conflict between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation.”⁷

It is possible to identify two distinct yet interconnected aspects of the Ruthenian (or Ukrainian-Belorussian) language question. The first dealt with the defense of the “Slavonic language.” In response to the penetration of Polish culture by the Latin tradition championed by Polish polemicists, Ruthenian activists sought to demonstrate that Church Slavonic was of sufficient dignity to safeguard the sacred tradition of the noble “Rus’ nation.” As David Frick has noted, Skarga’s *On the Unity of the Church of God under One Shepherd* “constitutes the explicit point of departure for many, if not all, aspects of the Ruthenian language question.”⁸ In this work Skarga called into question the capacity of the Slavonic language to perform religious and cultural functions. In his opinion, Church Slavonic was clearly inferior to Greek and Latin, for it lacked the grammars and dictionaries which ensured the immutability and prestige of a language.⁹

The defenders of a Ruthenian identity used several arguments in their support of Church Slavonic and its literary tradition. Some Ruthenian scholars, such as Meletij Smotryc’kyj, contended that, like Latin and Greek, the Slavonic language had full dignity by virtue of its *grammaticality*.¹⁰ Indeed, the many grammars and dictionaries published to meet the needs of

Smotryc’kyj and the Ruthenian Language Question,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 9, no. 1/2 (1985): 25–52.

⁷ R. Picchio, “Guidelines for a Comparative Study of the Language Question among the Slavs,” in Picchio and Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 1: 10.

⁸ Frick, “Meletij Smotryc’kyj,” p. 29.

⁹ For Skarga’s arguments against the Slavonic language, see above all part 3, section 5, of his polemical work, as published in P. Gil’terbrandt, *Pamjatniki polemičeskoj literatury v zapadnoj Rusi*, vol. 2 (= Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka, 7) (St. Petersburg, 1882), cols. 482–88. See Frick, “Meletij Smotryc’kyj,” pp. 29–30, for the relevant textual excerpts and their English translation. It is important to bear in mind that in the Church Slavonic language question initiated by Skarga, the real competitor with Slavonic would be not Greek, but Latin. In this sense, the Ruthenian language disputes hark back to the ninth-century “Cyrillo-Methodian language controversy” in Great Moravia, which also took place in an area of overlapping influence, that is, in a zone affected by intense rivalry between the Latin and Greek churches. Cf. Goldblatt, “Language Question,” esp. pp. 125–40.

¹⁰ See Frick, “Meletij Smotryc’kyj,” pp. 32–34. Cf. the definition of the Slavonic language provided by Metropolitan Myxajlo Rahoza, in an *Okružnoe poslanie* of 1592: “. . . i vsi čelověci priložišasja prostomu nes’veršennomu ljudskomu pisaniju, i seho radi v’ različnyja eresi vpadoša, nevěduščee v’ bohoslovii sily s’veršennaho hrammatičeskaho slovenskoho jazyka” (cited after Martel, *La langue polonaise*, p. 76).

the schools or “academies” at Ostroh, Lviv, Vilnius, and Kiev could be cited as proof that Church Slavonic had a fixed grammatical norm. It hardly mattered that codifications such as that of Smotryc’kyj were based largely on humanistic grammars produced in Poland or in the West,¹¹ because for the Ukrainians and Belorussians the “dignity” of Greek supported the status of their own linguistic tradition. In their struggle with “Western trends” Ruthenians, such as Zaxarija Kopystens’kyj, relying on both Orthodox Slavic language speculation and humanistic conceptions,¹² asserted that Greek was a model to be imitated to raise the Slavonic language to a higher level of perfection. By imitating the Greek model, Church Slavonic could acquire a dignity even superior to that of “Catholic Latin.” According to Kopystens’kyj, “it is safer and more secure to write philosophy and theology in the Slavonic language and to translate from Greek into it than into Latin, which is too poor, so to speak, unsatisfactory, and insufficient for elevated and theological matters.”¹³

Still other participants in the Ruthenian language question, strongly influenced by old Orthodox Slavic beliefs, insisted that only “simplicity” (*prostota*) and rejection of the “new Western learning” could ensure the preservation of Church Slavonic as the instrument of divine revelation and the supranational language of Orthodox Slavdom. In the view of Ivan Vyšens’kyj, the Slavonic tongue was the “most fruitful of all languages and God’s favorite” precisely because it lacked the “pagan devices” (*xytrost’/xydožestvo*) characteristic of Greek (and especially Latin) and relied, instead, on the true wisdom which resided only with God.¹⁴

The second aspect of the Ruthenian language question involved discussions on the legitimacy of a Ruthenian vernacular standard—that is, a written language to serve Ukrainian and Belorussian speakers. Because of the similarity of the two spoken languages, one standard Ruthenian could be viewed as a vernacular for both language communities. In these

¹¹ See O. Kociuba, “The Grammatical Sources of Meletij Smotryc’kyj’s Church Slavonic Grammar of 1619” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1975).

¹² See Picchio, “Church Slavonic,” p. 30.

¹³ This textual excerpt is found in a dedicatory epistle to Prince Stefan Svjatopolk Četvertyns’kyj (1623); cited after Struminsky, “The Language Question,” p. 17. The notion that Latin cannot convey the conceptual subtlety of Greek is also to be found in Smotryc’kyj’s *Threnos* (1610): see Frick, “Meletij Smotryc’kyj,” pp. 38–40.

¹⁴ On Vyšens’kyj’s language beliefs, see B. Gröschel, *Die Sprache Ivan Vyšenskyjs: Untersuchungen und Materialien zur historischen Grammatik des Ukrainischen*, Slavistische Forschungen, 13 (Cologne and Vienna, 1972), pp. 7–26; A. N. Robinson, *Bor’ba idej v russkoj literature XVII veka* (Moscow, 1974), pp. 319–36; D. Frick, “Meletius Smotricky and the Ruthenian Question in the Age of the Counter-Reformation” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1983), pp. 172–76.

discussions one can detect the impact of not only the debates on the dignity of Romance vernaculars, as well as the Protestant Reformation, but also the policies of the post-Tridentine Catholic church. The Ruthenians concluded that if Church Slavonic had a prestige equal to that of Latin, then, perhaps, a Ruthenian standard was not inferior to the Polish vernacular in defense of the faith.¹⁵ One should note that all major factions in the discussions—Ruthenian Orthodox, Uniate, and Polish Catholic—while accepting the appropriateness of a Ruthenian vulgar tongue, drew a clear distinction between a sacred language with full liturgical dignity and an apostolic medium for homiletic and polemical purposes (i.e., to ensure the *intelligibility* of Christian teaching for “simple people”).¹⁶ Instead, what appears to have been the real object of controversy were the precise limits of acceptability to be imposed on the use of a Ruthenian vernacular.¹⁷ In the view of

¹⁵ In his *Diarius* (first half of the seventeenth century), Afanasij Fylypovyč stresses the functional equivalence of Slavonic and Ruthenian, on the one hand, and of Latin and Polish, on the other: “*Rus’ [pol’] zuetsja] slovenskim i ruskim, a poljaki latinskim i polskim jazykom vedluh narodu i potreby literalnoj knih*” (cited after Uspenskij, *Jazykovaja situacija*, p. 70).

¹⁶ See Frick, “Meletij Smotryč’kyj,” pp. 30, 35–46. Note in this regard Smotryč’kyj’s definition of the duty of every Christian preacher, in the preface to his *Evanhelie učitelnoe* (1616): “*Khdyž to est’ každoho Xristianskoho Kaznoděi povinnost, ne diškursy o neponjatyx věry taemnic skrytoštjaj stroiti, ale voli i prikazanjam Božskim prostyx i neukix ljudej učiti*” (cited after Frick, “Meletij Smotryč’kyj,” p. 44). In other words, according to Smotryč’kyj, the Ruthenian vernacular is to be used to “teach simple and ignorant people God’s will and commandments,” but *not* to reveal the “unintelligible secrets of the mysteries of faith”: see fn. 17 below.

¹⁷ See the injunction against the use of the vernacular delivered by the Orthodox monk Vyšens’kyj: “*Evanhelija i Apostola v cerkvi na liturhii prostym jazykom ne vyvoračajte. Po liturhii ž dlja zrozumenja ljudskoho poprostu tolkujte i vykladajte. Knih cerkovnye vse i ustavy slovenskim jazykom drukujete*” (Ivan Višenskij, *Sočinenija*, ed. I. P. Eremin [Moscow and Leningrad, 1955], p. 23). Cf. the instructions given by the Uniate archbishop of Polack, Josaphat Kuncevyč: “*Khdy tež’ čitajut’ Evanhelie, albo jakuju molitvu v holos, abo ektenii, ne majut vykladat slovenskix slov’ po rusku, ale tak čitati jako napisano. Učitannoe zas Evanhelie abo žitie styx čitajuči ljudem, mohut vykladati*” (cited after Martel, *La langue polonaise*, p. 99). One should note that these prohibitions against the use of the vernacular are accompanied by references to its use *after* the readings in Slavonic, so that people might understand (*dlja zrozumenja ljudskoho*). The views held by Vyšens’kyj and Kuncevyč thus appear to rely on the traditional teaching of the Church regarding the use of sacred and apostolic languages. In particular, Vyšens’kyj’s admonitions about Slavonic—as well as his opposition to the presence of the vernacular in the liturgy together with an insistence on its use *after* the reading of the liturgical texts—are highly reminiscent of the position concerning Latin and a Slavic vernacular taken by the Roman church during the “Cyrill-Methodian language controversy.” See, for example, the epistle sent by Stephen V to Svatopluk, prince of Moravia (885): “*Divina autem officia et sacra mysteria ac missarum sollempnia . . . nullo modo deinceps a quolibet praesumatur . . . excepto quod ad simplicis populi et non intelligentis aedificationem attinet, si evangelii vel apostoli expositio ab eruditis eadem lingua [i.e., in the Slavic language] annuncietur, et largimur et exhortamur et ut frequentissime fiat monemus, ut omnis lingua laudet Deum et confiteatur ei,*” (F. Grivec and F. Tomšič, eds., *Constantinus et Methodius Thesalonicensis, Fontes* [= Radovi Staroslavenskog Instituta, 4] [Zagreb, 1960], p. 73). Cf. the

some Ruthenian polemicists, those who sought to elevate the prestige of the vulgar tongue not only threatened the very existence of the “true language” (i.e., Slavonic) of Rus’, but upset the delicate balance between a Ruthenian “national” consciousness and an orthodox “confessional” identity.

The Ruthenian language question at the end of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century brought about two significant developments in the relationship between “supranational” trends and “national” sentiments in Orthodox culture. On the one hand, the language disputes effected a linguistic unity for all of Orthodox Slavdom which had never before been achieved. The “Meletian” (from the name of Meletij Smotryc’kyj) norm of Church Slavonic not only became the authoritative model in the Ukraine and Belorussia (Rus’) and in Muscovy, and then in Romania and among the Orthodox Slavs of Serbia and Bulgaria, but also was used by the Roman church to standardize a Uniate Slavonic tradition stretching from the Ruthenian lands to the *glagoljaše* on the Dalmatian coast. On the other hand, “the linguistic theories that contributed to the most successful codification of Church Slavonic at the same time created favorable conditions for its gradual replacement by new languages based on local dialects.”¹⁸ Further cultivation of a Ruthenian vernacular—especially its

Commonitorium for John and Stephen, papal envoys to the Slavic lands: “Missas et sacramenta illa ministeria . . . ne aliquo modo praesumatur penitus interdicat. Verumtamen si aliquis Sclavorum lingua tam doctus invenitur, ut post sacratissimam evangelicam apostolicam lectionem eius explicationem doctus sit dicere ad aedificationem eorum, qui non intelligunt, et laudat, si fiat, et concedit et approbat” (Grivec and Tomšič, p. 75). On the position of the Roman church during the first controversy on the status and function of the Slavic language, see R. Picchio, “Il posto della letteratura bulgara antica nella cultura europea del medio evo,” *Ricerche Slavistiche* 27–28 (1980–81): 37–64. With regard to Vyšens’kyj’s language beliefs, one should also remember that the dignity of the “vulgar tongue” and its appropriateness for the liturgy were topics of central importance at the Council of Trent, especially in the debates which followed the fourteenth and twenty-first sessions of the council (cf. H. Schmidt, *Liturgie et langue vulgaire: Le problème de la langue liturgique chez les premiers Réformateurs et au Concile de Trente*, *Analecta Gregoriana*, 53 [Rome, 1950], pp. 95–155). One might mention, for example, the remarks made by Bartholomaeus de Miranda, Archbishop of Toledo, after the fourteenth session (25 November 1551). Proceeding from the crucial distinction between the doctrinal part of the mass and the sacrifice, Bartholomaeus de Miranda insisted that the use of the “vulgar tongue” at certain levels of the liturgy as an instrument of instruction was in no way heretical. One can recognize the views of the Spanish archbishop in the declaration made by a general assembly on 2 January 1552: “Et quidam vellet statui a sancta Synodo, quod in missis publicis semper aliqui interpretarentur epistolam et evangelium in lingua vulgari” (Schmidt, p. 106).

¹⁸ Picchio, “Church Slavonic,” p. 32. It is important to recall here the significance of the Ruthenian language question for the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debates on the legitimacy of a vernacular standard among the Southern Slavs. On these language disputes, see, inter alia, R. Picchio, “Lo slavobulgaro di Paisij,” *Ricerche Slavistiche* 14 (1966): 77–112, esp. 95–112; L. Costantini, “Note sulla questione della lingua presso i Serbi tra il XVIII e il

separation from the linguistic conventions of Church Slavonic—might have played an important role in strengthening a Ruthenian identity. In this regard, one should recall that despite the Union of Lublin (1569) and the resulting political separation of Ukrainians and Belorussians, the inhabitants of the Ruthenian lands continued to share a common cultural heritage which, however, they consciously distinguished from the traditions of the Poles and, in part, of the Muscovites.

The events of the second half of the seventeenth century would undermine the feelings of cultural “otherness” achieved above all by Peter Mohyla and his collaborators.¹⁹ True, the Xmel’nyč’kyj revolt of 1648 and the rise of a Cossack Ukrainian state on the Left Bank of the Dnieper enhanced the possibilities for the Ruthenian (or Ukrainian) vernacular as an instrument of national identity. As George Y. Shevelov has noted, in the Hetmanate it was widely used in the records of the central and local governments and became a strong contender for the status of the national literary language.²⁰ Yet the Perejaslav agreement of 1654, which gave the Muscovite tsar a claim to sovereignty in the Ukrainian lands, initiated a gradual process of Russification that would retard Ukrainian national development in the eighteenth century. After the partitions of the Commonwealth at the end of the eighteenth century, Russian ecumenical imperialism would offer similar protection to the Belorussians. From 1686, when the Kievan Metropolitanate was subordinated to the Patriarch of Moscow, intense efforts were made to ensure that Muscovy and Ukraine shared a single linguistic patrimony and “common church books.” Muscovite Russia still could not accept any opposition between *slavenskyj* and *ruskyj*. As pointed out by Bohdan Struminsky, “the final blow to Ruthenian-Ukrainian in church literature in the eastern Ukraine was dealt by a decree of Peter I in 1720, forbidding ‘any difference and separate dialect’ in the church books published in the Hetmanate.”²¹ Although the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) vernacular continued to be used in the Eastern Ukraine throughout the

XIX secolo,” in *Studi sulla questione della lingua*, pp. 163–68; V. P. Gudkov, “Bor’ba koncepcij ‘slavenskogo’ i ‘prostogo’ jazyka v istorii literaturnogo jazyka u serbov,” in *Slavjanskoe i balkanskoe jazykoznanie: Istorija literaturnyx jazykov i pis’mennost’* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 198–211; M. Iovine, “The ‘Illyrian Language’ and the Language Question among the Southern Slavs in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” in Picchio and Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 1: 101–156; G. Dell’Agata, “The Bulgarian Language Question from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” in *ibid.*, 1: 157–88.

¹⁹ See I. Ševčenko, “The Many Worlds of Peter Mohyla,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 1/2 (1984): 9–44, esp. p. 33, fn. 36.

²⁰ G. Y. Shevelov, “Ukrainian,” in Schenker and Stankiewicz, eds., *The Slavic Literary Languages*, p. 150.

²¹ Struminsky, “Language Question,” p. 29.

eighteenth century, its dignity remained low and it could not serve as a basis for asserting a Ukrainian identity.

3. The confrontation between the “Latin West” and the “Orthodox East” after the Union of Brest was not limited to the Ruthenian lands. During the “Time of Troubles” (*Smutnoe vremia*), the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth of King Sigismund III, representing the “European vanguard of the Counter-Reformation,”²² overran a large part of Muscovite territory. The invasion of Muscovy by Counter-Reformation Catholicism led to a resurgence of Orthodox Slavic patriotism with a strong local (i.e., Russian) cast. In this period of national crisis, the saintly image of the Muscovite patriarch came to symbolize the spirit of resistance to Catholic Poland and the defense of Russian Orthodoxy. Nowhere can the “nationalistic” adaptation of old myth be detected more clearly than in the exaltation of Patriarch Germogen offered by the “New Tale of the Most Glorious Russian Tsardom and Great Muscovite State” (*Novaja povest' o preslavnom Rosijskom carstve i velikom gosudarstve Moskovskom*), as well as in other homiletic-hagiographic compositions and epic-like military accounts written during the “Time of Troubles.”²³ When the Muscovite state appeared to be on the verge of collapse, the image of Germogen became the personification of Russian patriotism. Armed with nothing but the sacred doctrine, the patriarch “stood like an unshakable pillar amidst our great land, that is, amidst our great state, and fought for the Orthodox faith.”²⁴

The Muscovite Patriarchate attained even great spiritual authority when the father of the tsar, Metropolitan Filaret, returned from Polish imprisonment in 1619 to become the “Patriarch of All Russia” and assumed the title of “Great Sovereign” (*Velikij Gosudar*). Throughout the seventeenth century the traditional sacred image of the Orthodox pastor would remain inextricably bound up with that of the Russian “sovereign.” Yet beginning in the reign of Aleksej Mixajlovič (1645–1676), especially after the deposition and exile of Patriarch Nikon by the church council of 1666–1667,

²² J. Billington, *The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture* (New York, 1970), p. 104.

²³ See *Pamjatniki drevnej russkoj pis'mennosti, odnosjaščiesja k Smutnomu vremeni*, Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka, 13, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1909); S. F. Platonov, *Očerki po istorii Smuty v Moskovskom gosudarstve XVI–XVII vv.* (St. Petersburg, 1899); idem, *Drevnerusskie skazanija i povesti o Smutnom vremeni XVII v. kak istoričeskij istočnik*, 2nd ed. (St. Petersburg, 1913); A. A. Nazarevskij, *Očerki iz oblasti russkoj istoričeskoj povesti XVII veka* (Kiev, 1958); N. F. Droblenkova, “*Novaja povest' o preslavnom Rosijskom carstve*” i *sovremennaja ej agitacionnaja patriotičeskaja pis'mennost'* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960).

²⁴ Droblenkova, *Novaja povest'*, p. 195. On the role of Patriarch Germogen during the “Time of Troubles,” see Platonov, *Očerki*, pp. 474–527; R. Picchio, *Storia della letteratura russa antica* (Milan, 1959), pp. 296–98; Droblenkova, *Novaja povest'*, pp. 116–37.

emphasis was increasingly placed on the pious image of the Russian tsar, that is, on the guardian of a Russian Orthodoxy that now coincided with what was becoming a national state. As Stephen Baehr has noted:

At least fifty years before the replacement of the Patriarchate by the state-appointed Holy Synod under Peter the Great's Spiritual Reglement of 1721, there began a widespread appropriation of church concepts, vocabulary and symbols for redefining the new . . . state and its tsar. In this general transfer of images from church to state . . ., the symbolism of the icon and the vocabulary of "image" and "likeness" began to appear more frequently at court, where the Russian state was depicted as an "icon" of heaven and the tsar as an "icon" of God.²⁵

4. The confessional confrontation between Protestantism and Counter-Reformation Catholicism in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sharply affected not only the Ruthenian lands and Muscovite Russia, but the entire Orthodox Slavic community. After the success of Protestant religious propaganda in Slovenia and Croatia,²⁶ the Roman Catholic church hoped to recoup some of its losses by "conquering" those South Slavs who owed their spiritual allegiance to the Eastern Orthodox church. The Counter-Reformation policy of extending the Church Union of Brest to the Balkan Peninsula became particularly well organized after the creation of the *Congregatio de Propaganda fide* (1622) and the establishment of missionary academies at Loreto and Rome.²⁷

The protracted conflict between Protestants and Catholics was accompanied by a growing political interest in the hitherto unexplored national and linguistic traits which characterized the lower social strata of European peoples. This heightened social awareness extended to the Slavic world. As a consequence of the new type of social exploration carried out by institutions such as *Propaganda fide*, the existence of nationally-marked entities began to be perceived in the Orthodox Slavic community, and their linguistic patrimony became the object of intensive scrutiny. One should note that in its missionary efforts among the South Slavs, Counter-Reformation Catholicism used the same means that the Protestant Reformers had

²⁵ S. Baehr, "In the Image and Likeness: The 'Political Icon' in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Russia," *Russian Literature Triquarterly* 21 (forthcoming).

²⁶ One should note here the importance of the printing press which the Protestants operated in Urach near Tübingen from 1561–65; see in this regard M. Murko, *Die Bedeutung der Reformation und Gegen-reformation für das geistige Leben der Südslaven* (Prague and Heidelberg, 1927), pp. 1–23.

²⁷ On the multifarious activities connected with Counter-Reformation policy, see R. Picchio, "Un pamphlet epico de Propaganda fide. La 'Bulgheria Convertita' di F. Bracciolini," in *Relazioni Storiche e Culturali fra l'Italia e la Bulgaria* (Napoli, 1982), pp. 157–95.

employed.²⁸ Discussions ensued among Jesuits and Franciscans with the aim of determining which Slavic linguistic medium would best serve as an instrument of dissemination and propaganda for all of "Illyria," that is, for all the South Slavs. As Micaela Iovine has put it:

For Balkan Slavdom the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were a period characterized by linguistic experimentation, textual revision, and active debate concerning the codification and correct usage of the literary norm. All of this activity unfolded as either a collaborative response or hostile reaction to the aspirations and activity of Catholic *Propaganda*. Aroused from temporary inertia by the challenge of the Protestant Reformation, the Catholic church sought in the Slavic Balkans not only to strengthen the faithful threatened by Protestant "heretics," but also to effect the spiritual reconquest of the Orthodox populations.²⁹

Interest in the Orthodox Slavic world would remain a vital component in the ideological conflict between Protestants and Catholics until the reign of Peter the First. This interest is best evidenced by the eagerness both camps displayed to fill the spiritual vacuum allegedly created by Peter's reforms in a Russia already shaken by the church schism (*Raskol*).³⁰ For many Protestants and Catholics, "the religious union of Russia with Catholicism or the Lutheran church could still appear, in the early years of the eighteenth century, not only possible but also logically necessary as the concluding act in the ongoing revolt against Old Russia."³¹

Yet Russia did not remain quiescent in the face of Lutheran and Catholic attempts at spiritual conquest. In the reign of Aleksej Mixajlovič a plan of Orthodox Slavic expansion was conceived which was comparable to the ambitious designs of the two churches.³² This project of Orthodox Slavic patriotic imperialism was justified politically by the changing situation in the South Slavic lands under Turkish occupation. From the neighboring Habsburg Empire, Catholic propaganda was infiltrating the Balkan territory inhabited by Serbs and Bulgarians. Subject to Russian Orthodox and Catholic (and, as a consequence, Protestant) pressure, the spiritual and

²⁸ See Murko, *Die Bedeutung der Reformation*, pp. 24–179.

²⁹ Iovine, "The 'Illyrian Language,'" pp. 105–106.

³⁰ See I. Čistovič, *Feofan Prokopovič i ego vremena* (St. Petersburg, 1868), pp. 43–45; R. Picchio, "La 'Introductio in historiam et rem literariam slavorum' di J. P. Kohl, *Ricerche Slavistiche* 2 (1953): 3–6.

³¹ Picchio, "La 'Introductio,'" pp. 3–4.

³² One should bear in mind here the possible impact of Juraj Križanić's ideas on the views of Afanasij Ordin-Naščokin, the architect of Russian foreign policy under Aleksej Mixajlovič: see C. B. O'Brien, "Early Political Consciousness in Muscovy: The Views of Juraj Križanić and Afanasij Ordin-Nashchokin," in *Juraj Križanić (1618–1683), Russophile and Ecumenic Visionary: A Symposium*, ed. T. Eekman and A. Kadić (The Hague and Paris, 1976), pp. 209–222.

cultural traditions of the Serbs and Bulgarians were sharply affected. In this complex early phase of the “Eastern Question,” Orthodox Slavic patriotism clearly required a new systematization. This would take place in the eighteenth century.

5. A well-established interpretative tradition informs us that any discussion concerning Modern Russia ultimately must be traced back to the reign of Peter the First, the “tsar-transformer” (*car'-preobrazovatel'*).³³ It also is generally accepted that in the post-Petrine era, the idea of a universalist Russian empire was inextricably bound up with the notion of national pride. Both these beliefs would seem to validate Russia's full participation in the world of European politics, literature, and philosophy. Yet what remains unclear is whether the new type of state patriotism established by Peter I was actually in contradistinction to the older ideological patrimony of Orthodox Slavdom. A careful analysis of the literary works of important eighteenth-century authors such as Feofan Prokopovyč, Vasilij Tredjakovskij, and Mixail Lomonosov tends to suggest that the survival and resystematization of the Orthodox Slavic tradition played a central part in the “new secular nationalism” of post-Petrine Russia.

The most enigmatic and yet typical representative of what might be termed the “Orthodox Slavic revival of Petrine Russia” was Feofan Prokopovyč (1681?–1736), the leading ideologue of state power and promoter of Peter's reforms. One might even say that his rhetorically-embellished “Panegyric, or Oration in Praise of the Most Glorious Victory over the Swedish Forces” (*Panegirikos, ili Slovo poxval'noe o preslavnoj nad vojskami svejskimi pobede*), delivered in Peter's presence to celebrate the tsar's great victory over the Swedish king Charles XII at Poltava (1709), marks a critical moment in the spiritual development of Modern Russia. The oration so pleased Peter that he ordered its immediate publication in the Slavonic and Latin languages.³⁴ The Slavonic version of the work was printed together with an even more bombastic “Victory Song” (*Epinikion*) in verse, where Peter was portrayed by Prokopovyč as the Orthodox

³³ As Jurii Lotman and Boris Uspenskij have pointed out: “If we consider the interpretation of the Petrine period. . . , we are struck by the extremely rapid establishment of a mythological canon that, not only for subsequent generations but to a considerable degree for historians, was transformed into a device for coding the real events of the time. One must note above all the profound belief in the complete and absolute rebirth of the country, a belief that naturally stresses the . . . role of Peter” (Ju. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskij, “Myth—Name—Culture,” in *Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union*, ed. H. Baran [White Plains, N.Y., 1976], p. 17).

³⁴ See T. A. Bykova and M. M. Gurevič, *Opisanie izdanij, napečatannyx kirillicej, 1689-janvar' 1725 g.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1958), pp. 159–62.

sovereign who, by restoring the older sacred tradition and spiritual patrimony, had invalidated the dangerous revolution which he himself had once promoted. The Petrine revolution might have played rhetorical games and initially have pretended to liberate Russia from her Orthodox Slavic backwardness, but that alleged backwardness proved to be the only solid spiritual weapon in the struggle against “our fierce enemy” (*supostat naš lju-tyj*), the Swedish Lutherans. In Prokopovyč’s Orthodox Slavic restoration the very word “Lutheran” (*ljutor*) acquired a marked derogatory connotation.³⁵

6. A significant part of eighteenth-century Russian culture can be viewed as an attempt to adapt the Orthodox Slavic patrimony to the terms and symbols of a new philosophical language. Nowhere were the efforts to define the status of Russia’s cultural heritage of greater importance than in the discussions devoted to the codification of a new literary language which would replace the old language of Orthodox Slavdom. Indeed, the Russian “language question” of the eighteenth century can help us better comprehend the attempts of Russian society to establish an entirely new semeiologic system based on the acceptance, revision, or rejection of traditional symbols.

One might draw a parallel between, on the one hand, the rhetorical restoration achieved by Prokopovyč in the aftermath of Poltava and, on the other hand, the defense of the Orthodox Slavic tradition offered by Vasilij Tredjakovskij and Mixail Lomonosov. In the middle of the eighteenth century some suggested that Modern Russian was not the continuation of the old Slavonic tongue and should be fully liberated from its traditional patrimony.³⁶ In their writings Tredjakovskij and Lomonosov sought to counter the claim that the language of the “church books” (*cerkovnye knigi*) was not Russian. “Russian” cannot be opposed to “Slavonic,” for as Tredjakovskij points out:

Our Russian language is of one . . . nature with Slavonic, . . . so that our Russian

³⁵ Prokopovyč’s readers could not fail to perceive the pseudoetymological figure that established the connection between *lju-tyj* (‘fierce, cruel, malicious’) and *ljutor* (‘Lutheran’): cf. M. Fasmer, *Ėtimologičeskij slovar’ russkogo jazyka*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1967), pp. 546–47.

³⁶ On these discussions, see A. Martel, *Michel Lomonosov et la langue littéraire russe*, *Travaux et mémoires de l’Université de Lille*, n.s.: Droit et lettres, 16 (Lille, 1933); H. Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*, Russian Research Center Studies, 38 (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); K. Rosenberg, “Between Ancients and Moderns: V. K. Trediakovskii on the Theory of Language and Literature” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980), esp. pp. 29–137 and 324–67; B. A. Uspenskij, “The Language Program of N. M. Karamzin and its Historical Antecedents,” in Picchio and Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 2: 235–296.

language is called Slaveno-Russian, that is, Russian by nationality and Slavonic by nature. . . . The distinction between our language and Slavonic concerns, so to say, the surface of the language, but not its interior; thus, the difference resides either in newly-introduced words taken from foreign languages, or in a very few particular words. . . . But such differences do not in the least prevent our language being one and the same as Slavonic.³⁷

Slavonic is more than an indispensable component of Modern Russian. It is the very essence of the language; it is the "measure of purity" through which the Russian tongue acquires its spiritual dignity.

The "Orthodox Slavic revival" of the eighteenth century is reminiscent in many ways of the restoration which had occurred a century earlier during the "Time of Troubles." Yet there is a crucial difference between the new type of Orthodox Slavic patriotism and the traditional kind of patriotic sentiment. In the universalist empire established by Peter I, the state had not only subordinated, but totally replaced the church; indeed, one might even speak of a new state-based version of an ecclesiastic vision of society. According to Lomonosov, the "church books" were now symbols of a tradition which supersedes even the myth of Orthodox Slavdom, for they represented the continuity of a providential *translatio*.³⁸ By not rejecting the sacred patrimony of the old language, the new Russian state could present itself as the continuation not only of Kievan Rus' and Muscovy, but of Constantinople and even Rome. This imperial variant of Orthodox Slavic patriotism did not seek to oppose Russian nationalism, but rather aimed to insert patriotic feelings into a modernized ideological scheme which clearly prefigured imperialistic Pan-Slavism.

The need to combine a technically advanced ideological language with the message of the "church books" would remain a vital component of Russian spirituality until the dawn of the Romantic age. The linguistically innovative conservatism of Admiral Šiškov is one of the clearest examples of this continuity.³⁹ Nikolaj Karamzin's acceptance of French as a proper model for the establishment of a new norm for Modern Russian was bitterly opposed by Šiškov and his followers, for it gave credence to the notion that

³⁷ V. K. Tredjakovskij, "Conversation . . . on Orthography" (*Razgovor . . . ob orfografii*, 1748), cited after Uspenskij, "Language Program of N. M. Karamzin," p. 267.

³⁸ See in this regard S. Baehr, "From History to National Myth: *Translatio imperii* in Eighteenth-Century Russia," *Russian Review* 37 (January 1978): 1–13.

³⁹ On the language beliefs of A. S. Šiškov, see Martel, *Michel Lomonosov*, pp. 101–116; P. Garde, "A propos du premier mouvement slavophile," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* 5 (1964): 261–69; M. Colucci, "Il pensiero linguistico e critico di A. S. Shishkov," in *Studi sulla questione della lingua*, pp. 225–27.

“Slavonic” and “Russian” were two different languages.⁴⁰ In his polemical defense of the “old style,” Šiškov sought to affirm the unity and dignity of an Orthodox Slavic spiritual and cultural heritage which surpassed the traditions of Western Europe in both beauty and sophistication.⁴¹

7. The new sort of Orthodox Slavdom, which for all intents and purposes was identified with the universalist ambitions of the Russian empire, hoped to preserve the dominant role in the larger community of Orthodox Slavs that Muscovy had played earlier. Yet things turned out otherwise. No amount of rhetorical embellishment could confer upon the bureaucratic and military colossus known as the *Rossijskaia imperija* the sacred prestige of a universal church. Inevitably, the non-Great-Russian members of the Eastern Orthodox Slavic community will interpret the attempted transfer of Orthodox Slavic prestige to the empire as the initial phase in the partition of the old heritage. The growth of well-marked Ukrainian and Belorussian national ambitions may thus be seen as a consequence of the breakup of an ecumenical patrimony. The Orthodox Slavs of the Ukrainian and Belorussian lands will not accept the Russian Empire as a new church. Here, too, the disputes concerning the replacement of the old common language of Orthodox Slavdom with new linguistic media such as the “national” standard codified in “Great” Russia will acquire emblematic value. As soon as the Ukrainians and Belorussians discover that the empire has rejected the old language and “common” church books, they will feel entitled to have their own types of “neo-Church Slavonic,” seen as expressions not of new churches, but rather of new “national” Orthodox Slavic communities which are following the pattern already established by the Russian Empire.

8. Soon after Feofan Prokopovyč entered the arena of eighteenth-century international politics, he found himself at the center of a developing conflict between the old church-oriented and the new state-based universalist conceptions of Orthodox Slavic patriotism. The Vojvodina Serbs, who had settled on territory under the protection of the Habsburgs after the “Great Migration” (*Velika seoba*) of 1690, asked Tsar Peter to support them in

⁴⁰ On these controversies, see Ju. N. Tynjanov, *Puškin i ego sovremenniki* (Moscow, 1968); V. D. Levin, *Očerki stilistiki russkogo literaturnogo jazyka konca XVIII-nač. XIX v.: Leksika* (Moscow, 1964); N. I. Mordovčenko, *Russkaja kritika pervoj četverti XIX v.* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1959), pp. 77–99; Ju. Lotman and B. Uspenskij, “Spory o jazyke v načale XIX v. kak fakt ruskoj kul’tury (‘Proisšestvie v carstve tenej, ili Sud’bina rossijskogo jazyka’—neizvestnoe sočinenie Semena Bobrova),” *Učenyje zapiski Tartuskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta* 358 (1975): 168–322; V. V. Vinogradov, *Jazyk Puškina* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1935), esp. pp. 59–75; Uspenskij, “Language Program of N. M. Karamzin,” esp. pp. 225–39.

⁴¹ See Colucci, “Il pensiero linguistico e critico di A. S. Shishkov,” pp. 249–50.

their spiritual defense of the common Orthodox tradition against the moral onslaught of his Apostolic Majesty's Catholicism. Here, once again, the basic terms of a complex sociopolitical issue were translated into the terms of a "language question." The demand of the Vojvodina Serbs was still conceived in the spirit of a supranational and confessionally marked Orthodox Slavic patriotism. By restoring the correct and authoritative use of Church Slavonic as the common language of Orthodox Slavdom, the Serbs wished to assert their own identity and cultural heritage.

As the most prominent figure in the newly-created Russian Synod,⁴² Prokopovyč was confronted with a peculiar dilemma. Were Prokopovyč to act as the successor of his predecessors, the patriarchs of Old Muscovy, he would contradict his own political function, for it was he who had encouraged Peter to replace that older traditional image with the image of a new, imperial Russian church. Indeed, the old language, whose purity was believed by the Serbs to be best preserved in the Russian lands, was under attack in the empire and being replaced by the imperial bureaucracy with a mixture of secular colloquialisms and foreign borrowings.⁴³ Nevertheless, it was clearly in the interests of both the new Russian state and its church to use the best means at their disposal to make their presence felt in the Balkan lands. Prokopovyč ultimately acted on the basis of practical considerations and acceded to the Serbs' appeal for help.⁴⁴ He chose to clothe the Russian secular revolution in ecclesiastical garb, an act which revealed the tendency of an ascendant Russian Pan-Slavism to offer itself as a church.

9. However, this sort of spiritual pantomime ultimately proved unsuccessful. Around the middle of the eighteenth century the pan-Orthodox patriotism of the Serbs was shaken by emerging types of locally inspired confessional patriotism. Rather than attempting to restore Church Slavonic as a pan-Orthodox language, Serbian cultural activists now sought to assert the dignity of local variants of the language, that is, to establish certain types of "Slavo-Serbian" (in opposition to "Slavo-Russian") as the new sacred

⁴² J. Cracraft has rightly underscored "the historical importance of the Holy Synod in its early years, which is not to be seen in purely, or even largely, ecclesiastical or administrative terms: the Synod was, as well, a high-level committee on propaganda and state policy" (J. Cracraft, "Did Feofan Prokopovich Really Write *Pravda Voli Monarshei*?", *Slavic Review* 40 [1981]: 193).

⁴³ See V. V. Vinogradov, *Očerki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo jazyka XVII–XIX vekov*, 3rd ed. (Moscow, 1982), pp. 56–72.

⁴⁴ On the Russian mission to the Serbs, see P. A. Kulakovskij, "Načalo ruskoj školy u serbov v XVIII veke," *Izvestija Otdelenija russkogo jazyka i slovesnosti* 7, no. 2, (1903): 246–311, and no. 3: 190–297; Constantini, "Note sulla questione della lingua," pp. 187–208.

medium of Serbian Orthodox Slavdom. This activity acquires a paradigmatic significance when one considers that the switch from a pan-Orthodox language to a local variant of Church Slavonic paved the way for the eventual victory of a national language completely detached from the Orthodox Slavic tradition. In Serbia as in Russia, and later in Bulgaria, it is possible to follow the development of nationalism first as a subdivision of Orthodox Slavic patriotism and then as an adaptation of ethno-linguistic self-awareness to the state-based model produced by post-Petrine Russia.

These changes can best be followed through the works of the main discussants in the Serbian "language question," such as Gavriilo Stefanović Venclović, Zaharija Stefanović Orfelin, Jovan Rajić, Dositej Obradović, and Metropolitan Stefan Stratimirović.⁴⁵ One should remember that the would-be codifiers of the new Serbian language were also churchmen. In their writings the notion of a national church as the local continuator of earlier pan-Orthodox greatness was a precondition for the idea of a national state which, as in Russia, was intended to combine national pride with a new sense of ecumenical imperialism.

What nourished and justified the local ecumenical imperialism of Serbian Orthodox Slavdom was the dominance that the Serbian Church had maintained in the Balkan Slavic world since the revival of an autocephalous Serbian Patriarchate in 1557. Nor should one forget the cultural activity carried out by the Vojvodina Serbs with the aim of affirming Serbian spiritual preeminence over the entire Balkan Orthodox Slavic flock.⁴⁶ One thus can say that the new Serbian version of national Orthodox Slavic consciousness followed the patterns already established by Russian Orthodox state imperialism. In addition to the vision of a Serbian national state, there was

⁴⁵ On the Serbian "language question" from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century, see J. Skerlić, *Srpska književnost u XVIII veku*, Sabrana dela Jovana Skerlića, 9 (Belgrade, 1966); B. Unbegaun, *Les débuts de la langue littéraire chez les Serbes* (Paris, 1935); A. Albin, "The Creation of the Slaveno-Serbski Literary Language," *Slavonic and East European Review* 48 (1970): 483–91; T. Butler, "The Origins of the War for a Serbian Language and Orthography," *Harvard Slavic Studies* 5 (1970): 1–80; M. Pavić, *Istorija srpske književnosti baroknog doba (XVII i XVIII vek)* (Belgrade, 1970), pp. 28–38; Costantini, "Note sulla questione della lingua," pp. 163–224; idem, "Un capitolo della questione della lingua serba: Milovan Vidaković," *Ricerche Slavistiche* 24–26 (1977–79): 179–196; R. Katičić, "The Making of Standard Serbo-Croat," in Picchio and Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, 1: 261–295; N. I. Tolstoj, "Literaturnyj jazyk u Serbov v konce XVIII–načala XIX veka," in *Nacional'noe vozroždenie i formirovanie slavjanskix literaturnyx jazykov* (Moscow, 1978), pp. 269–328; idem, "Literaturnyj jazyk u Serbov v XVIII veke (do 1780)," in *Slavianskoe i balkanskoe jazykoznanie*, pp. 154–97.

⁴⁶ See I. Banac, "The Role of Vojvodina in Karadjordje's Revolution," *Südost-Forschungen* 40 (1981): 31–61, esp. pp. 46–51.

the dream of dominating all of Balkan Orthodox Slavdom, including the Bulgarian lands.

10. In Bulgaria, the attempt to confer upon the modern state the sacred dignity of a supranational church was, however, no more successful than it had been on other fronts of the East Slavic–South Slavic influence game initiated by imperial Russia. The emblematic figure who best typifies the process of resistance among the Bulgarians is Paisij Hilendarskij (1722–1773). It is important to remember that the impulse for writing his “Slavo-Bulgarian History” (*Istorija Slavėnobolgarskaja*), completed in 1762, came from his disputes with Serbian monks on Mount Athos. In deliberate opposition to Serbian Orthodox patriotism, Paisij set out to demonstrate the glories of Bulgarian history. In Bulgaria as in Serbia, the development of national awareness can be most easily followed through the works of the main participants in the “language question,” including Paisij Hilendarskij, Sofronij Vračanskij, Neofit Rilski, Hristaki Pavlovič, Konstantin Fotinov, Jurij Venelin, and Vasil Aprilov.⁴⁷ These language disputes aimed to assert, first, the dignity of a local variant of the common language of Orthodox Slavdom (in this case, Paisij’s “Slavo-Bulgarian”),⁴⁸ and, later, the appropriateness of a national language based on popular (i.e., secular) usage.

11. In conclusion, two points deserve emphasis: (1) the existence of a premodern type of supranational spiritual solidarity which was based on the common Orthodox Slavic heritage and which prefigured the nineteenth-century Pan-Slavist movement; and (2) the constant link between this older and broader type of nationalism and the local patriotic trends which flourished in a period prior to the age of Slavic national revivals. This is not to say that the older aspects of modern nationalism found among the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Russians, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Macedonians should be interpreted solely against the background of a common religious tradition. I do think, however, that it would be a mistake to underestimate the part played by a peculiar mixture of religious universalism and patriotism in the formation of modern national ideologies in the Orthodox Slavic world. Even the emergence of a Macedonian national ideology in the apparently secularized conditions created in the Balkan peninsula by World War II

⁴⁷ On the Bulgarian “language question,” see G. Keremidčiev, *Borba z knižoven ezik i pravopis* (Sofia, 1943); Dell’Agata, “Bulgarian Language Question.”

⁴⁸ R. Picchio’s analysis of Paisij’s language has led him to conclude that “Slavo-Bulgarian” refers to a language basically governed by the traditional structures of Church Slavonic grammar and vocabulary and at the same time open to all sorts of innovations, including either elements of the spoken language or high-style formulae (Picchio, “Lo slavobulgaro di Paisii”).

appears to have followed the traditional schemes described above. In order to assert the dignity of a new state and of a new language,⁴⁹ the leaders of the Macedonian national movement have sought to rewrite the entire history of their participation in the Orthodox Slavic world. They have based their political autonomy on the image of a nationally marked prefiguration of today's Macedonia in the medieval homeland of St. Naum and St. Clement of Ohrida.

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⁴⁹ The Macedonian literary language was declared the official medium of the Macedonian Republic (within the Yugoslav Federation) on 2 August, 1944: see B. Koneski, "Macedonian," in Schenker and Stankiewicz, eds., *Slavic Literary Languages*, pp. 62–63.

The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia

PAUL BUSHKOVITCH

What is Russia? Any number of historians and publicists of recent centuries have wrestled with this problem, trying not only to define Russia and the Russian nation in a simple ethnic sense, but also to find some crucial characteristics or essence of Russia. Conducted within the framework of modern forms of national consciousness, these discussions have been used as a starting point for the understanding of national consciousness in earlier eras of Russian history. Two methods are most common: to project into the past the modern forms of national consciousness (the approach of nearly all nineteenth-century writers), or to despair at the distortion introduced by that approach and then deny the existence of any national consciousness in Russia at all before the eighteenth century.¹ Neither position need be taken, however. Russians of the sixteenth and seventeenth century had a defined national consciousness, even if it did not take the same form as the national consciousness of Pushkin, Alexander III, or Lenin. This national consciousness can be discerned in the texts of the time, if only historians look for it without reading modern notions into earlier language and modes of thought.

During the sixteenth and early seventeenth century Russian national consciousness was in some respects clearer than in the nineteenth century. Unlike the conservative (and many liberal) Russians of the last century, the men of the sixteenth century did not confuse Russians with East Slavs. The tsar in Moscow ruled over *Rus'*, *Rossiia*, or the *Ruskaia zemlia*, and his

¹ Since the Second World War most Soviet historians have assumed, without proof, the existence of conscious "patriotic" feelings among Russians as well as other peoples in the early modern era and even before. In the West, it has been assumed, without proof, that national consciousness is equivalent to political nationalism and is thus a product of the French Revolution or the modern era generally. More recently John Pocock, Bernard Guenée, and Orest Ranum, among others, have discerned national consciousness in the historiography and political ideas of the early modern period. For the Soviet view, see D. S. Likhachev, *Natsional'noe samosoznanie Drevnei Rusi* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1945) and many subsequent writings. A convenient collection of lectures on the subject by Western historians is Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1975).

people were the *Rus'*.² The East Slavs of Poland-Lithuania were generally called *Litva* or (if Cossacks) *Cherkassy*. "Little Russia" was a Greek ecclesiastical term not used in Russia until Aleksei Mikhailovich's treaty with the Cossacks brought *Malaia Rossiia* (to be followed later by *Belaia Rossiia*) into the tsar's title. When Ivan IV took Polatsk he seems to have thought that he was conquering the people and land of Litva—his *otchina* or *otechestvo* (like Livonia and Kazan'), to be sure—but not *Rus'*. Certainly the Russians were aware of their common past with the people they then called *Litva*. They recognized that these people were closer to them than were the Poles, the Germans, or the Tatars. Nevertheless, Russians were the subjects of the tsar ruling in Moscow: no "West Russians" or "Little Russians" for them.

Thus in the simple ethnographic sense the meaning of Russia and Russians was clear in the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries. The problem is what these terms meant at that time. What were Russia's salient characteristics? Many Russian and Western scholars have proposed as the essence of Russian self-consciousness at that time the notion of Moscow as the Third Rome; this is perhaps the most common theory. Here Russia is identified as the last of the great world empires, the inheritor of Rome and Constantinople, the stronghold of the only true religion, with a resulting messianic world mission. The fall of the Russian state, the last great Orthodox state, would thus be the signal for the end of the world. More recently Michael Cherniavsky expanded and modified this conception of Russian national consciousness to include, as central ideas, Orthodoxy (primarily but not exclusively the theory of Moscow the Third Rome), autocracy, and the "imperial theme"—the consciousness of empire first clearly exemplified at the time of the conquest of Kazan' (1552). Cherniavsky and other scholars have built what appears to be a very impressive argument, but it is one grounded in a certain type of source, namely, the historical legends about the "Russian" state and the Rurik dynasty that were current in the sixteenth century: the *Skazanie o kniazikh vladimirskikh* (Story of the Vladimir princes), the *Povest' o vavilonskom tsarstve* (Tale of the

² On the translation of the notion of *Ruskaia zemlia* from the Kievan state to the Vladimir-Moscow principality, see Charles Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Moscovite Ideology 1380–1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976): 7–103; and idem, "The Concept of the Russian Land from the Ninth to the Fourteenth Centuries," *Russian History* 2 (1975): 29–38. Ecclesiastical writers sometimes use *Rus'* to describe the East Slavs of Poland-Lithuania, but this was not the norm. In claiming Kazan', the author of the *Kazanskaia istoriia* argues that the *Rus'* lived in the territory first, before Bulgars or Tatars, which places him in some confusion. This again is atypical. See Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)* (The Hague, 1974), pp. 116–17 and 119–23.

tsardom of Babylon), the *Povest' o belom klobuke* (Tale of the white cow) (to some extent), and the writings on the Third Rome of the monk of Pskov, Filofei. Now in a general sense such writings may be said to represent historical consciousness, and therefore to tell us what the Russians thought about their history and the national element in that history. They are not, however, the texts to which Russians turned to recover their past, and scholars who have studied Russian national consciousness have rarely used the actual historical narratives: the chronicles, *Stepennaia kniga* (Book of steps), *Kazanskaia istoriia* (History of Kazan'), and the tales of the Time of Troubles. Certainly history is crucial to national consciousness, not merely the legendary history contained in short legends and polemical tracts, but also the history that was recorded as history. Indeed it may be that the historical narratives reflect more accurately the normal national and historical conceptions of the literate Russian elite than the quasi-historical texts that have occupied the almost exclusive attention of scholars. The historical narratives present an idea of Russia quite different in many ways from the picture drawn by Cherniavsky: the imperial theme is very restricted, the notion of "autocracy" is not at all what we would expect, and (most surprisingly) the Third Rome theory is almost totally absent. Indeed, the contrast between the religious elements in the historical narratives and the conception of religion's role as perceived by modern historians is so great that some account is necessary of the development of the theory of Moscow the Third Rome in the religious-historical writings of the sixteenth century.³

³ There is an extensive literature on the theory of Moscow as the Third Rome, beginning with Malinin (see fn. 4, below) and other late nineteenth-century historians and philologists. The fullest survey published by a Western scholar is Hildegard Schaefer's *Moskau das dritte Rom* (1929; 2nd ed., Darmstadt 1957). See also Nikolai Andreyev, "Filofey and his Epistle to Ivan Vasil'yevich," *Slavonic and East European Review* 38, no. 90 (1959): 1-31; and I. S. Lur'e, "O vozniknovenii teorii 'Moskva-Tretii Rim,'" *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* (hereafter *TODRL*) (Moscow and Leningrad), 16 (1960): 626-36. The latter is a reply to Schaefer, while Andreyev's article tries to make a case for an earlier dating of the epistle to Ivan IV. Andreyev is also skeptical about the supposed political focus of the epistles, which in his view are primarily religious and moral tracts (pp. 30-31). Recently the whole issue has been in dispute: see Frank Kämpfer, "Beobachtungen zu den Sendschreiben Filofeys," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, n.s. 18, no. 1 (1970): 1-46; A. L. Gol'dberg, "'Tri 'poslaniia' Filofeia (Opyt tekstologicheskogo analiza)," *TODRL* 29 (1974): 68-97; A. L. Gol'dberg, "'Istoriko-politicheskie idei russkoi knizhnosti XV-XVII vekov,'" *Istoriia SSR* 4 (1975): 59-77; Frank Kämpfer, "'Sendschreiben Filofeys' oder 'Filofej-Zyklus': Argumente gegen die Ergebnisse Alexander Goldbergs," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13, no. 1/2 (1979): 126-38. Gol'dberg argues that only the epistle against astrology (see below) was written by Filofei, while the other works under his name were composed in the 1540s on the eve of the *Stoglav* council on the church. In my view, Kämpfer successfully exposes the weakness of Gol'dberg's textual argument, but does not do justice to some of his opponent's very apt remarks about the content of the texts and their lack of circulation before about 1590. In this area Gol'dberg seems to me to be on the right track, although I see no reason why Filofei must

The Third Rome

The examination of sixteenth-century Russian sources does not provide overwhelming justification for the central role that the notion of the Third Rome played in the literature on Russian political and national ideology in the early modern period. There is a rather ambiguous reference to the "New Constantinople" in the letter on the Paschal canon of Metropolitan Zosima at the end of the fifteenth century, coupled with some remarks on the second coming of Christ (which had failed to materialize in 1492/7000). However, as Stremoukhoff and others readily admit, this is not precisely the theory presented (or alleged to be presented) by the monk Filofei in his series of epistles of the 1530s and 1540s. In any case, Zosima's subject is not so much the "New Constantinople" as the "new Constantines," Vladimir and Ivan III. The conventional wisdom is that Filofei first articulated the notion, but that it was representative of sixteenth- (and later seventeenth-) century thought. As a matter of fact, none of the principal historians of the subject seems to have noted that Filofei has two theories of the Third Rome, what can be called an "optimistic" theory and a "pessimistic" theory. The optimistic theory is that the center of true Orthodoxy has been successively transferred from the Old Rome to the New Rome (Constantinople) and then to Moscow. No implications or conclusions are drawn, and he uses it merely as a device to underline the purity of Russia's faith. The pessimistic version is the one noted by historians: that Russia must not deviate from the true faith, since such deviation would signal the end of the world, and that Russia's inheritance of the dignity of being the Third Rome is bound up with the messianic traditions of Christianity. Neither version had much currency in any literature of sixteenth- or early seventeenth-century Russia. The only references brought to light by diligent searches are the notations in the *Povest' o belom klobuke*, the *Kazan-skaia istoriia*, and in the charter proclaiming the establishment of the patriarchate in Russia (1589). In all these cases the reference is to the

be a consistent thinker and why inconsistencies in the texts must be explained as the work of different authors. Neither Kämpfer nor Gol'dberg fully deal with the differences in tone and message of the Filofei texts which I describe below. See also Ihor Ševčenko, "The Intellectual Repercussions of the Council of Florence," *Church History* 24, no. 4 (1955): 291–323. Cherniavsky's views on Russian national consciousness are set forth in his chapter on Russia in Ranum, *National Consciousness*, pp. 118–43. The only historian to include historical narratives in the discussion of Russian national consciousness is David Miller, "The *Velikie Minei Chetii* and the *Stepennaia Kniga* of Metropolitan Makarii and the Origins of Russian National Consciousness," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 26 (1979): 263–382.

“optimistic” version, that is, to the non-messianic version.⁴ The messianic version first occurs in the 1640s in the *Povest' o nachale Moskvyy* (Story of the beginnings of Moscow), another historical legend, and in Old Believer literature from the end of the 1660s on.⁵

The absence of references to the doctrine (or doctrines) before the middle of the seventeenth century does not in itself conclusively demonstrate that the Third Rome was not a concept of great importance. More light can be shed on the issue by an examination of what Filofei actually wrote. The non-specialist reader faced with the existing literature might suspect that Filofei wrote a series of political tracts, or that he was a sort of Russian Joachim of Fiore. This, however, is not the case. His epistles are primarily on theological and moral subjects, and, with one exception, the Third Rome theme is subsidiary. His writings all deal with the Third Rome in one of three ways: some do not mention it at all, some present it only in passing, and one develops an actual theory. The writings that do not mention it are concerned mainly with operations of the Divine Will and man's duty in relation to it. Thus, the *Poslanie vo Pskov v bede sushchim* (Epistle to Pskov, to those in misfortune) addresses a great noble who has fallen into princely disfavor and consoles him with the thought that all such events are God's punishment for sin. The epistle to the clerk (*d'iak*) Misiur' Munekhin on the plague explains the plight as God's punishment and chides Munekhin for interfering with the divine will by taking a few primi-

⁴ The texts of Filofei's writings are found in V. Malinin, *Starets Eleazarova monastyrnia Filofei i ego poslaniia* (Kiev, 1901). A brief but still excellent account was that of D. Stremoukhoff, "Moscow the Third Rome: Sources of the Doctrine," in Michael Cherniavsky, ed., *The Structure of Russian History* (New York, 1970), pp. 108–125 (originally in *Speculum*, for Jan. 1953, pp. 84–101). On Zosima, see Stremoukhoff, pp. 112–13. The charter of Zosima is in *Pamiatniki drevne-russkogo kanonicheskogo prava*, Russkaia istoricheskaiia biblioteka, 4 (St. Petersburg, 1878), pp. 795–802. The document establishing the patriarchate is in *Sobranie gosudarstvennykh gramot i dogovorov*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1819), p. 97. For *Kazanskaia istoriia*, see *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter *PSRL*), vol. 19 (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 8–9; and G. N. Moiseeva, ed., *Kazanskaia istoriia* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1954), p. 57. Neither edition is wholly satisfactory. See Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, pp. 104–105, fn. 1; Edward Keenan, "Coming to Grips with the *Kazanskaia istoriia*: Some Observations on Old Answers and New Questions," *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States* 9, no. 1/2 (31/32) (1964–68): 143–83; and Frank Kämpfer, "Die Eroberung von Kazan 1552 also Gegenstand der zeitgenössischen russischen Historiographie," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 14 (1969): 7–161, esp. 9–25. Neither Pelenski nor Kämpfer accept Keenan's attempt to date the text to the post-*Smuta* era. For our purposes the text may be taken to have been finished in the 1590s.

⁵ M. A. Salmina, ed., *Povesti o nachale Moskvyy* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1964), pp. 173 ff. The first Old Believer reference is in Avraamii's *Khristianoopasnyi shchit very*, written in 1667–1670. The text was published in N. Subbotin, *Materialy dlia istorii raskola za pervoie vremia ego sushchestvovaniia*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1885), pp. 86–87.

tive measures to check the epidemic. The *Poslanie k vel' mozhe v miru zhivushchemu* (Epistle to a dignitary living in the world) has a similar message. Political and national ideas are not present in these epistles.⁶

The theory of the Third Rome appears in its messianic form only in Filofei's epistles to Russian rulers about what he saw as moral and ecclesiastical shortcomings. The most famous statement of the doctrine is in the epistle to Grand Prince Vasilii Ivanovich, the purpose of which was not to expound on the meaning of the Third Rome, but rather to call attention to a series of problems: the widowhood of the church of Novgorod (because of the absence of a bishop), the lack of care with which Russians make the sign of the cross, and the terrible evil of homosexuality in high places. The theory of the Third Rome functions as a threat: if Vasilii does not correct these abuses forthwith, the end of the world will come, since their continuance will call down God's wrath on the last Orthodox state. The epistle on church landholding to Ivan IV also uses the theory of the Third Rome as a threat.⁷

In neither of these texts does Filofei really develop a theory. The statement that two Romes have fallen, the third stands, and there will be no fourth is, in the end, merely presented. The epistle to Misiur' Munekhin on astrology, by contrast, does present a theory, but not in the messianic version. This epistle is an attack on the notion that the stars control the fate not just of men, but of empires. In Moscow the German doctor Nicholas Bülow proclaimed this to be the case, and apparently such beliefs had some audience in Russia. But for the Orthodox believer a problem arose: if God controls the world and not the stars, did not God cause the fall of Constantinople to the Turks? And if so, how can Orthodoxy be the true faith? The Old Rome, the Catholic Rome, still stands. Filofei's rather lame answer is that the Old Rome was captured by Satan if not by the Turks, and in any case the Third Rome (i.e., Russia) still stands, shining with piety. There is no implication that either the piety or the existence of the Third Rome is threatened. He calls on the sovereign to preserve faith and morals "s velikim opasaniem" ("with great care"), but there is no implication that the sovereign will fail, for the whole tone of the epistle is one of pride and triumph.⁸ This is the source of the references to the Third Rome in the *Povest' o belom klobuke*, the *Kazanskaia istoriia*, and the patriarchal char-

⁶ Malinin, "Prilozhenie," in *Starets*, pp. 7–24, 26–32, 36.

⁷ Malinin, "Prilozhenie," in *Starets*, pp. 49–66. The famous passage "vnemli blagochestivyi tsariu, iako vsia khristianskaia tsarstva snidoshasia v tvoe edino tsarstvie. Dva ubo Rima padosha, a tretii stoit a chetvertomu ne byti" occurs on pp. 54–55 and 55–56.

⁸ Malinin, "Prilozhenie," in *Starets*, pp. 37–47. Gol'dberg, "Tri 'poslaniia,'" p. 90, notes the "optimistic tone" of this epistle.

ter of 1589. In the Old Believer tracts it is the other version that is used, but the Old Believers had to construct a “theory,” that is, an idea with some development and explanation, by themselves.

It should not be very surprising, then, that Filofei’s ideas found little response in Russia for nearly a century after his death, for the concerns of the time were not his. Iosif Volotskii and Metropolitans Daniil and Makarii had no need of such doctrines to defend their causes. Iosif did not need rhetorical assertions of Orthodoxy, but rather factual support for specific policies and ideas. Daniil and Makarii were concerned with the justification and maintenance of ecclesiastical and civil authority and correct faith, not with devices to threaten the ruler into obedience. Filofei should not be treated as the exponent of “official” ideology at all, although he shared many notions with the dominant Josephite party. Rather, Filofei was a product of the specific conditions of Pskov, which was annexed by Moscow only in 1510 (by which time he must have grown to maturity) and which preserved many local traditions and institutions— social, political, and religious. The similarity in tone of his epistles to the lament for Pskov in the Pskov Chronicle under 1510 has been noted before, but its implications have not been fully drawn.⁹ If that was his spiritual world, then Filofei is to be treated not as an official spokesman, but as a semi-oppositional figure. It was the Old Believer Avraamii, then, who correctly understood him, not the modern historians.

It is the assumptions of historians of the last hundred years, not the situation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that have given the theory of the Third Rome its undeserved prominence. The first scholar to present it in detail was M. D’iakonov (1889), who blandly asserted that “at the present time it is not subject to argument that the very idea of autocratic power was borrowed from Byzantium,” taking the notion of Byzantine succession (“Third Rome”) to imply autocracy. He goes on to state: “The monk Filofei was not the creator of the theory of Moscow the Third Rome. The elements of the theory were already present and he was the author only of its final formulation.” No proof that the theory already existed is offered,

⁹ On Pskov see A. Nikitskii, *Ocherk vnutrennoi istorii Pskova* (St. Petersburg, 1873); B. B. Kafengauz, *Drevnii Pskov* (Moscow, 1969); Iu. G. Alekseev, *Pskovskaia sudnaia gramota i ee vremia* (Leningrad, 1980). On the annexation of 1510 and ideology in Pskov, see N. N. Maslennikova, *Prisoedinenie Pskova k Russkomu tsentralizovannomu gosudarstvu* (Leningrad, 1955). Maslennikova was also sceptical about the status of Moscow the Third Rome as a “theory” and about its significance in the sixteenth century, but she saw Filofei as more unambiguously pro-Muscovite than I do today. On the relationship of Filofei to the Pskov chronicle, see Stremoukhoff, “Moscow the Third Rome,” pp. 114, and the chronicle itself: A. N. Nasonov, ed. *Pskovskie letopisi*, vols. 1 and 2 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1941–1955).

beyond the presence of apocalyptic beliefs (but not connected with the Third Rome) and the paschal canon of Zosima. Malinin, after an exhaustive review of the sources of the doctrine, in which he, too, offers only beliefs about the Old and New Romes and apocalyptic ideas present everywhere in the Orthodox world (but not adding up to a theory of Moscow and Third Rome), says of Filofei's theory: "Although it was completely exceptional, it faithfully reproduced the general sense of the epoch, and it so sensitively caught the mood of Filofei's contemporaries that it was soon accepted by the spheres of the state, and it entered documents of state" (my emphasis). Thus the very founders of the literature on the Third Rome assumed what they should have tried to prove and admitted that they had no significant proof of the doctrine's acceptance. As we have seen, it entered only very few special documents of state and equally few other writings. More recent research has not born out the assertions of D'iakonov and Malinin that the doctrine was widespread. The Josephites, for example, copied some of Filofei's tracts, but did not adopt the doctrine.¹⁰

¹⁰ M. D'iakonov, *Vlast' moskovskikh gosudarei: Ocherki po istorii politicheskikh idei Drevnei Rusi do kontsa XVI v.* (St. Petersburg, 1889), pp. v and 68; Malinin, *Starets*, p. 383; Ia. S. Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV–nachala XVI veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), p. 484. The reference in the *Povest' o belom klobuke* appears to be early, but examination of the texts suggests otherwise. As Miroslav Labunka has recently shown in an important dissertation, the Story of the White Cowl is a Novgorodian document justifying local ecclesiastical claims, and its original, shorter version contains no reference to Third Rome or Moscow. See Miroslav Labunka, "The Legend of the Novgorodian White Cowl: A Study of its 'Prologue' and 'Epilogue,'" 2 vols. (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1978), 1: 183–85, 2: 413–36. The text of the short version is in A. A. Nazarevskii, "Povest' o belom klobuke": otchet o zaniatiakh v Voronezhskom gubernskom muzee (24–27 iunia 1911 g.), Prilozhenie VII," *Kievskie universitetskie izvestiia* 52, no. 8 ("Nauchnaia khronika") (1212): 36–40. The long version is in N. I. Kostomarov, ed., "Povest' o novgorodskom belom klobuke," *Pamiatniki starinnoi russkoi literatury izd. . . grafom G. Kushelevym-Bezborodko*, no. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1860). Labunka's argument that the short version is the earlier one is reinforced by the fact that Rozov's catalogue of manuscripts shows no sixteenth-century manuscripts of the long version and many of the short version. Rozov himself admits that the text circulated mainly in the seventeenth century (pp. 207–208). See N. N. Rozov, "Povest' o novgorodskom belom klobuke kak pamiatnik obshcherusskoi publitsistiki XV veka," *TODRL* 9 (1953): 178–219. Gol'dberg also placed the version of this story with the reference to the Third Rome at the very end of the sixteenth century, along with the interpolated passage in the *Kazanskaia istoriia* (ed. Moiseeva, p. 57; ed. Kuntsevich, p. 204). In the legend of the white cowl, the passage mentioning the Third Rome also predicts the establishment of a patriarchate in Moscow, which reinforces Gol'dberg's and Labunka's late dating, unless we assume that the authors of the legend had the gift of prophecy. Thus, all three important references to the "theory" in the sixteenth century come from the 1500s and should probably be connected with the establishment of the Moscow patriarchate. All three also give the "optimistic" version of the Third Rome theory, that is, the non-apocalyptic version. Examples of Josephite manuscripts containing the works of Filofei can be found in Ia. S. Lur'e, *Ideologicheskaia bor'ba v russkoi publitsistike kontsa XV–nachala XVI veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1960), p. 484, fn. 268. These are among the very few manuscripts copied before c. 1590 (cf.

The problem here is not incompetence or bad faith on the part of D'iakonov, Malinin, Schaefer, and the many other historians of the problem of the Third Rome. The problem lies in the cultural assumptions of the late nineteenth-century Russian historians and their successors. Most of them saw Old Russian culture as the fundamentally unitary, national essence of Russia, which both posed and answered questions that they themselves worried over. The theory of Moscow the Third Rome addressed the problem of Russia and the West, and asserted Russia's "Byzantine heritage." It addressed the problem of autocracy, ascribing Old Russian justifications of autocracy again to the reverence for the Byzantine model. Russian nationhood, autocracy, and Orthodoxy found their Old Russian sources in the writings of Filofei, and it is unfair and unhistorical to expect that D'iakonov would have found anything else in them.¹¹ The modern historian, however, is not required to follow in this direction. To learn what the sixteenth- and early-seventeenth-century Russians thought about Russian nationhood—and, by implication, about Russian autocracy—we shall turn to the historical narratives written in that period.

Autocracy, History, and Nationhood

For many European nations in the early modern period the ideology of nationality claimed the country's traditional political system, real or mythical, as a central feature. In spite of the relatively greater role of religion in Russia, it was no exception to this rule. The grand prince and, after 1547, *tsar' vseia Rusi* (Tsar of All Rus') was essential to the meaning of Russianness among the political elite of the period, and if anything his importance in defining nationality increased rather than decreased through the seventeenth century. Indeed, as we shall see later, the country itself acquired a new name, the traditional *Rossia* for the country as a nation, and another, *Moskovskoe gosudarstvo* (Moscow sovereignty), for the country as a monarchical state.

Gol'dberg, "Tri 'poslaniia,'" p. 93), but this fact may reflect only the importance of the scriptoria of the Josephite monasteries in forming existing collections. Another copy of the epistle on astrology is found in one version of the *Chetii Minei* of the Metropolitan Makarii (Gol'dberg, *ibid.*, p. 75).

¹¹ The source of D'iakonov's conviction is obscure. Perhaps he referred to V. S. Ikonnikov's *Opyt issledovaniia o kul'turnom znachenii Vizantii v russkoi istorii* (Kiev, 1869), which proposes that Russian notions of autocracy are Byzantine but does not make much of the theory of Moscow the Third Rome.

For historians of Russia (e.g., D'iakonov) the fundamental notion of Russian monarchy since the mid-nineteenth century was autocracy. This has meant essentially what it meant during the nineteenth century, that is, an absolute monarchy that ruled by its own will whether or not its subjects agreed with that will. This notion of absolutism is, of course, a nineteenth-century notion, one predicated on the rejection by official Russia of liberalism, parliamentary government, constitutionalism, and a loyal opposition. The Russia of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was quite different: the political realm was inseparable from the religious-moral realm, so that "political" questions were understood in this religious-moral sense, not in "political" terms. Even the "awe-inspiring" tsar, the *groznyi tsar'* of Peresvetov, was fundamentally a just judge of his subjects, not a secularized absolutist, and, in any case, Peresvetov's ideal tsar is not the figure presented in the historical narratives of the period. Indeed, Ivan IV, the "classic" absolute tsar, does not appear so in the texts. Naturally, he does not appear as a constitutional monarch either, for both terms imply a political vocabulary, while the conceptual scheme of the texts is not political but moral.

The fundamental notion in the texts is the idea of harmony between tsar and people, primarily, of course, between the tsar and the political elite of boyars and gentry. In the tradition of the Moscow dynasty, the first text to illuminate this ideal is the *Slovo o zhitii i prestavlenii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia Ivanovicha, Tsaria russkogo* (Account of the life and death of the grand prince Dmitrii Ivanovich, the Russian tsar), written in the early fifteenth century.¹² The point of this text, besides to praise Dmitrii for his wisdom, bravery, and saintliness, is to show the moral harmony between the prince and aristocracy, a harmony of virtue and wisdom. This is not a

¹² The *Slovo* can be found in the *Voskresenskaia letopis'* in the *PSRL*, vol. 8 (St. Petersburg, 1856), pp. 53–60. Similar copies are in the Novgorod IV and Sophia I Chronicles. The version in the Nikon Chronicle in the *PSRL*, vol. 11 (St. Petersburg, 1897), pp. 108–121, has some additions, but does not change the basic portrait of Dmitrii. On his deathbed he says to his son: "boiary svoia liubite, chest' im dostoinuiu v'zdavaite protivu sluzhenii ikh, bez volia ikh nichtozhe ne tvorite, privetlivi budete k vsem slugam svoimu (love your boyars, give them appropriate honor in accord with their service, do nothing without their will, be gracious to all your servants)" (*Voskresenskaia letopis'*, p. 56). In the Nikon Chronicle Dmitrii says at this place "bez ikh dumy nichtozhe ne tvorite" (*Nikon XI*, p. 114). Ia. S. Lur'e and M. A. Salmina consider the *Slovo* to date from the 1430s–1440s. See Ia. S. Lur'e, *Obshcherusskie letopisi XIV–XV vv.* (Leningrad, 1976), pp. 113–14; M. A. Salmina, "Slovo o zhitii i prestavlenii velikogo kniazia Dmitriia Ivanovicha, Tsaria Rus'skogo," *TODRL* 25 (1970): 90–98; and W. Vodoff, "Le panegyrique du Grand-Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13, no. 1/2 (1979): 82–101. I am not convinced by Fennell's view of this text as merely rhetorical, in J. L. I. Fennell and A. Stokes, *Early Russian Literature* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974), pp. 121–34.

political harmony in the modern sense, for the text does not say that the prince and boyars agreed on political aims (say, policy toward the Tatars); rather, it emphasizes their harmony of thought and deed, clearly stating that its foundation is the adherence of both parties to Christian precepts. This point of view is not surprising for the age, but it warns modern historians not to over-politicize Russian notions of the prince, particularly as presented in written texts. The harmonic ideal of the rule should not be confused with "absolutism," not only because the text does not operate in a political universe, but also because it does not imagine the case of the ruler ruling against the will of the aristocracy. Historians have occasionally pointed out that Old Russian texts do not imagine the ideal of constitutional resistance, which is true, but neither do they imagine the possibility of virtuous absolutism. As we shall see, when the historical narratives finally present the ruler who rules alone, he is wicked.

The middle of the sixteenth century witnessed a sharp break in the genre of Russian historical writing, but the harmonic ideal survived that break. In a sense it may be said to have been reinforced, since the new genre, exemplified by the *Stepennaia kniga*, presented a greatly increased role for the monarch, who acted entirely in the traditional way. Produced about 1563 under the eye of Metropolitan Makarii, the *Stepennaia kniga* represented a radical break in the method of exposition in Russian historical writing. The chronicles of Muscovy, like the chronicles of Kievan Rus', told their story in a year-by-year chronology, pausing only occasionally to tell a longer connected tale. The *Stepennaia kniga* broke up Russian history into seventeen *stepeni*, or degrees, each one being the reign of a monarch. The monarch's life was then told as a *zhitie*, a saint's life, using existing texts where possible (e.g., Alexander Nevskii) and compiling new ones where necessary. After the life of the ruler followed the lives of important churchmen and saints of the era and, in some cases, miracle stories or other short tales. The division into these *stepeni* was extremely artificial, particularly for the long period (roughly 1150–1450) in which "Russia" was not in fact united under one prince. This very artificiality, however, served to underscore the central place of the ruler, as well as to accent the lack of universality noted by David Miller in his recent study of the work. Russian history is no longer that of the Rus' land, but that of the Rurik dynasty, and the traditional story "*otkuda est' poshla Russkaia zemlia*" ("whence has come the land of Rus'") is replaced by the story of the saintly dynasty, beginning with Ol'ga (as a preface to the seventeen *stepeni*) and Vladimir.

The saintliness of the dynasty is presented as the central fact of Russian history. Not the saintliness of the land (as in Filofei) but that of the dynasty is crucial. Not only was the conversion of Vladimir a miracle, but

even until now among all the Russian autocrats there was not one who was not pious. Not one ever doubted or deviated nor was tempted to err about the true Christian religion or the life-giving gospel words of Christ, the apostolic traditions or the teachings of the father; rather, they observed all the divine strengths by the will of Providence, and, taught by the single path of correct faith, they continued without returning and in a single way of life. . . .¹³

Even in the Lithuanian state, though they lived among Latins, many of the Rurikids were able to retain the right faith. Not only did the descendants of Rurik maintain the correct faith, but they also kept to the true moral path. They were all distinguished, some in monastic life, some in good Christian marriages, some in celibacy. Many were martyrs, brave in battle and patient in captivity, enduring physical privation. They repressed internal conflicts (*mezheusobnie kramoly*) and were even holy fools (*iurodivye*) and beggars in Christ's name.

The portrait of the individual princes, however, is not always detailed enough to see the actual working out of these notions. In depicting Ivan III, Vasilii II, and Ivan IV, the authors briefly describe a series of events in which the ruler is normally a chief actor but little is said about him besides the usual epithets (merciful, pious, wise). In the *Kazanskaia istoriia*, by contrast, we are given a fuller picture of Ivan IV, which provides a notion of what the Russians of the sixteenth century thought was a good tsar. The *Kazanskaia istoriia* is doubly interesting because it represents what might be called a quasi-official point of view. Though more than merely the court's image of itself, the text gives no hint of opposition to Ivan IV's policies, much less to the dynasty in general. Ivan is the main but not the sole actor. The author is careful to give us fairly detailed lists of the prominent nobles who command the army, and Ivan's decision to conquer Kazan' is presented as resulting from consultation with the boyars. The crucial passage is to a large extent a reworking of a passage in the *Skazanie o kniazakh vladimirskikh*, but that does not change its force in the context of the *Kazanskaia istoriia*:

And he called to himself in the great hall his brothers, the noble prince Georgii and prince Vladimir, all the local princes, all the great commanders and all his noble dignitaries. And seating them according to rank he began to take good and wise counsel with them, for he wanted to move again against godless and cursed Kazan'.¹⁴

He reminds his boyars that he is his father's son, the inheritor of all his lands, and that he has the same great generals, "glorious, strong and

¹³ "Kniga stepennaia tsarskogo rodoslovnia," *PSRL*, vol. 21 (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 133–34.

¹⁴ *Kazanskaia istoriia*, ed. Moiseeva, p. 113; ed. Kuntsevich, *PSRL* 19: 99.

brave.” He asks them to die “for our Orthodox faith and for the holy churches.” They should take on this suffering like the pious tsars of old and God will reward them with eternal life. The boyars fully accept his proposal, saying that they will fight for the Orthodox faith, the holy churches, and Ivan, “*velikogo nashego samodorzhtsa*” (“our great autocrat”). They will neglect their estates and wealth to fight against Kazan’. This is the political ideal of the text, a complete harmony of tsar and aristocracy, an ideal going back to the *Slovo . . . Dimitriia* and the *Stepennaia kniga*. The author knows that such harmony does not always exist, for in Ivan’s youth the boyars sought only to increase their own wealth and to fight one another. The wisdom of Ivan’s rule prevents this disorder. Indeed, the author increases the impression of harmony by suppressing incidents of disharmony, such as the mutiny of the Novgorod gentry on the eve of the crucial campaign of 1552, known from other sources.¹⁵

How does Ivan achieve this harmony? Not by following the stern advice of those like Peresvetov, but by exhibiting meekness. When he returned in triumph from Kazan’, Metropolitan Makarii tells him to be joyful and to reward the boyars: “*Boiare e velmozha svoia chestny imei i obogashchati ikh*” (“honoring his boyars and dignitaries and enriching them”). To all the tsar’s servants, “*liubov’ tikhno pokazui, i potrebnaiia im podavai. . . povinnykh ne skoro smertiiu osuzhdai. . . otpushchati im dvashch i trizhdi*” (“quietly showing them love, and giving them what they needed. . . not quickly condemning the guilty to death. . . [he ordered] them to be released twice and three times”). Ivan accepts the advice “*so mnogim smireniem i strakhom iako ot bozhiikh ust*” (“with much humility and fear as if from the mouth of God”). He gives alms to beggars, monasteries, and parish churches, frees prisoners under sentence of death, and lowers taxes on the land. The author admits that some “*khodounnii chelovetsi, ili priamo reshchi bezumnii i tshchedushnii*” (“stupid men, or to speak directly, [men] mad or vainglorious”) murmured against Ivan because of the great burden placed on the country, but he rejects their complaints, for Ivan strove not for earthly glory, like Alexander of Macedon, but for the Orthodox faith and the Russian land. His final praise of the tsar is for having built new fortresses, churches, and monasteries rather than spending his time in idleness, hunting, and listening to music and entertainment

¹⁵ *Kazanskaia istoriia*, ed. Moiseeva, pp. 113–15, 72–73, 116–24; ed. Kuntsevich, *PSRL* 19: 99–101; “Letopisets nachala tsarstva,” *PSRL*, vol. 29 (Moscow, 1965), p. 85. The author is quoting from the *Skazanie o kniazakh vladimirskikh*, in which the dignity of the Russian dynasty is elevated by the myth of its descent from Augustus and other Byzantine connections. Thus, even when the reference to Byzantium is in the mind of the author, the portrait is far from autocratic in the later sense of the word.

(*smekhotvorenie*), and for having respected the army (that is, the boyars and gentry) most of all and consulted about military affairs “*s mudrymi sovetniki svoimi*” (“with his wise councilors”). He concludes: “*k semu zhe tshchashesia i pokushashesia vsiaku nepravdu i nechestie i krivosudstvo i posuly i rezoimanie i razboi i tat’by iso vseia zemlia svoeia izvesti pravdu zhe i blagochestie v liudekh naseiati i vozrastiti*” (“besides this he strove and attempted to expel all manner of falsehood and evil judgment and bribes and usury and banditry and robbery from all his land, and to sow and raise up truth and piety in people”). Consequently he had at his command faithful subordinates, as Moses had, and there was great peace (*tishina*), and no *beda i miatezh i velikie razboi i khishechnia i tat’ba* (“misfortune and rebellion and great banditry and stealing and robbery”). The raids of the Tatars ceased, and the borders were secure.¹⁶

This ideal of harmony between tsar and boyars is the essence of the Russian polity. It is implied in the titles *tsar’*, *gosudar’* in the political context of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.¹⁷ The tsar is sovereign not by virtue of his tremendous power or by his ruthless suppression of boyar intrigues and rebellions, but by his meekness, justice, and wisdom, and by his increasing consultation with the boyars. Of course, this is precisely an ideal, that is to say, a picture that does not fully reflect reality, and indeed to construct it the author has to suppress wholly or in part incidents of conflict between the tsar and the aristocracy. The point is that this is the conception of the Russian sovereign held by even its warmest defenders, and it is by this standard that a particular tsar was judged. It is not in the modern sense a political ideal, but rather a religious and moral conception of the state and the ruler. Only when the tsar fell short of this ideal did the Russians of the time stress his power and his determination to rule alone—in a word, what to modern ears are his autocratic characteristics.

¹⁶ *Kazanskaia istoriia*, ed. Moiseeva, pp. 168–69, 173, 175–76; ed. Kuntsevich, *PSRL* 19: 178–80, 185–88.

¹⁷ The use of the term “autocrat” to designate the tsar primarily in relation to his subjects is modern and is anachronistic in the sixteenth century. The epithet “autocrat” (*samoderzhets*) was first used officially in 1591 by Tsar Fedor to emphasize his lack of dependence on any other prince, perhaps in connection with the establishment of the patriarchate. If the sixteenth century had an epithet for the ruler that referred mainly to his relations with his subjects, it was probably *gosudar’*, meaning “sovereign” or, simply, “lord.” The origin of these terms is complex, but in any case the historian should look at what they meant in contemporary Russian political practice and ideology, not at what they might have meant in Byzantium or early Rus’. In this discussion I will continue to use the term “autocracy” in the sense of “unlimited power,” but the contemporary usage, “independent prince,” should be kept in mind. See Marc Szeftel, “The Title of the Muscovite Monarch,” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13, no. 1/2 (1979): 59–81.

The bad tsar is the central figure in most of the historical narratives of the Time of Troubles: the *Skazanie* of Avraamii Palitsyn, the *Vremennik* of Ivan Timofeev, and the Khvorostinin-Shakhovskoi-Katyrev-Rostovskii group of tales.¹⁸ Palitsyn's critique is particularly dramatic in that, unlike the others, he was to a large extent an official spokesman for the new Romanov dynasty. The first six chapters of his work were based on an earlier anonymous work attributed to Dionisii, the hegumen of the Trinity Monastery. Palitsyn took over the chapters almost entirely, only weakening the force of a few passages. The basic thrust of Dionisii's text remained.

The earlier version begins by contrasting the tsars. Ivan IV was pious and brave, whereas his son Fedor was more concerned for the heavenly kingdom than for the kingdom of this world. This was not a weakness, since God saw his piety and gave "*nemiatezhno zemli Rosiistei prebyvanie*" ("untroubled existence of the Russian land"). Boris, by contrast, is described as "*razumen be v tsarskikh pravleniikh, no pisaniia bozhestvennogo ne navyk i togo radi v bratoliubstvii blaznen byvashe*" ("was intelligent in governance as tsar, but had no training in divine writing and for that reason was unreliable in love of his fellow man"). It was this lack of fraternal love that caused Boris to give way when flatterers urged him to murder Dmitrii. It is Boris who is really "autocratic," in the sense that he seeks to establish his personal power alone, without consulting the aristocracy. He meets little resistance, for his oppression of the innocent is greeted by "*bezumnoe molchanie*" ("mad silence") from the population. Boris's rule does display a kind of harmony, but unlike the harmony of tsar and boyars in Ivan's reign, it is a harmony of evil: evil deeds by the tsar, and evil, even mad, silence from the boyars. Neither Palitsyn nor any other historical writer of the time is able to conceive of an all-powerful autocrat who crushes opposition but is virtuous: if he is virtuous, the people obey without compulsion; if he is evil, then they are compelled to obey, but there is a price. This is the evil that God has sent down on the Russian land. When he sees such wickedness, he sends down bad weather, crop failure, and hunger. Boris has tried to feed the poor and practice charity, but it does no good since God abhors the hypocritical charity of the wicked. All Russia is

¹⁸ Little work not of a purely textual nature has been done on these tales. See L. V. Cherepin, "'Smuta' i istoriografiia XVII veka: Iz istorii drevnerusskogo letopisaniia," *Istoricheskie zapiski* 14 (1945): 80–128; Wolf-Günter Contius, "Profane Kausalität oder göttliches Handeln in der Geschichte: Zum Geschichtsbild in den erzählenden Quellen der Smuta," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 18 (1973): 169–86; Daniel Rowland, "The Problem of Advice in Muscovite Tales about the Time of Troubles," *Russian History* 6, pt. 2 (1979): 259–83; and Daniel Rowland, "Muscovite Political Attitudes as Reflected in Early Seventeenth-Century Tales about the Time of Troubles" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1976).

seized by an orgy of greed. Those who have grain hoard it and let the hungry starve: “*I vo svekh gradekh vo vsei Rosii i veliko torzhestvo srebro-liubnoe k besom byvashe*” (“And in his towns in all Russia there was a great and diabolical triumph of avarice”). Palitsyn itemizes the wickedness of both tsar and people: peasants, especially the *kholopy* (slaves, as a small group within the peasantry; often house servants) run away to the southern border where they are filled with evil intentions and a rebellious spirit; the merchants rob the people with tax-farming; there is drunkenness, sexual license, murder, and robbery everywhere. Boris violates the traditional Christian prohibitions; he encourages the Latin and Armenian heresies, as well as homosexuality; he is too proud to marry his children to Russians, sending instead to Denmark for a foreign prince.¹⁹

All of these evils flow from the character of Tsar Boris. The consequences are truly terrible, for the False Dmitrii is in reality the agent of Antichrist. Only the Russians’ staunch adherence to Orthodoxy, if not to good morals, restrains God from permitting the victory of Antichrist and the end of the world. The defeat of the False Dmitrii, however, does not bring any improvement, and the reign of Tsar Vasilii Shiuskii proves as evil as that of his predecessors. Indeed, the Russians are so wicked that even the Poles, agents of Antichrist though they may be, often behaved better than the depraved Russians. Again and again Avraamii plays with this contrast. Only with the election of Mikhail Romanov in 1613 do the Russians mend their ways. Before 1613 there were a few good Russians—the defenders of the Trinity Monastery, Skopin-Shuiskii, the leaders of the *opolcheniia* (militia)—but still the wicked had the upper hand. Even at the election problems arise, for the boyars and *voevody* are too numerous and “*v samovlastie bludiakhu*” (“wandering in license”) but God guides them to choose Mikhail anyway. Avraamii prays that Mikhail will crush his foreign enemies underfoot, and “*Da podast emu gospod’ k voinskomu chinu khra-brskoe stroenie i ko vsemu pravoslavnomu khristian’stvu tsarskoe ego mnogorazumnoe milostivnoe prizrenie, povinnym zhe poshchada i dolgoterpenie*” (“May the Lord give him a courageous ordering to the army and his wise, merciful care as tsar to all Orthodox Christendom, and forgiveness and patience to the guilty”). Again, there is the note of mercy, justice, respect, and care for the gentry, since Mikhail is definitely different from Boris.²⁰

¹⁹ O. A. Derzhavina and E. V. Kolosova, *Skazanie Avraamiia Palitsyna* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1955), pp. 251–60.

²⁰ Derzhavina and Kolosova, *Skazanie Palitsyna*, pp. 264–65, 230–33, 239. The closest reference to “autocracy” in Palitsyn is the remark that Ivan IV had prevented revolts of runaway serfs on the southern border by “*razum i zhestotost*” (understanding and severity). But

Unlike Palitsyn, Ivan Timofeev was very critical of Russia's rulers. Even Ivan IV is a negative figure, whose uncontrollable anger (*iarost'*) leads to the oprichnina, the destruction of Novgorod, and the death of his own son. Boris is possessed by the love of power and is a hypocrite as well, so that he, too, is an evil tsar in spite of some statesman-like qualities. Vasilii Shuiskii also loves power to excess, and this sin leads to his misdeeds and ultimate defeat. The Russian people as a whole are no better, and twice Timofeev gives a long list of their sins. In some respects his understanding of events is even more moralistic than Palitsyn's, since in listing social-political disasters Palitsyn explains them in moral terms, whereas Timofeev is more concerned with enumerating the sins themselves. All Russians are guilty of greed, pride, sexual license, and drunkenness. In addition men of all classes—servants, gentry, boyars, and merchants—are trying to rise above their station in life, a desire that leads to untold calamities.²¹ Timofeev then turns to the long gallery of evil "autocrats" that Palitsyn had presented and expands it to include Ivan IV. More than any other writer on the Time of Troubles, or *Smuta*, Timofeev reflects a crisis in the traditional idea of the tsar and his power, since the harmonic, benign portrait of the older literature has been completely overturned, and the harmony is one of evil, not of good. The evil actions of the tsars lead to the wickedness of the people; yet Timofeev is not in favor of rebellion (particularly by the lower classes), since that only results in anarchy and greater wickedness. The older ideal of harmony of ruler and boyars is thus irrelevant, since there is no virtuous ruler for the boyars and other subjects to obey spontaneously; at the same time, neither that traditional ideal nor the new experience of the Time of Trouble permits rebellion. The results are Timofeev's tendency to stand back and complain about the sorry state of the world and the tone of pessimism that pervades the work. Palitsyn, with his Romanov loyalties, can permit himself a certain optimism about the future, while Timofeev, though he lived until 1629, left the text as it is. Even his account of the election of Mikhail does not change the overall pessimistic tone of his history.

this refers to Ivan's relations not with boyars, but with lower-class rebels, and is not developed. The portrait of Mikhail Romanov is the traditional one.

²¹ O. A. Derzhavina, ed., *Vremennik Ivan Timofeeva* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1951), pp. 92–98, 109–113. On Timofeev, see I. I. Polosin, "Ivan Timofeev—russkii myslitel', istorik i d'iak XVII v.," in *Sotsial'no-politicheskaia istoriia Rossii XVI–nachala XVII v.* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 263–352. Rowland's attempt to make Timofeev into an ideologist of autocracy in the modern sense is not at all convincing, because it is based not on Timofeev's portrait of the rulers, but on the terminology of his account of creation: Rowland, "Advice," pp. 265–66.

Compared to Timofeev and Palitsyn, the work of Khvorostinin represents a new departure. The same can be said even more strongly about what might be called the Shakhovskoi-Katyrev-Rostovskii complex. These three men mark a new departure in a variety of ways, one being that they were all open to newer influences from the Ukraine. All three wrote *virshi*, the first Russian syllabic poetry, and in that sense can be regarded as the first Russian poets. Khvorostinin was accused of sympathy to Latin religion and culture, but it is likely that the first allegation was simply slander: one of his longest works is an adaptation of a Ukrainian anti-Catholic and anti-Protestant poem. His account of the Time of Troubles is interesting because it does not share Palitsyn's and Timofeev's dark view of the people. The causal link between evil tsar and evil people is gone; all attention is on Ivan IV's and Boris's wickedness and injustice, especially to the boyars. The people are not perfect (and their social revolts are naturally reprehensible), but their sins do not get much space.²² Two other texts provide a more interesting account of events: one is usually attributed to Katyrev-Rostovskii but in one recently discovered manuscript is credited to Shakhovskoi; and the second is clearly written by Shakhovskoi. Shakhovskoi has little to say about the sinfulness of the nation. He echoes the general picture drawn by Khvorostinin, but his explanations go beyond purely Christian moral explanations. Boris easily believes slander and loves power, but he also puts away his rational powers: "*tsar*' Boris *vozneseia mysl'iu i pomrachiia umom, otlozheshe velemudrennyi i mnogorazsudnyi svoi razum. . .*" ("Tsar Boris raised himself up in thought and was darkened in his mind, putting away his most wise and much-judging intelligence"). Here one has the feeling that the author is struggling with a new idea—a somewhat different, less exclusively religious conception of human motivation. Later he tells us that Kozma Minin acted the very opposite of Boris: Kozma, "*otlozhshe svoei vshchi delo, i vospriemlet velemudrennoe razumenie i smysl*" ("putting away his other business, took up most wise deliberation and thought"); he took control of the Nizhnii Novgorod region

²² The text of Khvorostinin is to be found in "Povest' kniazia Ivana Andreevicha Khvorostinina," in *Pamiatniki drevnei russkoi pis'mennosti otnosiashchiesia k Smutnomu vremeni*, ed. S. V. Platonov, Russkaia istoricheskaia biblioteka, 13 (St. Petersburg, 1891) pp. 525–58. Khvorostinin's poetry is in V. I. Savva, S. F. Platonov, and V. G. Druzhinin, eds., "Vnov' otkrytye polemicheskie sochinenia XVII veka protiv eretikov," in *Letopis' zaniatii Imperatorskoi arkhograficheskoi komissii za 1905 god*, 18 (St. Petersburg, 1907): 1–177. The original poem is published in V. P. Kolosova and V. I. Krekoten', eds., *Ukrains'ka poeziia: Kinets' XVI–pochatok XVII st.* (Kiev, 1978), pp. 71–136; see also the introduction, pp. 54–55. On the *virshi*, the basic work is A. M. Panchenko, *Russkaia stikhotvornaia kul'tura XVII v.* (Leningrad, 1973).

and organized an army.²³ This context of *razumenie i smysl* (“deliberation and thought”), that is, practical political action, has replaced the justice, mercy, and bravery of the older texts. Minin’s virtues, *razumenie i smysl*, are both intellectual, not moral, virtues. Shakhovskoi’s description of the human personality acting in a political situation may also illuminate for us the dilemma of Shakhovskoi and indeed of many other Russians in the years between the *Smuta* and Peter. Shakhovskoi has clearly begun to abandon the older, exclusively religious framework, but has developed nothing to put in its place other than a new vocabulary, one probably derived from the forms of Renaissance thought current in the Ukraine, but one without any intellectual apparatus. He is sensitive enough to react to the new world of thought and emotion brought about in Russia by the social and political events of the decades from about 1590 to 1620, but he is not radical or profound enough a thinker to elaborate on his own intuitions. He had no sources to turn to, for only after 1650, when Ukrainians began to bring to Russia a part of the West’s intellectual tradition, was there something in Russia to build on. In a sense, Shakhovskoi is typical of seventeenth-century Russian culture: the old world is dying, and the new one is not yet born.

²³ I quote here from the so-called second redaction of the tale of Katyrev-Rostovskii: “Povest’ kniazia Ivana Mikhailovicha Katyreva-Rostovskogo vo vtoroi redaktsii,” in *Pamiatniki Smutnemu vremeni*, pp. 625–712; cf. pp. 631, 363, 699. In brief, the textual situation is this: Semen Shakhovskoi wrote two consecutive stories about the *Smuta* attributed to him in the manuscript tradition; these were published by Platonov as “Povesti kniazia Semena Ivanovicha Shakhovskogo,” in *Pamiatniki Smutnomu vremeni*, pp. 837–98. In the same volume Platonov published two unattributed tales similar to the Shakhovskoi texts, attributing them to Katyrev-Rostovskii, on tenuous grounds. But he did include a seeming reference to Katyrev in the *virshi* at the end of the first redaction of the text. Recently, M. V. Kukushkina discovered a text of the first redaction without these concluding *virshi* and attributed the manuscript to Shakhovskoi. Kukushkina and Edward Orchard then concluded that the first “Katyrev-Rostovskii” tale was the work of Shakhovskoi. On this intricate controversy, complicated by the involvement of these texts in the disputes over the Ivan IV–Kurbskii correspondence, see N. V. Kukushkina, “Semen Shakhovskoi—avtor povesti o Smute,” in *Pamiatniki kul’ tury—novye otkrytiia*, 1974 (Moscow, 1975), pp. 75–78, and G. Edward Orchard, “The Seventeenth-Century Book of Annals,” *Russian Review* 37, no. 2 (April 1978): 197–203. Another possibility is that Katyrev-Rostovskii may have done to Shakhovskoi what Khvorostinin did to the anti-Latin Ukrainian poem, that is, adapted it to his own purpose and then put a somewhat changed version back into circulation (with a direct reference to himself). The “Katyrev” versions show a somewhat stronger tendency to use the new terminology I note here (cf. the passage on Boris, pp. 567, 636, and 857; in the “Povesti . . . Shakhovskogo,” instead of “*pomrachisia umom*” we have the statement that Boris abandoned free will, “*svo-bodu samovlastniuiu*,” for fear and servitude, evidently servitude to sin, a much more traditional Christian explanation). The differences should not be overstated. Shakhovskii’s conception may have shifted slightly, and Katyrev-Rostovskii may have experienced some change in viewpoint. Only a close scrutiny of the texts can provide a more definite answer.

Any change in the elements that made up the established, older conceptions of state, nationality, and religion affected all other parts of the system. The harmony of ruler and aristocracy rested on the good morals inspired by correct faith, and vice versa. The correct faith was also, in turn, the peculiar religion of the Russian people. It should be remembered that it was only the Time of Troubles that had the effect of undermining these older notions, not the reign of Ivan IV, as we might expect. The famous correspondence of Ivan and Andrei Kurbskii testifies to the persistence of these notions, for both continued to see politics in religious-moral terms. Kurbskii remained entirely in the framework of the harmonic notion of the relations of ruler and people, accusing Ivan of violating that harmony. Ivan tried to break this theoretical framework by asserting the tsar's power, but his inability to go beyond the religious conception of politics produced a peculiar hybrid conception that had no followers in later Russian history.

The older conception took a while to disintegrate, of course, a process reflected in the tales of the Time of Troubles, which were composed over several decades after 1613. The harmonic ideal of the state was increasingly difficult to sustain in the light of that experience, and it is perhaps for this reason that the seventeenth-century tsars emphasize more and more frequently the legitimacy of the Romanov succession (including the election of 1613) and the divine justification of the tsar's rule. The actual if subordinate power of the aristocracy in the Russian state after 1613 is entirely a de facto power, for the gradual demise of the older conception does not result in its replacement with a legal notion analogous to the Central European estate. The tsar's title remains the traditional one until 1654, when the treaty with the Ukrainian Hetmanate at Pereiaslav brought not only the phrase "Great, Little, and White Russia into the title, but also a more regular use of the term *samoderzhets* ("autocrat").²⁴

Along with this gradual and incomplete shift in the concept of the tsar's political power came a certain separation between the state and the nation. This is implicit already in the dual terminology for country found in the tales of the Time of Troubles. The normal term is still *Rus'*, *Rossiiia*, or some variant, but in more political contexts (such as the election of Mikhail) the term *Moskovskoe gosudarstvo* or *Moskovskoe tsarstvo* ("Mos-

²⁴ Hans-Joachim Torke, *Die staatsbedingte Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich* (Leiden, 1974), pp. 9–43; and A. V. Soloviev, "Weiss-, Schwarz-, and Rotreussen: Versuch einer historisch-politischen Analyse," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 7 (1959): 1–33, reprinted in Alexandre Soloviev, *Byzance et la formation de l'état russe* (London, 1979). It would be useful to follow the precise semantic evolution of the word *samoderzhets* in Russian texts of this period, for it is primarily in the late seventeenth century that it begins to acquire much of its modern meaning, "absolute ruler."

cow tsardom'') appears. The two usages are not mutually exclusive, and they represent only a polarity in thinking about the same country, but the novelty of the usage does suggest a subtle shift. After mid-century the distinction between nation and state becomes stronger, as the Schism results in the departure from the Orthodox church of a whole group of people who see themselves not only as the last adherents to the true faith, but also as the last people of Russia. From the other side, the influence of Ukrainian culture also begins to distinguish state from nation by identifying all East Slavs as one nation, the "*slaviano-rossiiskii narod*" ("Slavo-Russian nation") of Innokentii Gizel', whose *Synopsis* presents the history of Russia as that of all the East Slavs, regardless of what state rules them. Simeon Polotskii's description of Russia as Sarmatia had the same effect. Nation no longer covered the same territory as state.

The reforms of Peter I naturally accentuated this difference, not only by bringing in Western political thought, but also by creating a state that looked "foreign." No wonder, then, that Tatishchev followed Peter's official usage in terminology, with a firm return to *Rossiia* as the only name of the country, and dismissed *Moskovskoe gosudarstvo* as a Polonism. The national status of the dynasty had to be defended, and in 1749 even the national status of the Rurik dynasty in the ninth century became the subject of violent debate (the so-called "Normanist" controversy).²⁵ The secularization of Russian culture completed by Peter I added to the complexity of the situation, for it removed religion as one of the main constituents of elite national consciousness. The forms of national consciousness that emerged in Peter's time and after are unfortunately little known, and it would be foolhardy to describe them in any detail. In the present very imperfect state of research, it seems that the fully modern conception of Russia as the state of the "Great Russian" nation (often taken to include other East Slavs) was basically a product of the 1860s. From Peter's time until then, an "imperial" conception of Russia as a state unit encompassing non-Russians as well as Russians coexisted uneasily with an evolving conception of the "Great Russian" nation, increasingly seen as distinct from other Slavs,

²⁵ Derzhavina and Kolosova, *Skazanie Palitsyna*, pp. 102, 104, 128, 130 ("*Rossiia*"), and pp. 231, 232 ("*Moskovskoe gosudarstvo*"). On pp. 231–32 both terms are used in the same sentence, but overall in Palitsyn (and Timofeev) there does seem to be some distinction in the usage. Innokentii Gizel', *Synopsis* (Kiev, 1680); Simeon Polotskii, *Orel Rossiiskii*, ed. N. A. Smirnov, *Obshchestvo liubitelei drevnei pis'mennosti*, 133 (St. Petersburg, 1915), p. 23 ("*Likui Rossio, sarmatskoe plemia*"); V. N. Tatishchev, *Istoriia rossiiskaia*, 7 vols. (Moscow and Leningrad, 1962–68), 1:288–89; and Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), chap. 5, pp. 186–252.

even (for some writers) other East Slavs. The path to modern national consciousness from the archaic notions of the sixteenth century was long and torturous, and it should not be simplified or artificially smoothed.

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The National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century¹

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The phenomenon of national consciousness lies in the sphere of several scholarly disciplines, including sociology, psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. Whereas historians try to trace the elements of national consciousness from its initial steps in a given society, sociologists seek to give a definition of nation at its modern, most developed phase.

Polish sociologists consider "state" and "nation" to be concepts that should be discussed separately. Their attitudes result from the specific circumstances of Polish history: for more than a century, there was no Polish state. The differentiation of the problem of nation and the problem of state seems to be particularly important in dealing with nations deprived of statehood, and in studying ethnic groups that remained at a low level of social development, such as tribes and clans.

In their research on the precapitalist phase of national development, many historians call attention to methodological problems, without proposing any unequivocal definition for the phenomenon of national consciousness. Controversies concerning the problem of nation and national consciousness still abound. Among them three are primary: (1) the controversy concerning the differences between Western and Eastern Europe in the process of the formation of nations and their national consciousness;² (2) the controversies spawned by the idea that the problem of nations as such should not be considered earlier than from the nineteenth century, in other words, only from the industrial era;³ (3) the difficulties in comparative discussions when the differing historical experiences of cultures are reflected in the differing connotations of words, making translation difficult.

¹ This essay sets forth the ideas developed in Teresa Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej i kozaczyzny od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985). I am grateful to Dr. Paulina Lewin for her assistance in preparing this English text.

² See, for example, Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar, Jr., "The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," *Slavic Review* 22, no. 2 (1963): 224–62.

³ *Le développement de la conscience nationale en Europe orientale, colloque de la commission internationale des Etudes Slaves du Comité International des Sciences Historiques* (Paris, 1968).

For example, the English “feeling of nationality,” “national consciousness,” “nationality” is not exactly the same as the Italian “sentimento nazionale,” “coscienza nazionale,” “nationalità,” or the Polish “poczucie narodowe,” “świadomość narodowa,” “narodowość.”

When I began to study the national consciousness of the Ukrainian nobles and Cossacks from the end of the sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century, I searched for my own definition of the phenomenon of national consciousness. Eventually, I formulated the following:

National consciousness is a phenomenon belonging to the sphere of social psychology, manifested by individuals or by groups of people. It is an expression of the existence of a nation in a certain phase of its development, and it constitutes a necessary condition of its existence. National consciousness is formed under the influence of determinants such as the sense of community of language, of historical tradition (including a community of laws and customs), and of religion; the need to create a popular hero (a moral ideal); a community of territory; a desire for independent statehood. Not all of these determinants are absolutely necessary, nor is the presence of one or two sufficient. All of them change through time.

This is not the place for a full presentation of the historical literature on the study of national consciousness in the Ukraine. It should be noted, however, that the controversies and methodological difficulties posed there still awaken excitement and prejudice. These are rooted in the very history of the Ukraine as well as in the interpretation of its political, economic, and cultural affairs. One main cause of the problematic understanding of the history of the Ukraine is the treatment of it as part of a collective Ukrainian-Russian-Belorussian history. Many historians have persisted in regarding Ukrainians, Russians, and Belorussians as one nation rather than as three different nations. That approach derives from the theory of a single “Russian” nation whose ruler migrated from one center to another: from Kiev to Suzdal to Vladimir-on-the-Kljaz’ma to Moscow. This concept was formulated in the *Synopsis* published in 1674, which was reissued in approximately thirty editions and was used as a history textbook until the mid-nineteenth century.⁴ The theory, adopted by Russian and Soviet historians, was criticized by Myxajlo Hruševs’kyj and, more recently, by Natalia Polons’ka-Vasylenko. The specific problem of the national consciousness of the Ukrainian nobility and Cossacks in the middle of the seventeenth century has been treated by some historians in a marginal and often controversial way, in the course of other research.⁵

⁴ Pritsak and Reshetar, “The Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building,” p. 228.

⁵ The scholarly literature comprises relatively few contributions, among them: Frank E. Sysyn, “Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement,” in *Poland and Ukraine:*

My essay focuses on three elements in the national consciousness that emerged among the Ukrainian nobles and Cossacks: loyalty to native language, affirmation of historical traditions, and defense of the Rus' religious inheritance. I also make note of my research into the question of the creation of ideal heroes. In examining the development and evolution of Ukrainian national consciousness, the impact of the insistence on antiquity, even as innovation was taking place, should be kept in mind. In precapitalist societies, the permanency of laws and customs created an aura of venerated customs and laws. To call something "old" or "ancient" was to call it "the best" or "the most proper and just."

The role of language in shaping Ukrainian national consciousness increased in the late sixteenth century, partially because the traditional Ruthenian and Slavonic literary languages were being threatened. After the Union of Lublin, the penetration of the Latin and Polish languages into Ruthenian culture became pronounced. The nobility avoided using their native tongue even for everyday matters—the consequence of the widespread Polonization of this social stratum. The Polish language began to be used for epistolography and official documents, and by the early seventeenth century the religious polemical literature was also written mostly in Polish. The Ruthenian nobility's daily use of the Polish language was reported even by papal nuncios. In addition, the Jesuit schools in which the children of Ruthenian nobility were taught influenced their rejection of their native tongue, although the Jesuits themselves used the Ruthenian language in their sermons, so as to communicate with all strata of their Ruthenian flock.⁶

Language use is not, however, the major criterion for establishing national consciousness: attitude and symbol are just as important. Ruthenians defended the dignity of their native tongue in tracts written in Polish. The annexation charter of Volhynia to the Kingdom of Poland (1569), like that for the Kiev palatinate, pledged:

In accordance with the request of all the [above mentioned] estates of the Volhynian lands, we guarantee that all their judicial affairs, such as summons, record book

Past and Present, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), pp. 58–82; Taras Hunczak, "The Politics of Religion: The Union of Brest, 1596," *Ukrains'kyj istoryk* (New York and Munich), 1972, no. 2, pp. 97–106; David A. Frick, "Meletij Smotryc'kyj and the Ruthenian Question in the Early Seventeenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 3/4 (December 1984): 351–75; Ivan Kryp'jakevyč, "Do pytan'ja pro nacional'nu samosvidomist' ukrains'koho narodu v kinci XVI—na počatku XVII st.," *Ukrains'kyj istoryčnyj žurnal*, 1966, no. 2, pp. 82–84.

⁶ On the use of Polish in the Ukraine, see A. Martel, *La langue polonaise dans les pays ruthènes: Ukraine et Russie Blanche, 1569–1667* (Lille, 1933).

registrations, and all other matters in our castle and land courts, as well as the decrees of the Crown chancery and the letters on all the matters connected with our king and the Crown lands, will be written and dealt with not otherwise but in Ruthenian writing for ever and ever.⁷

When the Polish kings failed to fulfill these legally valid promises, the Ruthenian nobility took action. In 1571, the Kievan nobles sent the first special petition to the Polish king on the matter of their language. They explained their lack of comprehension of Polish and expressed their desire to retain their mother tongue.⁸ The nobles of the Braclav palatinate, which came under the Volhynian charter, reacted likewise. In 1576 they sent a response to a letter received from King Stefan Batory's chancery: the king's letter had been written in Polish, so the addressees treated it as a transgression of the laws and a violation of the liberties of the Ruthenian nobility.⁹ In 1606 the nobility of the Kiev and Braclav palatinates, who were taking part in the Zebrzydowski rebellion, put out a postulate to appoint two Ruthenian scribes to the king's chancery.¹⁰ These kinds of requests were reiterated in the debates of the Diet. The Diet kept promising the nobles of the Ukrainian lands that it would abide by the "laws and privileges" given to them by the Polish kings, but to no avail.

The Ruthenians not only fought for the use of the Ruthenian language in official documents, but they were concerned with the colloquial and literary use of the Ruthenian language in their own writings. The best known and most significant example of such concern is the testament of the castellan of Braclav, Vasyl' Zahorovs'kyj, written in 1577. In this testament he advised his children to receive a Ruthenian education; he also warned them against abandoning the praiseworthy and virtuous Ruthenian customs and deserting their Orthodox faith and Ruthenian language in writing and speaking. However, this same Zahorovs'kyj, an ardent Orthodox, about whom Janusz Tazbir has written that he was "Ruthenian to the marrow of his bones," did

⁷ "To też za prośbą wszech wołyńskiej ziemie przerzeczonych stanów zostawujemy, iż we wszelakich sprawach ich sądowych, jako pozwy, wpisywanie do ksiąg, akta i wszelakie potrzeby ich, tak u sądów naszych grodzkich i ziemskich, jako z kancelarii naszej koronnej dekreta nasze i we wszystkich potrzebach naszych Królewskich i ziemskich koronnych do nich listy, nie jakim innym, jedno Ruskim piśmem pisane i odprawowane być mają, czasy wiecznymi." *Akta Unii Polski z Litwą, 1385—1791*, ed. S. Kutrzeba and W. Semkowicz (Cracow, 1932), p. 305.

⁸ M. Hruševs'kyj, *Kul' turno-nacional' nyj rux na Ukrajinі v XVI—XVII v.* (Lviv, 1912), p. 43.

⁹ *Arxiv Jugo-Zapadnoj Rossii* (Kiev), pt. 2, vol. 1 (1861), p. xxxviii (hereafter *AJZR*).

¹⁰ They wrote to the king: "...przy dworze naszym osiadłe, przysięgłe być mają, którzy spraw tych województw: kijowskiego, wołyńskiego i braclawskiego i miejskie z tych województw odprawować nie odstrzelając się od statutu i zwyczajów tych ziem mają i wszystkie sprawy z podpisem swem z kancelarii wydawać będą." From "Instrukcja szlachty wołyńskiej na sejm warszawski, 8.VIII.1607," *AJZR*, pt. 2, vol. 1 (1861), p. 71.

not hesitate to educate his sons in a Jesuit school in Vilnius.¹¹

In the late sixteenth century, considerable progress was made in reviving the church's liturgical language, Slavonic, and in developing the "vulgar" Ruthenian language into a more refined literary medium.¹² It was a time when the appropriate roles for the two traditional languages were being debated. The brotherhood schools and the presses of Lviv, Vilnius, Ostroh, and Kiev propagated the study and use of the Slavonic language among the literate strata of the Ukrainian population. At the same time, explanatory works for the general reader and literary works (polemical, poetic) were produced in Ruthenian (Middle Ukrainian). Both languages were defended against the incursions of Latin and Polish. In defending the dignity of the Slavonic language, the Kievan metropolitan, Myxajlo Rahoza, complained:

The teaching of the Slavonic-Ruthenian language found itself in the most straitened circumstances, and all of the people yielded themselves to writing in this imperfect Lach [= Polish] language. Thus, having no liking for the powers of the perfect Slavonic language, which possesses a fixed grammatical norm, they contracted various heresies.¹³

Whatever one says about the unquestionable Polonization of the Ruthenian nobility, for at least a century after the Union of Lublin one must also recognize that the process was full of contradictory situations. Many authors of historical and polemical writings, including Ivan Vyšens'kyj, Meletij Smotryc'kyj, and the author of the *Perestoroha*, expressed grief that their own Ruthenian and Slavonic languages, which were well used by the clever and learned Ruthenian nation for many centuries, were now neglected, and that Ruthenian children "are brought to shame and have been forced to use Polish books."¹⁴ A deep concern for the Ukrainian traditional languages (Ruthenian and Slavonic) runs throughout the literature of that time.

¹¹ Janusz Tazbir, "Hieronim Zahorowski, zapomniany autor głośnego pamfletu," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 70 (1963): 341–61.

¹² On the development of Slavonic and Ruthenian, see Bohdan A. Struminsky (Strumins'kyj), "The Language Question in the Ukrainian Lands before the Nineteenth Century," in R. Picchio and H. Goldblatt, eds., *Aspects of the Slavic Language Question*, vol. 2: *East Slavic* (New Haven, 1984), pp. 9–48.

¹³ "Najbardziej zas zubożała nauka słowińskiego rosijskiego języka i wszyscy ludzie oddali się niedoskonałemu, łachskiemu pismu i stąd w różne herezje powpadali, nie znając w błahosławii mocy doskonałego, gramatycznego, słowiańskiego języka." *Akty Zapadnoj Rossii*, vol. 4 (St. Petersburg, 1858), p. 42.

¹⁴ Hruševs'kyj, *Kul'turno-nacional'nyj rux*, pp. 59–60.

The majority of polemical works defending the Ruthenian and Slavonic languages were written in Polish. But despite the fact that Meletij Smotryc'kyj, Syl'vester Kosiv, and Atanazii Kal'nofojs'kyj, among others, wrote in Polish, they were integrally part of the Ruthenian tradition. This was apparent in their treatment of another determinant of national consciousness, namely, historical consciousness. Among their topics were the baptism of Rus' and its magnificence and splendor during the rule of Volodimer and Jaroslav. They extolled the importance of Kiev, the holy capital of Rus', and they studied the history of the Kievan metropolitans and the Ruthenian saints. Kal'nofojs'kyj, in his 1638 work *Teratourgēma*, reached back to the foundation of Rus' in writing about the ancient Kiev caves.¹⁵ Smotryc'kyj told the Ruthenians to recognize and give testimony to the great contemporary tragedy of their nation, as well as to live up to the memory and glory of their ancestors, and to trust their old chronicles.

Polemicists related the history of Rus' to biblical events and to the history of the ancient world. For example, Zaxarija Kopystens'kyj wrote that the Ruthenian nation descended from Japhet.¹⁶ This same motif occurs in Kasijan Sakovyč's eulogy written for Sahajdačnyj's funeral; there Sakovyč recognized the Cossacks as the representatives of Kievan Rus' and the Rus' nation. The motif of Cossacks during the time of Kievan Rus' appeared in the writings of several Ukrainian Orthodox clergymen, such as Jov Borec'kyj.¹⁷

Prominent Ruthenian families returned to the traditions of Kievan Rus' in tracing their genealogies. References to their old traditions and pride in their own past allowed them to behave as equal partners with the Poles. The right of the Ruthenian nobility to equality with the Polish nobility was expressed by Adam Kysil in his speech at the Diet of 1641:

First, that our ancestors, the Ruthenian Sarmatians, freely joined you, the Polish Sarmatians, and with their spiritual and material possessions they brought the provinces and their ancestral faith; then, that the Greek faith and your lordships' Roman faith were brought to the same status (I say so, for these are the formally expressed privileges), and are to be treated with the same respect and given the same privileges; then, that we are, and our ancestors were, guaranteed an equal access to all honors, whatever the confession—Greek or Roman; then, that especially our

¹⁵ A. Kal'nofojs'kyj, "Teratourgēma," *AJZR*, 8, no. 1 (1914), p. 481.

¹⁶ Z. Kopystenskij, *Palinodija*, Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka, 4 (St. Petersburg, 1841–42), p. 1003.

¹⁷ M. Voznjak, *Stare ukrajins'ke pys'menstvo* (Lviv, 1922), p. 279; Hruševs'kyj, *Kul'turno-nacional'nyj rux*, pp. 200–204.

cathedrals, and even more so our conscience, were given the guarantee of the same liberty and freedom in which you, my lordships, are living.¹⁸

References to the magnificence of ancient Rus' contrasted the "glorious old times" with the contemporary bad ones.

Religion was an essential element of the ancient tradition and culture. Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj wrote that during the seventeenth century the struggle for freedom of religion was the main yardstick of the consciousness of the Ruthenian nation, synonymous with national consciousness and its most highly valued characteristic.

The Union of Brest of 1596 was regarded as a turning point in Rus' history, that is, as the gravest violation of the ancient Ruthenian liberties and ancient laws (*swoboda i dawne prawa*). By referring to early history, the authors of polemical works written to defend the rights of the Ruthenians also tried to determine the causes of the existing situation. Orthodox, Uniate, and even Antitrinitarian authors referred to the tradition of Rus'—each, of course, in accordance with his own particular interest.¹⁹

The Orthodox authors' defense of their religion can be detected first in their reactions to the Union of Florence and later in protests against the reform of the calendar by Pope Gregory XIII. It was the Union of Brest, however, that unleashed vehement Orthodox protest in polemical literature, as well as in the dietines and the Diet of the Commonwealth. Immediately the Orthodox faithful condemned the secret actions of their metropolitan and some of their bishops, calling them apostates and accusing them of perpetrating the Union without the consensus of the Ruthenian community. Such feelings were well expressed by Konstantyn Vasyl' Ostroz'kyj in his protestation of 1596; there he added that Orthodox law ought to be respected in the whole Commonwealth, as the laws of the Jews and Armenians were.²⁰

¹⁸ Translated from the Polish original as quoted by Frank E. Sysyn, "Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility at the Diet of 1641," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1982): 186. "Primum, że przodkowie nasi Sarmatae Rossi do W. M., ad Sarmatas Polonos libere accesserunt, cum suis diis penatibus przynieśli prowincje i w nich swoje avitam religionem; że tak jest wyniesiony zakon grecki z zakonem W. M.-ciow rzymskim (dla tego tak mówię, bo to są formalia verba privilegiorum) in uno praedicamento, w jednym poszanowaniu jest położony i uprzywilejowany, równy aditus nam do wszelkich honorów i przodkom naszym, tak Graecae jako i Romanae professionis, obwarowany, pogotowiu katedry nasze i jeszcze bardziej sumnienia nasze w takiej swobodzie w takiej wolności są warowane, w jakiej W. M.-ci Moi Miłościwi Panowie sami żyjecie."

¹⁹ O. Levickij (Levyc'kyj), "Socynianie na Rusi," *Reformacja w Polsce*, no. 2 (1922): 205–208.

²⁰ "Supplementum Synopsis," *AJZR*, pt. 2, vol. 7, pp. 586ff.

In the correspondence between Ostroz'kyj and Ipatij Potij during the years 1595–98, in which Potij tried to recruit Ostroz'kyj for the Union, the adversaries made equally frequent reference to their concern for “our beloved Rus’” (*naša mila Rus'*) and even expressed this concern in exactly the same wording.²¹ The welfare of Rus' is also central in the period's polemical literature against the Union of Brest, and especially in the literature criticizing two books published by the Catholic and Uniate proponents of the Union: *Spraviedlivoje opisanie postupkov i spravy soboru berestejskoho* (The true, just description of the actions and affairs of the Brest Council) and *Synod Brzeski* (Synod of Brest) by Piotr Skarga.

Two important tracts were *Ekthesis* and Xrystofor Filalet's *Apokrisis* (the latter appeared in both a Ruthenian and a Polish edition). Both tracts emphasized that the Union of Brest had been concluded without the consent of all Ruthenians. The authors referred to the Orthodox tradition as well as to the memory of their ancestors, who adopted the Christian faith from Greece six hundred years ago and since then have been so faithful to their creed that even the Union of Florence was unable to destroy their conviction. The author of the *Ekthesis* wrote: “. . .we refuse the new faith. We do not reject the Orthodoxy and the creed of our ancestors,. . .the faith by which our fathers abode strongly and which they protected.”²²

The *Apokrisis*, a polemic for freedom of confession, has an obviously political character. Filalet examines the relations of Ruthenians and Poles; he contrasts the efforts of the Ruthenians made for the welfare of the Commonwealth, the common fatherland, with the injustice done to them at the “evasive, deceptive Union of Brest.” The Uniates, responding in a work entitled *Antirisis*, reproached Filalet for defending a cause he himself did not believe in, since he was a “heretic,” not an Orthodox. The Uniates also criticized his Polish origins, writing: “He hid himself with a Ruthenian cloak as a wolf with sheep's clothing.”²³ Only a Ruthenian and an Orthodox has a moral right to defend the cause of Orthodoxy, the Uniates maintained.

The atmosphere of protest brought forth many texts about the wrongs done to the Orthodox by the Catholics. Around the year 1610, it yielded one of the most interesting works in Ruthenian literature of the first half of

²¹ *Pamjatniki polemičeskoj literatury v Zapadnoj Rusi*, bk. 3, Russkaja istoričeskaja biblioteka, 19 (St. Petersburg, 1903), pp. 984–1118.

²² “Nie pozwalamy na nową wiarę. Nie odrzucamy prawosławia i nabożeństwa przodków naszych,. . .wiary, której ojcowie nasi trzymali mocno i strzegli.” *Pamjatniki polemičeskoj literatury*, pp. 358–60.

²³ “Pokrył się ruskim płaszczem jak wilk owczą skórą.” *Antirisis*, in *Pamjatniki polemičeskoj literatury*, p. 482.

the seventeenth century, *Perestoroha*, which can be regarded as an extension of *Apokrisis* and *Ekthesis*. The author of *Perestoroha* analyzes the current situation in Rus', a situation that has brought the Orthodox church into decline and that has subsequently forced many Ruthenians to become apostates. The writer addresses all Poles with the reproach that they treated even Turks, Tartars, and Jews better than Ruthenians, whom they have deprived of the freedom of their confession.²⁴

Some historians maintained that the struggle against the Union was waged only by a group of individuals, and that the Ruthenian community as a whole was not involved. For instance, Kazimierz Chodyncki saw only exaggeration in the statement of the author of *Apokrisis* that it was difficult to find one palatinate in which the sons of the Orthodox church did not protest against the Union. Platon Žukovič expressed a similar opinion.²⁵ They explained the numerous Orthodox protests at the Diet as the result of the influence of prominent Orthodox and Protestants at a time when both confessions had close political connections and demanded the implementation of the laws of the Confederation of Warsaw (1573). I have been unable to ascertain how widespread the protests against the Union actually were. More important, it seems to me, are the substance of these protests. The problems of the Orthodox faithful were expressed more or less fully in "the paragraphs on the appeasement of the Orthodox faith (*punkty o uspokojenie religii greckiej*)" presented at the dietines.

In the instructions given to the envoys to the dietines and the Diet, the Orthodox faith is called, interchangeably, "the Ruthenian" or "the Greek" faith. Relations between the Ruthenian nation and the Orthodox faith are much better explained in other sources. For instance, the contemporary Orthodox polemicist Ivan Vyšens'kyj emphasized the unity of the Ruthenian historical tradition and the Orthodox religion. In his letter to Ostroz'kyj and to all Orthodox Rus', Vyšens'kyj questioned who would free Rus' from papal slavery, since even the Ruthenian princes had left the Orthodox church.

The first religious polemical works were written by the Orthodox, Uniates, and Roman Catholics in both the Ruthenian and Polish languages, but after the 1620s they were written mostly in Polish. This new stage in polemical literature is well presented by the writings of Meletij Smotryc'kyj

²⁴ For the text of the *Perestoroha*, with an assertion that Jov Borec'kyj was its author, see M. Voznjak, *Pys'mennyc'ka dijaj' nist' Ivana Borec' koho na Volyni i u L'vovi* (Lviv, 1954).

²⁵ K. Chodyncki, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczypospolita Polska: Zarys historyczny, 1370–1632* (Warsaw, 1934), p. 359. P. Žukovič, *Sejmovaja bor'ba pravoslavnogo zapadnorusskogo dvorjanstva s cerkovnoj uniej do 1609 g.* (St. Petersburg, 1901), pp. 238–40.

(ca. 1577–1633), son of Herasym, who was rector of the Ostroh Academy. Meletij himself, however, graduated not from his father's school, but from the Jesuit school in Vilnius. Afterwards he studied in Silesia, Nuremberg, and Leipzig. Upon his return to Vilnius, he became involved in polemics. In 1620 Patriarch Theophanes ordained him archbishop of Polack. Following a journey to the patriarchates of the Near East in the 1620s—a trip which may have been prompted by the murder of Josafat Kuncevyč—he declared himself a Uniate. The motive behind his decision is unknown. Thereafter he was an ardent advocate of reconciliation between the Orthodox and the Uniates.

Smotryc'kyj's writings from both the period of his Orthodoxy and the period of his conversion are important. In 1610 he published a work in Polish under the pen name Theophil Ortholog, entitled *Threnos, to jest lament albo narzekanie cerkwie . . .* (Threnos, or a lament or complaint of the [Orthodox] church . . .). In the lament the Orthodox church, the true Mother of the Ruthenians, puts forth arguments against the Union of Brest and in defense of the Orthodox faith. The allegorical impersonation of the Orthodox church says: "my hands are bound, my neck is yoked, there are fetters on my feet, chains on my back, a double-edged sword hangs suspended over my head; the fire on either side of me is inextinguishable . . . Everyone has fled from me, abandoned me; my parents are far away from me, my friends here became my enemies."²⁶ Then the personification of the Orthodox church enumerates the many noble Ruthenian families that have abandoned Orthodoxy and converted to Catholicism: the Sluc'kyj, Zaslavs'kyj, Vyšnevec'kyj, Sanguško, Čartorys'kyj, Prons'kyj, Ružyns'kyj, Solomyrec'kyj, Holovyns'kyj, Krošyns'kyj, Masals'kyj, Sokolyns'kyj, Lukoms'kyj, Puzyna, Xodkevyč, Hlibovyč, Kyška, Sapiha, Dorohostajs'kyj, Vojna, Volovyč, Zenovyč, Pac, Xalec'kyj, Tyškevyč, Korsak, Xrebtovyč, Tryzna, Hornostaj, Bokija, Myška, Hojs'kyj, Semaško, Hulevyč, Jarmolyns'kyj, Čol'hans'kyj, Kalynovs'kyj, Kyrdej, Zahorovs'kyj, Meleško, Bohovytn, Pavlovyč, Sosnovs'kyj, Potij et al.²⁷

Smotryc'kyj cautioned Englishmen, Norwegians, Czechs, Frenchmen, and other Europeans not to give themselves up into slavery, and to learn from what had happened to the Ruthenians. In *Threnos* Smotryc'kyj made

²⁶ D. Čyževs'kyj, *A History of Ukrainian Literature: From the Eleventh to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, trans. George S. N. Luckyj et al. (Littleton, Colo., 1975), p. 350.

²⁷ Frank E. Sysyn, "The Problem of Nobilities in the Ukrainian Past: The Polish Period, 1569–1648," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 29–102.

a statement that became the main source of the charge against the Orthodox as the betrayers of Poland who plotted against the Commonwealth in alliance with Turkey: he declared that the Orthodox church would be better off under the rule of the Turks than to place body and soul at the service of the pope.

Piotr Skarga and Illja Moroxovs'kyj (Eliasz Morochoowski) responded polemically to *Threnos*, and the tract also roused the indignation of Francesco Simonetto, then the papal nuncio in Warsaw. Simonetto informed Rome about the "unfortunate book," as he called it, which was an obstacle in propaganda for the union.

At the same time, the rights of the Orthodox Ruthenians were being defended by Jan Szczęsny Herburt, who, although a Roman Catholic, argued for the Ruthenian cause. He wrote:

For I know well what wrongs are done to the Ruthenians after the Union of Brest. I know well that at the dietines their hopes are raised, but at the Diet they are ridiculed. . . . At the dietines they are addressed as brothers, but at the Diet they are called renegades. I know it because everyone knows it. But what do they [the Catholics and the Uniates] want with this respectable nation, and to what end and through what means are they aiming?²⁸

The struggle to defend Orthodoxy was revived by the reestablishment of the Kiev metropolitanate and the consecration of bishops. In these acts Patriarch Theophanes relied greatly on the Cossacks.

Some historians declare that the Cossacks took up the cause of Orthodoxy at least from 1610 or even earlier. I do not agree, for only from 1620 does the Cossack participation in the defense of Orthodoxy become clear. I also disagree with the opinion that the Cossacks were no more than a guard that secured Theophanes's goals. It is significant, I believe, that some prominent individuals of the time changed their attitude toward the Cossacks. Adam Kysil's opinion of the Cossacks as being "religionis nullius" became the most often quoted: it was repeated by the Uniate metropolitan Josyf Ruts'kyj and, later, by others. Yet it is also relevant that Alberto Vimina, reporting about an encounter with Kysil in his *Historia delle guerre civili in Polonia* (The history of the civil war in Poland), wrote that Kysil was well inclined toward the Cossacks because they were his equals in attachment to their common religion.²⁹

²⁸ J. Herburt, "Zdanie o narodzie ruskim," in M. O. Kojalovič, *Istoričeskoje issledovanie o Zapadnoj Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1865), p. 214.

²⁹ "Commemorò nel principio l'inclinazione sua particolare verso la nazione de Cosacchi, ai quali si conosceva debitore di portare afetto, non solo per la virtù loro, quanto perchè consentivano seco nei dogmi della fede, la cui propagatione gli era sempre stata fissamente a cuore."

Contemporaries did express controversial opinions and doubts about not only the Cossacks' role in the defense of Orthodoxy, but also about their faith. Today, differences of opinion about the Cossacks, compounded by the scarcity of sources, makes an analysis of the Cossacks' religious consciousness difficult. As already noted, it was Jov Borec'kyj and other Orthodox clergy who took the Cossacks to be the true representatives of the Ruthenian nation, culture, and religion. They wrote in their memorandum:

It is known that the knightly people of the Cossacks are of our own stock, that they are our brothers and Orthodox Christians. . . . Their ancestors were among the first to embrace Christianity from the Orthodox church together with Volodimir. Faithful to this religion they remain, in this faith they are born and baptized, and faithful to it they die.³⁰

Even if we acknowledge that the memorandum may express its authors' rather than the Cossacks' religious feelings, we should not deprecate the historical value of this document. For the very fact that the authors used such arguments in addressing the Cossacks is evidence that they believed the Cossacks would understand their sentiments.

The Cossack hetman Petro Konaševyč-Sahajdačnyj manifested a special preoccupation with the fate of Rus' and the Orthodox church. In October of 1621, after the battle of Xotyn, the Cossacks wrote a letter to King Zygmunt III Vasa, asking him for overdue payments, for a special award for the Xotyn campaign, and for the satisfaction of their demands for the Orthodox faithful.³¹ In a letter written shortly before his death, Konaševyč-Sahajdačnyj beseeched Zygmunt III and his son, Władysław, to protect the Cossacks. He also appealed to the king to influence the Jesuits and the Roman Catholic clergy as a whole to leave the Ruthenians in peace, proposing that the Catholics would do much better to instruct nations which had lost their faith entirely.³²

A. Vimina (M. Bianchi), *Historia delle guerre civili in Polonia divisa in cinque libri* (Venice, 1671), p. 56.

³⁰ Hruševs'kyj, *Kul'turno-nacional'nyj rux*, pp. 189, 190. Borec'kyj expressed more negative opinions about the Cossacks' religious views in a letter to K. Radziwiłł. E. Šmurlo, *Le Saint-Siège et l'orient orthodox Russe, 1609–1654* (Prague, 1928), p. 35.

³¹ "Najjaśniejszego królewicza J. M. Jaśnie Wielmożnego J. M.-ci Pana Hetmana, Ich Mciow Panów Komisarzów prosić mają, aby Ich Mc do Króla J. M. przyczynić raczyli, iżby król J. M. Pan nasz miłościwy, mając wzgląd na krwawe zasługi i wierność naszą, starożytną wiarę naszą grecką uspokoić raczył." *Žerela do istorii Ukrajinj-Rusi*, vol. 8 (Lviv, 1908), no. 152, p. 251.

³² *Akty odnosjasčiesja k istorii Južnoj i Zapadnoj Rossii*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1865), pp. 72–73.

The demand for satisfaction of the Orthodox faithful's needs was constantly repeated not only in the instructions given to the noble envoys to the Diet, but also in the instructions the Cossacks gave to their envoys meeting with the king's commissioners and to their envoy-observers at the Diet. A comparison of these two types of documents—for example, the instructions given to the noble delegates to the Sudova Vyšnja dietine of 1624 and the Cossacks' instruction prepared for negotiators with the king's commissioners after the Cossacks' defeat at Kurukiv Lake in 1625—shows that their demands were very similar.³³

The problems of the new Orthodox hierarchy were reflected in the polemical literature. Kopystens'kyj and Smotryc'kyj were among its ardent supporters. Like the writers who wrote after the Union of Brest, they raised issues concerning the historical, religious, and cultural traditions of Rus'. They wrote that just as Poland has her own highly respected ecclesiastical laws, so does Rus'—in fact, Rus' laws are even older than the Polish ones. "Let Rus' remain Rus'," wrote Smotryc'kyj in his *Obrona weryfikacji* (Defense of the verification).

An interesting Orthodox opinion was expressed in the *Supplikacja* (Supplication) of 1623:³⁴ if the union of the three nations (Poland, Lithuania, and Rus') secures freedom, laws, and liberty for all three (i.e., for their nobilities), there remains only one hindrance to their political union, that is, the "false religious union." Another tract stated that in order to eradicate the Orthodox faith among the Ruthenians, the whole nation would have to be destroyed.³⁵ Religious discontent even undermined political loyalties. In 1622 an Orthodox Ruthenian group rendered homage to the Polish king, but in 1622–25 they wrote letters and sent envoys to the tsar of Muscovy, complaining of the wrongs done to them in the Commonwealth.³⁶

The Orthodox set great hopes on the Convocation Diet of 1632. The Ruthenian nobility, Cossacks, and educated elite prepared their proposals. Even before the Election Diet in November 1632, Władysław IV signed a document (*artykuły*) in which he promised to restore privileges to the Orthodox church (*uspokojenie religii greckiej*), over the strong objections

³³ *Lauda sejmikowe*, vol. 1: *Lauda wiszeńskie, 1572–1648* (Lviv, 1909), p. 216; *Zbiór pamiątek o dawnej Polsce*, ed. J.U. Niemcewicz, vol. 5 (Puławy, 1830), p. 217. Instrukcja Kozacka 1625, MS WAP Gdańsk, Reces sejmu walnego w Warszawie, sygn. 300, 29/103, fol. 331.

³⁴ The full title is *Supplikacja do prześwieconego i jasnie wielmożnego przezacnej Korony Polskiej i W. Ks. Litewskiego obojga stanu duchownego i świeckiego Senatu*; republished in V. Lypyns'kyj (W. Lipiński), *Z dziejów Ukrainy* (Cracow, 1912), pp. 99–111.

³⁵ M. O. Kojalovič, *Istoričeskoje issledovanie o Zapadnoi Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1865), p. 244.

³⁶ P. Kuliš, *Materiały dlja istorii vozsojedinienia Rusi*, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1877), pp 123–30.

of the papal nuncios and of some Uniate clergy. In 1633 he also legalized the hitherto illegal Orthodox hierarchical structure, and it was then that Peter Mohyla became the metropolitan of Kiev. The Diet of 1635 accepted the constitution of the "Greek religion." This legal document guaranteed the Ruthenians liberty of confession (faith) and stated the equality of Uniates and Catholics, thus giving the Ruthenians full rights as citizens of the Commonwealth.

Orthodox demands were satisfied only in part, for the Union was not abolished. The Ruthenian nation was still divided, and the Orthodox put forth their demands again and again. For example, in 1645 the nobility of the Kiev palatinate stated that "However the Orthodox received the king's guarantees, they suffered in the free Commonwealth even more than the Greeks in pagan slavery."³⁷ This religious division of the Ruthenians was undermining the role of the Orthodox church as a unifying national institution. Thus, as early as 1621, Smotryc'kyj argued in his *Weryfikacja niewinności* (Verification of innocence) that a change of faith was not a change of nationality:

But it is not so that he who changes his confession changes at once his native blood; thus [it is not so] that he who belongs to the Ruthenian nation becomes a native Spaniard or Italian at the moment he embraces the Roman faith; he remains as previously a noble Ruthenian. For it is not the faith, but the birth and the Ruthenian, Polish, or Lithuanian blood that makes the Ruthenian a Ruthenian, the Pole a Pole, the Lithuanian a Lithuanian.³⁸

Smotryc'kyj later saw acceptance of the Union as a way of maintaining Ruthenian national unity. Most nobles and Cossacks, however, continued to believe that adherence to Orthodoxy was a necessary condition of membership in the Ruthenian nation.

In the course of my investigation into the existence of a national consciousness among the Ukrainian nobility and the Cossacks at the time in question, yet another problem emerged—that of the nation's hero, a moral paragon which for the contemporary Ruthenian society embodied univer-

³⁷ *AJR*, pt. 2, vol. 1 (1861), p. 287.

³⁸ "Bo nie już zaraz i ze krwi sie ten wyradza, kto sie w wierze odmienia, nie jest już kto z ruskiego narodu rzymskiej wiary zostaje zaraz i z urodzenia Hiszpanem lub Włochem zostawa; Rusin szlachetny po dawnemu. Nie wiara abowiem Rusina Rusinem, Polaka Polakiem, Litwina Litwinem czyni, ale urodzenie i krew ruska, polska i litewska." M. Korduba, "Die Entstehung der ukrainischen Nation," in *Contributions a l'histoire de l'Ukraine au VII^e Congrès International des Sciences historiques* (Warsaw and Lviv, 1933), p. 65; *Verificatia niewinności* (Vilnius, 1621), p. 60; David A. Frick, "Meletij Smotryc'kyj and the Ruthenian Question in the Early Seventeenth Century," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 8, no. 3/4 (December 1984): 357–59.

sally recognized values. For the nobility, Konstantyn Ostroz'kyj was undoubtedly the ideal of an "Orthodox Ruthenian." Both the Orthodox and Uniates invoked his name. For example, the *Lament domu knjažat Ostroz'kyx* (Lament of the house of the Princes Ostroz'kyj) says: "Remember that you are descendants of the Ostroz'kyjs, the Ruthenian princes; keep [always] in mind their ingenuity and piousness."³⁹ The Cossack hetman Petro Konaševyč-Sahajdačnyj was considered to be another hero worthy of emulation. Controversial, however, was the legendary clergyman and educator Petro Mohyla, whose Moldavian origin added to the complexity of his reputation. Some Ruthenians considered Mohyla's policies to have been too conciliatory toward Poland and the Latins. The school he founded was criticized for the large component of Latin-Polish culture and language in its curriculum. Nonetheless, in the 1630s, Metropolitan Mohyla was to many Ruthenians the defender and symbol of the Ruthenian tradition, just as Ostroz'kyj had been in the first decade of the seventeenth century.

Certainly it was chiefly the nobility and the higher clergy, most of whom were nobles, who considered themselves to be the carriers of national consciousness, the heirs of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nation, and who acted accordingly. The burghers also played a major part in intensifying Ukrainian national consciousness, and they deserve additional study. The term "nation," however, was applied first and foremost to the nobility. The attitude was well expressed by Adam Kysil in a speech made in 1641, in which he espoused the cause of the "Ruthenian nobiliary nation." Yet, when the need to manifest religious unity arose, the term "Orthodox Ruthenian nation" also comprised the other estates, including the Cossacks.

The term *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus* served to describe the political and national status and affiliation of the Ruthenian nobility during this time. In Polish historiography the emphasis has been on the second part of the definition. It has been interpreted as a class relationship that linked the nobility of Rus' with that of Poland, making both nobilities one political and constitutional body within the Commonwealth. It could well be that many Ruthenian noblemen had this understanding of their place and rights in the Commonwealth. I suggest, however, that the first part of the definition, *gente Ruthenus*, was as prominent in their minds as the second. The Ruthenian nobility as a whole was conscious of its Ruthenian national, if not always political, identity. Alongside the nobility, the Ukrainian

³⁹ "Pamjatatje, žeste z knjažat" rus'kyx", Ostroz'kyx vyšly, yx" vīru, dil'nost' y pobožnost' mījte na mysly!" Myxajlo Hruševs'kyj, *Istorija Ukrajinj-Rusy*, 10 vols. (rpt. New York, 1955) 6: 497.

Cossacks came to a greater consciousness of their national community through the controversies and polemics of the early seventeenth century. Both groups contributed to a heightened national consciousness in seventeenth-century Ukraine.

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Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690

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Historians have long found national consciousness to be an elusive subject, for its expressions are difficult to identify, define, and quantify. This is particularly true if one is dealing with periods before the nineteenth century. For Europe, nations and national sentiments clearly antedate that century, but it was not until then that national movements began to espouse and disseminate nationalist ideologies that were accepted by large segments of the population. Long before this age of nationalism, however, communities had evolved whose members were aware of their common identity and shared characteristics, whether language, culture, history, territory, ancestral ties, or permanence of residence. Words like *patria* and *natio* were already in use to represent these feelings of political and cultural communality. Indeed, it has been argued that the combining of *patria*, based on common territory, and *natio*, based on common “peoplehood,” has created a particular European type of nation.¹

Perceptions of history have frequently been the focus of studies of early modern national consciousness. In introducing a collection of essays devoted to the topic, the volume’s editor, Orest Ranum, explains: “The inclusion of the concept of history as one of the factors to be analyzed in these essays enables the authors to define the constituent parts of national consciousness and to discern fundamental shifts in their make-up. Perceptions of the past provide a manageable focus for studying national consciousness and for determining the factor of national consciousness itself.”² In the same volume, J. A. Pocock calls history “a form of political culture and a branch of national consciousness.”³

For the student of national consciousness, writings that outline “national” histories are particularly valuable. As attempts to describe and teach the national past, they are the foremost examples of history as “a

¹ See John Lukacs, *Historical Consciousness on the Remembered Past* (New York, Evanston, and London, 1968), pp. 199–200.

² Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore and London, 1975), pp. 3–4.

³ J. A. Pocock, “England,” in Ranum, ed. *National Consciousness*, p. 98.

form of political culture and a branch of national consciousness," to use Pocock's words. Of course, they do not represent the totality of the written evidence of a society's perception of its history. Statements on the past are scattered throughout many types of sources: correspondence, administrative documents, literature, etc. Attention usually focuses on historical writings, however, because such works not only reflect, but also shape a society's vision of its past. In contrast to other sources that inform about specific incidents and events, historical writings present the events of the past in an organized manner.

Over fifty years ago, Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi argued that although the Cossack histories written at the turn of the eighteenth century are of little value as sources for the history of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Ukraine, they are invaluable sources on the political and social thought of the age in which they were composed.⁴ The writings of Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samuil Velychko were intended to provide historical and political legitimacy for the Cossack Hetmanate as a fatherland of the Ukrainian (Little Russian) people. The Cossack historians declared their desire to record the history of their people and native land. Although the scholarly literature on national consciousness in early eighteenth-century Ukraine remains weakly developed, all discussion draws on historical writings. Hrabianka's theories on the origins of the Cossacks and the Little Russians and Velychko's references to the "Little Russian Ukraine, our country and fatherland," "our own Sarmatian-Cossack ancestors' knightly bravery," and "our Cossack-Ruthenian ancestors" provide the material for discussions of national consciousness.⁵ This article examines elements of concepts of nationhood in history writing for the preceding period, from 1620 to 1690, for which little work has been undertaken. It attempts to establish what elements of Ukrainian national consciousness emerged in the first phase of early modern Ukrainian history writing. In Ukrainian cultural history, this period is of particular importance for the development of a more distinctly Ukrainian literary tradition and for self-consciousness replacing the common Ruthenian (Belorussian-Ukrainian) patrimony of the preceding age.

After a long hiatus of over two centuries, during which cultural centers in

⁴ For discussion of the cultural significance of the Cossack histories, see Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi (Mikhail Grushevskii), "Ob ukrainskoi istoriografii XVIII veka: Neskol'ko soobrazhenii," *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1934, pp. 215–33, translated into English as "Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century," in *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, pt. 1 (Munich, 1972), pp. 9–16.

⁵ For a discussion of names used in the Cossack histories, see Serhii Shelukhyn, *Ukraina—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavniishykh chasiv* (Prague, 1936).

Ukrainian territories produced few chronicles, history writing revived around 1600. The chronicles of Kievan Rus', Galicia-Volhynia, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania began to be used and reworked to meet the needs of seventeenth-century Ukrainians. Although the revival of history writing was stimulated to some degree by the economic and demographic progress of the sixteenth century, its more immediate causes were the educational and cultural activities of Orthodox Ruthenians (Belorussians and Ukrainians) who were being challenged by the Poles and by Latin culture. In using Rus' sources and in writing about the history of the Ukrainian territories, Polish historians provided information and models of historical thought and method for Ukrainian intellectuals. At the same time, Catholic and Protestant efforts to convert Orthodox believers, as well as the controversy over the Union of Brest, forced the Orthodox to justify their history and traditions. The resulting polemical literature was saturated with appeals to history on both the Orthodox and the Uniate sides. Indeed, the publishing program of churchmen had led to a rediscovery of Rus' historical texts, just as Ruthenian intellectuals were urging their contemporaries to look to their own sources for their true history. Consequently, in the early seventeenth century Ukrainians began to produce their own historical writings—accounts written in Slavonic or Ruthenian which were intended to inform their contemporaries of the past of Rus'.

The authors of these historical writings were churchmen, who constituted the traditional Ruthenian intellectual elite and who were imbued with the traditions of Slavonic, Orthodox culture. Yet the churchmen were also educated in the culture of the Latin West, and were well read in both classical works and in contemporary Polish historical works. As a result, in their writings traditional forms mixed with new ideas. Much more research on their sources and methods of composition is necessary to identify their world view and to determine the intellectual roots of their works.

This period of Ukrainian history writing ended in the 1680s, when Orthodox clerics ceased writing original histories of the Ukraine. By the end of the century, they yielded to laymen as the major writers of history in the Ukraine. Although educated in the same schools as the churchmen, the officials of the Cossack Hetmanate who wrote the major Ukrainian historical works of the early eighteenth century were less wedded to the traditions and forms of Orthodox Slavonic history writing. They directed their attention to the history and origins of the Hetmanate and the Cossacks rather than to those of the Ruthenian people and the Rus' religious past.

The political and cultural context of Ukrainian history writing between 1620 and 1690 was shaped by three major influences: the dominance of

Latin and Polish cultures, the control of foreign rulers and states, and the revolt of 1648 that overturned the existing order.⁶

In comparison to historical works written by other contemporary Orthodox Slavs, Ukrainian writings reflect a greater degree of "Westernization." This does not mean that the assimilation of Latin and Western elements into the Slavonic Orthodox cultural tradition, which would later produce such shockwaves among the other Orthodox peoples, proceeded easily among the Ukrainians. Nonetheless, in seventeenth century Ukraine we can observe an adaptation of new forms of history writing in an Orthodox Slavonic culture that had been thoroughly exposed to the language, thought, and education of the Latin West. Ultimately, the meeting of these two traditions produced a new genre of history writing: it broke away from the annalistic style of the chronicles to incorporate the form and thought of the humanist and Renaissance historiography that had developed two to three centuries earlier in the Latin West.

Ukrainian history writing evolved during a turbulent time when the entire political and social order was being overturned. Before 1648, the Polish-ruled Ukrainian lands were rife with religious, national, and social tensions. After 1648, the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising and the establishment of the Cossack Hetmanate created a homogeneous Orthodox polity controlled by a Cossack political nation. Political and social thought in the Ukraine adjusted to the revolutionary events only gradually. The legitimation of "revolution" through history writing was largely the work of the Cossack historians of the early eighteenth century, but the course of events was also treated by the ecclesiastical writers of the earlier period. These writers also recounted the events of the uprising when they wrote about the Muscovite tsar's claims to the Ukrainian territory after 1654.

In general, Ukrainian history writing of the period was a conservative genre not given to the expression of innovative views or explicit opinions about national consciousness.⁷ To detect these, as well as to trace the

⁶ See my article "The Cultural, Social, and Political Context of Ukrainian History Writing: 1620–1690," to be published in an issue of *Europa Orientalis* devoted to history writing in Poland, the Ukraine, and Russia edited by Giovanna Brogi-Bercoff. For comparative purposes, see Edward L. Keenan, "The Trouble with Muscovy: Some Observations upon Problems of the Comparative Study of Form and Genre in Historical Writing," *Medievalia et Humanistica*, n.s. 5 (1974): 103–126.

⁷ The basic works on Ukrainian historiography, containing information on publications and secondary literature, are N. P. Koval'skii and Iu. A. Mytsyk, "Ukrainskie letopisi," *Voprosy istorii*, 1985, no. 10, pp. 81–94; E. M. Apanovich, *Rukopisnaia svetskaia kniga XVIII v. na Ukraine: Istoricheskie sborniki* (Kiev, 1983); Iu. A. Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi XVII veka* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1978); Ia. I. Dzyra, "Ukrains'ki litopysy XVI–XVII st. v radians'kii istoriografii," *Istorychni dzherela ta ikh vykorystannia* 3 (1968): 177–189; M. I. Marchenko, *Ukrains'ka istoriografii: Z davnikh chasiv do seredyny XIX st.* (Kiev, 1959); Dmytro

emergence of a new national and political vocabulary, one must look to political tracts or the correspondence of the Ukrainian secular elite (some of it written in Polish). There, terms such as *natio* and *gens* were used by Ruthenians to refer to themselves in the sixteenth century, and the term *narod* appeared in Ruthenian and Slavonic documents to describe the Ruthenian community.⁸ Like the word for nation, new terms for state or realm (*panstvo*) and fatherland (*otchyzna*) were adapted from Polish and then applied to describe the Rus' past and the Ukraine. Even the clerics who wrote historical works were more likely first to express new perceptions of nation in religious polemical works rather than in chronicles. Therefore, the very presence of new perceptions of "nation" in the historical works indicates that the new concepts were penetrating to the core of Ukrainian culture.

The documents analyzed here can loosely be described as "national" histories. Local and monastery chronicles, saints' lives, and memoirs are not included; polemical works, genealogies, and correspondence are not discussed. The editing, publication, and study of Ukrainian historical writings remain, generally speaking, at a rudimentary stage. Little research has been done to identify the sources from which information and passages are taken. The process that produced the texts in the form that they exist, in particular the incorporation of earlier historical writings, has not been definitively studied. Nonetheless, the available texts of historical works are adequate to serve as a source base for studying concepts of nationhood.

Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography* (New York, 1957) (= *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.*, 5–6); D. I. Bahalii, *Narys ukrains'koi istoriografii*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1923–1925) (= *Zbirnyk Istor.-fil. viddilu UAN*; 1–2), and V. S. Ikonnikov's classic *Opyt russkoi istoriografii*, vol. 2, pt. 2 (Kiev, 1908). On the forms of history writing, see Keenan, "The Trouble with Muscovy"; Bernard Guenée, "Histoires, annales, chroniques: Essai sur les genres historiques au Moyen Age," *Annales: Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 28, no. 4 (July–August 1973): 997–1016; and Denis Hay, *Annalists and Historians: Western Historiography from the Eighth to the Eighteenth Centuries* (London, 1977). On the reading public, see O. M. Apanovych, "Chytats'ke seredovyshe Ukrainy XVIII st.," *Radians'ke literaturoznavstvo*, 1983, no. 5, pp. 43–49.

⁸ I. P. Krypiakevych, "Do pytannia pro natsional'nu samosvidomist' ukrains'koho narodu v kintsy XVI–na pochatku XVII st.," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1966, no. 2, pp. 82–84. Use of the Latin terms *patrio* and *natio* occurs in the sixteenth century in the works of the writer of Ruthenian (Ukrainian) origin, Stanisław Orzechowski: "sum gente Scythia, nazione Ruthena, utroque autem modo Sarmata, quod ea Russia, quae mihi patria est, in Sarmatia Europae sit posita, dextra habens Daciam, sinistra Poloniam, ante illam est Ungaria, post vero Scythia vergit ad orientem solem." Letter of Stanisław Orzechowski to Pope Julius III, 1551, in Ign. Chrzanowski and Stanisław Kot, comps. *Humanizm i Reformacja w Polsce: Wybór źródeł dla ćwiczeń uniwersyteckich* (Lviv, Warsaw, and Cracow, 1927), p. 328.

The *Lviv Chronicle*, the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, the *Kroinika* of Feodosii Sofonovych (or Safonovych), and the *Synopsis* traditionally attributed to Innokentii Gizel' are the four texts under examination here.⁹ It should be noted that although Uniates discussed history in polemical works, they produced no comprehensive accounts of Ukrainian history in traditional chronicle form written in either Slavonic or Ruthenian. Therefore, it is the Orthodox view that is examined in this article. Because the Orthodox took upon themselves the role of defenders of the national tradition, theirs is the dominant, if not the only, concept of nation.

Written in Ruthenian (Middle Ukrainian), the work later named the *Lviv Chronicle* is part of a manuscript book that also includes the documents and notes of Mykhailo Hunashevs'kyi, who donated the book to the Lviv Brotherhood in 1649. It seems likely that Hunashevs'kyi was the author of the chronicle as well. A member of the petty nobility of the Bratslav palatinate, he took clerical orders and lived in Cracow, Zamość, and Lviv. In 1638, he participated in the Cossack uprising; after 1648, he served as a scribe and diplomat under Khmel'nyts'kyi. Hunashevs'kyi supported Hetman Ivan Vyhovs'kyi's anti-Muscovite policies. He ended his career as a clergyman in Peremyshl', outside the boundaries of the Cossack Hetmanate. No patrons are indicated for the *Lviv Chronicle*, which exists only in Hunashevs'kyi's *silva rerum*, but it did address the needs of the Orthodox burghers of Lviv, who wanted an account of major contemporary events. Organized by years, the chronicle records events, many of Orthodox or Ukrainian-Ruthenian interest, from the fourteenth century; most of it, however, deals with the seventeenth century, particularly with the Cossack revolt of 1630. An addendum covers the early Khmel'nyts'kyi years.¹⁰

⁹ The major omission is the portion of the second Ukrainian Chronograph entitled "Kroinika slavianorusskaia o panstvakh ruskikh, polskikh i litovskikh." Parts have been published in *Letopis' Grigoriia Grabianki* (Kiev, 1854), pp. 274–300, and by N. N. Ulashchik in *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei* (hereafter *PSRL*), vol. 32 (Moscow, 1975), pp. 15–127; and H. I. Pavlenko, *Stanovlennia istorichnoi beletrystyky v davnii ukrains'kii literaturi* (Kiev, 1984), pp. 232–73. In addition to the literature in fn. 7, see V. Naumenko, "Khronografy iuzhno-russkoi redaktsii," *Zhurnal Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia* 239, no. 5 (1885): 34–82; Iu. P. Kniazkov, "Nekotorye voprosy publikatsii ukrainskogo khronografa," in *Analiz publikatsii istochnikov po otechestvennoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1978), pp. 75–82; and A. N. Popov, *Obzor khronografov russkoi redaktsii*, 2 pts. (Moscow, 1866–69). Mytsyk asserts that the second Ukrainian Chronograph was written after 1611, probably between 1632 and 1648.

¹⁰ The most recent edition, with an introduction, is O. A. Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys i Ostroz'kyi litopysets': Dzhereleznave doslidzhennia* (Kiev, 1970). See my review of this edition in *Recenzija*, 3, no. 2 (Spring 1973): 27–44. Also see M. Hrushevs'kyi (Grushevskii), "O tak nazyvaemoi L'vovskoi letopisi (1498–1648) i ee predpolagaemom avtore," *Izvestiia AN SSSR*, ser. 7, *Otd. obshch. nauk*, 1931, no. 5, pp. 569–87. I have taken biographical material on Hunashevs'kyi from Mytsyk, *Ukrainskie letopisi*, pp. 46–48, but I do not accept his categorization of the work as a "local chronicle."

In contrast to the vernacular *Lviv Chronicle*, the *Hustyn' Chronicle* was written in Ruthenian Slavonic, probably in the 1620s. It is named after the place where it was recopied in 1670 by Mykhailo Losyts'kyi, namely, the Trinity Monastery in Hustyn'. Its title, which may well date from the 1670 recopying rather than its actual composition, informs the reader of its contents: *A Chronicle (Kroinika) beginning with the Deluge and Tower and the division of tongues, and the scattering [of people] upon the face of the earth, and about different nations; also about the origins of the Slavic-Rus' nation, and when Kiev was settled, and how the pious, devout prince Volodymer baptized the Rus' land, and about the great principality of Kiev, and about the Greek emperors.*¹¹ The chronicle has been attributed to the Kiev clergyman Zakharia Kopystens'kyi, archimandrite of the Caves Monastery and author of the polemical work *Palinodiia*. It certainly served the needs of the Orthodox institutions of Kiev in the 1620s—the metropolitan see restored in 1620, the Epiphany Brotherhood founded in 1615, and the Caves Monastery, then being transformed into an educational and publishing center. All three institutions needed texts that could provide historical legitimacy for their defense of the Orthodoxy of the Ruthenian church and people.

The *Hustyn' Chronicle* begins the history of the Slavs and the Rus' in the biblical past, focuses specifically on events between the ninth and the thirteenth century, and continues the account to 1597. The work's primary subject is the past of the Ruthenian people and the Ukrainian lands. In one of its opening pages the author repeats the question asked by the author of the Primary Chronicle, replacing the term *zemlia* with *narod*: "Why is our nation called Rus?" Toward the end of his work he describes the history of the Cossacks and the genesis of the Union of Brest among the Ruthenians. In discussing the major historical events of the Ruthenian people, the chronicler uses political rulers as the principle of organization. Although the

¹¹ Кройника, которая начинается от потопа первого мира, и столпотворения, и раздѣленія языка и разсѣянія по всей вселеннѣй, и о розныхъ народахъ, таже и о початку Славенского Россійского народу, и егда сѣде Кіевъ, и како крести благовѣрный князь Володымеръ Рускую землю, и о великомъ княженіи Киевскомъ, и о Греческихъ царѣхъ.

An incomplete text of the *Hustyn' Chronicle* is published as an appendix to "Letopis' po Ipatskomu spisku," in *PSRL*, vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), pp. 233–373. The published version is from a manuscript that was a later reworking of a text that most scholars assume was composed in the 1620s. The text presumed to be the earlier version has not been published. For information on manuscripts and publications, see the works in fn. 7, as well as D. I. Myshko, "Hustyns'kyi litopys iak istorychne dzherelo," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1971, no. 4, pp. 69–73; and A. Iershov, "Koly i khto napysav Hustyns'kyi litopys?," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, 100, pt. 2 (1930): 205–211. Myshko disputes Iershov's claim that Kopystens'kyi wrote the work.

work is written as a chronicle with annual entries, chapter headings are frequently provided. The topics and use of headings reflect the difficulty in writing a history of the Ruthenians and the Ukraine focusing on rulers, since there had frequently been no native rulers in the Ukrainian lands. The early topical headings—"On Kiev, the Kievan princes, and on the establishment of Kiev, and how our Slavs were subdued by the Varangians and Khazars," "On the great prince Riurik, from whom the great Rus' princes rule, and why our nation was called Rus'," "On the adoption of Slavonic letters and the translation of books from the Greek tongue to the Slavonic"—are followed by chapters devoted to the reigns of princes to 1243, except for one chapter on the "Conversion of the Rus'." At that point chapter headings end and only years and events are recorded, to 1392. Then comes a chapter entitled "Skyrhailo the prince in Kiev," followed by headings for Ioan and Svydryhailo. Under 1471 it is noted that upon the death of Symon Olel'kovich, "the Kievan prince," a palatine was appointed: "And henceforth princes ceased to be in Kiev, and instead of princes, palatines were established." Chapter headings reappear only at the end of the work, with the presentation of three great "national" events—the origin of the Cossacks, the introduction of the new calendar, and the Union of Brest. The importance of the Union of Brest in stimulating historical interest can be seen in that the chronicle concludes with a detailed discussion and condemnation of that event. Despite the difficulty of organizing his work according to those who had ruled the Ukraine, the author nonetheless produced a rudimentary continuous history of the Ukrainian land and people.

In recopying the *Hustyn' Chronicle* in 1670, Losyts'kyi exhorted his readers to know the history of their "fatherland," but he did not connect that history, which ends with events in 1597 in the chronicle, to the momentous events of the seventeenth century. In contrast, when Feodosii Sofonovych called upon his readers to learn their history, he presented them with a text that came down to the very years when his work was composed, 1672–73. A descendant of a Kiev burgher family, Sofonovych attended the Kiev Collegium in the 1630s. In 1649 he accompanied a group of Kievan clergymen to Moscow, a journey he made again in 1654. He served as vice-rector of the Kiev Collegium from 1653 to 1655, when he was elected archimandrite of St. Michael's Monastery. From 1669 to his death in 1677 he was the administrator of the Kiev metropolitan see in the Cossack Hetmanate. Generally an opponent of the Moscow patriarch's influence on the Kiev metropolitanate, Sofonovych followed a vacillating political line: he sought Muscovite help in the 1650s, backed attempts to compromise with Poland in the 1660s, and returned to a pro-Muscovite stance to counteract

Tatar and Ottoman incursions into the Ukraine in the 1670s. In addition to his *Kroinika*, he wrote religious, hagiographic, and poetic works, and he recopied the *pomianyky* of the monastery.

Writing in Ruthenian, Sofonovych composed his *Kroinika* in three parts: "Chronicle about Rus'," "Chronicle about the Beginning and Name of Lithuania," and "Chronicle about the Polish Land." Each part starts with the biblical past, to show how the Rus' state arose and how the Lithuanian and Polish states originated and entered Rus' history. Sofonovych's principal subjects were rulers, and in Rus' history he paid particular attention to the thirteenth-century prince of Galicia-Volhynia, Danylo. But in progressing from the history of Lithuanian and Polish rulers to events in the Ukraine, he shifted his focus. The Lithuanian part concentrated on the Ruthenian princes, above all Prince Kostiantyn Ivanovych Ostroz'kyi, whereas the Polish part focused on the Cossacks and, after 1648, the Cossack Hetmanate. In all three parts Sofonovych dealt with ecclesiastical institutions and events, including the Union of Brest and the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy in 1620.¹²

¹² In addition to the works cited in fn. 7, see Cecilia Borelius, *Safonovičs Chronik im Codex AD 10 der Västeraser Gymnasialbibliothek* (Uppsala, 1952) (= Publications de l'Institut slave d'Upsal, 6). This book includes information on manuscripts and publication of fragments, as well as some fragments. Subsequently, fragments have been published in Pavlenko, *Stanovlennia istorichnoi beletristyky*, pp. 213–232. Also see A. Rogozinskii, "Kroinika Feodosiia Sofonovicha i eia otshosenie k Kievskomu Sinopsisu Innokentiiia Gizelia," *Izvestia Otdeleniia russkogo iazyka i slovesnosti Imperatorskoi akademii nauk* 15, no. 4 (1910): 270–86, O. A. Bevo, "Feodosii Sofonovych i ioho Kroinika," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1968, no. 8, pp. 101–104. Iu. A. Mytsyk has published widely on this topic in recent years on the basis of his dissertation: "Kroinika Feodosiia Sofonovicha kak istoricheskii istochnik i pamiatnik ukrainskoi istoriografii XVII veka," *Avtoreferat* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1975). See his "Vliianie Kroiniki Feodosiia Sofonovicha na Kievskii Sinopsis," *Nekotorye voprosy istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1972), pp. 129–36; "Kroinika o pochatku i nazvisku Litvy Feodosiia Sofonovicha i ee istochniki," in *Nekotorye voprosy sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Ukrainkoi SSR* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1973), pp. 158–167; "Kroinika o zemli Polskoi F. Sofonovicha kak istochnik po istorii narodno-osvoboditel'nykh dvizhenii XVII v. v Vostochnoi Evrope," *Voprosy rabochego i natsional'no-osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia*, no. 1 (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1974), pp. 164–69; "Voprosy izucheniia Kroiniki Feodosiia Sofonovicha v istoriografii," *Voprosy otechestvennoi istoriografii i istochnikovedeniia*, no. 2 (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1975), pp. 76–92; "Feodosii Sofonovych—vydatnyi predstavnyk istorychnoi dumky. (300—richchia z dnia smerti)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1977, no. 12, pp. 113–115; "Voprosy publikatsii teksta Kroiniki Feodosiia Sofonovicha," *Analiz publikatsii istochnikov po otechestvennoi istorii* (Dnipropetrovs'k, 1978), pp. 58–74; "Kroinika o zemli Polskoi F. Sofonovicha pro Vyzvol'nu viinu ukrains'koho narodu 1648–1654 rr. i vozz'ednannia Ukrainy z Rosieiu," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 1979, no. 6, pp. 116–23. My discussion is based on a reading of Mytsyk's dissertation and an examination of manuscripts in Sweden, Leningrad, and Kiev.

In contrast to Sofonovych's still unpublished *Kroinika*, the fourth text we are examining, the *Synopsis*, appeared in three editions between 1674 and 1681 and subsequently in over thirty reprintings. This work—written in Slavonic, not Ruthenian—became the main source of knowledge about the history of Kievan Rus' in Muscovy and the Russian empire. Its full title is *The Synopsis, or short compilation from various chronicles, about the beginning of the Slavic-Rus' nation and the first princes of the God-saved city of Kiev and the life of the holy, devout prince of Kiev and all "Rossiia," the first autocrat Volodimer, and about the pious successors of his Rus' rule, even unto our Illustrious and pious sovereign, tsar, and grand prince, Aleksei Mikhailovich, autocrat of all Great, Little and White "Rossiia."* A number of questions about it remain unresolved.¹³ One is whether an earlier version existed that was subjected to censorship before publication in 1674. Another is the authorship. Innokentii Gizel', the archimandrite of the Caves monastery, cited in the *Synopsis* as blessing the publication, is commonly believed to be the author. Critics of this hypothesis argue that the German-born Gizel' was too well educated, too loyal to the autonomy of the Ukrainian church, and too opposed to direct Muscovite rule in the Ukraine to have produced a text with so many errors, with so little erudition, and with such unswerving devotion to the Muscovite tsars' political needs. Advocates of his authorship maintain that if one reads the *Synopsis* as maintaining that Kiev should have the Muscovite tsar as its sovereign but at the same time as portraying Kiev, the Caves Monastery, and the autonomous Ukrainian church in a positive light, then the work is consistent with Gizel's views.¹⁴

¹³ In the 1674 version the title is: СΥΝΟΠΣΙΣ или краткое собраніе от разныхъ лѣтописцев, о началѣ Славяно-Россійскаго народа, и Первоначальныхъ Кн[а]зей Б[о]госпасаемаго града Кіева, ѿ житіи с[в]а[т]отого Бл[а]говѣрнаго Великаго Кн[а]зя Кіевскаго ѿ и Всея Россіи Первѣйшаго ѿ Самодержца Владиміра и ѿ Наслѣдникахъ Бл[а]гочестивыя державы егѿ Россійскія даже до Пресвѣтлаго и Бл[а]гочестиваго Г[о]сп[о]д[а]ря н[а]шего Ц[а]ря и Великаго кн[а]зя Алексія Михайловича Всея Великія, Малыя, и Бѣлыя Россіи Самодержца. Hans Rothe, ed., *Synopsis, Kiev 1681: Facsimile mit einer Einleitung* (Cologne, and Vienna, 1983) (= Bausteine zur Geschichte der Literatur bei den Slaven, 17). The introduction examines the scholarly literature. Of particular note is I. P. Eremin, "K istorii obshchestvennoi mysli na Ukraine vtoroi poloviny XVII v.," *Trudy Otdela drevne-russkoi literatury* (hereafter *TODRL*), 10 (1954): 212–22; S. I. Maslov, "K istorii izdaniі Kievskogo *Sinopsis*," in *Stat'i po slavianskoi filologii i russkoi slovesnosti: Sobranie statei v chest' akademika A. I. Sobolevskogo* (Leningrad, 1928), pp. 341–48; and S. A. Peshtich, "Sinopsis kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie," *TODRL*, 15 (1958): 284–98.

¹⁴ The issue is discussed in Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 42–64. Mytsyk proposes Panteleimon Kokhanovs'kyi as the author. *Ukrainskie letopisi*, pp. 25–26.

Although the author of the *Synopsis* remains unknown, its patron and readers are readily determined. In contrast to Losyts'kyi's and Sofonovych's works, the *Synopsis* does not begin by exhorting its readers to obtain the knowledge of history necessary for a true son of the "fatherland." Its opening pages carry the archimandrite's blessing, and its title links the ruling tsar to Volodimer; thus the monastery and the Muscovite tsar can be regarded as patrons of this first printed history intended for both the Ukrainian and the Muscovite reading publics.

The *Synopsis* discusses the biblical descent of the Slavs, Rus', and other related peoples, devotes considerable space to Volodimer and the conversion of the Rus', and lists the rulers of Kiev to the Tatar conquest. After narrating Batii's destruction of the Caves Monastery and the devastation around Kiev, it tells of the fourteenth-century victory of the grand prince of Moscow Dmitrii Ivanovich over the Tatar ruler Mamai. The account then deals with Kiev's fate after its destruction by Batii and with the division of the metropolitan see of Kiev into two parts. The 1680–81 version also includes an account of the transformation of the metropolitan see of Moscow into a patriarchate. The princes and palatines of Kiev are then listed, to Adam Kysil (1649–1653). More extensive comments are made on the "return" of Kiev to the rightful tsarist rule of Aleksei Mikhailovich, followed, in the edition of 1678, by reports of the Chyhyryn campaigns. Although the Cossacks are mentioned there as well as in the commentary on peoples and languages in the early part of the work, nothing is said about the Cossack revolt of the seventeenth century or the role of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossacks in the "return" of Kiev.

The *Lviv Chronicle*, the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, Sofonovych's *Kroinika*, and the *Synopsis* were produced in different historical contexts for different purposes; they are also disparate in language and structure. Yet all deal with the question of the nation or *narod*, and all except the *Lviv Chronicle* use the term in discussing the Ruthenians. Each text could be analyzed in detail for its particular concept of nation. Such an examination would require a detailed analysis of terms, usage, and political, cultural, and social thought revealed in each text. Here, instead, all four texts are examined for topics that are constituent elements of concepts of nationhood. The goal is an explanation of some of the components of concepts of nationhood that emerged within the changing cultural and political context of the Ukrainian lands between 1600 and 1690. Two related topics about the role of historical writings in national consciousness of the age—the genesis of Slavic peoples and discussions on language—will not be explored here, since they require extensive study of manuscripts and sources. Under investigation, then, are seven elements of the concept of nationhood: nomenclature,

territory, distinct peoplehood, historical continuity, social structure and elites, religion, and political culture.

First, we must look at the terminology for land and people that appears in each work. This is a complex matter because of the diverse and at times contradictory uses of terms derived from *Rus'*, *Rossiiia*, and *Ukraina* to refer to the Ukrainian people and territory. Indeed, this terminological imbroglio has prevailed in Ukrainian national consciousness to the twentieth century.

The author of the *Lviv Chronicle*, in recounting the Ruthenians' relations with the Liakhs (*Liakhy*) or "Poles" (*Poliaky*), uses "Rus'" as the plural of "Rusyn" to refer to the Ruthenians. "Ukraina," which appears frequently in the text, occurs only in the usual seventeenth-century usage to describe the Ukrainian lands along the Dnieper.¹⁵ The *Hustyn' Chronicle* also uses variants of "Rus'" in referring to the Ukraine and its inhabitants. There, too, "Ukraina" refers only to the region of the Dnieper lands, although the process by which the term became a national name equivalent to "Rus'" is apparent in the chapter "On the Origin of the Cossacks."¹⁶ "Rossiia," the term that the Hellenizing Orthodox clerics of Kiev made use of more and more frequently after the 1620s, is occasionally used to describe the early periods, but its variants "Malaia Rossiia" and "Velikaia Rossiia" are not found at all. In his introduction to the chronicle written in 1670, however, Losyts'kyi uses the term "Malaia Rossiia" to designate his homeland and the subject of the chronicle. He describes the ancient state of Volodimer as "Rossiia."¹⁷ It is not known whether the title of the chronicle was selected by its author or by Losyts'kyi, but its use of "slavenskii rossiskii narod" reflects the new clerical preference for "Rossiia" as well as an interest in Slavic origins.

In referring to the Ukraine and its inhabitants Sofonovych uses derivatives of the word "Rus'." His introduction, for example, declares that he will tell the sons of Rus' (*ruskim s[y]nom*) how the Rus' and the Rus' state (*panstvo*) came into being; he also writes of the "Rus' faith" and the "Rus' nation."¹⁸ The name "Ukraina" is initially used to refer to the Dnieper region, but with the formation of the Cossack polity it takes on broader significance.¹⁹ When Khmel'nyts'kyi swears loyalty to the tsar, he

¹⁵ See the entry for 1636: Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 115.

¹⁶ *PSRL*, 2: 368.

¹⁷ *PSRL*, 2: 233.

¹⁸ Borelius, *Safonovičs Chronik*, p. 95.

¹⁹ *Gosudarstvennaia Publichnaia Biblioteka Leningrad* (hereafter GPB), Otdel rukopisei, F. IV. 215, p. 347. Sofonovych writes about the election of Demian Mnohohrishnyi by the Cossacks: Которого имя Царь подтвердилъ. И далъ великій воляости, изъ всей Украины доходы Гетману и Козакомъ поступилъ. This manuscript is the "Obshymyi Synopsis Ruskyi" of Panteleimon Kokhanovs'kyi.

represents “all the Ukraine on both sides of the Dnieper.”²⁰ Sofonovych refers to “Malaia Rossiia” only at the very end of his chronicle; he rarely uses “Rossiia,” and never “Velikaia Rossiia.”²¹ These terms do not occur in the Muscovite tsar’s titles.²² Although the *Synopsis* refers at times both to princes and chronicles as “ruskii,” it is the term “rossiiskii” that the author prefers to describe the princes and people of the Ukraine’s past. He calls Volodimer’s polity “Rossiia.” This preference is evident in the chapter “O narodě ruskom ili svoistveněe rossiiskom” (About the Rus’ [ruski] or more properly “Russian” [rossiiskii] nation). There the author of the *Synopsis* uses “slaveno-rossiiskii” as a synonym for “rossiiskii.”²³ In recounting the Chyhyryn campaign, he uses “Malorossiiskii” as well as “Zaporozkii” to refer to the Cossack Hetmanate forces, and “Velikorossiiskii” or “Moskovskii” for the Russian forces.²⁴ “Velikorossiiskii” is also used to refer to the metropolitan of Moscow and the council of the Russian church at which Moscow was elevated to patriarchal rank.²⁵ The *Synopsis* inaugurates the wider usage of “Great Russian” and “Little Russian,” terms that after 1654 appear in the tsar’s title. The use of “rossiiskii,” or “slaveno-rossiiskii,” reflects a conscious choice to incorporate Muscovite events, since the terms are used to describe a community encompassing the Ukraine and Russia. For instance, in describing the creation of separate metropolitan sees for Kiev and Moscow in the fifteenth century, the *Synopsis* states that two metropolitans arose in “Rossiia.”

In the period from 1620 to 1690, the clerical writers added the terms “Rossiia,” “rossiiskii narod,” and “slaveno-rossiiskii narod” to the traditional “Rus’” and “ruskii narod” that had dominated in the sixteenth century in legal and administrative texts. In addition, as “Rossiia” came also to designate Muscovy, “Malaia Rossiia” and “malorossiiskii” came into more frequent use. In Sofonovych there are already indications that the earlier meaning of “Ukraina” as solely a geographic term for the Dnieper lands was being transformed into a “national” term associated with the Cossack Hetmanate. In the *Synopsis* “Zaporozkii” occurs to describe the Hetmanate’s armies. No stable nomenclature was established in the historical writings of the period, as different terms were chosen to emphasize specific cultural and political factors or connections. This terminological

²⁰ GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 349.

²¹ For “Malaia Rossiia,” see GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 349. “Rosiiia” (with one “s”) is used in Volodimer’s title. Pavlenko, *Stanovlennia istorychnoi beletristyky*, p. 229.

²² The tsar is referred to as Orthodox (*pravoslavnyi*); cf. GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 339.

²³ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, p. 149.

²⁴ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 372–73, 387, 388.

²⁵ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 354–57.

assortment served as the basis for the selection of national designations in the Cossack histories of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as well as for similar choices in Muscovy and Imperial Russia.

The second element of the concept of nationhood is the territory that is the central subject of the works. To what degree do our four historical writings depict the Ukrainian territories as an integrated unit and as distinct from surrounding territories?

In virtually confining its discussion to the seventeenth century, after the new political realities of the Union of Lublin of 1569 brought almost all the Ukrainian lands into the Kingdom of Poland and separated them from the Belorussian lands, the *Lviv Chronicle*, more so than any other seventeenth-century text, describes events in all the Ukrainian lands, including Galicia and the Dnieper region, with only limited attention to surrounding territories. In the much longer time span covered by the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, the Ukrainian lands underwent division and redivision. While the author includes material on surrounding states and societies, his interest centers on the Ukrainian territories, with the city of Kiev and the Kievan political tradition at the fore. The chronicle does mention other areas, including the entire Riurikid realm and the "Sarmatia" so popular among Polish historians (in which he includes the lands of the "Poliane, Drevliane, Sivery, Kryvychy, and others, or Muscovy, White Rus', Volhynia, Podillia, the Ukraine, Pidhiria, etc.').²⁶ But in fact even Belorussia is outside his discussion. This focus on the Ukraine is also evident in Losyts'kyi's mention of "Malaia Rossiia" in the colophon to his copy of the chronicle.

Although Sofonovych's geographic boundaries are never delineated exactly and cannot be deduced readily from his often cryptic narrative, they include all the Ukraine. In the first part of his *Kroinika*, he concentrates on the southern East Slavic territories, particularly the Galician-Volhynian principality as the successor state to Kiev. In the Lithuanian portion, he deals with princes and events on the Ukrainian territories; in the Polish section, with political and religious events in the Ukraine and, later, the Cossack Hetmanate. Although the author of the *Synopsis* also addresses a public outside the Ukraine, he provides a continuous history only for events in the Ukrainian lands, or, more precisely, for Kiev and the Kiev principality. Yet the chronicle's accounts of "Mosokh" and the establishment of Moscow,²⁷ of the victory of Dmitrii Ivanovich over Mamai,²⁸ and of the division of the Kiev metropolitan see that created two metropolitans in

²⁶ *PSRL*, 2: 236.

²⁷ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 156–57.

²⁸ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 281–344.

“Rossiia”²⁹ show that the author is interested not solely in the Ukraine.

None of the historical works state their geographic confines explicitly, yet in all four the focus is on the territory of the Ukraine. The lack of precisely defined borders reflected the realities of the tenth and eleventh centuries, as well as of the seventeenth. Two factors influencing historical writers to see the Ukrainian lands as an entity in the early seventeenth century were the political unity of the Ukrainian lands formerly part of Lithuania with those of Poland, and the revival of Kiev, the traditional center of political and cultural life in the Ukraine. The Union of Lublin of 1569 had given a certain unity to the lands annexed by Poland from Lithuania. The palatinates of the Lublin incorporation—Volhynia, Kiev, and Bratslav, to which the Chernihiv land was added after 1618—were given similar privileges and were frequently referred to as Rus’ or the Rus’ palatinates. At the same time, the inclusion of these territories in the same state as the western Ukrainian lands—that is, together with the palatinates of Ruthenia, Belz, Kholm and Podillia—had strengthened the contacts between these two regions populated by Ukrainians. The economic, cultural, and finally political revival of Kiev had inspired memories of a time when Kiev had ruled all these lands. After 1648 this perception was strengthened by the existence of the Cossack Hetmanate, which in 1649 claimed the Rus’ lands as far as “Lviv, Kholm, and Halych.” The unity of the Ukrainian lands was reinforced by the tsarist claims to these territories as “Little Russia” (in contrast to “White Russia”). Soon, however, the perception of the intrinsic unity of Lviv and the western Ukrainian lands with the rest of the Ukrainian lands would erode, for in political reality it had reflected the situation only between 1569 and 1648. Ultimately the perception of the unity of the Ukrainian lands of the Lublin incorporation would fade as the Cossack Hetmanate, which lost much of this territory, became the central focus of historians. Finally, even the perceived unity of the two banks of the Dnieper under the Cossack Hetmanate would be understood. These processes, however, can only be detected in the Cossack histories and chronicles. Perceptions of the unity of the Ukrainian lands, whether as Rus’, the Rus’ lands of the Kingdom of Poland, or as “Malaiia Rossiia,” prevailed well into the seventeenth century.

As for surrounding lands, the concept of the unity of the Ukrainian lands with Poland, Lithuania, and even Belorussia was gradually undermined. Until the *Synopsis* there was little interest in the lands of contemporary Russia in writing Ukrainian historical works, although the focus on

²⁹ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 353–54.

Volodimer's far-flung realm did illustrate a past connection between the Russian and the Ukrainian lands.

The third element at issue is the degree to which the Ukrainians were viewed as distinct from surrounding peoples (Poles, Russians, Lithuanians, Belorussians, etc.). Were the "Rusyny" or Ruthenians seen as a separate community, and were the Ruthenians of the Ukrainian lands distinguished from the Ruthenians of the Belorussian territories?

The *Lviv Chronicle* clearly distinguishes the "Rus'" from the Poles. This differentiation, along with its religious connotations, is apparent in a wry comment on the mutual slaughter of 1630 attributed to Hetman Stanisław Koniecpolski: "There is Union—Ruthenians rest [in death] together with Poles."³⁰ The chronicler mentions Muscovy rarely, but when he does, he makes no connection between the Muscovites and the Ruthenians.³¹ Distinctions between the Ruthenians and the Poles, Lithuanians, Tatars, Turks, and other nearby peoples are drawn throughout the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, but not between the Belorussians and the Ukrainians.³² Distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians occur, but are ambiguous. Early in the chronicle, Muscovy is included in a list of Ukrainian and Belorussian lands as part of Rus': "Although the names of the lands are different, it is well known that all of [their people] are of the same blood and line, and even now all of them are called by the very same name, Rus'. But whence this glorious nation obtained the name is recounted differently by chroniclers."³³ This statement notwithstanding, the chronicle often makes a distinction between Russians, their rulers, and their realm (for which he anachronistically applies the term "Muscovite" to as early as the twelfth century) and the Rus' community.³⁴ One example is the statement: "And he [Svydryhailo] began to do much evil with Muscovy to the Lithuanian land and Rus'."³⁵ The distinction is drawn most clearly in presenting the demands of the Lithuanian ruler for a separate metropolitan for his land

³⁰ Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 110.

³¹ Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, pp. 112–13.

³² See, for example, the discussion of Svydryhailo for 1433: *PSRL*, 2: 354. Свидригайло, князь Литовскій, неспокойный, приведе Татаръ на Литву и Ляхи; Татаре же, пришедше, поразумѣша силу Ляховъ и Литвы, сего ради не идоша на Литву и въ Ляхи, токмо землю его Рускую поплѣниша, около Кіева и Чернѣгова, огнемъ и мечемъ, безъ чысла христіянь въ плѣнь поведоша.

³³ *PSRL*, 2: 236. "Но обаче аще и различіе есть во именованіи волостямъ: но вѣстно есть всѣмъ, яко сіи всѣ единокровни и единораствны, се бо суть и нынѣ всѣ общеидинимъ именовъ Русь нарицаются. Но откуду взятися сему славному народу сіе именованіе Русь, лѣтописци различнѣ повѣдають."

³⁴ *PSRL*, 2: 311, 315.

³⁵ *PSRL*, 2: 352. 1406 "и паки начать много зла зъ Москвою творити Литовской землѣ и Руси."

who would protect the St. Sophia Cathedral in Kiev, imperative because “when the metropolitans came from Moscow, they had only one thing on their minds: how to acquire for themselves whatever was of beauty in [the Cathedral of St.] Sophia and how to take back to the Muscovite land the tribute paid by the priests and other lovers of Christ, and the [grand prince] regretted [this] and reflected so that the wealth of the Ruthenian lands should not be diminished.”³⁶ Travellers are described as going from “Muscovy to Rus’” in the late sixteenth century.³⁷ Contradicting an earlier statement that the Muscovites were also called “Rus’,” when the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* deals with the decline of the Ruthenian nation, it lists the Muscovites along with the Poles and the Lithuanians as invaders who devastated “our Ruthenian land” and caused the decline of the Ruthenian nation.³⁸

In recounting the past of the Lithuanians and the Poles, Sofonovych clearly distinguishes them from the Rus’. The very structure of the work emphasizes the distinction, through the examination of when the Lithuanians and the Poles entered Rus’ history. Sofonovych also distinguishes the Rus’ from the Muscovites and, if only by dealing little with their history, from the Belorussians. He does discuss the dynastic link between the late Muscovite rulers and the Kievan rulers, and the origin of Moscow’s position as the capital of the “Rus’ grand princes.”³⁹ He has little interest in Muscovite history, except to praise Ivan III’s victory over the Tatars.⁴⁰ In recounting the events of the seventeenth century, he treats Muscovy (“Moskva”), the “Muscovite tsar,” and the “Muscovites” as alien powers involved in Rus’-Ukrainian affairs. The *Synopsis* speaks of “nations” rather than rulers only in its early chapters, where the Slavs, Sarmatians, Roxolanians, etc., are discussed as the ancestors of the Lithuanians, Poles, Pomeranians, Volhynians, and other groups. All this is a prelude to the origin of the “Slavic-Rus’” nation or the “rossiiskii narod.” In this discussion the earlier seventeenth-century distinction between Muscovy (Moskva)

³⁶ *PSRL*, 2: 353. 1415. “а митрополитове пришедши зъ Москвы о семь токмо пекутся, еже обрѣтше што красно въ Софіи себѣ взяти, такожде и дани отъ священниковъ и инныхъ христоробець собравши въ Московскую землю со собою отнести, и сожалѣ о томъ, еще же размысли и се, да не умаляется богатство въ землѣ Руской.”

³⁷ *PSRL*, 2: 370. 1589.

³⁸ This text is cited in fns. 61 and 62. Also see the entry for 1432 in *PSRL*, 2: 354. Свидригайло же, яко неспокоюнъ, не преста брани со окольными Литвою, Ляхи и зъ Москвою, яко и всѣ такожде на него востаща, и от всюду великими бранми Рускую землю удручиша. И оттолѣ Рускіе князи начаша оскудѣвати и обнищевати.

³⁹ Pavlenko, *Stanovlennia istorychnoi beletrystyky*, p. 221.

⁴⁰ GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 381.

and Rus' is retained.⁴¹ Although the version of the origins of the various Eastern European peoples in the *Synopsis* is complex and contradictory, it culminates in the "Rus'" (or "rossiiskii") polity's and dynasty's full emergence with Volodimer's conversion to Christianity. Later "Rossiia" is viewed as encompassing Muscovy, as well as the "Rus'" lands of the Commonwealth.

The original stimulus for rediscovering the Rus' past was the threat posed by the Poles and the Catholic church to the Ruthenians and the Orthodox church. Hence, despite the political existence of the Ukrainians as part of Poland, the historic and contemporary distinction between Ruthenians and Poles is expressed strongly in the historical works. The "otherness" of Lithuanians is also expressed. In contrast, differences from the "Ruthenians" who inhabited the Grand Duchy of Lithuania—that is, the Belorussians—are not articulated. They are implicit, however, in the focus on events in the Ukraine and on the political history of Kiev, to the exclusion of events in Belorussia. They are also expressed in the use of "Malaia Rossiia" and "Ukraina" excluding Belorussia, terms reflecting the post-1648 political reality.

The most complex development in questions of identity occurred in perceptions of Russians. In the first half of the seventeenth century the perception of "Moskva" and "Rus'" as two different "national" communities was usual, and little kinship with the Muscovites and their state was noted. On the other hand, the study of Kievan Rus' emphasized the dynastic links of Muscovy with that state and the common origins of peoples sharing the old Rus' tradition. Hence in the 1670s Sofonovych could view the Muscovites and Muscovy as a people and culture alien to the Ukrainians, while at the same time the *Synopsis* began the process of viewing both as part of "Rossiia," although continuing to distinguish "Malaia Rossiia" from "Velikaia Rossiia."

A fourth constituent element of national consciousness is historical continuity. The writing of history within a national framework served to increase Ukrainian national consciousness by linking seventeenth-century Ukrainians with the deeds of their ancestors. The more comprehensively a text described the Rus' people from ancient times to the present, the more directly it served to strengthen national consciousness.

The *Lviv Chronicle*, which contains little material on events before the late sixteenth century, provides minimal information for establishing historical continuity. Two notes written in Polish (presumably by the author) that

⁴¹ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, p. 151. About the parts of Sarmatia, Sofonovych states: "Вторая, идеже Москва, Рѣсь, Полаки, Литва, Прѣсы, и проч[іе] обитают."

precede the entry for 1498 show an interest in connecting seventeenth-century Ukrainians to their earlier political history. Under 1339, the taking of Lviv by Kazimierz the Great of Poland is mentioned, and under 1471 the forcible transformation of the principality of Kiev into a palatinate is noted.⁴²

Much more important in fixing historical continuity is the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, which condenses the history of Kievan Rus' and supplements it with an account of the events of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries. Its coverage of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century events does not equal in extent its account of the earlier period, for which it could condense the old chronicles, but the *Hustyn' Chronicle* does include extensive discussions of the great events of the sixteenth century.

Sofonovych provides the most complete continuous history of the four. In his *Kroinika* the "Ruthenian sons" he defines as his public could trace their history from biblical origins through the Kievan Rus' polity, to Galicia-Volhynia, and on to the 1670s, while reading about the origins and development of the Lithuanian and Polish states that controlled the Ukraine. Sofonovych maintains continuity, however circuitous, while recounting the political discontinuities of the Ukrainian past, and thereby gives "Ruthenians" a full history of their "fatherland."

The *Synopsis*, on the other hand, presents only a skeletal account of which rulers controlled Kiev at what time. The Ukrainian reader is informed about the rulers in Kiev from the time of Volodimer to the Mongol invasion. Following an extensive description of Dmitrii Ivanovich's struggle against Mamai, he can proceed to a description of the fate of the principality of Kiev after Batii, the migration of the metropolitans to Moscow, the Lithuanian annexation of the Kiev principality, the establishment of two metropolitan sees, and the transformation of the Kievan principality into a palatinate. He can learn about the palatines of Kiev before the city's "return" to the rule of Aleksei Mikhailovich, "autocrat of all Great, Little and White Russia." In later editions the Chyhyryn campaigns are recounted. The *Synopsis* is not, however, a continuous narrative account of the Rus' people of the Ukrainian lands.

Although the Ukrainians are not presented in them as a people absolutely distinct from the other East Slavs for the period of Kievan Rus', or from the Belorussians in later periods, the *Hustyn' Chronicle* and Sofonovych's *Kroinika* gave the Ukrainians a continuous history of their land and people stretching back to the history of Kievan Rus' and earlier. It was by reviving knowledge of Kievan Rus' and Galicia-Volhynia and by connecting these

⁴² Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 99.

states with the Ukrainians of the seventeenth century that these works helped to develop national consciousness. The Soviet Ukrainian scholar Iu. A. Mytsyk describes Sofonovych as a proponent of the theory of “Halych—the Second Kiev.”⁴³ The *Synopsis*, on the other hand, which does not provide this continuous history of a land and people, tended to create a very different consciousness of dynastic succession and the historic communality of “Rossiia.”

The fifth element under our investigation is the relationship between social groups and the national community. In early modern Eastern Europe, the “nation” was frequently seen as embodied in certain corporate orders, usually the nobility. The relation of corporate orders to the national community is complex in seventeenth-century Ukraine. Western corporate orders had emerged late among the Ukrainian population; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries numerous members of the leading order, the nobility, abandoned their link to the Ruthenian community by converting to Western faiths; and the Cossacks constituted a unique social order unknown in societies to the west.

In comparison to other short works of the period, which devote considerable attention to panegyrics to the Ruthenian Orthodox nobility, especially to Prince Kostiantyn Vasyl’ Ostroz’kyi, the *Lviv Chronicle* stands out by casting the Cossacks as defenders of Rus’.⁴⁴ Although primarily a history of rulers and states, the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* occasionally deals with specific social strata. For example, the chapter “On the Union, how it began in the Ruthenian Land” recognizes the importance of the Ruthenian nobility as representatives of the Rus’ land.⁴⁵ The author of the chronicle seems to have realized, however, that a new leading social order was emerging among the Ukrainians. The chapter “On the Beginning of the Cossacks” is evidence of the nobles’ anomalous position in a Commonwealth that had declared Orthodoxy illegal, a situation that forced the Orthodox to turn to the Cossacks for support. In that chapter the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* gives the

⁴³ Mytsyk, “Kroinika” Feodosiia Sofonovycha kak istoricheskii istochnik, p. 16. Sofonovych calls Danylo the Rus’ king: GPB, F. IV 215, f. 366.

⁴⁴ For praise of Ostroz’kyi in the *Ostroh Chronicle*, see Bevzo, ed., *L’viv’skyi litopys*, pp. 131–32. For a pro-Cossack stance, see in the *Lviv Chronicle* the account of the 1630 Cossack revolt and the description of the 1638 revolt. The first (p. 105) includes the statement: “Жолніре до Києва приїхали с тим інтендом аби впрод козаков, а затим во вшисткой Україні русь вистинати аж до москви.” The second (p. 115) has a marginal note: The beginning of the Cossack servitude (Початок козацької неволи). For legitimization of the Cossacks as knights, see the account of Sahaidachnyi’s speech to the king in 1620 (p. 104). Also see 1636, p. 116.

⁴⁵ The *Hustyn’ Chronicle* also notes the granting to the Ruthenian *shliakhta* of equality with the Polish in 1434. *PSRL*, 2: 354.

Cossacks historical legitimacy as a Rus' political nation, by linking their history to the Kievan past and by portraying them as the defenders of the Rus' land.⁴⁶

Sofonovych deals with social orders as part of his attempt to write a continuous Ukrainian history, but as an Orthodox cleric he is attuned to produce instead a history of churches and dynasties. In the "Chronicle about Rus'" he writes about the ruling princes, but for the Lithuanian periods he has to shift to descendants of ruling princes, such as Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi, and to the Ruthenian nobles.⁴⁷ Reflecting on their importance in Ruthenian religious life, he remarks: "The Ruthenian lords and nobles as well as the Ruthenian clergymen did not accept the Union," thus putting the powerful laymen in the primary position.⁴⁸ Although Sofonovych concludes his work with Khmel'nyts'kyi's revolt and the history of the Hetmanate, he does not provide a well-thought-out explanation for the rise of the Cossacks, and his shift from a history of Poland and its Ruthenians to a history of the Cossack Hetmanate is abrupt.⁴⁹ Its concentration on political rulers, with no attention to various Rus' social strata, sets the *Synopsis* apart from other Ukrainian historical works.

The question of social strata is particularly important in Ukrainian national consciousness because of the lack of a Ruthenian dynasty or polity and because of the transformation of political elites in seventeenth-century Ukraine. To understand the development in Ukrainian historical texts we must know what changes in concepts of nation were taking place in Polish political thought and historical works from the early sixteenth to the seventeenth century. The early Renaissance concept of a Polish historical-cultural-linguistic nation comprising several orders was replaced by the concept of a "noble nation." In essence, the political nation of the nobility was seen as embodying the Polish polity and representing the entire Polish people. It was this concept of a "political nation" that influenced the seventeenth-century definition of the Ruthenian nation, although the older Rus' traditions of a princely magnate elite distinct from the nobles as well as the replacement of the noble order with the Cossack in the mid-seventeenth century made for considerable differences between the Ukrainian and the Polish situation.

⁴⁶ See the citation of this text in fns. 61 and 62.

⁴⁷ On Ostroz'kyi, see GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 382, 388.

⁴⁸ GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 327.

⁴⁹ Sofonovych does provide historical precedence for the Cossacks' role in Ukrainian history by asserting their existence in as early as the thirteenth century. GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 366.

The authors of seventeenth-century Ukrainian historical works were inclined to present the Ukrainian past as the history of dynasties and states, under which the Ruthenian nation developed. Nevertheless, in recounting events after the fifteenth century, when the Kiev principality was transformed into a palatinate, only the *Synopsis* concentrates solely on government structures, listing the Lithuanian and Polish palatines of Kiev. The *Hustyn' Chronicle* and Sofonovych's *Kroinika* mention the role of the princely families and the rights granted the Ruthenian nobility, especially in justifying the resistance to the Union. In particular, Sofonovych's praise of Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi recalls Orthodox clerics' attempt to glorify the genealogies of early seventeenth-century Ruthenian princes in order to gain both legitimacy and supporters for their cause. The legitimization of the Cossacks' historic role is more apparent in the *Hustyn' Chronicle* than in Sofonovych's *Kroinika*, but the final elevation of the Cossacks to a Ukrainian political nation occurred only later, in the Cossack histories. This weak development of the concept of a political nation—noble or Cossack—in the ecclesiastic historiography of 1620–1690 goes far to explain why the *Synopsis*, with its dynastic history, had such attraction, and also why clerics ceased to write “national” history after 1690, leaving the task of depicting Cossack corporate grievances and the formation of the Cossack polity to laymen.

The sixth constituent part of concepts of nationhood is religion. Specifically, this issue deals with Orthodoxy as a factor differentiating Ukrainians from Poles and integrating them with Belorussians and ultimately Russians. Related is the position of the Uniates in the national community. Also included is the function of anti-Islamic sentiment in shaping national consciousness.

All the chronicles of the period pay particular attention to religious affairs. The *Lviv Chronicle*, ardently Orthodox, devotes considerable space to church matters, including the election of Peter Mohyla.⁵⁰ Its author is less anti-Muslim than he is anti-Catholic. He views the religious union with great animosity as a Polish attack on the Rus'. The same can be said about the author of the *Hustyn' Chronicle*; in dealing with the Union of Brest, he condemns the Uniates as “apostates.”⁵¹

Sofonovych's work displays an Orthodox fervor not apparent in his own career: in 1658 he had supported political union with Catholic Poland. In the *Kroinika* he cites the Muscovite ruler's Orthodoxy as a justification for

⁵⁰ Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 111.

⁵¹ *PSRL*, 2: 373: 1597: Сїи же апостаты, Рымскіе унѣты, даже и донынѣ отторгшеся отъ Востока въ томъ раздѣленїи пребываютъ, непрестанно гоняще церковь Божїю.

the resistance to Vyhovs'kyi's compact with Poland.⁵² His opposition to the Turks and Tatars stems not only from their devastation of the Ukraine, but also from their being Muslims: he criticizes Khmel'nyts'kyi's alliance with them for that reason.⁵³ The *Synopsis* also covers the main events of church history, e.g., the destruction of the Caves Monastery by the Tatars, the history of the Kievan metropolitan see and of the Moscow patriarchate. This work, too, is ardently anti-Muslim, particularly in its account of the battle against Mamai and the Chyhyryn campaign. The struggle against the Turks and Tatars is a struggle by the Orthodox "Russian" nation (*pravoslavnyi rossiiskii narod*), and the combined forces of Muscovy and the Cossack Hetmanate are the "Orthodox army."⁵⁴ In contrast to the other historical works, the *Synopsis* does not even mention the Union of Brest. This omission, even more than his not mentioning the Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, illustrates that the dynastic claims of the Muscovite tsar, rather than sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ukrainian history, were the author's major focus. Presumably, for a subject of the staunchly Orthodox Muscovite tsar the Union of Brest no longer seemed threatening.

Religious controversy had sparked the history writing. As Ruthenians' religious unity disintegrated and attempts to restore it failed, debates grappling with new cultural-national issues came to the fore. In general, the Orthodox continued to insist that Orthodoxy was at the root of Rus' identity. This is the view in historical writings, which do not contain the complex discussions about the division among Ruthenians and the relationship of religious and national allegiances of some of the polemical works. In the *Lviv Chronicle*, the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, and Sofonovych's *Kroinika*, the Uniates are "apostates" who separated themselves from the Rus' community. In all four works, the Roman Catholics are both enemies and Poles or "Liakhs." After the Uniate and Roman Catholic threat receded in the 1660s and the Turkish-Tatar threat came to the fore in the 1670s, Muslims were seen as the major enemy. This is reflected in the later works. In these ways religion served to define and strengthen national feeling and to prompt Orthodox churchmen to write about Ukrainian history.

Religion did not strengthen Ukrainian national consciousness in relation to the Muscovites, who were also Orthodox. As the Orthodox tsar and the patriarch of Moscow acquired more influence, the Orthodox clergymen, who had first resisted Muscovite influence, came to recognize the benefits

⁵² GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 340.

⁵³ GPB, F. IV 215, fol. 332.

⁵⁴ Rothe, ed., *Sinopsis*, p. 364: "ves' Pravoslavnyi rosiiskyi narod;" p. 365, "Pravoslavnorossiiskyi kraj;" p. 393, "Pravoslavnoe voinstvo."

to be gained from loyalty to an Orthodox tsar and state and to an influential Orthodox patriarchate. In the 1620s the *Hustyn' Chronicle* had justified efforts to create a separate metropolitan see for Kiev by the Grand Dukes of Lithuania by decrying the plunder of the Ruthenian church by metropolitans who resided in Moscow.⁵⁵ In the *Synopsis* of 1674, the author presented the division of the metropolitan see in factual terms, as having created two metropolitans in "Rossiia."⁵⁶ In the *Synopsis* of 1681, an added account provided prophetic justification for the elevation of the metropolitan see of Moscow to a patriarchate.⁵⁷ Orthodoxy and the church later figured in attempts to integrate Ruthenians or Little Russians and Muscovites or Great Russians into one "rossiiskii narod."

A seventh constituent element of national consciousness is the expression of political loyalties and the articulation of a specific political culture. As a historical text documented the past of the Ruthenian nation, it emphasized the political past, that is, the rulers and institutions forming that nation. In particular, the problem of political legitimacy and revolt shaped early modern Ukrainian national consciousness. History could provide legitimacy for Ukrainian political aspirations and for the events of the seventeenth century. In discussing concepts such as nation, fatherland, and state in a historical context, the historical writings gave a political dimension to the Ruthenian community.

The *Lviv Chronicle* shows ardent attachment to the Ruthenian community and contains anti-Polish overtones.⁵⁸ Yet, its account of events before 1648 is frequently loyal to the Polish-Lithuanian state, and even the account after 1648 displays relative impartiality in dealing with Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Polish government. On the other hand, it praises the Cossacks during their revolts of the 1620s and 1630s and traces the growing tension between the Ruthenian Orthodox and the Polish-Lithuanian political rulers. In the first two entries there is a certain consciousness of the Ruthenian political past, in the mention of Kazimierz's conquest of the Halych principality in 1339 and in another of the abolition of the Kiev principality in 1471.⁵⁹ The latter event, which marked the end of a separate political tradition in the Ukraine, is emphasized in other historical works.

⁵⁵ *PSRL*, 2: 353.

⁵⁶ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 408–409.

⁵⁷ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 353–58.

⁵⁸ See, for example, the ironic statement on Polish activities against the Cossacks in 1636, accompanied by the marginal note "The beginning of Cossack servitude." "In that year the Poles were fortunate (*Toho zh roku poshchastylo liakhom*)." Bevzo, ed. *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 115.

⁵⁹ Bevzo, ed., *L'vivs'kyi litopys*, p. 99.

The author of the *Hustyn' Chronicle* is loyal to the rulers and states that controlled the Ukraine, including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He does, however, prepare Ukrainian society for a shift of political loyalties—whether consciously or not—by documenting that Kiev had once been the center of a state and that Rus' had its own rulers.⁶⁰ He affirms the historical role of the Cossacks as defenders of the Ruthenian national interest, and, just as important, provides an answer to the question, whence come the Ruthenians. The *Hustyn' Chronicle* provides historical continuity for the Ruthenian people by tracing their history directly back to a state and civilization equal in importance to that of “Liakhs.” This text makes one of the most explicit statements of national consciousness while providing a historical proof for a continuous Ukrainian culture:

1516. In this year the Cossacks began in the Ukraine, and we shall say something about who they were and whence they came: Even though from its beginning this our Rus' nation has always been engaged in wars and from the earliest time has known in them skill, weapons, and battles, as has been discussed in length in an earlier chapter (whence came the Slavic people), when princes came into being, better governance and more agreeable customs started in our land. However, our war-loving people did not cease to fight, if not with neighboring peoples, that is, with the Greeks and later with the Polovtsians and Pechenegs, among themselves, as can be seen in this chronicle, until Batii, the Tatar tsar, who devastated our Rus' land, diminished and humbled our nation [or people]. And still by the Poles, the Lithuanians, and the Muscovites, and also from civil wars [our nation] was severely damaged and diminished, and then also our princes declined, and our nation became somewhat pacific. . . .⁶¹

Later, linking the organization of the Cossacks in the Ukraine to this same historical tradition, the chronicler writes that after raids had been

⁶⁰ He also emphasizes the political decline of Kiev and the conversion of the Kievan principality (*kniazstvo Kievskoe*) into a palatinate against the will of the Kievans, who resisted Marcin Gasztold's appointment because he was not a prince and even more so because he was a *Liakh* (here meaning Catholic). *PSRL*, 2: 358.

⁶¹ *PSRL*, 2: 367–68. Въ сіе лѣто начашася на Украйнѣ козаки, о нихъ же откуда и како начало свое пріяша нѣчто речемъ: Аще и отъ начала своего сей нашъ народъ Рускій брани всегда употребляшеся, и отъисперва въ нихъ сіе художество бѣ, оружіе и брани, якоже вышше пространнѣе речеся въ главѣ той, откуда изыде народъ Словенскій; посемъ егда начаша князи быти, наста въ нихъ лучшее строеніе и обычаи пріятнѣйшыи въ землѣ нашой: но одиначе сей народъ нашъ бранилюбный не преста строити брани, аще не со околными народы, си есть, Греки, а потомъ Половци, Печенѣги, то сами межю собою, якоже въ семъ Лѣтописци есть видѣти, донелѣ же презъ Батія Татарского царя, иже землю нашу Рускую пугу сотвори, а народъ нашъ умали и смири, ксему же еще и отъ Ляховъ, и Литвы, и Москвы, такожде и междособными брани зѣло озлобленны и умаленны быша, а потомъ и князи въ нихъ оскудѣша; тогда сей нашъ народъ мало упокоюся.

organized by the Polish-Lithuanian rulers against the Tatars and Turks recruiting in the Ukraine:

And then this warloving people, having tasted of booty, appointed for themselves an elder from among them named “Kozak,” and from him they were later called Cossacks themselves, and they frequently raided the Tatar land and from there brought back much booty. There were more and more of them, from day to day, they became more numerous with time, and even unto today they have not ceased to do harm to Turks and Tatars.⁶²

In this short account, the *Hustyn' Chronicle* offers a historical vision that places the Cossacks within a long tradition of defenders of the Rus' land and people. It certainly provided historical legitimacy for the actions in the 1620s of the Ruthenians, who had defied the Polish king and government by establishing an Orthodox hierarchy and who had turned to the Cossacks for support.

Recopying the *Hustyn' Chronicle* in 1670, Losyts'kyi knew that the Cossacks had attained a status far greater than that which they had had in the 1620s. No longer merely defenders of the Orthodox church against the Catholic Poles, they had taken control of much of the Ukrainian land. Although Losyts'kyi did not add to the historical account of the *Hustyn' Chronicle*, his preface did reflect the growing political and national consciousness of the Ukraine. His preface is the first of the four historical works to use “fatherland” to refer to the Ukraine.

⁶² The text following that cited in the preceding footnote is: Въ лѣто же вышеириченое, егда король забавляшеся зъ Москвою, а Миндикерей поплѣни землю нашу, якоже о томъ вышеи, посла Жигмонть король посла ко Миндикерей, глаголя: „почто, миръ имѣя со мною, поплѣнил еси мою землю?”. Миндикерей же отвѣща: „кромѣ моя воля се безчинницы нѣкія сотвориша, ихъ же азъ не могохъ возстягнути.” Жигмонть король хотя ему сей смѣхъ отдати, посла Прецпава Лянцкорунского на Украину собирати люду и такожде Татаромъ пакостити; онъ же собравъ охотниковъ скилка сотъ, пойде съ ними аже подъ Бѣлагородъ и тамо забра множество товара, и коней, и овецъ Татарскихъ и Турецкихъ, и возвратиса съ ними. Татаре же и Турци, собравшеся, гониша по нихъ и постигоша ихъ аже подъ Очаковомъ, у Овидова озера, и бишася съ ними; но наши поразиша ихъ и со великимъ добытиемъ во здравіи возвратишася. И потомъ бранилюбивый сей народъ, засмаковавши себѣ зъ добычъ, наставиша себѣ старѣйшину зпосередѣ себе, нарицаемаго Козака, отъ него же и сами потомъ козаками нарекошася, и начаша сами часто въ Татарскую землю ходити, и оттуду многія добытія приносити; день же отъ дне примножашеся ихъ, иже по времени умножишася, и даже доселѣ не престають пакости творити Татаромъ и Туркомъ. А старѣйшину себѣ избирають спосредѣ себе, мужа храбра и смысленна, по своему древнему обычаю; живутъ же всегда на Запорожю, риби ловяще, ихъ же безъ соли на солнцу сушатъ; а на зиму расходятся каждо во свой градъ, толко зъ килка сотъ оставляють на куренѣ стрещи стрѣлбы и чолновъ, а на лѣто паки собираются. И симъ образомъ козаки начало свое пріяша. (*PSRL*, 2: 368).

FOREWORD TO THE READER

Every man is possessed by a certain inborn desire and love toward his fatherland, which attracts everyone the way a lodestone attracts iron. This was clearly explained by the Greek poet Homer in his text [about one who] was far from his homeland due to captivity and could no longer return; caring about nothing else, he desired to see at least the smoke from the chimneys of his fatherland. The same goes for the authors of this Rus' Chronicle; although they were mortal men and undoubtedly knew that death would be their end, they, filled with inborn love toward their fatherland, desired even after their demise not to let the events of the past remain hidden from future generations, namely, from the Rus' nation. These they described and presented clearly to the world. For the beginning they added the [event] from the Deluge, when Noah, after leaving his ark, distributed the earth among his sons, and in which part each of them settled down, and what estate each of them was given by God's blessing, from which various nations originated and established themselves in various parts [of the world]. Also about the heroic wars. In addition to it, you, dear reader, will see in this Chronicle, about the Greek monarchy, how bravely it used to fight; and about the beginnings of holy baptism by the piously devout great prince Volodimer of Kiev, who, after he baptized "Rossiia," crushed the pagan idols; and how the Turks occupied Greece.

For what reason is the reading of history absolutely necessary to every man? For were it not to be described and presented to the world, all would descend unknown to the earth together with the [human] body, and people would remain as in the dark not knowing what took place during the past centuries. After reading all in this Chronicle, you may pass it on to other, younger people who need to learn and to whom the holy prophet Moses [said:] "ask thy father and he will show thee; the elders, and they will tell thee" [Deut. 32: 7]. But I, not diverting you any more with this foreword, am referring you further to this book for the better understanding of all you gentlemen who are willing to read it.

The well-disposed scribe of this chronicle, wishing you, gentlemen, the salvation of the soul and the health of the body, the unworthy hieromonach, Mykhailo Pavlovych Losyts'kyi.⁶³

⁶³ *PSRL*, 2: 233. Прирожная есть якась хуть и милость противко отчизнѣ своей жадному чоловікови, которая каждого не иначе едно яко магнесъ камень желѣзо такъ до себе потягаеть, шо оный поета Грецкїй Гомерусъ яснѣ до ихъ въ своемъ текстѣ выразилъ, же ни о шо недбаючи, кгда былъ отъ родства своего отдаленый презъ поиманье и южь ся вернути не моглъ, прагнулъ видѣти наветъ дымъ своеи отчизны. Такъ и сіе авторове Кройники сей Россійское любо были людьми смертелными и знали запѣвне, же смертію закочити мусягъ, природною милостию противко отчизны своеи зняты будучи, прагнули того, абы и по ихъ зейстю послѣднему роду не были прошлые рѣчи, а мяновите народови Россійскому скрытые: шо описали и свѣту ясне выразили, придавши напродь отъ потопа, кгда по выистю зъ ковчега Ное якъ землю сыномъ своимъ роздѣлили, и которые зъ нихъ якую часть осѣли, и яковый станъ которому сынови благословилъ отъ Бога данный мѣти, зъ которыхъ народове розные выишли и въ сторонахъ розныхъ поосѣдали, и о войнахъ валечныхъ. Дотого тежъ въ Кройницѣ сей обачишь, чителнику ласкавый, о монархіи Грепкой, якъ валечная бывала, и о початку крещенія святого черезъ благовѣрного великого князя Володымера Кіевського, который Россію окрестивши балваны поганскіе покрушилъ, и якъ Турокъ Грецію осѣлъ. Для чого каждому чоловікови читанье гисторый есть барзо потребно: бо кгда бы не описано и свѣту не подано, заразъ бы зъ тѣломъ безъ вѣсти все сходило въ землю, и люде бы якъ у тмѣ

Writing two years after Losyts'kyi, Sofonovych too wished to ensure that his contemporaries knew their national past. He made his work more accessible by writing it in Middle Ukrainian (Ruthenian). The desire to inform a wider public is spelled out in his preface: "I have considered it a proper matter to know myself and to tell other Ruthenian sons whence Rus' arose and how the Ruthenian *panstvo* has continued from its initial establishment until now. For it is necessary for everyone to know about his fatherland and to be able to answer other people's questions about it, since men who do not know their origins are regarded as fools."⁶⁴

Sofonovych chose to recount the history of the fatherland to his countrymen at a time when they had lived through a quarter-century of political turmoil. He did not advocate political revolution, or reluctantly approve Ruthenian political loyalty to Lithuania and Poland. He did not attempt to justify the Cossack revolt and the new political order. In writing about his own time, he did express loyalty to the Muscovite tsar, but, mindful of the uncertain current political situation, refrained from criticizing Hetman Petro Doroshenko's plans to bring the Ukraine under Ottoman suzerainty.⁶⁵ Sofonovych was most explicit in his political views when discussing the distant past. He censured Polish historians for casting aspersions on eleventh-century Ruthenian princes, and he propagated the theory that the Galician-Volhynian state succeeded to the Kievan in the thirteenth century.⁶⁶ For the contemporary period, his political views were as ambiguous as the age was uncertain. He provided an account that gave the Ukrainians a place in their time, but showed that place to be not a very secure one. The uncertain political culture of seventeenth-century Ukraine is evident even in his terminology. Still rooted in the Polish, not the Russian, political experience, Sofonovych considered it necessary to inform his readers that

будучи не вѣдали, що ся прошлыхъ вѣковъ дѣяло. Которую Кройнику прочитавши, можешъ подати до увѣдомленя и прочимъ требующимъ юнѣйшимъ, до которыхъ с. пророкъ Моисей мовить: вступи отца твоего, и возвѣститъ тебѣ, старца твоя, и рекуть тебѣ. Але я, не бавячи предмовою сею, далей въ книгу сію отсылаю для лѣпшого зрозумѣня всѣхъ вашихъ милостей, хто схочеть прочитати, и вашимъ милостямъ душевного спасенія и тѣлесного здравія,

зичливый писарь тоеи Кройники иеромонахъ недостойны Михаилъ Павловичъ Лосицкiи.

⁶⁴ Cited in Borelius, *Safonovičs Chronik*, p. 95. Предсловіе. В Руси я уродившися в вѣре православной, за слушную рѣчь почиталемабытвѣдал сам и ишим Рускимс[у] номъ сказа! от коль Русь почалася и якъ папство Руское за почат ку ставши до сего часу идет. Кождому бовѣмъ потребная есть рѣчь о своей от чизнѣ знати и ишимъ пытающимъ сказати бо своего роду незнаючихъ людей за глупыхъ почитаютъ. Що теды из розныхъ лѣтописцов Руских и кройник Пол скихъ вычиталетое пишу.

⁶⁵ ГРВ, F. IV, 215, fols. 345–46.

⁶⁶ These are the conclusions of Iu. A. Mytsyk in his candidate's dissertation, "Kroinika Feodosiia Sofonovicha kak istoricheskii istochnik i pamiatnik ukrainskoi istoriografii XVII veka"

someone was “a boyar, that is, a Senator.”⁶⁷ But if the politically indecisive archimandrite did not advance political thought, at least he provided data for it through a comprehensive history of the Ukraine to the 1670s. When he told his contemporaries that their Rus’ *panstvo* had endured from the earliest times, he presented the Ukrainians with an object for their loyalty that existed in 1672 as it had in 1072, and thereby demonstrated the continuity of the Rus’ past from the eleventh through the seventeenth centuries. His word for describing the early history of the Rus’ could mean “state” in seventeenth-century Ukrainian, although a broader interpretation as “realm” or “domain” would fit his insistence that it endured to the present, since his foreword and history had referred to the Ukrainian lands, which did not constitute a state in the sixteenth or the early seventeenth century. The Ukraine as the Rus’ *panstvo* of the 1670s was an inchoate political entity. Whatever the word *panstvo* meant, however, one thing was evident: to Sofonovych Muscovy did not constitute the Rus’ *panstvo*.

In political terms, the *Synopsis* propagates the view that *samoderzhavie* is the proper form of rule in Kiev and that the Muscovite tsars are successors to the ancient dynasty of Kievan princes. The Muscovite ruler’s takeover of Kiev is presented as the city’s return to its rightful sovereign. In contrast to other contemporary Ukrainian historical works of the period, which emphasize the role of the Union of Brest in solidifying opposition to Polish rule and which discuss the role of the Cossacks in overthrowing that rule, in the *Synopsis* the Muscovite takeover appears *ex nihilo* as the logical outcome of the Muscovite ruler’s legitimate dynastic claims.⁶⁸ Indeed, the *Synopsis* was written to justify the tsar’s claims. In all published editions—although this is more apparent in the edition of 1680–81 than in that of 1674—Muscovy is united with Kievan history to create “Rossiia” and to affirm the tsar’s rights over “*Velikaia Rossiia, Malaia Rossiia, and Belaia Rossiia.*” With this affirmation of a common ruler, origin, and history, the fundamental assumptions for the existence of one Russia are outlined. While it is not a history of an “All-Russian” nation, the *Synopsis* did establish the groundwork for the “All-Russian” histories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries grounded in dynastic legitimacy and for the transfer of political traditions from Kiev to Moscow. As Hrushevs’kyi was to point out, that historical tradition excluded any systematic account of events in the Ukraine from the Mongol invasion to Khmel’nyts’kyi.

(Dnipropetrovsk University, 1975), Leninskaia biblioteka DK 75–7, 546, pp. 111–15.

⁶⁷ GPB, F. IV, 215, fol. 345.

⁶⁸ Rothe, ed., *Synopsis*, pp. 361–62; the Cossacks are mentioned in the section on the origins of peoples, p. 153.

When Ukrainian writers picked up their pens to write history in the 1610s and 1620s, they filled a need for the Ruthenian “narod”—nobles, clergymen, burghers, Cossacks, and perhaps even the occasional literate peasant—to understand the past of their community, the Ruthenian people. They were motivated, above all, by attacks on the Orthodox church, the essential bearer of Ruthenian culture. Although these writers were clergymen who represented Slavonic Orthodox traditions far different from the new concepts of the society of orders and political nations that were influencing Ukrainian society, their education along Western and Polish models also shaped their writings. They wrote the history of a community that did not possess the usual seventeenth-century requisite for being viewed as a nation—a polity or a united privileged political nation—but that nonetheless was vital and dynamic. They gave that community a historical legitimacy that made it possible to think of the Ruthenian nation alongside the Polish and the Lithuanian, even if it had no seventeenth-century equivalent of the Kingdom of Poland or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. They demonstrated the continuous past of Kiev and the Rus’ land and connected it to the ancient Rus’ princes and polity. Had the seventeenth-century Ruthenian nobility coalesced into a stable Orthodox Rus’ political nation, the clergymen might have become its historians. But the religious crisis that sparked interest in history—that is, the conversion of princes and nobles—also deprived the history writers of their potential subjects and patrons for Rus’ history. The “national” significance invested in the Cossacks by the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* was more a move of desperation by Ukrainian Orthodox intellectuals than an exposition of a political ideology.

After 1648 the clerics had to deal with a new Cossack polity and after 1654 with an Orthodox suzerain. Although Sofonovych followed the tradition of the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* in incorporating the Cossacks into his continuous account, the work remained more a listing of events than a history of the relationship of the Cossacks to early Ruthenian history. Sofonovych did, however, remain firmly in the tradition of discussing the past of the Ruthenian people and the Ukrainian land. The *Synopsis* would depart from this tradition, by creating a concept of the “Russian” identity of the Ukrainians and Muscovites, with dynastic continuity added to the concept of the common origin of the “rossiiskii narod.” The fluid national nomenclature of *Rus’/Rossiia* made such a conflation possible. The *Synopsis* also departed from tradition by avoiding the distinct history of the Ukraine. It would serve as the basis for the political culture and national consciousness of Imperial Russia, albeit transformed by the Petrine reforms.

From 1620 to 1690, concepts of nationhood in Ukrainian history writing were as unstable as the cultural and political situation in the Ukraine. Nonetheless, the word *narod* came to describe the Ruthenian community, and this “nation” was discussed in historical and religious terms. As the Ukrainian territories and the Cossacks came to the fore in the historical writings, distinctions between the Ruthenians of the Ukrainian lands (Malorossiiia) and the Ruthenians of the Belorussian lands emerged. Emphasis on the Ukrainian lands caused the writers of history to use “fatherland” in referring to them. As early as the 1620s, the *Hustyn’ Chronicle* included a rather explicit statement of Ukrainian national consciousness. Although the historical writings described the past political existence of the Ukrainian lands, these territories could be truly a “fatherland” only if they had a political structure in the present. The concepts of *natio* and *patria* could be applied fully only after 1690, when Ukrainian history writing came to concentrate on new political factors—the Cossacks as the political nation and the Cossack Hetmanate as the fatherland. The work of writing new histories that took into account the new political culture of the Cossack Ukraine would pass to the Cossack administrators. After the 1690s, Ukrainian clerics contented themselves with dynastic and religious history; the secular Cossack intellectuals did not. They sought to explain the history of their land, the origins of the Cossack order, and the emergence of the Hetmanate.

The interest in the history of the “Ruthenian nation” that emerged in the early seventeenth century would be transformed into the glorification of the “Cossack-Sarmatian-Little Russian-Ukrainian” nation of the early eighteenth century. This new Ukrainian historiography and national consciousness, like the Russian historiography and national consciousness shaped by the *Synopsis*, traced its roots to the search for a national past and to the adaptation of new political and social concepts in seventeenth-century Ukraine. The Cossack political nation and the Russian imperial state would utilize these concepts of community and culture to fit their own needs. The rebirth of history writing between 1620 and 1690 had reflected the quest of the new national consciousness for historical legitimacy. During that time, the writers of history developed concepts of nationhood as they related the national past. Changing political, social, cultural, and religious factors modified and transformed the national community, but history writing remained central to all attempts of self-definition.

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Hungarian National Consciousness as Reflected in the Anti-Habsburg and Anti-Ottoman Struggles of the Late Seventeenth Century

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The years between 1664 and 1685 saw important changes in political thinking and national consciousness in Hungary. During those two decades the Hungarian ruling class turned away from the Viennese court and chose dependence on the Turks; it was also during those years that, with the relief of Vienna in 1683, the expulsion of the Turks from the territory of Hungary began.

From the point of view of political history and thinking, the period can be divided into three stages. The first revolves around the so-called Wesselényi conspiracy (or the “conspiracy of the magnates,” as it is frequently called in the historical literature) directed against the Habsburgs, which came to an end in 1670 with the failure of a badly organized uprising. The second stage, spanning the 1670s, centered around the struggle between Habsburg absolutism, openly revealed from 1670, and the so-called *kuruc* movement, which had an estate-like character, in the wake of the pro-Turkish Wesselényi conspiracy. The third stage, which developed in the years 1678–81, was characterized by the abandonment of absolutism on the part of the Habsburgs, while the *kuruc* fighters, led by the young Count Imre Thököly, managed to form a separate principality in northeastern Hungary under the auspices of the Turks. The period came to an end in 1685 when the Turks, after their failure to take Vienna, captured Thököly and overthrew the *kuruc* principality, hoping to please their now stronger opponents.

The first stage was not yet characterized by mature anti-Habsburg national consciousness, but rather by a quest for expression, often punctuated by uncertainty. The starting point was the Treaty of Vasvár, concluded in 1664, which sanctioned the largest territorial expansion of Turkish rule in Hungary, despite the Habsburgs’ military successes. The resulting situation was considered as an outright disaster by the Hungarian ruling class. They saw the treaty as the embodiment of the split between Habsburg imperial interests and Hungarian interests, because the armistice had brought peace only to the outlying Austrian and Bohemian provinces and did not bring real peace to Hungary, where the Turks, even without

formal warfare, continued their incessant plundering. The Hungarian nobility living on the frontier of the Turkish-occupied territories, in particular, felt themselves squeezed “between the upper and the nether millstone,” and surrounded by “fire ahead and water behind.” Their desperate situation was most vividly depicted by the *iudex curiae* Ferenc Nádasdy, who was later (in 1671) beheaded because of his participation in the anti-Habsburg conspiracy. In a pamphlet entitled *Oratio* (in 1668) he wrote:

Our protector [i.e., the Viennese court] obviously knows that the Turks will tear us away unless we submit. Now we desperately cry out and say: ‘Either protect us or let us submit!’ But the answer is threatening: ‘We do not let you submit.’ And of protection no mention is made, since there is nothing they could protect us with. . . . Look and judge, Christian World, what is the soul that willfully lets this to be so, and even promotes this by suitable action.

In other passages Nádasdy reproaches the Viennese high command for having monopolized the struggle against the Turks during the last war, and for having conducted the maneuvers so that the Hungarians would not be able to defend themselves.¹

The attention that ever-wider strata of the Hungarian ruling class gave to the plan of submission to the Turks after the Treaty of Vasvár was prompted, not only by the inefficiency of the German defense, but also by deeper social and political motives. As recent Hungarian historiography has demonstrated, the hasty conclusion of the Treaty of Vasvár after the wars of 1663–1664 sanctioned a general increase in the severity of Turkish rule in the territories they occupied, as well as in neighboring regions. The Turks used the consolidation of their power to increase state and especially manorial obligations and to limit the jurisdiction of the Hungarian landlords, which directly or indirectly had a bearing on the landownership of the Hungarian nobility in territories adjacent to the Turkish-occupied area.² Paradoxically, the Turkish orientation of the late seventeenth century was partly due to the general belief that with the whole of the country formally under Turkish rule, individual harassment would cease and there would no longer be any obstacle to peace. With that consideration in mind, Palatine Ferenc Wesselényi, the first constitutional authority in the country, took the

¹ Endre Veress, “Nádasdy Oratioja,” *Történelmi Társulat* (Budapest), 19 (1896): 106–107. One obvious reference is to Miklós Zrínyi (Nikola Zrinski), Ban of Croatia (1620–1664), who was conspicuously ignored by the Viennese court during the war, in spite of his renowned fighting spirit and outstanding abilities as a military leader. On Zrínyi, see: Géza Perjés, *Zrínyi Miklós* (Budapest, 1975).

² See István Purjesz, “A török hódoltság Pest megyében a XVII. század második felében,” *Levéltári Közlemények* (Budapest), 28 (1958): 173–200; and László Makkai, “Pest megye története 1848–ig,” in *Pest megye emlékei* (Budapest, 1958).

far-reaching step of sending a deputy to the Porte, through the good offices of Transylvania. In his instructions of August 1666, he proposed that Hungary be put “under the protection and *patrocinium* of the Turkish emperor,” and offered to pay a yearly sum as an expression of political subjugation. At the same time he also asked that the privileges of the nobility be respected in the Turkish-occupied territories. His most important condition was that the liberties, laws, and customs of the country remain intact.³

The ambiguity and the risks that were inherent in Wesselényi’s plan were openly debated by contemporaries. It was perhaps Wesselényi and his circle who were the most cognizant of them, because in proclamations written two or three years earlier the palatine had sought to deter people from submission to Turkey by reminding them of what had happened in the Balkan countries (Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia) that had been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. In the late 1660s, it was the *magister tavernicorum* Ádám Forgách who raised his voice against Wesselényi and his followers, proclaiming: “Those who want lords like the Turks are likely to come off like the frogs who elected the stork to be their king.”⁴

Nevertheless, the followers of the Turkish trend had their own trump, namely, the example of Transylvania. Having become independent after 1526, the Transylvanian principality managed to secure the continuity of its social and political development and its internal autonomy in spite of its subordination to the Turks in foreign policy. What is more, Transylvania, under two outstanding princes of the first half of the seventeenth century, Gábor Bethlen and György Rákóczi I, even managed to conduct a foreign policy that encompassed the whole of Europe and entertained intensive cultural relations with the Western part of the continent. In this sense, Hungary’s change of political orientation in the 1660s was not considered to be an undertaking without precedent. The anti-Habsburg “malcontents” (as some of the contemporary tracts called them) merely wished to extend the Transylvanian “model” to the whole of Hungary.⁵

Another important motive behind the anti-Habsburg turn was domestic discontent with the inner structure of Habsburg rule in Hungary. We have already seen that Hungarian contemporaries saw only two alternatives: total incorporation under Turkish rule (as in the Balkan countries) or total inter-

³ See László Benczédi, *Rendiség, abszolútizmus és centralizáció a XVII. századvégi Magyarországon (1664–1685)* (Budapest, 1980), p. 20.

⁴ Országos Levéltár (hereafter OL), National Archives, Budapest, p. 287; Archives of the Forgách Family, fasc. 16, 1667, folio 176.

⁵ Benczédi, *Rendiség, abszolútizmus*.

nal freedom (as in Transylvania). The great question was whether it was possible, given the existing situation, to secure the most advantageous alternative for Hungary. They judged Habsburg rule as an exclusively bad option, since by then the Habsburgs had introduced *absolutum dominium* in all their other lands and provinces. The Hungarian nobility, with in this case unfailing instinct, felt that time, in the sense of the rise of absolute monarchies in the greatest part of feudal Europe, was working against them and that the Habsburgs were only waiting for the suitable moment to crush the Hungarian system of estates.

The truth was that in those years the Viennese court still tolerated the Hungarian feudal constitution and abstained from introducing absolutist measures, but it did make arrangements to wrest political power out of the hands of the Hungarian estates at any moment. This tendency was evident from the 1650s, when the court began sending greater numbers of German soldiers into Hungary and giving a helping hand to the Counter-Reformation in an increasingly less concealed way. The imminent war with the Turks also offered Vienna an opportunity to curb the authority of the estates. The Habsburgs did not yet touch the existing estates apparatus, but set up a parallel system that took over actual management and reduced the corresponding institutions of the Hungarian estates to sham organizations. An authorized imperial commissioner was installed alongside, or rather above, Palatine Wesselényi himself, and this practice was repeated at each level of administration. One report from eastern Hungary from August 1661 read: "The Court consults about even the most insignificant Hungarian matters only with the German officials, while the Hungarian nobles and the Palatine are good only for collecting the soldiers' ration, and nothing else."⁶

These acts were enough in themselves to arouse the already highly agitated Hungarian nobility, but their protest was heightened by their firm resolve to limit the authority of the court just at the time when the central authorities tried to affect an even stronger centralization. A tug-of-war ensued between the until-then relatively balanced poles of the so-called dualism of the estates, at stake being which of the parties—the royal "crown" or the "county" of the estates—would win greater public authority.

These developments had come about due to an unparalleled boom in the political activity of the counties and of the nobility in general. A splendid renaissance of the early sixteenth-century (Jagellonian) constitution of the nobility, codified by the 1514 *Tripartitum* of István Werböczy, took place.

⁶ OL, p. 507. Archives of the Nádasdy Family, fasc. 12, no. 452, folio 155.

Its economic background was the ever-growing market and trade activities of the middle landowners, based on the growing exploitation of the serfs, mainly in the form of increasing *robot* or labor duty. This, in turn, brought about the demand of the “*respublica* of nobles” for secure personal participation in government and the right to vote, as suggested by Werböczy’s concept of the *una aedemque nobilitas*. The problem of the feudal diet proved to be the most thorny one. While the crown considered convening of the occasional diets an ever-growing burden and wanted to manage public matters more and more by decrees, the estates wished to replace indirect representation and the system of deputies by the direct participation of nobles, thereby extending the “democratic” basis of public authority.⁷

Given this situation, it is not difficult to recognize behind the radical reversal of political orientation the intent to find a new foreign safeguard for the republicanism of the nobility, threatened by Habsburg centralization. During the preliminary discussions the idea of Hungary’s becoming a protectorate under Louis XIV emerged, but the majority refused to consider it, arguing that the French governed their territories “too strictly and ruthlessly.”⁸ The leading personalities of the Hungarian estates did not want to risk falling out of the frying-pan into the fire, that is, they did not want to exchange the already realized absolutism of Louis XIV for the still only nascent one of Leopold I. In their quest to achieve unlimited freedom, the Hungarian nobility believed it better to withdraw under the protection of the Turks, on the Transylvanian example, as a frontier country of the Ottoman Empire.

By the 1670s, however, the situation had changed greatly. The most important new factor was that the confused and overhasty uprising of the Hungarian estates in 1670 and its quick collapse provided the Viennese court with the excuse for introducing absolutism outright. The Austrian government based its actions on the so-called *Verwirkungstheorie* that had been successfully applied in the 1620s in Bohemia. It suggested that the Hungarians should be punished collectively for their revolt. Leopold’s circles did not make it a secret, in any case, that they held all Hungarian governmental norms to be “good-for-nothing and worthless” laws that “should be burnt right on the head of the Hungarians.”⁹ Now they considered the time to be ripe for realizing their objectives without any obstacle. The most important means for making these changes were the German

⁷ László Benczédi, “A rendi anarchia és a rendi központosítás tendenciái 17. századvégi Habsburg-ellenes küzdelmeinkben,” *Századok* (Budapest), 113 (1979): 1041.

⁸ Benczédi, “A rendi anarchia,” p. 1040.

⁹ Benczédi, “A rendi anarchia,” p. 1047.

imperial army, the huge state tax obligations, and the unbridled Counter-Reformation. The court's steps were, however, so fully characterized by sheer vengeance that they could not counterbalance their unpopular measures with any constructive program or internal reform.

The crude steps taken by Habsburg absolutism created the conditions for a revival of the Hungarian estates even after the shameful failure of the 1670 uprising. As early as 1672, armed resistance reemerged, starting from Transylvania and from the frontier regions of the Turkish occupied territories. This was the beginning of the so-called *kuruc* movement of refugee nobles, who sought to regain "freedom of body and soul." In defense of the Hungarian constitution, which the Habsburgs had sentenced to abrogation, the rebels advocated the reestablishment of the "old laws" and "old privileges" granted by "the holy kings of old," and of the "old customs" in general. Even in this new phase the feudal opposition retained its anarchic character, reminiscent of the noble *respublica* in Poland; yet new demands and tasks, as compared with those of the 1660s, also emerged. After the open attack of absolutism, the movement could no longer remain in a restricted conspiracy; it now had to address the whole of society. It had to give voice to the grievances of the various classes and social strata, and devise a program able to mobilize the people.

In the wake of the mostly exploratory political activities of the 1660s, an anti-Habsburg national ideology, both extensive and intensive, developed by the 1670s. The tone of this mature ideological trend was set by the *kuruc* leader of its early days, István Petróczy, in his highly emotional proclamation of 1 January, 1673. He called the whole nation to arms with the following words: "Our eyes are full of tears, when watching the sorrowful nightfall of our decaying dear fatherland and nation, [since] there has never been on earth a nation strong enough to have defeated our beloved one. But now we shall be wrestled to the ground, owing to the great discord, if God does not have mercy on us. . . . Oh, Hungary! Hungary! Your empire comprised twelve countries, as Bonfinius and other historians, as well as the twelve flags at the coronation of kings, testify; now you can mourn for twelve lost possessions, and you are driven back to only certain parts even of the twelfth. This the enemy could not take from you, but you shall certainly lose it because of disunity. Now we can say that the Catholics are persecuting the Lutherans, and the Lutherans are forced to defend themselves. Understand, true Hungarians, make yourselves believe that the Germans hate the whole Hungarian nation *sine discretione religionis* [without any religious distinction]." Having issued this general warning, Petróczy went on to enumerate individual grievances: "We have no diploma, no palatine, no laws, no lawful general. . . . The archbishops and

the prelates have been deprived of their property, the chamberlains—although left in their offices—have become subservient to the Germans. . . . In the frontier castles the Hungarians get neither payment, nor respect. The sub-prefects are abused, the Hungarians have no say in the peace treaties. . . . The Germans use every means they can get hold of, unheard-of *accisae*, *repartitiones*, and *capitationes* [new kinds of taxes] to put the poor Hungarian nation's body and soul on the butcher's block and cut it into pieces." And finally: "If, therefore, there is any Hungarian sensitivity, or any drop of Hungarian blood in you, my beloved nation, wake up, and love your brethren. Serve God according to your faith, and let everybody have their castles, towns, villages, and property."¹⁰

Petróczy's proclamation contains nearly all the important features of Hungarian national consciousness at the end of the century, expressed in full glory. It rejects Habsburg absolutism, defends the Hungarian constitution, condemns the violation of the royal diploma, the abolishment of the palatine's authority, of Hungarian laws, and of higher military ranks, and advocates the social status quo while assuring everyone of the undisturbed possession of castles, towns, villages, and other properties. All the grievances of every social class and strata are expressed, in order to gain their sympathy. The promise of undisturbed possession is addressed primarily to the large landowners, while the county nobility is to be won over by the mention of the shame of the sub-prefects. The disapproval of the fact that the chamberlains (i.e., the financial officials) had gone over to serve the Germans is intended to win the sympathy of the city burghers. One interesting passage depicts the situation of the Hungarian soldiers serving along the frontiers: the lack of payment, the rude insults received from German soldiers, and the dismissals, which together secured the support of several thousand battle-tested soldiers for the *kuruc* uprising. It is equally important that the proclamation opposed the new German taxes, this being the most serious grievance of the serfs. As the sources testify, that passage did not fail to arouse the sympathy of the peasantry. The author links all these points to the description of the "sorrowful nightfall of our decaying dear fatherland and nation" and "the butchers' block" cutting up the nation's "body and soul," while counterbalancing the picture with the recollection of the nation's former glory and grandeur.

The highly emphatic national character of this ideology, or—one can say—its nearly nationalistic coloring, gives unity to the proclamation. This is manifest in elements other than recollections of Hungary's past, which could be regarded as natural reflexes of self-defense or as consolation in a

¹⁰ OL, p. 125. Documents of Palatine Pál Esterházy, no. 688/9609.

distressing historical situation. But phrases like "Hungarian sensibility" and "the tiniest drop of Hungarian blood" (other anti-Habsburg sources also mentioned "good Hungarians" [*jó magyarság*], "real Hungarians" [*magyari magyarság*], "true Hungarian blood" [*igaz magyar vér*], "the stir of Hungarian blood" [*a magyar vér felbuzdulása*], etc.) show unmistakably that it was the consciousness of ethnic unity that played the greatest role in the national consciousness of the day, which opposed everything "un-Hungarian" (*magyartalan*), everything "alien" (*idegen*), and, mainly, the "ugly and base nation" (*csúnya, rút nemzetség*) of the Germans as a whole. There is only a seeming contradiction in that this ideology, with its socially undifferentiated ethnic character, originated among the ranks of the nobility, that is, in the estates; in my opinion, there is an inevitable relationship between the two. In a situation in which the ruling class was in need of sympathy and support from the masses in its struggle with absolutism, national ideology was manipulated to be attractive and mobilizing. At the same time, the ideology was formulated in such a way as to conceal its basically feudal contents (the wish to preserve the privileges of the nobility) with slogans about the blood ties of the nation.

The interrelationship can also be viewed from another angle. As we have seen, Petróczy's proclamation protested against the new government taxes introduced by the Viennese court in 1671, in order to win the sympathy of the serfs for the rebel cause. There remained the possibility, however, that absolutism might fight back by advocating the reduction, or at least the regulation, of feudal (manorial) duties and rents (it is a separate matter that Vienna let this opportunity slip by.). The serfs were receptive to the rebels' promise to reduce government taxes only to the extent that the crown failed to do the same regarding seignorial duties. The rebel's program would have had the full approbation of the serfs only if it had also promised reduction of the rapidly growing manorial duties, as well as of government taxes. There is no trace of such a promise in Petróczy's proclamation, however; nor can one find any such mention in other documents of the uprising. Thus the rebels' program remained incomplete insofar as the basic interests of the serfs were concerned. Its missing part, the unrealized social reforms, were to be substituted by an overemphasis on ethnic ties. In this sense, the "nationalistic" formulation of a national ideology can be considered inseparable from struggles for independence growing out of feudal soil, especially in those cases where the nobility wished to gain the support of the masses without any intent to effect social reform (such as the regulation of the relationship between landowners and serfs, or the narrowing of the gaps between social classes). Undoubtedly, there was a direct

interrelation between the immobility of feudal society, the lack of any intent to introduce internal social reform, and the nationalism of the estates.

All these were related to another structural feature of Hungarian society in those days: the lack of an internal social program. Its absence was not only due to the reluctance of the ruling class to introduce reforms, but also because there was no demand for them. Although the anti-Habsburg nobility considered it a godsend that some former serfs who had already been relieved of feudal bonds joined the rebels, they knew that their active mass support came not from the ranks of the serfs, but from professional soldiers (the ones stationed at frontier castles mentioned in the proclamation), who no longer had any ties with the toiling peasantry. To win these people over, it was enough to offer them opportunities to secure their bread by incessant warfare. In this respect, the proposed national ideology, with its lack of a program of internal reform can be explained by the existence of a professional soldier class that made any intervention into the relationships of landowner and serf unnecessary.¹¹

The predominance of the theme of national unity in Petróczy's proclamation had another, much more direct and timely aim, namely, the overshadowing or, more precisely, the concealing of religious differences through stress on national slogans. This aim harked back primarily to the distressing experience of the first *kuruc* attack in 1672, when in some localities leaders barely prevented the anti-Habsburg struggle from developing into a religious civil war. To smooth over religious differences, and to ensure Catholic support, Petróczy did not refrain from exaggeration in accusing the Habsburgs of tampering with the archbishoprics and prelacies; in fact, the Viennese court had no intention whatsoever to do so. On the contrary, during the first experiment with absolutism, between 1670 and 1681, the Habsburgs had the support of only one local group, that is, the Catholic clergy, imbued with passionate Counter-Reformationist sentiments. Under the circumstances, the *kuruc* leaders were quite right to emphasize the anti-Habsburg, national aspect of the struggle as well as the community of interests of people belonging to different religions, even though this might have meant stretching the truth somewhat: Hungarian feudalism may be justly criticized for several reasons, but as regards religious tolerance, the estates had always displayed much more good will and flexibility than the Habsburgs, who were inflamed with hatred for "heretics" and who allied themselves with the Counter-Reformation, come life or death.

¹¹ László Benczédi, "Maďarské stavovské národné povedomie v 16–17. storičí," *Historický časopis* (Bratislava), 19 (1971): 549–57.

Having dealt with the second phase of the Habsburg-Hungarian controversy, of the 1670s, let us look at the third, beginning with the emergence of Imre Thököly in 1678, which initiated further changes in political relations. The period between 1678 and 1685 was characterized by three elements of change which were also in causal relationship with one another. The first change occurred with the Hungarian uprising itself: in the movement accused by Petróczy of "great disunity," Thököly introduced strong centralization. The second change took place in the policy of the Viennese court: the Habsburgs gave up their attempt to introduce absolutism and convened the diet at Sopron in 1681. In short, they turned back to the methods of government in effect before 1670. Finally, important changes also occurred in the international situation around 1681. The Porte, which had been engaged in wars against the Poles since 1672 and the Russians from 1677, and had therefore shown only passive benevolence toward the *kuruc* fighters in the 1670s, now turned its full attention to the Hungarian theater of war and actively embraced the cause of the "malcontents." The creation of Thököly's principality under Turkish protection in 1682 reflected the shift in emphasis from a theoretical confrontation between absolutism and the system of estates to an actual confrontation in a struggle for power.

One can detect a peculiar duality in the domestic policy of Thököly. Just as the Habsburgs had tried to avoid open confrontation with Hungarian feudalism while establishing centralization in the 1650s and 1660s, Thököly's tactics in the political arena were geared to achieving centralization without breaking with the ideology of the estates, to the point of even keeping feudal slogans. He even borrowed models and means from the Habsburg government—for example, the delegation of authorized princely commissioners. As his policy developed further and further along these lines, theoretical arguments were gradually pushed to the background in his propaganda aimed at the outside world: the protection of the feudal freedoms gave way to rude threats demanding submission.¹²

Other changes in the *kuruc* ideology can be observed in the Thököly-led anti-Habsburg uprising. While in the mid-1670s feudal resistance was concentrated in parts of the country where the population was primarily of Hungarian origin—the counties east of the River Tisza—by the early 1680s Thököly had to deal with the multinational character of the country, now extending to the territories controlled by the *kurucs*. Yet the ethnic concept of national consciousness could now be directed only to soldiers in the castles along the frontier, for the mainly Slovak and partly German inhabitants of the counties and towns of northern Hungary (present-day Slovakia)

¹² Benczédi, *Rendiség, abszolútizmus*, pp. 121–27.

naturally could not be expected to respond to the national grievances of the Hungarians. It is intriguing to note how Thököly and his followers kept changing their arguments, trying to strike on the right ones to win over the local population. When, for example, they had to deal with Protestant Slovak or German people, they either referred to the so-called *hungarus* consciousness of the Hungarian nation as a territorial concept (rather than an ethnic or linguistic unit), or pushed religious elements into the foreground (in contrast to Petróczy, who had belittled them), maintaining that they had taken up arms primarily because of the seizure of the Protestant churches and the proscription of worship. This was the case at Besztercebánya (Banská Bystrica) on the Garam (Hron) River in October 1678, where the inhabitants were obliged to sign letters of concession declaring their faithfulness to the Hungarian nation.¹³ The nearby town of Selmecebánya (Banská Štiavnica) was treated a bit differently, because its population was not religiously homogeneous; they were merely reminded of their “spiritual and bodily yoke,” and were promised the reinstatement of their liberties. Nonetheless, the *kurucs* threatened them with the destruction of their whole town should they “resist the weapons of the Hungarian nation.”¹⁴ All this reflects, on the one hand, the ideological adaptability of the anti-Habsburg rebels as regards the multinational character of the country, and, on the other, their determination to reserve the leading role, both politically and ethnically, for the “Hungarian nation.” One must mention, however, that this demand for Hungarian leadership still had nothing to do with forced assimilation or intolerance towards the nationalities.

Another new ideological feature of this period was the new treatment of the Ottoman question. The intent to submit to the Turks had played a great role in the program of the opposition in the 1660s, but by the 1670s it was pushed to the background—witness Petróczy’s proclamation. The relationship with the Porte became timely again in the early 1680s, when it became obvious that the two Great Powers, the Habsburgs and the Turks, were heading toward an open clash. While the anti-absolutist national ideology of the 1670s either did not mention the Turkish question or noted it only as a secondary problem, the *contentum* (satisfaction) of the “mighty nation,” i.e., the Turks, or, in other words, submission to the Porte again became the

¹³ Egyetemi Könyvtár (University Library), Budapest, Manuscript Archives, Hevenesii-Collection, LXXV/12. The Latin original reads: “Natio Hungarica maxime, imo fere unice ob templorum evangelicorum occupationem ac prohibitum religionis evangelicae exertium arma sumpserit.”

¹⁴ OL, p. 125. Documents of Palatine Pál Esterházy, no. 674/6610.

primary demand of the *kurucs* from 1681 on.¹⁵

In comparison with the 1660s there were certain other new elements in the *kuruc* opinion of the Turks. As we have already seen, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Vasvár it was not so much power relations that were important to the *kurucs* as the consideration that the country could exist much more peacefully on the basis of the given status quo under Turkish protection. In the 1680s, however, when the change in the status quo became imminent, a sober assessment of the overall situation in foreign relations had become inevitable. The political thinkers of the anti-Habsburg uprising considered the Turks the more likely to be victorious in case of a serious clash between the two parties. One relevant letter reads: "It seems that the Turkish power has by the grace of God made such progress that no one can possibly resist any longer."¹⁶ From this estimate of the situation, the *kuruc* leaders concluded that if they had to submit anyway, "it was better to submit to the mightier."¹⁷

Having formed this conviction, Thököly presented himself throughout the country as the only person able to forestall open subjugation by the Turks, thanks to his voluntary pro-Turkish orientation. He warned those who hesitated that their "double-dealing" was only to the Turks' advantage, since it gave them an excuse for direct intervention. Those who were reluctant to admit a *kuruc* guard into their towns were threatened by the prospect of destruction by the "mighty nation." This illustrates how the convincing element was gradually left out of *kuruc* ideology as the collapse of the uprising became imminent, giving way to the threat of force.

In sixteenth- to seventeenth-century Hungary, the Turks were called either "a traditional enemy by nature" or "a mighty nation," depending on the allegiance of the authors. The Germans were most frequently called "an alien nation." That by the end of the seventeenth century the Hungarians gave up fighting against the "traditional enemy" and finally forsook the "alien nation" for the "mighty nation" had two causes. One was the passivity of the Habsburgs toward Turkish matters for several decades and their partly imperial, partly dynastic, but exclusively West-European orientation, which gave no possibility for the Hungarians to fight against the Ottomans. In short, the Habsburgs reserved the right to define the time and form of warfare for themselves, for political reasons. One can say that the Hungarian nobility had grown tired of waiting for the opportunity

¹⁵ Benczédi, *Rendiség, abszolútizmus*, p. 110.

¹⁶ Farkas Deák, *A bujdosók levéltára* (Budapest, 1883), pp. 84–85.

¹⁷ See Imre Varga, *A kuruc küzdelmek költészete* (Budapest, 1977), p. 213. The principle was first expressed in this form by a *kuruc* leader at a council of war in 1681.

effectively to resist the Turks and had also become psychologically indifferent. It could not reconcile itself to the fact that Hungary had been pushed to the periphery of European politics, as compared with the flourishing fifteenth-century monarchy of Matthias Corvinus, so that it no longer shaped its own fate but passively had to endure changes brought by others.

The other reason for the political disorientation of the leading stratum of Hungarian political life was a mistaken notion of international power relations. The Hungarian ruling class had been deceived by the actual improvement in Turkish dominion during the rule of the two grand viziers called Köprülü (1656–1676). The fact that this upswing was but transitional and superficial, only a small respite in a general and long-range decline, became obvious to the outside world only in 1683, in the light of the failure at Vienna, and in the years thereafter. Thököly and his circle were actually badly informed and deceived by appearances, but their ignorance was shared by most of contemporary Europe. Yet, if Thököly's actions are compared with the good political sense and outstanding role in the Viennese victory over the Turks of the contemporary Polish king, Jan Sobieski, those actions cannot be excused, even under the extenuating circumstances described.

Some conclusions about the ideology and political history of the period are in order. Under the dual oppression of the country, Hungarian national consciousness in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in general, and in the late seventeenth century in particular, took on highly emphatic forms and penetrated deeply into the ranks of the unprivileged masses, as a defensive ideology. This, in turn, strengthened the unifying force of national consciousness, which served as a shield in the struggles to maintain national and state independence in this turbulent part of Europe. The broad social extension of the national idea did not mean, however, that the originally feudal type of Hungarian national consciousness contained democratic elements; any such element was due primarily to the objective features of contemporary Hungarian society. Seen as one link in a centuries-long *Geistesgeschichte*, this feature has had indisputable significance in terms of the forms of Hungarian national consciousness that were later dominant. This does not mean that the ideology was not justified when, at the given moment, it resisted the premature Habsburg attempts to introduce absolutism.

In terms of political history, the anti-Habsburg struggle of the late seventeenth century cannot be considered an entirely negative chapter in Hungarian history. Contemporary Hungary was characteristically wedged between the Habsburg and the Turkish empires, on the periphery of both. This brought about a peculiar kind of political thinking, on the one hand,

and provided some chance of maintaining national independence, on the other. The so-called “Grievous Imploring Letter” (*Siralmas könyörg levél*) written in 1659 compared the country’s situation to that of a man fallen into a deep well, who found the way to climb out by placing his feet on stones protruding from the inner sides of the well. The letter went on to explain: “Why should we not progress like others do, or even better . . . since should the Christians be wearying us beyond measure, . . . we should turn to another power [for protection] on certain conditions; and should this one tamper with us, we should call out to the Christians for help.”¹⁸ The anti-Habsburg uprising of the late seventeenth century can—for all its faults and failure—undoubtedly be considered a chapter in this “policy of mutual deceit,” which in the long run did not fail. The success of the Hungarian ruling classes—with Turkish help if necessary—in managing to resist the repeated attempts of the Viennese court to establish full control in Hungary and to undermine the Hungarian constitution played an important role in later Hungarian history, when the country managed to continue to exist as a state even in the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy.

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¹⁸ Katalin Péter, *A magyar nyelvű politikai publicisztika kezdetei* (Budapest, 1973), pp. 85–86.

The Slavic Idea of Juraj Križanić

IVAN GOLUB

Juraj Križanić, born in 1617 or 1618 in Obrh, Croatia, traveled extensively and knew exile. After sojourns in the old Rome of the Popes, in the New Rome of Constantinople, and in the so-called Third Rome of Moscow, he perished in the army of Jan Sobieski in 1683, during the Turkish siege of Vienna.¹

There has been much discussion over Križanić's ideas and writings in several spheres—economic, military, political, linguistic, musical-theoretical, historical, theological, and literary. The most lively debate centers on his Slavic and ecclesiastical ideas, which reflect what can be called his ideology.²

¹ A. L. Gol'dberg and I. Golub, "Bibliography," in *Juraj Križanić (1618–1683): Russophile and Ecumenic Visionary*, ed. Thomas Eekman and Ante Kadić (The Hague, 1976), pp. 329–52; Ivan Golub, "Bibliografija o Jurju Križaniću od 1974. do 1979," *Historijski zbornik* (Zagreb), 31–32 (1978–79): 325–29.

² Vatroslav Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića* (Zagreb, 1917); V. Vondrák, "Slovanska myšlenka u Križaniće a jeho soud o Slovanech vůbec," in *Masarykova Universiteta v Brně. Inaugurace rektora, 1921–22* (Brno, 1922), pp. 105–118; E. J. Šmurlo, "Juraj Križanić: Panslavista o missionario," *Rivista di letteratura, arte, storia*, ser. 1, 3–4 (1926); idem, "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* 6, no. 17 (1927): 321–35; H. Schaefer, *Moskau—Das Dritte Rome* (Hamburg, 1929); N. Škerović, *Djuro Križanić* (Belgrade, 1936); B. D. Datsiuk, *Krizhanich—pobornik svobody i edinstva slavianskikh narodov* (Moscow, 1945); idem, *Iurii Krizhanich: Oчерk politicheskikh i istoricheskikh vzgliadov* (Moscow, 1946); M. B. Petrovich, "Juraj Križanić: A Precursor of Panslavism," *American Slavic and East European Review* 6, no. 18/19 (1947): 75–92; V. I. Picheta, "Krizhanich i ego otnoshenie k Russkomu gosudarstvu," in *Slavianskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1947), pp. 202–240; P. G. Scolardi, *Krijanich, messenger de l'unité des chrétiens et père du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947); P. P. Epifanov, "Proiski Vatikana v Rossii i Iu. Krizhanich," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), 1 (1957): 77–86; J. Badalić, "Juraj Križanić—pjesnik Ilirije," in *Radovi Slavenskog instituta u Zagrebu* (Zagreb, 1958), pp. 5–23; M. Ginzburg, "Problema slavianskogo edinstva u Iu. Krizhanicha," in *American Contributions to the IV International Congress of Slavists* (The Hague, 1958), pp. 103–106; A. L. Gol'dberg, "Ideia slavianskogo edinstva v sochineniiakh Iu. Krizhanicha," *Trudy Otdela drevne-russkoi literatury Instituta russkoi literatury AN SSSR* (Moscow), 19 (1963): 373–90; T. Eekman, "Juraj Križanić o Polsce," in *Księga poświęcona Julianowi Kryżanowskiemu: Literatura-komparatystyka-folklor* (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 177–98; A. L. Gol'dberg (Goljdberg), "Juraj Križanić i Rusija," *Historijski zbornik* 21–22 (1968–69): 259–81; I. Golub, "Juraj Križanić i pitanje prava Slovenaca na sveto-jeronimske ustanove u Rimu," *Historijski zbornik* 21–22 (1968–69): 213–58; J. Božičević, "Juraj Križanić: Seventeenth-Century Panslav Visionary" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1967), p. 216; J. Badalić, "Juraj Križanić i Slovenci," *Slavistična revija* 17 (1969): 9–15;

This study sets out to examine and clarify Križanić's Slavic idea. Topics discussed are Križanić's environment: the books of his time and the period that preceded him; his circles: the groups to which Križanić belonged; currents: the development of Križanić's Slavic idea through his writings; and finally that Slavic idea itself, which encompasses the origin, condition, and mission of the Slavs.

Environment

Since we gain knowledge of times past through documents—primarily written documents—there is a tendency to ascribe this same way of understanding an era to the individuals who lived during it, as though they perceived the circumstances of their own time through the medium of literary sources. In regard to Juraj Križanić, there is some dispute about whether he was acquainted with this or that work of his own or the preceding period, as well as a certain astonishment that he does not mention certain works, which he "must" have known, for they express views akin to his own.

The past possessed its own environment, however, which could be transmitted by the written word but which could also be passed along without it: a "spirit of the time" which a man could absorb without having read this or another piece of literature, and which expressed and summarized the circumstances of the time.

Moreover, because a writer does not quote a certain work does not mean that he is unfamiliar with it. For his own reasons he may have dismissed it. To mention only one example, Križanić, in a text intended for the Muscovite tsar, crossed out a passage saying that he had supervised the printing of a

I. Golub, "Juraj Križanić kao preteča kršćanskog ekumenizma," *Encyclopaedia moderna* (Zagreb), 5, no. 11 (1970): 94–98; J. Šidak, "Počeci političke misli u Hrvata—Juraj Križanić i Pavao Ritter Vitezović," *Naše teme* 16, no. 7/8 (1972): 1118–35; M. Frančić, *Juraj Križanić, ideolog absolutizmu* (Warsaw, 1974); I. Golub, "Križanićevo teološko poimanje zbivanja," in *Život i djelo Jurja Križanića: Zbornik radova* (Zagreb, 1974), pp. 105–129; J. Šidak, "Hrvatsko društvo u Križanićevo doba," op. cit., pp. 15–34; I. Golub, "Juraj Križanić, Hrvat iz Ozlja-Georgius Krisanich Croata Ozalliensis-ili Križanićevo ukorjenjenost u zavičaju," *Kaj, časopis za kulturu* (Zagreb), 9–12 (1976): 100–103; idem, "Križanić théologien—sa conception ecclésiologique des événements et de l'histoire," in Eekman and Kadić, *Juraj Križanić*, pp. 165–82; A. Kadić, "Križanić and his Predecessors—The Slavic Idea among the Croatian Baroque Writers," *ibid.*, pp. 147–64; S. Baron, "Križanić and Olearius," *ibid.*, pp. 183–208; C. O'Brien, "Early Political Consciousness in Muscovy: The Views of Juraj Križanić and Afanasij Ordin-Nashchokin," *ibid.*, pp. 209–221; I. Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću iz rimskih arhiva," *Starine* (Zagreb), 57 (1978): 111–210; idem, "Tri jezična spomenika iz Križanićeve rodnog kraja (1656–1672)," *Gradja za povijest književnosti Hrvatske JAZU* (Zagreb), 32 (1978): 123–64; J. Šidak, *Kroz pet stoljeća hrvatske povijesti* (Zagreb, 1981), pp. 73–147.

work on music and musical harmony by João IV, king of Portugal. This he surely did because he thought it better not to mention to the tsar his “tie” with the king of Portugal.³ Similarly, he could have felt that in works intended for the tsar it was not necessary, for simplicity’s sake, to cite certain (Croat) writers, all the more so since on his arrival in Muscovy he had presented himself, out of a sense of caution, not as a Croat but as a Serb (*Serbenin*).

In this connection there arises the question whether “Jurko” (as Križanić signed himself) knew Vinko Pribojević’s *De origine succibusque slavorum* (Venice, 1532) and the book by Pribojević’s plagiarizer,⁴ Mavro Orbin, entitled *Il Regno degli Slavi* (Pesaro, 1601).⁵ Križanić most probably became acquainted with Orbin’s work during the conflict over the Illyrian province at the Institute of Saint Jerome in Rome, for the opposing side used it extensively, though he could have come across it while still in his homeland, in Nikola Zrinski’s library in Čakovec.⁶

Whether or not he had read Pribojević and Orbin, Križanić differed radically from these two writers. Whereas they approached the Slavs eulogistically, Križanić approached them critically. They, like wealthy men now ruined, prided themselves on their former riches (Orbin placed the Slavs as far as Scandinavia, saying it was their original homeland, and appropriated Alexander the Great and Aristotle into their number), whereas Križanić emphasized above all the difficult current position of the Slavs. They regarded Moscow from the Polish standpoint,⁷ whereas Jurko regarded it from his own. They had “no political intentions nor bases for liberation

³ Ivan Golub, *Juraj Križanić, glazbeni teoretik 17. stoljeća* (Zagreb, 1981), pp. 79–82; idem, “Juraj Križanić and João IV, or Križanić’s Supervision of the Printing of João’s Music and Works about Music,” *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* (Zagreb), 11, no. 1 (1980): 59–60.

⁴ Giovanna Brogi Bercoff, “Il Pribeveo e *Il Regno degli Slavi* di Mauro Orbini,” *Ricerche Slavistiche* 22–23 (1975–1976): 137–54; M. Pantić, “Mavro Orbin—život i rad,” *Kraljevstvo Slavena* (Belgrade, 1968); R. Samardžić, “Kraljevstvo Slavena u razvitku srpske historiografije,” *ibid.*

⁵ Badalić, “Juraj Križanić—pjesnik Ilirije,” pp. 5–23; J. Badalić, “Juraj Križanić kao pjesnik,” *Slavia* (Prague), 39 (1970): 198–217; J. Badalić, “Juraj Križanić kao pjesnik (1618–1683),” *Rusko-Hrvatske književne studije* (Zagreb, 1972), pp. 55–81. Gol’dberg, “Ideja slavianskoga edinstva,” pp. 373–90. J. Šidak, “Problem Jurja Križanića u hrvatskoj i srpskoj literaturi,” *Historijski zbornik* (Zagreb), 23–24 (1970–71): 147–78; J. Šidak, “Juraj Križanić als Problem der kroatischen und serbischen Literatur,” in Eekman and Kadić, *Juraj Križanić*, pp. 40–41; J. Šidak, “Problem Jurja Kiržanića u hrvatskoj i srpskoj literaturi,” *Kroz pet stoljeća hrvatske povijesti* (Zagreb, 1981), pp. 109–12; Kadić, “Križanić and his Predecessors,” pp. 147–64.

⁶ Golub, “Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću,” pp. 124, 161.

⁷ Bercoff, “Il Pribeveo et *Il Regno*,” p. 151.

from the Turks,"⁸ whereas Križanić was entirely oriented towards the future and had a detailed plan for the liberation of the Slavs from Turkish might with the aid of Moscow. As one scholar, Bercoff, has written, "A chasm divides Pribojević's and Orbin's heroic-mythological concepts from Križanić's messianic and visionary ideas."⁹ There is no indication whether Križanić knew any of the works of the greatest Croat baroque poet, the Ragusan Ivan Gundulić, who drew inspiration and yet differed from Pribojević and Orbin, primarily because while they focused on the glorious past, Gundulić was preoccupied with the present.¹⁰ Gundulić, a Polonophile, expected the Poles to bring about liberation from the Turks.

Because his opponents in the conflict over the Illyrian province in the Institute of Saint Jerome used the *Dictionarium quinque nobilissimarum Europae linguarum* (Venice, 1595), by Faust Vrančić, Križanić must have known it; indeed, he could have found it in Nikola Zrinski's library as early as 1643–44.¹¹ There he could have become acquainted with Vrančić's Pan-Dalmatianism, which stretched ancient Dalmatia from the Adriatic to the Drava, the Danube, and as far as the lands of the Germans, Italians, Macedonians, and Thracians, whereas contemporary Dalmatia included Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, Slavonia, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

It is not known whether Juraj Križanić knew the Bible published by Juraj Dalmatin (Wittenberg, 1584) or the passage in its introduction to the effect that the Slavic language (*die Windische Sprach*) existed not only within the borders of Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia, but also among the neighboring Croats and Istrians, as well as the Czechs, Poles, Muscovites, Ruthenians, Bosnians, and Vlachs.¹² Nor is it known whether Križanić knew the Carniolan grammar by Adam Bohorič, *Arcticae horulae* (Wittenberg, 1584), the subtitle of which stated that the Carniolan (Slovenian) language is adapted according to the example of Latin, and that the Muscovite, Ruthenian, Polish, Czech, and Lusatian languages, together with the related Dalmatian and Croatian languages, are mutually understood with ease.¹³

It is also unclear whether Križanić was aware of the attempt by the writers and translators of Croat Protestant books (Stjepan Konzul, Antun Dalmatin, Juraj Cvečić) to create a single common Slavic language by merging various dialects. We can only guess whether Križanić knew the preface to

⁸ Bercoff, "Il Pribevo e Il Regno," p. 151.

⁹ Bercoff, "Il Pribevo e Il Regno," p. 151.

¹⁰ Kadić, "Križanić and his Predecessors," pp. 153–57.

¹¹ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 124, 155.

¹² M. Murko, *Die Bedeutung der Reformation und Gegenreformation für das geistige Leben der Südslaven* (Prague and Heidelberg, 1927), p. 8.

¹³ Murko, *Die Bedeutung*, p. 8.

the Glagolitic edition of the "First Part of the New Testament" (Tübingen, 1562), which reads: "We . . . well know that this translation of ours and these letters of ours will not be pleasing to everyone. In answer to that, you, O dear and good Christian Croat, know that we wished to serve all people of the Slavic tongue with this our translation, first of all you the Croats and Dalmatians, then also the Bosnians, Bezjaks,¹⁴ Serbs, and Bulgarians."¹⁵

The writers of the Ozalj linguistic-literary circle were to shape their language on the formulations of the Protestant writers and of Franjo Glavinici.¹⁶ Juraj Križanić belonged to this circle. Although Franjo Glavinici belonged to the Catholic Counter-Reformation, he praised the translation of the New Testament made by Konzul and Dalmatin.¹⁷ In 1626 he wrote to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith asking not to retain the old language in the missal and the breviary (as he had previously suggested), but rather to form a committee of four or five people from various areas where the language was the most correct, so that together they could prepare liturgical books which could be understood in as many areas as pos-

¹⁴ "Bezjak" is a somewhat derisive and for the most part archaic term for the kajkavian Croats between the Sava and the Drava, the čakavian inhabitants of Istria, the Italians on the left bank of the Soča (Tržič, Gorica), a part of the population on the Donja Dobra (Stative), and the kajkavian Croats on the Sutla (from Kraljevac to Hum). According to the Venetian chronicler Marino Sanuto, "Besiatia" is kajkavian Croatia (*I Diarii*, October 9, 1526). Croat and Slovene writers (from Trubar to Lj. Gaj) used the words *Bezjak* and *bezjački* in this sense of the word from the sixteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century. The first trace of a pejorative meaning can be detected in Križanić's expression *bezjaščina*, i.e., a solecism, or perverted speech, called by the Croats *bezjački*, after the Bezjaks, "certain people who speak corruptly (*nekih ljudev koji prevratno govoret*)." J. Ribarić calls the Istrian čakavian-kajkavian dialects of the Buzet valley a Bezjak dialect, without any pejorative connotation. In the opinion of M. Gušić, the Bezjaks are ethnogenetically descendants of a pre-Slavic ethnic group, once widespread but later dispersed, who gradually merged with the new migrational strata, became Slavized, and preserved, in addition to their name, certain material and cultural values. M. Gušić, "Etnička grupa Bezjaci," *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje* (Zagreb), 43 (1967). Cf. Stjepko Težak, "Bezjaci," *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije* (Zagreb, 1980), 1: 617. See also F. Hešić, "'Bezjak' i 'Bezjaci,'" *Srpski dijalektološki zbornik* (Belgrade and Zemun), 3 (1923); J. Ribarić, "Razmjestaj južno-slavenskih dijalekata na poluotoku Istri," *Srpski dijalektološki zbornik* (Belgrade), 9 (1940); M. Gušić, "Etnička grupa Bezjaci," *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje* (Zagreb), 43 (1967).

Križanić uses the adjective *bezjački* and the abstract noun *bezjaština* to mean the speech of the Croatian kajkavians. The origin of the word *Bezjak* is unclear. Cf. Petar Skok, *Etimološki rječnik hrvatskoga ili srpskoga jezika*, vol. 1 (Zagreb, 1971), p. 144.

¹⁵ Zlatko Vince, "Putovima hrvatskoga književnoga jezika," *Lingvističko-kulturnopovijesni prikaz filoloških škola i njihovih izvora* (Zagreb, 1978), p. 28.

¹⁶ Vince, "Putovima hrvatskoga književnoga jezika," p. 36.

¹⁷ Josip Vončina, "Leksikografski rad Ivana Belostenca," in Joannis Belloszteneecz, *Gazophylacium, seu Latino-Illyricorum onomatum Aerarium* (Zagreb, 1740), p. xiii.

sible, since the Illyrian people were widespread.¹⁸ Did Križanić know Glavinić's *Czvit Szvetih* (The flower of the saints; Venice, 1657), where the wide dispersion and the glory of the Slavs were presented through Orbin's eyes? And was Križanić familiar with Glavinić's words: "Though you will find words that are not customary to you, bear in mind that our language is scattered over many lands. . . . Therefore find a way of pleasing not just one land, for even the larger villages should be pleased."¹⁹

Križanić may well have known čakavian mixed with other linguistic elements,²⁰ and he was certainly familiar with Komulović's mission to Moscow.²¹ Less certain is his acquaintance with Budinić's writing in a mixture of Croatian, Church Slavonic, Polish, and Czech.²² Also unknown is to what extent Križanić was familiar with Zoranić's lamentation over the indifference to the Croatian language and with Baraković's sorrow that his countrymen chased after that which was foreign in their speech.²³

It is certain, however, that in the literary environment of Križanić's time there already existed the idea of a South Slavic interdialect, or even of a common Slavic dialect; that voices were raised against foreign borrowings and for the purity of expression in one's own language; and that there existed views on the kinship of all Slavs and the need to liberate the South Slavs from the Turks with the aid of their brother Slavs.

Križanić was acquainted with quite a number of Polish writers who wrote on "Slavic matters." One of the rare books which he had with him even in Siberia was the Polish-Latin-Greek dictionary by Grzegorz Cnapius, *Thesaurus polonolatinograecus* (Cracow, 1643). Križanić certainly made extensive use of this work, particularly in military and musical terminology, because Cnapius had strived to eliminate foreign borrowings and to offer pure Polish words or create neologisms. Križanić adopted some neologisms from Cnapius, for example, *samowładstwo* (autocracy).

¹⁸ Bazilije Pandžić, "Franjo Glavinić i Rafael Levaković u razvoju hrvatske pismenosti," *Nova et vetera: Revija za filozofsko-teološke i srodne discipline* (Sarajevo), 28, pts. 1–2 (1978): 90.

¹⁹ *Czvit Szvetih. Toyeszt Sivot Szvetih. Od kih Rimka Czirkua čini Sspominak, Prenessen, i sslosen na Haruatski yezik Catholičanskim običajem. Pò O. F. Franciscv Glavinichv, Istriainv. Reda S. Francisca, Malebratye . . . V Mnetcii, Na MDCLVII*, p. 3.

²⁰ Vince, "Putovima hrvatskoga književnoga jezika," p. 26.

²¹ I. Golub, "Biografska pozadina Križanićevih djela," *Život i djelo Jurja Križanića: Zbornik radova*, pp. 39–44.

²² Vince, "Putovima hrvatskoga književnoga jezika," pp. 74–75.

²³ Vince, "Putovima hrvatskoga književnoga jezika," p. 85.

In his *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu* (1661–67), Križanić frequently cited Martin Cromer, the author of a history of Poland, *De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum* (Basel, 1555), with both criticism and praise. Križanić criticizes Cromer for his German soul, but praises him for his accurate description of the origins of the Slavs: “Martin Cromer, the famous historian and glorious writer on Poland, writing on the beginnings of the Polish people and of all the Slavic peoples, demonstrates, on the basis of the ancient chroniclers and the more recent annalists, the following: the terms Pole, Czech, Croat, Serb, Bulgarian, and the name common to all—Slav—are new, while the term Rus’ (*Rusko ime*) is older than all of them. And thus he correctly concludes that all these peoples originated from Rus’ (*iz Rusi*).”²⁴

Two works, *Polonia* (1656) and *Reformacia obyczajów polskich* (1649), by Szymon Starowolski, who was called the Polish Baronius because of his ecclesiastical-historical works, were among the books that Križanić had with him in exile.²⁵ Križanić agreed with Starowolski that Poland needed regeneration, but they conceived of it differently: Starowolski saw it in a return to the old ways; Križanić, in a plunge into the new. Križanić might have met Starowolski personally during his second sojourn in Rome.²⁶

Križanić quoted with satisfaction from the work *Cronica gestorum in Europa signularium*, Paweł Piasecki’s condemnation of the Poles for electing foreigners to their throne.²⁷ He was also familiar with Jan Kochanowski, critic of the legends of the origins of the Slavs, e.g., the legend of Czech and Lech. Križanić approvingly cites the verses from *Jezda do Moskwy* (Cracow, 1583) in which Kochanowski ridicules the tale that Ivan IV was the descendant of the Roman emperor Augustus.²⁸

Križanić was acquainted with C. Daminaeus’s pamphlet *Liga z zawadą koła poselskiego* (1596);²⁹ in urging the Muscovites to declare war on the Turks and to conquer the Crimea, he cites from it Sultan Süleyman’s warning to his children and to all Turks to beware the northern peoples, the Rus’

²⁴ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurii Križhanicha*, in *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskih pri Moskovskom universitete*, 3 pts. (pt. 1, 156 [1891, no. 1]; pt. 2, 157 [1891, no. 2]; pt. 3, 162 [1892, no. 3]); pt. 2: 20; Eekman, “Juraj Križanić o Polsce,” pp. 177–97.

²⁵ A. L. Gol’dberg, “Iurii Križhanich i Simon Starovol’skii,” *Slavia* (Prague), 34 (1965): 28–40.

²⁶ Henryk Barycz, “Roma nella cultura intellettuale del barocco polacco,” in *Barocco fra Italia i Polonia*, ed. Jan Ślaski (Warsaw, 1977), pp. 226–27.

²⁷ Juraj Križanić (Iurii Križhanich), *Politika*, ed. V. V. Zelenin, trans. and commentary A. L. Gol’dberg, gen. ed. M. N. Tikhomirov (Moscow, 1965), pp. 160–61.

²⁸ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurii Križhanicha*, pt. 2: 13.

²⁹ Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića*, p. 438.

(*Rusakov*) and the Poles, and not to stir up wars with them, for they would bring ruin to the Turks.³⁰

It is not clear whether Križanić was familiar with the writings of the Czech author Jan Matyáš Sudetinus, who, following Cromer, advanced the opinion that the Czechs descended not from the South Slavs but from the Rus': "Bohemorum nationem originem non e Slavis, sed ex Russia seu Roxolania originem habere" (1614); "Quaestiones tres, an Bohemi e Slavis et Croatis originem trahant" (1615). Nor is it clear that Križanić knew of B. Balbinus, although he shared Balbinus's condemnation of the xenomania of the Slavs, while departing from him in regard to Poland, for while Balbinus was a Polonophile, Križanić was instead a Russophile. Križanić's opinion that the Czech lands were almost lost to the Slavs as a result of Germanization does not differ greatly from the ideas of Balbinus and Pešin. Balbinus states in his "Defense of the Slavic Tongue" that Slavic or Illyrian is spoken among the Croats, Czechs, Slovaks, Bosnians, Poles, Rus', and others.³¹

Among East Slavic books Križanić was most influenced by the so-called "Cyril's Book," a collection of Ukrainian and Belorussian theological texts directed against the Latins, Protestants, and Armenians which was published in Moscow in 1644. After acquiring the book during his first stay in Moscow in 1647, Križanić offered to translate and refute the work for the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith. And indeed, he included certain parts of it in Latin translation in his compendium of controversies, *Bibliotheca Schismaticorum Universa*.³² Križanić was correct in judging this a significant book. It is indeed a book of the "Old Belief,"³³ as opposed to Nikon's "New Belief": that is, a book adopted before the *Raskol* by the Orthodox Russians, which would become the holy book of

³⁰ P. Bessonov, *Russkoe gosudarstvo v polovine XVII veka: Rukopis' vremen tsaria Alekseia Mikhailovicha*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1860), p. 133.

³¹ Frank Wollman, *Slovanství v jazykově literárním obrození u Slovanů* (Brno, 1958), p. 22.

³² Ivan Golub, "L'autographe de l'ouvrage de Križanić 'Bibliotheca Schismaticorum Universa' des archives de la Congrégation du Saint Office à Rome," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* (Rome), 39, no. 1 (1973): 131–61; A. Kadić, "Neobjavljeno djelo Jurja Križanića," *Kolo* (Zagreb), 2 (1966): 205–209; A. Palmieri, "Un'opera polemica di Massimo Greco (XVI secolo) tradotta in latino di Giorgio Krijanitch," *Bessarione* (Rome), ser. 3, 9, no. 16 (1912): 56–60; Bernhard Schultze, "Maksim Grek als Theologe," *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* (Rome), 167 (1963).

³³ N. Ivanovskii, "Kirillova kniga," *Bogoslovskaja èntsiklopeiia*, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg, 1909), pp. 227–31; Aleksandra Lilova, "O tak nazываемoi Kirillovoi knige," in *Bibliograficheskoe izlozhenie v otnoshenii k glagolemonu staroobriadstvu* (Kazan', 1858); A. S. Zernova, *Knigi Kirillovskoi pečati izdannye v Moskve v XVI–XVII vekakh* (Moscow, 1958).

the Russian Old Believers. The book was not only religious, but also national, as Križanić emphasized.

Križanić knew, copied, and refuted the Muscovite annals in which the genealogy of the Muscovite rulers was derived from Emperor Augustus and the Muscovite state from Byzantium and Rome.³⁴ He particularly attacked the idea of Moscow the Third Rome.

Križanić was familiar with certain state acts: the *Sudebnik* of 1550; the charter organizing the Patriarchate in Muscovy of 1589; the *Ulozhenie* of 1649.³⁵ He supported the passage of a new legal code for Muscovy which would affirm the monarchy but exclude tyranny, confirm Muscovite autochthony, and exclude foreigners from power.

In the theological and unionist context Križanić demonstrates his familiarity with Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian theological and ecclesiastical literature. He knew the *Kniga Kormchaia* (1653), *Skrizhal* (1656), *Limonar* (1628), Peter Mohyla's *Euchologion* (1646), *Pateryk Pecherskyi* (1661), I. Gizel's *Myr s Bohom cheloviku* (1669), *Potrebnik* (1651), Simeon Polotskii's *Zhezl pravleniia* (1666), and Peter Mohyla's *Trebnyk*. . .³⁶ In spite of minor disputes with him, Križanić called Mohyla,³⁷ inclined as he was to the Catholic West, "a wise hierarch, worthy of eternal praise."³⁸

The Polish literature which Križanić read expounded on the Rus' origins of the Slavs, urged the purity of the (Polish) language, and considered a military campaign against the Turks. These elements were characteristic of the Polish literary environment.

His knowledge of Ukrainian and Belorussian literature, with its disputes with the Roman church, and of Muscovite literature, with its genealogies deriving the Muscovite rulers from the Roman emperor Augustus and Rus' from the Romans and its idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, provoked Križanić to polemics and proselytism.

Križanić read all the non-Slavic authors who wrote about the Slavs, and two had a significant influence on him. The first was the Italian Antonio Possevino, who wrote *Moscovia* (Vilnius, 1586)³⁹ as the papal emissary to Ivan IV. Reading the work decided Križanić on working toward uniting all

³⁴ A. L. Gol'dberg, "Rabota Iuriiia Krizhanicha nad russkoi letopis'iu," *Trudy Otdela drevne-russkoi literatury Instituta russkoi literatury AN SSSR* (Moscow), 15 (1958); Gol'dberg, "Juraj Križanić i Rusija," p. 267.

³⁵ Gol'dberg, "Juraj Križanić i Rusija," p. 267.

³⁶ Gol'dberg, "Juraj Križanić i Rusija," p. 267.

³⁷ Octavius Barlea, *De Confessione orthodoxa Petri Mohilae* (Frankfurt, 1948), p. 278.

³⁸ *Sobranie sochinenii Iuriiia Krizhanicha*, pt. 370.

³⁹ Stanislas Polčín, "La Mission religieuse du Père Possevin en Moscovie," *Orientalia Christiana Analecta* (Rome), 150 (1957).

Slavs with the Catholic church. His memorandum to Francesco Ingoli, secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, included numerous quotes from Possevino's work.⁴⁰ He did not, however, take Possevino's book with him to Muscovy, certainly out of sense of caution.

The second author was a German, Adam Olearius (Ölschläger), who wrote *Vermehrte Neue Beschreibung der Muscowitischen vnd Persischen Reyse* (Schlesswig, 1656). It was this geographical-literary work that inspired Križanić to set off for Muscovy, against the pope's will, because it said that schools for the study of philosophy had opened there. At the same time he felt called upon to point out Olearius's calumnies about the Muscovites.⁴¹ Wrote Križanić to Tsar Feodor Alekseevich (1676):

I brought with me a book by Adam Olearius, a writer from the Holstein embassy, written, O Tsar, about this, your Empire and Rus' people (*narodu Rosijskom*), with certain pernicious calumnies, and published three times. And I informed the late Almaz Ivanovich Dumnyi, the boyar Boris Ivanovich Morozov, and the *okol'nichii* Feodor Mikhailovich Rtishchev and said that I wished to translate this book and write a rebuttal of it in the Rus' language (*Ruskim jazikom*) and in Latin so that your authorities would know the opinions that the neighboring peoples hold about the Rus' people, both true and false, so that it would be easier to shut the lips of the calumniators. And the late boyar and the *okol'nichii* praised my work: they said to translate the book and write a rebuttal. But when in Siberia I showed this book to Petr Ivanovich Godunov, *stol'nik* and governor, he took it from me and sent it to Moscow as some sort of crime on my part. And so I could not please either one or the other in the task by which I had most hoped to obtain your Imperial mercy, and unexpectedly I fell into disgrace. Thus is our unlucky philosophical lot.⁴²

Indeed, in his *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu* Križanić did translate some passages from Olearius's book and refuted them, to such a degree that his work can to some extent be called "Anti-Olearius." Thus, the German's book prompted Križanić to abandon his translation and rebuttal of the East Slavic-Greek Orthodox theologians in order to translate and rebut the Protestant "spy" (as he himself called him) Adam Olearius in Muscovy.⁴³ Recently Samuel Baron, a specialist on Olearius's work, has confirmed that it contains errors in regard to fact, that the author generalizes on the basis of insufficient evidence, and that his particular weakness is his cultural relativ-

⁴⁰ Ante Kadić, "Križanić and Possevino—Missionaries to Muscovy," in Eekman and Kadić, *Juraj Križanić*, pp. 73–89.

⁴¹ Golub, "Juraj Križanić i njegovi suvremenici: A. Kircher, I. Caramuel Lobkowitz, N. Fanaiotis, V. Spada, L. Holstenius," *Historijski Zbornik* (Zagreb), 27–28 (1974–75): 227–317.

⁴² Sergei A. Belokurov, "Iurii Krizhanich v Rossii (Po novym dokumentam)," *Chteniia v Imperatorskom obshchestve istorii i drevnostei rossiiskikh pri Moskovskom universitete*, 205 (1903, no. 2): 178.

⁴³ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 136.

ism, for he judged everything from the standpoint of his own culture and that which did not conform with it he condemned.⁴⁴

In his *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu* Križanić judged other non-Slavic authors thus:

Other nations write little about our other Slavic peoples (that is, about the Poles, Croats, and Serbs), rather they only needle them with sarcastic phrases. . . . They do not write entire books about them because they live near them and traffic with them every day and they know about their affairs even without books on them. It is only to the Rus' people (*Ruskom ljudstvu*) and this glorious state that not one but many writers have devoted entire volumes, for this land lies far from the European peoples and these affairs are less familiar to them, and because God in his mercy has lately deigned to elevate such a spacious and powerful kingdom as that which now exists here. The first to write books on Rus' (*ob Rusi*) was *Sigmund Herberstein*, emissary of the German Emperor to the Grand Prince Vasilii Ivanovich;⁴⁵ and after him *Filip Pernestein*, emissary from the same place to Tsar Ivan Vasilievich;⁴⁶ the third was *Antonio Possevino*, emissary of the Pope.⁴⁷ And *Paolo Giovio*, bishop, in his historical works, also writes the praises of this state⁴⁸ I do not have these books now, so I do not recall exactly what they write. I only know that they do not write as odiously and sarcastically about our customs and our life as the calumniator mentioned above [Olearius]. They do not magnify and spread our weaknesses and hold our customs up to scorn: they know well that there are sins and shortcomings among all people equally. Nor do they find fault with our plain furniture and our modest life; they know it is more virtuous to praise a modest life than a luxurious one. Nonetheless, not even these praise everything, but rather hold that certain things should be amended: that, for example, the people should be taught skills; and in speaking of Tsar Ivan's severe laws they do not praise all of them. But as I said, I cannot give an adequate opinion on these writers because I do not have them at hand. *Peter Petreius*, a German, has written weighty volumes on this empire, and every page is full of vile, caustic, calumnious, and hateful words and lying stories.⁴⁹ He calls his books "Rus' history" or "historical works," but they should really be called

⁴⁴ Samuel H. Baron, *The Travels of Olearius in 17th Century Russia* (Stanford, 1967), pp. 16–19; A. L. Gol'dberg, "Juraj Križanić und Adam Olearius (Aus der literarischen Polemik des 17 Jahrhunderts)," *Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Slawistik der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 28, no. 2 (1967): 94–113, 390–94; Baron, "Križanić and Olearius," pp. 183–208.

⁴⁵ Sigmund von Herberstein, *Rerum Moscovitarum Commentarii* (1549). Križanić quoted him as early as 1641 in his memorandum to Francesco Ingoli, secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith: A. Kadić, "Križanić's Memorandum," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 3 (1964): 342.

⁴⁶ Filip Pernestein, *Relatio de Magno Moscoviae Principe* (Frankfurt, 1579).

⁴⁷ Antonius Possevinus, *Moscovia* (Vilnius, 1586).

⁴⁸ Paulus Iovius, *Libellus de legatione Basilii Magni Principis Moscoviae* (Rome, 1525).

⁴⁹ *Historien vnd Bericht von dem Grossfürstenthumb Muschkow, mit der schönen fruchtbaren Provinzien vnd Herschafften, Festungen, Schloössern, Staädten, Flecken, Fischreichen Wassern, Flüssen, Strömen vnd Seen, Wie auch Von der Reussischen Grossfürsten Herkommen, Regierung, Macht, Eminenz vnd Herrligkeit . . . publiciret Durch Petrum Petreium de Erlesunda, Lipsiae Anno DDCXX.*

pasquinades, i.e., defamatory, caustic, niggling lampoons. It isn't worth quoting anything from them here even as a sample. There is not a page in them from beginning to end without base calumnies on it. No one could describe accursed devils worse, more hatefully, more repulsively, more horribly than he describes our people. He shows us to be worse than Turks, worse than Tatars, worse than Samoyeds, worse than all the devils of Hell. Nevertheless, the Germans in Moscow own these books, read them, and value them *Jacob of Denmark* the emissary writes maliciously, but I have not seen these books.⁵⁰ *Heidenstein* wrote long books concerned solely with the tortures of Tsar Ivan.⁵¹ He lists, from day to day, whom the Tsar had killed and how. *Salomon Henning* wrote the Livonian annals, and included Rus' matters there.⁵² *Hammelmann* wrote the Oldenburg annals, and there, too, Rus' matters are included.⁵³ *Acernus* wrote whole books about Rus'.⁵⁴ *David Chyträus*,⁵⁵ *Paulus Odorbornius*,⁵⁶ and the author of the book entitled *Archontologia*⁵⁷ among other things also wrote about Rus', but I do not have them in order now. But in short, all of these authors, wherever they write something about the Rus' people or any other Slavic people, appear to be writing not so much history as some caustic and abusive ditty. . . . We should note that the first four writers—Herberstein, Pernestein, Possevino, and Iovius (*Giovio*)—were men of the Roman confession. Therefore they do not calumniate, nor disgrace, nor exaggerate our sins, rather they give praise where they have seen something of worth. . . . Thus the good speak well and keep silent about that which is ill even if they know something about it. But the wicked never mention that which is good, but only spread the bad and make it ten times worse. Adam, namely, Olearius, Petreius, Jacob of Denmark and all the others we have mentioned are men of the Lutheran heresy and so speak according to their custom and schooling. It should be known that Luther and his followers had and still have nothing with which to reproach the Roman Church other than the sinful life of ecclesiastics. Therefore they do nothing but proclaim the sins of the clergy and so lead people away from the Roman faith into their own heresy. And here, too, they act in the same way: by proclaiming Rus' sins as well and by magnifying them they attempt to find fault with the Orthodox faith and destroy it. . . . Since you are eloquent and very loquacious, you surpass us in your speech and so find it easy to reproach us with all kinds of things, for we, because of our lack of eloquence, are unable to think up the same sort of remarks about you, nor do we know how to answer you back. In the same way the Greeks once believed that only they them-

⁵⁰ Iacobus Ulfeldus (Jacob Ulfeldt), *Legatio Moscovitica siue Hodoeporicon Ruthenicum* (Frankfurt, 1627).

⁵¹ Reinhold Heidenstein, *De bello Moscovitico Commentariorum libri VI* (Basel, 1588). The work can also be found in the collection *Rerum moscovitarum scriptores varii* (Frankfurt, 1600), pp. 325–434. It also forms an appendix to Martin Cromer, *Polonia siue De origine et rebus gestis Polonorum libri XXX* (Cologne, 1589).

⁵² Salomon Henning, *Liffländische-Churlandische Chronica, was sich vom 1554–1590 in den langwirigen Moscovitischer und andern Kriegen . . . zugetragen* (Rostock, 1590).

⁵³ Hermann Hammelmann, *Oldenburgisches Chronicon* (Oldenburg, 1599).

⁵⁴ S. Klonowicz [pseud. Acernus], *Roxolania* (Cracow, 1584).

⁵⁵ David Chyträus, *Vandalia* (Rostock, 1589).

⁵⁶ *Ioannis Basilidis Magni Moschoviae Ducis vita a Paulo Oderbornio tribus libris conscripta* (Wittenberg, 1585).

⁵⁷ J. Abelinus [pseud. Ludovicus Gotofredus], *Archontologia cosmica* (Frankfurt, 1628).

selves were humans and considered all the other peoples barbarians and cattle. But it came to pass that those whom the Greeks called barbarians now call the Greeks barbarians.⁵⁸

In this important text Križanić has sketched out the attitudes he found in reading the books written by non-Slavs about the Slavs. These were the books that formed the basis of public opinion in Europe about Muscovy and Rus'. He distinguishes between Catholic and Protestant writers, considering the former well-intentioned, the latter malicious. The Slavs lack a language equal to theirs to answer them back, but time will bring about a radical change. Križanić does not shut his eyes to this awkward reading matter, so unfavorable to the Slavs. He wishes to rouse the Muscovites from their indifference to that which was thought, written, and spoken about them in Europe. He believes that the reputation of a people (a phrase he uses frequently) is a thing of value which should be cherished if they are to take their place among the other nations.

Križanić believed the role of the book to be significant. That which he found valuable in books (purity of language, kinship among the Slavs, liberation from the Turks) he hailed, that which he found noxious (myths of the Roman origins of the Muscovite rulers, calumnies of non-Slavic writers, schism in the church) he attacked. He fought pen with pen. Through his writings in the Slavic tongue Križanić wished to create a single literary environment encompassing all the Slavs, but chiefly the Muscovites, and through his books in Latin he sought to shape a literary environment dealing with the Slavs among the non-Slavs.

Križanić was a critical reader, yet three books had a decisive influence on him. Possevino's *Moscovia* spurred Križanić to set off for Muscovy himself and to work on church unity. "Cyril's Book" provoked Križanić to devote himself to the writing of a compendium of the controversies with Orthodoxy. Olearius's *Vermehrte neue Beschreibung der Muscowitischen vnd Persischen Reyse* stirred Križanić to leave Rome for Muscovy so as to translate and rebut the work. In opposition to these three texts, he wrote three books of his own. His *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu* are in part an "anti-Olearius" treatise (and would perhaps have been more so had not the book been taken from him). The *Bibliotheca Schismaticorum Universa* is in part a corrective to "Cyril's Book," as are the disputes with it scattered throughout Križanić's other works. In 1682, a year before his death, he wrote that he had written his own *Moscovia*, a "report on the affairs of Muscovy (*la relazione delle cose di Moscovia*), which has the scope of a

⁵⁸ Križanić, *Politika*, pp. 136–39, 713–14.

fair-sized book."⁵⁹ This work, reminiscent of Possevino's *Moscovia*, has not been found.

Circles

One can belong to an intellectual circle physically, as it were, but it is also possible to belong in spirit alone. Furthermore, one can be in the center of a circle or on the periphery or in the space between the periphery and the center, depending on social position, age, and other factors. Finally, it is possible to belong to a circle wholly or only in part, according to the extent to which the member himself adopts the views of the circle.

As a decidedly independent individual, Juraj Križanić would seem to have remained outside circles. Yet this was not really so. In almost every milieu he entered (and he changed milieus often), he found or created his own circle. But he did this in such a way that he retained his independence and autonomy and never sacrificed his principles to please any circle.

In his homeland Križanić should certainly be included in the so-called Ozalj linguistic-literary circle.⁶⁰ This circle was created by Petar Zrinski, who sought Križanić for his court; Juraj Rattkay, who was at one time Križanić's friend; Ivan Belostenec, the soul of the circle, whom Križanić probably met; Katarina Zrinska and Frano Krsto Frankopan, with whom Križanić could have been acquainted. Disapproval of the Germans was characteristic of this circle, and of Križanić as well. The members of the Ozalj circle were conscious of the paucity of Croat books—Katarina Zrinska lamented that of all the languages of the world at that time, Croatian could boast the fewest printed books⁶¹—and they took pains over composition in and translations into Croatian. Katarina Zrinska translated the prayer book *Putni tovaruš* (The traveling companion), Petar translated *Adrijanskoga mora sirena* (Siren of the Adriatic) from Hungarian, Frano Krsto wrote *Gartlic za čas kratiti* (A garden to shorten the hours), Rattkay wrote *Kriposti Ferdinanda II* (The virtues of Ferdinand II), and Belostenec compiled his dictionary *Gazophylacium*.

The language of the Ozalj circle was a tridialectal koine of čakavian, kajkavian, and štokavian. Its work on literary matters and linguistic standardization was traceable to Glagolitic and Protestant books and to the

⁵⁹ Belokurov, "Križanich v Rossii," p. 272.

⁶⁰ Josip Vončina, "Jezični razvoj ozaljskoga kruga," *Filologija* (Zagreb), 7 (1973): 203–237.

⁶¹ Šidak, *Kroz pet stoljeća hrvatske povijesti*, p. 83.

Ozalj area.⁶² Križanić was to call the speech of the area around Ozalj, Dubovac, and Ribnik the purest and the closest to the original Slavic tongue in grammar and accent,⁶³ because of its interdialectal character and its closeness to Paleoslavonic. (In Križanić's time the mass was still said from the Glagolitic missal and some priests wrote their oaths in Glagolitic).⁶⁴ In his own writings Križanić, too, formed a Common Slavic koine, a Slavic interdialect (he called all the Slavic languages dialects). The Ozalj circle, in the person of Križanić, would stretch from Ozalj to Moscow and Tobolsk.

The circle that Križanić was to encounter in every Catholic milieu was that of the Counter-Reformation. This was especially pronounced in the center of Catholicism, in Rome. In his formative period Križanić was at almost every stage a pupil in institutions administered by the Jesuits and a student at Jesuit schools (although he himself never became a Jesuit, as is occasionally mistakenly said in the literature). The Jesuits were in the vanguard of the Counter-Reformation. At that time their entire training was permeated with its spirit, especially the study of polemical theology, based on the work of Robert Bellarmine, the theologian of the Counter-Reformation, and the history of the church, based on the work of Caesar Baronius, the historian of the Counter-Reformation. The Collegium Romanum where Križanić completed his study of theology emphasized polemical theology with the intention of creating adherents who after their studies would confront the Reformation on their return to their homelands.⁶⁵ Križanić was marked by the imprint of this schooling.

Križanić would later transfer the matrix of Counter-Reformation to Slavic Orthodoxy. As Bellarmine had written a compendium of the controversies with the Protestants, so Križanić, in his own way, was to write a compendium of the controversies with the Orthodox Slavs. As Baronius had written the *Annales* of the Christian church, so Križanić, to a more modest extent, would produce a sort of Slavic *Annales*.

Jesuit education and the Counter-Reformation atmosphere of Rome were not alone in creating the Counter-Reformation circle that Križanić entered through the school door. To all appearances he had also belonged to a Counter-Reformation circle in his homeland. Križanić certainly knew that many German Military Frontier officers—particularly in his own area—

⁶² Vončina, "Jezični razvoj ozaljskoga kruga," pp. 236–37.

⁶³ Juraj Križanić, *Gramatično izkazânje ob Rúskom jeziku*, (Moscow, 1859), pp. iii-iv.

⁶⁴ Golub, "Tri jezična spomenika," pp. 151–52.

⁶⁵ Riccardo G. Villoslada, "Storia del Collegio Romano del suo inizio (1551) alla soppressione della Compagnia di Gesù, (1773)," *Analecta Gregoriana, Cura Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana edita* 46, Series Facultatis Historiae Ecclesiasticae, sec. A, no. 2 (Rome, 1954), p. 233.

were zealous Protestants. He would have been aware of the articles of the Croatian Sabor prohibiting the new faith and denying its missionaries welcome, as well as permitting anyone to seize these sowers of tares and hand them over to the authorities. These articles did not languish buried in the minutes of the Sabor. On the contrary, the Croatian Ban and the Bishop of Zagreb hand in hand curbed the adherents of the new faith and converted the apostates. Križanić can scarcely have been ignorant of the way his superior, patron, and fellow-countryman Benedikt Vinković, as prelate and Bishop of Zagreb, had prayed, advised, taught, disputed, and threatened, solely to turn back those who had converted to Protestantism. It was certainly no accident that Križanić chose Nedelišće, exposed as it was to Protestant influence, as his parish (1643–44). In Muscovy, too, he was to propose that the tsar legalize the persecution of heretics—decrees which, in short, hark back to the Croatian Sabor's Counter-Reformation articles.⁶⁶

During his stay in Rome Križanić had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the Counter-Reformation's ecclesiastical policy. He was a pupil of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, then only twenty years old. With the enthusiasm of its own youth and led by its visionary secretary Francesco Ingoli,⁶⁷ it established and developed relations with those countries in need of missionary work, whether pagan, heretic (Protestant), or schismatic (Orthodox). During the hopeless period of the Thirty Years' War, when it was losing the Protestant Germans, Rome turned to work on winning over the Orthodox Slavs. The hope was that young Muscovy, having grown into a great state, would lift the Turkish yoke from Europe's back. The Catholic Slavs were to participate in this endeavour. Pope Urban VIII—during whose pontificate Križanić visited Rome for the first time—wrote in 1627 in the bull that re-established the Collegium Illyricum in Loretto that the people of the Illyrian tongue inhabit a great part of Europe and the greater part of Asia, that their kingdoms and countries once flourished throughout Europe, that theirs is among the ranks of the original churches sown by the apostles, that for the most part they groan beneath the godless tyranny of the Turks and are in part infected by the poison of the eastern schismatics (the Orthodox) and the northern heretics (the Protestants), and that he wished to check this situation through the reestablishment

⁶⁶ Golub, "Juraj Križanić, Hrvat iz Ozlja," p. 101.

⁶⁷ Josef Metzler, "Francesco Ingoli, der erste Sekretär der Kongregation," *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum, 1622–1972*, 3 vols. (Rome, Freiburg, Vienna, 1971–76), vol. 1, pt. 1: 197–243.

of the Collegium Illyricum.⁶⁸ To this end pupils were to be accepted into the Illyrian institute. But it was certainly to the same end that Juraj Križanić was accepted into the Collegium Graecum Sancti Atanasii in Urbe, desiring to prepare himself there for a mission to Moscow. Being neither a Greek nor a descendant of Greeks, Križanić was required to obtain special permission to enter the Collegium Graecum, which he received from Urban VIII. Overall, Križanić's Moscow intentions were in accord with the current policy in Rome.

When Rome's hopes that the accession of a Polish prince to the Muscovite throne would lead to ecclesiastical unification collapsed, Rome, lacking official relations with Moscow, found Juraj Križanić's offer opportune.⁶⁹ In 1641, in a memorandum addressed to Francesco Ingoli, Križanić developed his proposal: he would go to the tsar's court, work on the enlightenment of the Muscovites, be helpful to the tsar in booklearning, and at the appropriate moment urge the tsar into war against the Turks and into work for church unity:

I do not hold the Muscovites to be heretics or schismatics (for their schism does not stem from pride, the true root of schism, but from ignorance), but rather I hold them to be Christians who have simply been led into error. Thus I believe that to go to traffic with them does not mean to go to preach the faith to them (which enterprise I would never dare to undertake), but rather means to go to urge them to virtue, to knowledge, to free skills: when this has been achieved, it will afterwards be easy to show them their falsity and error, which shall be the work of others, full of virtue and spirit.⁷⁰

Ingoli,⁷¹ turned wholly to the future, accepted Križanić's memorandum. The words which he appended to Križanić's plea to be ordained as a priest to head this mission certainly refer to this memorandum: "I saw his writings to be so sensible that the best results can be expected."⁷²

Rome, fairly clear on the ethnic relationship of the Slavs, had no real concept of the Slavic linguistic family. Ingoli, the man most competent in the matter, a person with a good sense of the literature in the languages of

⁶⁸ *Bullarium Diplomatum et Privilegiorum Sanctorum Romanorum Pontificum Taurinensis Editio, Tomus XIII, Urbanus VIII (ab an. MDCXXIII ad an. MDCXXVII)*, Augustae Taurinorum MDCCCLXVIII, p. 541.

⁶⁹ Josef Olšr, "La Congregazione ed i Paesi assegnati al Nunzio di Polonia (Polonia, Svezia, Russia)," *Sacrae Congregationis de Propaganda Fide Memoria Rerum, 1622–1972* vol. 1, pt. 2: 203–208.

⁷⁰ Kadić, "Križanić's Memorandum," p. 342.

⁷¹ Metzler, "Francesco Ingoli," p. 242.

⁷² Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 10.

the peoples among whom Rome proselytized,⁷³ wrote that the Czech tongue was a variant of the Illyrian language spoken by the Muscovites.⁷⁴ The language in which the Congregation printed its books, both liturgical and non-liturgical, had to be understood by the largest number of Slavs possible. In this regard two models arose: the model of the widest-spread (and most beautiful) living dialect, supported by the Croat Bartol Kašić and the Italian Giacomo Micaglia, and the model of East Slavic Paleoslavonic, supported by Rafael Levaković (usually called Raphael Croata) and the Ukrainian Metodii Terlets'kyi. A certain vacillation on the Congregation's part between the two models can be seen in the fact that Kašić's "Roman Ritual" (Rome, 1640), in "a more general sort of Illyrian dialect," as Kašić himself wrote in the introduction, came out in the period between the publication of Levaković's Glagolitic missal (Rome, 1631) and his Glagolitic breviary (Rome, 1648). Kašić's translation of the Holy Scripture into contemporary Croatian, however, requested by the Congregation itself, remained unprinted, apparently because of opposition from some Croats, who believed that the Bible should be published in the old liturgical language.⁷⁵ In 1643, in Rome, Terlets'kyi informed the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith that he had cleansed Levaković's psalter in the Glagolitic breviary of alien Dalmatian quantities and had replaced them with uncorrupted Slavic sounds.⁷⁶ Levaković supposedly accepted this without much enthusiasm.⁷⁷ On his way to Rome and on his return journey in 1643, Terlets'kyi was Križanić's guest in Croatia. Perhaps he convinced Križanić that the original Slavic language had been preserved in the Ukrainian liturgical books, while in the Croatian Glagolitic missals and breviaries it had been corrupted by words taken from the living Croatian spoken language.⁷⁸ To a certain extent this opinion would become evident in Križanić's views on language. Križanić was to consider the East Slavic recension of Paleoslavonic the original language which the Rus'—or rather the Slavs—had spoken.⁷⁹ He would call his work on language a correcting of the language. However, he would not hesitate to introduce the living

⁷³ Metzler, "Francesco Ingoli," p. 211.

⁷⁴ E. Shmurlo, *Rossia i Italija: Sbornik istoricheskikh materialov i issledovanii, kasaiushchikhsia snoshenii Rossii s Italiei* (St. Petersburg, 1911), vol. 3, pt. 1, p. 92.

⁷⁵ Ivan Golub, Marko Mišerda, and Tomislav Mrkonjić, "Hrvatski teološki termini 'Rituala Rimskog' Bartola Kašića (1640)," *Bogoslovska smotra* 49 (1979): 332.

⁷⁶ Vatican Apostolic Library, Vaticano Slavo 23: Breviarium Romanum Slauonico Idiometate Iussu Sanctissimi Domini Nostri Innocentii Papae Decimi editum Per Fr. Raphaelem Leuacouich Archiepiscopum Acridanum, siue Iustinianae Primae, fol. 14.

⁷⁷ Pandžić, "Glavinić i Levaković," p. 108.

⁷⁸ Pandžić, "Glavinić i Levaković," p. 107.

⁷⁹ Križanić, *Gramatično izkazânje ob Rúskom jezíku*, p. ii.

Slavic spoken languages of the time into his Common Slavic tongue. In this respect he is perhaps closer to Levaković than to Terlets'kyi.

Križanić had strong and deep ties to his countryman Levaković. He was certainly familiar with Levaković's work on preparing the Glagolitic missal and breviary. He was to write to Levaković that he had a biography of St. Cyril written in ancient Glagolitic.⁸⁰ Another point of linguistic contact between Križanić and Levaković was poetry. In 1639 and 1640 Levaković printed in Rome three eulogistic poems under the title *Slavonicum Epigramma*: the first in East Slavic, in Cyrillic; the second in a tongue most closely resembling ikavian, in Glagolitic; the third in an idiom that included many East Slavic elements, in the Latin alphabet. It is not clear whether the fourth, unsigned poem, entitled *Ilirico Serviano*, for the most part in ijekavian with an admixture of ikavian, was by Levaković.⁸¹ In his own eulogistic poems, which he was to publish later, Križanić would follow Levaković's interdialect or his mixture of Paleoslavonic elements with the living spoken language in its variety of dialects.⁸²

The use of East Slavic Paleoslavonic and a Croatian interdialect was not the only characteristic of the Levaković-Terlets'kyi circle, to which Križanić in his own way belonged. It was also involved with work on the church union of the Orthodox Slavs. In his youth Terlets'kyi had preached among the Vlachs of Žumberak. Levaković had preached to the Vlachs living near Ivanić-grad. Perhaps under the influence of this pair Križanić asked the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to allow him to prepare for his work in Muscovy by working for a certain time among the Vlachs of Žumberak and Ivanić-grad. When the Zagreb Cathedral Chapter criticized Bishop B. Vinković for naming Rafael Levaković, a Franciscan, a canon of Zagreb, Vinković replied that Levaković was the priest most qualified for work on the unification of the Eastern and Western churches. That he considered Križanić qualified for this work as well can be seen from the fact that he proposed him, as well as Levaković, for episcopal dignity among the Vlachs. Rafael Levaković Croatia is undoubtedly a key to Križanić's views on language and on union.

One can, or course, belong to a circle by virtue of class or group affiliation. It was in this way that Juraj Križanić, as a canon, was associated with the Zagreb Cathedral Chapter. There he must have been closely linked with

⁸⁰ Belokurov, "Križanich v Rossii," p. 214.

⁸¹ Dragen Plamenac, "Rimska opera 17. stoljeća, rodjenje Luja XIV i Rafael Levaković," *Arti Musices: Muzikološki zbornik (Zagreb)*, 3 (1972): 51–62.

⁸² Plamenac, "Rimska opera 17. stoljeća," p. 59.

Juraj Rattkay, proponent of the Illyrian nature of the Sava (Posavina) area of Croatia who repeated the tale of the Slav brothers Czech and Lech and placed their homeland in Krapina.⁸³ During the dispute over the Illyrian lands in Rome, Rattkay would write to Križanić as a long-time friend and reproach him for including Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria in the Illyrian lands.⁸⁴

We can speculate whether Križanić knew the inscription made in 1643 by Ivan Zakmardi, protonotary of the Kingdom of Croatia: placed on the chest in which important papers relating to the kingdom were to be kept, the inscription acclaimed Croatia as the cradle of the Czech land and of the Polish kingdom.⁸⁵

Križanić belonged, in a way, to yet another circle in his homeland—a political circle. Ivan Drašković, the Croatian Ban, called “Defensor Croatiae”; Petar Zrinski, Croatian Ban, poet and translator; and Vuk Krsto Frankopan, general of Karlovac, all invited Križanić, who had returned from Rome in 1642, to their courts. Križanić, fearing that his Moscow plan might recede in his mind among the comforts of their courts, did not accept. His refusal was not necessarily a rejection of this circle: after all, Križanić shared the members’ common abhorrence of the Germans. Zrinski was to seek aid from the Turks in throwing off the German yoke, and Križanić would ask the Muscovite tsar to lift both the German and the Turkish yokes from all the Slavs.

As parish priest in Varažadin (1645–46) when the Croatian Sabor sat there, Križanić was surely aware of the pleas and protests sent by the Croat notables to the emperor in Vienna, asking the ruler to affirm the dignity of the Ban; to subject the German officers of the Military Frontier to the laws of the Croatian kingdom; to order that the German soldiers be removed and that the local menfolk not be recruited for Hungary, because they were indispensable for the struggle against the Turkish advance on their own land.⁸⁶ This experience would later be reflected in Križanić’s Siberian writings: he would beseech the Muscovite tsar and his boyars to banish the German officers who were instructing the Muscovite army.

Temporary, *ad hoc* circles also existed. The 150 people who were brought together for several months (1650–51) as the Viennese Court’s embassy to the Ottoman Porte formed such a circle. Križanić had a position

⁸³ Šidak, *Kroz pet stoljeća hrvatske povijesti*, p. 84.

⁸⁴ Golub, “Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću,” pp. 181–82.

⁸⁵ Šidak, *Kroz pet stoljeća hrvatske povijesti*, p. 84.

⁸⁶ *Zaključci Hrvatskoga sabora*, vol. 1: 1631–1693, ed. Josip Buturac et al. (Zagreb, 1958), pp. 123–30.

in the group, as chaplain and personal (Italian) secretary to the ambassador himself, Johann Rudolf Schmid, and expert on the Turkish language, culture, and politics. Križanić certainly owed his knowledge of the Turks not only to his own observations, but also to his contact with Schmid. After Schmid demanded that the metropolitans who had come to him with their internal church disputes first anathemize Calvinism and Lutheranism—which had begun to penetrate Orthodoxy—from the ambo of the Patriarchate, he sent Križanić to the Patriarchal church to ascertain whether they had fulfilled the demand. Križanić must have been gratified by the thought that the Protestants were being condemned: indeed, one wonders whether he had any part in influencing the grand ambassador to set this demand before the metropolitans. Križanić scattered recollections of his stay in Turkey throughout his Siberian works, mentioning in particular his conversations with the Greek Nikousios Panagiōtēs, an interpreter at the Ottoman Porte and also for the Viennese resident in Constantinople. Nikousios believed in the imminent collapse of Turkish might.⁸⁷

During his second stay in Rome (1652–58) Križanić belonged to a Croatian circle gathered about the Institute of St. Jerome. More exactly, he was a member of the Congregation of St. Jerome. He joined because of a legal battle over the question of what was to be understood as the “Illyrian lands,” specifically, whether they should be held to include Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia. During the dispute’s first phase Križanić maintained that the Carniolans, Styrians, and Carinthians had been Illyrians, i.e., Slavs, but that as a result of Germanization they had been lost to Slavdom. In the second phase, however, he asserted that they were still Illyrians, i.e., Slavs, and therefore had a right to the Institute of St. Jerome in Rome. Two opposing circles formed in the wake of the dispute: one around Jeronim Paštrić, primarily made up of Dalmatians but including other Croats; and the second around Juraj Križanić, made up of Slovenes (Carniolans, Styrians, and Carinthians) and some Croats. Paštrić’s circle won the suit.⁸⁸

At the time Križanić also belonged to the Roman Baroque circle. its founders included the German polyhistor, Athanasius Kircher, the encyclopedic Spanish scholar, Juan Caramuel; the Italian entrepreneur in the building of Baroque Rome, Virgilio Spada; the librarian of the Vatican and the Barberini, Lucas Holstenius; and the spirit of this circle, Alexander VII, the pope of the Baroque. Križanić collaborated with Kircher on his Egyptological compendium *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (Rome, 1655); he obtained a

⁸⁷ Golub, “Juraj Križanić u Carigradu,” pp. 193–202.

⁸⁸ Golub, “Juraj Križanić i pitanje prava Slovenaca,” pp. 213–57; Golub, “Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću,” pp. 148–210.

description of the obelisk of Constantinople through Nikousios Panagiōtēs and wrote panegyrics for the work. On his part, Kircher produced an expert report on the Illyrian lands in favor of Križanić's position. Virgilio Spada recommended Križanić's writings on controversies to Lucas Holstenius, who in turn recommended them to Križanić's immediate superior, the secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.⁸⁹ Caramuel, who was in Rome for a short time, dealt with Križanić's hypotheses in musical theory in his work *Musica*, and ranked him with Mersennius, Kircher, and Descartes.⁹⁰ He included Križanić's poetry in his exemplified poetics, or anthology accompanied by studies, thus placing him alongside Petrarch and Lope de Vega.⁹¹ Alexander VII, to whom Križanić presented one of his works on musical proportion, recorded in his diary Križanić's wish to go to Muscovy; on the same page, he mentioned Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini in connection with the building of arches (the colonnade) before the Basilica of St. Peter. So it happened that the pope of the Baroque, Alexander VII, the prince of Baroque sculpture and building Bernini, and Križanić, the outstanding scion of the Croatian and Slavic Baroque, all appeared on one page of the diary.⁹²

On his way to Moscow Križanić stopped in Nizhyn near Konotop, where battles between Hetman Ivan Vyhov's'kyi and the Muscovites were raging. He entered the circle of Archpriest Maksym Fylymonovych, who supported the Ukraine's fealty to the Muscovite tsar. Surprisingly, Križanić, although a Catholic, held that the Ukraine should belong to Orthodox Muscovy rather than to Catholic Poland. He supported that position in his usual way—by his pen. "Being in the Ukraine," he would tell the tsar many years later (in 1676), "in Nizhyn, during the Konotop sieges, I wrote an extensive paper of a political nature in order to convince the local people that it would be better for them to serve you, O Mighty Lord, rather than the Polish king. During that terrible period I gave my paper to the local leaders and the archpriest to read. Particularly after the siege had ended they read it at their

⁸⁹ Golub, "Juraj Križanić i njegovi suvremenici," pp. 227–317; Golub, "Contribution à l'histoire des relations de Križanić avec ses contemporains (1651–1658)," in Eekman and Kadić, *Juraj Križanić*, pp. 91–144.

⁹⁰ Ivan Golub, "Juraj Križanić's 'Asserta Musicalia' in Caramuel's Newly Discovered Autograph of 'Musica,'" *International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music* (Zagreb), 9, no. 2 (1978): 219–78; Golub, *Juraj Križanić*, pp. 101–18.

⁹¹ Ivan Golub, "Križanićeve stihovi u poetici Juana Caramuela (g. 1665)," *Forum* (Zagreb), 16, no. 4–5 (1977): 819–24.

⁹² Ivan Golub, "Juraj Križanić in the Diary of the Pope Alexander VII," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 47 (1981): 463–64.

meetings and approved it and through it strengthened their loyalty to your most radiant empire.”⁹³

Križanić saw any loss of power by Muscovy (the Treaty of Pereiaslav and the acceptance of Muscovite suzerainty had occurred only five years earlier) as bad, for only a strong Muscovy could carry out the mission which Križanić envisioned for it. On the ecclesiastical front, Križanić addressed the rebellious Old Believers in a similar way, exhorting them to return to the official Orthodox church and not to take a malicious delight in the schism within Orthodoxy. It would be good for the task of church unification if the Muscovite Orthodox church were whole.

As in Rome he had entered the circle of Pope Alexander, so in Moscow Križanić approached the circle around Tsar Aleksei. The tsar’s favorites, Rtishchev and Morozov, were champions of the new ways.⁹⁴ Morozov was married to the tsaritsa’s sister; Rtishchev enjoyed the tsar’s particular confidence. Morozov was well-inclined towards foreigners; Rtishchev was concerned with education, and had erected, not far from Moscow, the Monastery of St. Andrew (Andreevskii monastyr’), where he had settled Ukrainian monks to instruct those who wanted to know Slavic and Greek grammar, rhetoric, and philosophy, and to translate books. By day occupied in the tsar’s court, he spent his nights with the learned monks of the St. Andrew Monastery.⁹⁵

The intuitive Križanić succeeded in coming into contact with people who were both very close to the tsar—whom he had long dreamed of reaching—and who were open to innovation. As he wrote:

When I proposed to the late nobles of beloved memory, *Boris Ivanovich Morozov*, boyar, and *Fedor Mikhailovich Rtishchev*, *okol' nichii*, that I wished, with the aid of God, to write a conclusive, and extremely necessary refutation in the Rus' (*Ruskim*), Latin, and German languages of the blasphemies written in [the translations of] the Bible and in innumerable other books, these highly praised, deeply intelligent men, who knew how to value, love, and defend national honor, accepted my proposal with great joy and grace, and promised us great favor and demonstrated it in deed.⁹⁶

The books in question were Luther’s translation of the Bible and Olearius’s *Vermehrte neue Beschreibung der Muscowitschen vnd Persischen Reyse*.

⁹³ Belokurov, “Krizhanich v Rossii,” p. 175.

⁹⁴ S. M. Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen*, 15 vols. (Moscow, 1959–66), 6: 199, 622.

⁹⁵ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 5: 491.

⁹⁶ *Sobranie sochinenii Iuriiia Krizhanicha*, pt. 2: 19; Belokurov, “Krizhanich v Rossii,” p. 178.

We have no evidence whether Križanić approached—or perhaps even joined—the circle of church renewal whose spirit was Patriarch Nikon, although we do know that Križanić defended Nikon's correction of the church books. Nor is it known whether Križanić was in some way included in the St. Andrew Monastery circle, whose educational purpose could have appealed to him; he does mention respectfully several Ukrainian–Belorussian monks of the monastery: Epyfanii Slavynets'kyi, Simiaon Polatski,⁹⁷ as well as Ivan Shmatkovs'kyi, protohiereus of Hlukhiv.⁹⁸ Križanić's contact with people belonging to circles with which he himself did not agree is evident in his acquaintance with the priest Lazar of Tobolsk, an Old Believer, and in his attempt to talk with the leader of the Old Believers, Archpriest Avvakum, on a journey through Tobolsk.⁹⁹

On his return from Muscovy Križanić wrote to the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith that in Muscovy he had met many people of various classes who were secretly Catholics, some of whom had frequently begged him to issue a work in their own language, with which they could save their consciences and, if God willed, profess their faith openly.¹⁰⁰ It is not clear whether these people represented a coherent circle.

As in Zagreb he had joined the professional circle of the Cathedral Chapter by becoming a canon, in order to maintain his material existence, so in Vilnius, perhaps driven by hunger not only for bread but also for words (books and libraries), Križanić joined the estate circle of the Dominican Order. And just as he had renounced his canonicate in Zagreb in order to be free to journey to Moscow, so he attempted to extricate himself from the Dominican monastery in Vilnius in order to start out for Rome. He found the atmosphere in Vilnius extremely inimical, both to his person and to his task: he was threatened with confinement in the monastery, and his papers, with immolation. The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, which had a better sense of Križanić and his work in Muscovy, tried in vain, even through the offices of the Dominican General Monroy, to bring him back to Rome.

Križanić, meanwhile, had succeeded in reaching the king of Poland, Jan Sobieski, in his usual way—by presenting him with one of his writings, in this instance the manuscript of *Historia de Sibiria*, perhaps through the Dominican Skopowski, the king's confessor. The last group Križanić found

⁹⁷ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurii Krizhanicha*, pt. 3: 52.

⁹⁸ Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića*, p. 313.

⁹⁹ Ivan Golub, "Uz susret Jurja Križanića i Protopop Avvakuma," *Bogoslovska smotra* (Zagreb), 35 (1965): 357–68.

¹⁰⁰ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 278.

himself associated with was Sobieski's army, hurrying to Vienna, then under siege by the Turks. Križanić, who had developed an entire doctrine of military skill in the work *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu*, perished in the company of the Polish army below Vienna in 1683.

Križanić was a man who used books happily and often, but he was not a bookworm. He also moved happily and often among people, aware that he could only achieve his purposes through social intercourse with human beings. He did not daydream in hermit-like solitude, allowing the course of events to slip by him. On the contrary, he entered into associations or created his own circles. Križanić accepted something from and contributed something to each circle. In his youth he accepted more (Levaković), later he accepted and contributed in equal measure (the Roman Baroque circle), and still later contributed more (his Muscovite circle). However, one idea separated him from every circle he knew: his Moscow plan, or *intention moscovitica*. This idea, an elaboration of Muscovy's origin, status, and mission (national and ecclesiastical), cannot be detected in any other person or circle.

Križanić's membership in circles was not passive. He constantly entered new circles and did not fear contact with opposing ones. Exceptionally open-minded, he was a true theorist in the literal sense of the word, an observer, but he was also a truly practical man, in the sense that he put his observations to work in the realization of his Moscow plan. "By longitude," he wrote to Kircher in connection with the Slavic world, "I have undertaken travels from the Adriatic Sea to Moscow, by latitude from Vienna to Constantinople, where I have diligently observed all the differences of dialect, and the ways of writing, and the customs of the peoples, and what I might of the rest, particularly that which appertains to religion."¹⁰¹

Currents

In examining Križanić's Slavic idea one is faced with the question of whether it was a kind of pattern, established early and repeated like a stamp throughout his life, so that any variation depended on specific conditions, circumstances, or correspondents, or whether it was a developing idea which, while remaining true to itself in its entirety, changed easily according to the perception of new circumstances, correspondents, and conditions. To put it more concretely, one wonders whether Križanić's ideas on the

¹⁰¹ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," p. 142.

origin, condition, and mission of the Slavs and their languages grew with or without constraint.

Križanić found himself in circumstances in which he was compelled to express this Slavic idea, and in circumstances in which he wanted—even ardently desired—to express it. He also found himself in a position in which he was obliged, because of his correspondents, to be vague and incomplete. He had to use the terminology of his correspondents so that they would understand him at the same time that he was pleading for other terms. Finally, living at a time when attempts to standardize a national terminology and language were being made, Križanić himself would vacillate.

Križanić's fundamental and passionate interests were three: the well-being of the Slavs, the language of the Slavs, and the church unity of the Slavs. The three did not emerge at the same time. His interest in language had precedence: "You know, Reverend Father," wrote Križanić to Rafael Levaković in 1647, "the desire I have always cherished to work on the cultivation of our language."¹⁰² In 1676 he wrote to Tsar Fedor Alekseevich, "From my childhood, abandoning all concern for any other system of life, I have wholeheartedly given myself solely to the search for wisdom and to the correction, clarification, and perfection of our distorted—or, more accurately—our lost language, and to the adornment of my own mind and that of the entire people."¹⁰³ In the introduction to *Objasnjenje vîvódno o písmé Slovênskom* (A discussion of Slavic orthography; 1661), Križanić, in speaking of the need for work on the Slavic language, said: "In this matter, on which I have been working for almost 30 years now, I wish and hope, with God's aid, to give to the world in a short time a Grammar and Lexicon. . . ."¹⁰⁴ From this statement it appears that Križanić's linguistic interests had first arisen sometime in his fifteenth year; there is no reason to question Križanić on that here.¹⁰⁵ Križanić could have begun his study of the Slavic language during his years at the gymnasium, or he could have been the same sort of child-wonder as his friend Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, who published his first book at age eleven.

The determination to work toward the church unity of the Slavs developed after the genesis of his interest in the Slavic language. As Križanić wrote to Levaković in 1647: "when I read Antonio Possevino's Commentaries on the affairs of Muscovy, I at once realized that a great majority of our peoples are poisoned by schism. And I directed myself not

¹⁰² Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 143.

¹⁰³ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 177.

¹⁰⁴ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurija Krizhanicha*, pt. 1: 29.

¹⁰⁵ Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića*, p. 115.

towards work on language alone, but instead towards work on the abolition of the schism as well, and thus to be more productive. I went therefore to Rome and joined the Collegium Graecum.”¹⁰⁶

In Rome his early interest in language study and later interest in the ecclesiastical unification of the Slavs were joined by an ardent desire to visit the court of the tsar of Muscovy and urge him into war against the Turks for the liberation of the oppressed Slavs. Perhaps in this he was inspired by the inscription in the Croatian national church of St. Jerome in Rome,¹⁰⁷ where Aleksandar Komulović wrote that he had been sent by “Clement VIII, Pope, the best and the greatest, to the Grand Prince of Muscovy and to the other rulers, on affairs of the Catholic faith and to conclude a league against the Turks.” The knowledge that a countryman had agitated for a war against the Turks at the court of the Muscovite sovereign may have given birth to Križanić’s desire to follow in that countryman’s footsteps. He did obtain the Instruction which Clement VIII gave Komulović after his mission in Moscow, through either the Ragusan Petar Beneša, a close collaborator of Urban VIII, or Levaković. The Memorandum on his intentions that Križanić wrote to Francesco Ingoli in 1641 bears some traces of this Instruction. Komulović had been ordered to remind the prince of Muscovy that the peoples under the yoke of the Turks shared the same (or nearly the same) Muscovite tongue, and that they would raise their arms to the heavens to see their own kin coming to their aid, yearning for nothing more than that they become their defenders and their lords. In his memorandum Križanić wrote that as the tsar’s librarian and chronicler he would urge him to declare war against the Turks, assuring him that the enslaved Slavs, as well as the Greeks, would rise to their feet out of love for a ruler of their own common language and nation. The Instruction and Memorandum both said that the Slavs make up a single ethnic and linguistic family, and that this fact should be used to motivate the tsar to wage a war against the Turks. Križanić would never abandon this motif. Indeed, he would present it to the tsar in his Siberian works.

There were major differences between Clement’s Instruction to Komulović and Križanić’s Memorandum to Ingoli. According to the Instruction the oppressed Slavs would greet the Muscovite prince as a liberator passively, while according to the Memorandum they would participate in their own liberation actively, rising up against the Turks. Furthermore, according to the Instruction the oppressed Slavs would willingly accept the Muscovites, their kin, as liberators, and as lords, whereas in the Memorandum there is

¹⁰⁶ Belokurov, “Krizhanich v Rossii,” pp. 143–44.

¹⁰⁷ Golub, “Biografska pozadina djela Jurja Križanića,” pp. 39–44.

no indication that the Muscovites would become the rulers of the Slavs, or that they would foster such desire among the liberated. Finally, the instruction expresses the hope that after their military victories over the Turks the Muscovites would be moved by God's grace to unite with the other Slavs in a community of true faith. In the Memorandum, Križanić expresses the same hope but also specifies the way it is to be achieved: he will beg the tsar to debate and seek after the truth with a view toward unification. He will not go to the Muscovites—whom he does not, in any case, consider heretics or schismatics—to preach to them, but rather “to urge them to virtue, to knowledge, to free skills: when this has been achieved it will be easy afterwards to show them their falsity and error, which shall be the task of others, full of virtue and spirit.”¹⁰⁸

In 1641, the same year that the Memorandum went to Ingoli, Križanić wrote a letter to Vinković. In both he used terms relating to language which were geared toward his correspondents: his countryman and superior in Croatia, Benedikt Vinković, bishop of Zagreb; and his superior in Rome, Francesco Ingoli, secretary of the Congregation. In the letter to Vinković he expressed awareness of the poverty of his native language, such that some people were even ashamed to speak it. Therefore he had compiled, according to his ability, an entire grammar and arithmetic “*illyrico communi sermone*,” without using a single foreign borrowing.¹⁰⁹ The fact that his work was not confined to an everyday Slavic vernacular is made evident in the Memorandum to Ingoli, in which he notes that he has translated poetics, rhetoric, arithmetic, and grammar “*in lingua croata*.”¹¹⁰ Since both references are to the same translation, it is apparent that “*illyrico communi sermone*” and “*lingua croata*” are the same thing. Accordingly, the works that he compiled in “*illyrico communi sermone*” were translations into Croatian. What sort of Croatian was this? The works have not been preserved, or, rather, have not been found. One can, however, speculate. “*Illyricus sermo communis*” means either the spoken language (in contrast to Paleoslavonic) or an interdialect (of Križanić's native region around Ozalj). The latter seems the more probable inasmuch as Križanić in the Memorandum says that the works can be “translated into the Muscovite tongue with a small alteration (*con una poca mutatione metter nella [lingua] Moscivitica*).”¹¹¹ In the Memorandum he uses “*lingua slava*” to

¹⁰⁸ Kadić, “Križanić's Memorandum,” p. 142.

¹⁰⁹ Kukuljević, *Književnici u Hrvatah*, p. 193.

¹¹⁰ Kadić, “Križanić's Memorandum,” p. 346.

¹¹¹ Kadić, “Križanić's Memorandum,” p. 346.

mean Russian, noting that he has been studying the language for two years; yet he also uses the same term in referring to Croatian.¹¹²

In a letter to Levaković of 1647 Križanić wrote about his conversation with Gerasim Dokhturov, the Muscovite emissary to Warsaw. Križanić introduced himself to Dokhturov as an “Illyrian Croat (*Illyrius Croata*)” (obviously contact synonyms!) and went on to say that his Illyrian nation (*natio Illyrica*; he apparently meant his Croatian nation) was subjugated to the Turks, Germans, and Italians. His nation had not only mixed its language with the languages of these nations, but had almost completely submerged it. Saying that he had always been concerned with the cultivation of his native tongue, he expressed the continuing wish to work on it. In order to inform himself of every peculiarity of Illyrian speech (*Illyrici sermonis*) it would be necessary to become acquainted with its main dialects (*praecipuas eius dialectos*). He already knew the Croatian (*Croaticam*), Serbian, and Carniolan dialects, and he had come here to learn Polish and Ruthenian. But above all he wished to master the Muscovite dialect, which he considered to be the foremost, because “you alone of our entire nation (*ex tota nostra natione*) possess a native-born ruler and so conduct all your state and church affairs in your own language.”¹¹³ He also told Dokhturov that he wanted to write a Slavic history.

By “Illyrian speech,” then, Križanić meant the Slavic languages, which he called dialects. Surprisingly, he does not mention Bulgarian (though he would later include it among the six Slavic dialects), but cites Carniolan (which he would later drop). He ranks Russian as the foremost dialect, although not because it is the source of all the other Slavic languages, but because the affairs of church and state are conducted in it. By this time, when he was thirty years of age, Križanić had already laid the foundations of his linguistic views: that all the Slavic languages are Slavic dialects; that they are corrupt; that it was only among the Muscovites that public affairs were conducted in the native language. But it appears that he still did not consider Russian to be the source of all the Slavic languages. He also referred to the Slavic languages by the common term “Illyrian language,” rather than Slavic or Russian. It should be kept in mind, however, that Križanić was reporting what he had said to Gerasim Dokhturov, so that every word might have been used purposely, to represent expressions which his collocutor, Dokhturov, understood. Because the northern Slavs believed that they originated in the south, whereas the southern Slavs believed that they had emigrated from the Slavic north, in talking to Dokhturov about the

¹¹² Kadić, “Križanić’s Memorandum,” p. 347.

¹¹³ Belokurov, “Krizhanich v Rossii,” pp. 191–97.

Illyrian language, of which the Slavic languages were dialects, Križanić might have adjusted his terms to suit his listener, the more so because he had to explain what it was that was leading him away from the south towards the north. His justification was that he was following the path of the Illyrian language.

To Levaković he said that he had written a request in Paleoslavonic (*lingua Slavonica veteri*) asking Dokhturov to grant him an audience, that he had translated several Warsaw inscriptions—doubtlessly in Latin—into Slavic (*in Slavonicam linguam*) and had given them to Dokhturov, and that in speaking he had tried to adapt himself to Paleoslavonic (*linguae veteri*). Finally, he notes, he asked Dokhturov whether he had understood everything, and Dokhturov replied affirmatively; and as far as the language was concerned, he notes, Dokhturov had not asked him to repeat a single word.¹¹⁴ Thus, as early as 1647, Križanić, aged thirty, had created a Slavic speech, which tended towards the Paleoslavonic, and which he actually used. It is not known what other languages it included—perhaps Croatian and Polish. Križanić did not conceal his enthusiasm at this experience from Levaković. He showed Levaković, who had worked on Paleoslavonic liturgical books, how Paleoslavonic could be used in living speech—alone or combined with a living Slavic language or languages. Križanić's experience in Warsaw was decisive. Later, in Muscovy Križanić would doubtlessly speak a tongue similar to that which he had used to communicate with Dokhturov, and his papers show that he used it in writing as well.

In the same letter to Levaković, Križanić expresses a messianic view of Muscovy. There are two joyous periods for each nation: a time of corporeal joy, when the nation acquires an absolute ruler of its own blood, and one of spiritual joy, when the nation is baptized into Christianity. A perfect monarchy exists in Muscovy, the national language is in use in public life, and now is the moment to work for the unification of Muscovy with the Roman church. "He who prepared the Roman Empire to preach the Gospels of Our Eternal King can be considered to have chosen this new Muscovite principality as a light for the illumination of our wretched peoples."¹¹⁵ Križanić would remain true to this messianic vision, so lucidly expressed in his thirtieth year. In the same letter to Levaković, Križanić also pointed out his own place and task in Muscovy's messianic mission. "As the path leading to discussion of matters of faith was laid out for the holy fathers by the education of the pagan philosophers in Latin and Greek, so, too, though to a far lesser degree, literary education in our language, if it

¹¹⁴ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 197.

¹¹⁵ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 189.

please God's mercy to select me, an unworthy one, for this task, may represent a precursor of conversion among this people."¹¹⁶ Križanić wanted to be the precursor of Slavic unity. Indeed, it was no accident that in Siberia, on the eve of the feastday of St. John the Baptist Prodrumus (the Precursor), he would render the Latin hymn to the Precursor into the common Slavic tongue. Križanić appeared as a prophet of Muscovite messianism, but his prophecies were those of a forerunner. Somewhere here there is a link between his works on Slavic culture and his works on church unity, over which there is so much debate in the scholarly literature. It was to Levaković that Križanić confided in 1647: "I have determined never to separate work on language from work on the controversies."¹¹⁷ And indeed, Križanić's theological treatises are as much linguistic monuments as they are theological writings.

In a letter written in 1650 from Vienna to Dionisio Massari, secretary of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, Križanić wrote of an apologia against the schismatics. It could be written, he noted, "in the Muscovite or Old Illyrian language (*Muscovitice sive Illyrica lingua prisca*)," so that it would be of use to the Bulgarians, Serbs, Bosnians, and Muscovites.¹¹⁸ It is not clear whether the *sive* in this phrase is a disjunctive or a conjunctive. If it is a disjunctive, then what he is saying is that the apologia should be written either in Muscovite, that is, Russian, or else in Paleoslavonic, of the type in which liturgical books were published. If, however, the *sive* is a conjunctive, then the sense of the sentence is that the apologia should be written in Muscovite or Paleoslavonic. Concretely, "Muscovite" would be the Russian recension of Paleoslavonic, and the "Old Illyrian language" would be the Paleoslavonic of the "Illyrian" liturgical books. It should be remembered that Križanić was proposing this two years after the Congregation had printed Levaković's Glagolitic breviary with East Slavic linguistic influences. That which Levaković had done on the liturgical level, Križanić would certainly have extended to the theological plane. From this perspective it is unclear whether Križanić envisioned a Paleoslavonic enriched by the living Slavic languages; in any case, the possibility is not excluded. After all, Križanić was addressing an Italian correspondent who may have found discussion of Muscovite and Old Illyrian comprehensible, though he would have found the details of the system of languages in which his correspondent wished to write intricate, at the very least. It is possible that Križanić in fact envisioned the sort of

¹¹⁶ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 176.

¹¹⁷ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 187.

¹¹⁸ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," p. 255.

speech that he had used in his conversation with Dokhturov, that is, a speech built on Paleoslavonic and the living language.

After returning to Rome Križanić resumed his translation and rebuttal of "Cyril's Book." He broadened its original base by translating and rebutting all the famous Greek theological writers, from Photius to his own time. He entitled the work "The Universal Library of Schismatics," *Bibliotheca Schismaticorum Universa*.¹¹⁹ Only the first volume, in manuscript, has survived.

Križanić's musical interests, beginning with those of his student days, at the Collegium Graecum, to his participation in the Baroque musical life of Rome from 1652 to 1658, to those developed in Muscovy, were part of his Slavic idea. They also became part of his educatory activity in Muscovy. In Rome he published "Musical Assertions, All Entirely New" (1656), compiled "New Drawings Describing Music" (1657), and published the leaflet "New Aid for Composing Melodies Miraculously Easily" (1658).¹²⁰

When Athanasius Kircher announced his encyclopedic work on languages entitled *Turris Babel*, Križanić, in a letter dated 7 March, 1653, offered to collaborate on the Illyrian language:

Turris Babel is also promised. I imagine, Father, that in this work you will not omit certain ideas and universal harmonies of language. Therefore, if you should deign to touch upon something of the Illyrian language as well, I readily and humbly offer my own work. And I promise that whatever any of the Greeks can say about his language, grammatically, scientifically, and universally, I can say the same about the Illyrian language, if God so wills. For I have taken the greatest pains to observe and cultivate it so that there is scarcely a detail which I have passed over without illuminating it to the very depths of the problem. Thus I have had no rest until I had inquired into the length and breadth of the entire aforementioned language personally, with my own ears. Namely, I have undertaken travels by longitude from the Adriatic Sea to Moscow, by latitude from Vienna to Constantinople, where I have diligently observed all the differences of dialect, and the ways of writing, and the customs of the people, and what I might of the rest, particularly that which appertains to religion.¹²¹

Križanić, in adapting himself to his correspondent, included all the Slavic languages under the category Illyrian. By the time Kircher published his work Križanić had already been away from Rome for two decades, so he did not contribute a section on the Illyrian language to it. But he did contribute several poems, published under the title "Illyria," to Kircher's Egyptological compendium, *Oedipus Aegyptiacus* (Rome, 1655). These

¹¹⁹ Golub, "L'autographe de l'ouvrage de Križanić," pp. 131–61.

¹²⁰ Golub, *Juraj Križanić glazbeni teoretik 17. stoleća*.

¹²¹ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," p. 142.

eulogistic verses, dedicated to Kircher and his patron Ferdinand III, are reminiscent of Rafael Levaković's eulogistic poems printed fifteen years earlier in honor of the newborn Louis XIV.¹²² The title "Illyria" does not appear in the autograph (which is not identical with the published version of Križanić's poems); it is possible that Kircher himself added it (in agreement with Križanić).¹²³ Križanić's verses are included in the series of eulogistic poems, in various languages, honoring Kircher and his patron. The idea that Križanić was here acting as the representative of an Illyria encompassing all the South Slavs has not been substantiated.¹²⁴

If Križanić were giving an example of each of the South Slavic languages in these verses, then the Carniolan (Slovenian) language would have been included. For at the same time that Križanić was writing the eulogistic poems, he was engaged in a dispute in the Roman courts to prove that Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia were also Illyrian lands. Yet no example of the Carniolan language is included. And Križanić, it should be added, knew Carniolan. For each of the four poems he gave a parallel translation into Latin. There are: DVMA/*Harvačkì*, with the corresponding Latin translation CARMEN PINDARICUM/*Illyricè modernè*; then PJSAN/*Staroslovinski*, in Latin IAMBICVM BETTINIANVM/*Sclauonicè antiquè*; DAVORIJA/*Sarbski*, in Latin EPOS HEROICVM/*Modi et styli Sarbiaci*; and finally DAVORIJA/*Latinski*, in Latin EPOS HEROICVM/*Modi latini*. The language is indicated only in the phrases *Illyricè modernè—Harvačkì* and *Sclauonicè antiquè—Staroslovinski*. The languages used to sing the praises of Kircher and his patron are Croatian and Paleoslavonic. The expression "Sarbski" does not refer to the language, but rather to a type or style of verse, as can be seen from Križanić's words "Modi et styli Sarbiaci," meaning a poetic genre, well known among the Dalmatian Croats, usually called "bugarštica."¹²⁵ Nor does the expression "Latinski" indicate the language (the poem so titled is not in Latin) but rather the sort of verse, as is evident in Križanić's words "Modi latini," by which he means hexameter.¹²⁶ All in all, Križanić's "Illyria" is not a collection of poems praising Kircher and his patron in all the languages of the South Slavs.

¹²² Hlamenac, "Rimska opera," pp. 51–62.

¹²³ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 114–15, 144–46.

¹²⁴ Badalić, "Juraj Križanić—pjesnik Ilirije," pp. 5–23.

¹²⁵ F. Cancel, "À propos de l'origin des 'Bugarštice,'" *Revue des études Slaves* 1 (1921): 237–39.

¹²⁶ Ivan Slamnig, *Hrvatska versifikacija* (Zagreb, 1981), p. 49.

In 1651, when a position as canon in the Chapter of St. Jerome in Rome fell empty, Ivan Jampšić, born in Rome, son of Luka Jampšić, a native of Ljubljana, applied for it. The Congregation of St. Jerome in Rome then raised before the supreme court the question of whether Jampšić possessed all the qualifications which, by the bull of Sixtus V, founder of the Chapter of St. Jerome, a candidate was required to possess, namely, that he had a knowledge of Illyrian and was of Illyrian origin. At the beginning of 1652 Križanić handwrote a paper in which he stated that Carniola was not an Illyrian land, but remarked also that it had once been Illyrian:

It is the decree and the will of the founder, that is, the Bull of Foundation prescribes that those who are to be promoted to this benefice [of St. Jerome] are to be by birth and by tongue Illyrians, or to have descended from Illyrian parents, and of that same tongue. This decree indisputably excludes, in the first place, Albanians, and all others who are not Illyrians by virtue of birth, language, or origin. Secondly, those who once were Illyrians, but who by the force of circumstance have lost the Illyrian tongue and have been assimilated into another people and thus acquired other privileges, are also excluded. The Carniolans are of this type, for the Carniolan land is not Illyrian, but is instead the land of Noricum or Germany, and is included among the hereditary Austrian lands (which are German). The German language alone is used there in the courts, in sermons, in schools and in all public affairs, so that it is impossible even to see letters written in Slavic. At one time wars brought the Illyrian people swarming into this land, but they were expelled again or subjugated by the original German inhabitants. So it happens that among the peasants, though not even among all of them, a sort of likeness of the Illyrian language has been preserved, but so corrupt that we Illyrians are unable to understand it without an interpreter. For half of the language is German. . . . Therefore they cannot take advantage of the privilege of our Bull, which requires that those who are promoted speak the Illyrian tongue, and not a hybrid, which we Illyrians are unable to understand without an interpreter. Therefore, the Carniolans are excluded. Thirdly, those who descend from a Carniolan father and a non-Illyrian mother, and who know neither the Illyrian tongue nor the Carniolan hybrid [of languages], as is the case with Master Ivan [Jampšić] who has applied, are also excluded.¹²⁷

Križanić was later to stand up for the Carniolans, however, and would even act as their advocate, saying of his previous opinion that he had fabricated it in order to show Jeronim Paštrić, who supported the exclusion of the Carniolans from the Institute of St. Jerome, the absurdity of his position: "If the case were to be concluded in this manner it would follow that the Dalmatians should also be excluded, for the same reason, because they are much more Italianized than the Carniolans are Germanized."¹²⁸ Križanić would support the position that Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia also

¹²⁷ Ivan Črnčić, "Prilozi k raspravi: Imena Slovjenin i Ilir u našem gostinju u Rimu poslije 1453 god," *Starine* (Zagreb), 18 (1886): 110–13.

¹²⁸ Črnčić, "Prilozi k raspravi," pp. 155–56.

belonged to the Illyrian land before the Sacra Romana Rota, the supreme papal court, which assumed jurisdiction over the Illyrian lands.¹²⁹ Because each side was required to prove its opinion with evidence from geographical, historical, and linguistic authorities, the dispute was, for Križanić, not merely a chance Roman episode, completely separate from his other interests, but rather a mandated study of Slavic geography, ethnography, and history. The two sides of the dispute were acquainted with the arguments of their opponents and were called upon to refute them before the court. For this reason, to fathom Križanić's stand it is important to study not only his testimony, but also that of his opponent, Paštrić. In his opponent's testimony, for example, Križanić came across quotations from Orbin's work *Il Regno degli Slavi* and from Vrančić's dictionary *Dictionarium quinque linguarum*.¹³⁰ Can one doubt that he reached for these same works to verify and refute his opponent's claims? Whereas Paštrić conceived of nationhood as "affiliation with a country," Križanić "put all the emphasis on language . . . he shifted the focus from territory to language."¹³¹

The Sacra Romana Rota reached its decision on 10 December 1655:

The lord judges, after carefully weighing both the words and the intention of the Supreme Pontiff (Sixtus V), have decided that: the Illyrian lands are understood to mean, verily and properly, Dalmatia or Illyricum, the parts of which are Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia, completely excluding Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola.¹³²

In the final verdict of 24 April 1656 they state:

We speak, state, adjudge, decree, and declare that the true and proper lands of the Illyrian nation, according to the Bull and to the intention of the aforementioned Sixtus V, were and are and should be understood to be Dalmatia or Illyricum, the parts of which are Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia, completely excluding Carinthia, Styria, and Carniola, and that only those who come from the aforesaid four regions of Dalmatia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia can be admitted to the Canonicate and to the church benefices of the Congregational Church [of St. Jerome] . . . as well as to the Hostel and Congregation of this same St. Jerome. . . . Thus I, Hieronymus Priuli, Judge of the Sacred Rota, have spoken.¹³³

As an epilogue to the dispute over the Illyrian lands a geographic map of Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Slavonia was produced (by Andrea Buf-

¹²⁹ Golub, "Juraj Križanić i pitanje prava Slovenaca," pp. 213–58.

¹³⁰ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 119, 154–55, 161.

¹³¹ Johann Iljić, "Das Glagolitische Missale aus dem Jahre 1631, Die Geschichte der Herausgabe" (Dissertatio ad Lauream in Facultate Theologica, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, Rome, 1949). Typescript, Archive, Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana), pp. 52–54.

¹³² Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 206–210.

¹³³ Črnčić, "Prilozi k raspravi," p. 160.

falini);¹³⁴ to this very day, it can be found in the Institute of St. Jerome in Rome. The standpoint of the verdict handed down by the Sacred Rota on the Illyrian lands would also be followed by Ivan Lučić, author of the first critical history of Croatia, *De Regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae* (Amsterdam, 1666).

Križanić was reproached for his pro-Carniolan stand by Juraj Rattkay, also a Croatian historian, who asked him to which of the nine kingdoms constituting Illyricum he ascribed Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia—whether to Dalmatia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, or other distant kingdoms; could they really be part of Slavonia, Croatia, Istria, Liburnia? Rattkay added that the Illyrian kingdoms had always enjoyed full liberty, whereas Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria were subject to testamentary disposition and slavery.¹³⁵

Križanić himself, in enumerating the Slavic peoples in his later Siberian works, never included the Carniolans, Styrians, or Carinthians. Was this in obedience to the verdict of the Sacred Rota, or a conviction developed over time? What is certain is that Križanić—a Ljubljana student—never doubted that the Carniolans had been Slavs in ancient times, and that they had inhabited the Illyrian land; yet for some time he doubted whether they were still Slavs and whether they still formed part of Illyria.

Three years after the conclusion of the Roman dispute over the Illyrian land, Križanić offered to translate works by Constantine Porphyrogenitus and Giovanni Botero, authors whom he had referred to in the dispute, for the Muscovite tsar. Having arrived in Moscow in 1659, Križanić presented the tsar with a memorandum explaining why he had come and what he was prepared to do: he would like to refute the calumnies of Adam Olearius, to become the tsar's chronicler, and to write a just history of Muscovy and of all the Slavs. He would also like to become the tsar's librarian, to assemble books for him, and to recommend historical and political readings to him. (It is significant that he cites Botero, mainstay of the opposition to Machiavelli and opponent of Machiavelli's laicization of politics.) Finally, he is willing to work on the publication of a grammar and dictionary, for the Slavic language is now simply lost, and he would also undertake to produce a new edition of the Bible.¹³⁶ It is apparent from this memorandum that he had remained true to the ideas expressed in the memorandum that he had presented to Francesco Ingoli as a young man in 1641, and confirmed in his letter to Levaković of 1647: that he wished to work as an educator in

¹³⁴ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 190–91.

¹³⁵ Golub, "Nova gradja o Jurju Križaniću," pp. 181–83.

¹³⁶ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," pp. 88–92.

Muscovy and to pursue his two great interests—work on a common Slavic language and work on a general Slavic history.

His mysterious banishment in March 1661 cut short Križanić's work on language—of all his offers, this one had been accepted—but it did not still Križanić's pen. His Siberian works are truly the literary embodiment of Križanić's Slavic idea. They arose in part out of his longstanding intentions, and in part out of new political and ecclesiastical conditions.

The indomitable Križanić finished his linguistic work *Objasn'ênje vîvódno o pîsmé Slovênskom* (A discussion of Slavic orthography) by 8 August 1661. Slavic orthography was still in its swaddling clothes, he said, and it should be cultivated. He was writing to restore Cyrillic orthography. He attributed the greater part of the blame for its deficiencies to the Greeks (just as he had tried to prove, in matters of faith, that the Greeks had been poor mentors to the Muscovites).¹³⁷

In 1663 Križanić began to write *Razgowori ob wladatelistwu*, a trilogy dealing with economics, military skills, and politics which was intended for the tsar and his collaborators.¹³⁸ In this work he made a theoretical and practical plea that Muscovy become economically, militarily, and politically powerful and culturally elevated, and that it aid in the deliverance of the oppressed Slavic peoples. It was written in Križanić's Common Slavic language, as were all his non-Latin works.

In his "Grammar," the introduction to which he wrote in Tobolsk in 1665, he said that as the Greeks had a common dialect understood by all Greeks, in addition to the Attic and Doric dialects, so he was writing the "Grammar" in a tongue that should be understood by all Slavs. Up to 1665 Križanić used the term "Slavs" to mean all the Slavs, and the term "Rus' people (*Rúsiani*)" only for the East Slavs; but here, in the introduction to his "Grammar," he extended "Rus' people" to include all the Slavs.¹³⁹

The work "On Divine Providence," in its two rather divergent variants, written in 1666–67, gave the theological reasons for military defeats and victories—it was written at the time of the Polish-Muscovite war—and led to a consideration of the church schism as a religious and political mishap.

In the work "On Holy Baptism," Križanić tried to convince the Muscovite church leaders that the effort to convert the Latins should be abandoned. He noted the way in which the Greeks had led them astray with

¹³⁷ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurii Križanicha*, pt. 1: 29–71.

¹³⁸ Križanić, *Politika*.

¹³⁹ Križanić, *Gramatično izkazânje*, pp. i–ii.

regard to conversion. Finally, he recommended himself in the hope of being released from captivity.¹⁴⁰

The circumstances in which Muscovy found itself between 1672 and 1674 prompted Križanić to write the (incomplete) work “Interpretation of Historical Prophecies” (1674).¹⁴¹ At this time the Turks had reached as far as Lviv. The Old Believers were demoralizing the people, claiming that the end of the world was at hand and that the Muscovites were the troops of the Anti-Christ. The vacant Polish throne, thrown open to election, was an opportunity for the Muscovite tsar to place his son upon it, but the obstacle to this course was that he was Orthodox whereas the Polish people were of the Catholic faith. Križanić believed that this combination of circumstances represented the right moment to bring the Slavs together and to unify the church. In his “Interpretation of Historical Prophecies” Križanić dealt with every level of the current situation from both the pragmatic and the theoretical standpoints. In regard to the Turks, he proved, on the basis of actual and apocryphal prophecies, that the time for their collapse was at hand. As far as the Old Believers were concerned, he showed that they had interpreted Ezekiel incorrectly in predicting that Judgment Day was approaching and in maintaining that the Muscovites were the soldiers of the Anti-Christ. In regard to the opportunity for the Muscovite tsarevich to ascend the Polish throne, Križanić drew all the weapons in his theological arsenal against the sowers of discord between Rome and Moscow, arguing that the teachings of the Latin and Greek holy fathers were in accord and that there was no real obstacle to church unification.

The short work “On Chinese Trade” that Križanić sent to Moscow in 1675 perhaps contributed to the tsarist decision to send the Greek, Nicholas Spathary Milescu, to China.¹⁴² Spathary’s route led him through Tobolsk, where Križanić translated a book for him about the mission of Peter van Horn (1666–68) from German into Latin. Križanić also had Spathary’s work on China copied for him, gave him information on Siberian roads, and finally proposed a better route than the one that Spathary had intended to take—all of which testifies to his interest in the economic improvement of Muscovy.

The appeal of the Old Believer monks of the Solovki Monastery against the official Muscovite Orthodox church gave Križanić the occasion to write,

¹⁴⁰ *Sobranie sochinenii Iuriiia Križanicha*, pt. 3.

¹⁴¹ *Sobranie sochinenii Iuriiia Križanicha*, pt. 3.

¹⁴² Belokurov, “Križanich v Rossii,” p. 140.

in 1675, "A Rebuttal of the Solovki Appeal."¹⁴³ In truth, that was the only time a Catholic theologian rose in defense of the official Orthodox church when schism appeared in its ranks. For Križanić an undivided Muscovite Orthodox church, reformed by Nikon, was a needed partner in the discussion of church unification.

At about the same time Križanić also wrote the "Sermon on Superstition," in which he defended the exiled Patriarch Nikon's liturgical reform and refuted the accusation that he himself was a heretic.¹⁴⁴ In 1675, his health broken, he wrote his spiritual testament, a significant work, actually theological in nature, entitled *Smertnyi razred* (Mortal division). There he treated the main controversies between the Eastern and the Western churches.¹⁴⁵

Sometime between 1667 and 1675 Križanić had sent the heir apparent, Feodor Alekseevich, a "Letter for Liberation," in which he asserted that God had ordained for Muscovy tranquility, prosperity, and glory in greater measure than had so far appeared. He said that obstacles existed which he would like to discuss in person, and ended the text with the query "Whither goes Russia? (*Russia quo spectat?*)."¹⁴⁶

Križanić sent a congratulatory letter to Tsar Feodor Alekseevich, his liberator, on the occasion of his coronation (1676). He offered to translate Aristotle's *Politics* for him, and asked that in return the tsar permit him to leave Muscovy.¹⁴⁷ The same year he wrote the tsar a long letter in which he enumerated all the services he had rendered Muscovy, beginning with his paper written in Nizhyn in 1659 urging the Ukrainians to side with Muscovy rather than Poland, through his works on Slavic orthography, works on China, his "Grammar," the rebuttal of Olearius's calumnies, and historical prophecies. He declared his willingness to produce a self-propelling wheel, to perform beautiful court and martial music, and to teach others how to play it—all his own inventions.¹⁴⁸ His "History of Siberia,"

¹⁴³ *Sobranie sochinenii Iuriiia Krizhanicha*, pt. 3.

¹⁴⁴ A. L. Gol'dberg, "Neizvestnoe sochinenie Iu. Krizhanicha 'O preverstve beseda,'" *Nauchnyi biulleten' Leningradskogo gos. universiteta* (Leningrad), 19 (1947): 47–51.

¹⁴⁵ A. L. Gol'dberg, "O 'Smertnom razrede' Iuriiia Krizhanicha," in *Pamiatniki kul'tury: Nove otkritiia* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 95–106.

¹⁴⁶ Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića*, pp. 174–75.

¹⁴⁷ I. Dobrotvorskii, "Privetstvo Krizhanicha tsariu Feodoru Alekseevichu," *Uchenye zapiski Kazanskogo universiteta* (Kazan'), 1 (1865): 1–21.

¹⁴⁸ Belokurov, "Krizhanich v Rossii," pp. 174–79.

dedicated to the king of Poland, Jan Sobieski, contains not only geographical and ethnographic writings, but also recollections of his days in exile.¹⁴⁹

Ideas

Juraj Križanić's Slavic idea pervades all his works. Its accent shifts according to interests and circumstances, from language to history, to economics, to politics, to the military, to the church. Together Križanić's works form, naturally enough, the full embodiment of his Slavic idea. There are, however, a few pages among them—condensed, finely honed, carefully weighed—that can be called his manifesto or "Credo." These consist of the introduction to his "Grammar," the appeal to Tsar Aleksei which was framed as a covering letter for his work on politics, the address to the tsar about the liberation of the Slavs from foreigners, the tsar's speech to the people that Križanić composed, his own letter to the tsar on his work in Muscovy, the so-called Serbian letter, or memorandum to the tsar sent upon his arrival in Moscow in 1659, the 1647 letter to Levaković, and his youthful memorandum to Francesco Ingoli of 1641. Of course, a subject which Križanić emphasized in one text might be passed over in silence or barely mentioned in another, depending on his correspondent and on the circumstances. Only by inspecting the way in which his various writings intertwine can one grasp any of Križanić's ideas. This is particularly true of his basic, Slavic idea. If we attempt to collect and classify everything dealing with the Slavic idea in Križanić's writings, we find that that idea encompasses the origin, condition, and mission of the Slavs.

(A) *The Origin of the Slavs.* Križanić says that the Rus' people are autochthons in Rus', and in fact uses precisely this word (*aftohtony*). "It should therefore be known," Križanić wrote in a note to the tsar, "that we, the Rus' (*Rusy*), have no less right than the ancient Athenians to be called autochthons, or aboriginals. For there is no sign or evidence on earth that could lead us to understand that any other people had been here before us in this land of Rus' (*Ruskóv*) or had held any power over it."¹⁵⁰

The Slavs do not descend from any other people, their language does not derive from any other language, and their rulers trace their descent not from any foreigner, but from their forefather, who was called "Slav":

It is shameful for us to trace our race to the Scythians, people of a different language, as though our language could have created itself, and changed from Scythian into Slavic, and as though there were no honor and glory among our own

¹⁴⁹ A. A. Titov, *Sibir' v XVII veke* (Moscow, 1890).

¹⁵⁰ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 283.

people. It is better and more advisable to accept the truth and to believe that our language is as old as the original languages of the other peoples, and that it was created by God when he multiplied the languages. Our first father, "Slav," lived at that time, like the progenitors of the other peoples, and it was from him, and not from some other people, that our people sprang. Therefore it was sufficiently ancient and sufficiently glorious for Tsar Ivan to call himself the descendant of his true progenitor "Slav" and of King Vladimir, and not to seek glory in the false tales, mocked and derided by all other peoples, of descent from the line of Augustus, and to declare himself the descendant of the aged Silvia and Aphrodite, goddess of debauchery. If he wishes to derive glory from Augustus's lineage he must accept the disgrace as well.¹⁵¹

The fact that the Muscovite tsars called Moscow the Third Rome grieved Križanić as much as their claims to be descendants of the Roman emperor. Križanić clearly distinguishes between secular and spiritual Rome. The secular or, as he calls it, the corporeal Rome must, according to Daniel's prophecy, disappear without trace. The fulfillment of the prophecy began when Emperor Constantine abandoned ancient Rome and crossed into Byzantium, and was completed when the Turks conquered Byzantium (the so-called New Rome) without appropriating either the name of Rome or its blazon. On the site of secular Rome, also according to Daniel's prophecy, there would arise a spiritual Rome, i.e., the kingdom of Christ. God had humbled Constantine's heart so that he abandoned ancient Rome and relinquished it to the Vicar of Christ as its spiritual authority. Križanić derides the Greeks for calling themselves Romans. It pained him that the Muscovites should be deceived by the Greek tales that Moscow was the Third Rome. To him, this was historically and geographically illogical, for the Muscovite territory had never belonged to the Roman Empire. From a religious standpoint it seemed dangerous to take on the secular title of Rome, when secular Rome was destined by prophecy to vanish without trace. Križanić also ridiculed the Germans—in this he differed radically from Bellarmine—for calling Germany the Holy Roman Empire:

The Greeks plume themselves on the empty name of Romans. . . . In the same way the Germans call their Germany the Holy Roman Empire. And finally Patriarch Eremei has commanded that Moscow be the Third Rome. . . . Patriarch Eremei made Tsar Fedor Ivanovich Emperor of the Romans, Greeks, and all Christians. He spoke to him thus, "The first Rome fell through Apollinarius's heresy, the godless Turks have conquered the second Rome, but your great Russian empire surpasses them all in piety. . . ." The simple people (who cannot judge the case) call Moscow the Third Rome and say "There have been two Romes, the third still stands, there will be no fourth" Rome has two parts. One part is corporeal, one spiritual. Daniel prophesied about corporeal Rome that it would be destroyed. But on the site

¹⁵¹ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 289.

of corporeal Rome, once destroyed, there would rise a spiritual Rome, the kingdom of Christ. . . . We Slavs should rejoice and thank God, first of all because our nation has produced no such tormentor or persecutor of the name of Christ as did the Romans and the other inhabitants of that empire. Secondly, we should thank God that this most glorious Russian state does not lie within the borders of that unhappy empire, and that this state possesses neither its ill-omened name, nor its blazon, nor, therefore, the punishment foretold for it by the prophets.¹⁵²

Yet there certainly was another reason, not expressed here, for Križanić to oppose the recognition of Moscow as the Third Rome, one which flows from his entire opus: that is the fact that to proclaim Moscow the Third Rome would be to close the way to the ecclesiastical unification of Moscow with Papal Rome. Križanić was convinced of the autochthony of the Muscovites in Muscovy and opposed to everything which disturbed and diminished this autochthony.

On the migration of the Slavs, he supported the view that the Slavs originated in Rus'. When the emperors Mauritius, Phocas, and Justinian came to the fullness of time and sin, God, to punish the Roman Empire, moved certain peoples, among them some of the Slavs, i.e., the Rus', to burst upon the Roman Empire.¹⁵³ Many Slavs from Great, White, and Little Rus' crossed the Danube (which is why Križanić calls them the Trans-Danubian Slavs). They occupied the area which since ancient times had been called Illyrian and brought it the new name of the Slavic land (*zemlja slavenska*).¹⁵⁴ They called themselves by the common term Slavs, from the part of the Rus' land from which they had come. Later, when they had divided themselves into three kingdoms, they were named Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats according to the names of their leaders.

After the transfer of the royal seat and after the internal wars between Constantine's sons, as though at the sound of the trump of war or as if through some common agreement, various peoples burst in from all sides to destroy the kingdom, i.e., the Goths, Vandals, Heruli, Huns, Franks, Burgundians; a little later the Lombards, and last of all some of our forefathers, the Rus'. After coming from Rus' they then called themselves Slavs, according to their part of the country. After settling the Greek lands and dividing into three kingdoms, they were called the Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² V. V. Val'denberg, *Gosudarstvennye idei Križanicha* (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 145–47.

¹⁵³ Bessonov, *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 114; Križanić, *O promysle*, p. 86.

¹⁵⁴ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 284.

¹⁵⁵ Križanić, *O promysle*, p. 86.

Other groups which had also come from Rus' settled on the other side of the Danube and founded the Polish and Moravian or Czech kingdoms.¹⁵⁶ As a result of Germanization some one-time Slavic lands and cities were irretrievably lost: Pomerania, Silesia, Hamburg, Lübeck, Gdańsk, and Riga.¹⁵⁷ As we have seen, Križanić, after some vacillation, considered Carniola, Styria, and Carinthia lost to the Slavs as the result of Germanization.¹⁵⁸

In the introduction to his "Grammar," Križanić, who had until then used the terms "Slav" for all the Slavs and "Rus' people" only for the East Slavs, corrected himself. He wrote:

there were once six kingdoms and today there are still six peoples (*l'udstvo*), and six Slavic linguistic dialects among our people (*narod*): i.e., the Rus' (*Rusjani*), the Poles, the Czechs, the Bulgars, the Serbs, and the Croats; and these last three are called by the common name of Slavs, and Transdanubians. But of all these national territories, the tribe and name of Rus' (*jme Rúsko*) is the oldest, and the source of all the others, and it alone was known to the ancient Greek and Roman writers, and we read it written in the old books. But all the other tribes (*pokolénja*), as they derived from the Rus', their names are necessarily younger than the Rus' name, and they could not have been known to the ancient writers. But foreign writers (for we lack our own) of the later centuries tell us how, in the time of the emperor Mauritius, the Slavs first crossed the Danube and appeared in the provinces of the Roman kingdom, where they have remained until this very day. Although at first they were indeed called by the common name of Slavs, after a certain time, when they had conquered widespread provinces, they separated into three kingdoms, and were given the names of Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats, after their leaders. Other groups, also of the Rus' people, moving from the East westward, settled on this side of the Danube in various regions, and founded the Polish and Moravian, or Czech, kingdoms. Since the Slavs were constantly at war with the Greeks and Romans, and conquered not a few of their provinces, the name "Slav" became more familiar to the later Greeks than the name "Rus'," the common name for all the peoples, and this is the cause of the error mentioned above, that the later Greeks mention the name "Slav" more frequently in their books and that our chroniclers have believed that our people originated from the Slavs, and that the Rus', Poles, and Czechs had come here from there. But since only the Rus' tribe and name were known to the ancient writers, and it is still found in its immemorial homeland, in Rus', and since the other groups all left Rus' and appeared as new guests in the areas they now inhabit, it is certain that the Rus' tribe (*Rúsko pléme*) and name are the source and root of all the others. Thus, when we wish to encompass and comprehend all six tribes and all six linguistic dialects in a common name, it is not appropriate to call them by the newer name of Slavs, but we should rather use the ancient, germinal name of Rus'. And accordingly, the Rus' dialect is not the fruit of the Slavic dialect, but the Slavic, Czech, and Polish dialects are the descendants of the Rus' language. And most of all, the

¹⁵⁶ *Gramatično izkazânje*, p. 1.

¹⁵⁷ Bessonov, *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 116.

¹⁵⁸ Crmčić, "Prilozi k raspravi," p. 111.

language in which we write books is not nor can it correctly be called Slavic, but is rather literary Rus', or the ancient Rus' language. First, because this dialect is the root of the other five or six, and accordingly without a doubt had its origin among the oldest tribe, among the Rus'. And second, because this literary language is much closer to the common Rus' dialect of today than to any other Slavic dialect.¹⁵⁹

This Old Rus' language, once free of any Greek remnants, was spoken in ancient times throughout Rus'.¹⁶⁰

(B) *The Condition of the Slavs.* Križanić came to Muscovy at a time when it was still in search of structure. To a greater or lesser degree Muscovite society was conscious that Muscovy must develop from within the form which it was to take among nations, particularly the European nations. The modernistic orientation, championed on the secular level by the minister of foreign affairs Afanasii Ordin-Nashchokin and on the ecclesiastical level by Patriarch Nikon, aimed to structure the church and state through external reforms, whereas the conservative orientation, led by the Old Believers and their leader Archpriest Avvakum, strove to achieve a Muscovite identity through loyalty to the old ways. Foreigners, too, struggled for influence, and offered their own models: the Protestant Germans emphasized secularization and receptivity to the new; and the Greeks, a deepening of the old. The Turks and the Germans were only waiting for a chance to grasp at Muscovite lands and territories. Yet the Slavs, as Križanić had observed, suffered from an infatuation with everything foreign—*xenomania* (*czużebjêsje*), as Križanić calls it:

We allow foreigners to deceive us in a thousand ways. No other people on earth has suffered as much damage and as much disgrace from foreigners as has this glorious Russian kingdom, and the Poles, and the whole Slavic nation. . . . We suffer from the rule of foreigners (*xenoarchia*), as foreigners rule over us. So it is with the Poles. We suffer from a rage after things foreign (*xenomania*), and from belief in foreigners (*xenopistia*), because we rely on foreigners, place our hopes in them, believe them, take delight in them, and wait for them to defend us. However, we have found by experience that those from whom we expect good are our enemies.¹⁶¹

In the temptation between “new and old”—or, expressed differently, between “German and Greek”—in which Muscovy found itself at that time, Križanić emphasized that it was necessary to raise the process of reasoning to a different level, i.e., to the level of whether something was good or not.

There are two nations which, with conflicting illusions, are tempting, tormenting, and destroying the Rus' (*Russiam*), namely, the Germans and the Greeks. Although

¹⁵⁹ *Gramatično izkazânje*, pp. i–ii.

¹⁶⁰ *Sobranie sochinenii Iurija Križanicha*, pt. 1: 28.

¹⁶¹ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 276.

in many ways these two nations are the opposites of one another, in their exertions over this intention they agree splendidly, so that it appears that they have sworn to ruin us. The Germans recommend to us everything that is new. They want us to scorn all our ancient and praiseworthy institutions and customs and to imitate their perverse customs and laws. The Greeks, on the other hand, absolutely condemn every novelty and simply shriek and repeat "Everything new is bad." Nevertheless, they slip us certain of their own novelties disguised as ancient custom. . . . Reason counsels: Nothing is either bad or good simply because it is new. Rather, everything good and everything bad is new in the beginning. Everything that is now old was once new. A novelty should not be accepted lightly and without great consideration because of the danger of erring, but similarly a good thing should not be rejected just because it is new, because of the same danger of erring. Great consideration is needed everywhere, both in accepting and in declining what is new.¹⁶²

He says that the dispute over the new and the old is really a dispute over men's conceptions:

That which is old and good cannot be preserved without that which is new and good. . . . Therefore we conclude that nothing is old nor new, but rather that these are the empty ideas of men. Some things are good whether they are old or new.¹⁶³

The basic weakness of the Slavs—and Križanić mercilessly enumerates a goodly number—are a rage for things foreign, the solicitation of foreigners as rulers, and trust in foreigners. The Transdanubian Slavs are in part under Turkish occupation, in part under German rule.¹⁶⁴ In Poland's case it cannot even be said that foreigners live among the Poles, but rather the reverse, that Poles live among foreigners¹⁶⁵ and they choose foreigners for their rulers:

It is less of a disgrace to be conquered by force of arms than to allow oneself to be deceived by perfidious words into willingly bearing the shameful yoke of foreign rule. For only bodies are conquered by arms and minds remain free. But both bodies come under the yoke and minds fall into stupidity and degradation through words. Therefore our Transdanubians, the Croats, Serbs, and Bulgars, who are compelled to bear the Turkish and German yokes, bear the lesser shame. But the Poles have burdened themselves with great shame and deserve great censure, for although compelled by no distress they have sought so many foreign kings from the Hungarians, the Lithuanians, the French, and the Germans. Nor are the Rus' (*Russy*) without fault. First, because they write unseemly fairy tales about themselves, claiming to

¹⁶² *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 172–75.

¹⁶³ Val'denberg, *Gosudarstvennye idei Križhanicha*, pp. 225–26.

¹⁶⁴ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 157.

¹⁶⁵ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 147.

have once sought a ruler for themselves from the Varangians; second, because they sought the princes Władysław of Poland and Philip of Sweden as their tsars.¹⁶⁶

Contrary to reason and historical fact the Muscovites seek the lineage of their leaders among the Roman emperors and call Moscow the Third Rome.¹⁶⁷ They put up with German merchants and officers who impoverish and exploit Muscovy, gorge themselves with food and drink, and between glasses call the Muscovites dogs and pigs with their every third word.¹⁶⁸

The same tragic weakness shown by the Slavs for foreigners and all that is foreign is, alas, evident in the field of language. All the Slavic tribes that emigrated from Rus', after falling under foreigners, have nearly lost their ancient Rus' language as well:

For all our tribes (*pokolênje*) mentioned above, after arriving in their new settlements there, in time fell under the authority of other peoples, i.e., the Germans, Hungarians, Italians, and Turks, and some lost a third, and some a half of the words of the language of their fathers and they continue to lose more everyday. For where a nation lacks literary authors and royal offices and national organizations or law codes in its own language, there the language of necessity becomes corrupt and perishes. But where the affairs of the kingdom and the people's laws are effected in their own language, there the language is more ample and becomes more beautiful from day to day.¹⁶⁹

Having made these sad generalizations Križanić turns to the state of the language of each separate Slavic people.

And accordingly we have nothing to seek among the Bulgars, for the language is so lost there that scarcely a trace is left. Among the Poles half the words are mixed in from various other languages. In Czech books the language is purer than Polish, but it, too, is quite polluted. But the Serbs and the Croats have so lost their fathers' speech that, except for affairs of the home, they cannot compose any worthwhile disquisition on any subject at all and, as someone wrote of them: The Croats, he says, and the Serbs speak any language, but they do not say anything. For in their speech the first word is that of Rus' (*Rúska*), the second Hungarian, the third German, the fourth Turkish, the fifth Greek or Italian or Albanian. So that there the speech is corrupted with an admixture of foreign words, but nonetheless, in considering the rules of grammar, nowhere can one hear such correct accents, nor such pure pronunciation of words, either their own or foreign, nor a form of speech so close to and characteristic of the primeval, original Rus' language than among the Croats. Not, however, everywhere, but only in one small corner of the country around the river Kupa, in the area of Dubovac, Ozalj, and Ribnik. For it was there (amidst the steep mountains in places passable only with great difficulty) that the

¹⁶⁶ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 157.

¹⁶⁷ Križanić, *Politika*, pp. 283–97.

¹⁶⁸ Križanić, *Politika*, pp. 156, 164–74. L. M. Mordukhovich, "Iz rukopisnogo nasledstva Iu. Križanicha," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), 1 (1958): 159.

¹⁶⁹ *Gramatično izkazânje*, p. iii.

Croat and Serb nobility took refuge at the time of the last Turkish attacks and during the occupation of Bihać, the Croat capital. And as much of the old original pure pronunciation as has remained there until now was still to be heard during my childhood. And all because there is no traffic nor trade there, due to the steep mountains, the unnavigable rivers, and few foreigners who would corrupt the pronunciation come there. Here in Rus' (*ovdi na Rúsi*) on the contrary the pronunciation and grammar to be sure are somewhat shifted from their place, but there are many more seemly words among the Rus', belonging to our language, than among the Croats, or anywhere else, and this is because in Rus' the official papers and all the affairs of the people are executed in the native language. The Belorussian language [*Bilóruski*; that is, Ruthenian in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and in the Cossack Hetmanate] is no less corrupt and deformed than Croatian and Polish, or even more so, and littered with all kinds of foreign stuff and distortions.¹⁷⁰

It is unusual that in grammar and accent Križanić should consider the language of his homeland to be the closest to the pure, original Rus' language. The geographical reasons he gives (isolation, the unnavigable rivers) provide a partial explanation of why the languages there were not corrupted by foreign borrowings. But the question of what actually constitutes the purity of this speech remains. Perhaps it lies in its interdialectal nature and its Paleoslavonic character. The language of Križanić's region was an interdialect koine. Here three dialects—kajkavian, čakavian, and štokavian—were intertwined. Here some even wrote their oaths in Glagolitic. Thus, because the speech of Križanić's home was free of foreign borrowings, because it was a sort of interdialect, because Paleoslavonic was in some way present here, this speech was grammatically and prosodically the purest and the closest to the primordial Rus' language. Had Križanić's native speech been a pure, not to say a purist dialect, exclusively either čakavian, kajkavian, or štokavian, it would certainly not have reaped the praises Križanić bestowed upon it. Križanić himself was to create a Common Slavic koine.

An inspection of Križanić's treatise "On Music" settles any dispute about Križanić's familiarity with South Croatian literature and other Slavic literatures. He knew Croatian and Serbian folk poetry; he knew, at least in part, the verses of the Croats, both Dalmatians and northerners, Poles, and Czechs.¹⁷¹ He remarks that they are full of errors and unworthy of the name of poetry. In view of his generally unfavorable opinion of the Slavic languages, his criticism of Slavic poetry relates not only to its versification, but also to the language of composition. The poetry, like the language, is deficient, partly due to foreign borrowings, partly, one supposes, due to dialectal quality. For Križanić, pure dialectal speech would certainly have

¹⁷⁰ *Gramatično izkazânje*, pp. iii–iv.

¹⁷¹ Golub, *Juraj Križanić glazbeni teoretik 17. stoljeća*, pp. 57, 64.

been deficient and imperfect, because it is too far removed from the original proto-language. The speech which is the most general, the most interdialectal, which contains the broadest possible interweaving of dialect, would be the closest to the original proto-language.

Križanić called his work on language a correcting of the language. This activity, modeled on his native interdialect and Paleoslavonic, resulted in a language which all the Slavic languages—all dialects in Križanić's view—recognized.

(C) *The Mission of the Slavs*. Juraj Križanić called Muscovy a light for the illumination of the Slavic peoples.¹⁷² Križanić himself, modestly comparing himself to the prophet Nathan who appeared before King David, acted as the prophet of Muscovite messianism. He attributed the task of "savior" to Tsar Aleksei:

O most glorious Tsar! This, your most glorious empire, is the newest on the earth's sphere at the present time. . . . Since it is not so old, as yet it cannot be so ordered and so consolidated by various good laws as to find your special attention, care, and restoration unnecessary. Thus, as its founder Julius was to the Roman Empire, so its progenitor Tsar Ivan Vasilievich was to this Russian Empire. And as the Emperors Augustus, Trajan, and Constantine were to that empire, so may you be, and are, O glorious Tsar, to this Russian Empire, that is, lawgiver, builder, and consolidator.¹⁷³

The tsar bears the mission of creating a new Muscovy, economically wealthy, militarily strong, politically significant, and culturally developed, through a new code of laws. The tsar has the means of realizing this task in his hands, namely, perfect monarchy:

O Tsar, you hold in your hands Moses's miraculous staff and you can create wondrous miracles in government. You hold, I say, a perfect monarchy, and thus you have the perfect obedience and submission of your subjects.¹⁷⁴

The monarchy is not only a guarantee for the internal well-being of the country, but also the most certain defense against foreign encroachments:

Our Slavic nation lies between two extremely powerful peoples, between the Scythians and the Germans. Both long for our ruin. The Scythians surpass us in speed and military training. The Germans surpass us in wisdom and skills. What, then, do we have, or can we have, that is special, before the other peoples? We have a great treasure if we recognize it and make use of it. Caution and vigilance—this is our treasure, with which we can surpass all the peoples of Europe. The second treasure is the perfect monarchy. These two things will suffice, with God's mercy, for us to evade all the moves of our opponents. With these we should struggle against the

¹⁷² Belokurov, "Križanich v Rossii," p. 189.

¹⁷³ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 4.

¹⁷⁴ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 5.

Germans and against any other people. This is the true philosophers' stone, effective against all the ills of politics.¹⁷⁵

Križanić's meditation relates not only to Muscovy, but to the whole Slavic world, for it was all threatened by the Scythians, i.e., the Tatars and the Turks, and by the Germans.

After mentioning the ethnic unity of all six Slavic peoples (the Rus', Poles, Czechs, Bulgars, Serbs and Croats), their present difficult position (the pressure from the Tatars, Turks, and Germans, and the fact that only one kingdom, the Muscovite, had a Slavic ruler on its throne), Križanić addressed the tsar:

Thus it is that the responsibility for the whole Slavic nation has fallen on you, O most honorable tsar. Deign, as a father, to care for your scattered children and undertake efforts to gather them together. Take care of the little ones, who are deceived by foreign artifices, and return them to reason, as the father in the Gospels did for his son. For many of them are bewitched by some enchanted potion (like that of Circe) and their temperaments transformed into those of beasts, so that they do not sense the grievous miseries they suffer from foreigners, and do not perceive their unhappy shame, but rather enjoy it, and seek it out themselves; that is, they seek foreign rulers and kings for themselves. You, I say, O Tsar, alone have been given to us by God, to aid the Trans-Danubians, and the Poles, and the Czechs to begin to perceive their misery and shame, and to see to the enlightenment of the people, and to lift the German yoke from their necks.¹⁷⁶

What concrete acts should the tsar perform? Križanić's first concern was for those whom he had left when he came to Muscovy—the Trans-Danubian Slavs.

The Trans-Danubian Slavs (the Bulgars, Serbs, and Croats) have long since lost not only their kingdoms, but also all their power, their language, and their reason, so that they do not understand what is meant by honor or reputation, and do not think of it, and can in no way help themselves of their own accord. Instead, an external force is necessary for them to stand once more on their own feet and count themselves among the nations. O Tsar, if you cannot help them in this onerous time to complete revival, nor bring that kingdom to its original state and reestablish it, you can at least correct and illuminate the Slavic language in books and open the eyes of the intellect for these people, through the appropriate thoughtful books, so that they can begin, as we have said, to perceive honor and to think about establishing it. Then the Czechs, too, and last of all the Poles, until recently, had fallen into the same misery as the Transdanubians. That is, they had lost their kingdom, their power, their language, and their reason. Although the Poles pride themselves on an illusory shadow of a kingdom and on their licentious liberties, nonetheless the world knows that the Poles can never help themselves out of their misery and shame. They need aid from without to rise to their feet and come again to their original honor. You, O Tsar

¹⁷⁵ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 172–73.

¹⁷⁶ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 115.

(with God's aid), could easily offer the Poles this aid, this renewal and enlightenment, if only you were to conclude a firm alliance with them. . . . At this time it is advisable for this kingdom to be at peace with all the northern, eastern, and western peoples, and to war only with the Tatars. . . . O merciful Tsar, strive in every way possible to preserve eternal peace with the northern, western, and eastern peoples, that is, with the Poles, Lithuanians, Swedes, Bukharians, Chinese, Daur, Bagdoy, Kalmuks, and the others, and do not keep your troops armed against them, but rather turn all your force to the acquisition of the Perekop lands.¹⁷⁷

That Križanić did not envision the creation of an all-Slavic state with a Muscovite tsar at its head is apparent from the fact that, according to Muscovy's new law code, as Križanić formulated it, the Muscovite tsars could marry only the daughters of the Slavic rulers or princes. This means that the Slavic peoples would in the future again have native-born rulers. The enemy of every supreme suzerainty, or *hyperbasilea*, Križanić certainly did not envision the Muscovite tsar as a sovereign over the Slavic kings. "We and our heirs," Križanić wrote, letting the words be spoken by the tsar, "will never choose our wives from any sort of foreigner, nor anyone outside our kingdom, except for those of the rulers, kings and princes of the Slavic race. And next we will choose our wives from among you, our loyal subjects, particularly from the princes and nobles."¹⁷⁸ In this important sentence Križanić first states, through the tsar, how, precisely, the Muscovite tsars will not marry. The phrase that they will not marry "outside the kingdom" may represent a synonym for foreigners, it may refer to the marriage place—that the event will not take place outside the kingdom, i.e., Muscovy—or it may mean that the tsar will not marry a woman from outside the kingdom. The last interpretation is difficult to reconcile with the statement that the tsars will marry daughters of Slavic rulers, kings, and princes, who would include women from outside the kingdom. Does this then mean that Križanić envisioned the supreme suzerainty of Muscovy over the individual Slavic kingdoms? No, it does not, for the next sentence says that the tsars will also take to wife women from among their subjects, particularly princes and nobles—that is, from a different category altogether, because these are subjects and the others are not. Križanić uses a good deal of ink to prove the sovereignty of the kings. Perhaps "kingdom" in the phrase "the tsar will not marry outside the kingdom" does not mean the kingdoms from among whose royal women he will choose a wife. Perhaps here "kingdom" refers to the region of the Slavs rather than to foreign lands.

¹⁷⁷ *Russkoe gosudarstvo*, 2: 115–20.

¹⁷⁸ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 267.

There is another side to the coin. In discussing the exclusion of foreigners from the throne according to Muscovy's new law code, Križanić places the following words in the tsar's mouth: "Furthermore we decree that no foreigner may become king, prince, Ban, lord, *okol' nichii*, *vojevoda*, boyar, noble, or commander of any city. . . . Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Bulgars, and Croats are not to be counted among the foreigners."¹⁷⁹ These Slavs, then, are not excluded from the throne. Križanić's indirect support for the election of the Muscovite tsarevich to the Polish-Lithuanian throne should be understood in this light. All in all, that some things are so cannot be doubted, but how they are so is not clear. Slavic kings who are not subjects of the tsar do rule; Slavs are not excluded from the throne (either in Muscovy or, certainly, in any other Slavic country); some sort of community of Slavs exists. But what sort?

Križanić developed his ideas gradually, depending on his correspondent and on the moment, and revealed them only partially. He did not detail his conception of the relationship between the Muscovite tsar and the other Slavic sovereigns, or between Muscovy and the other Slavic countries, in any work yet known to us. Jagić made a guess in this regard:

In order to characterize Križanić's political ideals it is worth putting particular emphasis on the fact that he nowhere says in so many words that the Russian tsar should conquer these peoples and their lands and subject them to Russia, but only that he should help them to national self-confidence and freedom. Thus this was not true political Panslavism in the contemporary, West European interpretation, but rather, as we have said, a sort of keenly felt oration in the sense of Czecho-Slavic reciprocity.¹⁸⁰

According to A. Gol'dberg, "in assigning Russians the role of hegemon in the liberation struggle of the Slavs, Križanić was obviously not inclined to consider this hegemony permanent and did not attribute the role of ruler over the reborn Slavic peoples to Russia."¹⁸¹ Later, citing Petar Grgec and B. Datsiuk, Gol'dberg presents the following hypothesis: "One can hypothesize that Križanić foresaw the creation of a united Slavic political union under the protectorate of the Russian tsar in the course of further development, but he did not determine the form of this union in advance."¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Križanić, *Politika*, p. 269.

¹⁸⁰ Jagić, *Život i rad Jurja Križanića*, p. 147.

¹⁸¹ Gol'dberg, "Idea slavianskogo edinstva," p. 388.

¹⁸² Gol'dberg, "Juraj Križanić i Rusija," p. 273.

When Križanić advised the tsar not to expand Muscovy's borders to the north, the west, or the east, but to the south, toward the Crimea and against the Tatars, he obviously had in mind the liberation of the South Slavs from the Turks. Ordín-Nashchokin, who was then directing Muscovite foreign policy, would later take a position similar to Križanić's.

At that time, Križanić considered it possible for the tsar, with the aid of books written in the corrected Slavic (Rus') language, to help the blinded Slavs rouse themselves from their infatuation with foreign things and from their search among foreigners for rulers. In this Križanić pledged his own help, both in the correction of the language and in the translation and writing of educational books, both secular and spiritual.

He called the language in which he himself wrote a common dialect, comparing it with the Greek koine.

In exactly the same way that different dialects existed in the Greek language, and some Greek writers wrote in Attic Greek, some in Doric Greek, and some in a common dialect, so, too, I hope that all the tribes of the Rus' people (*Rúskogo naróda*) and all the dialects, i.e., the Rus' (*Rúsjanov*) themselves and the Slavs, the Poles, and the Czechs, will understand my speech. And because of this I proposed to speak this way (in a sort of common language) so that everyone would understand this speech. There is nothing alien here, either in the words or in the grammatical composition. I have chosen for the formation of words and their endings those which are the most usual or are common to many of our dialects. I judged this to be good. But let each man speak and write as seems best to him.¹⁸³

Could Križanić's language have been as intelligible to all the Slavs as he hoped? It seems so. Its Paleoslavonic stratum brought it close to the Orthodox Slavs, accustomed to liturgical and religious books in Church Slavic, and then to the Catholic Slavs, a number of whom used Slavonic Glagolitic liturgical books with an East Slavic orientation. Its rich Polish lexicon (borrowed considerably from Cnapius) brought Križanić's speech closer to the Poles, and words and synonyms drawn from various Slavic languages interpreted the words of one Slavic group in those of others.

Muscovy also had a religious mission. Having found itself in the One Church (the Roman Church, though not of the Roman discipline and rite)—fortunate not only in the religious sense (for according to Križanić the division of the Slavs into Orthodox and Catholic was disastrous)—Muscovy should help the Greeks to unite in the One Church as well. It was fitting, Križanić held, that the Slavs (in the person of the Bulgars), who were the reason that the Greeks had begun to anathemize the Latins, should contribute to the Greeks' reconciliation with the Latins: that they who had

¹⁸³ *Gramatično izkazânje*, "Ko čitatel'em predopominok."

been the cause of division should become the agents of unification. In addition the “Russians” had accepted the Christian faith from the Greeks. Thus the Greeks had done the “Russians” a spiritual favor when they had led them to the path of salvation. Now they should return to the Greeks mercy for mercy, and aid them to achieve church unity. One thing more: Križanić asked whether God had not decreed that the Greeks, who, proud of their own wisdom, had rejected the teachings of the western fathers of the church, should be given a lesson, or at least a good example by the Slavs, who in wisdom came last.¹⁸⁴

It was Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich Romanov, the “quietest tsar,”¹⁸⁵ in whom Križanić—fascinated by Aleksei ever since his first visit to Moscow in 1647—placed great hopes, and whom he compared not in origin but in mission to Emperor Augustus. But Aleksei was not bold enough a ruler for Križanić’s vision. Busy consolidating his still new dynasty, the tsar approached novelty with restraint. Preoccupied with the affirmation of his royal line, Aleksei had commissioned the *Istoriia o tsariakh* (1669), which traced a line from Augustus, Emperor of Rome, to himself. This was completely contrary to all that Križanić envisioned and proposed. Furthermore, Aleksei’s model statesman was Ivan the Terrible. It was precisely against Ivan the Terrible that Križanić had whetted his pen.¹⁸⁶

Tsar Fedor, Aleksei’s son, who freed Križanić from his Siberian captivity, was to a great extent the tsar of Križanić’s desires: he banished the Greeks, sanctioned a plan for an advanced school academy, and was inclined to ally with Poland.¹⁸⁷ But by the time of Fedor, Križanić had wearied and made haste to quit Muscovy.

P. A. Bessonov maintains that Križanić’s works were read and that Peter I not only knew them, but ordered that they be published.¹⁸⁸ A. Brückner thinks otherwise: “Križanić was a performer without a public, a virtuoso without a concert hall, a preacher without a community, an advocate of progress whom no one followed. There is something tragic about so much intelligence and general education, so much initiative and originality appearing in the isolation of exile in Tobolsk, and in the knowledge that his

¹⁸⁴ Golub, “Križanićevo teološko poimanje zbivanja,” p. 126.

¹⁸⁵ Solov’ev, *Istoriia Rossii*, 6: 609. p. 609.

¹⁸⁶ Hans-Joachim Torke, *Die Staatsbedingte Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich: Zar und Zemlja in der altrussischen Herrschaftsverfassung, 1613–1689* (Leiden, 1974), pp. 13, 17–19, 34–37.

¹⁸⁷ Torke, *Die Staatsbedingte Gesellschaft im Moskauer Reich*, p. 37.

¹⁸⁸ P. Bessonov, “Katolicheskii sviashchennik Serb (Khorvat) Iurii Krizhanich,” *Pravoslavnoe obozrenie* (Moscow), 1870, p. 339.

spoken and written words found neither listener nor reader, neither participation nor understanding.¹⁸⁹

However it may have been, Križanić lamented from exile that “some have called me warrantlessly a wanderer, a vagabond, a good-for-nothing. For I came to the sole king of my own race and language on earth, I came to my own people and to my own homeland! I came to the place where my works and deeds could be used and bear fruit, where alone my works, namely, the grammars, dictionaries, and other translations of books into the Slavic tongue, could have a price and be sold. . . . In any other part of the world I should be more of a vagabond and a stranger than in this kingdom.”¹⁹⁰ This was the fate of *pop Jurko Križanić Javkanica*.¹⁹¹

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¹⁸⁹ A. Brückner, “Ein Finanzpolitiker in Russland im XVII Jh.,” *Russische Revue* 1 (1891): p. 296.

¹⁹⁰ Križanić, *O promysle*, p. 39.

¹⁹¹ †Father Jurko Križanić the Lamentor, as Križanić signed himself.

The Redivived Croatia of Pavao Ritter Vitezović*

IVO BANAC

From the fifteenth century, Ottoman expansion and the gradual loss of Croat territorial unity became the preeminent factors in Croat social and political history. With the fall of Bosnia (1463) and the loss of the last remnants of Herceg Stipan's lands (1482), the Croat heartlands were exposed to the Ottoman onslaught. In 1493 the Croat nobility suffered a disastrous defeat on the field of Krbava, a reversal that Priest Martinac of Grobno found unprecedented "since the time of the pagan Tatars and Goths and Atilla."¹ With the ruin of the Hungarian forces at Mohács (1526), the estates of the Central European kingdoms turned to Ferdinand the Habsburg. First the Bohemian, then the Croat, and finally the Hungarian diet offered him their respective crowns. Nevertheless, the military advantages of this choice were not felt immediately. Moreover, with the growth of the Croat-Slavonian Military Frontier, the Croat estates became apprehensive about the curtailment of their prerogatives by the Imperial War Council and its Habsburg generals and captains.

The hostility toward the "Germans" did not lessen with the first substantial continental victories over the Turks in what is generally called the Long War, which ended in 1606 with the Treaty of Zsitvatorok. The Military Frontier was definitely excluded from the jurisdiction of the Croatian Ban (*prorex*) and Sabor (diet) in 1630, a circumstance that deepened the estates' opposition to the growing Habsburg absolutism in Croatia and Hungary. The Zrinski-Frankapan conspiracy, which reached its pitiless dénouement in 1671 with the beheading of the leading Croat and Hungarian magnates, deprived Croatia of the only leaders that could represent it under the conditions of feudal order.

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¹ Cited in Ivan Milčetić, "Hrvatske glagojske bibliografije," *Starine JAZU* (Zagreb), 33 (1911): 65.

The struggle against the Ottomans also continued on the Croatian littoral and on the Adriatic islands. Besides the Uskoks of Senj—a martial community in Habsburg service that menaced the Venetians as much as the Turks—Venice and the Venetian-held communes of Dalmatia also fought on, though not in the interests of Croat intercommunalism. Venetian gains in the Candian war widened the republic's Dalmatian holdings and underscored the feebleness of Croat claims to this ancient patrimony. Moreover, two centuries of war against the Turks brought on the long period of Croat migrations and the drastic population losses that affected all the Croat lands, with the possible exception of the miniscule Republic of Dubrovnik, an independent city-state under Ottoman protection.

Flight from the Ottoman territory and from the immediate war zones depopulated the land and created the vacuum that was filled by the "Vlach sons," as the Orthodox migrants from the hinterland of the Balkan peninsula called themselves when they started moving into Croatia from 1597 to 1605. Their Orthodox religion ran counter to the act of the Sabor of 1604, which recognized Catholicism as the only legally sanctioned confession in Croatia. Then, too, their exemption from serfdom in exchange for military service in the frontier zone with the Turks introduced a series of political, religious, and social problems. Most important, the inflight of the Balkan settlers and the vast Croat exodus "forever shattered the integrity of the Croat people's ethnic territory."²

As a result of the extreme disjointure of the Croat lands and of the continuing Ottoman pressure, Croat society became preoccupied with a search for effective remedies. Since support from the Christian West was meager and conditional, the principal recourses were internal unity and, increasingly, the wider Slavic world. The idea of Slavic national and linguistic reciprocity and interdependence had been heralded among the Croats since the Middle Ages. During the sixteenth century this idea found new adherents among scholars and ecclesiastics from the thin strip of land between the Drava and the Adriatic, which though the "reliquiae reliquiarum olim magni et inclyti regni Croatiae," nevertheless maintained the continuity of Croat statehood. Most of the ideas that advanced the political and cultural unification of all the Croats originated in the northwest. Among them, the historical and literary conceptions of Pavao Ritter Vitezović became especially influential, despite their marked bookish quality.

The Uskoks of the city of Senj had been exiled by the Habsburgs into the hinterland of Croatia for over three decades when "at the beginning of the

² Jaroslav Šidak, "Hrvatsko društvo u Križanićevo doba," *Život i djelo Jurja Križanića: Zbornik radova*, ed. Ante Pažanin (Zagreb, 1974), p. 21.

fifty-second year [1652] Senj gave birth to Pavao Vitezović (*Anni principio post quinquaginta secundi Seña Equitem Paulum genuit*).³ Pavao Ritter, who translated his surname as Vitezović in all of his Croatian writings, was a scion of a minor Alsatian noble house, some of whose members served as Habsburg officers in Croatia. Vitezović's grandfather, Antun, established his branch of the Ritters in Senj, where the family was assimilated through intermarriage with the local Croat lineages. Their title and Croatian citizenship were recognized by the Sabor only in 1653, more than a year after Vitezović's birth, a matter which this "noble and brave gentleman . . . a nobleman of Croatia and Senj (*Plemeniti i Hrabreni Gosp.ⁿ . . . Hërvatski i senyski Vlastelin*)," who was not affluent, did much to conceal.

After attending school in Senj, Vitezović went to the Jesuit gymnasium in Zagreb (1665–1670), where he mastered Latin poetic composition and acquired a taste for historical research. Besides a brief sojourn to Rome (around 1674), where he probably met Ivan Lučić (Joannes Lucius, 1604–1679), the founder of critical historiography among the Croats, young Vitezović also traveled to Carniolan Wagensberg (1676–1677); there he assisted Janez Weikhard Valvasor (1641–1693), the author of the famous *Die Ehre des Herzogthumbs Crain* (Ljubljana, 1689). It was in Wagensberg that Vitezović became skilled in engraving, which was important in Valvasor's ambitious publishing ventures. The skill served Vitezović well in his subsequent heraldic enterprises, as did the thorough practical education in research skills that he received from the learned Valvasor.

Besides his scholarly and literary activities, Vitezović pursued public office. He was elected Senj's representative to the Sopron Diet of 1681, where he first had contact with Leopold I. During the early stages of the Vienna war he served in the army of Ban Nikola Erdödy, and in 1684 Leopold appointed him a captain in the Croat regiment of Count Peter Ricciardi. Vitezović was a representative of the Ban and the Sabor at the Vienna court (*agens aulicus*) in 1684–1687, and in 1691 he became a titular comitat official (*podžupan*) of Lika and Krbava. None of these posts was lucrative enough to provide Vitezović with the means to sustain his scholarly predilections. As a result, he increasingly relied on selling his writings for his livelihood, becoming, thereby, the first professional writer in Croatia.⁴

³ Pavao Ritter Vitezović, "Plorantis Croatiae saecula duo," in *Hrvatski latinisti II: Pesci 17–19. stoljeća*, vol. 3 of *Pet stoljeća hrvatske književnosti*, ed. Rafo Bogišić et al. (Zagreb, 1970), p. 143.

⁴ Jaroslav Šidak, "Počeci političke misli u Hrvata—J. Križanić i P. Ritter Vitezović," *Naše teme* (Zagreb), 16, nos. 7–8 (1972): 1127.

Vitezović's literary activity intensified after 1694, when the Sabor chose him to manage the newly acquired official printing office in Zagreb. His manuscripts were published more frequently, following a succession of earlier publications. Of all the works from this period, Vitezović's *Kronika, aliti szpomen vszega szvieta vikov* (Chronicle, or a remembrance of all the times of the world; 1696) is particularly important, although not because of its originality (much of it was based on the chronicle of Antun Vramec, published in Ljubljana in 1578).⁵ Rather, in the postscript Vitezović first declared that the term Slavic embraced not only that part of the Slavic people living between the Drava and the Sava, the homeland of most of his readers, "but all the other states [*orsagi*] that the Greeks and Latins understood under the name of *Illyriae*."⁶ In short, he extended the ancient Illyrian name, which the Renaissance writers applied mainly to the Croats, to all the Slavic peoples. Moreover, Illyrian or Slavic nationhood, according to Vitezović, was based on linguistic communality, since all of these lands used "our glorious Illyrian or Slavic tongue (*szlavni nas Illyrski aliti Szlovinski jezik*)."⁷

This was not the first time that Vitezović widened the meaning of "Illyricum," the area that originally constituted a Roman province during the Augustan conquest of the eastern Adriatic littoral (35 B.C.–A.D. 9). To be sure, at various times the name Illyricum had been used to refer to widely different Roman holdings in Southeastern Europe, but it was on the whole unjustifiable to include practically the whole Balkan peninsula, as Vitezović had in his *Anagrammaton, Sive Laurus auxiliatoribus Ungariae liber secundus* (The second book of anagrams, or a laurel wreath to the helpers of Hungary; 1689).


The *Anagrammaton* was Vitezović's poetic homage to all the lands that aided the Kingdom of Hungary during the early stages of the Vienna war. Among them he included the following entities (see map 1):

⁵ The *Kronika* contains a very detailed political history of Vitezović's times. It is significant that, despite Vitezović's close ties with the Habsburg court (something that made him suspect in the eyes of Croat nobility), there is no hint of approval for the Habsburg retribution against the principals in the Zrinski-Frankapan Conspiracy in his dry entry on the magnates' sentence: "1671. The heads of Ferenc Nádasdy in Vienna, Zrinski Petar and Ferenc of Trsat [Frankapan] in Wiener-Neustadt, Erasmus Tattenbach in Graz, and Ferenc Boinich in Poszony were cut off." Pavao Ritter Vitezović, *Kronika, Aliti szpomen vsega szvieta vikov* (Zagreb, 1696), p. 199.

⁶ Vitezović, *Kronika*, p. 221.

⁷ Vitezović, *Kronika*, p. 221.

Map 1



(1) *Germania*—the whole Germanic world headed by Austria, together with Sweden, Denmark, and *Angliae regnum*; (2) *Italia, Cum Parte Graeciae*—the Italian states and southern Greece, with most of the Aegean and Ionian islands, Crete, and Malta; (3) *Illyricum*; (4) *Hispania*—Spain and Portugal with their European, African, Asian, and American possessions, including Florida and California; (5) *Sarmatia*—principally the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Muscovy and their possessions. In a brief separate section he chastised France (*Gallia*) on account of her infidelity to the Christian anti-Ottoman effort. Vitezović fashioned anagrams from the names of each of his 347 entries and then composed a Latin stanza for each in which the anagrams figured prominently.⁸

The localities—that is, states, lands, provinces, cities, and names of ancient Illyrian and Thracian tribes such as Japodes and Tribali—that were included in “Illyricum” (see map 2) indicate that in Vitezović’s view Illyricum embraced the whole Balkan peninsula, except for southern Greece (Attica and the Peloponnesus with the adjoining islands). The status of some areas was disputed. Istria and Trieste were included in Illyricum, but Istria was also noted within Germania and Italia, while the Slovene lands (Carinthia, Carniola, Goritia, and Styria) were mentioned only as parts of Germania.⁹ Similarly, Slavonica Marchia (the Slavonian Military Frontier) was within Germania (presumably because it was governed by the Habsburg War Council), but also within Illyricum.¹⁰ Wallachia (Dacia, vulgo Valachia) was within Illyricum, but Moldavia was a part of Sarmatia.¹¹ Despite these vagaries, it is important that Vitezović included the overwhelming majority of southern Slavs—and then some—within his concept of *Illyricum Laureatum*.

The origins of this classification lie in the Slavic idea—the notion that the Slavic peoples constituted one national and linguistic community. Elements of the Slavic idea could already be detected in the *Primary Chronicle* of the Eastern Slavs, and then they became clearly evident in the works of several thirteenth-century Czech and Polish chroniclers. Still, on account of peculiar historical circumstances, associated largely with the Ottoman menace, the influence of the Slavic idea reached its culmination among the Croats. It became a great preoccupation of Croat thinkers of the early modern period, inspiring them with the prospect of aid from kindred Slavic

⁸ Paul. Ritter *Equitis Aurati Anagrammaton, sive Laurus auxiliatoribus Ungariae liber secundus* (Vienna, 1689). Hereafter *Anagrammaton*.

⁹ *Anagrammaton*, pp. 69, 84, 18, 41, 11, 12, 15, 27.

¹⁰ *Anagrammaton*, pp. 26, 81.

¹¹ *Anagrammaton*, pp. 70, 65, 117.

Map 2



powers—first the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and, later, through the endeavors of Juraj Križanić (1617–1683), from Russia.

It was Vinko Pribojević (15th–16th century), the learned Dominican from Hvar, who first popularized the Slavic idea among the Croats. Pribojević was one of the first Renaissance scholars to state clearly that the Slavs were descendants of the ancient Illyrians. Moreover, he held that the Slavic appellation was younger than the Illyrian. Illyrus was the name of one of the twelve heirs of Thyras, the son of biblical Japhet, who was the forefather of the Slavs.¹² Pribojević was followed by many other writers, notably Mavro Orbin (d. 1614), a Benedictine scholar from Dubrovnik and the author of the first history of all the Slavs—*Il Regno degli Slavi* (The kingdom of the Slavs; 1601). Hence, when Vitezović in his *Kronika* extended the Illyrian name to include all the Slavs, he was simply following the logic of Pribojević and Orbin. Treading the same path as Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II, 1405–1464), who was inspired by various Polish chroniclers, Pribojević introduced among the Croats the legend that the ancestors of the Czechs, Poles, and Rus' (the mythical brothers Czech, Lech, and Rus) were natives of Dalmatia (Illyricum), who were expelled from their homeland after a period of civil strife.¹³ Orbin repeated this legend, and in 1652 (the year of Vitezović's birth), it was introduced to northern Croatia in the *Memoria regnum et banorum regnorum Dalmatiae, Croatiae et Slavoniae* (Remembrance of the kings and bans of the kingdoms of Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia; 1652) by Canon Juraj Ráttkay (1612–1666), who, moreover, specified that the birthplace of the brothers was Krapina, some thirty miles north of Zagreb.

Vitezović's claim that all the Slavs were really Illyrians, and that they were autochthonous in Illyricum, is explained by the tradition of Czech, Lech, and Rus. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Vitezović could reconcile this legend with the account of Croat settlement given by Constantine Porphyrogenitus, with whose *De administrando imperio* he was fully familiar. Lučić (Lucius) and later Josip Mikoczi (1700–1800) rejected the notion that the Serbs, Croats, and other Slavs were descended from Illyrians, but theirs were lonely voices. In fact, the influence of Vitezović helped shape Croat historical thinking well into the nineteenth century. This influence explains in part Ljudevit Gaj's choice of the Illyrian nomenclature for the movement that became synonymous with the Croat revival.

¹² Vinko Pribojević, *De origine successibusque Slavorum* (Zagreb, 1951), p. 69.

¹³ Pribojević, *De origine Slavorum*, p. 67.

There is, however, another reason why Porphyrogenitus's version of the Croat settlement was echoed in Vitezović's work. In the very passage that dealt with the advent of the Croats (chap. 30 of *De administrando imperio*), the emperor-historian noted that the Croats formerly lived "on the other side of Bavaria, where the White Croats can be found today," meaning in the tenth century.¹⁴ Surely this was evidence of Croat presence outside the Balkans. Porphyrogenitus's statement probably reinforced the notion that Vitezović had already found in Orbin: Czech, Lech, and Rus were not only natives of Illyricum—they were Croats. As Orbin had it, "Czecho Croato era p[er]sonaggio nobile."¹⁵ Moreover, in seventeenth-century Croatian usage the terms "Croat" and "Illyrian" were common synonyms. Vitezović was ready to make his great and wholly original leap—he extended the Croat name to all Slavs.

Historical circumstances kindled Vitezović's idea. After the failure of Kara Mustafa's adventure at the gates of Vienna (1683), Leopold I initiated the long-awaited reconquest of the Ottoman-held Danubian basin. Austria and her allies (Venice and the other members of the Holy League) penetrated deep into the Balkans, and for a time threatened to drive the Ottomans out of Europe. In the process, Hungary and much of Croatia were liberated. For its part, Venice extended its Dalmatian possessions.

The Croatian Sabor had reasons to be apprehensive about the territorial settlements reached at the Peace of Carlowitz (Sr. Karlovci, 1699). To the chagrin of the Sabor, certain frontier salients (notably Bihać) remained under Ottoman's rule. Croat resentment did not abate at the prospect of permanent Venetian rule in Dalmatia. Accordingly, the Sabor found it necessary to include its own representative in the bilateral commission that was established to determine the exact frontier line. The Habsburg delegation, headed by Count Luigi Marsigli, thus acquired the services of Pavao Ritter Vitezović.

During his travels with the commission in 1699, Vitezović presented Count Marsigli with a memorandum whose purpose was to fix the "frontiers of all Croatia (*limites totius Croatiae*)."¹⁶ He published this work in a somewhat different version one year later as *Croatia rediviva* (Redivived Croatia; 1700). The title of this "fiery protest against the Peace of Carlowitz, which . . . mercilessly and unjustifiably deprived Croatia of her ancient territories," as Ferdo Šišić, a twentieth-century Croat historian, referred to

¹⁴ Nada Klaić, ed., *Izvori za hrvatsku povijest do 1526. godine* (Zagreb, 1972), p. 3.

¹⁵ Mauro Orbini, *Il Regno degli Slavi* (Pesaro, 1602), p. 47.

Vitezović's work,¹⁶ fully justified the author's purpose. Vitezović set out to breathe life into his own version of Great Croatia, a territory worthy of Leopold's imperial ambition.

Croatia rediviva was in fact an outline for a more ambitious study of Croat history that Vitezović never finished. In the poetic invocation at the beginning of the work, which he explicitly called a prospect (*prodromus*), Vitezović called on his readers to spread his work throughout the "cities, fortresses, and houses of noblemen," and requested that these recipients send him their coats-of-arms, available historical sources, and seals.¹⁷ Conscious that his outline was a compilation from the writings of various authors—the most prominent among whom were Constantine Porphyrogenitus, Thomas the Archdeacon of Split (1200–1268), the Priest of Doclea (twelfth century), Orbin, and Lucius—he set out to reconcile the contradictions among these sources on the origin of the Croat name (really Croat ethnogenesis) and the limits of Croat territory. The answer to the first problem, which he solved by reconciling Porphyrogenitus's version of Croat origin from White Croatia in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in his time ("Clariùs Constant. Porphirogenitus Imper. . . . qui Sarmatas *Belochrobotos*, id est *Albos*, sive *magnos*, aut *terram multam possidentes*, appellat") with Thomas the Archdeacon's version of Croats' (called Curetes) presence in the Balkans at the time of Vergil, helped Vitezović to define the Croat frontiers. Citing Greek and Latin authors, Vitezović fixed Croat frontiers in the west on the Raša (Istria), but allowed, following Thomas the Archdeacon, that they included Carinthia.¹⁸ In the north, he accepted Lucius's minimum boundary up to the Danube, but quickly added that the "frontiers of the Croat kingdom extended widely across the Danube (*Sed & trans Danubium amplissimis terminis Croatorum Regnū extendebatur*)." Basing himself on the historically founded entity of White Croatia, he identified the White Croats with the Vandalic Slavs (Slavi Vandali), whom Georg Horn in a seventeenth-century work (*Georgii Horni arca Noae, sive Historia imperiorum et regnorum, a condito orbe ad nostra tempora; 1666*) divided into two groups—Wends (Venedicos) and Sarmatians (Sarmaticos).

¹⁶ Ferdo Šišić, "Hrvatska historiografija od XVI do XX stoljeća," *Jugoslavenski istorijski časopis* (Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade), 1, nos. 1–4 (1934): 44.

¹⁷ Pavao Ritter Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva: Regnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare* (Zagreb, 1700), p. [iv].

¹⁸ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, pp. 5–6.

Whereas the Wends consisted of Czechs, Moravians, and Sorbs (Sorabi), the Sarmatians were to be found in Muscovy, Poland, and Lithuania.¹⁹ But-tressing his assertion by referring to the legend of Czech, Lech, and Rus, Vitezović effectively claimed all of the Western and Eastern Slavs for the Croats.

Vitezović's sweep in the north made his task of fixing Croatia's eastern frontiers in the Balkans no less difficult. But following confused references in the works of several Byzantine authors, notably the awkward claims of Porphyrogenitus whereby the Croats bordered on Slavic Serbs "who are called Croats," Vitezović stuck to the notion that the Serbs were a people of the "Slavic and Croat nation." In addition, Croat territories also included (citing here some of his major units) Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria, as well as, with less emphasis, Albania, Epirus, and portions of Thes-saly (Pheras).²⁰ In a transparent allusion to the age of Alexander, he claimed that the cities of Macedonia, especially, "testified to the language and might of Croats in antiquity (*majoris linguae & potentiae Croatorum antiquitatis perhibent testimonia*)."²¹ The southern borders of Croatia were physical—the islands of the "Adriatic gulf"—so Vitezović concluded this section of *Croatia rediviva* with an invocation of Croat maritime power under Petar Krešimir IV (ruled c. 1059–1074). The polemical anti-Venetian aspect of his effort was underscored by an authentic history of Venetian tribute to the early-medieval Croat rulers.

The second part of Vitezović's work was a polemic against those who still thought that the Croats were a people different from the Slavs or Illyri-ans ("Ne quis verò Croatos à Slavis aut Illyriis aliam existimet esse nationem. . .").²² He disposed of the Illyrian appellation by asserting that the term "Illyrian" was nothing but a Greek and Latin name for the Slavs ("Quos enim Graeci & Latini Illyrios, ipsi se *Slavos & Slovinos* nuncupa-bant").²³ In a similar vein, the terms "Slav" and "Croat" were nothing but synonyms. The brunt of the argument, however, was directed against Lucius, whom Vitezović saw as a Venetian apologist. Citing numerous Croat sources, notably poets such as Juraj Baraković (1548–1628) of Zadar, Vitezović negated Venetian claims to Dalmatia. He held that the

¹⁹ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 10.

²⁰ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, pp. 11–12.

²¹ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 12.

²² Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 15.

²³ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 16.

name Dalmatia, though Croat in etymology (from the “Croat province of Dulma” where the Croat kings had themselves crowned), was proper only to the handful of Italians and Romans who lived on the Croat coast.²⁴ In this sense, then, the term was an instrument of Venetian imperial ambition. If Croatia was now feeble in comparison to the glorious past that Vitezović evoked, that was because the land had been devastated by numerous attackers, first by the Romans, then by various barbarians, and most recently by the Turks.


Ending with the newly acquired belief that the name Croat embraced all the Slavs, Vitezović concluded his work by dividing the Slavic world into two parts: Northern Croatia (*Croatia Septentrionalis*), north of the Danube and the Drava, including Venedicum, Sarmaticum, and Hungary; and southern Croatia (*Croatia Meridionalis*) on the Balkan peninsula. The latter (see map 3) was further subdivided into two parts: White Croatia (*Croatia Alba*) and Red Croatia (*Croatia Rubra*). Croatia Alba was divided into four areas; (1) Maritime Croatia (*Croatia Maritima*); (2) Mediterranean Croatia (*Croatia Mediterranea*); (3) Mesopotamian Croatia (*Croatia Interamnia—interamnensis sive Savia*); and (4) Alpine Croatia (*Croatia Alpestris—Citerior*). He allowed that these terms, which were of his own making, corresponded to Dalmatia, New Croatia, true Slavonia, and Noricum or Old Japidia. Croatia Rubra consisted of Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Odrysia.²⁵

Vitezović’s “Pan-Croatianism” was at once a historical construct and a political program. A protest against the centuries-old fragmentation of the Croat lands (and for that matter of the whole Slavic south), *Croatia rediviva* was also a polemic against Venetian territorial pretensions, and a legitimist entreaty for Habsburg support. Two matters should be stressed in this context. First, Vitezović did not assume that his Great Croatia was a unified whole. He recognized differences in frontiers, names, emblems, and customs (“cum propriis tamen singularum limitibus, etymo, Insignibus, rebusque ac magis memorabilibus populi moribus”).²⁶ Nevertheless, he believed that the distinctions were not as important as the common nationhood and lineage of all the “Croats.” Second, Vitezović’s conception should not be judged a case of national exclusivism, a danger latent in his

²⁴ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 26.

²⁵ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 32.

²⁶ Vitezović, *Croatia rediviva*, p. 32.



unjustifiable apotheosis of the Croat name. In fact, Vitezović influenced the national movements of the Serbs and Bulgars. His heraldic manual *Stemmatographia, sive Armorum Illyricorum delineatio, descriptio et restitutio* (Vienna, 1701) was adapted, translated, and expanded by Hristofor Žefarović (Vienna, 1741), and thus indirectly contributed to the growth of Serb national consciousness. The coats-of-arms of insurrectionary Serbia and of Bulgaria (which Vitezović borrowed from Orbin), as well as of Romania (which he invented), were major contributions to the iconography of Balkan nationalism. Nor was his research restricted to Croat subjects: Vitezović's *Serbiae illustratae libri octo*, one of the first critical histories of medieval Serbia, was never published but can still be read in manuscript.

Nevertheless, the Croats were Vitezović's principal heirs. Although he died in a wretched exile (Vienna, 1713), the victim of petty intrigues that drove him from Zagreb in 1710, his influence survived throughout the eighteenth century to the benefit of Croat resistance against growing Hungarian nationalism. Baltazar Krčelić (1715–1778) did much to popularize Vitezović's literary legacy, which was the principal source of his own historical writings. As a result, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Vitezović's works were in great demand and were increasingly reprinted.

Šišić was remarkably accurate when he claimed that "in the nineteenth century, *Croatia rediviva* became . . . the Bible of Croat national policy. Ljudevit Gaj [1809–1872], Ante Starčević [1823–1896], and Eugen Kvaternik [1825–1871], all of whom were quite familiar with Ritter's work, learned from him far more for their respective Illyrianist and Pan-Croatianist ideas than is usually thought."²⁷ Indeed, when Ljudevit Gaj sought to unite the generic names of the South Slavs under one, Illyrian "surname," he was merely following in Vitezović's footsteps. Moreover, Gaj's earlier attempts to extend the Croat name to the Slovenes—in his anthem *Horvatov sloga i sjedinjenje* (The harmony and unification of the Croats; 1832),²⁸—were identical to Vitezović's own, admittedly far more extensive efforts. Nevertheless, neither Vitezović nor Gaj wished to suppress any national or regional names that existed alongside their own all-embracing designations. Hence the pluralism of Gaj's anthem:

V kolu jesu vsi Horvati stare države,
Staroj Slavi verni svati z Like, Krbave,
Krajnci, Štajer, Gorotanci i Slavonija
Skup Bošnjaci, Istrijanci ter Dalmacija.

²⁷ Šišić, "Hrvatska historiografija," p. 46.

²⁸ Ljudevit Gaj, "Horvatov sloga i sjedinjenje," in *Hrvatski preporod*, vol. 1 (Zagreb, 1965), pp. 299–301.

In the circle are all the Croats of the old state,
 The faithful groomsmen of old Slavia from Lika, Krbava,
 Carniolans, Styrians, Carinthians, and Slavonia,
 Bosnians together, Istrians, and Dalmatia.²⁹

As for Starčević and Kvaternik, their ideas were on the whole a departure from Vitezović's Slavophilic concerns. The founders of the Party of [Croat State] Right (*Stranka prava*) denied the legitimacy of any term other than "Croat," thereby imbuing Vitezović's legacy with a new content. Nevertheless, the modern Croat national ideology of Starčević and Kvaternik was the most direct heir to Vitezović's Croatocentric ideas and terminology.

Vitezović's contribution to the nineteenth-century Croat national ideologies is not exhausted by his historicism. He anticipated the Romantics' linguistically based definitions of nationhood, an approach that had a considerable tradition among the Slavic peoples. He believed that all the Slavs spoke one single language, but recognized the need to overcome the divisiveness of local dialects. For Croat letters, his proposed orthographic system, based largely on the Czech diacritical marks, was the most comprehensive solution of its kind before Ljudevit Gaj's, and certainly influenced the leader of the Illyrianist movement. Though Vitezović was a native čakavian, who spent most of his life in kajkavian Zagreb, he showed a clear preference for the štokavian dialect, which was spoken by most Croats. This preference was at the cornerstone of the Croatian linguistic standard, whose origins can be fixed in the mid-eighteenth century.³⁰ Vitezović, too, did much to purify the Croatian language of foreign (non-Slavic) words: in the verses of one of his epic poems, "A man most proudly bears his own garment./And only that which cannot be found at home is sought abroad (*Cslovik najdicšnie svoju halyu nossi;/A sta domanie, tose vani prossi*)."³¹ Though his interest in folk poetry did not go beyond a scholar's desire to consider all the available historical sources, it cannot be denied that his recourse to folk compositions remained unique in the seventeenth century. In short, Vitezović foreshadowed practically every enterprise associated with the linguistic reform of Gaj's time.

The central point of Franjo Fancev's thesis on the autochthonous nature of the Croat revival was that the "main aims of the Croat 'Illyrianist'

²⁹ Gaj, "Horvatov sloga i sjedinjenje," p. 301.

³⁰ Dalibor Brozović, "O početku hrvatskog jezičnog standarda," *Kritika* (Zagreb), 3, no. 10 (1970): 21–42.

³¹ Pavao Ritter Vitezović, *Oddilyenje sigetsko* (Linz, 1684), n.p.

revival had at times already manifested themselves a century earlier.”³² One might add that in Vitezović’s case these aims can be traced back still further. Is not in fact the whole notion of “revival” an Illyrianist construct? Such a question would not have offended Ljudevit Gaj. One of his close associates preserved the reformer’s statement from the turbulent year of 1848: “Vitezović’s mission is over, now Ljudevit’s remains.”³³

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³² Franjo Fancev, “Dokumenti za naše podrijetlo Hrvatskoga preporoda,” *Gradja za povijest književnosti hrvatske* (Zagreb), 12 (1933): xvii.

³³ Cited in Jaroslav Šidak, “Hrvatski narodni preporod—ideje i problemi,” in *Studije iz hrvatske povijesti XIX stoljeća* (Zagreb, 1973), p. 102. Indeed, my study could not have been conducted without the use of Gaj’s own copy of the *Croatia rediviva*, which is now in the rare book collection at the University and National Library of Zagreb under the call number R II F-8°-104.

Count Djordje Branković's Political and Historical Impact on the Serbs

RADOVAN SAMARDŽIĆ

I

Towards the close of the seventeenth century the peoples of Southeastern Europe were suddenly and unexpectedly faced with new solutions for the problem of their political existence. Although Ottoman rule had slowed the rate of their cultural development and imprinted itself on their mentality, it had not shaken their political consciousness. In at least one aspect, that consciousness had not changed since the Eastern conqueror appeared in the fourteenth century: the belief that although the Ottomans' rule might last for centuries, it must eventually end, and that once it did, the experience would be remembered as a painful but brief episode. Had they not seen their position in this way—and that they did can be demonstrated by many acts and statements, as well as by their later spiritual state—the peoples of Southeastern Europe would have been brought to the brink of collective derangement under the Ottomans. Each tremor that widened the cracks in the edifice of the Ottoman state proved a new temptation to the subjugated peoples, particularly to those of them in responsible positions, to find a way out of their foreign bondage.

This attitude may seem odd in view of the fact that legal and social conditions were no less tolerable for the peoples under the Turks than they were for those under the surrounding Christian states. In fact, refugees from the Ottoman Empire who crossed into the territory of the Habsburg Monarchy or the Republic of Venice demanded that they be granted privileges similar to those they had enjoyed under the Turks in return for their military service. The percentage of Orthodox who accepted Islam in the Ottoman Empire is smaller than the percentage of Orthodox who were brought into the Roman church in Austria and the Republic of Venice. Varying forms of coercion were used in the two cases. Nevertheless, the destruction of the Ottoman state had begun from its very inception, if not yet by arms, then at least through tradition. A negative attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy came fully to light only after 1908 and never reached large proportions; even after its collapse in 1918 the Monarchy was mourned not only by privileged subjects and groups, but also by those widespread strata for whom its legal and social agreements were largely

satisfactory. The reasons for this phenomenon—that the same people should act differently in differing conditions of external restraint, regardless of objective factors—are without a doubt to be found in the relationship between the common consciousness of the subject peoples and the spiritual structure that their foreign rulers imposed on them. This relationship is determined by religion, still more by affiliation with a different civilization or group of peoples, and, finally, by the moment in history when it takes form.¹

The withdrawal of the Turks from the Danubian region, which began at the end of the seventeenth century, was not the only reason that the Habsburg Monarchy, as the heir of the state rights of the Hungarian Crown, joined the ranks of the great powers.² Agitation provoked by the possibility of attaining better living conditions had begun among its peoples and those who endeavored to represent them. To some the most acceptable solution was that the House of Habsburg replace the Ottomans as their rulers. Others brought legal traditions adopted from the past or developed through time in line with their class interests and sought a separate existence for their land within the framework of the Habsburg community. Still a third group saw the possibility for survival in Austria, through the acquisition of military duties and privileges, after the area of the Military Frontier had been extended to the recently acquired regions.³ Patriarch Arsenije III Crnojević, who was not only the spiritual, but also increasingly the political leader of the Serb masses, strove to assure his people a special status in the Monarchy, guaranteed by imperial privileges, which would preserve their national and religious integrity. Of course, the attitudes of those who then settled

¹ Attempts at a psychological analysis of the mental state of Christian peoples living under Turkish rule are rare. Rarer still are attempts to investigate, as a factor in this mental state, the spirit of the time and the way in which it was understood and experienced by these same peoples. Moreover, excursions into history that make use of historical ethnology are also as yet infrequent, thus depriving historical psychology of its primary material. No great advance has been made in Serbian historiography since Č. Mijatović's seminal essay "Pre trista godina," *Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva* (Belgrade), 36 (1872).

² Cf. O. Redlich, *Österreichs Grossmachtbildung in der Zeit Kaiser Leopold I* (Gotha, 1921).

³ The expansion of the Military Frontier to parts of Srem, Bačka, and Banat began in 1702, but this separate territorial movement was based on the Serb militia, which by 1690 was fully engaged in military events and was seeking privileges. The Serb militia was particularly prominent in the victories of the Imperial Army over the Turks at Slankamen (1691) and Senta (1697), won under the command of Viscount Jovan Monasterlija. Soon after the conclusion of peace in Karlovci (Carlowitz) in 1699, the Military Council in Vienna was urged to put the Military Frontier in order, for the Serb militia had begun to collect in certain places ("around Petrovaradin alone there are about 6,000 Serb soldiers"), and many Serbs, due to their unresolved status, were crossing back to Turkey. A. Ivić, *Istorija Srba u Vojvodini* (Novi Sad, 1929), pp. 292ff.; D. J. Popović, "Vojna granica," *Vojvodina* (Novi Sad), 2 (1940): 269 ff.

within the new borders of the Habsburg Monarchy tended to evolve over the years. At the same time, however, the Habsburg subjects bore the imprint of their original attitude.

Under these conditions, prepared well in advance by Habsburg policy, the undertaking proposed by Djordje Branković, the so-called despot of Illyricum, was preordained to fail, and his own fate was sadly predetermined. Branković proclaimed himself a descendant of the medieval Serbian despots. As the Austrian army prepared for a final reckoning with the Turks on the soil of Serbia and Bulgaria, he summoned the people of “Northern Illyricum, Thrace, Moesia, and other lands” to rise up.⁴ Austria, engaged in soliciting the population of European Turkey to join its forces—too few and too spent for the adventurous expedition to the south it had undertaken—in no way encouraged the hope that any form of their ancient state would be resurrected.⁵

Yet, Branković aspired to the creation of a separate state, based on the tradition of medieval Serbia, with himself, the legitimate heir of the last despots, as its ruler. The Austrian authorities did not verify the accuracy of Branković’s claims; they naively acted as though he was not even a serious pretender. Any defense of the Austrian authorities on the basis that in

⁴ J. Radonić, *Grof Djordje Branković i njegovo vreme* (Belgrade, 1911), pp. 358–402.

⁵ See P. Röder, *Des Markgrafen Ludwig Wilhelm von Baden Feldzüge wider die Türken*, 2 vols. (Carlsruhe, 1938–42); T. Brlić, *Die freiwillige Theilnahme der Serben und Kroaten an der vier letzten österreichisch-türkischen Kriegen* (Vienna, 1854); M. E. von Angeli, “Die kaiserliche Armee unter dem Ober-Commando des markgrafen Ludwig von Baden in den Feldzügen 1686–1692 gegen die Türken,” *Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs* (Vienna), 2 (1877); K. S. Protić, “Odlomci iz istorije Beograda (1688–1717),” *Godišnjica N. Čupića* (Belgrade), 6 (1884); R. Gerba, “Die kaiserlichen in Albanien 1689,” *Mittheilungen des k. k. Kriegs-Archivs* (Vienna), n.s. 2 (1889); T. Smičiklas, *Dvjestagodišnjica oslobodjenja Slavonije*, vol. 2 (Zagreb, 1891); J. Popović, *Vojna u Srbiji 1689* (Belgrade, 1898); J. N. Tomić, *Deset godina iz istorije srpskog naroda i crkve pod Turcima* (Belgrade, 1902); idem, “Patrijarh Arsenije III Crnojević prema Mlecima i cesaru,” *Glas Srpske kraljevske akademije* (Belgrade), 70 (1906); M. Kostić, “Spaljivanje Skoplja 26. i 27. oktobra 1689,” *Južna Srbija* (Belgrade), 1 (1922); idem, “Prilozi istoriji srpsko-arbanaskog ustanka 1689–1690,” *Arhiv za arbanasku starinu, jezik i etnologiju* (Belgrade), 2, no. 1 (1924); M. Filipović, “Austrijska vojska u Velesu i Štipu,” *Istorijski časopis* (Belgrade), 3 (1937); J. Radonić, “Od prve opsade Beča do Velike seobe,” in *Vojvodina*, vol. 1 (Novi Sad, 1939); R. Grujić, “Velika seoba patrijarha Arsenija III Čarnojevića iz Južne Srbije pre dvesta pedeset godina,” *Hrišćansko delo* (Belgrade), 5 (1940); R. L. Veselinović, *Arsenije III Crnojević u istoriji i književnosti* (Belgrade, 1949); J. Radonić, *Rimska kurija i južnoslovenske zemlje od XVI do XIX veka* (Belgrade, 1950); M. Kostić, “O postanku i značaju tzv. ‘invitorije’ Leopolda I balkanskim narodima od 6. aprila 1690,” *Istorijski časopis* (Belgrade), 2 (1951); R. Veselinović, “Toma Raspassanović (Raspasani) i njegov rad za austro-turskog rata krajem XVII veka,” *Zbornik Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), 12 (1956); idem, “O nekim pitanjima narodnih pokreta s kraja XVII veka,” *Istorijski glasnik* (Belgrade), 1–2 (1959); G. Stanojević, *Srbija u vreme bečkog rata* (Belgrade, 1976).

imprisoning Branković they removed a dishonest charlatan from the public scene is mistaken. That was not their motivation. The times were marked by dishonesty and a deep crisis of human conscience. The despot Branković was seized by treachery in the autumn of 1689 and temporarily exiled to Sibiu. He was held under guard for thirteen years in Vienna, and in 1703, when the Rákóczi rebellion flared up, he was transferred to Cheb; there he died, a prisoner, in 1711.⁶ During this time more than one erudite in the service of the Habsburg Court composed treatises trying to establish the hereditary right of the Court to the lands of Southeastern Europe. Some subordinated the fates of their own peoples to a conception of dynastic legitimacy and the rights arising from it. There were methodological qualifications more serious, more orderly, and more varied than those which Branković could demonstrate, but these, too, in the end approached mystification. Austria had acquired great territories and the peoples that inhabited them by the force of arms, by the luck of war, and by the law of might, but the Court needed a legal support in order to hold its new subjects more securely and to justify itself before Europe. Branković, on the other end of the political spectrum, emphasized a principle that can conditionally be called national, which contained elements of Balkan unification, and based his legitimacy as a ruler on indigenous traditions.⁷ Expression of this principle was thwarted, but it survived to reemerge in later times. From the moment he uttered it, there was no place for the principle's originator in the Habsburg Monarchy.

Branković himself behaved clumsily and confusedly. His behavior was marked by the defects of inconsistency in everyday conduct, reliance on fantasy when sober reason was required,⁸ and great isolation; he found support only among the Serbian masses, outcasts themselves. In later times, among the Serbs in particular, Branković was seen as having great faults

⁶ The basic monograph on Djordje Branković is Radonić's *Grof Djordje Branković*.

⁷ The most recent evaluations of Djordje Branković's historical role are those of J. Tadić in *Istorija naroda Jugoslavije* (Belgrade, 1960), pp. 772–76, and M. Pavić in "Istorijsko delo kao memorijalni akt, ili barokni slavizam," in *Istorija srpske književnosti baroknog doba* (Belgrade, 1970), pp. 338–41.

⁸ Although a significant number of historical studies have been devoted to him, a comprehensive psychological portrait of Djordje Branković has yet to be written. After I. Ruvarac's exceptionally crude attack on his personality and work (*Odlomci o grofu Djordju Brankoviću i Arseniju Crnojeviću, patrijarhu* [Belgrade, 1896]), later researchers made an effort to write objectively about the "despot of Illyricum," but they continued to view every act which could testify to his character with suspicion (the exceptions are J. Tadić and M. Pavić, fn. 7 above).

that rendered him superfluous and even harmful, though he never once betrayed the idea that had guided him.⁹

II

The last Serbian despot¹⁰ (later called false) was born in Inau (Jenopolj), scion of a family which cherished the tradition of its descent from the Branković dynasty and had settled in the Banat from Korjenici in Hercegovina.¹¹ While still a child Djordje lost his father, two elder brothers, and a sister to the plague. After his mother took the veil out of sorrow, Djordje was brought up by his elder brother Simeon, archpriest of Jenopolj; in 1656 Simeon became the metropolitan of Transylvania, under the name of Sava II, and moved to Gyula, the seat of the secular and ecclesiastical authorities of Transylvania. The Branković family was wealthy and distinguished, with a developed genealogical tradition, and it enjoyed well-established relations with the most distinguished houses of Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia, in particular with the prince of Transylvania, György Rákóczi, and the prince of Wallachia, Constantin Șerban.

Djordje Branković is wrongly accused of fabricating the family tree that connected him with the dynasty of the medieval Serbian despots. He quite certainly only adopted his family's traditions about its origins, accepted the validity of the documents (authentic or false) that testified to these origins, and raised his pretensions to rulership on this basis.¹² In addition, Djordje

⁹ Cf. J. Radonić, *Djuradj II Branković, "despot Ilirika"* (Cetinje, 1955), p. 191.

¹⁰ Not only the Serbs of the time, but also the Austrian administration used the title despot for Dj. Branković (Radonić, *Grof Djordje Branković*, p. 609 ff.). "The fact that even the foreign environment in which he moved, particularly in Cheb, became accustomed to his pretensions, and began to consider him to be that which he impersonated, can be explained by his persistence in the defense of his pretensions to the title of despot and his consistent assumption of the role of national leader" (Radonić, *Djuradj II Branković*, p. 191.) Branković retained the title of despot until the appearance of Ruvarac's *Odlomci*. At that time the title of count (*grof*) was appended to his name, a usage for the most part adopted through Radonić's monograph of 1911. In his book published in 1955, Radonić again gave Branković the title "despot," adding to it the form "Djuradj II," which served to link him with the medieval Serbian dynasty. Later writers, however, have not adopted Radonić's change.

¹¹ In his last work on Djordje Branković, Radonić presented his genealogy in such a way as to pose the hypothesis that the tradition of descent from the despots was rooted among the Transylvanian Brankovičes (*Djuradj II Branković*, pp. 26–31).

¹² Although the intellectual movement became a part of the foundations of modern historical criticism, chiefly through the development of the auxiliary historical sciences, scholarship still often serves to prove a predetermined thesis. In some instances, too, writers' intentions have been concealed by the highest critical standards. Branković tried to prove his genealogy by gathering various proofs, which included obvious fabrications, his own and inherited ones; thus he stands as a signpost for the beginnings of modern historical criticism among the Serbs. Cf. N. Radojčić, "Počeci istorijske kritike kod Srba," in *Spomenica Sime Lozanića* (Belgrade,

Branković had the opportunity to obtain not only a varied education but also high offices in the service of Prince Rákóczi. He wrote Slavono-Serbian, Hungarian, Romanian, and Latin; he also knew Greek, Turkish, Italian, and German. He read widely and avidly, primarily historical works, which he first discovered in the library of his brother, Metropolitan Sava II; it is there that the foundations of his knowledge of medieval Serbian history were laid. Entering the service of the prince of Transylvania in 1663, Branković spent four years, with interruptions, as a diplomatic interpreter at the Porte. There he made a detailed study of the internal structure of Turkish power, witnessed the political methods (particularly towards the European states) used by Grand Vizir Ahmed Köprülü, and entered into the whirlpool of international relations conducted by the individual foreign missions in Istanbul. Branković later claimed that in 1665 he had met in Edirne with Maksim, Patriarch of Peć, who was returning from the Holy Land, and that on this occasion Maksim had anointed him Serbian despot. Almost all Branković's biographers agree that this was his ultimate fabrication, without which his rights to the creation of an independent state could not have been asserted. Nevertheless, the time Branković spent in the diplomatic circles around the Porte marks the beginning of his personal political rise. Immediately after his service there, in 1668, as a member of his brother Sava's entourage, he visited the Russian court, seeking aid for the Serbian church. Talks were also held on plans for the liberation of the Orthodox peoples from the Turks. The elder Branković assured Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich that a powerful multitude of Serbs, Bulgarians, and Wallachians were only awaiting a suitable moment to rise in rebellion ("for they bear ill the misfortune, poverty, and violence"). Presumably even Sava intended his brother Djordje to play a major role in these plans.

Too weak to act more decisively in the international arena, Russia until the end of the seventeenth proceeded too cautiously and passively for the leaders of the Christian population of the Balkans and the Danubian region to see Russia as their sole hope in the approaching events.¹³ The period was full of troubles, discord both inside men and between them, changed priori-

1922). At the same time, the hypothesis that Branković was not a conscious liar and impostor, and that he truly believed in his origins, should be emphasized. He could have acquired his conviction through his family upbringing, and then become sincerely committed to it in the course of his attempts to establish the hereditary rights of his house. He leaves the impression not solely of a mystifier or charlatan, but also of a man carried away by his ideas, of the sort typical of the adventurers of his time.

¹³ Relations between the Serbs and Russia up to the end of the seventeenth century are best illuminated in the studies and addenda by S. Dimitrijević in *Glas SKA* (Belgrade), 58 (1900) and 60 (1901), and *Spomenik SKA* (Belgrade), 38 (1900), 39 (1903), and 53 (1922).

ties, and abandoned traditions that were to light the way to the future. The Habsburgs exploited all this in order to establish, with their insufficient forces, hegemony in Southeastern Europe.

Djordje Branković was again at the Porte in 1672 and 1673 as an interpreter, and from 1675 to 1677 as the emissary of the prince of Transylvania. In this period, too, he acted as a man of unstable conscience. He took advantage of his brother Sava's plans to conclude, in 1673, an agreement of dubious legal foundation with the prince of Wallachia concerning "aid to exiled Orthodoxy and the realization of their intentions, which seemed to lead to the creation of an independent state." In a short time similar plans were the subject of his conversations with Kindsberg, the Imperial Resident at the Porte. Branković divulged the secret negotiations between the Hungarian nobles and the Porte and the political plans of Mihály Apafy, Prince of Transylvania, to the Austrian emissary. At the same time he and his brother were in contact with the conspirators in Transylvania. This adventure, which testifies to the general confusion in the southeast of Europe prior to the great transformation of 1683, ended with Sava Branković's having been relieved of the position of Metropolitan, and thrown into prison, where he soon died (in 1681), "of tortures suffered." Djordje, after a shorter imprisonment, succeeded in taking refuge in Wallachia, where Prince Șerban Cantacuzene, convinced that he was dealing with a descendant of the Serbian despots, as well as with a relative, received him splendidly. For services rendered in the interests of Austria, in whose ranks he had also enlisted Wallachia, Djordje Branković was granted the title of Baron of Hungary by the Court in Vienna, immediately before the siege of 1683.

During several years spent in Bucharest, amidst reports of the advance of imperial troops towards Belgrade and amidst piles of books in the various libraries where he rummaged daily, Djordje Branković had an opportunity to form his own conception of Serbian history, to gather evidence about his own origins, and to become completely engrossed in the role he intended for himself. In May 1688 Patriarch Arsenije III issued him a certificate confirming his descent from the Branković dynasty. Soon afterwards, Djordje Branković arrived in Vienna as the emissary of the Prince of Wallachia, and delivered to the Court a petition seeking the establishment of a free state of the Illyrian peoples with himself, as despot, at its head, under the supreme rule of Emperor Leopold I. On the same day, 20 September 1688, when the service of thanksgiving was held in Vienna, Branković was issued a diploma granting him the title of count. For the moment his demands for a free state were passed over in silence. The title of count was granted because Austria was relying on his services in stirring the Orthodox

peoples of the Ottoman Empire to revolt. Austria intended to break through to the south, destroy the empire of the Ottomans, and impose its rule over the Porte's possessions in Europe. Branković set off for the battlefield in the conviction that he was not acting against the agreement that he believed had been reached in Vienna. From Orșova he proclaimed himself to the people as the hereditary despot and legitimate ruler of "the fatherland of his ancestors." In the meantime the Austrian authorities had learned of Branković's ties with Muscovy, on which the prince of Wallachia had also begun to place his hopes. With this discovery the outcome of Branković's undertaking was sealed.

III

Branković's foremost biographer, Jovan Radonić, who wrote several times about the unhappy despot of Illyricum, constantly revised his opinions¹⁴ and moved farther and farther away from Ruvarac's inglorious and crude condemnation of Branković as a "good-for-nothing, liar, imposter, in one word—a swindler, in the grand manner."¹⁵ Radonić concluded that the causes of "his tragic fate should be sought not only in the political situation of the time, but also in the man himself, in the disparity between his abilities and the magnitude of his deed, which he could not even conceive clearly, much less carry out."¹⁶ Isolated between the warring powers which portioned out lands according to their own claims, Branković could not have realized his goals even if he had possessed greater abilities. He lacked a military character and military training, which would surely have helped him to draw support from the broader masses of the Serbian population in the Ottoman Empire. Even had he achieved that, his army would have had to come under one of the warring Christian states, above all Austria. As a historian Branković cannot be compared with the famous intellectuals of that time; he certainly wrote history not from a desire to know the truth, but in order to emphasize his right to rule and to create an independent state for his Orthodox people. As a writer he falls among the learned antiquarians of his time: in speaking of the rights of individual states, no one in Southeastern Europe at that time strove after the truth, but rather after supporting evidence for some idea, at times even more complicated and more

¹⁴ In addition to the works already cited (fns. 4 and 9), J. Radonić wrote about Branković in the collection *Vojvodina*, vol. 1 (Novi Sad, 1939), pp. 455–528; a booklet on Branković that Radonić wrote for the wider reading public was published in Novi Sad by Matica srpska in 1929.

¹⁵ Ruvarac, *Odlomci*, p. 2.

¹⁶ Radonić, *Djuradj II Branković*, p. 105.

dubious than Branković's. In calling Branković "a genuine bungler" in the role of false despot, Ilarion Ruvarac was in fact defending the rights of the Habsburg Monarchy, but he did not even consider examining that empire's foundations. The self-proclaimed despot acted in harmony with his time and its political mentality, and thus he focused attention on the Serbian question. He could not have done otherwise, and that almost two centuries later historians crudely rejected him is proof, among other things, of their acceptance of the principles of their own time in the interpretation of earlier epochs and of their lack of understanding, under the pressure of foreign interests, of the special fate of their own people.¹⁷

In Branković's case it is of great significance that he did not succumb to the moral crisis of his time. Beginning as a political mercenary, with disordered mental traits, entirely under the sign of a provincial baroque not only in its nightmarish but in its disorganized character, he became in the end a

¹⁷ In the introduction to his extensive monograph *Grof Djordje Branković*, J. Radonić reviews both earlier studies and preliminary writings on the "despot of Illyricum" (by Z. Orfelin, P. Julinac, A. Horányi, J. Rajić, J. K. Engel, P. J. Šafařík, A. Sandić, S. Novaković, J. Šviker, E. Piko, L. Thallóczy, M. Dimitrijević, I. Ruvarac, K. Subotić, Lj. Jovanović, A. Protić, G. Geršić, M. Jakšić and J. N. Tomić). See, too, Ruvarac's settling of accounts with earlier writers in his treatise *Odlomci*, passim. Also deserving mention is D. Arnot, "Sudba Geogija Brankovića, despota, i naroda srpskog s njim u Austriju prešavšeg," *Peštansko-budimski skoroteča* (Budapest), 1843.

Until I. Ruvarac, patriotic motives led to predominantly favorable appraisals of Branković's activity. Ruvarac first wrote about Branković (and called him despot) at the suggestion that the *Chronicles* be published. See "Nešto o Kronici despota Djordja Brankovića," *Letopis Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), 3 (1866): 1–30. This work by Ruvarac originated "if not at their command, then under the direct influence of ideas at the Patriarchate in Karlovci," which feared lest the publisher Matica srpska, under pressure from Svetozar Miletić, should come into conflict with the Austrian authorities over the publication of Branković's *Chronicles*. Ruvarac did indeed demonstrate that the *Chronicles* should not be published. In writing a second time about Branković, Ruvarac rejected his story of having been anointed despot (1663), calling him a false despot and a falsifier (*O pećkim patrijarsima od Makarija do Arsenija III* [Zadar, 1888], pp. 100–101). Finally, Ruvarac also devoted to Branković his *Odlomci*, which provoked almost universal astonishment by its exaggeration: e.g., K. Subotić, "O ideji srpske vojvodine i narodnodržavne avtonomije na koncu XVII veka," *Letopis Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), 183 (1895); "Ugovori između Leopolda I i srpskog naroda," *Letopis Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), 184 (1895). See also Subotić's works in *Branik* (1892); G. Geršić, "Posle pedeset godina," *Delo* (Belgrade), 19 (1898); and M. Jakšić "Priroda prelaska Srba u Ugarsku 1690 i privilegije," *Letopis Matice srpske* (Novi Sad), 206 (1901); all three authors emphasized Branković's idea of national independence and distinguished his political activity from his work as a chronicler. The well-educated scholar Lj. Jovanović, in "Djordje Branković, lažni potomak starih srpskih despota," *Delo* (Belgrade), 11 and 12 (1896), played the most distinguished role in this quarrel, calmly and reliably defending Branković from Ruvarac's three accusations, namely: "(1) presenting himself as a descendant of the despots; (2) independent work among the Serbs of that time; (3) ties with Russia." According to Jovanović, Ruvarac erred in transferring "his delicate sensitivity to falsehood and truth" from scholars to politicians (who used means no more honorable than those Branković had employed).

conscious martyr for his convictions and for the rights of his Orthodox people. As a prisoner, he persisted in this attitude for more than two decades. He considered himself "a tragic individual who suffers and endures for the common cause," and consoled himself in prison with the thought that the Nemanjićs, too, "suffered while achieving glory and that in general there is no glory without suffering."¹⁸ In this way his people gained the time to accept whatever set a good example in his case and to merge their desires with that example. The modern Serbian metamorphosis began with Djordje Branković and, alongside him, Arsenije III.

Observed as a psychological case by anyone who is little acquainted with the history of the time, Branković leaves the impression of an unbalanced, disturbed, and confused individual. There is the anachronistic conviction that he can be comprehended solely as a historical and political mystifier and imposter. The real historical figure of Branković has been forced into the cliché created after the fact and merged with a psychological type that is characteristic of a different period. He was able to believe in his own fabrications or, more precisely, in his family's traditions much more deeply and in a different way than a man of a later cast. This was characteristic of an epoch of renewed aristocratism, which, after increasing during the seventeenth century, in the eighteenth became more and more connected with the adventures of a cosmopolitan time. Moreover, Branković in his own mind became more and more sincere in his mission of governing and liberating his people, and more and more deeply engrossed in his plans for the creation of an independent Serbian despotate. In this regard he was neither the first nor the last in Serbian history (note, e.g., Jovan Nenad, Emperor Pavle in Srem, Šćepan Mali). However, of all the pretenders of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—none of whom lacked the ambition to rule on inherited images of the glorious past—Branković's genealogical claims, social reputation, and knowledge were the most extensive, leading him to develop ambitions to rule within himself and to subjugate his being to them completely. In becoming the voluntary champion of an idea that would lead to martyrdom, he seems to have rearranged his character, formed in a period of spiritual confusion and political disorder, and to have gained clearer perspectives and more defined goals in directing the struggle of his people.

¹⁸ Radonić, *Djuradj II Branković*, p. 165.

IV

The most important period of Djordje Branković's public activity began, in fact, with his internment. From that time, in spite of his plans to rally the various peoples of Southeastern Europe beneath his rule, he was wholly bound to the Slavono-Serbian masses. After he was moved to Vienna, in 1690, Branković devoted himself to the writing of his *Chronicles*, as a historical foundation for Serbian national demands and as justification for their efforts to achieve as independent a position as possible in the framework of the altered relations between the European powers. That same year, the Serbs became a significant factor in the part of the Danubian region that the Austrian troops had occupied after the expulsion of the Turks. In attracting them to that area Leopold I gave the Serbs privileges which recognized the autonomy of their church and the jurisdiction of the patriarch. At first, Serbian demands did not concern claims that were based on a theory of state right, but rather were concerned with guaranteeing the patriarch and the episcopate the prerogatives which they had previously enjoyed in the Ottoman state. Bishop Isaija Djaković, who negotiated the content of the privileges in Vienna, encountered the imprisoned Branković there and with his information and advice managed to persevere in the struggle with court circles, which were permeated by the influence of the high Catholic clergy. In addition, under Branković's influence, Isaija Djaković recognized that in order to survive in the Habsburg Monarchy the Serbs needed not only church autonomy, but also a separate territory with a secular leader under the supreme authority of the emperor. In the middle of September 1690, Patriarch Arsenije III, fearing the Turks, led his people into Hungary and settled them in part between Buda and Komárom. Soon afterwards, in May 1691, after Leopold I had confirmed and extended the Serbian privileges and renewed Djordje Branković's title of count in the interests of resuming the war against the Turks, the prisoner of Vienna was proclaimed despot at a gathering of leaders in Buda, and the emperor was sent a demand that he be freed. In answer Vienna awarded Jovan Monasterlija the title of viscount, as a substitute for despot, an act which emphasized the military element. On 20 August, 1691, however, the Serbian patriarch was granted, by imperial patent, certain prerogatives for exercising secular authority over the Orthodox in Hungary and Croatia. Branković remained not only in captivity, but also engulfed in a well-considered silence.¹⁹

¹⁹ See fn. 5; see also J. Radonić and M. Kostić, *Srpske privilegije 1690–1792* (Belgrade, 1954).

The conflict between Djordje Branković and Arsenije III did not erupt tempestuously, although the break marked the beginning of the struggle between the church and secular circles for leadership of the Serbian people in Hungary, a conflict which would escalate in the nineteenth century. Branković could express his bitterness toward the patriarch only on the pages of his *Chronicles*. Under pressure from the leading Serbs, Arsenije III took steps in Vienna to liberate the captive despot, but here, too, he acted so as to exploit the situation for the Serbian position. A great realist in assessing circumstances, capable of placing public interests before private inclinations, tireless in rallying the people of an impressively large geographic area, the patriarch strengthened the Serbs' concept of themselves as a united people and assigned them a role in the common political task. The Serbs did not cease to rally around Branković in Vienna. They sent petitions to the Court seeking his release from imprisonment, and he gave them advice and guided them in their struggle for independence. They made extracts from his *Chronicles* while they were still being written and brought Branković historical material to incorporate in his work.

Arsenije III, within the bounds of his authority, worked to gather the Serbs together regardless of their division by state frontiers and to preserve their rights within the Habsburg Monarchy, where his spiritual transformation had begun. Djordje Branković gave this same people their first political program in the struggle for autonomy, for the preservation of their faith, and thus for their national individuality.²⁰ He did this by looking beyond the existing possibilities, which stimulated his fellow Serbs to do so as well.

V

Until the appearance of Jovan Rajić's *Istorija* (1794–95), Branković's lengthy, intricately written, and unpublished *Chronicles* (according to N. Radojčić, they ran to 2,681 pages)²¹ were the basis of historical knowledge and the view of history among Serbs. At the same time they contained the most important conceptual basis for Serbian political activity. Rajić's *Istorija* later played a similar role, becoming the spiritual source of the Serbian revolution of 1804. The works of H. Žefarović, P. Julinac, Z. Orfelin, V. Petrović and the Chronicle of Josif Trenošac, together with S. Vladislavić's translation and paraphrase of Orbin's *Il Regno degli Slavi*

²⁰ S. Novaković, "Iz Hronike despota Djurdja Brankovića," *Glasnik SUD* (Belgrade), 33 (1872); the published passages speak of Branković's conflict with Arsenije III.

²¹ N. Radojčić, "O Hronikama grofa Djordja Brankovića," *Prilozi za književnost, jezik, istoriju i folklor* (Belgrade), 6, no. 1 (1926): 7–13; see also D. Ruvarac, *Pokušaji o štampanju Kronike despota Djordja Brankovića* (S. Karlovci, 1911).

and other works, also became foundations for not only the historical, but also the political consciousness of the Serb people in the eighteenth century. Their transformation, which led to revolution, found its inspiration and confirmation in the past, as historical material was transformed and acquired new forms and a new significance.

Until the appearance of Branković's *Chronicles*, Serbian historiography had retained a medieval character. The series of biographies of rulers and archbishops begun in the thirteenth century with St. Sava's treatise on his father Nemanja ended in the middle of the seventeenth century with the life of Tsar Uroš written by Patriarch Pajsije. The aim of these biographies was a political one: they prepared the ground for the canonical induction of the Serbian rulers into the ranks of saints. The entire Nemanjić line received this treatment. There are modest elements of modernity, in the West European sense, as early as in the work of Pajsije, not only because of his possible familiarity with the Ragusan writers, primarily Mavro Orbin, and the adoption of a certain decor and sensibility characteristic of that area, but also because the author for the first time sought to answer the questions, where do the Serbs come from and how did they come into being? Djordje Branković attempted to answer this question through different means.

His *Chronicles* used, for the most part, forms characteristic of medieval historiography, but not those of biographical historiography, most highly developed in the Serbian milieu and so powerful conceptually that it predetermined the form of presentation and the way in which material could be used. Shaping the material according to chronological and genealogical norms allowed Branković to draw on Western writers as well as Serbian and Byzantine ones. In this he diverged completely from his predecessors in Serbian historiography, and shifted this area of intellectual activity into the Western sphere. He either challenged or concealed the Catholic writers' unfavorable reports on the Serbs and the other Orthodox peoples, but he adopted their style to compose a new work from the statements of his predecessors. Instead of a poetic synthesis presented as an oration, in the style of the old Serbian biographies, he produced a treatise which was anatomized in the baroque style, erudite in conformity with the trend then holding sway in historiography, and composed in the secular spirit, with the goal of documenting a royal genealogy invented by tradition. Instead of ascending to the heavenly kingdom and its laws, history remained on solid ground, in the realm of the genealogical ambitions of the new aristocracy, ambitions that were spreading everywhere, particularly on the fringes of Europe. The Serbian movement could not remain within its medieval boundaries any longer. Enlightenment was on the horizon, and traditions had to be used in different ways if they were to be fruitful once more. The role played by

Rajić's *Istorija* becomes more understandable in the mirror of Branković's *Chronicles*: the national ascent of the Serbs, which it most served, was not hindered by its rational interpretation of the past.²²

VI

In attempting to prove, through selection of the facts, his origins as despot and the right of the Orthodox peoples in Southeastern Europe to an independent state, Djordje Branković produced a critique of sources and facts that can hardly be said to mark the beginning of modern historical analysis in Serbian historiography. Yet his general view of the past was not devoid of breadth, and the concepts that he emphasized deserve attention in any study of the conceptual development of the Danubian and Balkan peoples. Branković was one of those early modern writers who, in turning back to history, were more successful in developing their ideas about it than in providing a critical appraisal of its factual validity.

N. Radojčić has established that religious affiliation had the greatest influence on the structure and nature of Djordje Branković's patriotism.²³ Every attack on Orthodoxy was at the same time a threat to the survival of the Serb people. He was as close to the other Orthodox peoples, particularly the Wallachians, as he was to the Serbs (although he found no basis for his claims to rulership in their history). "He had no aversion to the Magyars, except in as much as they were enemies of Orthodoxy and of the Brankovićes. But the Germans he hated with a deep, implacable, Magyar hatred."²⁴ Branković's emphatic confessional position was in keeping with that moment in the history of the Serbs, when, having lost at least in part their faith, they were in danger of losing their national identity as well. However, the element in Branković's activity, and in his *Chronicles*, that is particularly important is certainly the dawning of the Slavic idea as the force that bound together the majority of the Orthodox peoples.

Thirty years after his visit to Moscow, Djordje Branković again came into direct contact with the Russians when, in 1698, Peter I visited Vienna. It is thought that in writing his *Chronicles*, Branković fabricated the

²² Radojčić, "O Hronikama," pp. 1–45; idem, *O Tronoškom rodoslovu* (Belgrade: SKA, 1931); *Srpski istoričar Jovan Rajić* (Belgrade: SAN, 1952); "Počeci istorijske kritike kod Srba," *Spomenica S. Lozanića* (Belgrade, 1922); "Oblik prvih modernih srpskih istorija," *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke* (Novi Sad), 2 (1951); "Uvod u istoriju srpske historiografije XVIII veka," *Zbornik Matice srpske za književnost i jezik* (Novi Sad), 6–7 (1958–59). J. Radonić also wrote on Branković as a historian in *Grof Djordje Branković*, pp. 617–732, and in *Djuradj II Branković*, pp. 196–206.

²³ Radojčić, "O Hronikama," pp. 26–37.

²⁴ Radojčić, "O Hronikama," p. 33.

description of his meeting with the tsar, who allegedly promised him that for the love of Christ he would do all he could for the endangered Serb people and their despot. But this conversation, not confirmed in other sources, shows the direction in which Serbian thoughts and hopes had begun to move. Even if the tsar himself did not make the statement, the Russian emissary Voznitsyn took decisive steps at the Viennese court to protect Serbian Orthodoxy and the imprisoned Branković. To all appearances the pressure on the Serbs to accept church union was eased, and a promise was made that Branković's case would be decided in accordance with the wishes of Tsar Peter Alekseevich.²⁵ Naturally Austria continued its policy of religious pressure on its Orthodox subjects, and the despot that was not fated to hold office was removed from Vienna to the Czech spa, Cheb, in 1703. The path for Russian-Serb cooperation was open, however, and Branković's *Chronicles* became a testimony to the awakened feeling of unity among the Slavic peoples, above all the Orthodox. In earlier times, particularly in the seventeenth century, the idea of Slavic unity had been for the most part characteristic of Catholic authors, and the Roman Catholic church had made this idea one instrument of its propaganda. This had caused a certain distrust among the Orthodox Serbs, who as writers still most readily withdrew into the shell of their own traditions and timidly avoided bolder and broader historical and political conceptions. The turning point came at the end of the seventeenth century, when Atanasije the Serb and the monk Isaija of Athos arrived at the Russian court with messages calling on the Orthodox tsar to become the liberator of his coreligionists, the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, rather than Austria, who would enslave them more than Turkey.²⁶ Thanks to Djordje Branković, who doubtlessly remembered the words of his brother Sava, metropolitan of Transylvania, this view of Russia as a savior began to be transformed into the idea that the Slavs, particularly the Slavs of Southeastern Europe, were one people whose fates were indivisible. It was but a step from this to the cult of Peter the Great among the Serbs, expressed not only in their martial declarations, but also in their literature. Thus the idea of Slavic unity entered yet another phase in its constant metamorphosis.

²⁵ Radonić, *Grof Djordje Branković*, pp. 515–23.

²⁶ P. Srechkovich, "Vtoroe zapustenie Atanasii D'iakona Serbina (1691–99)," *Spomenik SKA* (Belgrade), 5 (1890); see Dj. S. Radojčić, *Razvojni luk stare srpske književnosti* (Novi Sad, 1961), and "Južnoslovensko-ruske kulturne veze do početka XVIII veka," *Zbornik Matice srpske za književnost i jezik* (Novi Sad), 13, no. 2 (1965); S. Dimitrijević, "Odnosaji pečkih patrijarha s Rusijom u XVII veku," pt. 2, *Glas SKA* (Belgrade), 60 (1901); S. Solov'ev, *Istoriiia Rossii*, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1864), pp. 54 ff.

* * *

Cardinal Kollonich, who had preeminent influence on the policies of the Habsburg Court in Vienna, once declared that Branković should not be released from prison because the Serbs, who were already too violent, would "raise their horns still more" if he were freed. Indeed, even from captivity this ruler directed the aspirations of his constantly migrating people, and provided them with historical arguments for independence in a separate territory. His activity remained a powerful stimulus for the early formation of Serb national consciousness. Branković's tendency to historical mystification must, at last, be overshadowed by his services to the idea of Serb national identity.

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Empire Versus Nation: Russian Political Theory under Peter I

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“Throughout history men have been attached to their native soil, to the traditions of their parents, and to established territorial authorities; but it was not until the end of the 18th century that nationalism began to be a generally recognized sentiment molding public and private life. . . Nationalism is a modern movement.” Hans Kohn.¹

“The word ‘imperialism’ is, therefore, entirely at the mercy of its user.” Hans Daalder.²

I

If “nationalism” by any commonly accepted definition of the term was not a force in Russian history before the nineteenth century, when did a “national consciousness” arise?³ Michael Cherniavsky has detected “flashes” of such an “individual and collective self-identification” in “early-modern Russia”—more definitely, in “Petrine Russia.” Actually, “two national consciousnesses” were found: one, that of the Europeanizing Peter I “and his gentry” (“for if they, the ruling class, defined ‘Russia,’ then everything they did was, by definition, Russian”); the other, that of the Old Believers and “the peasants in general, [who] began to insist on beards, traditional clothes, and old ritual—creating, in reaction, their own Russian identity.” These two national consciousnesses—elite and popular—were thus in conflict with one another from the beginning, a conflict, Cherniavsky left us to suppose, that was never resolved.⁴

¹ “Nationalism,” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th ed. (Chicago, 1975): *Macropaedia*, vol. 12, pp. 851–53, summarizing Kohn’s previous work, with further references.

² “Imperialism,” *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 7 (New York, 1968), pp. 101–108, with extensive bibliography.

³ Cf. K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, “National Consciousness in Medieval Europe: Some Theoretical Problems,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8 no. 1 (Spring 1981): 151–66, useful particularly for the distinction it draws between nationalism and national consciousness, and for its many references.

⁴ Michael Cherniavsky, “Russia,” in Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early-Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1975), pp. 118–43. Cf. M. Cherniavsky, “Khan or Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Medieval Political Theory,” *Journal of the*

While agreeing that the Petrine period was a critical one in the evolution of political culture in Russia (assuming both national consciousness and political theory to be aspects of political culture), I propose a quite different hypothesis. It is that the emergence of national consciousness in Russia was preempted almost at once by the imposition under Peter I of an absolutist ideology that was imperialist, not nationalist, in tendency. This imperialist tendency of Petrine absolutist ideology, which I will call Petrine hegemony theory and discuss with reference to the annexation by the Petrine state of certain non-Russian territories, was vague in its requirements, fairly tolerant (at least initially) of diversity, and open-ended. It drew on foreign as well as local sources. It helped to determine the subsequent development of Russian national consciousness in the eighteenth century and contributed its share, historically, to the formation of both Russian nationalism and Russian imperialism in the nineteenth century. In short, Petrine hegemony theory expressed the dominant form of Russian national consciousness in the Petrine period, and is not to be seen as in fundamental opposition to some other, allegedly popular but still unproven reserve of *national* sentiment.

Indeed, considering the apparent deficiency of appropriate source material as well as the problem of definition, it is doubtful that the existence of a pre-Petrine *popular* Russian national consciousness will ever be demonstrated. Rather, it is likely that the emergence of national consciousness at the popular or mass level in Russia will continue to be seen as a nineteenth-century phenomenon, a product of such factors as the Napoleonic invasion and the development among an articulate elite of Russian forms of the spreading European movement of, precisely, nationalism.

Yet more, it could be argued that the scattered reflections of national feeling to be found in the memorials of the pre-Petrine Russian elite, mainly a clerical elite, do not constitute evidence of a national consciousness, either. This argument turns in the main on the generally acknowledged centrality of history in the development of nationalism and even of national consciousness: on the concept of history itself, and then of national history.⁵ Medievalist chronicles and chronographies, for the most part never printed or printed only later by scholars, are not lacking among the written remains of pre-Petrine Russia, of course; nor are historical tales, boastful

History of Ideas 20 (1959): 459–76; idem, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven, 1961); idem, "The Old Believers and the New Religion," *Slavic Review* 20, no. 1 (March 1966): 1–39. See also, expanding on some of Cherniavsky's points, C. J. Halperin, "The Russian Land and the Russian Tsar: The Emergence of Muscovite Ideology, 1380–1408," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 23 (1976): 7–103.

⁵ Cf. Ranum, in the introduction to his *National Consciousness*, especially pp. 3–4.

genealogies, regal tables and dynastic accounts, and highly stylized biographies—all with a sizable legendary, not to say fictive, component. But this is not what we mean by “history.”⁶ In Moscow in the 1630s Adam Olearius was struck by the fact that the Russians he met were “little interested in memorable events or the history of their fathers and forefathers,” something he found to be particularly true of the “great boyars.”⁷ About forty years later the anonymous author of a Russian history commissioned by Tsar Fedor Alekseevich—possibly the first such history ever attempted—complained in his preface that among the peoples of the world only the Muscovites lacked a proper account of their past.⁸ In fact, it was only under Peter I and his daughter Empress Elizabeth that both modern historiography and national history began to be cultivated in Russia, the work for the most part of immigrant Ukrainian and German scholars.⁹

This is not to say, recalling Cherniavsky, that the Petrine regime failed to arouse widespread opposition in Russia.¹⁰ Nor is it to deny that the focus of much of this opposition was Peter himself—the man and his policies, not his office. Nor is it to deny that in expressing their opposition some of Peter’s opponents called him, among other things, a “servant of Antichrist” or “Antichrist” himself, a “Latinizer,” a “German” or a “Swede,” even a “Musulman,” in disguise. But I would not agree, all considered, that such epithets can be construed as evidence of “xenophobia,” let alone of the kind of xenophobia which constitutes, in turn, “a true confirmation of national consciousness.”¹¹ The widespread and persistent

⁶ Cf. Edward L. Keenan, “The Trouble with Muscovy: Some Observations upon Problems of the Comparative Study of Form and Genre in Historical Writing,” *Medievalia et Humanistica*, n.s. 5 (1974): 103–26; also idem, “Observations and Suggestions concerning the Place of the *History of the Grand Duke (Ivan IV) of Muscovy* in the History of Muscovite Literary Culture,” *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 24 (1978): 131–56 passim.

⁷ *The Travels of Olearius in Seventeenth-Century Russia*, ed. and trans. Samuel H. Baron (Stanford, 1967), p. 141.

⁸ The preface to this work, the rest of which remains in manuscript (at the State Public Library, Leningrad), is printed in E. Zamyslovskii, *Tsarstvovanie Fedora Alekseevicha*, pt. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1871), appendix 4 (pp. xxxv–xlii).

⁹ See Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), especially chap. 5, “The Uses of History” (pp. 186–252 and 309–313), for an introduction to the problem; and, for further details on the Petrine period, T. S. Maikova, “Petr I i ‘Gistoriia Sveiskoi voiny,’” in N. I. Pavlenko et al., eds., *Rossiiia v period reform Petra I* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 103–132.

¹⁰ The relevant literature, including printed primary material, is too extensive to cite here. But see, e.g., N. B. Golikova, *Politicheskie protsessy pri Petre I* (Moscow, 1957); and for a more comprehensive view of the subject, my “Opposition to Peter the Great,” in a forthcoming collection edited by M. Shatz.

¹¹ Cherniavsky, “Russia,” in Ranum, *National Consciousness*, p. 140; “Xenophobia,” it might be asked, by comparison with the situation in what contemporary state or society?

opposition to the Petrine regime in Russia was political, economic, personal, religious and/or cultural in motivation. And insofar as it was directed against Peter himself, it was against the tsar's perpetual, public, and seemingly unconcerned display of his own many follies, vices, and frailties (drunken cavorting with common sailors and workmen, typically shabby dress, mocking of the church, and so on). It was an anguished opposition to a pattern of behavior which did great violence to a world view that was still essentially religious. But expressions of religious community, of a religious outlook, of a religious identity, cannot be taken as manifestations of *national* consciousness. To do so, surely, is only to cloud the matter at hand.

Finally, it is surely also anachronistic to call the Russian state before Peter I (or even after him) a "nation-state,"¹² the term to mean, presumably, a political entity regarded by its subjects, conscious of a common nationality, as identical with their collective self and hence deserving of their highest loyalty.¹³ On the contrary, the Russian state of pre-Petrine times was a patrimonial-dynastic state of pronounced theocratic aspect. Its subjects thought to owe their primary loyalty to the father-ruler (*tsar'* or "king," etc.) who lived in the "ruling city" (*tsarstvuiushchii grad*) of Moscow, and whose dominion over the kingdoms, principalities, towns, and lands enumerated in his full title was his both by hereditary right and "by the grace of God" (*Bozh' eiu milost' iu*). This dominion was supported and even shared, somewhat ambiguously, by the head—patriarch—of a coterminous Orthodox Christian church to whom the tsar's faithful subjects also owed allegiance (as did the tsar himself). "Russia"—*Rosiia* or *Rossiia*, the term which in official documents had now largely replaced the older *Rus'*—was delineated not by the nationality of its inhabitants, but primarily by their subjection to the Orthodox ruler of "all Russia" or, after the treaty of 1654 with the Ukrainians, of "all Great and Little [or "Major" and "Minor"] Russia" (or again, after the conquest of Vilnius in 1656, of "all Great, Little, and White Russia"). To be sure, as the seventeenth century wore on these patrimonial, dynastic, theocratic, and personalist (or anthro-

¹² Ranum, introduction, *National Consciousness*, pp. 1ff.; Cherniavsky, in *ibid.*, pp. 118ff.; Jaroslaw Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438–1560s)* (The Hague, 1974), pp. 8, 10, and *passim*.

¹³ It will be evident that, following Hans Kohn and others, I view the concept of the nation-state as an element, even a product, of nationalism. Various points made in Charles Tilly et al., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), are also relevant here—although Tilly and his colleagues concentrate on "state-making" rather than on the "building of nations" (pp. 6, 47, 79, etc.) and so neglect any question of the interdependence of the two processes.

pomorphic) notions of ultimate political authority in Russia were challenged and even contradicted by religious schism and the infiltration of more abstract ideas from the West. But there is nothing in the sources to suggest a sense as yet of either belonging to, or presiding over, a nation-state.¹⁴

II

Petrine absolutist ideology was a fusion of recent European theories of sovereignty, monarchy, and law with established Russian notions of patriarchy (*otchina/votchina*), autocracy (*samoderzhavstvo*), and dominion (*gosudarstvo*).¹⁵ The ideology was formulated, usually at the explicit

¹⁴ On this whole question, and for the kind of evidence to be studied, see, all with extensive further references: W. Vodoff, "Remarques sur la valeur du terme 'tsar' appliqué aux princes russes avant le milieu du XVe siècle," *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s. 9 (1978): 1–41; N. A. Soboleva, "Simvoly russkoi gosudarstvennosti [15th–16th centuries]," *Voprosy istorii*, 1979, no. 6, pp. 47–59; M. N. Tikhomirov, "O proiskhozhdenii nazvaniia 'Rossiia,'" in Tikhomirov, *Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo XV–XVII vekov* (Moscow, 1973), pp. 11–17; J. Raba, "The Authority of the Muscovite Ruler at the Dawn of the Modern Era," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, n.s. 14, no. 3 (1976): 322–44; M. Szeftel, "The Title of the Muscovite Monarch up to the End of the Seventeenth Century," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 13, nos. 1/2 (1979): 59–81; A. Lappo-Danilevskij, "L'idée de l'état et son évolution en Russie depuis les troubles du XVIIe siècle jusqu'aux réformes du XVIIIe," in P. Vinogradoff, ed., *Essays in Legal History* (Oxford, 1913), pp. 356–83; R. C. Howe, ed. and trans., *The Testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1967); and three articles by G. Olsr—"Gli ultimi Rurikidi e le basi ideologiche della sovranità dello Stato russo"; "La Chiesa e lo Stato nel cerimoniale d'incoronazione degli ultimi sovrani Rurikidi"; and "La Chiesa e lo Stato nel cerimoniale d'incoronazione nel Periodo dei torbidi"—in *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 12 (1946): 322–73; 16 (1950): 267–302; and 17 (1951): 395–434. In spite of unexamined assertions that before 1552 "Muscovite Russia [was] a centralized national state" (after 1552 a "multinational empire"), and that a "national consciousness" is to be detected in sixteenth-century Muscovite writings, Pelenski, *Russia and Kazan*, provides a wealth of material exemplifying, rather, contemporary dynastic, patrimonial, and religious conceptions. So does D. B. Miller, "The *Velikie minei chetii* and the *Stepennaia kniga* of Metropolitan Makarii and the Origins of Russian National Consciousness," *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 26 (1979): 263–382, which I also find misconceived: note Miller's confusion of history with genealogy and/or hagiography (and/or teleology); national with dynastic and/or religious consciousness; sovereignty or independence (or autonomy) with absolutism; *Rus'* with Russia (*Rossiia*); even medieval with modern (see especially pp. 307–308, 313, 314–25, 362–69).

¹⁵ In addition to the works by Raba, Szeftel, and Lappo-Danilevskij, only cited above (fn. 14), see S. Benson, "The Role of Western Political Thought in Petrine Russia," *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 18, no. 2 (summer 1974): 254–73, with further references; Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), pp. 27–138 passim (on Russian patriarchy); and, emphasizing once more the foreign sources of Petrine absolutism, the relevant passages of C. Peterson, *Peter the Great's Administrative and Judicial Reforms: Swedish Antecedents and the Process of Reception*, trans. M. Metcalf (Stockholm, 1979), with numerous further references.

direction of Peter I himself, in response to specific events of the time, particularly the challenge to monarchical absolutism posed by rival theories of ecclesiastical or aristocratic power, theories that were both domestic and foreign in origin. The formulation of the new ideology—new in the Russian context and new in its Russian shadings—was entrusted by Peter I to various learned outsiders in his service, none of his native-born subjects, evidently, having been judged adequate to the task. These outsiders were Greek, German, Ukrainian, or, in one outstanding case (P. P. Shafirov's), Ukrainian-Jewish in background; and in varying degrees they drew on European sources, as mentioned, as well as on their knowledge of the local scene. The results are to be read in writings directly attributable to one or another of these men; in major pieces of Petrine legislation, usually collective efforts in which Peter himself lent a hand; in Peter's own papers; and in the extended treatise entitled (in short form) *Pravda voli monarshei*.

Peter's order to his troops on the eve of the battle of Poltava (27 June 1709) provides a fair sample of the element of national sentiment in Petrine absolutist ideology (there is some doubt as to whether Peter himself composed the order, none that it issued from his immediate entourage):

Let the Russian (*rossiiskoe*) army know that the hour has drawn nigh in which the very existence of the whole fatherland (*otechestvo*) is placed in their hands; either Russia (*Rossiia*) will perish completely or she will be reborn for the better. They must know that they have been armed and drawn up in battle array not for the sake of Peter, but for that of the realm (*gosudarstvo*: dominion) entrusted to him, for their kinsfolk, and for the all-Russian people (*za narod vserossiiskii*). . . . And let them know for certain that [Peter's] life is not dear to him, if only Russia and Russian piety, glory, and prosperity survive.¹⁶

A passage of the *Military Statute* of 1716, in both its Russian and contemporary German versions, clearly exposes the absolutist element in Petrine political ideology:

His Majesty [Peter I] is a sovereign monarch (*samovlastnyi Monarkh/souverainer Monarch*) who need not account for his acts to anyone on earth, but has the power and authority to govern his Dominions and lands (*Gosudarstva i zemli/Reich und Länder*) as a Christian Ruler (*Khristianskii Gosudar'/christlicher Potentat*), in accordance with his own will and good judgement.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Pis'ma i bumagi imperatora Petra Velikogo*, 12 vols. (St.-Petersburg/Leningrad/Moscow, 1887–1975), 9, pt. 1, no. 3251, and editors' note, pt. 2, pp. 980–83 (hereafter cited *PiB*).

¹⁷ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, 1st series, 46 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1830), 5: no. 3006 (hereafter cited *PSZ*).

This passage, it seems, was derived directly from a Swedish source.¹⁸

An attempt to root the ruler's absolute power in natural law as well as in Scripture and church law is manifest in the "Sermon on Royal Authority and Honor" preached by Feofan Prokopovich (Prokopovich), the Ukrainian divine who became Peter's leading apologist, on Palm Sunday (April 6), 1718, in what was now styled "royal (*tsarstvuiushchii*) St. Petersburg":

And behold, might not there be in the number of natural laws (*estestvennykh zakonov*) this one, that there are to be authorities holding supreme power among the peoples (*vlastem prederzhavshchem v narodekh*)? There is indeed! And of all the laws this is the chief one. For because the ill will of a depraved race does not hesitate to break nature's command to love ourselves and not to do unto others what we would not wish for ourselves, always and everywhere a guardian has been wanted, a protector and strong upholder of the law; and this is the ruling authority (*derzhavnaia vlast'*). . . . For we hold it certain that supreme (*vysokaia*) authority receives its beginning and cause from nature itself. And if from nature, then from God himself, the creator of nature. . . . Therefore we cannot help but call God himself the cause of the ruler's authority; whence it is also clear that nature, too, instructs us in the submission owed to [him]. . . . The authority of the ruler is necessary to natural law.¹⁹

Petrine absolutist ideology in its fullness is perhaps best represented in the celebrated treatise *Pravda voli monarshei vo opredelenii naslednika derzhavy svoei* (The right of the monarch's will in designating the heir to his power), a work first published in 1722 which is also attributed to Prokopovich and which certainly was composed, on Peter's direct orders, by one or more of those learned outsiders who assisted him in matters of propaganda and state policy.²⁰ The treatise advanced a justification of absolute monarchy and particularly of the monarch's right to designate his own successor should he have been "so unfortunate in his sons as to think none of them capable and fit to govern." It was written, as Peter himself states in its preface, to refute the "contradictions of certain enemies learned in political thought" and those equally of certain "hotheads among our people. . . [who] sow the tares of sedition in our country and bring the Russian people into disrepute among foreigners." At issue were two Petrine decrees, the

¹⁸ Source printed in *Zakonodatel'nye akty Petra I*, ed. N. A. Voskresenskii (Moscow and Leningrad, 1945), no. 235 (see chap. 2, sec. a) (hereafter cited ZAP).

¹⁹ "Slovo o vlasti i chesti tsarskoi," in I. P. Eremin, ed., *Feofan Prokopovich: Sochineniia* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1964), pp. 76–93; cf. H. G. Lunt, trans., "Sermon on Royal Authority and Honor," in M. Raëff, ed., *Russian Intellectual History: An Anthology* (New York, 1966), pp. 14–30.

²⁰ J. Cracraft, "Did Feofan Prokopovich Really Write *Pravda Voli Monarshei*?" *Slavic Review* 40, no. 2 (summer 1981): 173–93.

first of February 1718 excluding his elder son Aleksei from the succession, the second of February 1722 ordaining that the reigning monarch “should always have the power to designate his heir, and, having once designated him, to set him aside should he notice that he is in any way unfit.” The “learned enemies” referred to by Peter were authors of pamphlets published in Europe attacking these decrees, while the seditious “hotheads” in question were domestic opponents of the tsar who condemned his treatment of his son.²¹

In advancing its arguments *Pravda voli monarshei* invokes Scripture, the Code of Justinian, certain classical authors, decrees of Peter I, and, interestingly, Hugo Grotius’s *De jure belli et pacis*.

Among the peoples, Slavic and others, the title of majesty (*maestet, ili velichestvo*) is used to designate the highest and unsurpassable honor; it is applied to supreme rulers alone. The title signifies not only their transcending dignity, than which, after God’s, there is no higher on earth, but also [their] supreme legislative power—the power to judge without appeal and to issue incontrovertible orders while not being itself subject to any laws whatever. It is thus that the most eminent jurists define majesty; among others, Hugo Grotius says precisely this: “the highest power (termed majesty) is one whose actions are not subject to the control of another power, so that they cannot be rendered void by any other human will save his own.”²²

Later, discussing various forms of government, the *Pravda* states that the form in which “all power is held in the hands of a single person is called Monarchy, that is, Autocracy (*Monarkhiia, to est’ Samoderzhavstvo*).” Monarchy, then, was either elective or, as in the Russian case, hereditary (*monarkhiia naslednaia*). Moreover it was clear that every form of government, hereditary monarchy included, had “its inception in a primary consensus among this or that people, always and everywhere acting wisely by the direction of Divine Providence.” Thus

In a hereditary monarchy, the popular will was expressed in this way to the first monarch, if not in words, then in deeds: “We desire unanimously that for our common good (*k obshchei nashei pol’ze*) you should rule over us forever; that is, since you are mortal, you yourself must leave us a successor after you (are gone).

²¹ I quote here and below from the *Pravda voli monarshei* as published in *PSZ*, vol. 7, no. 4870. For further details and references, see Cracraft, “Did Feofan Prokopovich. . . .”

²² “Summa autem illa dicitur [potestas] cuius actus alterius iuri non subsunt, ita ut alterius voluntatis humanae arbitrio irriti possint reddi”: Grotius, in context, clearly refers here to the sovereign state—to the sovereignty of the state (cf. G. N. Clark, *The Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed. [Oxford, 1960], pp. 125–29); the author or authors of the *Pravda*, inserting the phrase “(termed majesty),” make Grotius refer more precisely to the ruler himself.

As for their part,

The people must obey all the orders of the Autocrat (*Samoderzhets*) without contradiction or murmur, as was shown above from the word of God and has now been clearly shown from this explanation of the popular will; for since the people have divested themselves of their general will and have given it up to their Monarch (*Monarkh*), they must obey his orders, laws, and statutes without objection.

The secular as well as the thoroughly absolutist character of this theory of Russian government, which in both respects was without precedent in Muscovite, East Slavic, or Byzantine thought,²³ deserves emphasis. It was a theory which did not allow for the independent existence of any other institution, and which granted the ruler priority, in both time and importance, over the church in particular.²⁴ The tsar was now a vaguely “Christian” rather than a specifically Orthodox ruler: a supra-confessional “Majesty” possessed of a power over his subjects that was limited only by his own will. Not even his children had independent rights, and most emphatically not the right of succession: “For an Autocratic Ruler,” to quote *Pravda voli monarshei* one last time, “is Ruler not only to the subject people (*podannomu narodu*), but to his own children as well.”

III

Expressions of the imperialist tendency of Petrine absolutist ideology—what I call Petrine hegemony theory—are to be found in various broadsides or manifestos issued by the tsar in the course of a military or diplomatic campaign, in the treaties or instruments of capitulation which he concluded with non-Russian rulers or local elites, and, most fully, in P. P. Shafirov’s lengthy *Discourse* of 1717 explaining Peter’s reasons for his prolonged war against Charles XII of Sweden.²⁵

²³ Cf. H. Neubauer, *Car und Selbtherrscher: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Autokratie in Russland* (Wiesbaden, 1964); V. Ia. Ulanov, “Vlast’ moskovskikh gosudarei v XVII v.,” in V. V. Kallash, ed., *Tri veka*, 6 vols. (Moscow, 1912–13), 1:248–56; and M. M. D’iakonov, *Vlast’ Moskovskikh gosudarei* (St. Petersburg, 1889), as well as various works cited in fn. 14 above. See also V. Savva, *Moskovskie tsari i vizantiiskie vasilevsy: K voprosu o vliianii Vizantii na obrazovanie idei tsarskoi vlasti moskovskikh gosudarei* (Kharkiv, 1901); and I. Ševčenko, “A Neglected Byzantine Source of Muscovite Political Ideology,” *Harvard Slavic Studies* 2 (1954): 141–79, with numerous references.

²⁴ On the latter point see further J. Cracraft, *The Church Reform of Peter the Great* (Stanford, 1971), especially pp. 147–57.

²⁵ *Razsuzhdenie, kakie zakonnye prichiny Ego Tsarskoe Velichestvo Petr Pervyi . . . k nachatiiu voiny protiv Korolia Karola 12 Shvedskogo 1700 godu imel* (St. Petersburg, 1717): reprinted, together with its contemporary English version, in P. P. Shafirov, *A Discourse Concerning the Just Causes of the War between Sweden and Russia: 1700–1721*, ed. W. E. Butler (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1973).

Peter's reaction to the defection in 1708 of the Ukrainian hetman, Ivan Mazepa, to the side of Charles XII provides a good case in point.²⁶ First, he repeatedly invoked the bond of Orthodox Christianity in his effort to contain the effects of Mazepa's defection, and in so doing drew on established Russian and, indeed, Ukrainian conventions. Yet in his proclamations and decrees to the local authorities following Mazepa's flight, Peter's religious appeal was more negative than positive: more an attempt to arouse or to play on local religious antipathies by depicting the "heretic" Swedes as bent on desecrating Orthodox churches and monasteries or on converting them, in collusion with their Polish allies, into Catholic or Uniate institutions. The religious was only one element of Peter's overall appeal—of his public justification for why he condemned Mazepa as a "betrayor of his people" and had ordered the convening of a *rada* to elect a new hetman, one whose loyalty to the tsar was tried and true. For Peter portrayed himself now not only as "one with you [the Ukrainians] in faith," as their "Orthodox ruler," but also as the "ruler and protector" by hereditary right of the "Little-Russian people and land": he was, invoking the tsar's title as adapted in the 1650s, "Autocrat of all Great, Little, and White Russia" as well as, in another older version of his title to be found in these same documents,²⁷ "hereditary ruler and grand prince" of the "Kiev" and "Chernihiv" lands, among others. In Peter's eyes, not only had Mazepa gone over to the common enemy, the Swedes and the Polish anti-king—Stanisław Leszczyński—whom they had placed on the throne; and not only did Mazepa intend thereby to "enslave" his countrymen to the Swedes and/or to "subjugate" them to the Poles, but Mazepa aspired (Peter somewhat inconsistently claimed) to set himself up as "sovereign (*samovlastnyi*) prince in the Ukraine."

This was the heart of the matter. There could be only one "sovereign prince" in any land claimed or acquired by the Russian ruler. Moreover, given what we know already of Petrine political theory, we can see that Peter's promises in these same documents to respect the Cossack "liberties, rights, and privileges" guaranteed by his father were largely—one might say necessarily—meaningless. Subjects could have no such rights. At a more personal level, there is also evidence here that Peter was stunned by

²⁶ For further documentation, details, and references, see J. Cracraft, "Prokopovyč's Kiev Period Reconsidered," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (June 1978): especially 152–55; Orest Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason," *ibid.*, pp. 158–83; *idem*, "Russia and the Ukraine: The Difference that Peter I Made," *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (January 1980): 1–17; *idem*, *The Mazepists: Ukrainian Separatism in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Boulder, Colorado, and New York, 1981).

²⁷ *PiB*, vol. 8, pt. 1, nos. 2759–63, 2767–83, 2791–94; *PSZ*, vol. 4, nos. 2209, 2212, 2213.

the hetman's defection, that he refused to believe that Mazepa could have had any legitimate reason for renouncing his allegiance to the tsar, and that he persisted, therefore, in blackening the old man's character. That Mazepa perceived himself as an autonomous prince who had voluntarily and, as it turned out, temporarily accepted the tsar's suzerainty, seems utterly to have escaped Peter's understanding.²⁸

Following Mazepa's defection and subsequent defeat at Poltava (1709), the Petrine notions of undivided sovereignty and unlimited monarchy began to take hold in the Left-Bank Ukraine—took hold, it might be added, with the help of a part of the Ukrainian elite, who saw their own best future and that of "Little Russia" in submission to the "all-Russian" tsar. In Poland-Lithuania, by contrast, where Peter attempted to protect the Commonwealth's Orthodox population, to claim the rest of his assumed Ukrainian inheritance, and to dominate central politics, no such thing happened. This was because, at least in part, Polish ideas of limited monarchy, of confederation and of *szlachta* democracy, were too firmly rooted. It has been shown, for instance, that in allying itself with Peter against Charles XII and Leszczyński between 1706 and 1709, the Confederation of Sandomierz in no way surrendered traditional Polish interests to the tsar.²⁹ On the other hand, while Peter's attempt to dominate Polish central politics was based on simple *Machtpolitik*, his claims to a protectorate over the Commonwealth's Orthodox population and to possession of the Right-Bank Ukraine were grounded in continuing Russian assumptions—now more forcefully expressed—of ethno-religious homogeneity and monarchical hereditary right. And this boded ill for Poland's future as a viable,

²⁸ Cf. the contemporary description of Mazepa by Charles Whitworth, the British envoy to Peter's court: "This gentleman is near seventy years old . . . and has heaped up vast sums of money in that wealthy province [Ukraine] where he governed so long with little less authority than a sovereign prince." *Sbornik Imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 148 vols. (St. Petersburg/Petrograd, 1867–1916), 1: 108; Whitworth to Secretary Boyle, Moscow, 10/21 November 1708; or that of a Swedish officer captured at the battle of Poltava: "perceiving the tsar was not to be bound by any contract or privileges granted, that he had forced the nobility in Russia to be soldiers and sailors and laid burthensome taxes upon their estates . . . [and] had forced the wearing of foreign apparel upon the nation and made alterations in their religion; he [Mazepa] and his Cossacks began to apprehend that if the tsar should become more powerful by the war, they might be the next to be treated in the same manner and, therefore, [that] it was high time for them to consider how to prevent it . . . His [Mazepa's] real intention was to convert his country into a separate principality": P. J. von Strahlenberg (F. J. von Stralenberg), *An Historico-Geographical Description of the North . . . ; But More Particularly of Russia, Siberia, and Great Tartary* (London, 1736), p. 261 (first published in German, Stockholm, 1728).

²⁹ A. Kamiński, *Konfederacja Sandomierska wobec Rosji w okresie poaltranszadzki 1706–1709* (Wrocław/Warsaw/Cracow, 1969).

sovereign state.³⁰ As for the Right-Bank Ukraine itself, events later in the eighteenth century would also show that no less than in the case of Kiev, which had enjoyed a measure of civic autonomy under the Commonwealth, or in that of the Left-Bank Ukraine, with its tradition of Cossack democracy, would the Russian government tolerate diversity within unity: this in part because, I would now argue, any divergence from the Russian model in what were coming to be regarded as “Russian” lands—in this case, “Little Russian”—was literally inconceivable.

In the Baltic territories annexed by Peter I in the course of his war with Sweden the Russian ruler could not, to be sure, invoke the Orthodox faith or the heritage of old Rus’ as claims on his new subjects’ loyalty. On the contrary: in his universal of 16 August 1710, in German, to the inhabitants of Estonia, Peter frankly acknowledged that the Evangelical religion prevailed throughout the country and, eschewing any intention of introducing innovations here, pledged not only to preserve intact the local church’s liberties, rights, and privileges, but to expand them.³¹ This was the same Lutheran religion which scarcely two years before Peter had reviled in his campaign to arouse Ukrainian resistance to the “heretic” Swedes. Similarly, Peter promised to maintain intact the liberties, rights, and privileges of the nobility of Livonia and the magistracy of Riga in the several accords and instruments of capitulation that he concluded with them, just as he agreed to leave the civil administration of these territories in the hands of Germans “because the inhabitants are of the German nation.”³²

Obviously, the motives behind Peter I’s concessions to the churches and leading classes of Livonia and Estonia were largely pragmatic: the need to pacify and to secure control of these newly won and valuable lands while the war against the Swedish king, their erstwhile master, went on. Clearly, too, Peter’s assumption in victory of the vanquished Swede’s position as overlord of these territories and protector of their dominant Lutheran religion encouraged the development in Russia itself of that new, more secular, indeed supra-confessional idea of monarchy which was discussed above. We notice that in these documents of accord, capitulation, and pacification

³⁰ As shown by J. Gierowski and A. Kamiński, “The Eclipse of Poland,” in J. S. Bromley, ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 6: *The Rise of Great Britain and Russia, 1688–1715/1725* (Cambridge and New York, 1971), pp. 681ff. See also L. Lewitter, “Russia, Poland, and the Baltic, 1697–1721,” *Historical Journal* 9 (1968): 3–34; and Lewitter, “Peter the Great and the Polish Dissenters,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 33 (December 1954): 75–101.

³¹ *PiB*, vol. 10, no. 3930.

³² *PiB*, vol. 10, nos. 4020, 4021, 4053; also *PSZ*, vol. 4, nos. 2277, 2279, 2286, 2287, 2297, 2298.

the tsar is titled, officially for the first time, “emperor” (*imperator*), with the distinctly universalist as well as secularist connotations that this title bore. Yet we should also notice in these documents that any concessions regarding local rights, liberties, or privileges were always granted conditionally: (1) on condition that the concessioners, so to speak, maintained in the future perfect loyalty to the tsar; and (2) because the concessioners had already sworn, unconditionally, to be the tsar’s most faithful subjects. And we know what that meant. In other words, these concessions by Peter to the local elites of the newly conquered Baltic territories represented pragmatic adaptations of basic Russian notions governing the relations of ruler and subject, not any fundamental redefinition of same. The anomaly, as time would show, remained just that: an anomaly.³³

Peter’s annexation of Livonia and Estonia was at first publicly justified—again in the documents just mentioned—only by right of conquest in a war both caused and perpetuated by the Swedish king. It was also represented as a “liberation” of these territories from the “Swedish yoke.” There appear to have been some grounds for the latter view and some actual support for it in the “liberated” territories themselves. But the Russian annexation of Livonia and Estonia and, earlier, of Karelia and Ingria, as well as the long and difficult Swedish war itself, seemed to require, for both foreign and domestic consumption, some fuller, more theoretical justification. This task Peter entrusted to P. P. Shafirov, a seasoned diplomat in his service, who by 1717 had produced, under Peter’s personal supervision, the *Discourse* already mentioned.³⁴

In the *Discourse* the Russian annexation of the Baltic territories was defended not only by right of conquest in a just war—Russian victories being evidence, incidentally, of divine favor—but on alleged historical and legal grounds as well. It was argued that these territories “did of old make part of the Russian Empire” (*iz drevle ko vserossiiskomu imperiiu prina[d]lezhali*). That was to say, at one time or another in the past these “provinces” had been acknowledged as “under the jurisdiction and protection of the Russian crown” (*pod oblast’ i proteksiiu korony Rossiiskoi*)—a claim that was true only with respect to Ingria—and that they were thus among the tsar’s “hereditary lands” (*iz svoikh naslednykh zemel’*). These lands had been give up, moreover, only in adversity, and in gaining or

³³ See R. Wittram, *Peter I, Czar und Kaiser: Zur Geschichte Peters des Grossen in seiner Zeit*, 2 vols. (Göttingen, 1964), 1: 323–54, and further references there (pp. 472–80); also, of related interest, E. Amburger, *Ingermanland: Eine junge Provinz Russlands im Wirkungsbereich der Residenz und Weltstadt St. Petersburg-Leningrad*, 2 vols. (Cologne and Vienna, 1980), 1 passim.

³⁴ Above, fn. 25: all further references are to the combined Russian/English edition of 1973.

regaining control of them now the Russian side had behaved with perfect legality, in accordance with both natural and civil law (*po vsem pravam naturalnym i grazhdanskim*). Indeed, it was argued here that as the “Father of the Fatherland” (*Otets otechestva*)—a title he was formally to assume in 1721—Peter had been obliged to recover by war these “hereditary provinces” which had been “unjustly wrested from his Crown.” For as the “potentates in this world have no superior over them but Almighty God. . . . every Monarch is bound to defend with arms and force his right and dominions (*pravo svoe i Gosudarstva*), which he holds of God, and to oppose force with force at opportune times, as has been the practice in the whole world from its beginning, and will be until its end.” It was also argued, still at the more theoretical level, that Peter had justifiably gone to war against Sweden “for the advantage and interest of his own Realm (*dlia pol’zy i interesy Gosudarstva svoego*),” a principle which meant in practice, as it was further explained, developing Russia’s commerce with Europe by securing control of “this side of the Baltic.”

Shafirov’s treatise has recently been described as a “legal-historical brief, officially inspired but unofficial in character, written by an individual well versed in the theory and practice of early eighteenth-century international law and diplomacy.”³⁵ That may be so. But for our purposes now the treatise is interesting for what it added to the Russian justification for annexing the Baltic territories in particular, and for what it reveals—or confirms—about Petrine hegemony theory in general. Employing current, wholly secular notions of legality and of what came to be called *Realpolitik*, concepts which frequently required the use—in Russian—of new words,³⁶ Shafirov (and Peter I) had provided an elaborate rationalization for Russia’s original aggression against Sweden, for Russia’s continued prosecution of the war, and for the Russian takeover of the lands in question. The rationalization was intended primarily to gain European approval of (or at least acquiescence to) Russia’s conduct here, to calm critics of the war at home, and to set the stage for negotiations with Sweden. But nowhere in this lengthy work are any rights or peculiarities of the inhabitants themselves of the occupied territories ever mentioned, while at the same time, as noted, the rights and powers of the Russian monarch are often adduced.

This leaves the reader to infer that as against the rights of the sovereign his subjects even here had none, and that his acknowledgment in practice of their peculiarities was at best a temporary concession of his power. Most probably this was not a matter of oversight or of deliberate *legerdemain* but

³⁵ Shafirov, *Discourse*, editor’s introduction, p. 7.

³⁶ See the list in Shafirov, *Discourse*, pp. 17–19.

of, again, an unwillingness or even an inability to alter fundamental Russian conceptions of the relation of sovereign and subject, the peculiarities of a new situation or the possible implications of new ideas notwithstanding. In Shafirov's treatise, as in *Pravda voli monarshei*, contemporary European thought is mined in support of the Russian monarchy while the tendencies in European thought hostile to monarchical absolutism are ignored. It is also remarkable that in Shafirov's treatise, written just a few years after Mazepa's downfall, the office of the Ukrainian hetman is referred to as that of the tsar's "general," the Cossacks are termed his "subjects," the Ukraine is called his "dominion" and the unfortunate Mazepa himself, simply a "traitor."

Thus, hegemony theory under Peter, such as it was, was essentially an extension or adaptation of Petrine absolutist ideology to new or different conditions, and little more. Like the latter, it was a mixture of tradition and innovation, but a mixture in which the new subsumed and advanced, rather than modified, the old. The thrust of Petrine hegemony theory was clearly to strengthen the center at the expense of the "province"; to subordinate local liberties, rights, or privileges to the undivided, unlimited, undiluted dominion of the tsar-emperor. An "empire" indeed had come into being, but as an assemblage of provinces grouped around the sovereign's Russian realm and awaiting "Russification," using that term now in a narrowly political sense. Or so the theory inclined. Perhaps the historical importance of the justifications for Russian annexation of non-Russian territories advanced under Peter I lies in the fact that they imposed no legal or moral restraints whatever on the practitioners of Russian imperial policy.

IV

In conclusion, the element of national sentiment infusing both Petrine absolutist ideology and its imperialist tendency—what I have called Petrine hegemony theory—might be emphasized. For it was, ostensibly, on behalf of the "Russian" people that the Petrine wars were waged, new territories were annexed, and, in an unprecedented exercise of royal power, the new succession law was laid down. It was, after all, in an effort to enhance the glory and prosperity of the "all-Russian realm" that the government was further centralized, the church subordinated to the monarch by the institution of the Holy Synod, and a new capital city, St. Petersburg, built on conquered land. Indeed, these and other political and military accomplishments of the Petrine regime gave rise, there is plenty of evidence to show, to a surge of what must be called national pride. The sentiment is unmistakably present, for example, in the act of October 1721 of the newly

founded Senate and Synod conferring the imperial and other new dignities on Peter:

To show due gratitude to His Majesty for his gracious and paternal care and exertions for the welfare of the realm during the whole of his most glorious reign, and especially during the recent Swedish war; moreover [to acknowledge that] through his guidance alone, as is well known to everyone, he has brought the all-Russian realm into such a strong and prosperous condition and his subject people into such glory before the whole world: it is resolved to beg His Majesty, in the name of the whole Russian people, to accept from them the title of Father of the Fatherland, All-Russian Emperor, Peter the Great.³⁷

Nor did it end with Peter I. Here is Lomonosov, in a panegyric to Peter's memory delivered in April 1755 to commemorate the coronation (in 1743) of his daughter, Empress Elizabeth:

Our Monarch is robed in purple, is anointed for imperial rule, is crowned and receives the Scepter and Orb. Russians rejoice, filling the air with applause and acclamation. Enemies blanch and quail. . . . Following the example of her great progenitor [Peter I], she [Elizabeth] gives crowns to Sovereigns, calms Europe with peaceful arms, consolidates the Russian inheritance. . . . The far-flung Russian state, like a whole world, is surrounded by great seas on almost every side. On all of them we see Russian flags flying. . . . Here new Columbuses hasten to unknown shores to add to the might and glory of Russia [etc.].³⁸

Or here is Potemkin, in the later 1770s, urging Catherine II that it was her "duty to exalt the glory of Russia" by annexing the Crimean Khanate.³⁹ This was the same Catherine "the Great" who a dozen years before, in her famous "Instruction" to the Legislative Commission, had declared that in Russia

The sovereign is absolute; for no other authority except that which is concentrated in his person can act appropriately in a state whose expanse is so vast. The expanse of the state requires that absolute power be vested in the person who rules over it. . . .⁴⁰

Or here, finally, is Prince Bezborodko in a memorandum of 1799 to Catherine's son, Emperor Paul:

³⁷ *PSZ*, vol. 6, no. 3840. Cf. *ZAP*, no. 212; and see further, Stephen L. Baehr, "From History to National Myth: *Translatio imperii* in Eighteenth-Century Russia," *Russian Review* 37, no. 1 (January 1978): 1–13.

³⁸ M. V. Lomonosov, "Panegyric to the Sovereign Emperor Peter the Great," trans. R. Hingley, in Raeff, *Russian Intellectual History*, pp. 32–48.

³⁹ As printed in G. Vernadsky et al., eds. and trans., *A Source Book for Russian History from Early Times to 1917*, 3 vols. (New Haven, 1972), 2: 411.

⁴⁰ As printed in *ibid.*, p. 404, which is based on the contemporary English and Russian (and French) editions of the document. For the Russian text, see *PSZ*, vol. 18, no. 12949.

Russia is an autocratic state. Its size, the variety of its inhabitants and customs, and many other considerations make it the only natural form of government for Russia. All arguments to the contrary are futile, and the least weakening of the autocratic power would result in the loss of many provinces, the weakening of the state, and countless misfortunes for the people.⁴¹

Is it too much to suggest that both absolutism and imperialism were inherent in Russian nationalism virtually from the beginning, and that in studying the origins and development of the one we cannot ignore the others?

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Addendum. Since this article was completed several studies directly relevant to—and generally supportive of—various of its points have been published (or have come to my attention): I. de Madariaga, “Autocracy and Sovereignty [in early modern Russia/Russian],” *Canadian-American Slavic Studies* 16, nos. 3/4 (fall-winter 1982): 369–87; E. C. Thaden, *Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710–1870* (Princeton, 1984); idem, “The Beginnings of Romantic Nationalism in Russia,” *American Slavic and East European Review* 13 (1954): 500–21; J. L. Black, “The Search for a ‘Correct’ Textbook of National History in 18th Century Russia,” *New Review of East European History* 16, no. 1 (March 1976): 3–19; D. B. Saunders, “Historians and Concepts of Nationality in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 60, no. 1 (January 1982): 44–62; idem, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985), pp. 145–99.

Among more general studies are J. A. Armstrong, *Nations before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1982); and B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London, 1983). Anderson, in the chapter of the latter work entitled “The Origins of National Consciousness” (pp. 41–49), argues that the phenomenon of national consciousness resulted from the interaction in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe of capitalism and the revolution in printing, which produced stabilized, unifying “print-languages” and “languages of power”; these, in turn, contributed crucially to the development, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of “modern self-conceived nations and nation-states.” Russia is entirely absent from this analysis. Indeed, the Russian (or “Romanov” or “Czarist”) Empire enters Anderson’s story only as the most egregious example, in the nineteenth century, of the invention and propagation of “official nationalism,” defined as “the willed merger of nation and dynastic empire”—a phenomenon, Anderson stresses, which “developed *after*, and *in reaction to*, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s” (p. 83: italics his): “Official

⁴¹ As printed in M. Raeff, ed. and trans., *Plans for Political Reform in Imperial Russia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), p. 70.

nationalism, of which Czarist Russification is only the best-known example, [was] a means for stretching the short, tight, skin of the [Russian] nation over the gigantic body of the empire . . . the huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages'' (p. 82). In discussing the Russian case Anderson draws heavily on H. Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, 1977).

Religious Tradition and National Consciousness Among the Romanians of Transylvania, 1730–1780

KEITH HITCHINS

I

The middle decades of the eighteenth century represent a crucial turning-point in the evolution of Romanian community sentiment in Transylvania; it turned away from spontaneous ethnic attitudes toward a modern national consciousness. Up to this time, the small Romanian educated class—mainly priests—and the peasantry—the overwhelming majority of the population—had thought in religious terms whenever they placed themselves in a social context outside the family or village. For them, the teachings of the Orthodox church provided an adequate explanation of their place in this world and of their prospects in the next. Not surprisingly, they considered themselves a part of the greater Orthodox community and felt a special kinship with Serbs and Russians. In their minds, the terms “nation” and “Orthodox” were synonymous.

Far-reaching changes, however, had already begun to take place at the end of the seventeenth century. New elements were introduced into the religious life of the Romanians that were to have a profound impact on their cultural development, especially on their idea of nation. Between 1697 and 1701 complicated negotiations between Jesuit missionaries acting under the direction of the Roman Catholic primate of Hungary and the leaders of the Romanian Orthodox church brought a large body of Romanian priests into union with Rome. In this “conversion” theological considerations were secondary. The chief sponsor of the union, the Court of Vienna, which had only recently added Transylvania to its dominions, wished to bring the Romanians within the fold of the Roman Catholic church as one means of subduing the independent Protestant estates of Transylvania. For its part, the Romanian clergy had turned to the union for salvation from social degradation. For several centuries that clergy had ceased to share the rights and privileges of the ruling estates because their people, overwhelmingly peasant, did not constitute a *natio* like the Magyar nobility, the Saxon bourgeoisie, and the Szekler upper classes. Consequently, the Orthodox church, a church of peasants, could not be admitted to the ranks of the “received”

churches—the Calvinist, Lutheran, Unitarian, and Roman Catholic—but was merely “tolerated.”¹

In keeping with the secular aims of the two parties to the union, the documents that sealed the bargain had little to say about religion. They dealt instead with material things. To persuade the hesitant leaders of the Orthodox clergy to take the final step, the Court issued a diploma on 16 February 1699, which, in brief, offered those priests who would unite rights equal to the Roman Catholic. Reassured, Metropolitan Atanasie and some of his clergy signed the formal Act of Union on 5 September 1700. But doubts about the wisdom of their action persisted, and before the new church could formally come into being, Emperor Leopold I was obliged to issue yet another diploma, on 19 March 1701, setting forth in greater detail than the first the benefits that the “united” would enjoy. Of particular importance were guarantees of the same immunities from taxation and other dues and services as those enjoyed by nobles. Even more important, in the long run, was the vague suggestion that Uniate priests and laymen could belong to the Roman Catholic estate and, in so doing, share its considerable privileges. His remaining scruples thus allayed, Atanasie went through with his reconsecration as bishop of the new Greek Catholic, or Uniate, church in Vienna in April 1701. To the Court of Vienna and its supporters, this act signified the dissolution of the Orthodox church in Transylvania.

The finality of such judgments notwithstanding, events were to show that the Orthodox church was far from dead. Although deprived of its hierarchy, it endured among the mass of rural believers. The manner in which the Jesuits had gone about the union had left the villages virtually untouched. They had concentrated their efforts on the clergy, reserving the conversion of the bulk of the population to some later time. As a result, religious life in the rural areas, especially in southern Transylvania, continued to follow traditional patterns.

Yet the church union was to influence the history of the Transylvanian Romanians in ways unforeseen by any of its authors. For the first time young Romanians in large numbers were encouraged to attend Roman Catholic schools in Transylvania. The Jesuit gymnasium in Cluj (Hungarian: Kolozsvár; German: Klausenburg) led the way; almost every important figure in the Uniate church in the eighteenth century passed through its doors. Other Jesuit schools in Alba Iulia (Gyulafehérvár; Karlsburg), Braşov (Brassó; Kronstadt), and Sibiu (Nagyszeben; Her-

¹ Fundamental for the study of the Transylvanian Romanians in the eighteenth century are: Zoltán I. Tóth, *Az erdélyi román nacionalizmus első százada 1697–1792* (Budapest, 1946), and David Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (Bucharest, 1984).

mannstadt) and the Piarist gymnasium in Bistrița (Beszterce; Bistritz) received a smaller but no less steady stream of students. The best among them were sent for advanced theological studies to the Jesuit university in Nagyszombat, the Collegium Sancta Barbara and the Pazmaneum in Vienna, and the College for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome.² The aim of such hospitality was to create a well-trained clergy capable of promoting the union among the peasant masses. These expectations had, at least in part, been fulfilled by the middle of the century, when, as we shall see, a well-educated priesthood saved the union from almost certain collapse.

The essentially Western education acquired by Romanian Uniate priests had consequences for national development far beyond the sphere of religion. In Roman Catholic gymnasia and universities they came into contact with Europe for the first time. Their exposure to new currents of thought and to the spirit of progress substantially altered their perspectives on life in general and social change in particular. In time they became the bearers of a new conception of nation and the formulators of a secular dogma to explain the position of the Romanians in the European community. They were thus drawn mentally, if not always physically, out of the patriarchal village, which continued to rely upon religious tradition to explain the past and regulate the present.

The effects of the union were not limited to Uniates. It had a decisive influence on those who had remained loyal to the "old faith." Because of the abolition of a formal Orthodox administration and the exclusion of "schismatics" from educational and other benefits offered by the union, the Orthodox of Transylvania remained isolated from the new currents of ideas that altered the intellectual life of Uniate priests. Consequently, they became increasingly dependent upon their co-religionists, the Serbs of the Metropolitanate of Carlovitz (Karlovci) and, to a lesser extent, the Russians. These ties to the international Orthodox community reinforced the traditional consciousness of the Romanian Orthodox and delayed the emergence of modern national sentiments.

In the discussion to follow I shall deal with the role of religion in shaping the earliest expressions of modern Romanian national feeling. Works dealing with the relations of Uniates and Orthodox in the middle of the eighteenth century focus their attention upon the antagonisms that divided the two confessions. Yet, it is important to remember that they shared the same Eastern religious heritage. However much their interpretations of it differed, that heritage remained the chief point of reference from which they determined their place in the world.

² Tóth, *Erdélyi román nacionalizmus*, pp. 168–70, 183–84.

I am also concerned with the emergence of the modern idea of nation. But I shall have little to say about language as a badge of nationality or about the political and territorial dimensions of national feeling. These were matters that came to the fore only towards the end of the period under discussion. They properly belong to a discussion of the historical and philological work of the so-called Transylvanian School, which in the last two decades of the eighteenth century inaugurated a new stage in Romanian thought about national origins and character.

This study of the early manifestations of national feeling among the Transylvanian Romanians focuses on the contrasting mentalities of the Orthodox rural world and the cosmopolitan Uniate higher clergy. In the middle decades of the eighteenth century both were confronted by a grave crisis of conscience. Their respective reactions to it suggest fundamental differences in style and vision between a community whose culture was essentially oral and traditional, and one whose foundation lay in the written word and in the broader currents of European thought.

II

In the eighteenth century religion dominated the world of ideas in the village. Its inhabitants were bound by a way of life that had so inextricably blended folk customs and superstitions with the rudiments of Christian teachings that they viewed any change in the forms of religious observance as an assault on the foundations of the community itself. The power religion exercised over their lives displayed itself violently in a series of clashes with the Uniate clergy and its allies, the imperial bureaucracy, which kept the countryside in turmoil from the 1740s to the 1760s.

For four decades after the act of union, Uniate bishops had either been too absorbed in the organizational problems of their own church or had simply had the good sense not to force change too quickly upon the village faithful. Except for an occasional local disturbance, calm prevailed in the countryside. Then, in 1744, a singular event occurred that roused the mass of the Orthodox from their indifference toward the union. In early March a Serbian monk named Visarion Sarai appeared in the Mureş valley of southern Transylvania, preaching like a missionary the truths of Orthodoxy. His simple manner and ascetic appearance had an electrifying effect on the sensibilities of those who had been nourished on stories of martyrs who had suffered for the true faith. Visarion's language reinforced the vision of saintliness. Although he spoke Serbian and was, hence, incomprehensible

to his audience, the sounds called to mind the Slavonic that had been the “sacred” language of the Romanian liturgy before the eighteenth century.³

For nearly six weeks, until he was arrested near Sibiu at the end of April, Visarion attacked the church union with Rome in stark, uncompromising terms. In village after village he told his listeners that their priests had secretly accepted the union and that they themselves were counted as Uniates. He admonished those who had received the ministrations of such priests and had, therefore, been “delivered into the hands of the devil” to “cleanse themselves” or else be prepared to sink to the “depths of Hell.”⁴

Such terrifying visions shattered the tranquility of whole districts. Entire villages claimed not to know what the union was or that their priests had united, and to a man they vowed to remain steadfast in the “old religion” and to tolerate no changes in the faith they had received from their ancestors. Throughout southern Transylvania they rose in defense of their “Wallachian” and “Greek” faith, expressing their determination in acts at once of reckless cruelty and of touching piety. Whole villages acted together. They seized Uniate churches and expelled their priests, whom they denounced as “papists” and “devils from Hell,” and installed Orthodox in their places. In many localities the faithful had themselves rebaptized and remarried by Orthodox priests in order to avoid eternal damnation, and they refused to bury their dead in Uniate cemeteries until the ground had been reconsecrated.⁵ In those villages where Uniate priests had survived the onslaught, usually by the grace of the civil authorities, the faithful ceased to attend church and to receive the sacraments from them. Such priests were completely ostracized; they lost their share of communal rights and could find no one to marry their daughters.⁶

Visarion’s disappearance following his arrest and secret removal to Vienna did not end the massive resistance to the union he had set in motion. Although the violence eventually subsided, the aroused Orthodox found other ways to press their cause. They created a loose coordinating organization spanning half a dozen counties and scores of villages, which entered into regular contact with the Serbian Orthodox Metropolitanate in Carlovitz

³ I have described Visarion’s movement in “Religion and Romanian National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Transylvania,” *Slavonic and East European Review* 57, no. 2 (1979): 226–30.

⁴ Ioan Lupaș, *Două anchete oficiale în satele din scaunul Sibiului, 1744 și 1745* (Sibiu, 1938), p. 15.

⁵ Magyar Országos Levéltár, Budapest (hereafter OL): Erdélyi Kancellária, Acta generalia (hereafter EK), 1749/90, f. 53–55.

⁶ OL, EK, 1750/297, f. 19–28; Silviu Dragomir, *Istoria desrobirei religioase a Românilor din Ardeal în secolul XVIII*, 2 vols. (Sibiu, 1920–1930), 1, Annex: 44–46: report of the magistrate of Sibiu, 22 April 1745.

and dispatched one delegation after another to Vienna and to local authorities with petitions of grievances. Behind all these activities were the “village intellectuals”—priests, artisans, and better educated peasants—who had regularly taken the lead in community affairs. They kept alive a tenacious, if somewhat diffuse, resistance to the union for fifteen years, until a new and even more massive outbreak of violence occurred in 1759.

In this period the demands of the Orthodox remained what they had been during the time of Visarion. They continued to spurn Uniate priests, who, they claimed, “talked out of both sides of their mouths,” swearing to the civil authorities that they were devoted to the union and in the same breath assuring their faithful that they would have nothing to do with the “German faith.”⁷ Some Orthodox went so far as to express a preference for “pure” Catholic priests, who, despite “obvious failings,” had at least remained true to their faith. No matter what their particular grievance, however, the consuming desire of all the Orthodox was “to be of one religion with the Greeks and Serbs.”⁸ They were prepared to take drastic action to ensure freedom of worship; if their “just requests” could not be granted, then they declared themselves ready to abandon their homes and seek “spiritual peace” in “Turkey” (i.e., Wallachia) and “Muscovy.”⁹

The village intellectuals of the 1750s, more certain of their goals than the crowds who had flocked around Visarion, cultivated support within the broader Orthodox community. They maintained regular contacts with the Serbian Metropolitanate of Carlovitz, whose head, Pavel Nenadović, became their staunchest advocate in Vienna.¹⁰ He had clear-cut objectives of his own. Besides wishing to defend Orthodoxy in general against the Roman Catholic tide, he saw an opportunity to extend his own jurisdiction over the Transylvanian Orthodox. It was not by chance, therefore, that he urged the Romanians to seek from the Court of Vienna the same privileges granted to the Serbian nation by Leopold I in 1690–1695, and that he sponsored the printing of a brochure in Romanian setting forth the benefits they could expect to enjoy.¹¹ It is little wonder, then, that when the Romanians

⁷ OL, EK, 1752/312, f. 2–11a.

⁸ OL, Magyar Kancellária Levéltár: Ungarn und Siebenbürgen, packet 52, 1749, f. 6–13.

⁹ OL, EK, 1749/183, f. 2–3; petition to Empress Maria Theresa, June 1749.

¹⁰ Silviu Anuichi, “Relații bisericești româno-sârbe din secolul al XVII-lea și al XVIII-lea,” *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* 97, no. 7–8 (1979): 944–56.

¹¹ Ioan N. Beju, “Tipărituri românești vechi necunoscute,” *Mitropolia Ardealului* 9, no. 1–2 (1964): 61–64.

demanded from Vienna the appointment of a bishop of their own, they specified that he be a Serb from Carlovitz.¹²

The Transylvanian Orthodox also looked to Russia for aid. With Carlovitz acting as intermediary, they made contact with Russian diplomats in Vienna as early as 1750. Such encounters were sporadic and for the time being brought no change in the status of the Romanians. Yet, they could occasionally be dramatic. In 1751 a monk, Nicodim, travelled from Vienna to St. Petersburg where he was received by Empress Elizabeth. He begged her to take the Orthodox of Transylvania under her protection and to intercede with Austrian authorities to allow priests to be ordained in Russia and to be subject to the Holy Synod of the Russian church.¹³

Neither direct petitions to Vienna nor the intervention of Carlovitz on their behalf altered the condition of the Romanian Orthodox. Austrian authorities treated concessions to the Orthodox as inimical to the unity of the empire.

Orthodox frustration set the stage for a new outbreak of violence. Once again the leader was a monk, this time a Romanian, Sofronie of Cioara, from southern Transylvania, who aroused the same religious enthusiasm as had Visarion. For nearly two years, from the fall of 1759 to the spring of 1761, Sofronie led a massive following that fought the union with a zeal reminiscent of medieval crusaders. Taking advantage of the undiminished antipathy toward “papists” and the Uniate clergy in particular, he denounced the union as “false” and accused Uniate Bishop Petru Aron, who had been unrelenting in his pursuit of schismatics, of behaving like the “pagan emperors [of Rome].”¹⁴

Sofronie’s movement followed the pattern of Visarion’s in almost every respect. Throughout southern Transylvania large numbers of people—mainly peasants, often as whole villages—formally abandoned the union.¹⁵ They seized churches and drove off Uniate priests, replacing them with their own. Uniate priests who resisted were subjected to public interrogations about their beliefs and were sometimes beaten.¹⁶ As the movement progressed, the Orthodox reinforced their ties to the Serbian Metropolitanate. Parishes and larger assemblies of the faithful, often encompassing

¹² OL, EK, 1752/94 1/4, f. 40–42: report about an Orthodox synod at Săliște, January 1752.

¹³ Dragomir, *Istoria*, 1: 196, 220–22.

¹⁴ OL, EK, 1760/41, f. 159; 1760/533, f. 3: Sofronie to Aron, 29 July 1760.

¹⁵ OL, EK, 1760/125, f. 83–84, 93–95.

¹⁶ OL, EK, 1759/362, f. 2–3: report of Jesuit Emeric Pallovics of Sibiu, 15 September 1759; 1760/125, f. 81–82, 85: Vice Count of Hunyad County to Transylvanian Gubernium, 15 March 1760; 1760/253, f. 11–12: Uniate protopope of Alba Iulia to Bishop Aron, 14 May 1760.

several counties, sent delegations of laymen and priests to Carlovitz with appeals to Metropolitan Nenadović to intercede with Empress Maria Theresa on their behalf.¹⁷ For their part, Serbian churchmen provided moral and organizational support. They also tried again to persuade their Romanian co-religionists to demand from Vienna the extension to them of the privileges granted the Serbs by Leopold I.¹⁸

Although the principal demands of the Orthodox—freedom of worship and priests of their own choosing¹⁹—and their threat to emigrate en masse unless these demands were met recalled Visarion's movement, Sofronie and his supporters displayed an organizational sophistication absent fifteen years earlier. Sofronie, who styled himself "Vicar of the Holy Synod of Carlovitz," was determined to re-establish a permanent Orthodox church administration in cooperation with the Serbian Metropolitanate. He summoned two general "synods," the first at Zlatna on 10–11 August 1760, and the second at Alba Iulia on 14–18 February 1761, in order to reconstitute the Transylvanian diocese in time for the long-awaited arrival of a new bishop from Carlovitz.²⁰

Sofronie and his followers were remarkably successful. Because of an exhausting war with Prussia, the Court of Vienna was obliged to choose internal tranquility over religious conformity. On 13 July 1759 Empress Maria Theresa had already grudgingly recognized the principle that the Orthodox might worship as they chose, and on 13 July 1761 she appointed a bishop to administer their affairs, in the person of Dionisie Novacovici, Serbian Orthodox Bishop of Buda. Although many decades were to pass before the Transylvanian diocese could function normally, these acts provided a structure for educational and cultural development that would eventually open Orthodox intellectual life to influences similar to those that had expanded Uniate horizons.

For the time being, however, the religious consciousness of the Orthodox showed little sign of giving way to a more comprehensive understanding of community. The so-called *dismembratio*, the forcible separation of Orthodox from Uniate and the assignment of churches and other property to one or the other, which was carried out by Austrian military authorities in the

¹⁷ OL, EK, 1759/558, f. 4–5; 1760/41, f. 84–85.

¹⁸ A brochure explaining the Serbian privileges circulated in Transylvania: OL, EK, 1760/253, f. 14–17.

¹⁹ Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki, *Documente privitoare la istoria Românilor*, 44 vols. (Bucharest, 1876–1942), 15, pt. 2: 201–202: petition of the Romanians to the Transylvanian government, July 1760.

²⁰ Dragomir, *Istoria*, 2: 177–80, 193–99.

1760s, exacerbated confessional hostility.²¹ The terms “union” and “Uniate” had become so thoroughly odious to the Orthodox that their mere mention was enough to thwart any reconciliation.²² It was the same in the 1770s; the Orthodox clergy and faithful showed no inclination to soften their contempt for Uniates, and they engaged in missionary activity with all the intensity, less the violence, of a Visarion and a Sofronie.²³

It is evident from the foregoing that ethnicity did not form the basis of community feeling among the Orthodox. The most striking demonstration of the lack of ethnic consciousness is the greater affinity of the Orthodox for their co-religionists, the Serbs and the Russians, than for their fellow Romanians who were Uniate. Nor did the Orthodox give much thought to political matters, questions of language, or the origins of the Romanian nation. For the followers of Visarion and Sofronie none of these elements of the modern conception of nation lay at the heart of community life. It was religion, in simplified form and suffused by the folk tradition, which gave rural society cohesiveness and made manifest a broader design for human existence. The Christian explanation of man’s place in the world determined the Orthodox believer’s thinking about the supreme events of his life—birth, death, and salvation—and the rituals of the church, which embodied age-old custom, served as his guide on what was for him an exceedingly uncertain temporal journey.

The reaction of the vast majority of the rural population to the church union with Rome must be viewed from this fundamentalist religious perspective. Their violent, uncompromising behavior was an act of self-defense against what they perceived as a threat both to individual salvation and to the very foundations of village social life. Disagreement over doctrine had little to do with their actions simply because the union had left them largely untouched. Their resistance was directed not at the doctrinal content of the union but against the idea of what they saw as drastic change in traditional ways of life forced upon them by “outsiders” in the guise of Uniate priests.

²¹ Nicolae Iorga, *Scrisori și inscripții ardeleni și maramureșene*, 2: *Inscripții și însemnări* (Bucharest, 1906), pp. 241, 243, 246, 247, 248, 250.

²² The chronicle *Plîngerea sfintei mănăstiri a Silvașului*, written by an Orthodox monk from Prislop, near Sibiu, in 1763, offers valuable insight into the Orthodox mentality of the period. See Dan Simonescu, ed., *Cronici și povești românești versificate (sec. XVII–XVIII)* (Bucharest, 1967), pp. 69–90.

²³ OL, EK, 1773/1614, f. 10–11; 1775/295, f. 7; 1776/126, f. 4–6.

III

Despite the massive shocks delivered to it by Visarion and Sofronie and the implacable popular antipathy which at times reduced it to a shambles, the church union with Rome survived. That it did was in no small measure due to the perseverance of a clergy whose dedication went beyond religious motives to embrace an entirely new idea of community. Beginning in the 1730s the bishops and an elite of Western-educated priests undertook a systematic campaign to establish the Uniate church as the independent, vigorous entity promised in the imperial diplomas of 1699 and 1701. In the process they evolved a theory of Romanian historical development that interwove elements of the Eastern religious tradition with modern ideas of nation. Yet, paradoxically, their efforts to draw all Romanians together into a single community produced an even greater cleavage between themselves and the Orthodox masses.

The pioneer in seeking full recognition of the Uniate clergy and faithful as a fourth constitutional nation was Bishop Ion Inochentie Klein (bishop 1729–1751). His ideas about the nature of the Romanian nation, a curious blend of respect for the existing system of estates and of spontaneous ethnic feeling, stamp him as a precursor of modern national consciousness.

At first, Klein worked within a religious framework. He limited his goals to the fulfillment of the terms of the two Leopoldine diplomas, for he recognized that these documents had been addressed to a religious, not an ethnic, group—to Uniates, not to Romanians. Thus, in petitions to the Court he cited provisions granting Uniate priests the status of nobles and demanded that they no longer be made to endure the indignities of serfs and that they be allowed to take their rightful places beside Magyar nobles and Saxon patricians in the governing councils of the principality.²⁴

In spite of his evident respect for constitutional norms and his appreciation for the importance of the union, Klein was, nonetheless, imbued with a sense of community that transcended both. He came from the same devout peasantry of southern Transylvania who followed Visarion and Sofronie, and although he had been trained in Jesuit colleges, he had never lost the feeling of solidarity with his native region, the product of distinctive religious observances and folk traditions. In all his acts the welfare and sense of unity of the greater Romanian community in Transylvania were never absent. His insistence that the union had been complete is a case in point. To persuade the Court and the Transylvanian estates that the Romanians

²⁴ OL, EK, 1731/111, f. 8–10, 19–22: Klein to the emperor, undated; Augustin Bunea, *Din istoria Românilor: Episcopul Ioan Inocențiu Klein (1728–1751)* (Blaj, 1900), pp. 37–39.

had wholeheartedly embraced the union and, hence, were entitled to all the benefits of such piety, he conducted his own census in 1733 that showed only a few remaining “schismatics.” His primary aim was not the welfare of the union at all, but the material and cultural progress of the Romanians, which the imperial diplomas, if carried out, would make possible. Evidence of Klein’s true feelings toward the union as merely the means to an end was his reluctance to impose the new order in the villages. While, on the one hand, he trumpeted the unanimous adherence of the Romanians to the union, on the other, he made no significant effort to promote it. His chief concern was nation rather than confession, and he knew the peasantry from which he himself sprang well enough to fear that any attempt at proselytizing would turn Romanian against Romanian.

As time passed Klein came to think primarily in ethnic terms. His use of the word “nation” suggests that he drew no distinction, other than a legal one, between Uniate and Orthodox. Although as late as 1743 and 1744 in petitions to the Court he used the term *natio* to refer only to members of the Uniate church,²⁵ this restricted meaning was obviously dictated by the purpose at hand: to persuade those who guarded their prerogatives jealously and were unmoved by appeals to ethnic equality that at least a part of the Romanians were by law entitled to a place among them. In other circumstances, however, he almost always used “nation” in the broader, modern sense to designate a community united by common origins and customs. For example, in petitions to Vienna in 1742 and 1744 he pleaded eloquently for relief from the heavy burdens of serfdom for the “tax-paying population,” that is, for the Romanian peasant regardless of confession.²⁶ At other times, to buttress his demand for Romanian representation in the government of Transylvania, he argued that the “Romanian nation” was larger and paid more in taxes than any of the other nations of Transylvania.²⁷ The rudiments of historicism are also present in Klein’s thought. He viewed the evolution of the Romanian nation from a broad perspective that relegated the union with Rome to the status of a mere episode, and for the first time he used the idea of the descent of the Romanians from the Roman conquerors of Dacia as an argument on behalf of equality with the three nations.²⁸

²⁵ Hurmuzaki, *Documente*, 6: 567–69, 575–76.

²⁶ Nicolae Nilles, *Symbolae ad illustrandam historiam ecclesiae orientalis in terris Coronae S. Stephani*, 2 vols. (Oeniponte, 1885), 2: 519.

²⁷ OL, EK, 1735/28, f. 2–4: Klein’s petition of 8 March 1735.

²⁸ OL, EK, 1735/93, f. 2–4: discussion of Klein’s petition to the Transylvanian Chancellery in Vienna on 18 April 1735; Nilles, *Symbolae*, 2: 528: Klein to Joseph Hundegger, Jesuit superior in Sibiu, 19 March 1735.

Klein was a major influence on subsequent generations, but in his own day he stood practically alone. He made no attempt to create a movement or to give his ideas about Romanian nationhood and historical development the coherence of a doctrine. These tasks were left to the second generation of Uniate leaders. Inspired by Klein's example, they expanded on his idea of nation and laid the groundwork for a true national ideology.

The differences between Klein and his spiritual descendants appear most striking when we consider their respective attitudes toward the union. Whereas for Klein it had been merely a tool to achieve other ends, for his successors it became the centerpiece of a new theory of nationhood. The union explained the Romanians' place in history and showed the Uniate intellectuals how they themselves might shape the future course of their people's development.

Klein's successors—Bishops Petru Aron (1751–1764), Atanasie Rednic (1764–1772), and Grigorie Maior (1772–1782)—and their assistants worked ceaselessly to rebuild and expand the union. Their missionary zeal among the “schismatics” was implacable. The ascetic Aron and Rednic spared no effort to eradicate “ignorance” and “error” among the common people, and Maior seized churches, made forced conversions, and maintained the fiction of the completeness of the union by treating the Orthodox clergy as his own.²⁹ They all placed great hope in education. Aron and Rednic were particularly anxious to increase the number of well-trained priests as the most effective weapon in combatting the “schism.” Aron opened both the Seminary of Bunavestire in 1760 and, a short time later, a Basilian monastery at Blaj (Balázsfalva; Blasendorf), the diocesan headquarters; Rednic expanded the enrollments at both institutions and in 1766 began the practice of sending the brightest students to the Pazmaneum Institute in Vienna. Maior, on the other hand, stressed the importance of primary schools for the common people as the most direct method of undoing the “nefarious influences” of itinerant monks and teachers from Wallachia and other Orthodox centers.³⁰

Aron and his contemporaries used, for the first time, the printed word to defend the union, and in so doing inaugurated an original religious literature among Romanian Uniates. Characteristic of these writings was *Floarea adevărului* (The flower of truth), composed in 1750 by Aron, Rednic, Maior, and several other monks at Blaj. Their purpose was to demonstrate the truths of the union by citations from the Bible and appropriate liturgical works. Interestingly enough, they drew their arguments solely from Ortho-

²⁹ OL, EK, 1775/149, f. 8–10.

³⁰ OL, EK, 1775/295, f. 7: Tóth, *Erdélyi román nacionalizmus*, pp. 244–51.

dox church books published in the Romanian principalities.³¹ Aron also wrote *Păstoricească datorie* (Pastoral duty) in 1759, an erudite work based upon Orthodox canonical and patristic literature intended to prove that ordinations of priests in foreign dioceses, i.e., Carlovitz and the Romanian principalities, were without validity in Transylvania, and to combat “superstitious” practices among the mass of the faithful.³²

This zeal notwithstanding, the defense of the union by these intellectuals was not solely a religious act. It was, rather, linked to a broader conception of historical development, which in turn reflected the shifting cultural patterns of mid-eighteenth-century Transylvania. Uniate intellectuals were very much men of their time. Without in the least denying the tenets of their faith or rejecting the ultimate divine authority over men, they nonetheless exuded an unshakeable confidence in education and reason as the proper guides to social and spiritual fulfillment in this world. Belief in progress and in their ability to control their own destiny stamps them as men of the new age of Enlightenment.

The church union provided a theoretical justification of their belief in progress and gave substance to the idea, “Romanian nation.” It explained the history of the Romanians since Roman times—their rise and fall—and presaged a new age of glory. The weaving of these ideas into a coherent doctrine signified nothing less than a reconciliation between East and West, which, moreover, provides the key to an understanding of all modern theories of Romanian nationalism. In trying to harmonize the patriarchal Orthodox tradition of an essentially rural world with the dynamic spirit of urban Europe, Uniate intellectuals made an indispensable contribution to the creation of the new, distinctive entity called “Romanian.”

Their ideas were given coherent form for the first time in *Despre schismaticia grecilor* (On the Schism of the Greeks), written in 1746 by Gerontie Cotorea, a monk and later vicar-general of the Uniate church. Cotorea forcefully asserted the direct descent of the Romanians from the Roman conquerors of Dacia. This idea was common coinage among Romanian intellectuals of the period. The novelty of Cotorea’s argument lay in his identification of the ancient Romans with the Church of Rome and his linking of the decline of the Romanian nation in the Middle Ages to their abandonment of the Western church in favor of Eastern Orthodoxy. He discerned a striking analogy between the “decadence” of the Romani-

³¹ Ioan Bianu, Nerva Hodoș, and Dan Simonescu, *Bibliografia românească veche, 1508–1830*, 4 vols. (Bucharest, 1903–1944), 3: 141–44.

³² Augustin Bunea, *Episcopii Petru Paul Aron și Dionisiu Novacovici* (Blaj, 1902), pp. 369–70, 386–87.

ans and the widely accepted explanation of the fall of Constantinople to the Turks. The cause of both tragedies, he argued, had been the separation of the Romanians and the Greeks from Rome. It was too late for a revival of Byzantium. But Cotorea was certain that the Romanians stood on the threshold of a renaissance, if only they would return to the Mother Church.³³ He thus saw the union as a reaffirmation of the inherent Latinity of the Romanians. But he had no intention of abandoning the spiritual culture of Eastern Orthodoxy, for he (and his colleagues) recognized it as a determinant of national character at least equal to Romanness. The task Cotorea had set for himself, then, was to connect the Rome of Trajan with the Rome of Peter and Paul and to reawaken in his fellow Romanians a consciousness of their Western origins without at the same time requiring them to sacrifice their Eastern heritage.

The second Uniate generation thus conceived of their church as an entity quite different from Klein's. Whereas he had treated it as something imposed from the outside, they revered it as a peculiarly Romanian institution, or, in modern terms, as the embodiment of the national spirit. Such an interpretation is suggested by their use of "Romano-Valachus" beginning in the 1740s to describe Romanians who had united. They clearly accepted an identification with Eastern Orthodoxy, which is inherent in the word "Valachus," for it differentiated Romanians from the other inhabitants of Transylvania—the Lutheran Saxons and the Calvinist and Roman Catholic Magyars. But, in their minds, the link to Rome ("Roman"), established by the union, further differentiated the Romanians from the surrounding Slav Orthodox—the Serbs, in particular. Thus, by removing the Romanians of Transylvania from the Orthodox International, Cotorea and company seem to have placed ethnic interests, represented by the Uniate church, ahead of religion.

Uniate intellectuals clearly regarded their church as a Romanian national institution. The most striking evidence of their feelings was their uncompromising opposition to the *teologus*, a Jesuit "adviser" to Uniate bishops whose chief task was to maintain the doctrinal and liturgical purity of the new church. Uniate intellectuals objected to such tutelage on national rather than religious grounds, for, in their eyes, the "theologian" was a foreigner whose duty it was to make their church as Catholic as possible and subordinate it to the Hungarian Roman Catholic hierarchy.³⁴ They

³³ Zoltán I. Tóth, "Cotorea Gerontius és az erdélyi román nemzeti öntudat ébredése," *Hitel* 9, no. 2 (1944): 89–91.

³⁴ Bunea, *Episcopii Aron și Novacovici*, pp. 11–30; OL, EK, 1773/1607, f. 5–6: petition of Maior, Silvestru Caliani, and Ignatie Darabant to Maria Theresa, probably in March 1773.

manifested similar sentiments when it came to the election of a foreigner as bishop. After the resignation of Klein in 1751,³⁵ the Court of Vienna favored as his successor Manuil Ol'shavs'kyi, the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Uniate Bishop of Mukachevo (Munkács), but the outcry from the Romanian clergy was so intense that the plan had to be abandoned. Uniate intellectuals also objected to conversions to Roman Catholicism. Grigorie Maior turned this seemingly confessional dispute into a political question. He was afraid that many Uniates, especially those in government, would be tempted to become Roman Catholics in order to further their careers, and he knew from the past history of the Romanians that such conversions were usually the prelude to ethnic assimilation. He therefore petitioned the Court repeatedly to guarantee Uniate nobles and sons of priests the same access to public office as their Catholic counterparts.³⁶

The implacable opposition of Uniate intellectuals to the Latinization of their church created a paradox. On the one hand, they took immense pride in the union as a return to their Roman origins, but, on the other, they refused to make their church more Roman. Such behavior suggests an ethnic and cultural conception of nation quite in keeping with the modern spirit.

IV

Some general conclusions about the state of Romanian national feeling on the threshold of the modern age can now be formulated. Any assessment of this complicated question must first of all take account of the fact that both the followers of Visarion and Sofronie and the Uniate intellectuals viewed the Romanian nation from a religious perspective. Although they acknowledged the ethnic identity of all Romanians, ethnicity itself had not yet become the dominant criterion of membership in the community that it was to assume in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For the Romanian Orthodox and Uniates of the mid-eighteenth century that criterion was still the degree of commitment to the Eastern religious tradition. Nonetheless, as has already been suggested, there were substantial differences between their respective world views.

³⁵ Klein had left Transylvania in 1744 and lived in Rome until his death in 1768.

³⁶ OL, EK, 1773/1680, f. 37: minutes of the nineteenth session of a conference of Uniate bishops in Vienna, March and April 1773; 1778/716, f. 2-3: Maior to the Transylvanian chancellor, 5 May 1778.

The climate of opinion in the Orthodox rural communities was ahistorical. The followers of Visarion and Sofronie displayed little sense of history or of social and economic development. From popular tradition a few of them may have gleaned a hint of their Roman ancestry, but they did not place themselves in a historical context. Rather, they saw their own lives in terms of the biblical story of man's fall and redemption; hence, the Christian past was their present, and ancient beliefs and practices were models of daily life. These ideas, which largely shaped their notions of social change, and the resistance they mounted against the union suggest affinities with millenarianism. The petitions, the "synods," and the violence were a cry of protest against an evil world, but, like millenarians elsewhere, they had only the vaguest idea of what the future should be like and no effective strategy to bring their goals to fruition.

The climate of opinion in the village was also non-national. As we have seen, religious concerns were paramount, and when the supporters of Visarion and Sofronie contemplated membership in a community beyond the village, they considered themselves a part of the Orthodox world. They were by no means lacking in ethnic consciousness, for they clearly recognized the differences in speech and customs between themselves and the Serbs, for example, but the idea of nation as the natural division among men was utterly foreign to their way of thinking. When, for example, Sofronie and his supporters called themselves "Nos Valachi non Uniti" and "Orthodoxi romeni," they were emphasizing religion as the supreme test of membership in the community.³⁷ Yet it must be emphasized that for the mass of the Orthodox faithful religion meant the outward forms of observance—attendance at Sunday services, the keeping of fasts and holidays, the veneration of icons—and not doctrinal subtleties. Hence, in defending the faith against the perceived innovations of the union, they were in fact protecting a folk heritage bequeathed to them by past generations, not a specific theology. The terms they used to describe themselves—"Gens valachica" and "natio valachica"—therefore, represented a religious conception, but one with strong popular, ethnic connotations.

The Orthodox drew no political conclusions from their sense of ethnicity. Nor did they investigate the history of their people and the origins of the language they spoke. The Roman descent of the Romanians or the Latin character of their language did not concern them, for they saw no

³⁷ OL, EK, 1760/656, f. 16: a letter of Sofronie, 21 November 1760; 1760/685, f. 7–8: a letter from the Orthodox faithful to the Transylvanian government, probably in December 1760.

relation between such things and the processes of salvation. Hence, they were incapable of formulating a theory of the historical development of the Romanian people and of organizing a movement to achieve truly national goals.

In certain respects the thought of the second generation of Uniate intellectuals about community paralleled that of the Orthodox. They, too, treated the Romanian nation within a religious context, as the distinctions they made between themselves and "schismatics" and their often harsh treatment of the latter attest.³⁸ Yet Aron, Maior, and company regarded the union as much more than a contest between two confessions. All Uniate intellectuals of the period subscribed to Cotorea's theory of the church union as a reaffirmation of Roman origins. In this modern context they made no distinction between Orthodox and Uniate, and their efforts to bring all Romanians within the union must, therefore, be seen as a recognition of the essential oneness of the Romanian nation. But this is not yet modern national consciousness. The approach to ethnic unity taken by the Uniate intellectuals differed considerably from that of Romanian national leaders in the nineteenth century. It was still based primarily on legal precedents and privileged castes rather than on an organic view of nation that blurred all distinctions between its members except the ethnic.

Nonetheless, the activities of the Uniate intellectuals marked the decisive departure from spontaneous folk consciousness. In elaborating an idea of nation that fused Roman ethnic origins and the Eastern spiritual tradition, they opened the way for a reconciliation of all Romanians. They offered as the basis of community a common heritage that encompassed religion and at the same time surpassed it.

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³⁸ See, for example, Grigorie Maior's petition to Maria Theresa, 12 March 1775: OL, EK, 1775/295.

The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding

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In Western Europe the development of national consciousness is linked so closely with the evolution of the state that the process is usually referred to as the emergence of the nation-state.¹ As traced by Marc Bloch, the first step in the process was the identification of the people and their territory by a distinct name.² This rudimentary sense of identity was accompanied, or soon followed, by the expression of political loyalty, perhaps at first to a dynasty, but leading to patriotism toward a country.³ This patriotism was further reinforced by the awareness of a developing historical tradition.⁴ Finally, a unifying linguistic medium emerged that facilitated the creation of a national language, literature, and culture.⁵ Religion, which held the

¹ See Charles Tilly, ed. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), and V. G. Kiernon, "State and Nation in Western Europe," *Past and Present*, 1965, no. 3, pp. 20–38. There is a large body of work devoted primarily to the study of nationalism as an ideology, but the development of national consciousness in pre-modern times has received little attention. Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism* (New York, 1951), Hugh Seton-Watson in *Nations and States* (Boulder, 1977) and, most recently, John Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill, 1984), all place greater emphasis on the historical antecedents of nationalism. The emergence of national consciousness in early modern Europe has been the subject of Orest Ranum, ed., *National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe* (Baltimore, 1975). Several ground-breaking articles have traced the origins of national sentiment from medieval times. See H. Koht, "The Dawn of Nationalism in Europe," *American Historical Review* 52, no. 2 (January 1947): 265–80; E. H. Kantorowicz, "Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought," *American Historical Review* 56, no. 3 (April 1951): 472–92; J. Huizinga, "Patriotism and Nationalism in European History," in his *Men and Ideas* (New York, 1959), pp. 97–155; K. Symmons-Symmonolewicz, "National Consciousness in Medieval Europe: Some Theoretical Problems," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 8, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 152–66, and his "National Consciousness and Social Theory," *ibid.* 7, no. 2 (Fall 1980): 386–90; also *idem*, "National Consciousness in Poland until the End of the Fourteenth Century: A Sociological Interpretation," *ibid.* 8, no. 2 (Fall 1981): 249–66.

² M. Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1971), 2: 432–37.

³ Koht, "Dawn of Nationalism," pp. 265–80.

⁴ Ranum, *National Consciousness*, pp. 3–18.

⁵ For the importance of a common language and culture, see Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe," in Tilly, *Formation of National States*, pp. 562–600; Carlton J. H. Hayes, in his clas-

greatest claim over the loyalties of medieval and early modern man, played an ambiguous role. As a supranational body, the church in some instances hindered emerging national sentiments. However, religious differences, when coupled with ethnic strife, sparked the most intense proto-national feelings in early modern Europe.⁶

The elements of national consciousness coalesced gradually within a state structure which was itself evolving. The usual sequence of European states includes the feudal state, the *Ständestaat*, the absolute monarchy, and the nineteenth-century constitutional monarchy.⁷ As a greater part of the population was drawn into the state structure, national consciousness expanded from a tiny elite to the upper and middle classes and, finally, to the masses.⁸ In early modern Europe, national consciousness reached only the elite and upper classes. However, the slow organic development of the Western nation-state allowed these elites to build political structures, historical traditions, national languages and literatures, and cultural institutions before the emergence of a mass society, with its problems of political participation, socioeconomic redistribution, and, of course, national feeling.

The model of the Western nation-state presumes that territory, political structure, ethnicity, language, and culture were all more or less coterminous. However, even the most often-cited example of the modern nation-state, France, had and continues to have its ethnic minorities and varied languages and cultures. Despite the numerous exceptions, the model of a Western nation-state does serve a purpose in pointing to a type of modern nation which evolved so gradually that historians have difficulty in pinpointing either its beginning or culmination, and which Hugh Seton-Watson has called "the old continuous nation."⁹

Only a small number of nations experienced this slow process. Most modern nations were not merely the result of an organic development, but were also consciously molded by intellectuals and politicians in the modern period. Nations that had undergone some elements of the nation-state

sic *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York, 1931), placed great importance on linguistic and cultural factors.

⁶ The fusion of religious, social, and cultural factors in producing intense proto-national sentiment is described by Frank E. Sysyn, "Ukrainian-Polish Relations in the Seventeenth Century: The Role of National Consciousness and National Conflict in the Khmelnytsky Movement," in *Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present*, ed. Peter Potichnyj (Edmonton and Toronto, 1980), pp. 58–82.

⁷ Gianfranco Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction* (Stanford, 1978); Tilly, *Formation of National States*.

⁸ Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation," pp. 562–600. Mass mobilization is the subject of Karl Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953).

⁹ Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp. 15–87.

formation but were divided among several political units launched movements for political unification. In the German case, this process consisted in consolidating existing native political units into a single nation-state. In the Polish case, national consolidation had to be accompanied by the overthrow of several foreign powers.

Another group of nationbuilders faced an even more formidable task. Whereas the advocates of political unification of existing nations could rely on present or past native political structures, as well as developed national languages and cultures, the leaders of new nations had to base their movements primarily on ethnicity and spoken language. It was their task to devise a unifying script, create a literature, and, at the same time, convince the populace that it belonged to a nation. In most instances, this intelligentsia had to face suspicious and hostile political authorities that tried to smother any budding national movement.¹⁰

It is almost axiomatic in Western historiography that Ukrainians belong to the category of new nations and that Ukrainian nationbuilding consisted primarily of transforming “ethnic-linguistic masses into a conscious Ukrainian political and cultural community.”¹¹ Although historians acknowledge that the nineteenth-century Ukrainian intelligentsia made use of some symbols and ideas from Cossack Ukraine, they see few direct links to it. My own contention is that any study of modern Ukrainian nationbuilding must consider the role of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian political unit called “Little Russia” by contemporaries, and subsequently labeled the “Hetmanate” by historians.

The Hetmanate’s origins can be traced to 1648, when Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi led the Zaporozhian army in a successful uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and gained control over most of the Ukraine. In 1654, under the terms of the Pereiaslav agreement, Khmel’nyts’kyi placed Cossack Ukraine under the suzerainty of the Muscovite tsar. After a prolonged series of wars, the Right-Bank Ukraine (west of the Dnieper River) was reincorporated into the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Left Bank (east of the Dnieper) remained a separate political entity under the protection of the tsar. It is this truncated Left-Bank successor to the polity established by Khmel’nyts’kyi that is usually referred to as the Hetmanate. Although its autonomy was seriously curtailed after Hetman Ivan Mazepa’s alliance with Sweden (1709), the

¹⁰ Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, pp. 143–91.

¹¹ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Role of the Ukraine in Modern History,” in *The Development of the USSR*, ed. Donald W. Treadgold (Seattle, 1964), p. 212.

Hetmanate retained its own institutions until the 1780s, when it became subject to the Russian imperial administration.

During the Hetmanate's long period of autonomy it developed a unique system of government which has close links to the military organization of the Cossack Host. The regiments and companies of the Zaporozhian army became attached to specific territories, and Cossack officers assumed administrative, judicial, and fiscal duties. The hetman, or leader, of the Cossacks and his staff functioned as a central government, whereas regimental and company officers became provincial and local administrators. The Cossack officials quickly solidified into a social stratum that in many respects resembled a landed nobility.¹² This elite underwent some of the stages in organic, pre-modern nationbuilding that resulted in the formation of a "Little Russian" identity.

According to Marc Bloch, an important factor in Western nationbuilding was the elite's identification of a specific territory and people by a single name.¹³ In the Ukrainian case establishing such a name was particularly complex, because, as Mykola Kostomarov pointed out over a century ago, throughout history Ukrainians had used a multiplicity of names for self-identification.¹⁴ Terms used most frequently were "Rus'," "Little Russia" (*Mala Rus'*, *Mala Rossiia*, *Malorossia*), and "Ukraine" (*Ukraina*). "Rus'" was, of course, the most ancient name originating with the Kievan realm. It included the concept of "Rus'" territory, dynasty (the Rurikides), and church (the metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus'). After the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols (1240), Galicia-Volhynia and Suzdalia became the two major claimants to the Rus' tradition. Of primary importance in the struggle over the inheritance of legitimacy from Rus' was the residence of the metropolitan "of Kiev and all Rus'." In 1301 the metropolitan moved from Kiev to the Suzdal lands—first to Vladimir and then to Moscow. The Galician princes, insisted, however, that the metropolitan reside on their territory. Perhaps because of fears that the Galician-Volhynian principedom was tainted by close contacts with Catholic states, the ecumenical patriarch and the Greek prelates favored the north, but, under the impact of political events, relented and granted Galicia a Rus' metropolitan as well.

¹² Zenon E. Kohut, "The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility," in *The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe*, ed. Ivo Banac and Paul Bushkovitch (New Haven, 1983), pp. 65–97; Aleksandra Efimenko, "Malorusskoe dvorianstvo i ego sud'ba," in *Iuzhnaia Rus': Ocherki, issledovaniia, i zametki*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1905), 1: 145–200.

¹³ Bloch, *Feudal Society*, 2: 432–37.

¹⁴ M. Kostomarov, "Dve russkiiia narodnosti," *Osnova*, 1861, no. 3 (March), p. 40.

In order to distinguish the two metropolitans of Rus', the patriarch and the Greek prelates began to use the terms "Major Rus'" and "Minor Rus'."¹⁵ The reasons for choosing the terms remain obscure. They might simply have reflected that the Galician metropolitan had fewer eparchies than the Suzdal one, or they might have come about due to an ancient Greek practice of denoting the homeland as "minor" while the colonies were labelled as "major" (e.g., "Magna Graecia" for the Greek colonies in Italy). Whatever the conceptual underpinnings, the terms gained acceptance in ecclesiastical circles and by the 1330s entered the political sphere. Whereas the Galician princes utilized a number of variants of Rus' in their titles, e.g., "Dux totius terrae Russiae," "Dux et Dominus Russiae," and even "Rex Russiae," the last prince of Galicia, Iurii II Boleslav, on occasion also called himself "Dux totius Russiae Minoris."¹⁶

As a political designation "Little Rus'" faded with the demise of the Galician Principality (1340), but it continued to be important in the expanded battles over the Rus' metropolitanate. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Poland, Lithuania, and Muscovy vied for metropolitanates of Rus' and, at times, there were three Rus' metropolitans at the same time. The ecumenical patriarch attempted to maintain one Rus' church with one metropolitan of "Kiev and all Rus'" residing primarily in Muscovy, but the political situation made this impossible. By the second half of the fifteenth century, the Rus' church was not only divided into separate branches, but solidified into separate eastern and western churches. The western Rus' church under Lithuania was headed by the metropolitan of Kiev and all Rus', and the eastern Rus' church was headed by the metropolitan of Moscow and all Rus'. Each church had its own organization and hierarchy, with the western Rus' church still closely under the authority of the ecumenical patriarch. Since the Muscovite Rus' church was no longer tied to Kiev (even in the metropolitan's title), the distinction between "Little Rus'" and "Great Rus'" was probably no longer necessary, for the term "Little Rus'" disappeared by the latter part of the fifteenth century.¹⁷

During the sixteenth and seventeenth century, the term "Rus'" underwent some changes in meaning and spelling. Its use was retained in civil affairs of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (*Rus'*, *Russia*, *Rus'ke kniazhestvo*). Thus for both Ukrainians and Poles, "Rus'" meant the

¹⁵ The best discussion of the terms "Rus'" and "Little Russia" is by A. Solovev in "Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus'," *Voprosy istorii*, 1947, no. 7, pp. 24–38.

¹⁶ See the collection of essays, *Boleslav-Iurii II: Kniaz' vsei Maloi Rusi* (St. Petersburg, 1907).

¹⁷ Solovev, "Velikaia, Malaia i Belaia Rus'," p. 33.

people and land of the Ukraine and Belorussia, although by the early seventeenth century more often specifically of the Ukraine. To the east existed "Muscovy" and the "Muscovites." However, in ecclesiastical circles, under the influence of revived Greek learning, "Rus'" was gradually replaced by "Rossiia." In the late sixteenth century, the metropolitan of Kiev began calling himself metropolitan of all "Rossiia." As is clear from the texts, at that time "Rossiia" referred only to the Orthodox lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and not Muscovy. But under the Uniate challenge, Orthodox prelates began to seek support from the tsar of the other Rus' or "Rossiia"—Muscovy—and reintroduced the old term "Mala Rus'," now spelled "Malaia Rossiia." The term gained greater currency after the restoration of the Orthodox hierarchy in 1620.¹⁸

In addition to the various permutations of the word "Rus'," the term "Ukraine" was also used to designate the land and people, as is attested in the chronicle literature from the thirteenth century. Usually it referred to the borderlands of both the Kiev and Galician principalities. That meaning persisted through the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but then the term "Ukraine" was used to refer to the southeastern borderland of Poland-Lithuania. It was this middle Dnieper region which, as the frontier between Islam and Christianity, gave rise to the Cossack phenomenon. Soon "Ukraine" became virtually synonymous with the land of the Cossacks. The Cossacks referred to "Ukraine" as their "fatherland" or their "mother," and as the Cossack movement expanded geographically so the term "Ukraine" began to be applied to a larger and larger territory. The term was accepted by Western cartographers, who designated the land as "Ukraina que est terra Cossacorum."¹⁹

The successful Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising not only brought the Cossacks from the Ukraine's borderlands to its heartland, but also resulted in the creation of a new polity that needed a name. Officially, Khmel'nyts'kyi's polity was called "the Zaporozhian Army," which hardly resolved the question of what country, territory, or people were under the army's control. The attempts by contemporaries to deal with this problem reflect the varied political orientations and diffused identities of the period. "Rus'," "Ukraine," "Little Russia (Malorossiia)," "Zaporozhian Army," and "Cossacks" were all used singly or in various combinations to designate

¹⁸ The transformation of the term "Rus'" into "Rossiia" and then "Malorossiia" is best summarized by M. A. Maksimovich, "Ob upotreblenii nazvanii Rossiia i Malorossiia v Zapadnoi Rusi," in *Sobranie sochinenii*, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1877), 2: 307–311.

¹⁹ There is an extensive literature concerning the term "Ukraine." The best analysis of the historical evolution of the term is provided by Serhii Shelukhyn, *Ukraina—nazva nashoi zemli z naidavniishykh chasiv* (Prague, 1936), and V. Sichyns'kyi, *Nazva Ukrainy* (Augsburg, 1948).

the new entity and its inhabitants. Hetman Vyhovs'kyi in negotiations with the Swedes wrote about our "ancient Ukraine or Rus'," and Hetman Doroshenko in a letter referred to our "Orthodox Rus' Ukrainian people."²⁰ Perhaps the chronicler Samiilo Velychko best exemplified the terminological overabundance of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, for he used virtually interchangeably all the following terms: "Cossack Rus' Ukraine," "Cossack Ukraine," "Little Russian Ukraine," "Little Russia," and "Zaporozhian Army."²¹

But in the eighteenth century the term *Malorossiiia*, or "Little Russia," gradually displaced all others, although *Ukraina* was still used on occasion. "Little Russia" received official approbation when after the Pereiaslav agreement (1654), the tsar changed his title from "tsar of all Rus'" to "tsar of Great and Little Russia."²² After over a half-century of use by Muscovite authorities, it was accepted by Ukrainian society as the usual term for the Hetmanate. "Little Russia," then, did not refer to all of the Ukraine, but only to the truncated Left-Bank successor to the polity established by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Yet the elite considered this "Little Russia" to be their fatherland—a special land that they were bound to cherish and protect. By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian elite had identified a specific people, territory, and political structure with a distinct name.²³

The development of a specific Little Russian identity was further bolstered by the concept of "Little Russian rights and liberties." Contemporary sources often repeated the formula that as a "free people" (*vol'nyi narod*) the Little Russians had entered into voluntary agreements with the Polish king and later with the Muscovite tsar while always retaining their "rights and liberties" (*prava i vol'nosti*). The nature of these rights was imprecise, reflecting their diverse origins and the ambiguity of the Pereiaslav agreement and its subsequent revisions. At Pereiaslav, the hetman had acted as a Cossack commander, as a leader of a country, as a representative of the major social groups, and as a patron of the Orthodox religion. As a result, the tsar had become the protector of the Zaporozhian army, the Little Russian land, the principal social groups, and the Orthodox

²⁰ These examples are taken from *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva*, 3 vols. (Munich, 1949), 1: 15.

²¹ For a listing of Velychko's varied terminology, see Shelukhyn, *Ukraina*, pp. 145–50.

²² *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii*, vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1830), doc. 119, p. 325.

²³ By the middle of the eighteenth century, official documents (both Russian and Ukrainian), political and historical works, and even correspondence refer to the Hetmanate simply as "Little Russia."

faith. "Little Russian rights and liberties," therefore, included a mixture of sometimes contradictory socioeconomic, political and religious prerogatives. The Ukrainian populace expected the tsar not only to protect Little Russia from foreign invasion, but also to uphold these same "rights and liberties."²⁴

While the major segments of Ukrainian society believed that they had some sort of reciprocal agreement with the tsar, none was ever recognized by the tsarist authorities. From the Muscovite point of view, Little Russian rights and liberties were gifts of the tsar and could be rescinded whenever he wished. Moreover, the tsar claimed Little Russia not only on the basis of the submission at Pereiaslav in 1654, but as a hereditary land of Kievan Rus'—a claim facilitated by the theory of the transfer of princely seats advanced by a Ukrainian prelate in the basic treatise on East European history, the *Synopsis*.²⁵ Nevertheless, the tsar did reconfirm and amend "Little Russian rights and liberties" each time a new hetman assumed office (1657, 1659, 1663, 1665, 1669, 1672, 1674, 1687).²⁶ Thus, the tsar may have considered "Little Russia" as his patrimony, but de facto he recognized it as a special patrimony inhabited by privileged subjects.

The practical accommodation between the autocratic tsar and privileged Little Russian society changed significantly during the reign of Peter I. Perhaps the most dramatic innovation was the concept, as yet perceived only dimly, of the state as an entity separate from the tsar's patrimony. Ultimately, this outlook ascribed to the newly emerging Russian Empire a will and purpose of its own, and Peter would create an expanded and reinvigorated government machinery to serve it. This bureaucracy was to regulate the activities of the inhabitants in order to increase revenue, power, and glory for the state, but also to contribute to the common welfare. The inhabitants were no longer merely subjects or "slaves" of the tsar, but also servants of the state. Thus, Peter put Russia on the road to a goal-oriented, centrally regulated, absolutist monarchy—a type of "well-regulated" state

²⁴ A general description of Little Russian "rights and liberties" can be found in my "The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763–1786): A Case Study in the Integration of a Non-Russian Area into the Empire" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1975), pp. 9–40.

²⁵ See Jaroslaw Pelenski, "The Origins of the Official Muscovite Claims to the 'Kievan Inheritance,'" *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 1, no. 1 (March 1977): 29–52. The *Synopsis* is analyzed by I. P. Ieremin, "K istorii obshchestvennoi mysli na Ukraine vtoroi poloviny XVII v.," *Trudy Otdela drevnerusskoi literatury* 10 (1954): 212–22, and by S. L. Peshtich, "'Sinopsis' kak istoricheskoe proizvedenie," *ibid.* 15 (1958): 284–98.

²⁶ A. Iakovliv, *Ukrains'ko-moskovs'ki dohovory v XVII–XVIII vikakh*, Pratsi Ukrains'koho naukovoho instytutu, 19 (Warsaw, 1934).

which had emerged in eighteenth-century Central Europe.²⁷

The clash between the concept of a centrally regulated empire and the idea of Little Russian "rights and liberties" was inevitable. Little Russian society had no loyalty to the Russian state, yet believed the tsar to be its protector. Peter's reforms and centralizing tendencies exasperated the Cossack elite until, finally, Hetman Ivan Mazepa decided to end the tsar's protection over Little Russia (1709). Peter I, however, saw this change of allegiance not as a personal rebuke or betrayal, but as treason to the Russian state. It was clear that Peter considered the Hetmanate as simply a not yet integrated but nonetheless integral part of the Russian Empire.²⁸

It was the newly emerging imperial concept coupled with internal developments in the Hetmanate that sparked the crystallization of the Little Russian identity. The social basis for that identity was the new elite that emerged in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, after the Poltava debacle. In essence, this small stratum of Cossack officers had developed into a gentry and saw itself as comparable to the nobility of the Polish times, or *szlachta*. Indeed, many Cossack officers "traced" their origins to the pre-1648 *szlachta*. Thus the descendants of the rebels against the *szlachta* Commonwealth, after solidifying as a gentry, turned to the political and estate traditions of the *szlachta* estate as a model for the Hetmanate. Such identification received tacit legal recognition in the compendium of laws produced in the 1740s, the "Laws By Which the Little Russian People are Judged," and in the restoration of *szlachta* judicial courts in 1763 and 1764. But above all, the *szlachta* tendencies contributed to the new gentry's political outlook. According to the constitutional theory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the *szlachta* was the sole component of the political nation and thus was responsible for the country's rights, privileges, and current needs (expressed through the Diet). In the Hetmanate, the recently established *szlachta* also began to assume the role of the defender

²⁷ The gradual emergence of a state concept in seventeenth-century Muscovy is traced by G. Stökl, "Die Begriffe Reich, Herrschaft und Staat bei den orthodoxen Slaven," *Saeculum* 5, no. 1 (1954): 104–117; Peter I's emerging concepts of state are also noted by Richard Pipes, *Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1974), pp. 127–28; Peter's emulation of the "ordered" or "regulated" state has been proposed by V. I. Syromiantnikov, "Reguliarnoe gosudarstvo" *Petra Pervogo i ego ideologiiia* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1943). The whole question of the "well-ordered" state has recently been studied by Marc Raeff in "The Well-Ordered Police State and the Development of Modernity in Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-Century Europe: An Attempt at a Comparative Approach," *American Historical Review* 30, no. 5 (December 1975): 1221–43; and in his *The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600–1800* (New Haven, 1983).

²⁸ See O. Subtelny, "Mazepa, Peter I, and the Question of Treason," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 2 (June 1978): 158–83, and his "Russia and the Ukraine: The Difference that Peter Made," *Russian Review* 39, no. 1 (January 1980): 1–17.

of Little Russia, its constitutional arrangement, and its social structure—in short, to imitate somewhat a *szlachta* political nation.²⁹

The institutional forum for the elite's political role was the Officers' Council. Meeting during the Christmas and Easter holidays, it evolved from an informal gathering of officers, expressing holiday felicitations to the hetman, into a more elaborate and formal body with elected regional participants and a prescribed agenda.³⁰ For example, the 1763 council was attended by 100 middle- and high-ranking notables, representing all regions of the Hetmanate. The council adopted a program of administrative and judicial reforms, outlined an economic policy, and requested the tsar to confirm the rights of various social groups, particularly the *szlachta*. The council's discussions and the resulting petition to the tsar also gave a good indication of the elite's political views. Clearly, they viewed Little Russia as a separate country, possessing its own borders, government, and institutions. Admittedly, Little Russia was connected to Russia by a common monarch, but the council reminded the Russian authorities that the submission to the tsar was based on treaties and recommended that the tsar again reconfirm the Pereiaslav agreement—a custom which had been abolished by Peter I.³¹

The rejection of the centralized Russian state was expressed explicitly in a political poem written in 1762 by an official in the Hetmanate, Semen Divovych. Entitled "A Dialogue Between Great Russia and Little Russia," the poem was dedicated to the "honor, glory, and defense of all Little Russia." It ascribed to the elite the paramount role in liberating the Hetmanate from the Polish yoke, and lamented the lack of proper recognition of Ukrainian military and noble ranks. In the poem, the personified Little Russia tells Great Russia that it swore allegiance to the tsar, not to Great Russia, and states clearly that Little Russia and Great Russia are separate lands bound only by a common monarch—a monarch who has always guaranteed Little Russian "rights and liberties."³²

Such Little Russian patriotism was further reinforced by a historical consciousness present in a relatively new literary genre—the Cossack chronicle. At a time when most literature was produced by churchmen, the Cossack chronicles were written by the clerks and officials of the Ukrainian

²⁹ Kohut, "Ukrainian Elite," pp. 65–97.

³⁰ On the evolution of the Officers' Council, see Lev Okinshevykh, *Tsentral'ni ustanovy Ukrainy-Het'manshchyny XVII–XVIII vv.*, pt. 2: *Rada starshyn*, Pratsi Komisii dlia vyyvchannia istorii zakhidno-rus'koho ta ukrains'koho prava, 8 (Kiev, 1930).

³¹ Kohut, "Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy," pp. 80–90.

³² A. V. Petrov, ed., "Rozgovor Velikorossii s Malorossiei: Literaturnyi pamiatnik vtoroi poloviny XVIII veka," *Kievskaiia starina* (hereafter *KS*), 1882, no. 2, pp. 313–65.

civil administration. In fact, the genre was to some extent sparked by indignation over the clergy's failure to discuss the Cossacks and the Hetmanate in their historical works. In 1718, Stefan Savyts'kyi, a clerk from the Lubny regiment, lamented the fact that none of his countrymen "particularly from the spiritual ranks, who since the time of emancipation from Poland lacked neither people capable of the task nor the necessary typographical means," had written a history of the Hetmanate.³³ The clerks and officials of the Hetmanate took up Savyts'kyi's challenge and produced a steady stream of chronicles and histories creating a Little Russian historical mythology.³⁴

The emergence of a historical consciousness, the expression of political loyalty to Little Russia and its constitutional and administrative prerogatives, and the clear identification of the people and territory with the term "Little Russia" all indicate that by the mid-eighteenth century the Ukrainian elite had undergone some of the stages of pre-modern nation-building. If a pre-modern Little Russian nation had not as yet matured, then, at the very least, the elite had shown a strong Little Russian identity—an identity with the potential of serving as a focal point in forming a modern "Little Russian" nation. But the introduction of the Russian imperial concept—which had at first helped crystallize the Little Russian identity—now undermined its base. During the reign of Catherine II, the autonomous institutions of the Hetmanate were gradually abolished, the Ukrainian elite was brought into the Russian nobility, and the peasants were

³³ M. Hrushevs'kyi, "Some Reflections on Ukrainian Historiography of the XVIII Century," in *The Eyewitness Chronicle*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies, 7, pt. 1 (Munich, 1972), p. 12.

³⁴ Two of the most famous eighteenth-century chroniclers were Hryhorii Hrabianka and Samuil Velychko. Hrabianka was published under the title *Deistviia prezel'noi i ot' nachala poliakov krvavshoi nebuvaloi brani Bogdana Khmel'nitskogo. . . Roku 1710* (Kiev, 1854); and Velychko under the title *Letopis' sobytii v Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii v XVII-veke. Sostavil Samoil Velichko byvshii kantseliarist kantseliarii Voiska Zaporozhskogo, 1720* (Kiev), vol. 1 (1848), vol. 2 (1851), vol. 3 (1885), vol. 4 (1864). For a brief description, see Ia. I. Dzyra, "Samiilo Velychko ta ioho litopys," *Istoriografichni doslidzhennia v Ukraini'kii RSR* 4 (1971): 223–35. There were also many histories and chronicles written around the middle of the eighteenth century, among them: "Letopisets ili opisanie kratkoe znatneishikh deistv i sluchaev. . .," published in *Sbornik letopisei, odnosiaschchikhsia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rusy* (Kiev, 1888), pp. 1–69 (another version appeared in *Iuzhno-russkiiia letopisi* 1: 51–106); "Kratkoe opisanie Malorossii" was first published by V. Ruban in 1777 as part of *Kratkaia letopis' Malyia Rossii 1506 po 1776 god.* (St. Petersburg, 1777) and as a supplement to *Letopis' Samovidtsa po novo-otkrytyim spiskam* (Kiev, 1878); P. Simonovskii, *Kratkoe opisanie o kozatskom malorossiiskom narode. . .* (Moscow, 1847).

completely enserfed.³⁵ The disappearance of Little Russia as a distinct political and administrative entity deprived the elite of the major symbols of a distinct Little Russian identity.

The Ukrainian elite, of course, protested against the attempts to impose a uniform Russian imperial state. Approximately 950 Ukrainian nobles participating in Catherine II's Legislative Commission signed petitions for the continuation of the Hetmanate's autonomy (1767). In fact, some of the elections to the Legislative Commission became so stormy that thirty-six nobles were sentenced to death for refusing to retract their demands for the election of a new hetman (the harsh sentences were eventually commuted).³⁶ Political theorists such as Hryhorii Poletyka advanced several projects for reform which they hoped would both placate the imperial authorities and retain "Little Russian rights and liberties."³⁷ But these efforts were to no avail. The leveling of the Hetmanate's institutions continued unabated. Moreover, the rights to Russian nobility, complete enserfment of the peasantry, and unprecedented opportunities for imperial careers had shown the Ukrainian elite some of the advantages of integration into the imperial system.

While the leveling of the Hetmanate's institutions was undercutting the basis for a Little Russian identity, a gradual cultural transformation was bringing the Ukrainian elite into an imperial cultural milieu. Culturally, the Ukrainian gentry was directly or indirectly the product of the Kiev Academy or its educational satellites—the Chernihiv and Kharkiv Collegia. At the beginning of the eighteenth century a graduate of these schools would have a good knowledge of Latin, Polish, a Ukrainian rendition of Church Slavonic, Slavono-Ukrainian (a mixture of Slavonic and Ukrainian), and, perhaps, a smattering of classical Greek or of German. Latin and Polish were the elite's window to world culture; Slavonic served not only as a sacred language, but was considered appropriate for use in high literary genres such as drama. Slavono-Ukrainian—in various combinations and forms—was the most extensively used linguistic medium, prevailing in the world of officialdom, in personal correspondence, and in literary genres such as poetry, drama, sermons, and oratorical works. Colloquial Ukrainian was reserved for *interludia* and *intermedia*—humorous

³⁵ Kohut, "Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy," pp. 208–280.

³⁶ For the Ukrainian elite's participation in the Legislative Commission, see Kohut, "Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy," pp. 133–207.

³⁷ Zenon E. Kohut, "A Gentry Democracy Within an Autocracy: The Politics of Hryhorii Poletyka (1723/25–1784)," *Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak by His Students and Colleagues on His Sixtieth Birthday* = *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 3/4 (1979–80), pt. 2: 507–519.

skits performed between the acts of serious drama.³⁸

In Russia, an adaption of Ukrainian Slavonic largely replaced the Muscovite version by the early eighteenth century. This new version of Slavonic was cleansed of Ukrainianisms in vocabulary, but retained the Ukrainian version's structure and form of exposition.³⁹ At the same time, the Kiev Academy was adopted as a model for Russian schools, which were frequently staffed by its graduates. By the mid-eighteenth century, Ukrainian clerics and monks assumed a very influential, if not dominant, position within the imperial Orthodox church.⁴⁰ The end result was the creation of a fairly unified Slavonic Orthodox cultural milieu.

Outside the religious realm, Russia in the eighteenth century made giant strides in the development of a modern literary Russian language and secular Russian literary culture. At the turn of the century, the Russian literary scene was somewhat analogous to the situation in the Ukraine. Literary works were written in an admixture of Slavonic, chancery Muscovite, and colloquial Russian. The "higher" the genre, the closer it came to Slavonic. Lomonosov's theory of three styles allowed more genres to be produced in a middle style, in a linguistic medium that was developing into literary Russian.⁴¹ The process of forming modern literary Russian was facilitated by the publication of grammars and dictionaries. Also, the civil alphabet introduced by Peter I sharpened the distinction between church and civil linguistic forms. The state became the publisher of the printed word and the promoter of secular Russian culture.⁴²

³⁸ For information on the elite's education, see Oleksander Hrushevs'kyi, "Zminy shkil'noi systemy na Livoberezhzhi v XVIII v.," *Ukraina*, 1924, nos. 1–2, pp. 82–87; for changes in literary production, language, and culture in the eighteenth century, see P. Zhitetskii, "Eneida" Kotliarevskogo i drevneishii spisok ee v sviazi s obzorom maloruskoi literatury XVIII veka, serialized in *KS*, 1899, no. 10, pp. 1–30; no. 11, pp. 127–66; no. 12, pp. 277–300; 1900, no. 1, pp. 16–45; no. 2, pp. 163–91; no. 3, pp. 312–36. For a discussion of the literary language, see George Y. Shevelov, "Evolution of the Ukrainian Literary Language," in *Rethinking Ukrainian History*, ed. Ivan L. Rydnytsky (Edmonton, 1981), pp. 216–31; M. A. Zhovtobriukh, "Davni tradytsii v novii ukrains'kii literaturnii movi," *Movoznavstvo*, 1970, no. 2, pp. 24–40; P. P. Pliushch, *Istoriia ukrains'koi literaturnoi movy* (Kiev, 1971), pp. 215–52; I. K. Bilodid, "Movna kontseptsiiia Kyievo-Mohylians'koi Akademii," in his *Kyievo-Mohylians'ka akademiia z istorii skhidnoslov'ians'kykh literaturnykh mov* (Kiev, 1979), pp. 48–84.

³⁹ V. V. Vinogradov, *Ocherki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo iazyka XVII–XIX v.v.* (Leiden, 1949), pp. 17–27.

⁴⁰ K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vliianie na velikoruskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn'* (Kazan, 1914).

⁴¹ Vinogradov, *Ocherki*, pp. 95–119.

⁴² Vinogradov, *Ocherki*, pp. 72–84.

The imperial development of language, literature, and culture had a profound impact on the Ukraine. In 1721 a Petrine decree permitted monasteries in the Ukraine to publish only religious works, and then only in linguistic conformity with Russian imperial norms. Because there was no secular typography in the Hetmanate, the decree in effect reduced whole genres of Ukrainian literature to a manuscript tradition.⁴³ Moreover, under the impact of daily intercourse, the chancery Slavono-Ukrainian was being gradually replaced by Slavono-Russian (although on the local level a Ukrainian chancery language was in use until the nineteenth century). As more and more literary, scientific, and practical works were becoming available in Russian, the developing literary Russian language replaced Polish as the medium of contact for the Ukrainian elite with the outside world. All these changes signified the gradual demise of literary Slavono-Ukrainian, so much so that by the 1780s, it was removed from the Kiev Academy and replaced by Russian.⁴⁴

Much had changed if one compares the cultural world of a typical Ukrainian nobleman at the beginning and at the end of the eighteenth century. Both would still learn a good deal of Church Slavonic, but whereas at the beginning of the century several high genres were written in Slavonic, by the end Slavonic was relegated strictly to the religious realm. Both nobles would have a working knowledge of Latin with a smattering of classical Greek. However, the Slavono-Ukrainian used extensively in administration and literature in 1700 had by 1800 been replaced by Slavono-Russian—a language which was evolving into a standard literary Russian. This language was further reinforced by a vigorous imperial publication program which produced works dealing with all aspects of the secular world, from practical manuals to translations of foreign literature. In fact, the newly emerging literary Russian language also replaced Polish as the medium for contact with the non-Orthodox world. Contact with the West was further strengthened by an increased knowledge of German and, by the end of the century, of French.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ukrainian elite fit well into the imperial cultural milieu. Since many Ukrainian nobles still learned their letters from the Slavonic Psalter and other sacred texts, Slavonic or “bookish” Russian sounded both learned and native. For the Ukrainian gentry, the replacement of Slavono-Ukrainian with Slavono-Russian or simply Russian was so gradual that it was barely perceived. It meant the displacement of one unspoken “book language” by another, while the Slavonic

⁴³ Zhitetskii, “Eneida,” *KS*, 1899, no. 10, pp. 6–30.

⁴⁴ Zhitetskii, “Eneida,” *KS*, 1899, no. 11, pp. 129–35.

component in both gave the illusion of continuity. It is true that colloquial Ukrainian could still be used for “low-style” genres, particularly for travesties and humor. This was not insignificant, for it was precisely from such low-style humor that modern Ukrainian literature was born (Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi, author of the first published modern Ukrainian literary work, was a nobleman from the Hetmanate). But for the Ukrainian gentry this was mere local humor and color. They could not conceive of the language spoken by the people as a medium for high culture. By the end of the eighteenth century they shared in an imperial high culture that was both cosmopolitan and Russian.

Immersion into a cosmopolitan Russian cultural milieu did not preclude the existence of a very strong Little Russian patriotism. The Little Russian identity combined Russian imperial culture with an attachment to the Hetmanate and its institutions. Vasyl’ Kapnist (Vasilii Kapnist) is a good example of the Little Russian identity at the end of the eighteenth century. A well-known imperial literary figure who wrote in Russian, he also advanced a project to restore the Hetmanate’s Cossack formations and, in general, was an ardent defender of the few remaining Little Russian prerogatives. It is almost certain that Kapnist held secret talks with the Prussian king, seeking Prussia’s support for a reconstituted Little Russia.⁴⁵ While others were not as extreme in their devotion, efforts at either preserving or restoring some of the Hetmanate’s institutions persisted through the first half of the nineteenth century. Occasionally, these traditionalists met with limited success. Emperor Paul I partially restored the Hetmanate’s judicial system; the Lithuanian Statute survived as the basic law code until 1843; and the Hetmanate’s inheritance and property laws were in use until the Russian Revolution.⁴⁶

The few surviving native legal practices, however, were hardly sufficient for the preservation of a strong Little Russian identity. With the possibility of restoring the Hetmanate’s major institutions waning, patriots were reduced to bemoaning Little Russia’s fate in manuscript tracts. The most influential political work produced in the early nineteenth century was *Istoriia Rusov*. Written anonymously in Russian, it was a thoroughly modernized apology for Little Russia and its rights and liberties. Here

⁴⁵ On V. Kapnist’s activities on behalf of the Hetmanate, see O. Ohloblyn, *Liudy Staroi Ukrainy* (Munich, 1959), pp. 49–114. For the debate over Kapnist’s secret talks with the Prussian king, see William B. Edgerton, “Laying a Legend to Rest: The Poet Kapnist and Ukraino-German Intrigue,” *Slavic Review* 30, no. 3 (September 1971): 551–60; and O. Ohloblyn, “Berlins’ka misiia Kapnista 1791 roku: Istoriografia i metodolohiia pytannia,” *Ukrains’kyi istoryk*, 1974, nos. 1–3, pp. 85–103.

⁴⁶ Kohut, “Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy,” pp. 227–80, 298–303.

Little Russia is portrayed as a major power in Eastern Europe, whose destruction had upset the balance of power. The author was well acquainted with the ideas emanating from the American and French Revolutions, as well as concepts of natural law and the balance of power. Implicit in the work is the hope that Little Russia would be restored to its rightful place in the family of nations. It also shows a new interest in the question of national terminology, arguing that the Russians had stolen the name "Rus" from the Ukrainians.⁴⁷

In decrying Little Russia's fate, the patriots recorded it. From the time of the Hetmanate's abolition in the 1780s until the 1830s, the Ukrainian gentry compiled and published topographical descriptions, genealogies, local histories, family archives, and several works of synthesis.⁴⁸ But this surge in historical consciousness did not reflect a further development of the Little Russian identity, but rather a belief in its imminent demise. The abolition of the institutions of the Hetmanate convinced many Little Russian patriots that they were epigones of a country and a nation that had ceased to exist. Oleksa Martos captured this mood in his diary while visiting the grave of Hetman Mazepa in Moldavia in 1812:

Mazepa died far away from his country, whose independence he defended. He was a friend of liberty and therefore deserves to be honored by posterity. After his expulsion from Little Russia, its inhabitants lost their sacred rights, which Mazepa had defended for so long with great enthusiasm and patriotic ardor. He is no more, and the name of Little Russia and its brave Cossacks have disappeared from the list of nations who, although small in numbers, are yet famous for their way of life and their constitution.

Now rich Little Russia is reduced to two or three provinces. That this is the common destiny of states and republics, we can see from the history of other nations.⁴⁹

Such was the peculiar fate of the Little Russian identity. Rather than evolve into a modern Little Russian national consciousness, the Little Russian identity was gradually channeled into a peculiar *Landespatritismus* that lamented the demise of a Little Russian "nation."

What, then, was the role of the Little Russian identity in the process of Ukrainian nationbuilding? If viewed in terms of a direct linear development, the emergence of a Little Russian identity was merely a pale and ultimately aborted reflection of the West European nationbuilding model. But if one considers national development as a dialectical rather than linear process, then the emergence of a Little Russian identity can be considered an

⁴⁷ O. Ohloblyn, ed., *Istoriia Rusiv* (New York, 1956).

⁴⁸ Dmytro Doroshenko, *A Survey of Ukrainian Historiography*, Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 5-6 (New York, 1957), pp. 92-116.

⁴⁹ Doroshenko, *Survey*, p. 112.

important step in Ukrainian nationbuilding. Because of their antiquarian interests and nostalgia, the Ukrainian gentry preserved at least a remnant of the Little Russian identity until the 1830s and 1840s. At the same time, under the influence of Herder and romanticism, a new generation discovered the Ukrainian folk with its vernacular language. Young students came to identify themselves by the term “Ukrainian,” which to them signified a cultural rather than a political affiliation.⁵⁰

For a while, the apolitical researchers of Ukrainian folk language and customs and the nostalgic Little Russian descendants of the elite of the former Hetmanate could pursue their activities without much contact. But after a time they inevitably clashed. The author of *Istoriia Rusov*, in writing this modernized swan song of the Little Russian identity, already witnessed the reemergence of the term “Ukraine” and fired a salvo against it.⁵¹ It was a clash of generations (fathers versus sons) and social groups (gentry versus newly-formed intelligentsia) over language (Russian versus Ukrainian) and orientation (restoration of Little Russian institutions versus apolitical Ukrainian cultural work). This clash helped spark modern Ukrainian nationbuilding because the intelligentsia of the 1840s combined Ukrainian cultural activities with the political outlook and historical consciousness that had been part of the Little Russian identity.⁵²

But only a part of the gentry and intelligentsia accepted the new Ukrainian national identity. With its Russian cultural base, the Little Russian identity also prepared its adherents for the All-Russian concept which postulated that the Little Russians were merely a branch of a single Russian nation. In fact, D. B. Saunders has argued that the “Little Russians” were the first to raise the question of Russia’s own national identity. He claims that these Ukrainians played a substantial part in defining Russian *narodnost’* and prepared the ground for Slavophilism—thus making a contribution to imperial ideology and Russian nationalism.⁵³

⁵⁰ For an overview of the activities of the early ethnographers, see Boris P. Kirdan, *Sobiratel’ narodnoi poezii: Iz istorii ukrainskoi fol’kloristiki XIX v.* (Moscow, 1974); an anthology of the literature was compiled by Ia. Aizenshtok, *Ukrains’ki poety-romantyky 20–40kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev, 1968).

⁵¹ Ohloblyn, *Istoriia Rusiv*, pp. 4–5.

⁵² In my view, N. I. Kostomarov, M. A. Maksymovych, and P. O. Kulish exemplify such a synthesis. For a study of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the 1830s and 1840s, see Orest Pelech, “Toward a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologies in the Russian Empire of the 1830’s and 1840’s” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1976).

⁵³ D. B. Saunders, “Contemporary Critics of Gogol’s *Vechera* and the Debate about Russian *narodnost’* (1831–1832),” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5, no. 1 (March 1981): 66–82; and his *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture, 1750–1850* (Edmonton, 1985).

In conclusion, the Little Russian legacy played an ambiguous role in the Ukrainian nationbuilding process. On the one hand, the ability of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to draw upon the traditions of the Hetmanate meant that the process did not have to begin at a virtual *Naturvolk* stage. Thus, a Ukrainian movement could emerge sooner and with greater vitality than national movements in Belorussia or Slovakia, for example. On the other hand, the Russian cultural component of the Little Russian identity made the Ukrainian intelligentsia hesitant and suspicious when incorporating its political and historical traditions into a new Ukrainian outlook. It was even more difficult for the Little Russian gentry to accept the new Ukrainian identity, because it was based on the language and culture of their serfs. For many of the gentry and intelligentsia, the competing identities—imperial, all-Russian, Russian, and even Slavic—were ultimately more attractive than the Ukrainian one. In this respect, the lingering Little Russian identity which initially stimulated the Ukrainian national movement hampered its further development once the movement was underway. Yet, despite that contradictory role, the development of a Little Russian identity was a prelude for modern Ukrainian nationbuilding.

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Josephinism and the Patriotic Intelligentsia in Bohemia

HUGH L. AGNEW

“No other Habsburg ruler on the throne of the Bohemian kingdom since the time of Ferdinand I and Ferdinand II intervened so deeply in the social development of the Czech lands as did Joseph II in the not quite ten years of his reign (1780–1790).”¹ This sentence characterizes the importance given to Josephinism in the most recent survey of Czechoslovak history published by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. Outside of Czechoslovakia, too, the achievements of this restless monarch, whose “terrible genius” so transformed his realm,² retain their interest. One of the areas in which his transforming genius was at work was in what was later dubbed the “national question” in the Habsburg Monarchy. Classical formulations of this issue, which sometimes gave Joseph credit for creating the very nations themselves,³ have been superseded by less personalized interpretations. But the recognition that nationalist movements drew their inspiration from many sources (some of them inimical to Josephinism) does not rob Joseph II’s reign of its significance. The decade of his rule was a key one in the development of almost all the Habsburg nationalities, and the whole reforming thrust of Josephinism had an important impact on the early phases of the national movements.⁴

¹ Československá akademie věd, Ústav čs. a světových dějin, *Přehled dějin Československa*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Prague, 1982), p. 413.

² The phrase is C. A. Macartney’s, from *The Habsburg Empire, 1790–1918* (London, 1968), p. 119.

³ Joseph Frederick Zacek, “The Czech Enlightenment and the Czech National Revival,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 10 (1983): 27, cites Ernest Denis: “Joseph II wanted to create a state, but he created nations.” Louis Eisenmann dates the national question from Joseph II, though the national resurrection was “in the air of the eighteenth century.” See his *Le compromis Austro-Hongrois de 1867: Étude sur le dualisme* (Paris, 1904; rpt. Hat-tiesburg, Miss., 1971), p. 50.

⁴ Among many possibilities, see Józef Chlebowczyk, *On Small and Young Nations in Europe: Nation-Forming Processes in Ethnic Borderlands in East-Central Europe* (Wrocław, etc., 1980), pp. 62–71. To see Josephinism mainly in terms of its religious policies—as does Ferdinand Mass, ed., *Der Josephinismus: Quellen zu seiner Geschichte in Oesterreich, 1760–1790*, vol. 2: *Entfaltung und Krise des Josephinismus* (Vienna, 1953), and, to a certain extent, Eduard Winter, *Der Josephinismus: Die Geschichte der österreichischen Reformakatholizismus, 1740–1848* (Berlin, 1962)—seems to me too restrictive. An excellent and

Debate continues over the precise nature of this impact. In Czechoslovakia, scholars have tended to view the effect of Josephinism on their own national renaissance (*národní obrození*) as important if they were sympathetic to the nationalist interpretation stemming from Palacký and Masaryk; adherents of the Pekař school, with its more positive view of the Czech Baroque, have, on the other hand, tended to belittle its significance. Since 1948, Marxist scholars in Czechoslovakia have scoffed at both interpretations, stressing instead the role of Josephinism in strengthening capitalist modes of production and bourgeois society in the Czech lands—a position which leaves them closer to the positive view of the nationalist school.⁵ Abroad, the question is usually treated only as part of broader studies of Czech nationalism or as a prelude to the triumphant, nineteenth-century nationalist movement.⁶

A close look at the response of the patriotic intelligentsia in Bohemia to Joseph's policies should help illuminate the complex relationship between the Czech renaissance and Josephinism. About the importance of the emergence of an intellectual elite, or intelligentsia, in the articulation of modern national consciousness and nationalism there is little doubt; and such an elite had emerged in eighteenth-century Bohemia.⁷ This intelligentsia was not, as a group, nationally Czech, but there were among its members many who contributed to the development of the *obrození*. That they were aware of this aspect of their work, and recognized that they belonged to a subset of the intelligentsia as a whole, is suggested by the frequency with which the same names turn up as examples of "good patriots" in many of their own publications. In the following discussion, "patriotic intelligentsia" refers

comprehensive summary in English is T.C.W. Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism* (London, 1970).

⁵ See Albert Pražák, "Názory na české obrození," in his *České obrození* (Prague, 1948), pp. 63–110. Josef Kočí, *České národní obrození* (Prague, 1978), gives a Marxist interpretation. For general orientation in modern Czech historiography, see Andrew Rossos, "Czech Historiography, Part 2," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 24 (1982): 359–85.

⁶ For example, see Joseph F. Zacek, "Nationalism in Czechoslovakia," in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle, Wash., 1969), pp. 166–206. The Czech Enlightenment still awaits comprehensive treatment. Two recent discussions are Zacek, "The Czech Enlightenment and the Czech National Revival"; and Mikuláš Teich, "Bohemia: From Darkness into Light," in Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in National Context* (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 141–63. A. S. Myl'nikov has also devoted attention to these themes, especially in his *Vznik národně osvícenské ideologie v českých zemích 18. století: Prameny národního obrození* (Prague, 1974).

⁷ See Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 3–4, and Hugh Seton-Watson, "Nationalismus und Nationalbewusstsein," *Österreichische Osthefte* 8 (1966): 3–4.

to this group, whose members are also known in Czech as “awakeners” (*buditelé*).⁸

These awakeners, like the rest of the intelligentsia, participated actively in the cultural life of Prague, the Austrian Monarchy, and beyond.⁹ In Prague, the milieu in which they moved included the salons of enlightened nobles, the university and monastic libraries, and such unofficial organizations as the Masonic lodges or the Bohemian Society of Sciences (Böhmische Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, Česká společnost nauk). In social origin the intellectuals were mostly non-noble, frequently coming from peasant or small-town, artisan backgrounds. They were products of a church education (Piarist or Jesuit or both) and many of them had taken holy orders. Others supported themselves as tutors to the sons of leading nobles, or sought state employment.¹⁰ They were thus well-placed to feel the impact of Joseph II’s policies.

Josephinism did not burst without warning upon the intellectual scene in 1780. The way had long been prepared, both by the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment among the educated elite, and by government policies aimed at overhauling the Habsburg state. In almost every area, Josephinism was already coming into outline before the death of Maria Theresa, and Joseph continued to act in directions laid down during the years of coregency or even earlier.¹¹ The change in 1780 was that Joseph could at last set the tempo for a concerted effort to forge a centralized, unitary state out of his disparate realm, and to make all his subjects into equally useful contributors to the good of the whole. This necessitated a change, above all, in the status of the peasantry.

Behind the abolition of serfdom in 1781 stood the experience of earlier efforts at improving the conditions of the peasantry, in which Bohemia had played an important role. Not surprisingly, the beneficiaries of serfdom opposed any change, especially to their rights to *corvée* labor, or *roboty*.

⁸ While I am fully aware of the ambiguities in the term “patriotic,” which could refer to the entire monarchy, the territorial entity of Bohemia, or the Czech nation, I use it here primarily to distinguish the awakeners from the intelligentsia in general.

⁹ Walter Schamschula, *Die Anfänge der tschechischen Erneuerung und das deutsche Geistesleben (1740–1800)* (Munich, 1973), demonstrates the range and fruitfulness of contact with, for example, the German intellectual world.

¹⁰ Jan Havránek, “The Development of Czech Nationalism,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 3, pt. 2 (1967): 237–38; A. S. Myl’nikov, “Ideino-politicheskie predposylki prosveshcheniia v cheshskikh zemliakh i ego rannii period,” in *Istoriia, kul’tura, fol’klor i etnografiia slavianskikh narodov* (Moscow, 1968), pp. 90–91; and Zdeněk Šimeček, “Půjčovny knih a čtenářské společnosti v českých zemích a jejich působení do roku 1848,” *Československý časopis historický* 29 (1981): 63–88.

¹¹ Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, pp. 21–40.

Echoes of their opposition can be found in the reactions to Joseph's peasant reforms of some contemporary intellectuals, such as František Martin Pelcl (1734–1801).¹² In his manuscript "Böhmische Kronik unter der Regierung des Römischen Kaisers und Königs in Böhmen Josephus II,"¹³ a kind of running commentary on Joseph II's reign, Pelcl began with a critique of Maria Theresa's efforts at peasant reform. One of her agrarian advisors, Franz von Blanc, misrepresented the Bohemian lords as "tyrants and oppressors of their subjects," and his reform proposals touched off the great peasant uprising of 1775. Of the Raab system, Pelcl noted that at least it was voluntary, and that the conversion of *robot*a to money rent was not necessarily detrimental to the lords.¹⁴

As might be expected from these remarks, Pelcl was also reserved in his reaction to the *Leibeigenschaft* Patent of 1781, a position which had not altered by the time of the proclamation of the Urbarial Patent in 1789.¹⁵ But these reservations were not shared by all of his peers. One who greeted the abolition of serfdom quite differently was Václav Matěj Kramerius (1753–1808).¹⁶ Kramerius was an active popularizer of Josephinism among the Czech-speaking masses, and he welcomed the agrarian reforms. In 1782, he published the handbook *Patentní ruční knížka pro měšťana i sedláka*,¹⁷ which contained Czech translations of the measures taken during the first two years of Joseph's reign. This handbook was popular enough for a second edition to appear in 1787. The importance of placing the relevant texts directly into the hands of the common people should not be underestimated, especially in consideration of the power of local authorities to hinder the carrying out of orders from the center.

¹² Pelcl spelled his name Pelzel in German and Pelcel in Czech. In this case and for others whose names have both Czech and German forms, I have adopted the spelling currently used by Czechoslovak scholars. Pelcl's latest biography is Josef Johanides, *František Martin Pelcl* (Prague, 1981).

¹³ German titles are given with original spellings and capitalization. The complete manuscript has never been published in full in the original German. It is now located in the Státní oblastní archiv Litoměřice, pobočka Žitenice-zámek (Lobkovicové roudničtí, rodinný archiv VI Ff 58). A partial version was published by Karel V. Adamek in *Časopis Matice moravské* in 1904, and a complete translation by Jan Pán, titled *Paměti*, appeared in 1931. This was reprinted, with a foreword by Jiří Černý, as František Martin Pelcl, *Paměti* (Prague, 1956); all citations are to this version.

¹⁴ Pelcl, *Paměti*, pp. 34–35, entry for January 1781. For more on agrarian reform under Maria Theresa and Joseph II, consult William E. Wright, *Serf, Seigneur, and Sovereign: Agrarian Reform in Eighteenth-Century Bohemia* (Minneapolis, 1966).

¹⁵ Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 44, entry for 17 October 1781, and p. 84, entries for 6 and 10 February 1789.

¹⁶ Kramerius's most recent biographer is Jan Novotný, *Matěj Václav Kramerius* (Prague, 1973).

¹⁷ Czech titles are given in modern orthography.

An even more remarkable piece of propaganda for Josephinism was Kramerius's *Kniha Josefova*, which appeared in 1784.¹⁸ *Kniha Josefova* and its German model were attempts to present the Josephine reform program in a style accessible to the common people. The language was patterned after the Bible in order to reach the masses directly, over the heads of the usual intermediaries—the parish priests and landlords' officials. Joseph was represented as the archetypal Old Testament king, a new Solomon, sent by God to bring "enlightenment" to his people. The abolition of serfdom was the first reform mentioned, and it was presented as a concrete example of Joseph's concern for the welfare and happiness of his subjects.¹⁹ In the popular propaganda the humanitarian aims of the reform occupied the foreground, but Kramerius and some of his associates were also well aware of the economic justification for the abolition of serfdom.

If the peasant were to become an economically useful citizen, then the abolition of personal servitude was only a first step. The general cultural and economic level of the peasant would also have to be raised. The second serfdom enshrined by the Habsburg victory over the Bohemian estates during the Thirty Years' War²⁰ bore most heavily on the mainly Czech-speaking peasantry in the fertile core of the Bohemian lands—so much so that in the eyes of some contemporaries the backwardness of the peasant was ascribed to the national character of the Czech, or *Stockböhme*.²¹ As a result, the drive to improve the peasants' lot could, and did, assume national overtones in the work of "popular awakers" (*lidoví buditelé*) such as Kramerius or his friend and collaborator František Jan Tomsa. Popular enlightening activities will be discussed below in the context of Joseph's educational policies; but the essential connection with the *Leibeigenschaft* Patent should not be forgotten.

If Joseph II's agrarian reforms met with resistance because they threatened the nobility's social and economic status, another group of measures threatened its political position. To realize Joseph's unitary, central-

¹⁸ *Kniha Josefova* was based on a German model, *Das Buch Joseph* (Prague, 1783), published by F. A. Zieger. See Josef Hanuš, Jan Jakubec, Jan Máchal, and Jaroslav Vlček, *Literatura česká devatenáctého století* (Prague, 1911), p. 389. The unabridged text of Kramerius's version was printed as an appendix in Novotný, *Kramerius*, pp. 265–301.

¹⁹ Novotný, *Kramerius*, p. 269.

²⁰ "The Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the long military struggle in 1648, consecrated the dual victory of the Habsburg Monarchy over the Bohemian estates, and [of] the landed magnates over the Czech peasantry." Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State* (London, 1979), p. 204.

²¹ Milan Šmerda, "Zrušení nevolnictví a české obrození: K 200. výročí zrušení nevolnictví v českých zemích," *Slovanský přehled* 68 (1982): 9–10.

ized state, regional and corporate privileges would have to be eliminated.²² In this area, too, the attitudes of some members of the intelligentsia mirrored those of the aristocracy. Pelcl included a list of complaints in his summary of Maria Theresa's reign at the beginning of his chronicle, and elsewhere in it he questioned the value of imposed uniformity. By 1788, Pelcl was openly siding with the estates against the emperor, whom he accused of wanting to "exterminate the nobility" by taking away their property (i.e., the right to *roboty*). "It seems, however," he continued, "that the nobility will outlive him and that it will still be here in the future."²³

Pelcl's chronicle was written without an eye on the censor, but even in published works, the Bohemian intelligentsia could express its attitudes toward contemporary politics by a judicious use of historical subjects. Many of the historical articles in the journal of the Bohemian Society of Sciences seem calculated to stress the historical individuality of the Bohemian kingdom.²⁴ Pelcl's friend and fellow-historian, Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt (1733–1787), was even more open in his *Über den Geist der Böhmisches Gesetze in den verschiedenen Zeitaltern*. Published by the Society of Sciences in 1788, it amounted to a panegyric of the Bohemian *Ständestaat*. While expressing his strong Slavic and Czech patriotism, Voigt also praised the estates, emphasizing their important role in politics: "One can see that the estates at that time [1526] had a great say in legislation. The kings could command nothing; levy no new taxes; make no important changes in the state system, without the consent of the three estates. . . ."²⁵ The contrast between the present and the glorious past was obvious.

²² Gerhard Hanke, "Das Zeitalter des Zentralismus (1740–1848)," in Karl Bosl, ed., *Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart, 1974), pp. 437–68.

²³ Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 82, entry for 22 December 1788.

²⁴ Two examples are Gelasius Dobner, "Historischer Beweis, dass Wladislaw der Zweyte Herzog in Böhmen zu Anfang des 1158sten Jahr zu Regensburg gekront worden, und dass der goldene Reif (Circulus) so ihm und seiner Thronfolgern Kaiser Friedrich der Erste ertheilet hat, eine wahre königliche Krone gewesen sey," *Abhandlungen einer Privatgesellschaft in Böhmen zur Aufnahme der Mathematik, der vaterländische Geschichte und der Naturgeschichte* 5 (1782): 1–54, and Dobner, "Kritische Abhandlung von den Gränzen Altmährens, oder des grossen mährischen Reichs in neunten Jahrhundert," *ibid.* 6 (1784): 1–45.

²⁵ Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt, *Über den Geist der Böhmisches Gesetze in den verschiedenen Zeitaltern* (Dresden, 1788), p. 200. Voigt remains a rather controversial figure. Cf. the depictions of Hanuš, *Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt, český buditel a historik*, *Rozpravy ČAVU*, no. 32 (Prague, 1910), and Jan Strakoš, *Počátky obrozenského historicismu v pražských časopisech a M. A. Voigt: Příspěvek k historii proti-osvěcenské reakce v národním obrození* (Prague, 1929). At stake is the relative importance of the Baroque and the Enlightenment in the Czech renaissance. The question is not entirely resolved by František Kutnar, "Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt, profil historika a vlastence," *Věstník Československá akademie věd* 79 (1970): 75–84.

Less obvious than the aim of such historical comparison was why the intelligentsia (whose generally positive response to other aspects of Josephinism is outlined below) should side with the social and political interests of Joseph's noble opponents. Of course many of them were dependent on noble employers for their daily bread. Pelcl's long association with the Sternbergs and Nostitzes, two of Bohemia's greatest noble families, is only the best-known instance of this. Members of the nobility were also important as patrons and supporters of scholars, and they controlled access to family archives and libraries. The estates as an institution supported an official historiographer, František Pubička (1722–1807).²⁶

But one need not make the intelligentsia out as fawningly servile and dependent to account for its relationship with the nobility. For one thing, they shared intellectual interests with certain elements in the nobility, for whom "enlightenment" was genuinely more than the mode of the times. Even more, they were influenced by the traditional corporate view of the estates as the nation. This concept was probably reinforced by the way in which the development of absolutism in Eastern and Central Europe had tended to erode the power and independence of the towns, rather than of the aristocracy. Thus the estates, dominated by the nobility, provided the only entrenched, institutional expression of the separate statehood and national existence of Bohemia.²⁷ Yet, thanks to the Habsburg victory in the Thirty Years' War, the Bohemian nobility was not actually "national"—even in the limited, political sense—but comprised the descendants of rewarded imperial servants from all over Europe, leavened by a very few Old Czech or Old German families who had remained loyal to the Habsburg cause.²⁸ By the late eighteenth century, this nobility had nevertheless evolved a kind of local, territorial patriotism (*Landespatriotismus*) which suited its political interests.

It was to this patriotism that the Bohemian intelligentsia appealed in its efforts to get the estates to assume the leadership of the "national" cause. But this does not mean that the patriotism of the aristocracy was of the same kind as the patriotism of the intelligentsia. In flattering dedications of their works to leading nobles, the members of the intelligentsia courted support; but the repeated exhortations to love, use, and defend the Czech language

²⁶ Kamil Krofta, "Frant. Pubička, předchůdce Palackého v zem. dějepisectví českém," *Časopis Společnosti přátel starožitnosti* 51–53 (1943–45): 1–24.

²⁷ Peter F. Sugar, "External and Domestic Roots of Eastern European Nationalism," in Sugar and Lederer, *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, pp. 25–26; Anderson, *Lineages*, pp. 205–206.

²⁸ Robert J. Kerner, *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1932), pp. 67–71.

which are found side-by-side with comparisons of the past glory and present decline of the estates suggest that the intelligentsia's patriotism included support for Czech culture and language—and a sense of exasperation that the nobility was *not* doing these things.²⁹

It was not the social, economic, and political privileges of the nobility alone that stood in the way of Joseph's unitary, secular state. The church confronted him as perhaps the most entrenched and most conservative privileged body in his realm. Though in his way a true believer, Joseph was determined to subordinate the church to the state. He severed its direct links with Rome, attacked its independent economic position through dissolution of the monasteries, and tried to replace Baroque piety with the reform Catholicism of the Febronians or Muratori. He also proclaimed religious toleration (limited to Lutherans and Calvinists) and reorganized the censorship, finally removing it from church hands.³⁰

Because of Bohemia's historical experience of re-Catholicization after the Battle of the White Mountain, Joseph's moves to subordinate the church had a special resonance for intellectuals there. The close ties between them and the church, through education and vocation, have already been mentioned. But many of these intellectuals were also influenced by the reform Catholicism that colored Joseph's policies. Pelcl and his friend and long-time associate, Josef Dobrovský (1753–1829), enjoyed friendly relations with some of the leading figures of the Josephine church in Bohemia, such as Bishop Johann Leopold von Hay or Augustin Zippe, first head of the Prague General Seminary. Dobrovský eventually became rector of its sister institution at Olomouc.³¹ Jesuit- and Piarist-educated laymen like Kramerijs and Tomsa tried to popularize the new concepts of piety in their publications. Finally, the relaxation of the censorship and its transference to secular hands directly affected the conditions in which the intellectuals worked.

The piety of the victorious Counter-Reformation, expressed in the exuberance of the Czech Baroque and appealing to the senses and emo-

²⁹ A clear example is Karel Hynek Thám, *Obrana jazyka českého proti zlobivým jeho utrhcům, též mnohým vlastencům v cvičení se v něm liknavým a nedbalým* (Prague, 1783), p. 21, where he blames the nobles for ignoring their duty to protect and develop the language.

³⁰ Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, pp. 58–63.

³¹ Several passages in Pelcl's correspondence with Dobrovský bear out the friendly relations the two enjoyed with leading Josephinist churchmen, e.g., this comment about Zippe: "H. Zippe fand ich in Umgange so wie in seinem Schriften, alles gründlich und auf das practische Christenthum abziehend." Pelcl to Dobrovský, undated (1784), Literární archiv Památníku národního písemnictví (hereafter LA PNP), Prague, sign. I/5/6.

tions,³² was alien to many of the intellectuals, with their cool, rational, practical Christianity. Pelcl, in his "Böhmische Kronik," complained of the state of religious observance in the Prague churches before the reforms. Masses were unintelligible because priests chanted different portions of the mass simultaneously, to save time; the worshippers behaved more like a theater audience; and indeed the music was more suitable for the theater than the worship of God. In 1784, he approvingly outlined the new regulations and again spoke of the decline of genuine piety in the pre-reform era.³³

Under the newly-relaxed censorship, a group of more radical supporters of religious reform published a periodical review of the sermons preached in Prague, with the suggestive title *Geissel der Prediger* (Scourge of the Preachers). Among the contributors to this review were Jiljí Chládek, professor of pastoral theology at the university, Karel Raphael Ungar, Praemonstratensian monk and librarian, and, as prime mover, the actor and dramatist Franz Guolfinger Ritter von Steinsberg.³⁴ Their attacks on the old order were carried on with all the sharpness of contemporary polemical style. Yet not every member of the intelligentsia was willing to go quite so far. One of the more moderate was the former Paulist monk and literary historian, František Faustýn Procházka (1749–1809). In an anonymous publication of his own, *Über die Broschüren unserer Zeit* (1782), Procházka discussed some of the products of the *Broschürenflut* that followed the relaxation of censorship. His attitude to the *Geissel* was negative, but more in regard to tone and style than to substance. "One must never go too far," he wrote. "I have already said many times that to err on this side of the truth is just as bad as on the other side."³⁵ In a later article, "Critische Nachricht von den bisherigen Producten der Pressfreiheit in Böhmen," published in 1785, he returned to the extremism of *Geissel's* editors: "No one trumpeted the enlightened times more than our supposed

³² See Andreas Angyal, *Die slawische Barockwelt* (Leipzig, 1961), for a discussion of the Baroque in its Slavic forms.

³³ Pelcl, *Paměti*, pp. 36–37, entry for 16 January 1781, and p. 58, entry for 6 May 1784. These comments probably say as much about Pelcl's prejudices as they do about what the services were actually like.

³⁴ Bedřich Slavík, *Od Dobnera k Dobrovskému* (Prague, 1976), pp. 172–75. Paul P. Bernard, *Jesuits and Jacobins: Enlightenment and Enlightened Despotism in Austria* (Urbana, Ill., 1971), p. 71, mentions a possible Viennese model for this undertaking.

³⁵ Hanuš, *František Faustýn Procházka, český buditel a literární historik*, *Rozpravy ČAVU*, 3, no. 39 (Prague, 1915), 42.

philosophers; and no one produced stronger evidence that they are not yet here, than the same."³⁶

Monks and monasteries were other targets attacked with abandon in the *Broschürenflut*, and Procházka called for moderation here as well. He refused to question Joseph II's dissolution of the monasteries, but said it was still unnecessary to publish plain untruths about monasticism. Much of what had been written was generalized from individual cases of abuse, or applied the standards of the present to the past. As Procházka concluded ironically: "I am no great patron of monastic institutions, even if I myself committed the juvenile error of becoming a monk. But I am also no friend of those who delight in tormenting humanity, even if it should be concealed in a Capuchin's cowl."³⁷

If Procházka called for more moderation, Voigt's reservations went further. When suggestions were made to introduce German into the liturgy, he attacked the idea in a pseudonymous work, *Über den Gebrauch der Volkssprache bei dem öffentlichen Gottesdienste* (1783). Though this won him the enmity of the more radical Josephinists,³⁸ Voigt's position was not necessarily a reactionary defense of Counter-Reformation Catholicism. Pelcl described him as free "from most of the prejudices which still cling so strongly to his fellow monks," claimed that his thinking was "enlightened, tolerant and free," and said that "with the exception of the habit of his order [he] had nothing monkish about him."³⁹ Clearly, however, Joseph II's church policies were going too fast for Voigt, destroying the good with the bad. To see Latin, a language which he loved, replaced by German in church services was unacceptable to him.⁴⁰

Two groups in particular had to be convinced of the correctness of the new policies if they were to have any real effect. Adherents would have to be found among the masses, and among the parish clergy. Right-thinking priests could do much to teach the people new ways, so General Seminaries were set up to train them. The Bohemian intellectuals were involved in this aspect of Joseph's policies, too. Chládek published a very influential textbook, *Počátkové opatrnost pastýřské* (1780–81), for his pastoral theology

³⁶ František Faustýn Procházka, "Critische Nachricht von den bisherigen Producten der Pressfreiheit in Böhmen," *Miscellaneen der Böhmisches und Mährischen Litteratur*, vol. 1, pt. 2 (Prague, 1785), p. 254.

³⁷ Procházka, "Critische Nachricht," pp. 245–48.

³⁸ Walter Schamschula, "Der tschechische Anteil an der 'Österreichische Biedermanns-Chronik' (1784)," *Welt der Slaven* 16 (1971): 267–70.

³⁹ Pelcl, "Biographie des Adauct Voigt, à S. Germano," *Abhandlungen der Böhmisches Gessellschaft der Wissenschaften* 4 (1788): 16 and 19.

⁴⁰ For Voigt's attitude to Latin, see his *Über den Geist*, pp. 125–26.

students. Its message was so in harmony with Joseph's program that it was officially adopted for use both in Prague and Brno. Václav Stach (1755–1831) also furthered efforts in this direction. On his authority as professor of pastoral theology at the General Seminary at Olomouc, he published a two-volume handbook, *Příručka učitele lidu*, also aimed at the parish priests. It contained exegeses of biblical texts in a Josephinist sense, moral stories, excerpts from modern philosophers, and pedagogical hints, all intended to be useful to priests in their tasks.⁴¹ Stach was more immoderate than Chládek, and provoked a reaction from some elements in the church. He attacked them as “that church clique in which priestly despotism lords it over the wiser clergy,” and claimed that “a priest should know everything. To the pure, nothing is impure.”⁴² Stach's translation of a German theology text by Franz Giftschütz is further evidence of his radical Josephinist stance. It replaced Chládek's *Počátkové* as the textbook at Olomouc in 1789.⁴³

If the shepherds were to be trained in the new ways of thought, so were the sheep. To reach the common people who spoke only Czech, it was essential to provide them with religious reading in Czech. First, the Bible was published in a new Czech translation, at the behest of Maria Theresa herself. The translators were Procházka and his fellow-Paulist, Václav Fortunat Durych (1735–1802), and their work was rationalistic and enlightened throughout.⁴⁴ But there was a need for more than Bibles: prayer books, catechisms, and devotional manuals conforming to the new ideas were also necessary. Foremost among those who helped fill this need were Kramerius and his colleague, František Jan Tomsa (1751–1814). Tomsa was employed as translator and editor of Czech books at the Normal School in Prague. It is significant that the second work he translated, according to his autobiography, was a catechism. For even Maria Theresa was willing to publish the catechism and other religious books in Czech.⁴⁵ Under Joseph II, Tomsa continued this activity, publishing translations of two German prayer books by K. H. Seibt, *Knihy katolická, obsahující v sobě*

⁴¹ Václav Stach, *Příručka učitele lidu*, 2 vols. (Prague and Olomouc, 1787), 1:4.

⁴² Stach, *Příručka učitele lidu*, vol. 2, unpaginated foreword.

⁴³ Stach, *Počátkové k veřejnému v c. k. zemích předepsanému výkladání pastýřské theologie*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1787).

⁴⁴ See Procházka's foreword to *Pismo svaté nového zákona, podlé českého přeložení od jeho knížecí milosti arcibiskupa pražského léta Páne 1778 na světlo daného, v nově vydané, a však s řeckým textem, s starým latinským výkladem, též podobně s východními přeloženími &c. naskrze srovnané, na mnoha místech opravené, i obšírným literního smyslu výkladem vysvětlené* (Prague, 1786), unpaginated.

⁴⁵ See František Jan Tomsa, “Kurze Lebensbeschreibung des Franz Tomsa,” LA PNP, Dobrovský collection, sign I/5/7; and Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 27.

naučení a modlitby (1780) and *Vyučující a modlíci kniha pro mládež* (1784). Seibt, who lectured in such subjects as aesthetics, ethics, and practical philosophy at the university, composed his prayer books fully in the sense of Josephine reform Catholicism. Kramerius also contributed a translation of a religious manual, *Křesťanská katolická užitečná domovní postilla* (1785), based on a work by the Viennese Josephinist, J. V. Eybel. It was very popular and, in spite of its title, was also used by the newly-tolerated Protestants in Bohemia.⁴⁶ Stach was among those who joined Kramerius and Tomsa, translating a Lutheran religious manual by J. F. Seiler in 1785 and a non-denominational work by Jakob Federsen in 1786.⁴⁷

These last examples raise the question of religious toleration. The Patent of Toleration of 1781 was welcomed by many intellectuals, but there were still people at all levels to whom it was anathema. Religious toleration, too, needed its popularizers. Besides his *Patentní ruční knížka* and *Kniha Josefova*, Kramerius published a Czech translation of a pastoral letter by J. L. von Hay, bishop of Hradec Králové. In it, Bishop von Hay set out the new regulations on toleration, and demanded that his clergy obey them. The Czech version, *Cirkulární spis pána z Haje, biskupa královéhradeckého, na duchovenstvo osady jeho strany tolerancí* (1782), was very popular and quickly sold out.⁴⁸ Kramerius also put toleration into practice personally, helping to teach Czech to the newly-arrived Protestant pastors in Prague. Though this activity seems to have ended by late 1783, Kramerius's support for toleration did not end.⁴⁹ He kept the idea alive in his *Nový kalendář tolerancí*, published yearly from 1787 to 1798. He listed Catholic and Protestant feast days side by side, gave summaries of decrees affecting religion, and also provided much other useful and entertaining material for his readers.

Procházka's was another voice raised in support of religious toleration. He attacked the anti-semitic tone of some of the pamphlets appearing in the *Broschürenflut*, saying that if only the dark side of a nation is emphasized, "then there is no people, no community in the world that would cut even a

⁴⁶ Novotný, *Kramerius*, pp. 38–39. Eybel's career is treated in Bernard, *Jesuits and Jacobins*, pp. 58–59, 67–68, and 72–73.

⁴⁷ Stach, *Rozmlouvání mezi otcem a dítětem o věcech náboženství se týkajících* (Prague, 1785), and *Kniha mravů křesťanských pro měšťana a sedláka* (Prague, 1786).

⁴⁸ Novotný, *Kramerius*, p. 22.

⁴⁹ Dobrovský to Jiří Ribay, a Slovak Protestant pastor, on 11 May 1786: "[Kramerius] hat sich einige Zeit unter den Evangel. und refort. Pastoren aufgehalten, um sie in der böhm. Sprache zu unterrichten." *Korrespondence Josefa Dobrovského*, vol. 4: *Vzájemné listy Josefa Dobrovského a Jiřího Ribaye z let 1783–1810*, ed. Adolf Patera, *Sbírka pramenův ku poznání literárního života v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku*, 2, no. 18 (Prague, 1913), p. 42.

bearable figure."⁵⁰ In keeping with his dislike of extremes, Procházka criticized Catholics for treating Protestants in ways the Protestants did not allow in their treatment of Catholics: "But they are heretics, you tell me, and we aren't? My reply: Just as you believe that they err, so on the other hand they hold that you err, and the dunces among them think you as heretical as you them. . . . Do you want to be such a dolt? Stop accusing them of heresy, let them stop doing the same to you, and may there be among us all the peace of Christ."⁵¹ Voigt had earlier proclaimed a tolerant attitude in his *Abbildungen Böhmischer und Mährischer Gelehrten und Künstler* (1773), by including Jan Hus and several Jewish scholars among the learned men whose biographies made up the work. "Tolerance must be observed in the Republic of Learning more than in any other public institution."⁵²

This remark suggests how the literary and historical interests of the intelligentsia, the issue of toleration, and that remaining feature of Joseph's church policies, the secularization of the censorship, could all be bound up together. Not only did the loosening of censorship allow freer expression to the intellectuals, it also freed their path to Czech literature from the "Golden Age" of the sixteenth century, and to a reinterpretation of some elements of their history. Given their interests, it is not surprising that they greeted the new regulations with such enthusiasm. Pelcl, who had complained that the censor was "often a great ass," responded to the new *Censurgesetz* in glowing terms: "Rejoice, oh Czechs, now you may cultivate your intellect like other nations, think and write more freely, assemble your knowledge in good books and prove that you also have abilities. Our spiritual tyrants have fallen, fallen in disgrace. Preserve in infamy the names of those who held you so long in slavery!"⁵³ Procházka, though he had some reservations about the use to which the freer conditions were put by some, wrote that the product of an unforced conscience must always be better than "when one writes as he does not think and thinks as he may not write."⁵⁴ In his own work on a revision of the Czech New Testament (1786), Procházka benefited from the new conditions, since it was possible for him to use the Králice Bible of the Czech Brethren as a source, and to go further than he had in 1780 in the rationalistic explanation of biblical events. The

⁵⁰ Procházka, "Critische Nachricht," pp. 238En40.

⁵¹ Procházka, *Erazma Roterodamského ruční knížka o rytíři křesťanském* (Prague, 1787), p. ix.

⁵² Voigt, *Abbildungen Böhmischer und Mährischer Gelehrten und Künstler*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1773), p. 118.

⁵³ Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 42, entry for 14 July 1781.

⁵⁴ Procházka, "Critische Nachricht," p. 252.

only complaint he feared, wrote Procházka, was “that I have not yet made enough use of this freedom.”⁵⁵

The intelligentsia showed particular interest in the fate of Czech literature at the hands of the Counter-Reformation. After 1618, claimed Dobrovský, “instead of writing new books, they burned what had still survived.”⁵⁶ Pelcl compared the missionaries whose job it had been to burn confiscated literature to Tatars or other barbarians, and praised Joseph II for doing away with them.⁵⁷ Karel Raphael Ungar (1743–1807), first custodian of the university library, made similar complaints about the treatment of Czech books in his *Allgemeine böhmische Bibliothek* (1786), where he denounced the “tyranny with which the pious literary storm troops (*Bücherstürmer*) burned them, otherwise destroyed them, or at least rendered them practically unusable by blotting out entire passages with Chinese ink.”⁵⁸

Once the new censorship regulations had cleared the way, the intellectuals turned avidly to the books which had once graced the *Index librorum prohibitorum* (final edition, 1767). When he had completed his revised New Testament, Procházka embarked on a plan to republish a selection from the monuments of Czech literature, mostly from the great humanist tradition of the sixteenth century. The series was divided into four broad areas: theology, other secular arts, history of other lands, and Czech history. Thirteen titles in all appeared before the series was discontinued because of financial difficulties; included were several translations of works by St. Augustine and Erasmus, a collection of excerpts from the classical philosophers, a Czech translation of the Chronicle of Muscovy, and a version of the *Kronyka Boleslavská*, or Dalemil’s Chronicle.⁵⁹

Especially in the philosophical and theological works, Procházka commented on toleration and the censorship. At the close of his *Kniha Erasma Roterodámského, v kteréž jednomu každému křesťanskému člověku naučení a napomutení se dává, jakby se k smrti hotoviti měl* (1786), he defended Erasmus’s orthodoxy: his propositions could be twisted to have a false meaning, but “if we were to deal with every proposition or book the way the missionaries once dealt with Czech books, then we could enlarge the register of heretical books by adding the best writings of the Holy Fathers,

⁵⁵ Procházka, Foreword to *Pismo svaté nového zákona*, unpaginated.

⁵⁶ Josef Dobrovský, “Geschichte der böhmischen Sprache,” *Neuere Abhandlungen der k. böhmischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften* 1 (1790): 361.

⁵⁷ Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 39, entry for 30 April 1781.

⁵⁸ Karel Raphael Ungar, *Allgemeine böhmische Bibliothek* (Prague, 1786), pp. 6–8.

⁵⁹ For a complete list of titles and the fate of the series, see F. Vodička, “Neznamé svědectví o vydavatelské činnosti Fr. F. Procházky,” in *Acta Universitatis Carolinae, Philologica* 3, *Slavica Pragensia IV* (Prague, 1962), pp. 689–95.

and burn them.”⁶⁰ In *Příkladné řeči a užitečná naučení vybraná z knih hlubokých mudrců* (1786), which included Plato, Socrates, and other “pagan” philosophers, he imagined that if these men rose from their graves, they would laugh to see their names on the Index, for no other reason than that “in the natural order of things they did not have the good fortune to learn their philosophy in Jesuit schools.”⁶¹ When such remarks provoked an attack on him by conservative circles, Procházka responded in his strongest language in the foreword to Erasmus’s *Ruční knížka o rytíři křesťanském* (1787). He denied that Erasmus had been a heretic, and praised his interpretation of Christianity. In a Josephinist sense, he denied that papal proscriptions had any validity in the Habsburg lands: “We have imperial indexes,” he said. He also repeated his attacks on the missionaries, especially for their destruction of Czech books. Any visitor to a library in Prague could see for himself the results of their efforts. “How did the missionaries injure me? They did not injure me, but my fatherland; or rather they injured me, too, because they injured my fatherland.”⁶²

If toleration and a relaxed censorship opened up the way to the classics of Czech humanism, it did the same for a particularly sensitive era of Czech history—the Hussite. There was a marked increase in interest in Hus and in figures such as Žižka at that time. Pelcl, in the successive editions of his *Kurzgefasste Geschichte der Böhmen* (1773, 1779, 1782, and 1817), and in the Czech version, substantially revised, *Nová kronyka česká* (3 vols., 1791–96), contributed much to a changing interpretation of the period and its main figures.⁶³ But perhaps the most famous work of the period was the four-volume history of the Council of Constance by the Slovene historian and professor of church history at Prague, Kaspar Royko.⁶⁴ Royko’s book, which expressed a sympathetic attitude to Hus, was widely read among Prague intellectuals. The first two volumes were even translated into Czech by Stach, who used the pseudonym Václav Petrýn. As was his wont, Stach graced his translation with forewords pugnaciously defending Hus, and

⁶⁰ František Faustýn Procházka, *Kniha Erasma roterodámského, v kteréž jednomu každému křesťanskému člověku naučení a napomutení se dává, jakby se k smrti hotoviti měl* (Prague, 1786), p. 198.

⁶¹ Procházka, *Příkladné řeči a užitečná naučení vybraná z knih hlubokých mudrcův* (Prague, 1786), unpaginated foreword.

⁶² Procházka, *Erasma Roterodámského ruční knížka*, pp. ix–x.

⁶³ Frederick G. Heymann, “The Hussite Movement in the Historiography of the Czech Awakening,” in Peter Brock and H. Gordon Skilling, eds., *The Czech Renaissance of the Nineteenth Century* (Toronto, 1970), pp. 228–29.

⁶⁴ Kaspar Royko, *Geschichte der grossen allgemeinen Kirchenversammlung zu Kostnitz*, 4 vols. (Graz, 1781, 1782; Prague, 1784, 1785).

with satirical dedications calculated to irritate more conservative readers.⁶⁵ Royko, too, made his enemies, and as censorship regulations were once more tightened towards the end of Joseph's reign, he was reported to the Religion Commission in Vienna regarding certain passages in his history. Pelcl, informing Dobrovský of this move, feared that "it will not turn out well for him, because things are regressing, and monkishness (*Monachismus*) will once more lift up its tonsured head."⁶⁶ Royko escaped unscathed, however, perhaps because of powerful friends at court.⁶⁷

This interest in the Hussite period and its leading personalities has been used by some interpreters of the Czech renaissance as evidence for the key position of Hussite traditions and Czech Protestantism in it. Yet the intellectuals thought of themselves as good Catholics, and many of them were ordained priests. One could hardly claim that they were crypto-Protestants. Two other factors probably influenced their view of the Hussite era. In the first place, it was a great national moment, when Bohemia had stood alone against the rest of Europe. Secondly, Hus's teaching on the church and its relationship to the secular power and secular property were remarkably in harmony with Josephinist policy. It was Hus's ecclesiology, not his dogma, that appealed to the intelligentsia.⁶⁸ In any case, the religious fervor of the time was alien to the cool, rational children of the Enlightenment. The patriotic intellectuals condemned the fanaticism of both sides.⁶⁹

The subordination of the church to the state was accompanied by the latter's movement into education. As in other areas, Josephinism in educational policy grew out of measures enacted under Maria Theresa.⁷⁰ What she had begun with the school regulations of 1774 and the establishment of normal schools in each "provincial" capital, Joseph continued with decrees on compulsory attendance and royal supervision of schools through commissioners appointed from the center. A uniform school system was essential to the creation of Joseph's unitary state, and it needed a single language

⁶⁵ Václav Petřín (Václav Stach), *Historie velikého sněmu kostnického*, 2 vols. (Prague, 1785–86). The first bore the dedication "Velebným a dvojitěhodným pánům a pánům farářům a kaplanům církve římské pro dobrou vůli"; and the second, "Sedlákům římské církve."

⁶⁶ Pelcl to Dobrovský, 9 April 1788, LA PNP, Dobrovský collection, sign. I/5/6.

⁶⁷ Schamschula, "Der slowenische Kirchenhistoriker Kaspar Royko (Rojko) und die tschechische nationale Erneuerung," in *Geschichte, Kultur und Geisteswelt der Slowenen: Studia Slovenica Monacensia, in honorem Antonii Slodnjak septuagenarii* (Munich, 1969), pp. 105–106, 108.

⁶⁸ Schamschula, "Der Slowenische Kirchenhistoriker Royko," p. 105.

⁶⁹ Hanuš, *František Martin Pelcl, český historik a buditel*, *Rozpravy ČAVU*, 3 no. 38 (Prague, 1914), pp. 54–56; Heymann, "Hussite Movement," pp. 228–29.

⁷⁰ Anton Vantuch, "Cesta k teraziánským školským reformám a boje o ich charaktera," *Historické štúdie* 24 (1980): 147–62.

of instruction, German. It is this Germanization, promoted by the school system, which has drawn much scholarly attention.⁷¹ There is no doubt that Joseph's school system was intended to spread the German language,⁷² nor that the patriotic intelligentsia recognized and reacted against this. Procházka and Pelcl had both commented on this feature of government policy under Maria Theresa.⁷³ Now Joseph II was promoting German even more vigorously. A powerful contemporary depiction of Germanization comes from Pelcl's "Geschichte der Deutschen und ihrer Sprache in Böhmen," published in the *Abhandlungen* of the Society of Sciences in 1788. He described in detail how the use of German as the language of instruction could spread it even in purely Czech areas, and concluded:

Thus the second generation will already be German, and in fifty years more German than Czech will be spoken in Kouřím and the other cities of Bohemia—yes, one will have trouble even flushing out a Czech. Since such institutions for furthering German exist in Bohemia, and the recently established school commissioners, each in his *Kreis*, are pushing in that direction, one can easily conclude how far the German language will come in a hundred years, and how badly Czech in contrast must lose, and finally vanish altogether.⁷⁴

Yet in spite of the best efforts of Joseph's school system, it was simply not possible to move so quickly to complete Germanization. Bilingual teachers were in short supply, and Czech instruction remained the norm at the elementary level, though the second language was introduced as soon as possible.⁷⁵ And since, as Dobrovský sourly pointed out, five million inhabitants of the realm obstinately continued speaking Czech, the government had to communicate with them in that language.⁷⁶

Tomsa's career is a good example of the paradoxes of this situation. Though an employee of the hated normal school, that "seedbed of Germanization,"⁷⁷ Tomsa contributed greatly to the Czech renaissance as translator, lexicographer, and grammarian, and popular educator. He gained the

⁷¹ A classic study is Bohuš Rieger, "Z germanisačního úsilí 18. věku," in *Drobné spisy*, vol. 1 (Prague, 1914), pp. 191–247.

⁷² Most probably for utilitarian, rather than chauvinistic, reasons. The unitary, secular state needed a single administrative language if it was to be run efficiently. See, for example, Chlebowczyk, *On Small and Young Nations*, p. 61.

⁷³ Procházka, *De saecularibus liberalium artium in Bohemia et Moravia fatis commentarius* (Prague, 1784), p. 417; Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 27.

⁷⁴ Pelcl, "Geschichte der Deutschen und ihrer Sprache in Böhmen," *Neuere Abhandlungen der k. böhmischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, 1 (1791): 301.

⁷⁵ Janet Wolf Berls, "The Elementary School Reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II in Bohemia" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1970), pp. 263–91.

⁷⁶ Dobrovský, "Geschichte der böhmischen Sprache," pp. 362–63.

⁷⁷ Rieger, "Z germanisačního úsilí," p. 195.

support of Ferdinand Kindermann, the prime mover behind Maria Theresa's and Joseph's school policies. Kindermann made Tomsa his secretary in 1783, and helped him to the post of director of the press in 1786.⁷⁸ Among other activities, Tomsa translated textbooks, corrected and oversaw the printing of the Czech Bible of 1780, and repeatedly urged the authorities in Vienna to sanction the printing of more Czech books.⁷⁹

Although all this was already important, it was in his contribution to the education of adults that Tomsa and several colleagues stood out. The "enlightening" of the masses followed naturally from Joseph's abolition of serfdom, the loosening of censorship, and the educational reforms. Some improvement in the cultural and economic level of the masses was necessary, and in Bohemia much of this work had to be done in Czech—while the children might be Germanized in school, working adults would be slow to give up their language. Thus the state found itself in the curious position of Germanizing with one hand, while encouraging Czech education with the other.

The state encouraged, and even sponsored, the Czech-language efforts. The Highest Burggrave, Prince Karl Egon von Fürstenberg, published a popular educational periodical, *Der Volkslehrer*, from 1786 to 1788.⁸⁰ He asked Tomsa to translate it into Czech as *Učitel lidu*, and it became one of the earliest such periodicals to appear in Czech. Tomsa must have found the work challenging, for he left *Učitel lidu* after one year to establish his own monthly, *Měsíční spis k poučení a obveselení obecného lidu* (1787). In his monthly Tomsa aimed especially at spreading basic knowledge of the physical and natural sciences, so that rational, scientific explanations for natural phenomena could replace superstition. Each issue also contained an illustration, fable, and moralistic tales.

Kramerius seconded Tomsa's efforts. His career took a new turn when he accepted the post of editor of J. F. von Schönfeld's Czech newspaper, the *Schönfeldské c. k. pražské poštovské noviny*. Kramerius proved gifted at his task, and the paper grew both in popularity and linguistic quality.⁸¹ Kramerius viewed his newspaper not only as a purveyor of foreign and domestic political news, but also, and more importantly, as a means of raising the cultural and economic standards of the people. Early in his tenure,

⁷⁸ L. Zeil, "Die Bedeutung des tschechischen Josefines František Jan Tomsa (1751–1814) für die Entwicklung seiner Muttersprache," *Zeitschrift für Slawistik* 14 (1969): 599.

⁷⁹ Zeil, "Die Bedeutung," 599–601; Rudolf K. Nesvěra, "Zásluha Františka Jana Tomsy o český knihtisk," *Sborník Národního technického musea* 1 (1955): 74–76.

⁸⁰ Miroslav Laiske, *Časopisectví v Čechách, 1650–1845* (Prague, 1959), pp. 126, 133.

⁸¹ At its height under Kramerius, *Schönfeldské noviny* had 900 subscribers. Pelcl to Dobrovský, 24 June 1789, LA PNP, Dobrovský collection, sign. I/57.

he introduced a special section on household management, “Naučení k domácímu hospodářství,” and added one aimed at encouraging craft and manufacturing knowledge, “O vzdělávání řemesel a fabrik,” in 1787. In 1789, he left Schönfeld’s employ and founded his own newspaper, *Kramerijsovy c. k. pražské poštovské noviny* (the name was changed in 1791 to *Kramerijsovy vlastenské noviny*, after Schönfeld complained that he had an exclusive right to the adjective “poštovské”). This paper also proved a success, and Kramerius remained its editor until his death in 1808.

In addition to the journals and newspapers, books and pamphlets also appeared whose aim was to spread useful knowledge. They were mostly religious and devotional works, or else they publicized new crops, agricultural techniques, or other information calculated to improve the peasant’s lot—and his value to the state.⁸² Yet since the activities of the “popular awakeners” were to prove so important in raising not only the level of useful knowledge among the people, but also their national self-awareness and self-confidence, Joseph’s efforts to create a unitary, centralized, enlightened state in effect contributed to developments which were to run counter to the original aims.⁸³

* * *

Joseph’s self-composed epitaph is a bitter comment on his fate: “Here lies Joseph II, who was unfortunate in all his enterprises.”⁸⁴ A reign that had begun with hopes of progress and “enlightenment” ended with Belgium in an uproar, Hungary on the brink of open rebellion, Bohemia simmering with resentment, and the monarchy drained by the Turkish wars of the last years. Among Bohemian intellectuals, too, there were many who were disillusioned and resentful. Their response to Josephinism had by no means been uniform, as this discussion has illustrated. One cannot simply divide the patriotic intelligentsia into those who supported Joseph and those who did not: even individuals changed their response during his reign. Pelcl,

⁸² E.g. Tomsa, *Tejné rady Šubarta dobře míněné volání na všechny sedláky, kteří nedostatek píce trpí, i taky na české* (Prague, 1785), or Vavřinec Amort, *Uvedení jak snadným a sprostým způsobem se hedvábní dílo se konáti má* (Prague, 1783).

⁸³ Novotný, “Příspěvek k otázce úlohy některých lidových buditelů v počátcích českého národního obrození,” *Československý časopis historický* 2 (1954): 600–632; Hugh LeCaine Agnew, “Enlightenment and National Consciousness: Three Czech ‘Popular Awakeners,’” in Ivo Banac, John G. Ackerman, and Roman Szporluk, eds., *Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich* (Boulder, Colo., 1981), pp. 201–226.

⁸⁴ Blanning, *Joseph II and Enlightened Despotism*, p. 73.

who welcomed his accession in glowing words, was looking forward to his death by the end of the decade.⁸⁵

In what ways, then, did the intellectuals respond to Joseph II? Most of them were disappointed by his attacks on the institutional separateness of Bohemia. Many of them rallied around the beleaguered estates, as the corporate expression of Bohemia's independent statehood and (they hoped) the leaders of the Czech nation. They did not necessarily subscribe to the backward-looking social and political aims of the nobility, any more than the nobles who approved the call for a chair of Czech at the university in Prague really supported the revival of the Czech language. But in the face of Joseph's relentless drive towards a centralized, Germanized state, the nobility seemed to provide the strong point from which to resist.

Other factors added to the intelligentsia's disappointment with Joseph II. One of these was Joseph's severely utilitarian approach to "enlightenment." The idea of "learning for learning's sake" was foreign to him—elementary education was to make industrious citizens and efficient soldiers; higher education was to train bureaucrats for state service. During the dissolution of the monasteries and rationalization of some libraries in Bohemia, much was destroyed that had value for the intellectuals, if not for Joseph. "The greatest, most beautiful and most useful works, which Czechs had collected and brought to Bohemia in the course of two centuries, have now been resold, mostly to foreigners, and sent out of the country," lamented Pelcl in 1789. "This was certainly not done to support learning in Bohemia."⁸⁶

Germanization was resented, but Joseph's school policies did have their paradoxically good side. The practical curriculum helped meet a real need of the people,⁸⁷ and the simple fact that elementary education was promoted served in the long run to benefit the Czech nation.⁸⁸ In any case, just as Germanization was not yet being pushed for nationalist, chauvinist reasons, so it was not necessarily being resisted for those reasons. At this time, the patriotic intellectuals were only developing that reification of mother-tongue and *vlast* that was to make linguistic affiliation the decisive criterion for national identification. German was the language of much of their own work, and the major language in which Enlightenment ideas reached them.

⁸⁵ Cf. Pelcl, *Paměti*, pp. 31, 34, and 37, entries for January 1780, 7 January 1781, and 20 January 1781, with *ibid.*, pp. 88–89, entry for 20 November 1789.

⁸⁶ Pelcl, *Paměti*, p. 83, entry for 23 January 1789.

⁸⁷ Kramerius noted this in *Kniha Josefova*. See Novotný, *Kramerius*, p. 287.

⁸⁸ Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism," p. 233; Myl'nikov, "Kul'tura i natsional'noe samosoznanie narodov tsentral'noi i iugo-vostochnoi Evropy v èpokhu natsional'nogo vozrozhdeniia," *Sovetskoe slavianovedeniia*, 1974, no. 4, pp. 78–79.

They were not precisely anti-German; but they hoped to raise Czech to the same level as German, and to transmit to the Czech-speaking masses the cultural and economic advances already being spread among German speakers.⁸⁹ Germanization acted as a spur to emulation as well as to resistance.

It was Joseph's policies in the cultural field that aroused the intellectuals' most whole-hearted support. Their own activities were given more scope, and the initial steps taken during the 1780s would lead to an independent Czech culture. The ferment of the decade made it an exciting time to be educated and reach maturity, and it left a lasting influence on younger awakeners. Even the reaction following Joseph's death did not undo its effects.

Two other aspects of Joseph's policies survived him—the popular education movement, and the subordination of the church to the state. The value of popular education to the renaissance has been mentioned above. Josephinism gave it a momentum which could only be slowed, not stopped by the ensuing reaction. The same can be said of the reform Catholicism propagated by Joseph's church policies. A generation of graduates from the general seminaries kept alive its traditions, and it was this rational, tolerant Catholicism—not the Hussite and Protestant tradition nor the Baroque piety of the Counter-Reformation—which was perhaps most typical of this generation of awakeners. In the schoolmasters, priests, and officials who were so many of the second generation of patriots, the impact of Josephinism continued to be felt by the Czech renaissance.

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⁸⁹ For a particularly clear expression of this attitude toward German, see the foreword to Kramerius, *Křesťanská katolická užitečná domovní postilla* (Prague, 1785).