THE LEFT
TRANSFORMED IN

POST-COMMUNIST
SOCIETIES

**The Cases of
East-Central
Europe,
Russia, and
Ukraine**

Edited by

Jane Leftwich Curry

and

Joan Barth Urban

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in Post-Communist Societies

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Contents

Abbreviations

AWS	Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność"; Solidarity Election Action
CDU	Christlich Demokratische Union; Christian Democratic Union
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CP RSFSR	Communist Party of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic
CPRF	Communist Party of the Russian Federation
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
CSPP	Centre for the Study of Public Policy
CSU	Christian-Social Union
EU	European Union
FAR	Fatherland–All Russia bloc
FCP	French Communist Party
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend; Free German Youth
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic (Communist East Germany)
HSP	Hungarian Socialist Party
HSWP	Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (formal title of pre-1990 Communist Party)
HU/LC	Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives
ICP	Italian Communist Party
ILCP	Independent Lithuanian Communist Party, the name of the reformed Communist Party in 1989–1990

LCP	Lithuanian Communist Party
LDLP	Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party
LLU	Lithuanian Liberal Union
LPP	Lithuanian People's Party
LSDP	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party
LSP	Lithuanian Socialist Party
LUSP	Lithuanian Union of Social Justice
MP	Member of Parliament
MSA	Movement in Support of the Army
NATO	North Alantic Treaty Organization
NFHTU	National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions
NPUR	National-Patriotic Union of Russia
NU/SL	New Union/Social Liberals
OPZZ	Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazków Zawodowych; All Poland Trade Union Coalition
PDS	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus; Party of Democratic Socialism
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe; Polish Peasant Party
PUS	Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczne; Polish Social Democratic Union
PZPR	Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza; Polish United Workers' Party
RCP	Russian Communist Party
SD 2000	Social Democracy 2000
SdRP	Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej; Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; Socialist Unity Party of Germany
SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej; Democratic Left Alliance
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands; Social Democratic Party of Germany
SPU	Socialist Party of Ukraine
SPW	Socialist Party of Workers
UCP–CPSU	Union of Communist Parties–Communist Party of the Soviet Union
UD	Union of Democracy
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Preface

This book began as an idea broached by Jane Curry to Joan Urban, at the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in autumn 1992, about the need to analyze the ongoing fates of the Soviet-era ruling communist parties. The importance of this topic was confirmed by the formation of coalition governments led by Lithuanian, Polish, and Hungarian ex-communists (by then renamed) after their countries' respective democratic elections of 1992, 1993, and 1994. The topic's relevance was further underscored by the revival and unexpected electoral clout of the quite different, neo-Leninist Russian and Ukrainian communist parties during 1993–1995. As a result, during the mid-1990s, while Curry undertook extensive research and interviews in Poland, Urban did the same in Russia and Ukraine.

This phase culminated in a conference, organized by Curry with Professor Stanislaw Gebetner of Warsaw University, which took place on October 25–26, 1999, at the Institute of Political Sciences, Warsaw University, in Poland. The conference, entitled "The Return of the Left: The Past, Present and Future of the New and Old Left in Post-Communist Societies," was funded by the Polish Fundacja im. Kazimierza Kelles-Krauza and the International Research and Exchanges Board. Paper givers at that conference included Curry, Urban, Thomas Baylis, and Algis Krupavicius, all of whom are contributors to the present volume. In addition, Radoslaw Markowski of Warsaw University reported on the Hungarian Socialist Party, Jana Reschova of Charles University reported on the Czech and Slovak socialist parties,

Radzislawa Gortat of Warsaw University reported on the Communist Party of Ukraine, and Jerno Pikalo of the University of Lubljana spoke about the Slovenian case. Marjorie Castle of Tulane University and Professor Gebetner provided comparative overviews. For the support and expertise of the above individuals as well as the many other specialists with whom we have consulted over the past decade, we are grateful.

Following the Warsaw conference, Curry and Urban put together this volume, recruiting several additional contributors and jointly piloting the various authors to the completion of their chapters. Their collaboration was facilitated by a short-term fellowship Curry received from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in summer 2001.

The following acknowledgments are also due. Table 3.1 in Algis Krupavicius's chapter on Lithuania first appeared in his article "The Post-Communist Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania's Parties" (*Political Studies* 46, no. 3 [1998]). Much of the early material for Andrew Wilson's chapter on Ukraine first appeared in his article "Reinventing the Ukrainian Left: Assessing Adaptability and Change, 1991–2000" (*Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no.1 [January 2002], pp. 1–39).

With regard to her chapter on Poland, Curry would like to thank Gloria Hofer for her unstinting patience at working out computer glitches; Marjorie Castle and Joanna Socholowska for their help with diacritical marks. Finally, this manuscript would not have become a book had it not been for the support of our families and, especially, of Laszlo K. Urban, who provided encouragement throughout our collaboration and who critiqued several of the draft chapters, thereby contributing to their analytical clarity and accuracy.

—Jane Leftwich Curry and Joan Barth Urban

Introduction

The year 1989 seemed to be the end in Eastern Europe not only for communist rule but for any political party ever associated with Marxism-Leninism. As scholars and analysts watched in awe from each side of the rapidly vanishing Iron Curtain, the previously ruling communist parties underwent what had been unthinkable: they gave up their monopoly on power, lost elections, and endured public criticism by citizens they had once cowed into silent submission. Most East-Central European communist parties, outside the Balkans, seemed to have fallen into what Marx once termed (writing about capitalism) the "dustbin of history." Where former communists remained in power, as in Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia, they seemed involved in a great charade of claiming to be democratic, holding token elections, but then ruling on as authoritarian nationalists.

Then, after the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow and the December 1991 breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) into fifteen independent states, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, too, fell like Humpty Dumpty. What we once saw as a set of closely controlled titular "republic" parties within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) turned into a multitude of local bit players in search of a new script. As for the much vaunted unity of the CPSU leadership, it had in fact splintered beyond recognition even before 1991. Indeed, the final demise of the Soviet Union was triggered by the fragmentation of the CPSU itself, with the rapidly social democratizing leadership team of Mikhail Gorbachev facing growing opposition from conservative or hard-line rivals and lower-level

party bureaucrats, on the one hand, and from impatient members of the Soviet elite calling for faster democratization and marketization, on the other.

In the immediate aftermath of 1989–1991, statesmen and analysts alike focused their attention on the democratic reformers in the newly independent states of the former Soviet East European bloc and the ex–Soviet Union's constituent republics, assuming that communist parties across the board had lost all political relevance. Wishful thinking doubtless contributed to this clouded vision. Whatever the case, while observers concentrated on evolving democratic institutions, emerging free-market economies, and new right-of-center parties in the region, successors to the old ruling communist parties regrouped in country-specific ways, preparing to play critical roles in the post-communist orders.

The Focus

This book examines the nature and depth of the transformations of the formerly ruling communist parties and their successor organizations in Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. Its time frame begins with the states' exits from communism in 1989–1991 and extends through 2002, by which time the international setting had once again been as indelibly altered as it had been a decade earlier at the triumphal start of the post-communist era. The volume focuses on this particular set of left-of-center parties because of their enduring domestic significance in the 1990s and beyond, the prominence of their countries in the geopolitical space of the former "Soviet bloc," and, last but not least, the striking contrast they offer between Euro-Atlantic-oriented social democrats and anti-Western neo-Leninists.

Taken together, the country studies illuminate the stunning diversity in the post-communist trajectories of the Soviet-era Marxist-Leninist parties and explain the reasons for the profound differences among them. Written by American and European scholars whose knowledge of their topics is informed by extensive fieldwork as well as years of intensive study, this is a work of contemporary history rather than theory construction. It analyzes a major slice of the "post-communist transition" phenomenon in a comparative framework that should be of interest to professionals working in the area, university students, and political scientists alike.

In Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania, former communists came back as social democratic parties prepared to adapt to Western systems of capitalism and democracy. Beginning in the early 1990s they were able to win elections and form governments, and thereafter they continued to be key players in their respective democratic polities as they alternated in power with

center-right parties or coalitions. In the Russian Federation and Ukraine, on the other hand, the successor communist parties remained Marxist-Leninist in ideology, "statist" in public policy, and programmatically committed to working toward the "radiant future" of communism so persistently heralded in the Soviet past. They managed quickly to surmount the initial bans on their legal activity and to challenge the power of their countries' post-communist presidents and legislatures in hotly contested elections throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium. As for the ex-communists from what was once the hard-line German Democratic Republic, in post-unification Germany they occupied a middle ground between the new thinking of the East-Central European social democratic parties and the old thinking of the Russian and Ukrainian neo-Leninist communist parties.

While our focus is on the above six parties, a successor communist party exists, in some manner, in almost every post-communist state. After a decade of slow change in the Balkan and Moldovan political-economic systems, some of these parties even returned to government, claiming, at least, to have social democratic goals and to be prepared to work in democratic systems. In the new Czech Republic (after Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce" between the Czechs and Slovaks in late 1992), the Communist Party remained a small retrograde political force, representing the orthodox pro-Soviet collaborationist core that had imposed hard-line rule after the Warsaw Pact invasion that ended the "Prague Spring" reform movement in 1968. While the pre–World War II Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party did coalesce in the late 1990s as a relatively important force, the renamed Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia was slow to change or play any significant parliamentary role, despite attracting a growing protest vote by spring 2002. In Slovakia, the ex-communist party initially dissolved into a morass of personality politics until it entered parliament by virtue of winning 6.3 percent of the votes in the September 2002 election. By way of contrast, in relatively Westernized Slovenia the former communists quickly transformed themselves into social democrats and won early entry into the Socialist International. Yet even they had difficulty winning sizable electoral pluralities. In short, it was the successor parties in Poland, Hungary, Lithuania (in the Baltics), and to a lesser extent eastern Germany that experienced the most dramatic political transformations and electoral successes in states generally considered to be among the most important in what was once the communist-controlled eastern half of Europe.

As for the independent states of the ex-USSR, the communist parties of Latvia and Estonia, predominantly ethnic Russian creations of the CPSU, withered away into backward-looking rumps—in contrast to what happened in

Lithuania. In Belarus two rival but numerically small successor communist parties persevered under the autocratic Aleksandr Lukashenko regime, with one supporting the status quo and the other evolving in a social democratic direction. There was a similarly mixed picture in the trans-Caucasian states. In the five ex-Soviet Central Asian republics, small successor communist parties struggled in largely clandestine fashion against authoritarian regimes whose leaders were, for the most part, either the former CPSU republic party chiefs in new "presidential" guises or their close adjutants. Meanwhile, these vestigial hard-line groups remained affiliated with a shadowy would-be organizational successor to the CPSU that was cobbled together by one of the August 1991 Soviet putschists, Oleg Shenin, and housed during the mid-1990s in an obscure, tightly secured warehouse in the outskirts of Moscow. In a word, only in Russia and Ukraine did the ex-Soviet loyalist communist parties sufficiently regroup to pose a challenge to the new political-economic orders.

On one level, every one of the six successor parties analyzed in this book was radically transformed. Each one, having lost its former monopoly on power, had no choice but to play by the new rules of competitive electoral politics. In the jargon used by West European Marxist-Leninists after World War II, all of these parties began pursuing the "parliamentary path to socialism," regardless of how they now defined *socialism*. But on another level, as already suggested, these formations occupy a wide doctrinal spectrum that ranges from the social democrats in Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania; through the fence-sitters of the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany; to the neo-Leninist communists in Russia and Ukraine. What differentiates them is not their participation in electoral politics but, rather, their domestic and foreign policy agendas as well as their professed programmatic goals.

The social democrats are, for the most part, pragmatists turned pluralists, determined to move their polities into the mainstream of European market-based democracies. These parties take their cues from continental European social democracy's shift away from its Marxist roots to acceptance of both the post–World War II West European model of a social market economy and region-wide economic integration. The neo-Leninists, in contrast, engage in rhetoric and occasionally conduct that prompt their opponents to accuse them of duplicity, of viewing the game of electoral politics as but a transitional stage back to the Soviet past. Their party programs are unabashedly anti-Western, anticapitalist, and focused on the gradual (if "voluntary") restoration of the USSR. The neo-Leninists likewise see late-twentieth-century globalization as a process orchestrated by the United States, implemented by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and bent on trans-

forming the ex-communist lands into neocolonial dominions reduced to the status of the impoverished Third World.

In many ways the differences among the successor left-of-center parties in East-Central Europe, Russia, and Ukraine recall the sharp cleavages within the European Marxist movement during the first half of the twentieth century and later in postwar West Europe. The history of Marxism during the last century was above all a struggle between Leninists and social democrats, which dramatically sharpened after the 1917 Russian Revolution and continued into the post–World War II decades. Viewed from a quite different perspective, however, competition and cleavages between hard-line and moderate members of the Leninist international communist movement were at times just as cutting as they were *between* the two mainstream branches of the European left: social democracy and Marxism-Leninism. Cleavages between reformers and hard-liners likewise existed *within* most of the postwar communist regimes, especially after the death of Stalin. There were, of course, differences of degree and style from country to country. The infighting inside ruling communist leaderships was, moreover, constrained by the Leninist ban on minority dissent, the threat of losing individual power and perks, and the collective need to project a monolithic face to their own regimented populations.

Within communist regimes struggles over policy and personnel thus played themselves out behind closed doors unless or until they became so intense that they spilled over into ever wider circles of a party's elite, triggering grassroots involvement. Under the latter circumstances the result was violent confrontation, as in Hungary in 1956; relatively consensual liberalization, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968 (until terminated by Soviet-led military intervention); or an alternating process of liberalization and hard-line crackdowns, as occurred in Poland from 1956 until the rise in 1980 of the free trade union movement, Solidarity, which culminated in the imposition of martial law. In the Soviet Union internal leadership struggles remained largely hidden from public view until their "resolution," as in the case of the sudden ouster of Nikita Khrushchev in October 1964. Only with the ascendancy of Gorbachev to the CPSU general secretaryship in March 1985 did party infighting between reformers and hard-liners escalate to the point of outright schism, mass involvement, loss of central control, and eventual collapse of the communist system.

It should, therefore, come as no surprise that the successors to the former ruling communist parties within the Soviet bloc as a whole evolved in very different ways once they found themselves operating in a pluralist political framework. At that point country-specific influences—such as the record of

popular unrest and economic adjustments under communism, the political profile of the regime on the eve of the collapse, and the mode of exit from communism—became more important than earlier Soviet-era systemic similarities in determining both the character and the role of successor leftist parties in their respective countries.

A Brief Look Back at the Traditional Communist "Party-State"

Our analysis of the major successor communist parties invites a quick review of the essential features of the traditional communist party-state system, especially for readers educated in the post–Cold War era. Ruling communist parties were never political parties in any Western sense. While some of the skills party activists learned in the old order would work for them later in democratic elections and party building, the Soviet-style "form" imposed on them did not "fit" with democracy. Ruling communist parties orchestrated noncompetitive, single-candidacy elections, or, when limited competition was permitted in some states of East-Central Europe, the communist parties controlled the selection of candidates and programs. Communist-era elections were not about choice. They were exercises in mass mobilization, intended to demonstrate the population's unified support for the ruling party and regime. For this reason, everyone was expected to participate in elections for bogus "representative bodies" at local, regional, and national levels.

Why would citizens show up to vote when the electoral process was so manipulated? Aside from possible sanctions for not voting, they did so because the system provided cradle-to-grave economic security: stable state-set prices; guaranteed employment; subsidies for housing and transportation; and free education, health care, and state pensions—albeit all at a level affordable to the inefficient communist economic system.

Communist parties also governed in ways that were very different from governance in Western democracies. Their constitutional charge, as the "vanguard of the working class," was to play the "leading role" in both policy making and public administration. They also reviewed and approved appointments to all prominent positions in the government as well as managerial posts in the state's economic and social bureaucracies. Through the party rule of "democratic centralism," leaders had the right to silence minority dissent in every area of life they deemed important. Finally, these parties aimed, at least initially, not just at getting acquiescence but also at indoctrinating and mobilizing the populations under their control.

The ruling communist party's powers were multiplied further by the fact that the state had control of virtually all aspects of society, including the

economy, culture, and the welfare system. This meant communist parties, through the state administration, not only dominated political decisions but also directed what was produced in the economy, how much, and for whom. In countries like Poland and Hungary, unlike the USSR, some small-scale private artisan production and retail trade were allowed. In Poland, to secure minimal support from the peasantry, private farming was also tolerated. But the party retained ultimate control over supplies, taxes, employment regulations, and distribution opportunities for private owners.

As the designated propagators of the exclusive state doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, the communists denied the existence of group interests while claiming to be the representatives of the entire working class—broadly defined as wage and salary earners. Ideologically, they maintained there was no other path to political and economic development than the one set forth by Karl Marx, "updated" by Vladimir Lenin, and implemented in the Soviet "fatherland" by Joseph Stalin and his successors. In this worldview, capitalism not only exploited the working class but also was inevitably doomed to fail and be replaced by socialism.

In the area of culture, the ruling party insisted on conformity, at least in public, to Marxism-Leninism and the party-state's policies. The communist elite, through formal and informal directives, rewards, and censorship, controlled everything legally published and performed. Little or nothing actually appeared that was not according to "the party line," except when the leaders were divided or the production of a dissident press could not be stopped. Communism and the Communist Party were never permissible targets of public criticism and, given the fear of being reported on, were rarely subjects of sharp private criticism.

Membership in the ruling Communist Party was viewed as an honor reserved for less than 10 percent of the population. To join, members were selected and put through a candidacy period before they were approved by the party bureaucracy (*apparat*) and, formally, by their own grassroots Primary Party Organization. As members of Primary Party Organizations, usually based in workplaces, they were expected to participate in local party meetings, exhibit exemplary loyalty to the decisions of top party leaders, and pay party dues. Their observations about each other and what was happening around them, moreover, were fed up the bureaucratic ladder. Membership had its rewards: if not a requirement, it certainly helped demonstrate political trustworthiness and ensure job-related promotions. In fact, however, party members had little real say about anything that happened within the party-state. Decisions came from the top down, made by a set of full-time party functionaries working in the apparat. When the members

voted in internal party elections, they had no choice but the single candidate picked by the apparat for the next highest party body.

The Politburo was the highest decision-making organ in the communist party-state. Its members, under the direction of the top party leader (variously designated first secretary or general secretary), distributed among themselves the key government and party posts. These dozen or so men were the ultimate arbiters of public policy. Ostensibly elected by the party's Central Committee, which in turn was formally elected by national party congresses every four or five years, the Politburo was in fact a self-perpetuating body that selected the Central Committee members from among the party's elite in various fields. Only very rarely did the Central Committee act on its own. Usually, Central Committee meetings were orchestrated discussions in support of specific policies already endorsed by the Politburo.

The real administrative work was done by the full-time bureaucrats in the party apparat. They ran party and state affairs based on the Politburo's directives, overseeing every aspect of the government's work. In the process, they were decisive in who was hired for the so-called *nomenklatura*, or elite positions, throughout the state bureaucracies. They gave specific directives to every ministry, from heavy industry to culture, as well as to every economic, welfare, and political unit at the regional and local levels; and they also collected information for their superiors about what was really happening in the units they supervised. Supplementing this whole system of party control was a compliant media, orchestrated by the party leadership's propaganda department, and an extensive secret police and informer network that monitored individuals ranging from party officials to declared dissidents.

Following Stalin's consolidation of power in the Soviet Union after Lenin's death, in the 1920s, he forcibly imposed agricultural collectivization and a nationalized, centrally planned command economy by means of police terror and ideological mobilization. After Stalin's death in March 1953 and Nikita Khrushchev's strategic shift from terror to economic promises and incentives, the system of party-state controls described above held the USSR together until 1991. Along with a joint military body (the Warsaw Pact) and a closed trading and payment system (the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation), it also allowed the Soviet Union to control the East European states and communist parties. All the East European party-states (as well as the individual Soviet republics) had to subordinate their own interests to those of the USSR. There was Soviet intervention in everything from economic decisions to ideological debates. Communist party leaders from different countries met together only under the supervision of the central Soviet leadership, with whom they

also had periodic individual meetings, and their politics and policy agendas had to reflect Soviet interests or limits.

How these structures worked and the impact they had on people's lives depended, in large part, on what sort of leaders held power, their perceptions of what was possible, and the geopolitical histories of their respective societies. Periodically, there were instances of popular upheaval when reformist intraparty groups and leaders sought ways to "democratize" the system. These happened as a result of deepening economic failures, a divided political leadership, and a population that was increasingly restive. In 1956 in Hungary and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, upheavals went from demands that socialism fulfill its promises of social fairness and economic well-being to calls for radically changing the system and freeing it from Soviet control. Traditional party-state controls collapsed, only to be put back together once the Soviet Union ordered in troops to end the "counterrevolution." In Poland in 1956, the 1970s, and 1980–1981, there were similar popular demands for the system to make good on its promises. In contrast to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, however, the Polish communist leaders managed to obviate the need for Soviet military invasion by tightening the screws or making concessions, depending on the circumstances.

The Exit from Communism

The exit from communism was as sudden as it was decisive, even if underlying pressures for change had long been mounting. The Soviet "superpower," unable to compete with the postindustrial Euro-Atlantic community, was left with no choice but to give up confrontation with it and eventually even try to join it. The die was cast with the coming to power of a CPSU general secretary who saw to the west of the "Soviet bloc" not a mortal enemy but "our common European home." On the details of this historic turnabout tomes have been—and remain to be—written. But the bottom line is clear. Communist-dominated Eastern Europe could not withstand the comparison with capitalist Western Europe, and, by the second half of the 1980s, the Soviet hegemon had lost its will to maintain by force what it had never been able to sustain by persuasion.

First came the rapid-fire end to the Cold War standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987–1988. This included the agreement to destroy all intermediate-range nuclear weapons, with unprecedented on-site verification, and Mikhail Gorbachev's December 1988 declaration to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly that all societies had the right to self-determination, accompanied by his announcement of a partial unilateral

conventional force reduction and withdrawal from East-Central Europe. In tandem with these surprising developments came the end to censorship in the Soviet Union and the holding of partially competitive elections, in March 1989, for a working Soviet parliament to replace the rubber-stamp body of the past. The path was thus opened for the liberation from communist domination of the states of Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and elsewhere on the periphery of the Soviet heartland.

In Poland the final struggle had begun in 1980, when endemic economic decline led to strikes and the formation of the free-trade union, Solidarity. The communist leadership tried to crush Solidarity by imposing martial law from late 1981 until 1983, only to see the Communist Party itself gradually atrophy and the economy continue to stagnate under increasingly heavier international financial obligations. Finally, in late 1988 and early 1989, the communist leaders negotiated a roundtable agreement to share power with their former Solidarity rivals. To that end, they held semicompetitive parliamentary elections in June 1989, only to lose the crucial majority of seats in the lower chamber that the roundtable agreements were supposed to have guaranteed them. For the first time in more than forty years a communist regime in Eastern Europe was voted out of power.

In Hungary, long before Gorbachev became CPSU general secretary, a system of "market socialism" had developed in which industry and business were still owned by the state but were run on market principles. Even with those reforms, Hungary did not come close to the prosperity of the West. Nor did Soviet-bloc constraints permit more than token democratic rights. But by spring 1989, in tandem with the Soviet transformation, the Hungarian communists allowed the resurrection of the martyrs of the 1956 Revolution, hitherto treated as villains, and gave them a ceremonial reburial. They also liberalized the economy to make it competitive, took down the segment of the Iron Curtain between Hungary and Austria in summer 1989, and relinquished their one-party monopoly on power to open the system to political competition by October 1989.

After the negotiated turnovers in Hungary and Poland, the other East European communist regimes virtually imploded. The Czechoslovak, East German, and Romanian communist leaders did their best to avoid making any reform. Nothing, though, stopped the general trajectory. By November 1989 popular demonstrations forced change in the communist German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and, somewhat later, Romania and Albania. In all of these countries, some party members were involved in the grassroots movements, but in none of them had communist *leaders* traveled as far along the path of reform as they had in Poland and Hungary. Nor

did the latter fully understand that sharing power meant the total demise of their systems. Elsewhere, newly designated "reformist" leaders, after being brought in to placate popular demands, could not stem the tide and, with little or no negotiation between the ruling parties and the opposition, ended by giving up all their power. Only in Romania did some of the top communist authorities put up armed resistance, after which the longtime party leader and his wife were summarily tried and killed.

The whirlwind exit of East-Central Europe and the Balkan states from single-party communist dictatorship in the second half of 1989, galvanized by Gorbachev's foreign-policy concessions and domestic political reforms, had a dramatic impact on subsequent developments in the USSR. In winter 1990, Gorbachev ended the CPSU's own "constitutional" monopoly on power and was elected USSR president by the new Soviet parliament, in an attempt to shift real executive authority away from the CPSU Politburo and apparat to government bodies. At the same time, ethnic-based separatism was rapidly gaining the upper hand in the Baltic states and trans-Caucasian Georgia, with Lithuania's communists—led by reformer Algirdas Brazauskas—siding with their citizens' push for independence. In Russia itself, by spring 1990, the grassroots Democratic Russia movement, joined by reform communists and "Russia firsters," backed Boris Yeltsin in his bid for the chairmanship of the newly elected Russian parliament and, ultimately, in his escalating rivalry with Soviet President Gorbachev.

All the while, antireformers in the CPSU apparat put up bureaucratic obstructionism to the reform process, precipitating the fragmentation of the Soviet nomenklatura (elite) into multiple divergent opinion groupings. The August 1991 attempted putsch by hard-liners against Gorbachev was but the tip of the iceberg of the CPSU's internal meltdown as an instrument of centralized control over the fifteen titular republics composing the USSR. Yeltsin's championship of elite and popular resistance to the putsch prompted vacillation among the Soviet security forces and military, resulting in the putschists' quick defeat. This, in turn, led to Yeltsin's de facto ascendancy over Gorbachev; declarations of independence by the Baltics, Georgia, and eventually Ukraine; and the breakup of the USSR in late December 1991.

Overview of Post-Communist Government Structures

The political systems spawned by the collapse of Soviet-style communism were as different as the communist systems were alike. Our authors analyze the political profiles and roles of the ex-ruling communist parties' successor formations in Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.

But crucial to understanding just how these successor parties operated during the 1990s and into the new millennium are their respective institutional contexts—the government structures and electoral systems created after the collapse of communist rule.

In the Polish case, the initial post-communist system was an amalgam of compromises. The 1989 roundtable negotiations between the communist rulers and the opposition led to the addition of an upper house (Senate) to the existing Polish legislature (Sejm) and the creation of a weak presidency. In the seminal June 1989 elections, competition for the 460 Sejm seats was carefully circumscribed, with 65 percent of the seats reserved for candidates nominated by the Communist Party and its puppet allies and 35 percent reserved for candidates from what had been the antiregime opposition. Seats in the new Senate were freely contested and elected on a majoritarian basis. The two houses of parliament in joint session elected a president with limited powers to veto legislation and serve as head of state. By an agreement reached during the roundtables to reassure the Soviets, this was to be the Communist Party leader, Wojciech Jaruzelski. Until the so-called small constitution was passed in 1992, the powers of these various institutions were rather ad hoc. They were not fully delineated until 1997 when a new constitution was approved by a popular referendum.

After 1990, when Jaruzelski resigned as president, the Polish government structures began to evolve into a mixed presidential/parliamentary system, roughly on the pattern of the Fifth French Republic. This happened, initially, as much because of the strength of the two men elected to that post since 1990 as because of its legal powers. Majoritarian presidential elections are held every five years. Once elected, a president nominates the prime minister for parliamentary approval. He can disband the Sejm and call new parliamentary elections. He has the right to either veto legislation or refer legislation to the Constitutional Court for review. He also serves as head of state, is responsible for national defense, and in a national emergency has a limited right to declare martial law.

The Sejm is the primary legislative body. It is here that most political discussions are centered. Its 460 members have been elected by proportional representation since 1991. But, in response to the fragmentation of parties in the 1991 elections, a threshold was added: only those parties with 5 percent of the national vote or coalitions with 7 percent qualify for seats in the Sejm. The weaker upper house, the Senate, can amend a bill or vote it down, but, ultimately, the Sejm can override the Senate's objections. The one hundred members of the Senate are elected by majority vote in their individual districts. Since 1993, parliamentary elections have been held every four years.

Subnational governmental units in Poland—local and regional councils— have had their boundaries drawn and redrawn in the post-communist period. Essentially, they are the administrators of major areas of social policy and economic development but are dependent on the national government for funding. Their elections have been held in off years from national elections.

In post-communist Lithuania, the president can be much more closely harnessed by an opposition majority in parliament than is the case in Poland, even though he remains an important player in this mixed presidential/parliamentary system. The 1992 constitution, written soon after Lithuania's independence, provides for a single house of parliament, the Seimas, which is responsible for enacting legislation and approving the prime minister and his cabinet as well as other top state officials. It also is charged with overseeing government policy, including investigating citizens' complaints about official abuse of power; and may remove from office the president, judges, or a Seimas deputy for gross violation of the constitution or a felony. The Seimas can also remove the prime minister or a cabinet minister by a majority vote of no confidence.

Parliamentary elections are held every four years. Half of the 141 seats in the Seimas are elected in 71 single-member districts; until 2000, when a plurality system was put into effect, if no candidate won a majority of the vote in the first round, then runoff elections were held. The other half of Seimas deputies (seventy) are elected by party lists in one multimember nationwide constituency, with thresholds of 5 percent for a single party and 7 percent for a party coalition (as in Poland) required for seats distributed according to proportional representation. Local governments are regularly elected but have little real authority, because they are dependent on the national government for funding.

The president is popularly elected for a five-year term. He is responsible for leading the state in foreign and military policy and also for appointing the prime minister and cabinet, subject to confirmation by a majority vote in parliament. He cannot veto legislation as the Polish president can, although he can declare a state of emergency if the country's security is threatened. The president can call early elections for the Seimas, but, if he does this, the new Seimas can then call early elections for the presidency. In Lithuania the post of prime minister is more powerful than that of the president.

Hungary's government, still based on a much-amended version of the communist-era constitution, is a parliamentary system. Its single-chamber National Assembly is responsible for passing all legislation and overseeing the government functions. Of the total 386 seats, 176 are elected in single-member districts using a system of runoff elections, and 152 are elected from regional lists by proportional representation. A 5 percent threshold prevents

very small parties from claiming seats. A national list is then used to distribute the remaining seats by proportional representation to the parties that did receive at least 5 percent of the vote.

The National Assembly also elects both the president and the prime minister. The prime minister is charged with selecting and directing the cabinet and running the government. Although Hungary's post-communist governments have always been multiparty coalitions, the prime minister dominates decision making in part because the Hungarian constructive vote of no confidence makes it hard to replace him. Likewise, the disproportionate outcome of the electoral system ensures that governments comprise one very large party with a generally much smaller coalition partner that has little incentive to bring down the government. The president, elected for a five-year term, is the head of state and has the power to propose legislation, call referenda, and refer laws to the Constitutional Court. In general, however, the presidency has been largely ceremonial. On the local level, as in Poland and Lithuania, there are regular elections, but the Hungarian local governments have little real power, as they, too, depend on the central government for funding.

The change in the government structure of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or Communist East Germany, was the most dramatic yet smoothest of all the post-communist political transformations. The territory of the former GDR was simply absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In October 1990 the original ten West German states were joined by five new eastern German states, while newly united Berlin, whose forty-year division between East and West had been a key Cold War hot spot, became the sixteenth federal unit and reunified Germany's city-state capital. The Basic Law (constitution), according to which the FRG had been governed since 1949, was automatically extended to apply to the new eastern states as well.

Post–World War II Germany has had a stable parliamentary system with a bicameral legislature and a unique form of federalism. The national parliament includes the popularly elected lower chamber, the *Bundestag*, and a smaller upper chamber, the *Bundesrat*, whose sixty-nine members are appointed by their respective state governments. Although the Bundestag's 656-plus deputies have primary legislative authority, most public policies are implemented at the state level and must therefore be approved by the Bundesrat before becoming law. Chief executive authority is vested in the federal chancellor, who designates a cabinet after being confirmed by a majority vote of the Bundestag deputies. While the chancellor represents the party with the largest plurality of parliamentary deputies, he must normally form a coali-

tion cabinet with a smaller party in order to command a majority in the Bundestag. The formation of state governments follows a similar pattern, with coalition governments also being the rule at the subnational level. A chancellor may be removed between national elections only by a constructive vote of no confidence.

Elections for the Bundestag, normally held every four years, are based on personalized proportional representation. Voters cast two ballots, one for a candidate from their own districts and one for a party list. Although each party is entitled to a total number of deputies equal to its percentage of the national party-list vote, the delegations of the larger parties include numerous winners of district seats, while those of the smaller parties are more likely to come from their party lists. To qualify for any representation in the Bundestag, however, a party must win 5 percent of the party-list vote or at least three electoral district seats. The latter provision has been particularly important for the former GDR communists, who have garnered considerable regional support in the new eastern German states. Elections for each state parliament, or landtag, are staggered between the quadrennial national elections.

Russia's post-Soviet government structure began as an uneasy mix of institutions created in the late Gorbachev era. These included a Congress of People's Deputies, competitively elected in spring 1990; a newly created and directly elected presidency, which Boris Yeltsin won by a substantial majority in June 1991; and a set of government ministries whose personnel were largely holdovers from the Soviet period. By late 1992 the Congress of People's Deputies claimed parliamentary supremacy over the president in a political stalemate that was compounded by a deepening economic crisis triggered by Russia's version of economic reforms. By autumn 1993 this conflict led to Yeltsin's forcible dissolution of the Congress and a violent clash between government troops and the most intransigent among the parliamentary deputies (about one-third of those elected in 1990). This became known as post-Soviet Russia's Black October.

In the aftermath of Black October, a new constitution of the Russian Federation was drafted by Yeltsin's administration and approved in a December 1993 referendum. The "Yeltsin constitution" calls for a presidential system that formally resembles the French Fifth Republic's mixed presidential/parliamentary system but in fact grants much more power to the presidency. As in France (and Poland), the president is popularly elected on a majoritarian basis, with a runoff ballot between the two leading candidates if no one receives an absolute majority in the first round. The presidential term in Russia is four years.

The constitution also proclaims Russia to be a federation composed of the original eighty-nine regional units of the Russian Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union. However, the precise powers of these regional units and their relationship with the central government still remain to be clarified at the start of the new millennium. Although the constitution designates the Russian parliament's upper house, the Federation Council, to represent the regions, that body has normally been dominated by the presidential administration under constantly changing rules for selecting its 178 members.

The State Duma, the lower house of the post-1993 Russian parliament (National Assembly), is the primary arena for legislative deliberation and is elected every four years (except for an initial two-year term in 1994–1995). One-half of its 450 deputies are chosen in single-member districts and one-half according to party lists, with a 5 percent threshold required to receive a share of the 225 seats distributed by proportional representation. As in Poland (and France), the Duma has the power to confirm the president's nomination for prime minister as well as to pass a motion of no confidence once a prime minister takes office. Nevertheless, even though Duma deputies often play a constructive role in working out the details of legislation, a floating majority consistently heeds presidential preferences on key public policy issues. This is partly because of the weak, undeveloped character of Russia's multiple political parties (except for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation), which makes them more susceptible to political and financial pressures than might otherwise be the case. But it is also partly because of the president's power to dissolve an obstructionist Duma and call for early elections, an eventuality feared by most sitting deputies.

The Duma's caution in defying the president is paralleled by the government ministries' subordination to the powerful presidential administration as well as by the propensity of the Federation Council and the regional governments it represents (with the exception of Chechnya) to bow to the will of the central authorities. These phenomena suggest that in Russia both democracy and federalism are works in progress.

Independent Ukraine's political system was initially similar to that of Russia's with regard to the institutional continuities between the late Soviet period and the immediate post-Soviet years. Leonid Kravchuk, elected first president of Ukraine in early December 1991, continued in that position until 1994. But then, in a two-round election based on the majoritarian principle, Kravchuk was defeated by Leonid Kuchma (who was reelected in 1999). Meanwhile, the Soviet-era parliament, the single-chamber Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Soviet), continued in office until 1993, when new elections were held on the basis of single-member districts. In 1998 Ukraine

adopted a Russian-style electoral system for parliament: 450 deputies are chosen for a four-year term, one-half in single-member districts and one-half according to proportional representation, with a 4 percent threshold. According to the constitution of 1996, drafted by the presidential administration and approved by parliament, Ukraine also has a mixed parliamentary/presidential system with actual power heavily tilted in favor of the president—for many of the same reasons as in Russia. But unlike the case in Russia, the presidential term is five years.

The major difference between these two largest post-Soviet polities (Russia's population is about 145 million, and Ukraine's, 50 million) is that Ukraine is a unitary state, with over two dozen local administrative regions and the semiautonomous Crimea. A federal structure is precluded because of the potential for civil conflict between the ethnically mixed (Russian and Ukrainian), Orthodox, and Russia-oriented eastern and southern regions, on the one hand, and the predominantly Ukrainian, Roman Catholic, and Euro-Atlanticist western regions, on the other. These ethnocultural cleavages complicate both the consolidation of Ukrainian national identity and compliance with democratic norms and procedures.

The foregoing cursory overview of government systems is intended simply to provide a backdrop for the in-depth analyses that follow of the Soviet-era communist parties' successors in Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine.

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Poland's Ex-Communists: From Pariahs to Establishment Players

Jane Leftwich Curry

The Polish United Workers' Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza [PZPR]) suffered what seemed to be a terminal blow in 1989. In elections rigged so that the communists and their old allies were guaranteed 65 percent of the seats in the main house of parliament, the communists did so badly that their old allies deserted them. After what appeared to be a total defeat, all the communist reformers could do was turn the government over to the men and women of Solidarity they had interned and harassed for more than a decade. Then they had to disband themselves and form a new party to inherit the tattered remains of their mantle and resources. Less than four years after what looked like a complete rejection, in the 1993 free parliamentary elections, the successor party to the PZPR, the Social Democrats of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [SdRP]), and its coalition, the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej [SLD]), did well enough to dominate the parliament and form a government. Two years later, in 1995, the leader of the SdRP and its coalition's presidential candidate, Aleksander Kwaśniewski (a junior member of that last communist government), soundly defeated the Solidarity leader and incumbent president, Lech Wałęsa. By 1999, when the coalition turned itself into a party, the SLD was, by far, both the most popular and the most stable party in democratic Poland. As a result, it dominated the parliamentary elections of 2001, leaving Solidarity's old parties so fragmented that they did not get enough of the votes to get seats. In the process, it raised the population's hopes that it could solve Poland's economic problems and bring the same economic boom Poles remembered from 1993 to 1997.

From ignominious defeat to what seemed to be ever-increasing popularity, the social democrats had transformed themselves, their ideology, and their public image. They went from an unpopular ruling communist party to a successful player in democratic and capitalist Poland. As their continued gains at all levels have proved, this was not an accident. It reflected the fact that the "new" successor party was the party that, in form if not in ideology, did what appealed to voters. Its successes haunted the other parties of Poland— triggering attempts at political revenge that ended up distorting postcommunist Poland's politics and its ideological spectrum.

This is the story of how the social democrats transformed themselves from the hammer and sickle of Marx and Lenin (however much it had been kept in the background during the waning years of communism) to a party symbolized by a single red rose and, finally, by a red and white S (a modernist version of the symbol of its decades-old opponent, the independent trade-union movement, Solidarity). It is a critical tale of democratic transformation and also a cautionary tale for those who thought they understood what communism was all about. In the end, though, it is a demonstration of how lessons of a rejected past and the desire to be accepted by other politicians can play a major role in determining how a party transforms.

The story begins with the outpouring of opposition to the PZPR that showed up in the partially free elections of 1989. The redesign and return of the former communists to power in Polish politics began as a reaction to the shock of this defeat and the bitterness generated among new politicians by the communists' continued presence in the government bureaucracy and, as a minority, in the parliament. They were defeated in 1989 but not totally vanquished. So, they were easy to blame for Poland's problems. The story then moves from the attempts to build on the rubble and resources of the once ruling communist party to the founding of the Social Democratic Party of Poland and the formation of an electoral coalition that tied together the SdRP, the old government trade union (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Zwiazków Zawodowych/All Poland Trade Union Coalition [OPZZ]), and an odd assortment of small parties and interest groups. Then, in 1999, it ends when the SdRP disbanded itself, and the SLD coalition turned into a sleek new party designed to avoid the pitfalls of the old coalition, to leave the taint of "communism" behind, and to reclaim national leadership in the 2001 parliamentary elections.

The Prelude

Poland's communist party, the Polish United Workers' Party, was always a "special case," not just when it negotiated itself out of power but throughout

its history. It simply never was as "in control" as were communist parties elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Even before de-Stalinization, communism in Poland repressed the Catholic Church and internal party dissidents less than in other Soviet-bloc systems. Reformists from within and popular revolts from without kept the party unstable for most of its forty-five years of rule.

After the workers' strikes in Poznań and the liberalization of the "Polish October" that followed in 1956, the "Polish Road to Socialism" went in the direction of private farming, more private industry and trade than anywhere else but Yugoslavia, and relative autonomy for the Catholic Church to teach religion and play a real role in political decisions. Over all this was an ideological veneer that did little to hide the party's own cynicism and reformist impulses.

With the Poznań workers' demonstrations and the Polish October of 1956, Poland and its communist party began a never-ending cycle of popular upheavals and party reactions. The worker demonstrations and strikes of 1956, 1970, and 1976 all resulted in repression and then at least momentary compromises with workers' demands. In the process, Poland opened up more and more to the West. In the 1970s, this openness involved not just scholarly and intellectual exchanges and tourism but also a policy of improving the economy by opening up for imports and exports from the West. The intellectual demonstrations in 1968, on the other hand, had resulted in repression and then a purging of the party and an anti-Semitic purge of both party and government.[1]

Finally, the shipyard workers' strikes in August 1980 resulted in the formation of "Solidarity," the first independent and legal trade-union movement in Eastern Europe since before World War II. By this time, though, Poland's economy was teetering, and the pattern of protest, repression, and compromise had worn down the party. Not only were Poland's party leaders ready to negotiate with the Solidarity strikers, but they also were ready to allow, for fifteen months, Solidarity to be a major actor in Polish politics. During this time, Solidarity had a membership of more than one-third of the Polish population. There was a virtually free press, with more open discussions in the establishment press and a plethora of Solidarity papers printed independently; there was also an upheaval in the PZPR that led to an "Extraordinary Party Congress" where old leaders were voted out.

After fifteen months of internal protest and Soviet pressure, the Polish leadership under Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law on December 13, 1981, interning Solidarity's leaders, intellectual critics of the regime, and the leaders of the PZPR from the 1970s.[2] Martial law essentially froze political change for the first half of the 1980s and left the society bitterly

split and those party members who did not leave the PZPR in protest isolated.[3] By the end of the 1980s, it was clear to both the party leaders and most of the old Solidarity leadership that the stalemate could not continue. The informal contacts between the establishment and the opposition that had gone on in the 1980s were turned into a public roundtable in 1989 that initially was aimed at setting up a new system whereby Solidarity would be included but not "in power" and the two sides could work toward opening up the system. Out of this came accords that were to protect workers' interests, allow Solidarity to be a legal player in politics, open up the press, lead to partially free elections for the legislature (Sejm), and change the system so that there was a freely elected second house, the Senate, and a president who was to be elected by the two houses. Six weeks after the accords were signed, the old Soviet bloc's first even partially free elections were held.

These elections, designed to begin a limited "power sharing" with the opposition, actually ended in a shocking defeat for the communists. The election had been planned so that the communists and their allies would be guaranteed 65 percent of the seats in the Sejm (the lower house of parliament) and would compete against nonparty candidates only for seats in the newly organized upper house, the Senate. In the first round of the election, virtually none of the "party" candidates won a majority. Even the few who "won" a majority in this round did not win a traditional victory: the party had required only twenty-five signatures for a candidate to get a place on its ballots. Most candidates campaigned with as little mention of their party connection as possible. For those who had to run in a second round, victory was often a result of Solidarity intervening to urge voters to vote again and to vote for a specific "regime" candidate as the best of a bad lot. In simultaneous elections for the one hundred Senate seats, the communist candidates lost all but one seat. Finally, in what was to be a "guaranteed" election for Communist Party leaders running on the National List with no opposition, most voters crossed off all or most of the candidates' names. Only the two listed at the bottom of the list (where, presumably, single Xs over the whole list simply did not reach) got enough votes to win. The results were such a debacle for the regime that the Peasant Party and Democratic Party, loyal to the Communist Party through four decades of communist rule, bolted from this "sinking ship." They went into a coalition with the victorious Solidarity opposition, leaving communist reformers with too little support to form a governing coalition.

Solidarity, at the same time, shifted from being a trade union to being a governing party. In that form, the former trade union imposed "shock ther-

apy" economic reforms that brought hardships to most Poles and left many Solidarity supporters feeling betrayed by their national leaders. Among the men and women who had believed the roundtable promises that social welfare would be protected in Poland, there was a real desire to find advocates for the return and preservation of social welfare.

In dealing with the past, the first Solidarity government advocated "drawing a thick line" between the past and the present. But, less than six months after they had turned over power, Communist Party members and leaders found themselves and the communist past subject to public criticism and attacks on "the party" and its rule. To these criticisms, the party leadership and its Sejm delegation had no real response. Most Sejm deputies had run against their ties to the party. Once elected, deputies who had been in the party were treated as pariahs by other deputies. The party's reformist leaders, who would have led them, were out of power. They had, essentially, been ousted in what seemed a full-scale rejection of the national party list.

Furthermore, the party had no agreed-on direction. There was no clear party agenda for the election. After all, regime candidates ran against each other, not against the opposition's candidates. Each candidate ran his own campaign, promoting himself against opponents who were also from the PZPR. What the PZPR platform officially promised was that the system would be "more democratic." In the campaign, the party simply identified itself as "realizing the ideals of the working class as the party of working people which had and was going to have no other program than serving the nation."[4]

The shock of Solidarity's victory was so overwhelming that it swept PZPR deputies into joining Solidarity's full-scale assault on the old system. Party deputies set aside many of the promises of the roundtable. The political changes they supported went much further to diminish communist power than anyone had expected. As a result, those elected as PZPR representatives were left without constituencies. At the local level, the party essentially crumbled. Members who had joined the party to get ahead professionally were no longer interested in it because it now hurt rather than helped their careers. Those who had supported the old system were alienated by PZPR deputies' votes for the Balcerowicz Plan of economic shock therapy and also for political reforms made to end the communist system. By the end of the year, the PZPR group in the Sejm had essentially dissolved into small groups that eschewed any direct identification with the communist party: a "military group," the "unaffiliated deputies group," a "democratic left group," and a "socialist group."[5]

The men who had been the party's leaders either left politics or committed themselves, in fall 1989, to establishing a new political party that could

make use of the resources the party still had. Working from the top, these leaders called an extraordinary congress to dissolve the party and to form a new one. By design, it was to distance itself from the past and focus on social democratic goals. These, they hoped, would draw not only former Communist Party members but also new supporters. Even party intellectuals did little real ideological rethinking as to "What next?" The rethinking that did happen was done in spontaneous groups formed in summer 1989, at universities in Warsaw and Kraków. They concluded then that the old party was finished but went no further.[6]

Many party bureaucrats had seen the "writing on the wall" even before the election debacle. Those with marketable skills and connections had been taking other positions for years. In moving from party posts, they often camouflaged their party past. The rest of them were trapped. Their situations were so difficult, even before communism had been defeated, that the PZPR Organizational Department published a book in 1988 touting party bureaucrats' training and skills as managers and specialists. At the same time, PZPR leaders quietly shifted money to other accounts and to investments in various enterprises that were to cover the unemployment and retirement for those party bureaucrats who could not find employment after the party dissolved.

In 1989, when the first "noncommunist" government since World War II was formed, the communists got three key cabinet posts (the Ministries of Interior, Defense, and Transportation). Their appointments, like Wojciech Jaruzelski's election by a bare majority of the parliament to the presidency, were justified as something the Soviet Union required in order to accept Poland's transformation out of communist rule. Without the support of a panoply of party ministers and top administrators, the government bureaucrats who had gotten their positions in ministries through the communist-era nomenklatura system of appointment were essentially persona non grata. Most were kept in their positions because they had the expertise the new government needed and because there were few others who wanted to join the government's bureaucracies. The new Solidarity ministers made it clear that these men and women of the nomenklatura were neither trusted nor needed. So the old bureaucrats, who knew how the system worked, laid low to avoid drawing attention to themselves.

It was the party loyalists in the local party bodies who felt the attacks first. Local party members were scoffed at or assaulted. Many party headquarters were robbed or attacked. Newspapers were suddenly filled with criticism of "the party." According to their own reports, most members either wanted to forget they had ever been in the party or were outraged their lead-

ers had totally deserted them. Some local organizations tried to get credibility by "sharing their wealth"—their extra telephones, faxes, and mimeograph machines—with local schools, hospitals, and youth centers.[7] Many, among the party faithful, were angry with their old leaders for handing over power to the "Solidarity" enemy without protecting them. They also felt ignored by "their" Sejm deputies who were so focused on being reformers, surviving the defeat of their old party, and caught up in activity in the capital that they did not come back to their constituencies. Even their party membership was an embarrassment. To many, all it seemed to do was trigger attacks. At the same time, it was clear to the old party members that they were unwelcome anywhere else.

By January 1990, the system and the party had reached the point of no return. Even though Sejm deputies elected on the PZPR list had voted for all the new government's reforms, the public blame for just about everything was placed on "the party." Attacks and revelations about its "evil" past became a staple of the new media, and some Solidarity politicians went further. Legislation was passed allowing PZPR assets to be investigated and then seized (if not directly traceable to party members' dues and collections). Accounting commissions were set up to reclaim the state assets shifted to Communist Party coffers over the years. So, for instance, the giant press concern the party had controlled, R.S.W. Prasa, had its assets broken up, sold, or given to private publishers. This was the beginning of the PZPR's loss of all but a limited number of its buildings and accounts. Some in the new regime went further. They called for following the Czech and East German pattern of "decommunization" by removing from public positions all party officials and others who had held positions in party bodies as well as those who had worked for the secret police. All this heightened the fear and powerlessness of local party officials and people from the party.

As these attacks escalated, the PZPR announced and held what was presented, from the start, as its final congress. The groundwork had been laid by top national leaders of the PZPR to establish a successor party, which would represent "social democratic goals" but not reject the party's remaining assets or its past. Another, smaller group of leaders and most of the Sejm deputies from the PZPR ticket had already taken a more radical position. They withdrew from the PZPR and created the Polish Social Democratic Union (Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczne [PUS]) in fall 1989 before the final party congress was even held. Their new party advocated the establishment of a social welfare state but separated itself totally from the "ill-gotten gains" of the PZPR.[8] It was led by Tadeusz Fiszbach, the former Gdańsk Party leader who had become close to the Solidarity leaders in the early 1980s. In the ensuing fight

over what to establish and how, PUS stayed away from all that was tied to the PZPR. It ignored local party organizations. At the same time, the old top party leaders who wanted to protect the PZPR's legacy made their first forays back to local party meetings and tried to get commitments for support for the new party from people elected as delegates to the national congress.

When the congress opened in January 1990, there was a day of short speeches about the party's reformist past,[9] a playing out of old party rituals, a formal vote to disband the PZPR, and an announcement that delegates should adjourn to one of two adjoining rooms, either to the first session of the Social Democratic Party of the Polish Republic or to the session of the Polish Union of Socialists. The other option many party congress delegates took was simply to walk out the door and join nothing.[10]

In the end, the SdRP emerged as an awkward coalition of PZPR reformist leaders, a minority of the PZPR parliamentary deputies elected in 1989, and the local party *aktiv* who had nowhere else to go. There was no common ideology. The old party leaders essentially organized this transition and left the scene (or were simply ignored). The deputies to the Sejm who had voted for the economic reforms and the removal of the Communist Party from power were in a quandary. They had made their statement against the old Communist Party but then were welcomed into none of the new parties. So their only option was to join the SdRP. Local activists who joined the SdRP were, most often, conservatives opposed to the reforms supported by the PZPR deputies. But, again, if they wanted to belong to something, the SdRP and PUS were the only parties that would accept them. PUS, though, openly decried the party's heritage, wealth, and power, so it was not as safe a haven.

What the SdRP had going for it was an infrastructure, experience in organizing, and a tradition of members sticking with and working for the party. Their loyalty was further cemented by what seemed to be overwhelming anticommunism in the rest of the society. From the start, all this had made the social democrats a lightening rod for attacks on the communist past and the power anticommunists claimed it still had. These attacks, in turn, made even the most "Leninist" former communists see the SdRP as the only real defender for party members. So, no matter what liberal policies the new party supported, the old party "hacks" were sure to vote for it.

The Polish Social Democratic Union was supported by a majority of Sejm deputies and intellectuals from the "7th of July Movement" at the University of Warsaw and its equivalent discussion group in Kraków. For them, being connected with the old Communist Party was also nothing but a disadvantage. Their strategic problem was that, when they made rejecting the "ill-gotten gains" of the old PZPR and support for Solidarity's

painful economic reforms a major part of their program, they were left with no resources to build their party and no way to differentiate themselves from Solidarity parties. After all, supporting the economic and political reforms alienated party members and the losers in the economic transition. Refusing to take the PZPR's "ill-gotten gains" alienated activists bound up with the PZPR and left the PUS with no resources. But, no matter how it marketed itself, PUS remained "communist" in the public's mind. The only saving grace was that it was truly invisible: the media and Solidarity politicians focused on Solidarity's victories and the demise of the old communists they identified with the SdRP.

The Miracle: The Rise to the Top

After the Rubicon of 1989 had been crossed the former communists looked as though they had no future at all. Solidarity and post-Solidarity parties fixated on attacking the communists and their past as a central element of their platforms. Ironically, out of these experiences, the SdRP developed its winning ideology, organization, and tactics. The miracle was that, out of what seemed near-total defeat and rejection, the new party formed a coalition, the SLD, which would succeed in dominating the democratic landscape for the next decade and beyond. True, the successive elections held during 1990 and 1991 were all disasters for the former communists. But the SdRP survived and had few defections, with none from its leadership, whereas, less than four years after the PZPR had disbanded itself, the other post-communist party (PUS) was dead. Meanwhile, along with a host of parties that broke off from their Solidarity base, a noncommunist left party emerged, but it was never really able to capture either the votes of former communists or the loyalty of "losers" from Poland's dramatic economic reforms. It was after this period that the SdRP-backed coalition was able to use the lessons and remaining resources of its "old days" and begin its "winning streak."

In the 1990 local elections, the former communists were virtually invisible. The few candidates identified with the SdRP did very poorly. PUS did not run any candidates because it was so strapped for resources and focused on its work in the Sejm. Because no candidate could run without a party affiliation, most former communist candidates disguised their past communist ties and ran under new, fake party labels. In the end, this meant that, even when communists did well, it was impossible to measure the party's support and equally hard to deny that this first truly free election had been a total disaster for the former communists. Specifically identified Social Democratic Party candidates got 2.7 percent of the vote, losing in all the major regions

of the country. Even counting the fake parties created by the communists, estimates of the total vote for all those connected with communism are no more than 6 to 7 percent.[11] Not only was this another public sign of weakness, but it left the successors without the hold on local jobs and privileges that had brought support in earlier years. The new rulers took over and cleansed their local administrations of "communists," giving jobs to Solidarity supporters.

In the wake of this debacle, Lech Wałęsa's supporters began a petition campaign for Jaruzelski to resign from the presidency. By the end of 1990, he had resigned after being a major figure in Poland for more than thirty years as head of the Polish military, first secretary of the PZPR, prime minister during martial law and after, and then the man who had governed during Poland's exit from communist rule. His resignation seemed to many to be the ultimate renunciation of the past.

For the presidential election to fill Jaruzelski's position in fall 1990, the SdRP formed a coalition of real or "imagined" leftist parties, social organizations, and trade unions. This was the coalition that would return election after election for the next decade. SdRP leaders were so "gun-shy" of another massive defeat that none of them ran. Instead, they supported the candidacy of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former PZPR member who headed the self-declared leftist group in the parliament and had not joined any of the new parties. In the campaign that followed, he, former communists, and their successor party were marginal to the public battles. The campaign avoided the old stereotypes by portraying him as a legal scholar and middle-class peasant.[12]

Cimoszewicz's campaign, like the coalition that supported him, was a response to the unpopularity of the images of the old communist movement. It emphasized noncommunist things: his legal professionalism, middle-class life, and connections to one of the poorer and least "communist" sections of Poland, Białystok. His campaign did not even mention a return to state welfare. Instead, it stressed the normalcy of a market economy and called only for a more generous social welfare policy. This was a prototype of future social democratic campaigns. No matter how much voters were hurt by the economic reforms and wanted to return to the social guarantees and economic benefits of the communist regime, the social democrats were too concerned about not being tarred as being "still communists" to advocate for social welfare or to criticize the economic reforms. They dealt with the past simply by avoiding anything that would look "communist."

In the election, Cimoszewicz drew 9.21 percent of the electorate by drawing votes from people in all social groups except those who defined

themselves as "religious." As would remain the case for the SdRP and its SLD coalition, his strongholds were the smaller cities and towns hurt most in the economic reforms and the "workers" in the communist apparatus and government bureaucracies.[13] His vote put him fourth of six candidates in the first round: he came after Solidarity hero Lech Wałęsa (39.96 percent); the incumbent prime minister and Solidarity intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki (18.08 percent); and "dark horse" Canadian businessman Stan Tymiński (23.1 percent). At the same time, he was ahead of the Peasant Party leader, Roman Bartoszcze (7.15 percent), and the anticommunist group leader, Leszek Moczulski (2.5 percent).[14]

PUS, on the other hand, took what proved to be a suicidal stance. It did not join the coalition or run a candidate. Instead, the party stayed out of the election. Its leader, who had been head of the Gdańsk Party during the Solidarity era, gave his support to his friend, Lech Wałęsa. This neither benefited Wałęsa nor gave PUS a public presence.

The 1991 parliamentary elections were called early by Solidarity groups to "cleanse the system of its old communist representatives." In a continuation of the process of responding to attacks and trying to prove they were not communists, the SdRP and its coalition produced a platform that did not reflect the frustration and fury of their natural electorate, those who had lost in the initial, drastic shock of Poland's "shock therapy" transformation of the economy. They walked a fine line, avoiding taking a negative approach to either the communist system or the new noncommunist, capitalist system. As a result, their platform, from the beginning, did not truly stand for anything or propose any policy alternatives. Instead, it criticized those who attacked communism for ignoring the work and achievements of Poles over the past forty years, without ever mentioning the Communist Party or communist rule.

The slogan of the 1991 campaign was "It Can't Be Like This Any Longer."[15] But, as Cimoszewicz had done in his presidential campaign a year earlier, SdRP campaigners mentioned social welfare services only as products of the future growth of the economy and private industry. They also did not advocate special protections for state industries but, rather, called for equal treatment of state, private, and cooperative industries. They also did not support a return to state welfare.

Other aspects of their program were also purely defensive. They avoided arguments about communism and used the rhetoric of the former Solidarity opposition to defend themselves. For instance, instead of criticizing the Catholic Church, they stressed the need for "religious freedom" (something they had been criticized for denying in the communist era). What they did

say was that the state should be separate from the Church. On foreign policy, they played the "Russian Bear Card," suggesting that Poland was only safe if its relations with the Soviet Union were as good as those with the new Germany. The platform went on to indicate that Poland was poised to take the lead in the newly emerging markets of the former Soviet bloc. Given their long connections with the Soviet Union, they hoped to gain from the assumption that they were the only ones who had the ties to make this happen.[16] This also was all they could claim: the West was so heavily invested in Solidarity and the ending of communism that the SdRP could make no claims in 1991 of even being welcome at the negotiating table with the West.

In these elections, the SdRP gained again, and PUS essentially disappeared. While it did not make any great gains with its 11.8 percent of the vote, the SdRP coalition, the SLD, got only slightly fewer votes than the Union of Democracy (UD), the centrist Solidarity group of leaders who had run the first Solidarity government. The UD got only 12.31 percent of the vote. This meant the social democrats became the second-largest party in the fractured Sejm, holding only two fewer seats than the strongest party, the UD.[17] But neither could truly lead, as the rest of the Sejm was made up of a cacophony of tiny right-wing parties that had split off from Solidarity or emerged to oppose the "reforms."

In the 1993 election, the SLD coalition gained again and won 20.41 percent of the vote. But the SdRP got 37.5 percent of the seats in the Sejm (171 out of 460) because the former Sejm had set 5 percent of the national vote as a minimum requirement for a party to enter the lower house of parliament. Right-wing parties were so fragmented that they could not meet this standard, so more than half of the votes went unrepresented. Support for the SLD in the Senate, however, made it clear that the post-communists were popular in their own right: in the plurality-based votes for the Senate, the coalition won thirty-seven of one hundred seats.[18]

This was the beginning of what would be a constant pattern of support. The SdRP and SLD retained the supporters they had in the two earlier Sejm elections (1989 and 1991) and the 1990 presidential election. Their permanent supporters were concentrated among people with strong ties to the old system: former party members, employees of the state sector (educated bureaucrats, administrators, and teachers), and people from the western and northern territories (with the exception of Gdańsk). These, after all, were the areas where communist power had been strengthened by the communists having controlled the postwar distribution of German agricultural land and where opposition to communism was weakened by the extraordinary losses of state farmers in the economic transition.[19]

But by 1993 the campaign and the party's own self-presentation had transformed it into a real "catch-all party." It gained among workers, farmers, and (perhaps most significantly) private owners. Workers were a "gift," not a result of any direct appeal. They were the people most hurt by the transition. So they voted economic reformers out of office. Even for many Solidarity loyalists, the hardships they faced in the new era made the communist past seem better. In addition, the anticlerical stance of the SLD fit workers' views: they traditionally were opposed to the Church dominating politics.[20] Farmers in this election were the targets of special appeals. The SLD campaigned to get them to shift from what had been the communist era's special "party" for the peasants, now transformed into the pro-Church Polish Peasant Party.

The result was a geographical concentration of social democratic support in the so-called second Poland of small and middle-sized towns where state industries had closed and there was high unemployment. These were the communities hurt most by the transformation.[21] To them, the SLD offered some promise that they would not continue to be marginalized—coalition leaders went to these areas to campaign and stressed the "forgotten" Poland in their election literature, if not their actual programs. In the process, the SLD also made limited inroads among other groups who lived outside the intellectual and Solidarity strongholds of Warsaw, Kraków, and Gdańsk.

In this process, though, the SLD lost some of its support from the "losers" of the transformation (the retirees, white-collar workers, and the unemployed). These groups either did not vote or shifted to the noncommunist left (Union of Work) or the populist right.[22] In reality, though, the noncommunist left was an intellectual organization supported by the "losers" only when its candidates ran popular campaigns and got out the local vote. This meant those who got elected as Union of Work candidates, the noncommunist left, saw it as their personal victory, not the victory of the party or its ideas.

The SLD got its final boost to control the parliament from the strength of its coalition partner, the Peasant Party. It had been "born again" after 1989 (from its former pro-communist status) to support the Catholic Church and private farming, so it appealed to another sector of the population. Its overwhelming support among peasants resulted in it getting 15.4 percent of the total vote and 28.6 percent (131) of the seats in the Sejm.

For all of these gains, however, the SLD remained weak in key areas: youth, religious people, and the heart of Solidarity country.[23] It was these voids and the sense that women could be a key component of their constituency that would shape SdRP and SLD strategy in their next elections.

The broad strength of the SLD continued, even expanded, in the 1995 election for president. The number of voters who actually voted for Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the first round (35.1 percent) was more than double the number who voted for Solidarity candidates in 1993 parliamentary elections. The "left's take" was slightly more than the total first-round support for Solidarity hero Lech Wałęsa (33.1 percent). The difference looked even more dramatic when the other two left-leaning candidates (Tadeusz Zieliński, supported by Union of Work, who got 3.5 percent, and Jacek Kuroń, from Solidarity's old leadership, with 9.2 percent) were out of the running in the second round. Then Kwaśniewski, facing only Wałęsa in the second round, got 51.7 percent in comparison to Wałęsa's 48.3 percent.[24]

In the first round, Kwaśniewski did best among those in their forties who knew only the failing years of communist rule (37.8 percent as opposed to Wałęsa's 30.6 percent); from small and middle-sized cities of the "second Poland" (36.7 percent as opposed to 31.9 percent for Wałęsa); with high school (35.9 percent) or higher education (30.2 percent as opposed to 25 percent for Wałęsa and 19 percent for Jacek Kuroń, the Union of Democracy candidate); in groups whose jobs were based in the old communist power and welfare state, such as the police, army, and security services (64.8 percent as opposed to 16.2 percent for Wałęsa), office workers (37.4 to 28.8 percent), and managers of enterprises (38.8 to 28.8 percent). Ironically, two years after the social democrats had taken over the government, the social democratic candidate also did well among the unemployed (38 to 28 percent) even though unemployment had continued to rise. In all other categories, the vote was almost evenly split in the first round between Wałęsa and Kwaśniewski.[25]

Once the other candidates were removed, the election was portrayed, by the right, as a choice between Solidarity and the communists. In part, the gains Kwaśniewski made were the result of his emphasis on being rational and middle class—not communist—whereas Wałęsa came to be seen as unpredictable and irrational.[26] Much of the shift to Kwaśniewski happened as a result of the right's raging about communism being a serious threat while the communists held to the moderate center. The right coupled this raging about the evils of communism with calls for a return to the social welfare that had been provided under communism. By then, all this was truly counterproductive. SLD politicians had gotten so much public respect that, even if the public still thought communism was bad, the SLD seemed not only far from that past but also comparatively more sane and rational than those who were not "tainted" by communist pasts.

Kwaśniewski gained in the second round among eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds but lost support from those over fifty. He continued to hold

small and middle-sized towns and, marginally, held his plurality in villages, but he remained almost 10 percent behind Wałęsa in major cities and industrial centers where the ethos of Solidarity was strong. His greatest support, of course, came from those associated with the old regime: enterprise managers, peasants, the military, and the police. Wałęsa did better among specialists and professionals, private owners, retirees, and housewives.[27] Ironically, given the support Kwaśniewski got from the unemployed (59.6 to 40.4 percent), he got less support among the least and the most educated than Wałęsa did.

In the second round, Kwaśniewski picked up voters from the Peasant Party (67 percent of those who voted for Waldemar Pawlak in the first round); the Union of Work candidate (66 percent of Tadeusz Zieliński's voters); and voters who voted in the first round for Andrzej Lepper, the radical, anti-system candidate. In addition, 58 percent of those who had not voted in the first round and went to vote in the second round voted for him against Wałęsa.[28]

With these two victories, the SLD had become the first Polish party or coalition in the post-communist period to win two successive elections rather than winning one and being thrown out in the next. After Kwaśniewski's presidential victory, the party also made major inroads in the local government elections.

Then, in 1997, although the SLD increased its share of voters, it lost its hold on parliament. Its proportion of the vote went from 20.4 percent in 1993 to 27.13 percent in 1997. "Second Poland" was still its stronghold; but, in the face of a troubled right-wing coalition, the SLD "caught" voters from even more groups. It gained among small businessmen and retirees (even though there were two parties explicitly for retirees) and also among the religious. Among its target groups, women and youth, the SLD improved but not as significantly. Even though the Solidarity Election Action coalition (Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarność" [AWS]), the right-wing coalition claimed Solidarity as its heritage, 18 percent of the SLD electorate in 1997 had been members of the original Solidarity trade-union movement in 1980.[29]

What ended the SLD's control of the government in 1997 was the fragmented right's decision to form a coalition essentially against the SLD and its Peasant Party partner's self-destruction. Rather than face certain defeat as little parties that again could not make the requisite 5 percent voting requirement, the parties on the right papered over their differences before the election to form the AWS. That coalition won 33.83 percent to the SLD's 27.1 percent, even though its members fought publicly to come up with even a minimal platform that went beyond calls for punishing the

communists and returning to "Polish ways." At the same time, the Peasant Party lost most of its support and went from 15.4 percent to 7.31 percent.[30]

Even with the right wing's strength and the losses of the Peasant Party, the final defeat of the SLD remained a product of its history: no post-communist party would join with "former communists" in a coalition, no matter how close their policy interests were. The noncommunist left party, the Union of Work, although it had prominent leaders who had been Communist Party members, insisted on running on its own rather than join in a coalition with the tainted SLD. On its own, though, it got only 4.74 percent of the vote rather than the requisite 5 percent to get seats in the Sejm. Then the centrist intellectual party that had come out of Solidarity, the Union of Democracy, got 13.4 percent of the vote—enough to form a viable governing coalition with either side.[31] It refused to consider joining a coalition with "communists" even though it had more in common with the SLD than it did with the AWS, which railed against the very economic reform the UD (and the SLD) had championed.

That the SLD was not on a real decline became clear in the October 2000 presidential race. Aleksander Kwaśniewski was assumed to be the winner from the start. As a result, he did not really have to campaign as anything more than Poland's successful president. No other party could put up a candidate who could come near him. In the first round, Kwaśniewski got 53.9 percent of the vote to independent candidate (and former communist) Andrzej Olechowski's 17.3 percent and Solidarity alliance leader Marian Krzaklewski's 15.6 percent.[32]

In the October 2001 parliamentary election, the victory of the newly formed SLD party, Alliance of the Democratic left (discussed below), was also assumed from the start. The centrist-based Union of Freedom, the Peasant Party, and the SLD were the only parties from the past that ran in this election. The Union of Work joined in a coalition with the new SLD party when faced with the latter's overwhelming popularity well before the election and its own lack of resources to mount a campaign. The AWS ruling coalition essentially admitted defeat before the campaign began, had groups split off, and collapsed (taking only 5.6 percent of the vote, less than the 7 percent required for a coalition). The Union of Freedom, having left the coalition with the AWS in 2000 and changed its top leadership, could not stop its downward slide into oblivion with this campaign. It got 3.1 percent of the vote, well under the requisite 5 percent.[33] What emerged in its stead were issue parties that focused on either the marginal fame of their founders or the pull of a single, stark message.[34]

The SLD, in this melee, truly proved itself to be a catchall party with support coming from all groups: the gainers and the losers of the transformation, old and young, men and women, and urban and rural dwellers. The AWS coalition's policies had been so disastrous that it lost most of its supporters, and the SLD was able to get support simply by running "against" the last four years. Although the party was strongest in districts where it had been successful before, loyal Solidarity districts essentially disappeared. Every group, everywhere, except among the very religious, had a significant portion of its electorate vote for the SLD.[35]

The Crucible of Rejection:
Building a Winning Party under Assault

From the start, the SdRP, ideologically and organizationally, was a product of its rejection by everyone else in the new political elite. Its communist predecessor had controlled not only the coercive apparatus of the state but also all the jobs and material rewards. As a result, it had been able to block almost all criticism of it or its policies. So, when its successors found themselves without their usual hold on power and subject to personal and media criticism, the sense of being a pariah was overwhelming.

Even when they were elected in democratic elections, individual deputies were shunned by their colleagues. There were no parties other than their old albeit now reformed ally, the Peasant Party, that would even consider joining them in a coalition. For the communists and, as a result of their continued presence on the political stage, for the other parties and politicians, this meant the past frequently became far more important than issues of economic reform or social policy. The successor party's politicians' response to this, over the first decade after the fall of communist rule, was to "circle their wagons" and create their own social and political world, even as their ultimate goal was clearly to be accepted by noncommunist parties. To make itself more palatable, the new Social Democratic Party avoided anything that would link it to the communist era, even if this meant eschewing its worker constituency. Even without any formal way to hold onto members and hold the party together, its elites insisted on looking united but not "controlling" as a party and on doing whatever was pragmatic to get the broadest possible support.

The series of losses and affronts that made for its isolation also made being in the party uncomfortable for some and kept a negative image of the party before the public. Ultimately, however, the attacks and the isolation helped the party to create a new and respected persona. Poles came to see the

social democrats as professionals who could run the government better than anyone else—in part because they were excluded from the great policy and personal battles of the early nineties.[36]

The successor social democrats were not only defeated but also stripped of their old resources. This was so despite the concessions the PZPR had received in the roundtable agreements as well as after its initial defeat in the June 1989 elections: its leader, Wojciech Jaruzelski, was made president; party leaders got three major positions in the postelection cabinet; and party members or people who owed their original appointments to the party were not formally removed as they were in Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The reality, though, was that there was one assault after the other against the new SdRP in the next three years. Even after the SLD won power and became popular, its earlier rejection remained a decisive factor in all its decisions.

From the start, even if they did well in elections, SLD politicians simply could not win the battle to be included and respected. Once in parliament in 1991, the SdRP/SLD deputies, already a significant force in supporting the reforms, were ignored in debates and coalitions in what was a highly fragmented Sejm, with its loud set of eight small right-wing parties among the seventeen parties that won seats. Even former friends would walk away rather than sit next to SLD deputies in the parliamentary dining room or lounges.

This left the social democrats no choice but to socialize and work almost exclusively with each other. Under the leadership of Aleksander Kwaśniewski, the party's Sejm offices became virtually "a home away from home." There, relations were convivial. Social democratic deputies tightened their social bonds of "us" against the "them" who were shunning them. In the process, a clear and visceral sense of the importance of "the party" developed.[37] This tight loyalty and sense of a group identity, as well as the unity of the top leadership group that emerged, would define the party for at least the next decade.

At the same time, consciously or unconsciously, they developed other strategies to "cope" with their isolation. These became such a part of the new organizational and institutional model of the Social Democratic Party and its SLD electoral coalition that they continued to define it even after the isolation ended.[38] One strategy was to focus on organization and infrastructure by using what the party retained of the PZPR's resources and also by depending on their parliamentary deputies' resources as their new party "base." The second was to be the "professionals" in politics who did not debate and fight over procedure or grand issues but, rather, focused on making things work. The third was to do all they could to be a "catchall" party that represented "the nation" rather than any particular group or issue.

The focus on organization and on using parliamentary offices as party offices was also necessitated by attacks from outside against the resources the SdRP inherited from the PZPR. Beginning in 1990, the right insisted that anything inherited from the PZPR was the product of "ill-gotten gains." Most of their former buildings, accounts, and equipment were confiscated or threatened with confiscation. So the only resources the SdRP had that were safe from confiscation were state funds allotted to Sejm deputies. The SdRP deputies used these funds for offices, staff, and equipment in the Sejm and in their districts. In addition, they used their allotments to meet with their constituents. Their individual offices usually doubled as party headquarters and were stocked with communications equipment. When they could, deputies opened district offices in the unconfiscated and least visible buildings of the old Communist Party, thereby protecting them from confiscation.

The party did have some other monies and resources. These included individual members' dues, funds from foundations formed by West European social democratic parties, and "businesses" created by party leaders with monies they could access.[39] Whether or not this gave it more assets than the new noncommunist parties got in 1989 and 1990 from their early supporters and Western funders, the SdRP ended up with a much better infrastructure. SdRP leaders, from their training in the Communist Party, saw infrastructure as crucial and made the choice to invest in it as a first priority. Beyond this, they used the PZPR membership lists to find contacts among now displaced former communist workers and activists to serve as "free" labor in the new social democratic district offices and campaigns.

The other parties that emerged in 1989, on the other hand, had gotten the idea that "glitzy" campaigns were the avenue to victory. Western advice along with their victories in 1989 and 1990 seemed to prove that they won voter support largely because they opposed communism and led the changes. By 1991 and 1993, however, when they fought each other rather than "the communist enemy," it became clear they also needed offices, phones, and faxes. But by then the cost of equipment and office space had risen so much and most salaries had dropped so far that there was no money to buy them. So, although they had parliamentary allocations and state electoral funds, the new parties were left emphasizing what they could afford: campaigns rather than local offices.

The attacks on "communists" meant few newcomers joined the SdRP. Instead of looking for new members, it depended on those who had worked in the PZPR bureaucracy or as local activists. For them, public attacks on the "communists" made the SdRP their only possible haven. The politics of organization and loyalty were all they knew. So the SLD and its SdRP got a

cost-free cadre of people to do the legwork of putting leaflets under doors, organizing voter meetings, and marching for candidates. This was supplemented by the once "communist" trade union, the OPZZ. It mobilized its members for demonstrations and other actions. In short, voters saw the SdRP as a permanent and accessible presence in the community, not a temporary phenomenon focused on getting out the vote so its leaders and deputies could live in the capital.[40]

In addition, the unwillingness of deputies from any of the other parties or coalitions in the 1991 parliament to do anything with those connected to the SdRP and its coalition partners kept the social democrats out of what were bitter and public ideological and personal battles within the Solidarity grouping. These attacks and battles dominated the headlines and lowered the prestige of the other parties. Because SLD deputies were unwelcome in the backroom negotiations, public debates, and fragile coalitions that were the key to parliamentary life in the Sejm (but not particularly popular with the population), they took the only three roles left for them: (1) "detail people," professional legislators who reviewed legislation and made corrections so laws would actually work; (2) "links" between their regions and the national government; and (3) "advocates" for their districts. By default, the social democrats were seen as the ones making things work better in practical and non-ideological ways and advocating on behalf of individuals feeling the brunt of the economic reforms.

This gave them ways to look like they "fit" in the new system. Ironically, even among the deputies who shunned them, the focus on being practical and professional wore down their negative images. It seemed to voters that these were the men and women who cared about the public's needs and could get things done. By the end of the term, research showed SLD deputies were, on the whole, perceived as the most effective legislators both by the public and by other deputies in the Sejm. This would remain the case even as the Sejm and its deputies as a whole declined in general public esteem.[41]

The final strategy was to do everything not to be "communist." This strategy was triggered, as were the party's organizational decisions, by the social democrats' isolation within parliament, the pervasive sense that "communism was dead," and ongoing and escalating attacks on the former communists' real and presumed resources. The strategy went far beyond their willingness to vote for drastic political and economic transformation measures. It involved not reaching out to appeal to their old constituencies: the workers and state employees (even the former Communist Party workers were immediately hurt by the reforms). In their image making,

even the few party leaders from the working class made no effort to look "working class."[42] Instead, they presented themselves as successful, middle class, and entrepreneurial.

When the right-wing parliament fell apart, Lech Wałęsa called new elections only a year and a half after the 1991 elections. The increasing popular disgust of many groups with the new politics and economics of Poland opened the door for the SdRP to mobilize supporters by being far more explicitly antireform in its platform for the 1993 parliamentary elections. The formulation of that platform, however, was constrained by the interest of the party leaders in being accepted by their peers as well as by the ability of a significant group of former PZPR and state officials to make money in the privatization game.[43] Hence the decision not to play on the anger of most Poles over the losses they had suffered as a result of "shock therapy."

The leaders' goal was, first and foremost, for the SdRP and the SLD to be welcomed into "normal" political coalitions and not treated as evil pariahs.[44] This crystallized in the drafting of the 1993 platform: the word *workers* disappeared from the text. The real losers from the reforms (retirees, single mothers, and the unemployed) and their plight were not mentioned. Instead, a new, blanket phrase was coined, "the people who work." The program focused on how there should be social support and also state money for the needs of the middle class: higher education, academic and scientific research, and culture. It made no explicit mention of the basics of free education, health care, unemployment support, and increases in welfare and pensions.[45]

In dealing with the communist period, the 1993 platform's response was essentially a criticism of governance during the first three years after the communists handed over power. It virtually mirrored the right's criticism of the communist period and stressed the SdRP's ability to defend all Poles' interests:

> Currently, the politics in Poland is . . . directly tied to "strong armed" and dictatorial attempts to direct social change and public opinion. It does not have to be like this any longer. The S.L.D., standing as a political structure to integrate the party, trade unions, social organizations, and people who are not organized but are tied to social democratic ideals of fairness and social equality, is trying to effectively end the degradation of Poland and develop conditions to fill the needs of people who work. At the same time, we are moving to systematically develop our [national] political and economic life. This is being done by our representatives to parliament, by the Sd.R.P., and O.P.Z.Z. organizations, and also by our leaders in self-government. In a situation where there is an expansion of the right politically, where it controls significant financial resources and has easier access to the mass media, this has not been an easy

task. Aggressive attacks on our group and bitter attempts to isolate us in the
Sejm clearly show their arrogance and prove their lack of respect for the hun-
dreds of thousands of left-leaning voters. These are ineffective attempts to
force us into resignation . . . from responsible and constructive opposition in
the interests of the nation and the state, to correct the situation of Polish fam-
ilies and guarantee Poland an equal and safe position in Europe and the
world.[46]

Along with this attack on their attackers, the SLD platform focused its
economic proposals on improving conditions in the new market economy for
producers as much as, if not more than, for workers. In the process, even
though they were running beside their Peasant Party allies, they gave farm-
ers as much and even more specific attention than the working class.

In foreign policy, the SLD focused on the failings of the right both to repre-
sent Poland well and to draw together all groups in Poland: "The picture of
Poland in the world has worsened. We are taken as a country that is sympa-
thetic, capable but weak and unable to solve its problems. . . . It is absolutely
necessary in our opinion to develop a minimum understanding of all the signif-
icant political groups in Poland as to the aims and directions of its foreign pol-
icy."[47] It was the SLD that articulated the need for greater societal involvement
in foreign policy decisions and for a less ideological foreign policy (again shift-
ing the negative images of the old PZPR to the new rulers' politics). By 1993,
the SLD actually turned West, supporting Poland's entrance into the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union. Relations
with the former Soviet Union and its former allies in Eastern Europe fell to the
bottom of the list of foreign-policy priorities, with merely the mention of the
need to establish "equal and good relations with our neighbors to the East."[48]

Finally, in the critical area of religion and the state, a central issue for the
right in this campaign, the SLD muted its tone. It made the case for "free-
dom of religion" and for respect of religious rights, without any religion dom-
inating the state.[49] Defending women's right to abortions and reaffirming the
need for academic freedom without Church control were key points. The
SLD also opposed, in its campaign, the *konkordat* the government had signed
with the Vatican. In opposing it, leaders did not frame their opposition in
terms of an unwillingness to come to a special agreement with the Vatican.
Instead, they framed it in terms of their support for the principle that secret
agreements were bad and it was inappropriate to sign agreements giving out-
side powers special authority over issues normally within the purview of the
Polish government.

In this campaign, the SdRP and its coalition presented themselves as "pro-
fessional politicians" who did not argue with each other but, rather, worked

to serve their communities and provide their expertise in writing legislation. They did not present themselves as successors to the Communist Party but, instead, as virtually a "catchall party" (with no prior history) that was focused on representing "all Poles." Indeed, their program and image were explicitly noncommunist. They advocated the West European economic and political models as well as ties with the West. The party, in its style and structure, looked like the opposite of the traditional Communist Party. It completely ceased to speak as a representative or protector of the "workers" and "losers" and turned into a party trying to draw support from the "gainers."

None of this was an accident. In interviews about both their ideological stances and their electoral calculations, SdRP leaders focused, in 1993, on how they were cleaning up their image, opening doors for coalitions with noncommunist parties, and drawing on a much broader constituency than they had in the initial post-communist elections. They assumed, no matter how far the social democrats deviated from the old communist ideology, old party members, some of whom had gained and others of whom had lost from the transition, would either not vote or would vote for the social democrats simply because they were welcome nowhere else.[50] This, they felt, created a solid base from which to seek new support and work in the new system.

From Rejection to Legitimacy

The SLD won in 1993 not only because of this ideological and organizational base but also because of how the right had used its power when in government. As the society chafed from losses triggered by the economic reforms, the right tried to shift the blame to the "communist" past. In a society that had supported the Catholic Church in its opposition to communism but not in its teachings about abortion (Poland traditionally had one of the highest abortion rates in Europe), the right put through one of the strictest antiabortion laws in Europe. These policies, along with public fights within the right and anticommunist attacks from the right just before the election, benefited the SLD. After all, the right's politics made the SLD look eminently rational in comparison to what looked like the irrationality of the rest of the political world. This, ultimately, delivered the SLD its electoral surge and furthered the trajectory of its organizational and political development.

The passage of a bill, at the very end of the 1992 Sejm session, that barred abortions and included criminal penalties for the women and doctors involved also gave the SLD its first opening to do public advocacy and work with a noncommunist party. The SLD and the newly formed Union of Work, the leftist outgrowth of the Solidarity movement, organized parallel petition

campaigns to force a referendum on the issue. In the end, that nascent co-operation failed, but the SLD and the Union of Work, on the local level, had found some common ground. While the Union of Work gained in the process a public forum to make its name, the SLD got its first opportunity to fight visibly "with society" with a group associated with "Solidarity."

The second and more direct, if inadvertent, assistance the right gave the post-communists came from its attempts to pass laws removing communists and "secret police agents" from government positions. The minister of interior also took it upon himself to present to the Sejm a list of politicians who were, purportedly, implicated in the secret police files. These included Lech Wałęsa and other Solidarity heroes as well as former communists. The presentation of the Macierewicz list resulted in Wałęsa using his presidential powers to disband the Sejm and call new elections. But these attempts to "decommunize" still culminated in preelection right-wing demonstrations against the communists, demanding the "cleansing" of former Communist Party members and secret police agents from the government. These took place at the very end of the campaign and made headlines. To former communists who had done well in the transition as well as those who had lost from the transition, the proposed laws and related moves seemed to be potentially more serious threats than the ongoing and seemingly endless audits and court cases over reclaiming the PZPR's old buildings and bank accounts. In the end, the right's actions delivered to the SdRP both the old PZPR apparatchiks who had previously not voted for the SdRP because it had betrayed the cause and the nomenklatura entrepreneurs who had more in common with the reformist Union of Democracy and the Congress of Liberal Democrats than with most of the SdRP/SLD voters. The attacks made it clear to both groups that the social democrats were their only protectors.

With these attacks and the SdRP's response of focusing on disproving them by its actions, the model was cemented for what the SLD coalition would stand for, how it would present itself, whom it would represent, and how it would ultimately govern. It was a model that would hold firm even after 1999 when the right's attacks decreased and the SdRP dissolved itself, transforming its coalition into a party in its own right.

From its 1993 election victory, and even after it lost control of the Sejm in 1997, the SdRP and its SLD coalition remained relatively stable not only in their ideological stands but also in their voter support, organizational structures and goals, leadership, and strategy for electioneering and running the government. The goal was to be "establishment politicians" in an electorate divided, by its own rhetoric, not on economic grounds but on ideological grounds of religious *versus* secular and anticommunist *versus* pro-communist sentiments.[51]

Basically, the former communists' programmatic options were limited by their fear of being seen as "communist." Even when they were at their most popular, this burden continued pushing them ever further into the center. This made representation of the particular interests of "losers," seen as linked to the old communist "workers' state," seem counterproductive. The refusal of other parties to be tainted by being in coalitions with the SLD exacerbated all this. No matter what the social democrats did, they were an anathema to the rest of the political elite.

As the social democrats continued to try to convince other political leaders they were not "communists," their natural constituency of workers and people who were surviving in state jobs or on state welfare fell to new right-wing parties. The latter condemned both the communist rulers for their repression and the first generation of liberal reformers for "shock therapy" and the withering of the welfare system. At the same time, they promised there would be a return to communist-style social welfare. In the right's never-ending rhetoric, both Solidarity, the once archenemy of the communists, and the communists had betrayed the workers. Only these "new parties" on the right claimed to have had no responsibility for anything before they emerged: these leaders had not done anything in the communist era and had not been in the first Sejm to vote for "shock therapy."

The SdRP's position after 1993 was further complicated by the emergence of the Union of Work, a noncommunist left party. It was a blend of leftists from the Solidarity Sejm delegation and former PZPR reformers. This group was clear about its support of the losers' needs in the new system. It looked back to the promises of the roundtables and to the Scandinavian model of social welfare democracy. Its policy plans were far from vague and general. They were laid out in detail in its program. It was committed to rational, nonideological politics to the point that both former communists and Solidarity activists were welcomed into the party. But, in reality, it was a party of intellectuals for whom consistency, not electoral popularity, was critical.

Thus, although the SdRP and the SLD had the resources the Union of Work needed to get established in the electorate in terms of both name recognition and an organizational base, leaders of the Union of Work considered the successor social democrats too centrist, opportunist, and also compromised and compromising to be an appropriate coalition partner.[52] As a result, the Union of Work, although it did reasonably well in the 1993 election, was virtually squeezed out of any positions of power. Only when it did not make the necessary 5 percent to have seats in the 1997 election did its founding leadership leave and a new, more pragmatic group emerge.

From its 1993 victory on, the SLD's position was essentially stabilized. True, in the 1997 parliamentary elections it lost control of the government even though it gained voters. But as the second-largest party in parliament, albeit in opposition, the SLD continued to maintain a high profile even as the right continued to attack it. After all, Kwaśniewski was elected president in 1995 and reelected for a second five-year term in 2000. Then, after it became a party, the SLD got its first real breakthrough in "making it" with Solidarity-based parties. Andrzej Celiński, a Solidarity activist and prominent politician in the Union of Democracy, joined the SLD and was instantly promoted to head of the Program Committee. Moreover, just before the October 2001 Sejm elections, the Union of Work, threatened with extinction, joined in an electoral and governmental coalition with the SLD.

In victory and defeat, the SLD kept its public image as a coalition of rational professionals focused on practical issues. Although its base of voter support spread far beyond former Communist Party members, its top leadership remained stable. In coalitions, it and its members would do almost anything to hold together. When there were divisions over economic policy between the OPZZ (the SLD's trade-union partner) and the SdRP leadership, coalition deputies voted with the coalition even if they disagreed with the policy. And, as is elaborated below, after the SLD's self-transformation from coalition to party (which effectively excluded the OPZZ's troublesome presence), it agreed to form a coalition with the small Union of Work on the latter's terms. Quantitatively, the Union of Work got far more seats than its numbers would have indicated, and, at least in the agreement, it was guaranteed a real presence in the government.

The SLD: From Successor Coalition to Successor Party

The SdRP formally disbanded in April 1999 when the SLD coalition registered as a party in its own right. In its new incarnation, membership was only on an individual basis, not by groups. The new SLD was essentially a "successor party" to the "successor party." The hope was that it would no longer have to deal with its communist past and, without group members like the OPZZ trade union, that it would be more internally coherent and easier to manage.[53] In the process of becoming a "successor" to the "successor," it also moved back to a more structured and controlled membership. It was no longer totally open. Membership, according to the new party's rules, required acceptance by the membership "circle" or, if that was not possible, by higher-level regional organs. Once a member, there were obligations: members were expected to "care for the good name of the party, seek out sympathizers and

supporters of the party, be involved in the activities of the party, carry out the decrees of the party leadership and observe the regulations of the party statutes, and pay their party dues."[54] Those who had public functions were, additionally, "responsible to the party for their activities."[55] In reality little changed, given the persistence of that tightly knit cohort created in the hard times before its 1993 victory and the disinterest of most Poles in party politics. What did change was that the SLD leaders simply gave up the pretense of internal democracy taken on to disprove their rightist critics. The SLD leadership (of both the old coalition and the new party) continued to run its own show, using local and regional offices to deliver votes rather than having them be independent forces. Now it had a structure that granted the leadership real authority.

In its program as in its governance, the trajectory of the SLD did not change. It continued to move toward increasingly liberal capitalist doctrine and further away from any of the pillars of Marxism. So, as a provisional member of the Socialist International since 1997, the Polish party stands as one of its more centrist parties.

What changed when the SLD was voted back into power in 2001 was that its image as a successful and undivided party of skilled administrators tarnished rapidly. So, in spite of warning that it would not be able to reverse the decline in the economy and social services immediately, the failure of the Polish economy to right itself resulted in divisions in the leadership and a dramatic downturn in its popular approval ratings less than six months after the SLD formed a new government.[56] Beyond this, although the top party leaders got posts in the new government and the Peasant Party and Union of Work got only a few posts, the new SLD party clearly sought new faces. Few, other than the top party leaders and those who controlled economic ministries, were from the old cabinet or party leadership. Instead, they were men and women in their forties and early fifties who were nonparty professionals or SLD experts on various policies—proof for the SLD that they were no longer rejected by "establishment politicians." As a result, although there were established local leaders who had served in the Sejm or Senate and ran large local parties, they were not given cabinet positions.

What did happen was that the top party leaders, in taking over the key ministerial positions (interior, defense, and foreign affairs), lost their tight control of the party's day-to-day affairs. Beyond this, once the SLD had no real party competitors on the left, right, or center, the pressure for unity decreased. The result of all of this and the pressures of a failing economy were open splits between President Kwaśniewski and Prime Minister Leszek Miller and within the cabinet.[57] Finally, the economic crisis, the weakness of the

peasants, and the pressure put on local and regional leaders—as well as the sense that positions in state industries and government posts had been political prizes under the previous AWS government and were now the rightful bounty of SLD—led to battles in the SLD leadership that had been avoided in the 1993–1997 period.

Leadership

Throughout the 1990s, at the top levels of the party and its coalition, there was little difference between its leaders and those of the rest of Poland's parties. Studies of party elites show that SLD leaders, like the leaders of all of Poland's major parties and coalitions in the transition, tended to be middle-aged (from thirty-five to fifty-five), well educated, and financially successful. Almost all were male (in the 1990s, only one woman, Ewa Spychalska, head of the OPZZ trade union, was on the Executive Committee). The only features that actually differentiated the social democrats and their leaders from their counterparts were that they were less likely to go to church and more likely to have been members of the PZPR or, at least, not to have been affiliated with Solidarity.[58] (Although data are not yet available as to the membership of the new SLD party, it appeared that this would remain the case even though, as former party members aged, a past of PZPR membership was on the decline.)

The top SLD leadership differed from other parties basically in its experience, strength, and continuity. The men at the very top of the SdRP and its SLD coalition had been PZPR regional first secretaries (Leszek Miller and Josef Oleksy), secondary national government or party officials (Aleksander Kwaśniewski) in the 1980s, or younger academics (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz). During the twelve years between the collapse of the PZPR and the emergence and electoral victory of the "successor to the successor party" in 2001, these men rotated the top party, parliamentary, and governmental positions. But no one new entered into this top level.

Surrounding them initially were men who had been in the PZPR apparatus or organs at the end of the communist era. Most came in as candidates for election to the early Sejm or as academics. Then, beyond these ten or so individuals, there was a number of more established academics and professionals who sat on the successor organizations' various executive councils or were brought in for government positions.[59] Where conflict occurred, it was almost always at the second level of power, with the women and trade-union activists who rose up and held such positions as chair of the women's organization or the trade union. Their positions as the heads of separate groups within the SdRP (in the case of the women's organization) or the SLD coali-

tion (in the case of OPZZ) marginalized them. They became more marginalized when they remained or were involved in independent advocacy. At this second level of party leaders there was really not any significant change until 2001 except that Ewa Spychalska, who led and fought for the OPZZ trade union, was sent as ambassador to Belarus.

Even though there were ideological differences among the top five leaders of the party, the sense of the need for unity at the top remained unchanged for the first ten years.[60] They were, after all, the successor party's de facto decision makers. Rather than compete for top offices, the SLD top four or five leaders traded them. Indeed, their differences, until 2001, were more about the strictness of "party line" votes and party ideology issues than about economics. The splits occasionally became partially visible in what were played out as essentially jocular discussions within the SLD parliamentary group or in the nuances of their public statements.[61] Although some outsiders saw the leaders' history of joining and working in the party during the martial law period of the early 1980s as a sign of their conservative tendencies, none ever came near voicing anything close to neo-Leninist positions or defending the virtues of martial law.

The commitment to consistency and loyalty was quite clear at all levels until 2001. Even when Josef Oleksy was accused of having had close relations with a Soviet Russian agent and had to resign as prime minister, the SdRP did not censure him or distance itself. Instead, it demonstrated its loyalty by making him head of the party. Only in the new SLD party did he move from visible leadership to de facto leadership. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who played a major role in creating the SdRP and its parliamentary community both informally and as its chairman, formally left the party when he became president. He presented this as a way to "represent all Poles" as president. But he continued to be involved with internal party issues behind the scenes. Only after 2001, when Poland's economic problems threatened his position and that of the party was it clear he was taking a more centrist line and was not in full agreement with Leszek Miller.

The party's attempts to draw new people into its leadership were so marginal that when Solidarity activist Andrzej Celiński, of the Union of Democracy, joined the SLD in 1999 it was a major event. He was instantly made head of the Platform Committee. Indeed, that was the only formal change in the top leadership circle when the SLD went from being a coalition led by the SdRP to being a party in 1999. The reality was that there was no real change in the top leadership even though the new party rules required that there be a representative of youth and women's groups in the executive. The two people who were brought in were clearly tokens, too young and marginal to have a real role.[62] By this time, though, a cadre of local leaders had begun to emerge, interested in

moving into the top leadership and also in getting the local positions seen as having been the "fruits of victory" for the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) in 1993–1997 and the AWS after its win in 1997.[63]

When the SLD finally was able to form a coalition with a Solidarity-based party, the Union of Work, this coalition did not involve any shift in leadership. All the parties agreed to do was work together in the election, form joint candidate lists based on their relative size, and develop a common platform. Once in government, although the heads of the Union of Work and the Peasant Party were made vice–prime ministers and the Peasant Party was also given the two "agricultural" ministries, the Union of Work got no ministerial positions. Essentially, Leszek Miller controlled all the appointments himself. Indeed, SLD leaders were so accustomed to working together that policy was made as often by default by the top leaders as it was by open discussion. In the process, the cabinet drifted apart and conflicts between economic cutbacks and social welfare benefits complicated policy.[64]

More important than the backgrounds of the leaders was their public demeanor. The SdRP and SLD leaders not only were middle class but, even though few had real professional training other than law or extensive experience in administration, presented themselves as administrative and policy professionals. To the public, they stressed their restraint and control, avoiding even in the heat of campaigns relying on "charisma" and rallying the crowds.[65] In negotiations and conflicts, they always acted as though they were at least willing to compromise, to forgive partners or potential partners for not cooperating, and to take no strong policy stances. When the SdRP was in a governing coalition with the Peasant Party in 1993, it first made Waldemar Pawlak, Peasant Party head, the prime minister, even though the social democrats were the dominant coalition partner. During this entire coalition period from 1993 to 1997, the SdRP came through every confrontation looking like it had avoided conflict and compromised, while its partners in the Peasant Party looked increasingly intransigent and confrontational. Even as the dominant party in the preparation of the new Polish constitution, it sought out the participation of the right-wing parties not in parliament, made real compromises on the issue of Catholic influence in the state, and did little to strengthen the powers of the presidency. Its leaders were also willing to have a national referendum on the constitution rather than appear to push through the draft the Sejm had passed against the objections of the right.[66]

Party Organization

The internal structure of the SdRP and the image it projected initially reflected the social democrats' desire to disprove those who attacked them as

"communists." At the same time, they carried with them a clearer sense than anyone else of the need for internal communication and organization. In the process of both avoiding any appearance of being communist and following the lessons of its past that organization is important, the SdRP developed a formal and informal structure. Its informal structure, since 1991, was of an elite clustered at the top that ran the party and held the power in the parliamentary group. After the party created a governing coalition in 1993, some of these leaders took on a third set of positions, becoming cabinet ministers.[67]

Between this small and closed elite group and the membership, there were no real links, only formal organizational structures. The actual power of the middle and lower levels was limited at best. Even in the national party headquarters, the visible staff, including building guards, hovered at less than thirty. As long as the wealth of the party was questioned, party leaders did everything they could to not look well endowed. Funding came from members' dues to the local bodies and from the state allocations that were made to each party's parliamentary deputies. Support came as well in "donations" of manpower and materials from the OPZZ, other small parties, and special-interest organizations. Beyond that, the SdRP had a variety of small-scale enterprises and endowments structured in ways that their origins were hard to trace directly.

The formal structure of the SdRP was touted as proof that it was not like the old Communist Party but, rather, involved relatively autonomous bodies at all levels. Membership in all these organizations required no selection or candidacy period. All prospective members had to do was fill out a membership card and agree to pay minimal dues to the local organization.

The top levels of the party were supposed to be directed by party conferences held every two years and congresses held every four. At the conferences and congresses, the party delegates, elected with no guidance from the top, were supposed to be able to remove party leaders or question and change party policy. These congresses then had the formal right to elect a top leadership from among their ranks that included a director and governing council to make ongoing decisions. (In reality, at the middle and local levels there was so little interest in what happened that no one actually used these "rights," and attendance at the congresses and conferences was pro forma: delegates listened to top leaders' speeches and engaged in orchestrated discussions.)

The top had little real or independent role in this formal structure other than to represent the party publicly, based on the conference and congress policies, and to serve the needs of party deputies. There certainly was no built-in bureaucratic base. Ostensibly, the top had no funds other than those

sent up to it by local groups. In reality, of course, the top leaders were a self-sustaining group with funds from the Sejm allocations and its own "businesses" as well as local allocations. The lower levels had little contact with these leaders and certainly no power over them.[68]

The electoral coalition the SdRP formed around itself went even further to avoid any sense of party dominance or control. There were never any published accords for the electoral alliance. Instead—according to people in the national leadership—parties, unions, and social organizations were welcome to join, if they wanted, even when they had a history or took positions that set them against the SdRP or its predecessor, the PZPR. Indeed, even the radical group claiming to be from the prewar Polish Socialist Party, which had been actively involved in some of the most open and violent resistance to communism, was welcomed into the coalition. For the SdRP, the most important thing was to get legitimacy from having others join it. But, given the social pressure against being a part of the "old regime," the groups that joined were marginal at best, and there was never any rush to join.

Once in the alliance, the various groups' leaders went to coalition meetings prior to the elections to propose their own candidates for slots on the coalition ticket. They were focused on political action. The SLD coalition had no permanent structure or independent resources. The SdRP representatives on the steering committee had not only a majority of the seats but also most of the resources and the only real permanent organization. According to SdRP leaders who were members of the SLD coalition steering committee, the various organizations were "given" places on the electoral lists based on their size, significance, or importance to the coalition's aims. Beyond this, individuals were assigned districts where they were either the "locomotives" to draw voters or could be assured of party support even if they did not have name recognition. Individual candidates' campaigns were not funded by the party or the coalition. Candidates themselves had to front the money for the basics of the campaigns. Then, unlike other parties, when the SLD got money back from the state based on the size of its "win," it did not return the money to any candidates.[69]

Of the member organizations in the SLD, of course, the prime organization (other than the SdRP) was the OPZZ. It was the communist-era trade union formed when Solidarity was forced to disband. It bore the stigma of having been imposed to replace the popular, mass-based Solidarity after martial law was declared in 1981. But, in building on the Solidarity funds it inherited and the government's allocations to it, the OPZZ became a major force for workers' welfare. By the end of the decade, in spite of its dependence on the PZPR for its very birth and initial position, the OPZZ had weaned it-

self away from the control of the PZPR. In the process, it became a political force in itself so that, in the roundtable discussions, OPZZ was a partner to the settlement.[70]

After the 1989 elections, the OPZZ found itself in competition with Solidarity for both members and funds on a workplace and national level. It billed itself as the trade union that represented the working class, especially those that worked in state-owned enterprises. But it and its leaders were not welcomed even at the enterprise level into Solidarity meetings or organizations. They were, though, players in a Tripartite Commission to discuss economic policy along with Solidarity, the Ministry of Labor, and representatives of various producers' organizations. In addition, the OPZZ formed its own "Movement of Working People," a more Marxist-Leninist, labor-oriented miniparty that also had candidates and deputies in the coalition.

The relations between the OPZZ and the SdRP were not easy when the coalition was in power. Although not ministers in the government, OPZZ leaders were in the SLD parliamentary delegation and were thus involved in the decision-making process and in dealing with government experts. As a result, their views were closer to those of Solidarity union leaders who had the same experiences or who worked with them in the Tripartite Commission than they were to the more alienated workers they represented. At the same time, OPZZ deputies led the union. This meant that OPZZ deputies would vote in parliament for the national budget, labor regulations, and salary limits that were part of the government's economic program. Then, many would walk outside of the Sejm building, talk critically to reporters about the SLD's program, and join in demonstrations against that very legislation they had just voted for in the Sejm. This soured relations within the SLD enough that the two conjoined organizations drafted a formal agreement in 1996 allowing them to differ but ensuring that the differences would be controlled and that the OPZZ would stay in the SLD and not make other alignments. For the SLD, this was critical, because the OPZZ provided a source of critical campaign "foot soldiers" as well as funds that could not be taken away as ill-gotten gains from the communist era.

By the end of the decade, the ongoing tension was a major reason given in internal papers and discussions for the SLD to transform itself from a coalition to a party. Typical of the SdRP's avoidance of conflict, however, this was not stated publicly as a reason for the shift; rather, it was attributed to the need to comply with the Sejm's new "Law on Parties." That law ruled that organizations could not belong to parties and that trade unions could not actually run in elections. Because the OPZZ had no other options if it was to align with a political party, the shift was a safe one.

Ideology and Policy

During their time in government in 1993–1997, the SdRP and SLD became much more moderate in their policy positions than they had been even in the 1993 parliamentary election or the 1995 presidential election. They were active public advocates for Polish membership in NATO and for Poland's membership and cooperation with the European Union. They were also, in their platform and actions, committed to privatization and the development of privatized public services. For them, state subsidies and increases in welfare provisions were basically "nonissues." In areas of religion and social policy, the SLD continued to copy the rhetoric of the communist-era opposition's attacks on communist rule by calling for "freedom of religion" and also intellectual freedom. Their goal was clearly to be seen as modernizers, professionals, and rational actors, not as men of the past or ideologues.[71]

In control of the parliament from 1993 to 1997, and with Kwaśniewski as president from 1995 on, the SLD's policies were little different in substance than those of the previous Solidarity-based governments. In power, the SLD moved further to the center than its election platform had suggested. It continued the Balcerowicz Plan free-market reforms with no real changes even in their speed. This meant passing legislation that hurt workers and cut back on social service funding as well as forcing a number of major state industries into bankruptcy.

Its position as a secular party did not spell real action to repeal laws against abortion and for religious education in the schools. Under the SLD coalition, the konkordat with the Vatican was ratified even though the SLD had campaigned on how it put the Catholic Church "above the law" by, for instance, exempting Church property from state control and making Church weddings separate from the civil code. In spite of the SLD's criticism of the antiabortion law passed in 1992, it made no move to repeal or even liberalize the law. In the area of Church presence in schools, the SLD minister of education offended the Church by instituting sex education, but he did nothing to end required religious education at all levels in state schools.

In foreign policy, the SLD basically ignored the minor parts of its platform that stressed the importance of Poland as a bridge between the states of the former Soviet Union and the rest of the world. Western support and confidence were its priorities beginning in 1993. The SLD government, in fact, took the lead in getting Poland into NATO and the European Union, while the right increasingly challenged the encroachment of Western influence and power.

In the presidential campaign of 1995 and the parliamentary election of 1997, the SLD stressed, programmatically, that it had "Kept Its Word" and "Today Is Good, Tomorrow Will Be Better."[72] In both campaigns, the em-

phasis was on rational style and the economic gains that would result from such "professionalism." The party leaders continued to focus its program on promoting a "high-tech" Poland. Public policy, they claimed, was to be focused not on group interests but on the development of a strong private sector with specific government incentives rather than either control or subsidies. In the SLD program and electoral statements, the emphasis was on how the poor would gain from the "trickle down" of wealth generated by increases in technology; the growth of private industry; and the jobs generated by the establishment of a housing industry as well as by the expansion of Poland's infrastructure of roads, transportation facilities, and communications links. Indeed, the party promised that taxes would decline as the government reduced its involvement in the economy and focused on the most significant issues for the "whole society: research, education as well as the security of the state and the individual." Again, none of its promises responded to the needs of workers or even those state-sector professionals who had supported the SLD and the Union of Work. The ultimate goal was to be part of the "Western world" of advanced industry and technology.[73]

Ironically, in 1997 the SdRP's stance on its past was more complex than previously. Publicly, in its overall program, there was no reference to the SLD being an outgrowth of the PZPR. Instead, the SLD traced its ideological legacy to the interwar Polish socialist movement. There were acknowledgments that, in the postwar settlement, Soviet control was forced on Poland and that excesses occurred in the Stalinist period, followed by periods when Poland was the most liberal of the communist states and reformers played as strong a role as they could. But the SLD insisted that a large portion of the nation, instead of being demeaned by attacks on the past, deserved credit for rebuilding and industrializing Poland in the communist era. This assessment, however, was written as if it was a historical review almost of someone else's past actions. The SLD linked itself and its politicians only to the initiative to hold the roundtables.[74] Attacks on them for being "communists" were characterized as an inappropriate shift of attention away from the gains and concerns of the present.

All the while, SdRP leaders were privately engaged in discussing campaign strategies and holding meetings with other successor social democratic parties in such countries as Lithuania and Hungary. These were deliberately held out of the public eye. But in private discussions, the people involved made it clear that it was important to their strategies that their reformist counterparts won electoral victories elsewhere in the former Soviet bloc. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, while making his initial state visits to the West,

did not ignore what happened in Russia and the neighboring Ukraine, but he went there as a supporter of Poland's presence in NATO and the European Union.

Although the leaders of the SdRP were always clear that their goal was to form coalitions with centrist parties and the noncommunist left party (Union of Work), they also wanted to use membership in the Socialist International to prove they were not communist but, in fact, were a legitimate center-left party. So, in 1996, they fought hard to be Poland's one representative to the Socialist International. At the same time, this was not something that they touted in the general media in Poland or that Poles actually cared about. In the end, this association of European socialist and social democratic parties, including Tony Blair's New Labour Party, Germany's Social Democrats, and the French Socialists, recognized both the SdRP and its then competitor, the Union of Work, as provisional members in 1997.

The newly transformed SLD party's victorious campaign platform in 2001 was marked by a continued move to the center. The move itself was one that had been debated since 1999 and was reinforced by public opinion research commissioned by the SLD and presented in various party meetings. Although the party promised to help "the poorest," the concepts of class and of worker did not appear. Instead, the platform continued to talk about alleviating poverty by the development of business, increasing the strength of small and medium industries, and getting Poland into the European Union as soon as possible. It emphasized making education accessible without making any promises to assist those who could not afford to go to school. The past was essentially ignored, although the party platform did mention the need to have normal relations with Russia.[75] Two "new" figures in the SLD, one a former Solidarity leader and former member of the Freedom Union, were assigned to respond to the Catholic Church's attacks on the party as still being "communist" by simply denying that connection and saying "the Church is an important part of Polish life."[76]

The focus of the SLD–Union of Work coalition program was specific. Its slogan was "Let's Return to Normalcy—We're Winning the Future." Its focus was on the AWS government's poor administration and policy that had hurt Poles as well as Poland's economy and position in the world. In turn, the SLD emphasized its professionalism by promising that the coalition would work together (as opposed to the fractious AWS–Freedom Union coalition) while not promising an instant solution to Poland's problems: as head of the coalition, Leszek Miller promised "a competent government and competent coalition."[77] The SLD, once closely associated with state welfare and a huge state bureaucracy, also promised to cut drastically the government bureaucracy

and even the number of ministries (including the AWS "dysfunctional" bureaucrats) and make state administration much sleeker and less costly.[78]

After the SLD's first one hundred days in office, the new SLD prime minister, Leszek Miller, reported that his government had made real cuts; gotten Poland back on track toward European Union negotiations; and developed a less wasteful budget that, while significantly reduced, still provided for the poorest segment of the population.[79] In the process, though, his government suffered from its experience in 1993–1997 when people had learned to expect little and got an economic boom: this time what they inherited was an economic disaster and a population that expected them to "do it again" and bring about a new economic boom.

Organization Is Everything

A decade after the first partially free vote in June 1989 came out against the communists, the men who had been second-rung leaders of the Polish United Workers' Party in the 1980s managed to become the most successful centrist politicians in Poland's otherwise fragmented and fractionalized political world. In campaigns and in governing, they appeared as professionals, taking, at best, vague ideological positions and making no real promises. Ironically, the lessons they learned from joining the party just after the repression of 1968, holding power in the last decade of communist rule, and being condemned after the 1989 election ultimately made them much better at amassing support and governing in a democracy than the politicians who had cut their teeth opposing communism and the men and women who came to the fore after communism fell. These groups were more ideologically strident and prone to bitter battles than the politicians of the successor center left.

If anything, those who had been in the Communist Party before it fell entered politics with a clear sense of the importance of organization and coordination. They knew how to do it and had the initial resources, left over from the communist era, to do it. The rejection and attacks they experienced in the aftermath of their first defeat in 1989 gave substance to this: it was the crucible that brought them together and created a sense of "us" versus "them" that would last more than a decade. This ensured not only that the SLD coalition spoke with one, or almost one, clear voice but also that its leadership would remain stable in spite of its "open" membership, attacks from the outside, and early setbacks. It was this professional, nonconflictual, and consensus-oriented style that corresponded to what a majority of Poles evidently wanted from their politicians.

There was little desire on anyone's part to support "communist ideology." The PZPR had been one of the most liberal parties in the Soviet bloc during the 1950s and early 1960s. The debacle of the economy's collapse and martial law in the early 1980s ultimately strengthened the hand of the party's liberals. So, by the end of the 1980s, its leaders had moved far from doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism.[80] In the face of attacks on the successor party's deputies and leaders for being responsible for all that was bad in the old system, the men and women who ran the SdRP tried to shield themselves by avoiding doing or advocating anything that could be construed as "communist." Meanwhile, no one else was willing to risk being tarred as "Red" by taking on searing social problems or working with former communists. The ultimate irony of all this was that the rejection the communists' successors suffered from other politicians determined their platforms, not the interests of voters, until the "successor" to the "successor party" emerged in 1999. As a result of the incessant anticommunist attacks in the 1990s, the SdRP always structured political debate and advocacy so as to underscore both the fact that it was not communist and the right's inability to tolerate or cooperate with anything or anyone it saw as "Red." The successors became successes because of the lessons of their party's failure and subsequent rejection—they reacted to being unwanted by their political peers rather than to any sense that they were representing a social group or ideal.

Notes

1. Jane L. Curry and Luba Fajfer, *Poland's Permanent Revolution* (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1996).

2. Curry and Fajfer, *Poland's Permanent Revolution*.

3. Paul L. Lewis, *Political Authority and Party Secretaries in Poland, 1975–86* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

4. "Deklaracja Wyborcza Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej" (original in *Trybuna Ludu*, May 6–7, 1989), in *Programy partii ugrupowań parlamentarnych, 1989–1991*, vol. 1, ed. Inka Słodkowska (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1995), p. 12.

5. *Początki Parliamentarnej Elity, Posłowie Kontraktowego Sejmu*, ed. Jacek Wasilewski and Włodzimierz Wesołowski (Warsaw: Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii PAN, 1992), p. 80.

6. The main group was a group of young professors and graduate students mostly connected with the University of Warsaw on July 8, 1989, and came to be called the Ruch 8-ego Lipca (Movement of the 8th of July).

7. Mimeographed PZPR internal document, 1989.

8. "Deklaracja Socjaldemokracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej uchwalona przez Kongres Założycielski w dniu 28/01/1990" (original in *Trybuna Kongresowa*, February 3–4, 1990), in *Programy partii ugrupowań parlamentarnych 1989–1991*, vol. 1, ed. Inka Słodkowska (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1995), p. 98.

9. Of these, the speech by the first secretary and former prime minister, Mieczysław Rakowski, was the defining one ("Przemówienia Pierwszego Sekretarza"). See the reports of the discussions and ceremonies in *Trybuna Kongresowa*, January 28, 1990; and Antoni Dudek, *Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej, 1989–1995* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo GEO, 1997), p. 88.

10. Dudek, *Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej, 1989–1995*, p. 88. (Indeed, a number who would later become leaders of the social democratic movement did not affiliate with any party. In Katowice, on the other hand, a small group formed the League of Communists that was neo-Leninist and never went beyond its declaration.)

11. For a full discussion, see Bohdan Jałowiecki, *Narodziny Demokracji w Polsce Lokalnej* (Warsaw: University of Warsaw, Instytut Gospodarki Przestrzennen, 1990), pp. 87–88; and Jacek Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe "Scholar," 1997), pp. 116–122.

12. Ironically, for the Solidarity camp, *communist* was an epithet Lech Wałęsa and his supporters used against intellectuals and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the very man Wałęsa recommended in 1989 to Jaruzelski to be prime minister of the first noncommunist Polish government since World War II.

13. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, p. 69; and Mirosława Grabowska and Ireneusz Krzemiński, *Bitwa o Belweder* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie Kraków, 1991), pp. 119–139.

14. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, p. 69; Grabowska and Krzemiński, *Bitwa o Belweder*, pp. 119–139; and Radosław Markowski and Gabor Toka, "Zwrot na lewo w Polsce i na Węgrzech pięć lat po upadku komunizmu," in *Wybory parlamentarne, 1991 i 1993* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1995), p. 202.

15. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej, Nie Może Być," leaflet, April 1991.

16. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej, Nie Może Być."

17. Stanisław Gebethner, "System wyborczy: Deformacja czy reprezentacja?" in *Wybory parlamentarne, 1991 i 1993* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1995), p. 10.

18. Gebethner, "System wyborczy," p. 10.

19. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 151, 180–186.

20. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 53–54, 178–216.

21. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 148–166.

22. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 180–185, 253–255.

23. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 53–54.

24. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 89–90.

25. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, p. 91.

26. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 82–85; and, for another analysis, see Dudek, *Pierwsze lata III Rzeczypospolitej, 1989–1995*, pp. 359–364.

27. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, pp. 97–98.

28. Raciborski, *Polskie Wybory*, p. 90.

29. Jacek Wasilewski, Maciej Kopczyński, and Sławomir Szczur, "Stabilność zachowań wyborczych," in *Wybory Parlamentarne, 1997*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), p. 101.

30. Stanisław Gebethner, "Stabilność i dynamika zmian w polskim elektoracie w latach, 1991–1997," in *Wybory Parlamentarne, 1997*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), p. 234.

31. Gebethner, "Stabilność i dynamika zmian w polskim elektoracie w latach, 1991–1997," p. 234.

32. Richard Rose, Neil Munro, and Tom Mackie, *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990*, no. 300 (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy,).

33. Rose, Munro, and Mackie, *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990*.

34. These included the right-wing Samoobrona Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Self-Defense of the Polish Republic), the Catholic Ligi Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families), and Platforma Obywatelska (the Citizen's Platform), as well as the more centrist Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) run by Andrzej Olechowski, a former communist activist and academic who admitted to having been an informant for the secret police for a short period of time.

35. Rose, Munro, and Mackie, *Elections in Central and Eastern Europe since 1990*.

36. In interview after interview after 1993, this was an issue and an experience SLD deputies raised.

37. Jerzy Wiatr's *Krótki Sejm* (Warsaw: BGW, 1993) tells the story of this period from the perspective of one of the leaders of the SLD coalition.

38. For an examination of the internal dynamics of the SdRP, see Ewa Nalewajko, *Protopartie i Protosystem?* (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 1997).

39. Interview data, 1993–2000. In what would become a celebrated basis for attacks on the Social Democratic Party, Mieczysław Rakowski borrowed a million dollars in cash from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the waning days of the Polish United Workers' Party. Apparently, he intended to use it to support the SdRP, but the political situation changed so rapidly that he never made use of the monies. In the end, he was in the anomalous position of not having used the cash but having the Soviet Union collapse before he could return it. When he finally did return it, the transaction leaked out and created a "mini scandal" because he returned the last half when he was accompanied to an ambassadorial dinner by Leszek Miller, one of the SdRP's more prominent new leaders.

40. Joanna Kuszlik, "Pragmatyczna Zjednoczona Partia Rzadaca? Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej szczebla lokalnego na tle ugrupowań postsolidarnościowych," in *Korzenie demokracji*, ed. Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel (Warsaw: PAN Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2000), pp. 49–76; and Krystyna R. Sielawa-Kołobowska, "Partie polityczne na lokalnej scenie publicznej," in *Korzenie demokracji*, ed. Mirosława Grabowska and Tadeusz Szawiel (Warsaw: PAN Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 2000), pp. 233–280.

41. Krzystof Zagórski and Michał Strzeszewski, *Nowa Rzeczywistość* (Warsaw: DIALOG, 2000), pp. 63–66.

42. Of the four top leaders in the SdRP, the only one who could claim to be truly from the "proletariat" was Leszek Miller. Yet he was the leader who dressed and presented himself as the most "upper class" and did not show any affinity to workers.

43. Gil Eyal and Jacek Wasilweski, "Pochodzenie społeczne i postkomunistyczne losy nomenklatury," in *Elity w Polsce, w Rosji, i na Węgrzech*, ed. Ivan Szelenyi, Don Treiman, and Edmund Wnuk-Lipiński (Warsaw: PAN Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1995), pp. 105–132.

44. Interview data, Warsaw, 1993.

45. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Wybory '93: Program SLD," "Karta Społeczna i Ekonomiczna," and "Co i Jak Zmienić w Polskiej Gospodarce: Materiały Wyborcze," leaflets, 1993.

46. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej Być Nie Może" ("It Can't Be This Way Any Longer"), in "Wybory '93: Program SLD," leaflet, 1993.

47. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej Być Nie Może," p. 17.

48. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej Być Nie Może," p. 17.

49. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Tak Dalej Być Nie Może," p. 6.

50. Interview data, Warsaw, 1993.

51. Krzysztof Jasiewicz, "Portfel czy różaniec? Ekonomiczne i aksjologiczne determinanty zachowań wyborczych," in *Wybory Parlamentarne, 1997*, ed. Radosław Markowski (Warsaw: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1999), pp. 149–168.

52. Interview data, Warsaw, 1996.

53. "Nowe Partii," internal document, 1999.

54. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Statut," Article 10, April 15, 1999.

55. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Statut," Article 10.

56. CBOS, "Preferencje Partyjne w czerwcu" (June 2002), p. 2.

57. The splits have been much discussed in the Polish press since the 2001 election. In July 2002, the resolution of the shake-up of the cabinet was delayed by disagreements between Miller and Kwaśniewski that spilled into the press. See, for example, "Pojedynek Generałów," *Wprost* (July 14, 2002), pp. 18–21.

58. Ewa Nalewajko, "Posłowie Sejmu X kadencji. Charakterystyka ogólna," in *Początki parlamentarnej elity*, ed. Włodzimierz Wesołowski and Jacek Wasilewski (Warsaw: Instytut filozofii i socjologii PAN, 1992), pp. 73–97; and Jarosław Pawlak, "Polityczne korzenie nowej klasy politycznej," in *Zbiorowi aktorzy polskiej polityki*, ed. Jacek Wasilewski (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1997), pp. 303–337.

59. Nalewajko, "Posłowie Sejmu X kadencji," p. 141.

60. Nalewajko, "Posłowie Sejmu X kadencji," pp. 119–202.

61. Marjorie Castle and Ray Taras, *Democracy in Poland* (Boulder: Westview, 2002), p. 129.

62. Interview data, Warsaw, 2001.

63. Interview data, Warsaw, 2002.

64. Among others, Janina Paradowska's "Trochę pudru, trochę różu" (*Polityka* 28 [2002]) discusses the splits in the cabinet over the budget and public expenditures.

65. Aleksander Kwaśniewski did attempt to make his presidential campaign "popular" by modeling it and even his appearance on Bill Clinton's presidential campaign. So, for instance, he took a bus with other top leaders around the country. In this, though, his stress was on "personality," not on whipping up crowds.

66. Stanisław Gebethner, *W Poszukowaniu Kompromisu Konstytucyjnego* (Warsaw: Elipsa, 1999).

67. Leszek Miller was head of the Council of Ministers; Jerzy Oleksy was prime minister after Pawlak; Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (never actually a member of the SdRP but a candidate and deputy for the SLD) was prime minister and minister of justice at various times; and Zbigniew Siemiakowski was minister of interior. Other academics who had been identified with the reformist wing of the PZPR—Grzegorz Kołodko, Dariusz Rosati, and Jerzy Wiatr—held parliamentary positions; were in the party's broader elite; and were, respectively, minister of finance, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of education.

68. Anna M. Grzymała-Busse, in *Redeeming the Communist Past* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 103–105, presents this picture as well, although she emphasizes party rules rather than personal connections.

69. Interview data, Warsaw, 1993–2000. For a full discussion of campaign finance issues in Poland and a comparison of the parties, see Marcin Walecki, "Wydatki polskich partii politycznych," in *Finansowanie polityki*, ed. Marcin Walecki (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2000), pp. 116–138.

70. Grzymała-Busse, *Redeeming the Communist Past*, p. 255.

71. Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, "Program Socjaldemokracji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej," March 1997.

72. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Program Wyborczy: Dobre Dziś–Lepsze Jutro," Warsaw, 1997.

73. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Program Wyborczy."

74. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Program Wyborczy," pp. 7–9.

75. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Porozumienie Programowe SLD i UP," May 2001.

76. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Celiński i Czapiński o liście biskupów," November 9, 2001.

77. Janina Paradowska, "Zespół Millera," *Polityka* 42 (2001).

78. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Porozumienie Programowe SLD i UP."

79. Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, "Miller: 100 dni rządu," January 24, 2002.

80. Leszek Miller is quoted as saying, "I was interested in Marxism, but not as instructions on how to carry out a revolution but as an analysis of the contemporary world" (Paradowska, "Zespół Millera").

CHAPTER TWO

Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism

Diana Morlang

The Hungarian Socialist Party, the successor to the Hungarian Communists, entered the second decade of democratic politics with a reputation for pragmatic policy making and a consistent bloc of voters but still faced challenges to remain competitive in Hungary's changing multiparty system. Out of the initial transition process the Socialists developed a strong commitment to market reforms and integration into Western Europe. Loyalty among Socialists to the party helped the organization to integrate a diversity of opinions inside the party into a unified and disciplined organization. The combination of internal diversity and cohesion, in turn, enabled the party to attract a broad spectrum of voters. The Socialist Party worked to balance its pro-market emphasis with social policies and protection of workers' interests to attract traditional left-wing voters. Economic realities disrupted this policy balance in 1994 when the Socialists formed the government. During their tenure, economic pragmatism led to unpopular economic reforms. The party returned to the opposition in 1998, but it continued to build its reputation as a party willing to implement tough economic reforms to improve the country's economy while working to protect traditional left-wing interests. The Socialist Party maintained a committed pool of voters through the late 1990s, and in mid-2002 it returned to government in a coalition with its earlier partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats. So far the challenge facing the Socialist Party has been to reconcile its different policy orientations, to attract voters from the traditional left, and to fend off populist competitors from the right. The Socialists' triumphant return to government suggests

that their strategy has been successful but also points to new challenges in shepherding Hungary into the European Union and healing the polarization of Hungarian society.

Communism in Hungary

By the 1970s Hungarian Communism provided the most economic freedom to its citizens of any country in the Soviet sphere of influence, save Yugoslavia. The relaxation of the government's control over the economy reflected a tacit social compromise between the government and the public following the crushed Hungarian Revolution of 1956. After the Soviet army returned the Communist leadership to power under János Kádár, Hungary experienced a period of strong state control. However, the Hungarian leaders also gained more latitude for conducting Hungary's internal affairs, and they distanced themselves from the strict command economic model of the Soviet bloc. With the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1968 Hungarians were granted some freedoms such as owning personal property, less-restricted travel, and more access to consumer goods. In return, Hungarians acquiesced to the political control of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP), the formal title of the Communist Party. Hungary's model came to be known as "goulash Communism," evocative of a rich, distinctly Hungarian-flavored mixture. Inside the Communist Party a similar focus on pragmatism evolved. Economists and technocrats engineered the slow economic opening of Hungary from within the government. Ironically the increased consumption by Hungarians undermined the balance of payments of the Hungarian state; the New Economic Mechanism precipitated enormous foreign debt and economic crisis by the late 1980s.

Looming economic crisis helped reform-oriented Communist Party members to remove Kádár and his older, ideological cohort from power in 1988. At first the more conservative reform Communists dominated the leadership circle in the HSWP. Party Secretary Károly Grósz allowed some freedom of press and the beginning of public debate over long-suppressed subjects such as the plight of Hungarian minorities abroad and the truth about the 1956 uprising. But the more reform-oriented Communists pressed for greater political openness and further economic reforms. Meanwhile, political opposition groups became increasingly vocal in their demands for reform of political and social institutions. As the political reform movement gained momentum both inside the Communist Party and among new opposition groups, a younger generation of reform Communists toppled the moderate conservative leadership, replacing Grósz with the Harvard-educated Miklós

Németh. This new generation of reformers—many entering politics only in the 1960s—had strong economic and political credentials. Under this reformist leadership the government cautiously distanced itself from Soviet policies.

A clear split emerged between conservative Communists and the new reform-oriented leadership, the latter hoping to preserve its role in a multiparty system. The government and the opposition conducted roundtable negotiations in spring 1989, but unlike Poland they opted to resolve the political crisis through "unfettered electoral competition" rather than institutional compromise.[1] The government agreed to institute democracy because its reform-oriented leaders calculated that they could "use their superior resources, organization, and nationally recognized candidates to defeat the opposition in a straightforward electoral contest with no strings attached."[2] By June 1989 and during the roundtable negotiation to design the transition process, the HSWP already saw itself as a democratic competitor, and it fought for electoral institutions that would best enable it to hang onto government through multiparty elections.

Defeat and Transformation into a Post-Communist Party

The Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) resulted from the split between reformers and conservatives in the Communist Party during the party congress of October 1989. This party congress was held following the conclusion of the negotiations of the Communist Party and its allies (social organizations such as labor unions, the Leftist Youth Alliance, etc.) with the "democratic" political opposition. These negotiations ended the Communist monopoly on power and laid the timetable for fully democratic elections in May 1990. Reform-oriented Communists viewed the party's Communist past and its pliant opportunistic membership as liabilities for the multiparty elections. To remake its image into a democratic competitor, party reformers including Rezsö Nyers, Imre Pozsgay, Miklós Németh, and Gyula Horn designed a new party, dropping from the name the association with workers and embracing the European-style social democratic image.

A key element to the formation of the new party was a requirement that prospective members officially join the new party. This meant that the Communist Party was disbanded and its members were not automatically transferred into the new party. The registration process enabled the new party's leadership to screen out hard-line Communists and other political liabilities. Those committed to traditional Marxist-Leninist principles formed the Workers' Party. At the same time, many members of the old Communist

Party defected altogether, joining the opposition parties or exercising their new right to remain politically nonaffiliated. In July 1989, the Communist Party claimed 700,000 members; by the following October, its successor, the Hungarian Socialist Party, registered only 30,000 members.[3] Most of the moderate conservatives who had dominated the Communist Party in the late 1980s left the party or retired from politics, leaving the most reform-oriented members of the former Communist Party in control of the newly formed HSP.

Although the Socialists were not the ideological successors of the Communist Party—the Workers' Party filled that role—they were the HSWP's legal successors. This meant that the Socialist Party continued to control the assets of the old Communist Party. The party used its inherited administrative offices to build the best local chapter network of any party in Hungary.[4] However, the new Socialist Party also recognized the political liability of absorbing all the assets of the Communist Party. To preempt criticism that the party had not really changed anything, the Socialists "took steps to reduce its assets before public pressure to that end could become an embarrassment" and announced in 1990 that the party had diverted 90 percent of its inherited assets to the state.[5] This divestiture was successful in that, unlike other successor parties in the region, the Hungarian Socialists faced few criminal charges and no comprehensive lustration law. Subsequently, the Socialist Party was able to minimize and even to ignore its complicity in the abuses of power under the Communist regime.[6] This was in sharp contrast to the post-Communist political environment in Poland and elsewhere.

By forging a new party with a screened membership the Socialist leadership created an organization that was ideologically more consistent than its predecessor and electorally more resilient and, hence, competitive. However, given the climate of the transition years, it is not surprising that the Socialists had difficulty attracting new members who were not affiliated with its predecessor. In 1990 nine out of ten Socialist Party members were former Communist Party members. Although the Socialist Party was made up of reformers and not conservative Communists, it had trouble marketing the party and failed to establish a distance in the public's perception from the Communist Party leadership and rhetoric. The party tried to capitalize on its role in facilitating a peaceful transition to a multiparty system. However, the "new" democratic parties were much more successful in catching the public's imagination through promises of freedom, democracy, and economic openness. Voters were not inclined to view the Socialist Party as "new" or "reformed" and blamed the Socialists for the problems of the past. Yet the Socialists were generally unapologetic as to their role in government before 1989.

The Socialist Party electoral program for 1990 reflected the party's as-yet-unformed identity as a left-of-center party. With a vagueness characteristic of most Hungarian parties during this election period, the Socialist Party did not include specific policy packages in its election program. Instead, it concentrated on defining itself in relation to the process of marketization and democratization and on distinguishing itself from both the orthodox Workers' Party and the opposition parties.[7] The Socialist Party platform supported social justice and a market economy tempered by socialist interests, classifying itself as a leftist socialist party with roots in Marxism. The party members took a defensive and passive stance in the campaign, seeking to show their ideological restraint and to eschew authoritarian methods. It is clear from the course of the 1990 campaign that most voters supported parties that had clean pedigrees, distinct from ideological or membership links to the Communist regime. Initially at least, the Socialists suffered a public backlash against the Communist era because they could not clearly distance themselves from the past.

Just one year after the electoral rout of the Communists by Solidarity in Poland and the collapse of Communism all over Eastern Europe, the Hungarian Socialist Party's poor showing in the May 1990 election was not surprising. Indeed, the HSP won only 10.9 percent of the vote, thereby gaining thirty-three parliamentary seats from the party-list vote (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1.   Hungarian Election Results, 1990

Party	% Vote	% Seats	Electoral Districts	Regional	National	Total
Socialist Party	10.9	8.55	1	14	18	33
Free Democrats	21.4	23.80	35	34	23	92
Young Democrats	8.9	5.18	1	8	12	21
Democratic Forum	24.7	42.50	114	40	10	164
Christian Democrats	6.5	5.40	3	8	10	21
Smallholders' Party	11.7	11.40	11	16	17	44
Workers' Party	3.4					
Agrarian Alliance			1			1
Independent and Joint Candidates			10			10
Total	100.	100.	176	125	85	386
Coalition	**42.9**	**59.3**	**128**	**64**	**37**	**229**
Government: Democratic Forum, Christian Democrats, Smallholders' Party						

The Hungarian electoral system uses a complicated combination of single-member districts and a proportional system of voting that benefits large parties and underrepresents small parties such as the Socialists in 1990. Seats are allocated on three levels: local (voting districts), regional (counties), and national. Voters directly choose the first two levels of candidates on two ballots. On one ballot, voters select a single candidate to represent the electoral district (SMD), and seat allocation follows majoritarian rules for 176 seats. On the other ballot, voters choose a party, and the votes are aggregated at the regional level. Allocation of 152 seats follows proportional representation rules. The third, national level is not determined directly by balloting. Instead, votes cast for the losing candidates in the district races are collected into a national pool and distributed to parties proportionally. The fifty-eight seats distributed at the national level compensate parties that fail to win SMD seats equal to their overall proportions of the popular vote (although the number of seats may vary). In 1990, the Hungarian Socialists were unsuccessful in the single-member district elections even though they ran candidates with good name recognition and political experience against unknown opposition candidates. The Socialists won seats based on the percentage of votes from the regional party-list ballots and the national-level compensation seats.

With thirty-three seats the Socialist Party was a relatively coherent group with shared history and similar goals. The cumulative vote for the left in 1990 was actually 26 percent, which could have yielded a strong bloc in parliament. However, these parties were unable to cooperate on candidates or objectives, and so the Socialist Party became the only parliamentary voice for the Hungarian left. The party was thus in a position to designate itself to represent those leftist voters whose parties were not represented in parliament. These included the Workers' Party, the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (which has since disbanded), the Agrarian Alliance that represented the interests of collective farm workers, and other small parties.

In 1990, the right-of-center government parties were the Democratic Forum, the Christian Democrats, and the Smallholders' Party. The Democratic Forum, the dominant party of the coalition, developed from intellectual and literary roots in society and focused on issues of historical identity and retribution against the Communists. The small Christian Democratic People's Party was more conservative and nationalistic than the Democratic Forum, and the Independent Smallholders' Party was a single-issue party focused on property restitution and reestablishment of small landowners in the countryside. The left-liberal party, the Free Democrats, also developed in opposition to the Communists and also from intellectual roots. Unlike the Democratic

Forum, however, which was composed of academics in the humanities, the Free Democrats evolved from the social sciences and economics. They supported free-market economics and individualism. Fidesz, or the Young Democrats, had a similar orientation to the Free Democrats until 1993, when it self-consciously moved from center left to center right with a shift toward a more conservative agenda.

The significant turnout of left-of-center voters suggested a potential pool of supporters for the Socialist Party in the future. The Socialists faced the dilemma of identifying and capturing these potential voters while understanding and satisfying their core constituency, who were mostly middle class, urban, educated, and from the older generations. They generally were people who had benefited from the institutional predominance of the Communist Party. This constituency had risen to positions of power in the Communist institutional and political system and voted for the party that would help maintain aspects of this system. Many of the voters who supported the Socialists in 1990 had ties to the Communist Party themselves or had family members who had been active before 1989. These voters felt alienated by the strong anti-Communist rhetoric of the opposition parties. Even with a low-profile campaign the Socialists offered the only sympathetic party to many of them. As mostly long-term party careerists and less-politicized technocrats and experts, the leaders of the Socialist Party were essentially "colleagues" of these urban and educated voters who had benefited from the old system. Alone among the left parties in 1990, the Socialist Party polled its support from those who had either lucrative positions or expertise to soften their transition to the new political and economic environment. The party's failure to extend its appeal beyond those economic elites and former Communist Party members, combined with blame for the Communist era, undermined its mass appeal in the 1990 election.

Survival as a Competitive Party

The low voter support for the Socialists in 1990 surprised many party members and forced them to turn their attention to making the party more competitive. Socialists clearly understood that to survive they must attract voters beyond the small group of core constituents they won in 1990. This meant identifying those voters who would be natural constituents for the Socialist Party and reshaping the party agenda and image to attract them. The leadership recognized that the traditional constituency of the left—working- and lower-class voters—could provide a strong support base if the Socialists could draw them away from marginalized parties on the left. In

pursuit of a competitive voter base the Socialist Party used its time in opposition to revise the party's image. In parliament this task entailed acting as a modern and professional party organization. It further included democratizing and strengthening the party organization. The Socialists also worked on their policy agenda by championing working-class interests in parliament, reshaping the party's leadership and platform to embrace a traditional leftist agenda, and promoting its ties to left-wing organizations. Finally, the party had to overcome its position as a political pariah with which no other party would work. At the same time that the Socialists tried to win over traditional leftist voters, however, the party retained its technocratic and reformist leadership and combined its rhetorical support for protection for average Hungarians with calls for economic realism and market-oriented reforms. This strategy transformed the Socialist Party into the most competitive party in the new Hungarian democracy by 1994, but it also laid the foundation for conflicting policy promises and constituencies with very different expectations.

Professionalizing the Party Image

During its years in opposition, the Socialist Party worked to improve its image as a professional party in contrast to the ineffective government of the center right. Following its poor showing in the 1990 election, the Socialists held a congress in May 1990 to define the party's ideological image and policy strategies. In pursuit of its goal to become the sole representative of left-wing voters, the Socialist Party focused on European social democratic goals and jettisoned references to Marxism-Leninism. Severing its ties to the weak Workers' Party enabled the Socialist Party to rethink its relationship to the other parties in parliament and to embark on new relationships with diverse social groups. The party's makeover reflected the preferences of the younger generation of leaders in the party and their economic expertise.

During the first year of the democratic parliament the younger, reform-oriented party elites in their forties and fifties took over the Socialist Party leadership positions from elites in their sixties. Imre Pozsgay, the leader of the parliamentary party and an influential actor before and during the negotiated transition roundtable, left to form his own party in November 1990. His departure removed the central populist voice from within the Socialist caucus. Rezsö Nyers, the party leader just before the transition period, retired, and Miklós Németh resigned to join the newly formed Bank for Reconstruction and Development. As Gyula Horn and a younger cohort of leaders replaced the older elite, they consolidated control over the party by pragmatic reformers.[8] Although many of the Socialist members of parliament (MPs) were

former Communist Party members, they were seen as technocrats rather than part of the old Communist elite.

After 1990 the Socialist Party also sought to change its image among voters by developing a reputation for professionalism and effective representation. The party was generally unable to influence government policy from its small opposition bloc during the first two years of the center-right government; the other parties in parliament shunned it. To overcome their pariah status Socialists pursued several strategies to enhance their image as a responsible party. By refraining from personal attacks and extremism, the Socialist Party set itself apart from the parties of the governing coalition. Halfway through this first parliament the social-liberal opposition parties, led by the Free Democrats, began to criticize the government for its undemocratic domination of the media and its focus on nationalism. The Free Democrats demanded that democratic principles be observed by the government and began to work more closely with the Socialists in opposition to the conservative government coalition, effectively ending the Socialists' isolation in parliament.[9] By 1993, the Socialist opposition began actively to criticize the government for its ineffectiveness in solving Hungary's economic and social crises, which helped shift public opinion in its favor.

The Socialists maintained strong party discipline inside parliament and projected an image of expertise. With only thirty-three MPs, the Socialists did not experience the factional infighting that characterized the new democratic parties, particularly the parties in government from 1990 to 1994. The right-of-center government parties appeared emotional and unstable. Already by 1993, they began to disintegrate, losing public support but also fragmenting internally and publicly sabotaging other members of their own coalition. The Democratic Forum expelled the ultranationalist leader, István Csurka, but he continued his political career as a thorn in the side of the government coalition with his Hungarian Justice and Life Party. The Democratic Forum itself broke into competing factions by the 1994 election. The Smallholders' Party also experienced internal dissent and breakaway factions. The government focused parliamentary debate and policy making on the punishment of those associated with the Communist past, but this strategy alienated voters who were ready to put the past behind them.

Meanwhile, the conservative coalition that governed Hungary during 1990–1994 was unable to solve Hungary's macroeconomic woes while the populations' living standards continually declined. It adopted unrealistic spending policies that exacerbated the high foreign debt and low credit standing inherited from the Communist era. The main government party, the Democratic Forum, was unwilling to undertake difficult economic reforms,

and by 1993 Hungary teetered on the edge of economic collapse. The government attempted to calm public dissatisfaction by increasing government spending. However, this strategy created a burgeoning budget deficit that rose from 5.4 percent of gross domestic product in 1992 to 6.7 percent in 1993 and 7.5 percent in 1994.[10] Voters blamed the government for the decline in living standards, and many Hungarians became nostalgic for the security and stability of the Communist era. Public support shifted toward the Socialists by late 1993 partly in response to their campaign message of reform and social security but also because the Socialists presented a party image that promised expert management and rationality.

Democratizing the Party

To increase competitiveness the Socialist Party worked to strengthen and democratize its party organization. The Socialist Party has long had the best network of local party chapters of all parties in Hungary.[11] Socialists maintained party offices throughout Budapest and the countryside and fostered neighborhood and youth associations that were open to nonparty members. This extensive outreach into communities helped the party improve its image as a democratic competitor in several ways. First, its presence in small towns throughout the country gave citizens direct contact with politicians. Local offices enabled national and city Socialist politicians to hold forums and meetings with citizens and promoted constituent contact with the party. Except for the Smallholders' Party, the parties of the right and center were considered "Budapest" parties because their organizational networks were poorly developed outside the capital city. Second, these local chapters provided foot soldiers who were crucial in the campaign of 1994. Socialist leaders repeatedly attributed the party's success to the campaign work done by chapter members.[12]

Finally, local chapters provided the party with a loyal and politically involved pool of members from which to draw future candidates. Party leaders often linked the expertise and discipline among Socialist Party politicians to the strong network of local party organizations. While the right-wing Democratic Forum had been successful in attracting regional and local candidates to run for parliamentary positions, these individuals were generally not professional politicians and were ineffective at providing constituent services. The lack of political experience among new party politicians also negatively affected the governing coalition's unity in government.

The internal democracy of the Socialist Party enabled party chapters to select their own candidates to run in elections. Although the Budapest leadership occasionally suggested candidates, particularly to be run on regional

lists, local authorities had the final say on candidate selection. This helped to ensure that candidates had appeal to voters and that the party chapter would remain supportive of its politicians. This strong local role actually enhanced party discipline and loyalty because it encouraged chapters to become directly involved in national party politics. The HSP leadership explicitly encouraged chapters and political candidates to address local political agendas rather than simply adopting the national party agenda.[13] The party capitalized on its strong organization and used this organization to reach out to other social and political organizations and to encourage a diversity of opinions within the party.

A related Socialist Party strategy was to build subgroups within the party organization that would attract specific demographic and occupational groups to the party. This mobilization process meant that the party developed "functional organizations."[14] These internal groupings included interest blocs such as teachers, workers, women, the religious, pensioners, and youth that focused the party on the concerns of key constituencies and encouraged more committed membership from particular social groups. The HSP's functional organizations worked with unions and associations outside of the party to better develop joint policy positions. Eventually, the party included leaders from several of these organizations on the party list in 1994. In some cases these individuals were not even party members but had worked together with the party to develop common ground.[15] The party's organizational outreach enhanced its image as a democratic party with real ties to communities.

While the Socialist Party was smaller than its predecessor, it was by no means ideologically monolithic. However, although internal factions continued to raise debate within the party, the leadership had tightly controlled the overall direction of party policy since 1990. Factions included loose groups associated with policy interests as well as alternative "platforms" that published policy agendas and promoted leaders within the party. One such platform was the Social Democratic Platform, which promoted greater liberalization of politics and the economy. In terms of policy, the Social Democratic Platform was close to the liberal Free Democrats. There was also the left-wing Association that supported traditional left-wing goals and union interests. These platforms focused debate within the party on two conflicting policy directions: market reform and protection of traditional working-class interests. Their importance was mostly limited to the Budapest party organization where they served as forums for party activists to explore policy alternatives.[16] Many Socialists and political observers felt that this diversity served as an asset by broadening the scope of interests represented by the Socialist Party.[17] At the same time, by incorporating these different viewpoints

into the party, the Socialists undercut the appeal of smaller parties that claimed to represent workers or market reformers. All the while, the technocratic party elite prevented the party from becoming a chaotic tangle of competing interests by holding the party to a coherent platform aimed at a pragmatic rather than ideological reform agenda.

With its reorientation toward social democratic goals and ideology, the HSP was able to share many policy objectives with the other large opposition party, the liberal Free Democrats. These two parties built common ground in their fight against the nationalist and religious policies of the government. Together the Free Democrats and the Socialists became associated with the tolerance and reform many Hungarians viewed as "Western." The Socialists also continued their strategy of representing the left by presenting policy alternatives that articulated the interests of workers and the lower classes.

Championing the Left

The Socialist Party began preparing for the 1994 parliamentary elections by reorienting its political message to better attract the voters of the left and by developing a partnership with traditional allies of the left, namely, trade unions. In Hungary as in several other Eastern European countries, the role and strength of unions was unclear immediately following the Communist era. The official unions associated with the Communist government renamed themselves the National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions (NFHTU). The federation fought to keep the property and the membership it had during the Communist era. Under the center-right government, the union federation came under legal pressures aimed at reducing its control of members and its financial resources. The HSP used the widening social breach between unions and the government to become the parliamentary defender of the organized working class. During this time, the NFHTU was also in competition with newly formed unions. Its members were defecting to these "independent" unions allied with the liberal parties and the conservative government. In general, these unions organized and represented different sectors of the labor force, whereas the NFHTU retained its representative monopoly over skilled and unskilled workers in the public sector and state-owned enterprises.

The decisive moment in the power struggle between the unions was a referendum held in 1993 over the control of social security boards. The referendum allowed all unionized workers to determine which bureaucratic body would administer the collection and distribution of social security funds.[18] The NFHTU won this vote, thus successfully consolidating its leading role as the paramount representative of Hungary's workers. During this time, the

Socialist Party demanded that negotiations over economic policy include consideration of social interests. The convergence of the political interests of the leading trade-union federation and the Socialists led to a formal electoral pact between the two. The HSP's electoral platform incorporated union concerns, and the head of the NFHTU, Sándor Nagy, took the prestigious second position on the party list. The HSP enjoyed increasing popularity in the polls during 1994 due partly to its focus on representing workers and the formal endorsement of the largest union.

As a final organizational strategy the Socialist Party worked to gain acceptance in the West. Its pro-Western rhetoric created a stark contrast with the ruling parties' suspicion of Western domination and bitterness over the West's disregard for the "Hungarian nation," citing examples of Western betrayal from the Treaty of Trianon to the Revolution of 1956. The Socialist Party, on the other hand, worked to be accepted as a member of the Socialist International, and Socialists modeled themselves on the Social Democratic Party of Germany by combining social welfare policies with free-market economics. Already in 1989 the new Socialist Party had applied for membership in the Socialist International. It received full membership in 1996.[19] The HSP leader, Gyula Horn, had become a darling of the German government because of his role in opening the borders for the East Germans in 1989. When Horn became the prime minister in 1994, his acceptance and contacts in Europe an asset in assuring Hungary's integration into the West. Above all, as elaborated below, the Socialists became vocal supporters of Hungarian membership in NATO and the European Union.

Triumph in the 1994 Election Campaign

In an effort to overcome its political and social marginalization during the first democratic parliament, the Socialist Party redefined itself and pursued a strategy of social and political alliances and focused on left-wing interests. The HSP platform for the 1994 elections reflected the saliency of economic issues to the Hungarian voters. In Hungary, sociocultural issues are important for how parties define themselves and provide the greatest differentiation among parties. The reformist character of the Communist Party in the 1980s prevented the Hungarian opposition parties from mobilizing against the then-Communist regime on the basis of freer markets and capitalist reforms. Because the HSWP preempted the opposition demands for economic liberalization, the democratic opposition contested the government's legitimacy on the basis of sociocultural issues. However, economic issues now became the key to winning elections, because these issues were most important to Hungarian voters.[20] The Socialist

Party was able to dominate the public debate over the economy, whereas the right and center parties were unable to provide more promising alternatives to the HSP economic programs.

The Socialist Party election program reflected different policy goals derived from diverse interests within the party as highlighted by the competing platforms. Rather than undermining party support, "so far these different voices have been an advantage to the party during campaigns, because the party can turn different sides of itself to different groups of voters."[21] The Socialists' campaign program announced that "modernization combined with social responsibility were the compass of the future . . . ; the program stressed the importance of measures to protect labor. Instead of income redistribution, the goal was capital accumulation and a social liberal orientation."[22] This economic agenda sought to decrease the state's control over the economy and enable market reforms to get the Hungarian economy back on track. The party platform offered relief from economic hardship for those most hurt by the transition and sought "social justice" by reallocating the costs of reform. At the same time, the Socialists made clear their commitment to market reforms and made explicit their goal of EU and NATO membership for Hungary.

As elections approached, much of Hungarian society was frustrated by the economic stagnation of the post-Communist era and looked to the Socialists to return some of the security and living standards they had enjoyed before 1990. A survey in early 1994 conducted by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences found the public most concerned over the decline in living standards in the transition period. Of those who planned to vote for the HSP, 69 percent reasoned that "things were better in the old days, when there were jobs and a secure existence."[23] Overall the public resented the costs of privatization and marketization and had little faith that a free market was a desirable goal. Hungarians longed for some "socialist elements" and for more state regulation and redistribution in the economy. Ironically, the right-of-center government had dragged its feet over the reform process in response to voter disenchantment with liberalization, but, in so doing, the government exacerbated the economic stagnation and undermined its own chances for reelection. Widespread nostalgia for the Kádár era transformed the political equation: the Socialists' connection to the past became an asset rather than an embarrassment to the party.

In its 1994 campaign, the Socialist Party combined its new image of professionalism with policy promises that satisfied a broad coalition of voters. It campaigned with the slogan "Bring expertise to government," promising direction and results in the next parliament. In his inaugural address Gyula Horn, the HSP leader and new prime minister, reiterated the party program

to address social justice, maintain a dialogue with society, and pursue economic reform, economic growth, and entrance into the EU as soon as possible.[24] The party capitalized on the extensive network of party chapters and its relatively large membership to get out the vote. The Socialists criticized other parties that ran showy public relations campaigns from the capital and focused much of their campaign effort on making connections between locally selected candidates and voters. The efforts to integrate local chapters into the party organization helped the HSP present a unified image to voters during the campaign and later as a governing party.

The Hungarian Socialist Party in Government

The Socialist Party won 33 percent of the vote in 1994 and received 54 percent of the seats in parliament (see Table 2.2). This majority reflects the magnifying effect the electoral system has for larger parties.[25] Although the Socialists could govern alone, they chose to join in coalition with the liberal party, the Free Democrats. Because the Free Democrats had been staunchly anti-Communist and constituted the nonpopulist democratic opposition from the 1980s, their coalition with the Socialists created deep divisions among Free Democrats. Even so, the political agendas of these two parties were close, as were their values and the shared interests of their managerial and entrepreneurial voters. The Socialists sought a coalition partner from among the democratic opposition to signal their commitment to democracy and to avoid accusations of a monopoly on power. Together these parties controlled more

Table 2.2.   Hungarian Election Results, 1994

Party	% Vote	% Seats	Electoral Districts	Regional	National	Total
Socialist Party	32.99	54.15	149	53	7	209
Free Democrats	19.74	18.13	17	28	25	70
Young Democrats	7.02	5.18		7	13	20
Democratic Forum	11.74	9.84	5	18	15	38
Christian Democrats	7.03	5.70	3	5	14	22
Smallholders' Party	8.82	6.74	1	14	11	26
Independent			1			1
Workers' Party	3.68					
Total	100.00	100.00	176	125	85	386
Coalition	**52.7.0**	**72.00**	**166**	**81**	**32**	**279**
Government:						
Socialist Party and						
Free Democrats						

Source: www.election.hu

than two-thirds of parliament, enabling them to amend the constitution. Earlier cooperation with the Free Democrats in opposition to the right-of-center government had forged an understanding over social and economic goals. This was further supported by pressure from the Social Democratic Platform within the HSP to form a coalition.

The Socialists clearly became the dominant members of the government, which caused an extensive debate among the Free Democrats concerning the compromises needed to work with the HSP. The Free Democrats accepted ministry portfolios traditionally associated with government control over society, notably the Interior Ministry, but did not claim influential economic posts. The Socialist Party thus retained the stronger voice in most government policy areas, especially economic policy. As the majority party with a strong technocratic background, the Socialists could act with the greater legitimacy in economic policy. As one Socialist Party activist stressed, the coalition partner "played a very important role but not in shaping laws. . . . They lent us the anti-Communist commitment."[26] The coalition government program deviated somewhat from the HSP's original campaign platform by making economic reform the central priority.[27] This was, however, more the result of circumstances than of pressure from the Socialists' more liberal coalition partner.

The Socialists' success in 1994 reflected the support of diverse constituent groups and social classes with conflicting expectations of government policy. The party attracted half of all votes cast by semiskilled workers and top managers, as well as more than 35 percent of the votes cast by skilled and white-collar workers.[28] Overall, the party won similar support from "every occupational, residential, educational and age group within society."[29]

The size and breadth of their electoral margin surprised many Socialists, who worried that the party was not really prepared to represent all of society. The conflicting pressures for continued economic liberalization and social protection created a dilemma for the new government in terms of satisfying the HSP's campaign promises, substantiating its reputation for economic expertise and leftist social values, and building a support base for the next election. That these policy expectations were incompatible was clear even during the campaign process, but once in office, economic realities forced the government to choose a liberal economic reform program.

The Socialist Party appealed to two constituencies with distinct expectations. One group of voters included the "losers" of the transition: pensioners, blue-collar workers, and public-sector employees. They responded to campaign promises and policy expectations for more social protection, more gradual reform, and greater involvement of unions in economic decision

making. These traditional leftist voters represented the largest reservoir of electoral support in Hungary; pensioners alone accounted for nearly one-third of the population. However, Socialist politicians believed that many of those voters who expected social welfare improvements would be likely to vote against the government regardless of its policies because of the short-term worsening of the economy or might abstain altogether. While most Socialists readily agreed that the party's election to office reflected the support of the "losers" of the transition, few saw the party as exclusively tied to traditional left-wing voters.[30]

The party also drew support from the "winners" of the transition—economically mobile and flexible workers who could take advantage of the opening economy. These voters, including managers, business professionals, the well educated, and the middle class, demanded increased progress toward an open economy. Many of these economic elites had parlayed their past connections to the Communist Party into lucrative positions in the market economy. Hence, they now supported the Socialists as the party of economic reform.[31] Their policy expectations included faster liberalization of trade, ownership, and banking as well as overall deregulation of the business environment. In terms of short-run economic benefits, the winners of the transition were best served by the government's commitment to economic liberalization. Undoubtedly, those in influential economic positions could take advantage of new economic opportunities afforded by the reforms and could profit most from the anticipated growth.

While the left-of-center coalition saw reforms as the proper remedy for the economic crisis in Hungary, the Socialist Party also had core constituents who supported these measures. The Socialists further believed that most "winners" of the transition would provide a more consistent source of electoral support over time because, as Hungary became a more stable capitalist economy, fewer voters would rely on old state-interventionist policies and most voters would adjust to and benefit from a market system. Pro-market voters were likely to be influential in future business and political circles and not only provide electoral support in terms of votes but also serve as "opinion leaders" who could persuade others to support the HSP. Socialist politicians understood that not enacting reform policies to satisfy pro-market voters might mean losing their electoral support in the future. Because they reckoned that this group would grow larger in number over time, disappointing them now was seen as potentially crippling the party's objective of winning future elections. Still, in terms of numerical support, traditionally left-wing voters were more important to the immediate electoral success of the party than the smaller base of economic elites.

Thus, while the Socialists weighed the costs of alienating the electorate with the needed economic reforms, they realized that were they to provide single-minded protectionist policies to help the "losers" of the transition, the resulting economic stagnation would eventually also turn those voters away from the party. Moreover, even if the Socialists provided greater social welfare now, the voters benefiting from these policies would dwindle in number as more individuals adapted to the unfolding market economy. In light of these alternatives, the HSP chose to implement policies that would be part of a long-term strategy for party development rather than attempting to implement stopgap measures that would eventually result in lost votes anyway.

The Socialist-led government faced economic crisis on several fronts caused by large deficits in the budget and current accounts in an economy that had not recovered from the initial shock of the transition. Once in office the center-left government realized that socialist welfare policies were unsustainable before the economic crisis was solved. In March 1995, therefore, the government announced a stabilization package that aimed to cut state spending, raised taxes and customs duties, called for further devaluation of the currency, accelerated cash privatization mostly to foreigners, and included other steps to balance government accounts.[32] Besides policies designed to stabilize the economy, the government implemented a range of fiscal measures aimed at balancing the state budget.

The austerity package contained measures that were very unpopular with voters, such as raising taxes, lowering spending on social programs like family benefits, raising the age of retirement, and adopting a unilateral wage ceiling for public-sector workers. The wage policy allowed restricted wage increases to a maximum of 10 percent, but the inflation rate of 28 percent meant a substantial decrease in real wages for most Hungarians.[33] The overall costs of these reforms were felt in the 11 percent decrease in real wages in 1995, followed by another 7 percent drop in 1996. Many voters who supported the Socialists in 1994 felt abandoned by this International Monetary Fund–inspired program.

Undoubtedly, the mixed campaign messages had contributed to expectations that the HSP would not pursue such radical austerity measures. However, Socialists asserted that providing Communist-style security was never their intention. One party politician associated with the trade-union federation characterized voter expectations as unrealistic: "Some [voters] thought that the HSP would bring the return of the Kádár-era security. Some wanted things like unemployment levels to be fixed immediately. . . . The HSP did not promise these things, but people had illusions."[34] Socialist politicians believed that voters heard the promises of economic reform but did not under-

stand the policies necessary for achieving the desired outcomes: "The citizens did not believe that we would do what we said was necessary to fulfill our election program. They thought that we would find another method, [but] we found that we could not give a real left alternative."[35] Some two years into the Socialists' mandate, therefore, their policy choices confused and alienated voters who had expected more protective safety-net-style measures from this left-of-center government.

Despite their commitment to meaningful reforms, many Socialists were genuinely torn between representing traditional leftist interests and helping the economy recover. Socialist MPs recognized that, although they were sympathetic to the problems of those hurting from the transition, they could not legislate socially protective policies for a broad spectrum of voters without jeopardizing their underlying long-term goals. Some expressed hope that, after "legislating capitalism," they would be able to address leftist interests. One politician summarized such views, saying, "The HSP must make a liberal policy in this four years, and then will have the opportunity to make a social liberal policy in the next four years, and then in the next century make a socialist policy. Now the party must concentrate on building democracy and the free market. However, this is not the end but just the step in the direction of . . . social democracy."[36] Another argued, "I have some hope that the party will be able to become a real left-wing interest-driven party, not just like in the West but really concentrated on left-wing interests. However, for the time being, we must continue the current economic policy regardless of its effect on party support."[37] Yet another Socialist said, "If we keep building capitalism, then we may not be able to keep our connection with society. We cannot know what will happen in the next cycle, but I do not think we can be real socialists or leftists yet."[38]

Torn between apparently contradictory policy objectives—economic reforms and protecting key left-wing voters—the Socialists tried to combine policies for economic growth with targeted programs to help those most hurt by reforms. The HSP made one important exception to the liberal agenda by providing protective policies for pensioners. Unlike its stance toward other traditional left-wing constituent groups, the government tried to win over pensioners at the end of its term in government with greater social security provisions. This decision was rooted in the electoral strength of the pensioner population. Not only were retirees an important source of votes—pensioners made up one-third of voters—but their motivation to vote made them an even more powerful voting force. In the words of one Socialist politician, "The government is already making policies that will affect target areas. Most clearly for pensioners. . . . This is an important voting group for us. Pensioners always vote, regardless of the

weather, while young people go out of town in nice weather, and stay home when it is raining."[39] The pensioners' union had close ties with the Socialist Party and fielded representatives on the HSP electoral list. Socialists thus acknowledged the government's attempts to win over pensioners despite their emphasis on economic liberalization and their assertion that the economic program should not be undermined by electoral goals. The HSP strategically engineered its economic policy in an effort to satisfy those groups that seemed vital to the party's long-term electoral competitiveness.

Still, the Socialists clearly lost popularity during their tenure in government, particularly among working-class voters. Two years into his term in office, Prime Minister Horn polled close to last in popularity among national politicians. The party maintained a core of supporters throughout these years, but these supporters were mostly among well-educated, upper-middle-class voters. The Socialists were unable to maintain consistent support among the "losers" of the transition who had made up the large swing vote in all post-1989 elections in Hungary. The loss of key left-wing voters reflected the hardships they experienced as a result of the economic reforms pursued by the HSP-led government.

The right-of-center opposition harnessed the discontent of voters hurt by continued liberalization by employing populist claims to protect the common man. Particularly, the Smallholders' Party and the extreme Justice and Life Party led by István Csurka capitalized on the discontent of low-income and less-educated voters. The Socialists' gamble that the economy would begin to turn around by the 1998 election did pay off, as signs of economic recovery became evident in 1997. However, for most working-class Hungarians, the benefits of incremental growth and currency stability did not translate into meaningful changes in their standard of living. Even as macroeconomic indicators began to improve, voters remained critical of the Socialist government's policies. As one local party councilman explained, "The number one basis of HSP support in 1994 now has only negative feelings . . . ; it cannot understand that the total economic situation is getting better."[40] Moreover, government scandals undermined the professionalism that was the selling point of the Socialists in 1994. Finally, while the center-left government won the praise of international and European financiers for putting Hungary's economic house in order, the growing income inequality and obvious wealth of some groups in society played into the hands of the center-right opposition. The far right parties skillfully used nationalism and criticism of Western bankers to win public support.

In the face of declining popularity the Socialist Party felt pressure from traditional left-wing voters and leftist allies like trade unions to alter the

speed and severity of its economic program. Despite such pressure, however, the government continued to pursue market reforms and focus rhetoric on the necessity of such a bitter pill to Hungary's eventual prosperity. The coherence of government policy during this period reflected, in turn, the solidarity of the members of the HSP.

Party Organization in Government

Throughout the HSP-led government the Socialist Party maintained a high level of unity and discipline both within its parliamentary group and among the larger active membership. The party suffered no splits in its ranks, and of the original parliamentary caucus of 208, only two MPs left to become independent. Several organizational characteristics help explain why the HSP was able to maintain strong party unity despite the diversity of opinion within the party and the pressures on it stemming from the financial crisis and the voters' unhappiness over the immediate negative consequences of the austerity measures. Interviews in the year before the 1998 election found that a majority of Socialist MPs and activists identified with traditional left-wing policies, such as protecting workers' rights and continuing social entitlement programs. However, they also recognized the importance of maintaining party unity and support for the government program even when its policies undermined their popularity among traditional left-wing voters. The HSP organization supplied incentives for party unity that helped preserve the Socialists as a cohesive body in government. Candidate nomination, discipline requirements among MPs, and the role of local party organizations, combined with an insulated party leadership, provided the government flexibility and support in its policy making.

At the HSP's inception, new members were required to reregister rather than directly transfer their membership from the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. This filter provided the new Socialist Party with a membership without large discrepancies in ideology or agenda. The Socialists do have a number of internal platforms that vary in their support of market reform and social protection. However, there is a high degree of loyalty to the party center, both within the parliamentary group and among local party chapters. Inside, the party discussion is open, and decision making (separate from government leadership) is democratic. Local chapters and the Budapest central office are active in their communities. There is a great deal of cross-fertilization between party leaders outside of the capital and within parliament. The party runs an ongoing leadership seminar, training incoming MPs as well as providing forums and education for activists and youth

throughout the party organization. The Socialists have the best integrated and most active membership of any party in the Hungarian system, and this pays off in terms of the high level of integration among chapters of the party and in terms of the loyalty among party politicians.[41]

The organizational structure of the party is democratic, in that local party chapters control their own resources and have complete freedom in nominating candidates for election.[42] Local control over candidate nomination does not fragment the party because of the extensive communication and cooperation between local decision makers and the party leadership. Local HSP organizations reward unity and discipline in their parliamentarians, and they expect them to support the party position over "local" concerns. This reflects the fact that funding for local chapters depends on the party's electoral strength, for party budgets are distributed from state funds based on the number of officeholders. Local party leaders emphasize that MPs cannot affect much at the local level and should concentrate on national politics instead. One Socialist regional administrator explained: "The representatives' main task is to make laws. They must look at the national interests for this, and the county interests do not really matter at this level."[43] Although Socialist MPs depend on local party organizations to promote and renew their candidacy, these local organizations encourage them to support national party positions in the legislature.

During 1994–1998, however, this internal party democracy did not extend to Prime Minister Horn, who resisted control over his cabinet and policies by the party organization. Many Socialists complained in interviews in spring 1997 about the "glass ceiling" between the views expressed by the party membership and the policy agenda of the prime minister. Horn surrounded himself with personal advisers and navigated government policy making without consulting the HSP leadership. Although the government was nominally responsible to the party leadership committee, in truth the party had little ability to check the prime minister.[44] Again, however, the culture of cohesion within the party organization translated into party support for the prime minister. Socialist Party unity and the party organization's inability to control directly the government gave Prime Minister Horn exceptional flexibility to design and pursue the economic reform program. Despite dissent within the party regarding the hardships and unpopularity of the government program, the HSP supported it, and Socialist politicians remained optimistic that the gamble would pay off in time for the 1998 election.

By 1997, the popularity of the center-right and populist parties had increased, at times eclipsing the government in national polls, as their

antireform/anti-international institutions and nationalist rhetoric attracted some voters who felt abandoned by the Socialists. Still, most Socialists remained optimistic that their economic policy strategy would succeed on the macroeconomic level while benefiting fixed-income earners as well. Many Socialists expected that the party would be elected to govern again, although with fewer seats than in 1994. Among party leaders surveyed in 1997, 52 percent agreed that the HSP would remain the main governing party following the 1998 election. Less than 20 percent responded that they anticipated the party not to be a decisive actor in the next government.[45] Their optimism about remaining in government was reflected in their continued support for economic reform and pro-market policies. Party members viewed these policies as realistic given the economic constraints on Hungary. When asked to choose the economic policy strategy that would be most advantageous for the party in the 1998 electoral campaign, the majority (70 percent) favored continuing the current program emphasizing a balanced budget, low inflation, crawling peg currency devaluation, and rapid privatization. Only 13 percent favored alterations to that program so as to make the transition less painful for key constituent groups. Another 17 percent of respondents preferred an economic policy that emphasized economic growth instead of deficit and inflation reduction.[46] The Socialist politicians viewed the HSP-led government's economic strategy as the best way to compete against parties that had no real economic alternatives to offer. As others have argued, economic policies are the primary dimension of party competition in Hungary.[47] Indeed, few alternatives to the HSP program existed for the Hungarian economy if Hungary were to join the EU and compete in the international economy.[48]

Although Prime Minister Horn's popularity among voters continued to slide, party unity remained high, and Horn preserved his position as head of the party for the 1998 election. The HSP congress of mid-1997 elected a new national leadership council that included both traditional left-of-center and more moderate Social Democratic Platform leaders. This signaled that the party list would balance these interests as well. There had been discussion within the party in early 1997 about selecting a new leader who would be more popular with voters, but there was little consensus as to who could better lead the party. In the end, this issue was not addressed at the HSP congress, and Horn retained his control over the party leadership. Commentators widely blamed this outcome on a lack of alternatives among the party elite. Horn headed the 1998 election list and personified the continuity expressed in the HSP platform.

Success and Failure in 1998: Return to the Opposition

The Socialist-led government had gambled that reforms would generate economic growth before it faced reelection. The choice of economic policy was not a result of wishful thinking or ignorance of its likely short-term consequences for electoral support. Rather, HSP leaders viewed liberalization as the best strategy to secure the party's competitive position in the long term. Party politicians hoped their policies would improve the economy enough by 1998 that voters would reelect them. Even though Socialist politicians were uncertain about the outcome, they remained committed to the process.

By late 1997, the economy overall began to show incremental improvement after two years of negative growth and falling standards of living. Even so, up until the electoral campaign of 1998 little proof existed that the economic experience of average citizens was improving noticeably. The HSP campaigned with promises of continuity and eventually reaping the benefits of reduced budgetary overruns and an improved payment balance. However, voters perceived this message as being unsympathetic to the hardships experienced by society. The main opposition, the Association of Young Democrats (Fidesz), waged a flamboyant campaign coupling bright media images with promises similar to those used by the Socialists in 1994: high economic growth combined with redress for those hurt by the transition. As Barnabas Racz comments, the Socialists' "subdued tactics inadvertently put a favorable spotlight on the opposition's more daring and upbeat attitudes suggesting that 'they are the party of the future against the party of the past.'"[49]

The HSP electoral program adopted in March 1998 proclaimed that during the next four years the Socialists would work to complete the economic and social renovation begun during their first term in government. It called for completion of the long-term reform of the economy as well as enhancing social "solidarity" by improving living conditions, increasing employment, reforming the rural economy, and so on. Finally, it promised to open the way to Europe both politically and economically.[50] Thus, at the time of the May 1998 election, the party remained committed to the reform it had enacted in government but also sought to highlight its long-term commitment to European socialist values and the interests of the working class.

The calculation of the Socialist-led government almost worked. The HSP won about the same percentage of the popular vote in the 1998 election as it had in 1994, that is, it won 33 percent of the proportional representation vote in 1994 and 32 percent in 1998 (see Table 2.3). Data on voter mobility provide a rough idea of which parties gained voters from the Socialists.[51] Only 1.9 percent of the HSP's 1994 supporters defected to the unreformed Workers'

Party in 1998. Voters who had voted for the Socialists in 1994 based on their promises of greater protection from the market were more likely to support right-of-center populist parties in 1998. Those parties, the Smallholders' Party and the extreme right-wing Hungarian Party of Justice and Life, blamed Hungary's problems on outsiders (international investors and multinational organizations), Jews, and former Communists. According to preelection polls, they would attract almost 6 percent of the voters who supported the Socialists in 1994. The biggest anticipated defection of former Socialist supporters was to the center-right Fidesz party (11.6 percent), which positioned itself to attract disillusioned Socialist voters with promises of greater protection from the market and an emphasis on law and order.[52] Overall, though, the Socialists were able to retain most of those voters who supported them in 1994, with 76 percent of them planning to vote Socialist again in 1998, while small numbers of voters from all other parties switched to the Socialist camp.[53]

Despite the similarity of their party-list vote share in the two elections, however, the Socialists lost to Fidesz in many single-member district elections. The Fidesz–Democratic Forum alliance ultimately formed the next government in coalition with the populist Smallholders' Party. As discussed below, the reasons for the HSP's electoral loss in 1998 can, in part, be found in the intricacies of the Hungarian electoral system and the failure of their

Table 2.3. Hungarian Election Results, 1998

Party	% Vote	% Seats	Electoral Districts	Regional	National	Total
Socialist Party	32.3	34.9	54	50	30	134
Free Democrats	7.9	6.2	2	5	17	24
Young Democrats*	28.2	38.3	90	48	10	148
Democratic Forum	3.4	4.4	17			17
Christian Democrats	2.1					
Smallholders' Party	13.8	12.4	12	22	14	48
Justice and Life Party	5.0	3.6		3	11	14
Independent			1			1
Workers' Party	4.1					
Total	100.	100.	176	128	82	386
Coalition	**43**	**55**	**119**	**70**	**24**	**213**
Government: Young Democrats, Democratic Forum, Smallholder's Party						

Source: www.election.hu.
*Fifty electoral district seats were won by the electoral coalition comprising Fidesz and the Democratic Forum, but these parties also won seats independently. In this table, joint seats are divided and added to the respective parties by candidate affiliation.

coalition partner, the Free Democrats, to garner sufficient votes. This suggests that the Socialists' reputation for economic pragmatism and professionalism remained strong in 1998 and could be an asset to the party in future elections.

The loss of some votes to rival parties on the right contributed to the HSP's failure to stay on in government, but additional factors were also at work. First, the structure of the electoral system has, since 1990, ensured that to dominate the government a party must win a majority of the single-member district seats. In 1994, the Socialists not only won the most votes on the party lists but also gained more than half of their parliamentary seats from the single-member district votes. In 1998, the Socialists won only one-third of their previous seats in the single-member district contests. The Young Democrats (Fidesz) beat the Socialists in many of the single-member district races by only a narrow margin yet subsequently achieved a majority of seats in parliament. Thus, a narrow defeat in individual races, despite a nearly constant share of the vote by proportional representation, robbed the Socialists of their strong place in the contest.

The second reason the Socialists failed to return to government involved the collapse of public support for their coalition partner, the Free Democrats. Support for the Free Democrats dropped from almost 20 percent in 1994 to less than 8 percent in 1998. Ironically, its support fell even though the government's economic reforms conformed closely to the policies the Free Democrats promised voters in 1994. The fall in support reflected divisions within the party.

Despite its liberal economic orientation, the Free Democrats also included a social-liberal wing that supported a means-tested safety net for people hurt by market reforms.[54] One Socialist leader and member of parliament suggested that the Free Democrat Party "also has harder liberal and social liberal sides."[55] The Free Democrats represented many young entrepreneurs and others who benefited from liberalization, but in 1994 it also attracted voters who wanted to maintain some social welfare but were unwilling to support the Socialists because of their links to Communism. To some extent, there was a gap between the orientation of the party toward economic policies and the expectation of many of its voters.[56] Of the party's 1994 voters, those who expected greater protection from the government during the reforms blamed the Free Democrats for the hardships of liberalization. Free Democrat politicians, although committed to liberalization, complained that they shouldered more than their share of the blame for the economic policies of the coalition. As one leading liberal politician grumbled, "Being the policy scapegoat is not at all useful for the [Free Democrats]."[57] They seemed to bear the brunt of public dissatisfaction with the economic reform process.

On the other hand, political observers in Hungary including many Socialist politicians suggested that the collapse of the Free Democrats' support reflected their inability to claim credit for the introduction of a real market economy in Hungary. The Free Democrats did not want the portfolios associated with the economy, so they headed the ministries of culture, interior, and transportation. Consequently, they did not play a noticeable role in directing the reform program. Interviews and informal conversations with members of the Free Democrats showed that they considered themselves the "conscience" of the government, rather than the driving force behind economic policy making.[58] Political scientist László Andor argued that the liberal coalition partner was "very important to the intellectual and ideological framework of the government" but that they did not really influence government policy.[59] Free Democrats championed the enactment of laws on conflicts of interest and the transparency of privatization but otherwise did not play a central role in furthering liberalization.

Finally, many Socialists identified an image problem for the Free Democrats stemming from the latter's role in government, in that they were reluctant to be associated with either the failures or successes of the government. As one Socialist parliamentarian summarized, "The [Free Democrat Party] is being punished by the Hungarian people. They are in government but are also in opposition. People do not like this . . . it is not a successful strategy . . . to try to be on both sides."[60] Thus, Socialists expected that public support for the liberals would fall not because of the government's reform program but because the Free Democrat Party did not participate in the outcomes as a full member of the coalition. Together, these observations suggest that the Free Democrats lost support among voters because they did not take a clear stand for economic reform or for social security protection; hence they could not take credit for any of the achievements of the government.[61]

The collapse of public support for the Free Democrats hurt the Socialists' ability to prevent a coalition between the center-right and far right parties following the 1998 election. With their poor electoral showing, the Free Democrats could not provide enough seats for a two-party coalition. Likewise, on the single-member ballots, the liberals could not throw much support behind the Socialist candidates, contributing to the weaker turnout for the Socialist Party compared with the Young Democrats.[62] Thus, even though the Socialist Party may have correctly gambled on economic reforms from the perspective of their own party-list electoral performance, they failed to win another term in government at least in part because of the poor showing of their coalition partner.

Although the Socialists were turned out of government in 1998, their long-term expectations from liberalization proved, in retrospect, to have been realistic. The new right-of-center government worked to slow and reverse many of the reforms implemented by the Socialists, but the HSP had laid the groundwork for economic advancement. Since 1998 the Hungarian economy showed steady progress, and the GDP finally surpassed 1990 levels.[63] The Young Democrat government naturally claimed credit for much of Hungary's subsequent economic success even as it dismantled a number of pro-market programs. For their part, the Socialists, now in opposition, repeatedly called attention to the government's populist and nationalist policies. The HSP also highlighted government scandals and growing international concern over the government's populist rhetoric. In preparing for the 2002 election, the Socialists reminded voters of their economic reform record and tried to parlay their image as the main representative of Hungary's working-class voters into a successful campaign.

Party Organization and Party Program

After the Socialists' defeat in 1998, former Prime Minister Horn resigned his role as HSP leader although he retained his MP status. The party elected former foreign minister László Kovács to the role of party chairman and leader of the parliamentary group. Kovács, born in 1939, was an elder statesman compared with the majority of young, influential Socialist politicians. He provided leadership for the party during its difficult reorientation as an opposition party, but he was criticized as too quiet to champion Socialist interests or to make the party's role reflect its status as one of the largest parliamentary groups.

One year before the 2002 election the HSP congress sought a new face for the campaign ahead and elected Péter Medgyessy, a nonparty member in a formal legal sense, to be its candidate for prime minister. Medgyessy had been the third finance minister in the earlier Socialist-led government and had a strong commitment to market-style economics. He was considered a popular candidate from outside the Socialist Party and therefore a good choice to head the campaign.[64] Medgyessy exemplified the nonideological and technocratic expertise that had been the hallmark of the Socialist Party since 1990. His past connection to the financial reforms of 1997–1998 signaled the party's continued commitment to a pragmatic economic policy geared to securing European Union membership for Hungary. Meanwhile, Kovács remained the chairman of the HSP. The division between the posts of party chairman and top candidate for government reflected a change in party strat-

egy. Prime Minister Horn had held both positions and was criticized for subordinating the interests of the party organization to those of the government. Dividing these offices suggested that the Socialist Party may in the future represent divergent interests from those of a Socialist-led coalition government.

Even with a financial expert as the party's candidate for prime minister, the party continued to proclaim its solidarity with the working class. At the end of 2000, Sándor Nagy took over as the leader of the HSP parliamentary group. Nagy had been the head of the largest trade-union organization until 1993 when he entered the Socialist Party to champion trade-union interests. Meanwhile, over time a younger reform-oriented generation had entered the HSP leadership, creating a blend of new and old voices. The new party leadership council comprised mostly individuals in their forties and fifties who were not important politicians in the Communist era, even including one member born in 1975.[65] Eschewing ideology, the newly assembled HSP leadership seemed poised to govern with a focus on improving daily life for the average Hungarian while assuring that Hungary would take its place among members of the European Union.

The party's 2001–2002 program, endorsed at the same party congress that elected Medgyessy, promulgated a dual-policy agenda. The program pledged to carry on the political and economic changes that the HSP began in 1994. At the same time, it also promised that the party would continue to address the needs of citizens and achieve a higher standard of living.[66] Medgyessy's 2002 election agenda thus focused on continuing the pro-market agenda he pursued as finance minister. He projected great optimism about the future prospects of the Hungarian economy, suggesting that, by the end of the next electoral cycle, a Socialist government would produce a rate of 5.5–6 percent annual growth in the gross domestic product with low inflation, as well as raise wages, shorten the work week, increase pensions, create 300,000 new jobs, and resolve a number of other pressing issues for working- and middle-class voters.[67]

As candidate of the party that had formally initiated Hungary's accession to the European Union, it was natural for Medgyessy also to pledge the adoption and implementation of the remaining legislation necessary for EU membership. Unlike parties on the right, the Socialists attracted more voters who favored EU integration as well as improved relations with Hungary's immediate neighbors, particularly Romania and Slovakia. While the right-of-center government likewise avowed support for EU membership, it more frequently expressed concern about the dwindling share of ethnic Hungarian minorities in adjacent states. It thus sponsored the controversial "Status Law," adopted by a large parliamentary majority in mid-2001, which granted

to ethnic Hungarians living in neighboring countries certain cultural rights and socioeconomic benefits. In contrast to the right-of-center parties' concerns about Hungarian ethnic identity during the 2002 campaign, Medgyessy, who himself speaks Romanian and is of Transylvanian origin, presented the "Status Law" as arising from the border regime stipulated by the European Union's Schengen Agreement, which would help mitigate Hungarian tensions with Romania and Slovakia.

The balancing acts within the Socialist Party prior to the 2002 election suggested that the leadership was still struggling to find a comfortable combination of its two seemingly conflicting agendas. Should the HSP predominantly represent the interests of the traditional left-wing voters of Hungary, such as pensioners, blue- and white-collar workers, and the unemployed? This orientation required greater emphasis on social entitlement programs and policies to protect workers' security and include trade unions in decision making. Or should the party continue the economic priorities it previously championed in government, such as market liberalization and improvement of opportunities for business and investment in Hungary?

Ironically, this very tension between socialist values and market economics helped the Socialist Party to remain competitive in the 2002 elections. The only challenge on the left, the old-line Workers' Party, had long been weak and unable to draw enough voter support to enter parliament. At the same time, the Socialists' one-time government partner, the Free Democrats, agreed to preelection coordination and to forming a government coalition once again, thereby bolstering the Socialist's commitment to market economics, as in 1994. However, unlike some other post-Communist parties in the region, the Hungarian Socialists had little need to establish their democratic and reformist credentials. Although in the 2002 campaign the right-of-center prime minister, Viktor Orban, raised the specter of the return of socialism to Hungary, most voters rejected his negative association of the HSP with the Communist past. The Socialists had by then proven their commitment to democracy. Both inside and outside Hungary, they were considered credible democrats and professional politicians in a region where post-Communist parties were often associated with corruption and disregard for democracy.

Return of the Left

In the two years before the 2002 election the Socialists remained popular among committed voters, regularly polling between 40 and 50 percent of their support.[68] In the buildup to the 2002 election, the HSP and Young

Democrats competed closely in opinion polls, although the latter, the dominant government party, was considered in the lead by most analysts.[69] However, after the two-round balloting in April 2002, the Socialist Party returned to government, winning 46 percent of the seats in parliament. As during 1994–1998, the Socialists once again formed a governing coalition with the Free Democrats.

The election results highlighted the continued polarization of Hungarian voters. Past elections pitted rural and agricultural Hungary against the city population. The 2002 election repeated this trend on an even more exaggerated scale. The Socialists dominated the urban population centers of Budapest and secondary cities, while the Young Democrats–Democratic Forum were strongest in the western and rural regions of the country.[70] As shown in Table 2.4, the proportion of the vote received by the two leading parties was roughly the same, indicating an evenly split electorate that rejected extremist parties and supported the large parties of both the center left and the center right.

Essentially the tables had been turned since the 1998 election when the Socialists won slightly more votes but were unable to form a government. Back then, the HSP lacked a strong ally, whereas Fidesz was able to broker a coalition agreement with the Smallholders' Party to form the government. This time, Fidesz increased its popular support, but the Smallholders' Party dissolved because of scandals and internal fragmentation, while the Hungarian Party of Justice and Life dropped below the 5 percent threshold. At the

Table 2.4. Hungarian Election Results, 2002

Party	% Vote**	% Seats	Electoral Districts	Regional	National	Total
Socialist Party	42.10	46.10	78	69	31	178
Free Democrats*	5.60	5.18	3	4	13	20
Young Democrats	41.10	48.70	95	67	26	188
Justice and Life Party	4.37					
Centrum (new party)	3.20					
Workers' Party	2.16					
Smallholders' Party	.80					
Total	100.00	100.00	176	140	70	386
Coalition	**47.70**	**53.90**	**81**	**73**	**44**	**198**
Government:						
Socialist Party						
and Free						
Democrats						

Source: www.election.hu.
* One joint Socialist–Free Democrat candidate joined the Free Democrat parliamentary group.
**Based on the percentage of votes won in the first round of voting on regional lists.

same time, the HSP together with the small Free Democrats won a slim ten-seat majority that enabled them to form a coalition government.

The new Socialist prime minister, Péter Medgyessy, took note in his acceptance speech of the division of the Hungarian electorate into two main camps: the Socialists and the Young Democrats, or Fidesz. This polarization meant that the HSP now completely dominated the left of the electoral arena. The much smaller Free Democrats functioned as the crucial pivot party in government formation but would likely be overshadowed by the Socialists in the coalition. The trend in Hungary was toward a two-party system in which a small shift in voter support could dramatically alter the political profile of government.

A Successful Social Democratic Party

The Hungarian Socialist Party experienced ups and downs in its efforts to become a viable competitor in a democratic system. To be sure, the party began the transition with a number of advantages, both vis-à-vis other competitors in the Hungarian party system and compared with post-Communist parties around the region. The HSP has since refined and enlarged those initial advantages to become a social democratic party on the pattern of the modern West European center left.

The material inheritance and organizational advantages from the Communist era enabled the new HSP to build an extensive network of local party chapters that helped the party to connect with voters more than any other Hungarian party was able to do. In part, this strong organization, aided by the Socialists' initial exclusion from parliamentary coalition politics, encouraged loyalty among party members and politicians. Furthermore, internal cohesion enabled the party to implement politically difficult policies, notably, to incorporate both socialist values and market economics without fragmenting into splinter groups. Its broad policy agenda made the Socialist Party especially competitive in an electorate divided between winners and losers of the transition. Perhaps most important for future electoral competition, the HSP developed a reputation for professionalism that set it apart from other parties in Hungary.

Compared with other post-Communist parties, the Hungarian Socialists were particularly successful in shedding the hard-line ideologues of the Soviet-era Communist Party as well as escaping punitive legislation. At its formation the Socialist Party was mostly free of Marxist-Leninist ideological baggage, in part because it did not automatically absorb the former membership of the Communist Party. More fundamentally, the Socialists benefited

from the legacy of a relatively open and diverse Communist regime during the 1980s. Thus, when the new party was established, its leadership included mostly young technocrats who had both national and international reformist reputations. All this undoubtedly facilitated the Socialists' early bid to join the Socialist International, but it also helped them become the party of the business sector in Hungary. In this way, the HSP was not trapped into representing only disgruntled pensioners and a numerically declining working class. Instead, the Socialists came to represent a broad cross section of society. While this diversity could have been a liability for party unity, in fact the party organization worked hard to balance the diverging interests of voters and HSP members in order to maintain overall unity.

Because of their economic reform orientation even back under Communism, the Hungarian Socialists preempted anti-Communist opposition parties from monopolizing the market reform agenda. Hence Hungary's new democratic parties were unable to compete well on economic issues until 1998. Thus, unlike more traditional left-wing successor parties in East-Central Europe and the post-Soviet space, the Hungarian Socialists parlayed their economic credentials into a position at the center of the Hungarian party system. The combination of market reform and left-wing values—reiterated repeatedly in party programs—put the HSP in a league with the center-left parties of Western Europe. Much like Britain's New Labour and Germany's Social Democrats, the Hungarian Socialist Party's success rested partly on the reframing of left-wing interests in a global economic context. Hungarian voters supported this combination of programs in larger numbers than ever before in April 2002 when they returned the Socialist Party to government.

Notes

1. For a comparative discussion of the process of regime breakdown that resulted in Hungary's transition to free multiparty elections, see David Charles Stark and László Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways: Transforming Politics and Property in East Central Europe*, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

2. Stark and Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways*.

3. András Körösényi, *Government and Politics in Hungary*, trans. Alan Renwick (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).

4. Andor mentions that the new Socialist Party became the legal successor to the Communist Party and thus absorbed its property, but he offers no statistics as to their net value. Later interviews with Socialists highlighted that many HSP chapter offices were inherited from the Communist Party, resulting in important financial savings

where chapters did not need to rent offices. See László Andor, "The Hungarian Socialist Party," *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* 48 (1994): 58–71.

5. Michael Waller, "Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East-Central Europe: A Case of Social-Democratization?" *Party Politics* 1, no. 4 (1995): 482.

6. Attila Ágh, "Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties: The Case of the Hungarian Socialist Party," *Party Politics* 1, no. 4 (1995): 491–514. For example, when Gyula Horn became the Socialist Party leader, he was exposed as a member of the police that aided the Soviets in crushing the 1956 rebellion. He "confessed" to a minor role that did not destroy his political career or the party's ability to return to government in 1994. See Andor, "The Hungarian Socialist Party."

7. The Workers' Party retained its ideological links to the extinct Communist Party and advocated a return to the pre-1989-style state. It has not polled the requisite 5 percent in the past three elections and has not held seats in parliament. A 4 percent threshold on the party-list ballot applied in 1990 but was raised to 5 percent in 1994.

8. Horn himself had been active in the Communist Party since the early 1950s and had been in the Foreign Ministry for several decades. Many of his personnel appointments were not compromised by such long membership in the Communist Party, but most had at least long-term economic connections with the party.

9. Author's interview with András Bozóki, January 13, 1997.

10. For detailed descriptions of the economic policies implemented by the right-of-center government, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Country Report: Hungary* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economic Intelligence Unit), 1993–1998.

11. Andor, "The Hungarian Socialist Party."

12. Author's interviews with party leaders and administrators, 1997.

13. Ágh, "Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties."

14. Ágh, "Partial Consolidation of the East-Central European Parties."

15. Examples of professional or functional organizations' leaders within the Socialist parliamentary caucus from 1994 to 1998 include Jenö Bléyer of the Pensioners Association and religious leader László Donáth.

16. Author's interviews with party leaders and administrators, 1997.

17. Author's interview with András Bozóki, January 13, 1997.

18. The national elections were to decide which unions would be part of the national boards that would administer the health care and pension funds, which were to be removed from the state budget. The NFHTU won around 50 percent of the votes cast for representatives on the two boards, and Sándor Nagy, the leader of NFHTU, became the chairman of the pension fund. The union federation also won the elections determining who would oversee the implementation of union contracts and the distribution of state assets among unions. Overall, these elections served to institutionalize the power of the NFHTU and to make other independent unions dependent on central decision making.

19. Körösényi, *Government and Politics in Hungary.*

20. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski, and Gabor Toka, *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter-party Co-operation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

21. Author's interview with András Bozóki, January 13, 1997.

22. Barnabas Racz and István Kurkorelli, "The 'Second-Generation': Post-Communist Elections in Hungary in 1994," *Europe–Asia Studies* 47, no. 2 (1995): 251–280.

23. Edith Oltay, "The Former Communists' Election Victory in Hungary," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* 3, no. 25 (1994): 1–6.

24. Edith Oltay, "Hungary's Socialist-Liberal Government Takes Over," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* 3, no. 33 (1994): 6–13.

25. Racz and Kurkorelli, "The 'Second-Generation': Post-Communist Elections in Hungary in 1994."

26. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 26), April 13, 1997.

27. The choice of policy resembling the priorities of the Free Democrat Party did not mean the latter was dominant in the coalition. In fact, not only did the Socialists control 54 percent of the seats in parliament and all key economic ministries, but the party was very little influenced by pressures from its coalition partner. Interviews with Free Democrat politicians corroborate the finding that their party had only a marginal effect on the direction of policy in the government. Their influence was mostly limited to legislation about conflicts of interest among politicians and aspects of the new constitution.

28. István Stumpf, "Articulation of Political Interest in Hungary: Parties and Voters," unpublished manuscript, 1996.

29. Körösényi, *Government and Politics in Hungary.*

30. Author's survey of Socialist Party politicians, ninety-three responses, spring 1997.

31. Author's interview with András Bozóki, January 13, 1997.

32. For a description of the economic reform program adopted by the Socialist–Free Democrat government, see Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Economic Surveys, Hungary* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1995).

33. Although the wage ceiling was legally adopted only for public-sector workers, private market employers followed suit, in part because of the high unemployment levels.

34. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 70), June 4, 1997.

35. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 72), June 2, 1997.

36. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 21), March 5, 1997.

37. Author's interview with Socialist district leader (interview 26), March 27, 1997.

38. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 40), April 5, 1997.

39. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 25), April 10, 1997.

40. Author's interview with Socialist administrator (interview 27), April 18, 1997.

41. Gabriella Ilonszki, "Legislative Recruitment: Personnel and Institutional Development in Hungary, 1990–1994," in *Elections to the Hungarian National Assembly 1994: Analysis, Documents and Data*, ed. Gábor Tóka and Zsolt Enyedi (Berlin: Sigma, 1999), 82–107. See also Diana Morlang, "Socialists Building Capitalism: The Hungarian Socialist Party and Economic Policy Making," Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1999.

42. The Socialists have the most democratic internal structure in Hungary, whereas the other parties are "plagued by power-driven leaders, expelling their own members and parliamentary representatives or simply dissolving themselves" (Barnabas Racz, "The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition: Stagnation or Renaissance," *Europe–Asia Studies* 52, no. 2 [2000]: 319).

43. Author's interview with Socialist administrator (interview 37), May 3, 1997.

44. Racz, "The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition," 319.

45. Author's survey of Socialist Party politicians, question: "What results do you expect from the 1998 election?"

46. Author's survey of Socialist Party politicians, question: "Please choose which of the three listed strategies you think would be most advantageous to the HSP from the perspective of the 1998 election."

47. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems, Competition, Representation and Inter-party Cooperation*.

48. According to Hungarian and international economic observers, a consensus prevailed that Hungary must implement economic reforms. See, for example, Janos Kornai, "The Dilemmas of Hungarian Economic Policy," in *Lawful Revolution in Hungary, 1989–94*, ed. Béla K. Király and András Bozóki (Boulder: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., 1995), 323–350; International Monetary Fund, "Integration of the Transition Countries in to the Global Economy," in *World Economic Outlook, Globalization, Opportunities and Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1997); European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, *Transition Report Update* (London: European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1996); and Anders Aslund, "Post-Communist Economic Transformation," in *Dilemmas of Transition, the Hungarian Experience*, ed. Aurel Braun and Zoltan Barany (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 69–90.

49. Racz, "The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition," 319.

50. *A Magyar Szocialista Párt Választási Politikai Programja (1998–2002)*, available at www.mszp.hu/polprog.html (accessed on April 13, 1998).

51. I wish to thank Gábor Tóka and the Central European University for the opportunity to use their survey database: Central European University, "The Development of Party Systems and Electoral Alignments in East Central Europe: The April 19, 1994 Survey in Hungary," machine-readable data files (Budapest: Department of Political Science, Central European University, 1994); and the 1998 preelection survey conducted by the Central European University and Median (a polling firm). Gá-

bor Tóka pooled data from two surveys, conducted one month apart (March–April 1998); questions: "Which party list would you support in the (1998) election? And which party list did you vote for in 1994?" The data may be biased because voters had not yet cast their 1998 ballots and may not have accurately recalled their 1994 choice (number of observations: 2,229).

52. The liberal party, the Free Democrats, lost even a greater number of voters to Fidesz (16.7 percent), but because its vote share was much smaller than the Socialists', the latter's previous supporters accounted for twice as big a percentage of Fidesz's support (22 percent to the liberals' 11 percent). Interestingly, the liberals lost almost 11 percent of their 1994 supporters to the Socialists in 1998, suggesting that the liberal Free Democrats failed to retain its ideological distinction from its Socialist coalition partner.

53. Racz also highlights that in the second round of voting (runoffs) the HSP performed well in overall numbers, receiving in aggregate 1,939,022 to Fidesz's 1,703,813, although the Socialists lost most of the individual campaigns. See Racz, "The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition."

54. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems, Competition, Representation and Inter-party Cooperation.*

55. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 59), May 31, 1997.

56. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems, Competition, Representation and Inter-party Cooperation.*

57. Author's interview with Free Democrat MP (interview 80), January 28, 1997.

58. Author's interview with Free Democrat MP (interview 81), August 9, 1997.

59. Author's interview with László Andor, February 10, 1997.

60. Author's interview with Socialist MP (interview 69), June 5, 1997.

61. Tóka's 1998 exit poll data suggest that almost 17 percent of voters who supported the Free Democrats in 1994 supported the Young Democrats (Fidesz) in 1998. Gábor Tóka, "Exit Polls for the Hungarian Parliamentary Election," unpublished manuscript, 1999.

62. The single-member district voting takes place in two rounds, which encourages parties to form electoral coalitions for the second, runoff vote. In these cases, parties that cannot compete in the second round urge their supporters to vote for an electoral ally. In 1998, the Free Democrats could not donate much support to the Socialist candidates and thus may have hindered the HSP's ability to defeat the opposition Young Democrats.

63. "Is Democracy Working?" *Economist,* June 23–29, 2001: 45–46.

64. The *Economist* reported that Medgyessy was not officially a party member; see "A Second Term for Orban?" *Economist,* June 23–29, 2001: 46.

65. For details on the leadership of the Socialist Party, see its website: www.mszp.hu.

66. A *Jóléti Rendszerváltás Programja,* available at www.mszp.hu (accessed on September 6, 2001).

67. Népszabadság, *Voks 2002 (Election 2002)*, available at www.nepszabadsag.hu/Extra.asp?EXTRA=valasztas2002/valasztas_cont (accessed on June 29, 2001).

68. SzondaIpsos, *Mi Újság*, available at www.szondaipsos.hu/partpref.php (accessed on June 27, 2001).

69. Népszabadság, *Voks 2002 (Election 2002)*.

70. The Népszabadság website has a special election results feature that shows the distribution of votes in all of Hungary's single-member districts: www.nepszabadsag.hu.

The Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002

Algis Krupavicius

The twentieth century in Lithuania's history might be characterized as a dramatic and permanent struggle for the survival of nationhood. Since the beginning of the thirteenth century when the first Lithuanian state was founded, Lithuania lost and regained independence several times. During the twentieth century alone this happened twice. In 1918, as a result of World War I and the Russian Revolution, the country's independence was restored for slightly more than twenty years. In June 1940 Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union after the division of East-Central Europe by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. Nazi Germany forced the Soviets out in 1941, but at the end of World War II the Soviet regime was forcibly reimposed on Lithuania. Then in March 1990 Lithuania became the first of the fifteen constituent Soviet republics to declare itself an independent country.

As early as the beginning of 1988, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia were the first countries in the former Soviet Union to turn in the direction of democracy and independence. However, a paradox of democratization in Eastern Europe was that, when it started in a particular country earlier than in other countries, it tended to take a longer period of time to finish. During the initial years of regime change the complexity of the exit from communism to democracy was often described by a popular joke: everybody knows at least a few recipes on how to prepare soup from fish, but there is no recipe on how to prepare fish from fish soup. Leszek Kolakowski once mentioned that dealing with the post-communist transition was "predicting the unpredictable."[1]

Political conflict in democratizing Lithuania developed along two dimensions: democracy versus communism and national independence versus staying part of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In general Lithuania represented an example of negotiated transition. This mode of transition presupposed that a reformist part of the old *nomenklatura* elite was willing to take and actually did play an important role in the democratization process, especially in helping to delegitimize the old regime, and to facilitate accommodation among different political forces. The reformist and most numerous part of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) in 1988–1992 was led by the charismatic figure of Algirdas Brazauskas, who became a nomenklatura man in the late 1950s during the Khrushchev "spring," when the LCP recruited many young technocrats to various positions within the party to supervise and manage social and economic policies. Brazauskas had experience in various economy-related positions, but in mid-1988 with the support of Sajūdis, the main emerging opposition movement, he was rocketed into the leadership of the LCP as it not only broke away from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in late 1989 but was soon transformed into the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), the main left-wing party in Lithuania during 1990–2000.

The other camp in transitional politics was represented by Sajūdis and its leader, Vytautas Landsbergis. Certainly, Sajūdis was a much more numerous political force in Lithuania in 1988–1990 than the LCP. Moreover, Sajūdis was the strategic and intellectual leader of the Lithuanian transition to democracy and restoration of national statehood through the nonviolent "singing" revolution of 1988–1990. S. N. Eisenstadt compares "the crucially important role of intellectuals" in the breakdown of the communist regimes to the vital role of the Puritans in the English Revolution.[2] Vytautas Landsbergis, a prominent intellectual, professor of musicology, and well-known researcher of the heritage of M. K. Čiurlionis, a famous Lithuanian painter and composer at the beginning of the twentieth century, embodied the intellectual leadership of Sajūdis in the Lithuanian transition to democracy. Political competition between Brazauskas and Landsbergis, between the reformist LCP and Sajūdis, as well as among their successor political organizations, the LDLP and the Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives (HU/LC), was the main axis of Lithuanian politics and its structuring along a left–right dimension for almost a decade.

More than ten years after the restoration of Lithuania's independence in 1990, when the country was considered a consolidated democracy, the left-wing parties were not only legitimate but also very influential players on Lithuania's political stage. Lithuanian party politics is often described as a

constant fluctuation of the political pendulum from left to right and back again. However, Lithuania can be hardly classified as an example of two-partyism; it is, rather, a case of moderate pluralism with three to five parties as leading political actors. Until 2000, at least two left-wing parties, the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), were among core elements of the country's party system. Moreover, in 1992–1995 the LDLP even dominated the institutional political scene, having an absolute majority in the parliament and relative majority in local government. At that time the LDLP was considered almost an exclusive representative of the left wing of the political spectrum. Certainly, the LDLP in itself was a very unique phenomenon, as it was the first ex-communist party able to come to power in East-Central Europe after losing the founding, pre-independence free elections in February 1990. Nevertheless, the basic configuration of the Lithuanian left wing included not only the LDLP but also the LSDP and a few small nonparliamentary parties such as the Socialist Party, Social Democracy 2000, Lithuanian People's Party, and Lithuanian Union of Social Justice. As detailed later in this chapter, the LDLP and LSDP eventually formed an electoral coalition for the 2000 parliamentary elections, in which they won a plurality of votes and seats. This victory spurred the outright unification of the two parties in early 2001 and the new united LSDP's entry later that year into a coalition government headed by Brazauskas as prime minister.

Transitional Variables and the Lithuanian Context

Herbert Kitschelt has described the four most common types of party–citizen linkages developing in Eastern Europe. The first type, the charismatic citizen–elite linkage, creates a "delegative" democracy wherein leaders focus attention on their personalities but consciously disarticulate policy commitments in order to avoid constituency divisions. The second form of party–citizen linkage is represented by the legislative faction or protoparty, when individual politicians form coalitions around a variety of policies in the legislative arena without an organizational infrastructure. The third mode, the clientelist and patronage party, relies heavily on investments in administrative-technical infrastructure to promote campaigns and attract voters and contributors by offering direct material and symbolic advantages to those individuals and constituencies that demonstrably support the party's candidates but forgo intraparty procedures of consensus building about policy packages.[3] Finally, the fourth party type is the programmatic party wherein politicians make some investments in administrative-technical infrastructure

and considerable investments in procedures of consensus building. Whereas clientelist parties ground accountability and responsiveness in direct material exchanges between politicians and clients, programmatic parties build on indirect, program- and policy-mediated exchanges with their supporters.[4]

Certainly political parties are dynamic organizations, and once established, for instance, as a clientelist party, a given party may change into a programmatic party in the course of time. Still, here it is appropriate to ask: What kind of party–citizen linkage tends to develop in the left-wing parties? Timing and the relationship with the old elite of the left-wing party seem to play crucial roles.

Political parties started to reemerge on Lithuania's political stage in 1988 and 1989, even though their existence lacked a certain degree of constitutional legitimacy. After the "constituent" elections of 1990 (to be discussed in the next section), along with major economic, political, and social reforms, many political parties also acquired their much needed legitimacy. Between 1990 and 1992, the Supreme Council, as the Lithuanian parliament was then called, was only one of the institutions that could legalize parties in law, but it became the cradle of party politics. Two aspects of this process are extremely important. On the one hand, the Supreme Council was a place for the institutionalization of party organizations. As early as March 1990, the informal Sajūdis opposition established in the constituent parliament what might be described as a protoparliamentary faction of Sajūdis. But because of the internal ideological differences within Sajūdis, the process of factionalization continued until the first multiparty elections in 1992. Finally, seven factions, most of them loosely connected with extraparliamentary political organizations, were founded on the basis of their elected representatives in parliament. By October 1992 as many as seven parliamentary factions with origins in Sajūdis were registered in the constituent parliament, that is, the Center faction, the United Sajūdis faction, the faction of Nationalists, the faction of Moderates, the Liberal faction, the faction of National Progress, and the Sajūdis's Concord faction. They had entered the Supreme Council on the Sajūdis list in 1990, with the two remaining factions representing the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Lithuanian Polish Union. The general outcome of this process is that parliamentary factions in the parliament have represented all major traditional ideological trends since early 1992.

Looking at the different paths of party development, four distinct modes may be distinguished. Moreover, the parties' development was closely related to their historical roots. All of the *historical* parties were reconstituted outside of parliament initially, including the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party,

and only after the multiparty elections of October 1992 did they form independent parliamentary factions.

The so-called post–mass opposition parties (in the case of Lithuania, *post-Sajūdis* parties) came about after the gradual disintegration of the umbrella movement in the constituent parliament. The mainstream of Sajūdis was reorganized into the Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives) in May 1993. However, on the eve of the general elections of 1992, Sajūdis still confronted the nonexisting ancien regime (inasmuch as new democratic leaders often use an "inverse legitimacy," validating the new regime simply by pointing at the faults of the previous one)[5] and was not prepared for a new era of party politics. In the same way, the various centrist political groups that may be regarded as successors to the moderate wing of Sajūdis decided to stay as amorphous political movements prior to the elections of 1992. All in all, the fragmentation of Sajūdis was an extremely positive process for the institutionalization of a multiparty system, and at the end of the system's reform (during the last part of 1992), representative parties and other *would-be* parties became the principal players that shaped electoral choice in Lithuania.

A quite different story is the case of the *ex-communist* Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. From a Baltic perspective, the Lithuanian Communist Party was substantially different from its counterparts in Estonia and Latvia. As a consequence of its differences, the role and evolution of the Lithuanian Communist Party during the transitional period are only marginally comparable to the fate of the communist parties in neighboring countries. A crucial factor in the Lithuanian Communist Party's exceptional role was due to its ethnic composition. The LCP was a "Lithuanized" party vis-à-vis the "Russified" communist parties in Estonia and Latvia (see Table 3.1).

Not only did the native population dominate the LCP, but the average number of Communist Party members among the adult population was also lower than in Estonia and Latvia. Lithuanization of the LCP created a relatively high level of legitimacy for the Communist Party on the domestic political stage, compared with other Baltic countries, where the Communist

Table 3.1.   The Ethnic Composition of the Baltic Communist Parties in 1989

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania
Members of the Communist Party per 1,000 of adult population	98	92	78
Representatives of titular nations in the Communist Party (%)	50	40	71
Russians (%)	39	43	17
Others (%)	11	17	12

Party was perceived, for the most part, as an external and alien institution. Lithuanian reform communists were supported by the opposition forces from the very beginning of democratization and came to the top of the Lithuanian Communist Party quite easily in 1988. Furthermore, between 1989 and 1990, the LCP was able to transform itself into a representative parliamentary party, whereas attempts to reform the former communist parties in Estonia and Latvia failed. But differences in ethnic composition and level of legitimacy of the former communist parties in the Baltics were not the only reasons that the LCP was able to survive democratization and its counterparts in Estonia and Latvia did not. Citizenship laws, which excluded from electoral processes a significant number of the potential constituency of the reform communists from ethnic minorities, the strength of alternative parliaments elected by "legal citizens" that confronted the founding parliaments in 1990–1991, the absence of charismatic or at least very attractive leadership, and even larger numbers of hard-line communists in Estonia and Latvia were all considerations that favored political mobilization of voters by parties closely related to the mass opposition movements rather than by the soft-liners in the former communist parties.

On the internal political stage, the changes within the LCP might be described as a gradual transformation or even an evolution. The final phase of this transformation was reached at the end of 1990, when the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party adopted a moderate social democratic program and was renamed the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party.

Along with the parties that emerged from the larger political entities, such as Sajūdis and the LCP, or through the revival of historical political organizations, several other parties should be added. The Liberal Union or Social Liberals, Green Party, and Electoral Action of Lithuanian Poles were entirely new elements on the Lithuanian political stage. This fourth type of party might be named as *new parties* insofar as they entered the political arena without any roots in Lithuania's history or an established connection with either Sajūdis or the LCP.

Looked at from an organizational and citizen–party linkage perspective, Sajūdis and to a larger extent the LDLP during the first years of their existence were acting as would-be catchall parties but not mass membership parties or parties fixed in homogeneous and socially distinct electorates. As Juan Linz pointed out in the mid-1990s, "They will be parties less committed to integrate their supporters into a variety of mass organizations, and even less into an encapsulated subculture, as some socialist and Christian democratic parties did in the past. There will be fewer voters with a strong party identification, and more of them will be 'floating voters.'"[6] On the other hand, the

LDLP also had several features of a clientelist party, which came to the surface after the LDLP victory in the 1992 parliamentary elections. The LDLP was sharply criticized by right-wing opponents, mainly from the Conservative Party, for lack of transparency in small- and medium-scale privatization or even for favoring some economic companies in 1992–1996. However, gradually the LDLP moved to the practices of a programmatic party, and after the unification of the LDLP and LSDP in 2001, the new unified LSDP certainly became a programmatic party.

The LSDP as a historical party going back to the pre–World War II era legitimized itself by reclaiming the social democratic tradition in Lithuania's political scene. The programmatic orientation of the LSDP was very clear from the day of its formal reestablishment in August 1989. All other left-wing parties were founded after 1992 when democratic institutions and procedures had been institutionalized, and political conflict moved from values-based to interests-based competition. These new conditions drove all new claimants to membership in the party system to identify themselves as more or less programmatic parties. Certainly, this does not mean that the ambitions of political leaders, or the charismatic factor, and clientelist or patronage linkages have no chance to become the basis of new parties in the system. However, in the case of most newcomers on the left side of the political spectrum, for instance the Socialist Party (founded in 1994) or Social Democracy 2000 (founded in 2000), they were established with a predominant programmatic element.

In summing up these remarks on modes of party–citizen linkages, it is possible to draw a few tentative conclusions. Political parties that appeared on the political scene in the early phases of democratization, because of their lack of organizational consistence and ideological maturity, tended more frequently to change their profiles from associations around a charismatic leader or legislative faction into party organizations of a clientelist or programmatic nature. Latecomers or new claimants to a more or less established party system have much more limited choices. Here an almost necessary condition of a new party's survival is its self-definition as a programmatic party because party competition and political mobilization are more and more based on ideological premises.

The Ex-communist Parties: Between Mythology and Reality

After the relatively successful February 1990 founding elections, when the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party (ILCP) was able to win 46 seats of 141 in the constituent parliament, it was a bit surprising that following the

reorganization of the ILCP into the LDLP at the end of 1990 only nine members were left in the LDLP faction by mid-1992. Thinking quite rationally, at that time the political future of the LDLP seemed bleak indeed.

Stability is not a characteristic feature of any political transformation, and Lithuania during the period of 1988–1992 was no exception to this rule. The "singing revolution" and the prospect of the reestablishment of Lithuania's independence created an atmosphere of social euphoria and mass political mobilization during 1988–1990. The nonviolent revolution reached a high point in August 1989 with the "Baltic Way" human chain through Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In Lithuania this mass action attracted more than one million participants—or about one-third of the country's population. Up until the attempted coup d'état in Moscow in August 1991, the aim of restoring Lithuania's statehood united the newly emerging political elite and prevented major political splits. However, the beginnings of political fragmentation were already discernible in the newly elected Supreme Council and in the Sajūdis movement, with the first formal parliamentary factions emerging during summer 1990.

Still, political attitudes were divided only on the instruments of how to regain Lithuania's independence de facto but were not questioning independence as such. The radical or right-wing faction of Sajūdis, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, called for demanding immediate recognition of Lithuanian independence by the West and the Soviet political leadership. But neither the West nor the Soviet Union was prepared to take such a step. The moderate wing, headed by Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskienė, seeking a balanced compromise on the issue, argued for requesting support from the West while initiating intergovernmental negotiations with the Soviet leadership.

Low-intensity disagreements between the radicals and moderates continued from spring 1990 until early 1991. But as the political environment in Soviet Russia began to revert from moderate liberalization to more orthodox communism, a new wave of repressive Soviet actions against Lithuania in January 1991 brought internal political quarrels temporarily to an end. However, the failed coup attempt of Soviet hard-liners in August 1991, as the last convulsion of the Soviet Empire, paved the way to Lithuanian independence de facto and once again altered the domestic political situation.

The first signs of impending parliamentary crisis appeared in autumn 1991, when Landsbergis found himself the leader of the minority factions. There were two ways for the right-wing parties to attempt to regain control of parliament: to call for new parliamentary elections or to call for immediate restoration of the institution of the presidency. Sajūdis and the other

right-wing parties opted for the second tactic. A draft law on the presidency was presented to parliament but was rejected by the majority factions, which argued that the proposed law would create a pyramidal structure of power headed by an omnipotent president. The radical right minority faction responded by calling for a referendum on restitution of the presidency. The referendum, held on May 23, 1992, resulted in a vote of 69.4 percent for immediate restitution of the presidency and 25.5 percent against. It was a loss, nonetheless, for the right wing, as only 40 percent of the eligible electorate voted yes, thus falling short of the absolute majority required by law. Landsbergis criticized the outcome of the referendum, declaring in parliament, "There were not enough votes to adopt the law but the citizens' opinion (if this had been an election) according to Western standards would be considered very representative, absolutely convincing."[7]

The next move of the radical right was the so-called parliamentary resistance, whereby the chairman and some fifty MPs refused to participate in the Supreme Council sessions in order to demonstrate to Lithuania and the world that parliament was no longer entitled to pass legislation. The narrow center-left majority could not secure a quorum, and the crisis was resolved only by a decision to hold new parliamentary elections in October 1992.

The 1992 general elections fundamentally changed the balance of political power in Lithuania, tipping the weight from the radical right to the left. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party in coalition with the Lithuanian Future Forum and the Agricultural Union emerged victorious, capturing 73 out of 141 seats in the Seimas (the new designation of parliament). The presidential election strengthened the position of the LDLP again. A decree issued by the previous parliament requiring that presidential elections be held within two to four months of the Seimas elections, while adopted on the initiative of the right, turned out to be to the advantage of the LDLP after its victory in the general elections. On February 14, 1993, LDLP leader Algirdas Brazauskas was elected president of Lithuania. Construction of a political pyramid with the LDLP at the top was completed.

Political analysts tend to simplify the phenomenon of ex-communist parties, typically ascribing to them a pro-communist political orientation. While it is easy to call the LDLP an ex-communist party, this label only partially reflects the actual origins of the LDLP. As Kazimiera Prunskiene, former Lithuanian prime minister, observed shortly after the 1992 general election,

> The LDLP was the first in the former Soviet Union to break away from the control of Moscow, as well as from the reactionary [party establishment] in Lithuania. LDLP members include signers of the Independence Act and co-authors of

a wide range of political and economic reforms. This political grouping does, in fact, include a large number of former members of the nomenklatura, yet one cannot ignore the fact that the LDLP ranks include a great many specialists in various fields. Furthermore, there are some LDLP members who have never belonged to the Communist Party.[8]

Strong reformist and nationalist tendencies appeared within the ranks of the Lithuanian Communist Party after the foundation of the Sajūdis movement in June 1988. The appointment of Brazauskas as first secretary of the Central Committee of the LCP in autumn 1988 ultimately led to a split from the CPSU, announced at the 20th Congress of the LCP in December 1989. The Congress declared the reestablishment of Lithuanian independence as a primary goal and adopted a new program rejecting communism as an ideology and calling for a reorientation toward social democratic principles. The scale of transformation, maybe, is best indicated by changes in the LCP membership. Over 55,000 of the former LCP's 220,000 members registered as full-fledged members of the new Independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Orthodox communists established a separate Lithuanian Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU, headed by the Bolshevik-style theoretician M. Burokevičius. The ILCP won one-third of the seats in the parliamentary elections of February 1990, and Brazauskas, the ILCP leader, became deputy prime minister in the Sajūdis government.

Throughout 1990 three ideological orientations competed within the ILCP: social democratic, liberal, and national communist. However, these groupings lacked clear leaders, and none became dominant. Various scenarios for the party's future development were discussed, ranging from evolution into a democratic leftist movement, to the merging of several political factions or parties into a broad union, to the dissolution of the ILCP altogether.

The ILCP further transformed itself at the Extraordinary ILCP and Constituent LDLP Congress in December 1990, adopting a social democratic program and changing its name to the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party. The LDLP registered only 29,000 members, and by the 1992 general elections membership had dropped to 15,000, but it still remained Lithuania's largest political party. From the middle of 1991 the LDLP served in the parliamentary opposition to the radical right government. Emerging parties of the center and moderate right, however, largely avoided cooperating with the LDLP, identifying the latter as the "ex-communists."

In sum, throughout 1988–1992, democratic reformers within the ILCP and later in the LDLP responded to societal demands for independence, broader political participation, and pluralism. By neutralizing the conserva-

tives within the Lithuanian Communist Party, the democratic communists played an important historical role in the restoration of Lithuanian statehood and democratization. The LDLP victory in the 1992 general elections paved the way for the party's further development.

Comments on the Lithuanian ex-communists' victory in the 1992 elections were, however, clouded by two powerful myths. The first myth was that because of their origin the ex-communists' coming to power was an indubitable evil. The defeated right-wing parties were automatically regarded as the exclusive bearers of democracy, while the ex-communists were suspected of antidemocratic intentions. Although this attitude was understandable from the emotional point of view, objective evaluation of the respective parties, their actual statements and policy decisions, reveals that right-wing parties no less than ex-communist parties were the products of the post-communist transformation. The pressures of the communist order also shaped the mentality of their present members. While the right-wing block emerged, in the initial stage of the transition, primarily on the basis of anticommunism, it was never homogeneous but, rather, always included nationalists, autocrats, democrats, and followers of other ideological persuasions. Indeed, the defeat of the right-wing parties by ex-communists was brought about, to a large extent, by the former's political fragmentation as well as the social hardships of the reforms during the initial phases of transformation. The Polish economist Leszek Balcerowicz was very correct in once mentioning that the transition in Eastern Europe was based on the scenario of mass democracy first and capitalism later. The political costs of this sequence of events was such that the Sajūdis leadership started to introduce a market economy in Lithuania, but after a few years it was voted from power in democratic elections.

The second misleading assumption was that there was no difference between the reformed communists (ex-communists) and neo-communists. Ex-communists, in this view, were suspected of attempting to restore the communist ideology and order. In reality, however, while neo-communists openly admired and propagated communist dogmas, ex-communists declared their reorientation toward social democratic beliefs. Democratic inclinations of the Lithuanian ex-communists were manifested in their evolution from a group of soft-liners within the former Communist Party into an independent party. One would have to support the conclusions made by Lech Wałęsa, at that time president of Poland, whose anticommunist credentials are surely above suspicion, that the ex-communists were not seeking to restore the communist system. On the contrary, some former communists had already become large-scale capitalists and were amassing great wealth. And because

capital and wealth are incompatible with the communist order, the fear that the ex-communists might engineer a return to the communist past was clearly exaggerated and unfounded. Furthermore, there were quite a few supporters of liberal policies among the predominantly social democratic ex-communists. Although it can be said that there were some descendants of hard-liners in these parties, they were clearly in the minority. The potential for democracy was arguably relatively the same within the ex-communist parties and within their opponents on the political right. The latter as well as the former were both the children and the coauthors of the collapse of the authoritarian regime.

The examples of Lithuania in 1992, Poland in 1993, and Hungary in 1994 illustrate the phenomenon of ex-communists coming—not returning—to power in East-Central Europe. They came to power through free elections, in a new pluralistic and competitive political environment, and in a new, constitutionally defined political order. New political elites and developing democratic political cultures in these societies hindered the restoration of the ancien regimes. These states were no longer directly threatened with a choice between authoritarian paternalism and an open society, for they had moved far enough toward democracy to be classified, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski's typology, as being in the consolidation phase of democratization.

In the context of East-Central Europe, there were several common features of the ex-communist parties in such countries as Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania where the "second turnover," speaking in Huntington's terms, obviously took place in 1992–1994. First of all, the former communist parties in these countries turned to the road of reforms relatively early, and, even more significant, the pro-democratic wing overcame the party hard-liners speedily. In the short run popular politicians if not charismatic personalities were recruited to their leadership. Both circumstances reinforced the legitimacy of the ex-communist parties as participants in democratization and the building of a new multiparty system. A moderate political style also was a common feature of the LDLP in Lithuania, the Democratic Left Alliance in Poland, and the Socialist Party in Hungary. In all three cases the ex-communist parties, in the status of parliamentary opposition after the constituent elections, held out against an aggressive political offensive by the ruling right-wing parties and movements. Despite a physical (in membership) decline, all three ex-communist parties used the period in parliamentary opposition to undergo a programmatic reconstruction and to implement some organizational changes as well as to adapt to conditions of competitive politics.

Nevertheless, two important elements made a difference between the cases of the ex-communists in Lithuania, on the one hand, and in Hungary

and Poland, on the other. First, the LDLP had a shorter period of time—a little more than two years—to implement internal reforms than the other two parties, which had about four years. Consequently, the quality and extent of party reform were greater and broader in Hungary and in Poland. Second, after the 1992 Seimas elections the LDLP was unable to find any influential political partner such as the Polish Peasant Party, which joined the coalition with the Democratic Left Alliance in 1993, or the Hungarian Free Democrats, which agreed to collaborate with the Hungarian Socialist Party in 1994. Precisely the ability of the ex-communist parties to find political allies after their "comebacks" to power was a major indicator of their legitimacy in the democratic political environment.[9] In such cases, if other players on the new political stage were willing to enter into a coalition with the ex-communists, it was a sign that these parties were recognized as legitimate and influential members of the new political order. As will be discussed below, as of the end of 1992 the LDLP failed to achieve full recognition from other political parties as a legal and important member of the democratic political scene even though the voters' decision in the Seimas elections of 1992 legitimized the LDLP (see Table 3.2).

The incomplete legitimacy of the LDLP was related directly to the problem of a shortage of political cadres, which was highly important during the first two years of its rule. A political ally or allies would have helped the LDLP to mitigate many problems more successfully.

Table 3.2. Parliamentary Strength of the Left-wing Parties, 1990–2000

	1990		1992		1996		2000	
	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats
Lithuanian Communist Party–Communist Party of the Soviet Union[a]	7	5.19						
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party[b]	46[c]	34.07	73	51.77	12	8.69	51	36.17
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	9[d]	6.67	8	5.67	12	8.69		
Total	62	45.93	81	57.44	24	17.38	51	36.17

a. This is the nonreformed Communist Party.
b. In 1990 the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party was still called the reformed Lithuanian Communist Party.
c. Some members of the reformed Lithuanian Communist Party were supported by Sajūdis as well as the LCP and were on the lists of both organizations in 1990.
d. Lithuanian Social Democratic Party candidates competed with the support of and on a joint list of Sajūdis.

The LDLP in Power, 1992–1996

Immediately after the 1992 Seimas elections, the LDLP efforts to form a broader center–left coalition were not successful. In early December 1992, the LDLP thus decided to form an interim government led by B. Lubys, a member of the Liberal Union, former deputy prime minister in the Sajūdis cabinet, and, even more important, the former director of the biggest plant of mineral fertilizers in Jonava (here the clientelist inclinations of the LDLP were demonstrated very profoundly). LDLP members received only three top positions, namely, the ministries of foreign affairs, agriculture, and culture and education. Nine ministers remained from the Sajūdis cabinet, including the strategic ministries of defense, communications, and energy.

After the presidential elections in February 1993, the Lubys cabinet resigned. Parliament approved President Brazauskas's candidate for prime minister, Adolfas Šleževičius, an economist in the food-processing industry and president of the Lithuanian–Norwegian joint venture, Olsen-Baltic. Šleževičius essentially retained the Lubys cabinet, which was identified as a government of specialists or professionals. The new government presented to parliament a program embracing continuity of reforms and a commitment to market-oriented economic restructuring, with a focus on three priority issues: creating competitive market structures, developing a market infrastructure, and improving the social safety net.

During the first years in power, the LDLP reduced political tensions despite the fact that the right-wing parties continued vigorously to criticize the ex-communists, blaming them for the continuing economic crisis, ineffectual privatization, rising crime rates, and problematic relations with Russia. Landsbergis, as leader of the parliamentary opposition and the Conservative Party, declared that "Lithuania's principal problem today is its present state authority." In May 1994 two far right parties, that is, the Lithuanian Nationalists Union and the Lithuanian Democratic Party, began collecting signatures for a referendum on early parliamentary elections. However, the LDLP convinced several leaders of other center-left parties to take leading positions in the Seimas. Aloyzas Sakalas, leader of the Social Democratic Party, and Egidijus Bičkauskas, deputy leader of the Center Union, were appointed deputy chairpersons of the Seimas. Some members of the Center Union, National Progress Movement, and other organizations were recruited to the presidential office and other governmental institutions. Nevertheless, despite the relative success of its moderate political style, the LDLP faced major problems in the areas of economic and social policy.

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi have argued that analyses on the linearity of the relationship between development and the presence of democracy are rather a waste of time, because the variable of democracy has certain characteristics that simply ask for a nonlinear function.[10] However, there is another position in the dispute on the relationship between development and democracy. Davide Grassi has stressed that

> wealth and economic growth may decisively ease the permanence in time of democratic institutions, especially in developing countries. Once democracy is established, its survival chances are higher if the country is richer. Yet, even current wealth is not decisive: if they succeed in generating development, democracies can survive even in the poorest nations. Resuming growth at stable and moderate levels of inflation is the key criterion to evaluate the success of economic reforms undertaken by new democracies and to sustain the democratic regimes in the long run.[11]

This latter approach is relevant to Lithuania.

A comparison of macroeconomic indicators from 1993, the first full year of LDLP rule, and 1992, the last year of the Sajūdis government, can best evaluate the achievements or failures of the LDLP economic policy. There can be no doubt that considerable progress was made in the sphere of privatization. Following a temporary suspension of privatization in late 1992 at the initiative of the Social Democratic Party, 774 state enterprises were transferred into private hands between June 1993 and March 1994. As of March 1994 the total value of privatized enterprises was 474.7 million litas, or 44 percent of all state assets. Private enterprises accounted for 83 percent of capital in consumer services, 75 percent in construction, and 71 percent in trade. During the first nine months of 1993 jobs in the private sector accounted for 53.3 percent of total employment.

Another real success of the LDLP economic policy was the reduction of inflation rates in 1993 and during the following years. Lithuania was the last of the three Baltic states to introduce its national currency, the litas, in June 1993. Plans to introduce the litas in early 1991 had been aborted by Moscow's aggression in January and remained on hold during the internal political clashes of 1992. The annual inflation rate was reduced from 1,163 percent in 1992 to 188.7 percent in 1993. Inflation dropped further to 31.7 percent in the second half of 1993 and to 12.9 percent in the first four months of 1994. In March 1994, parliament voted to peg the litas to the U.S. dollar at a rate of four to one. The fight against inflation did not influence unemployment rates, which remained very low compared with other East-Central

European and Baltic states, averaging only 1.6 percent in 1993. At the same time, the government reduced energy subsidies and increased import tariffs for some agricultural products to protect the very socially sensitive agricultural sector, in which more than 20 percent of total employment was concentrated. Living standards benefited from reduced prices for foodstuffs, which dropped from 54 percent to 47 percent of the average family budget over the course of 1993.

Other macroeconomic indicators improved considerably in 1993 as compared with 1992. The gross domestic product declined 17 percent in 1993 as compared with 37.7 percent in 1992 (the figures were 19.9 percent and 33.8 percent for Latvia and 2 percent and 14.4 percent for Estonia, respectively). Industrial production dropped 46 percent in 1993 and 51.6 percent in 1992 (38 percent for Latvia and 26.6 percent for Estonia in 1993), indicating that Lithuania's economy remained in deep depression throughout 1993. Signs of economic stabilization, however, gave grounds for optimism among the LDLP leadership and made possible the preservation of political stability. As Justinas Karosas, leader of the LDLP parliamentary faction, summarized the events of 1993, "Lithuania achieved stabilization in poverty."

Nevertheless, the LDLP's political standing suffered setbacks. The LDLP successfully reentered the Lithuanian political scene in 1992 and enjoyed the support of more than one-third of Lithuanian voters—between 36.4 and 41.6 percent—from November 1992 through June 1993. In autumn 1993, however, the LDLP ratings began to decline, and public opinion polls indicated only 17.2 percent support for the party in May 1994 and 12.9 percent in June 1995. During the first half of 1995, the LDLP lagged considerably behind the 33 to 36 percent combined ratings of its major opponents, the Lithuanian Conservatives/Homeland Union and the Christian Democrats.

Declining electoral support for the LDLP was confirmed during municipal elections in March 1995. The Conservative Party gained one-third of local government seats, while the LDLP won only around one-fifth. Moreover, by joining forces with the Christian Democrats and some smaller right-wing parties, the Conservatives gained control in a majority of municipalities. The right-wing parties were supported not only in the urban centers, a traditional stronghold of the right wing, but also in the countryside, a traditional LDLP constituency. Support for the LDLP was only one-quarter of what it had been in the 1992 parliamentary elections, down from 800,000 to 200,000 votes. This drop might be partially justified by a decline in voter turnout (usually a low turnout is more favorable to the right-wing parties in Lithuania), but there were, nevertheless, other indications of substantial difficulties faced by the LDLP after 1994.

Three sets of causes might be considered to explain the decrease in popular support for the LDLP in 1994–1996: problems in the LDLP's internal environment, changes within the Lithuanian political system in general, and the impact of changing socioeconomic conditions. The refusal of right-wing and centrist parties to form a broad coalition after the 1992 elections forced the Labour Democrats to assume political responsibility alone. The LDLP successfully met this challenge during its initial period in power. At the same time the Labour Democrats began to experience significant internal challenges. The LDLP had been an ideologically heterogeneous party from the very beginning. With the relative weakening of external political pressure on the LDLP in 1993, these internal ideological divisions began to manifest themselves in new ways within the parliamentary faction. A so-called Program Group of leftist social democratic MPs was formed in mid-1993, accusing the mainstream faction of deviating from the party's election platform and ignoring social policy issues. Still, the majority of the LDLP MPs retained their moderate social democratic positions, having learned some lessons from the Sajūdis disintegration process in 1990–1992. Internal tensions and disputes nevertheless intensified and were reinforced by the banking crisis (the large Joint-stock Innovation Bank broke down at that time, and around 25 percent of total deposits were lost), leading to the resignation of Šleževičius from his positions as prime minister and LDLP leader in February 1996.

Furthermore, the change of the LDLP leadership after Brazauskas's election as president of Lithuania in February 1993 was a serious loss to the party.[12] Algirdas Brazauskas, leader of the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party and later the LDLP, was among the most popular politicians in the country from 1988 through 1992. The popularity of Brazauskas played an enormous role in securing the 1992 electoral victory of the LDLP, known by many voters simply as the "Brazauskas party." After intense collaboration with the Sajūdis in 1988–1989, Brazauskas led the LCP in its breakaway from the CPSU, and, last but not least, he was respected for his moderate political behavior, which contrasted sharply with the right-wing radicalism of 1990–1992. However, while Brazauskas remained one of the country's most popular politicians, the LDLP was no longer able to use his personal popularity to build support for the party. Party leadership positions were filled by key activists in the party organization as well as by professionals from the state bureaucracy and universities, who joined the "political team" only on the eve of the 1992 Seimas elections and were unknown on the national political scene. Furthermore, a mass exodus of former party organizers to political and administrative positions in government agencies significantly weakened the LDLP's

organizational cohesion and capabilities. As a consequence, LDLP membership dropped from 15,000 in 1992 to 8,000 in early 1994. Only toward the end of 1994 did membership begin to rise again, reaching 10,000 in 1995, which was still one-third less than before the elections of 1992. The conclusion here is rather straightforward: the LDLP's organizational crisis continued during its entire period in power.

The changing rules of the political game in Lithuania during 1992–1994 was the second factor that seriously affected the position of the LDLP. As early as 1990, the Sajūdis parliamentary majority campaigned to reinstate the system of "party government" that Lithuania had employed in the early 1920s. This attempt failed because the emerging democratic system lacked ideologically well-defined and institutionally well-organized political parties. Instead, the major political actors at the time were megapolitical conglomerates or movements. Only after Brazauskas's victory in the 1993 presidential elections was the LDLP cabinet led by Šleževičius formed. In spring 1993 Šleževičius was elected to the leadership of the LDLP, indicating that the first steps were being taken toward a reestablishment of the party government model. Still, absolute majorities of cabinet members were "professionals" rather than the LDLP members. In mid-1994, at the request of Šleževičius, the Seimas replaced about one-third of the cabinet with party members. In early autumn 1994, Deputy Party Chair G. Kirkilas presented the so-called Theses of September, stressing the party's responsibility for Lithuania's social, economic, and political performance and thereby endorsing the principle of government by "politicians" rather than government by "professionals." Several months later, Kirkilas was elected chair of the LDLP parliamentary faction.

Although the institutional architecture of Lithuania's political system was designed by the Constitution of 1992, its actual implementation took place only after the LDLP assumed leadership of the Seimas. The LDLP was able to rationalize national political life by forming a relatively stable party government. To a certain extent it can be said that the LDLP was forced to adopt the party government model by its political opponents' tactics of noncooperation or, at best, in the case of the LSDP and the Center Union, of limited cooperation. Reestablishment of party government was a step toward rationalization of political order in the country along democratic lines as well as toward giving more responsibility to the LDLP. However, these two complementary processes had serious implications for the LDLP itself. First, the LDLP had to rely solely on its own political resources and draw a clear line dividing itself from all other political groupings. Second, the LDLP took on full responsibility for the results of government policies and could not blame

others for its own political failures. The situation was complicated by the fact that the new rules of the political game were adopted during a period of economic reforms, when economic growth was slow and the government lacked effective instruments of social policy and when there was an objective need to have a consensus rather than conflict among the main political parties.

Along with the LDLP steps toward party government, another major change in the political landscape during the 1992–1995 period was the further articulation of a multiparty system in Lithuania. In 1993, when the HU/LC emerged from the ashes of the Sajūdis movement, it became clear that the era of dominance of broad semiparty political conglomerates was finally over. The institutionalization and consolidation of new parties brought to the forefront of the national political stage at least four parties capable of opposing the LDLP: the Conservatives, Christian Democrats, Center Union, and Social Democrats. For the LDLP, this meant intensified debates and multidirectional challenges from the political center as well as from the right.

Finally, let us turn to the third set of factors, the impact of socioeconomic changes on the LDLP. It is a general assumption that

> economic expansion reduces the conflicts resulting from inequality or other social cleavages and, accordingly, mutes the tendency to political alienation, polarization and destabilizing social violence. Likewise, observers have assumed that economic decline poses a severe threat to the survival of democracy. The prolonged failure of elected governments to address effectively growth and equity challenges are likely to undermine the depth and stability of support.[13]

If we compare macroeconomic indicators for 1993, 1994, and 1995 with those for 1992, we see clear improvement in the overall socioeconomic situation. The GDP rate of growth increased from 1 percent in 1994 to 3.6 percent in 1996, annual inflation rates decreased to 13.1 percent, and unemployment was maintained at 6.2 percent in 1996. In 1992, the private-sector share of the GDP was 37 percent, and in 1994 it reached 63 percent. Lithuania's exports to Russia accounted for 56 percent of the total in 1991 but only 28 percent in 1994, thanks to the growth of exports to the West. Total foreign investment rose by a factor of more than sixteen times, or from U.S.$19 million in 1992 to $310 million in 1994 (foreign investment was still, however, playing a marginal role in the revitalization of the Lithuanian economy).

In 1992 and 1993, a majority of voters tended to accept the LDLP argument that it was impossible to overcome the hardships of economic reform in a short time period. But in 1994, public opinion began to turn as the first signs

of economic growth raised voters' expectations and the speed of socioeconomic stabilization was evaluated as too slow. The LDLP government failed to produce rapid change and, moreover, made a number of serious mistakes. First, on the level of public relations, the cabinet and even the president began to claim publicly that the period of social troubles was over and that the country would immediately begin to enjoy a higher standard of living. On the policy level, the government failed to push through a new tax policy to stimulate the development of small- and medium-scale businesses, social security issues were increasingly neglected, and plans for the revitalization of agriculture were abandoned. Although social issues tend to be neglected in nearly every reforming country, such issues as tax policy and industrial restructuring are usually at the center of decision making. Unfortunately, even in these areas the LDLP government employed "wait and see" tactics. Only in 1995 did the LDLP begin to turn more attention to social welfare issues, but the banking crisis at the end of the year crushed all the efforts to increase public assistance to social groups most threatened by reforms.

Foreign affairs and defense policy were the areas in which the LDLP was, clearly, more successful than in the domestic policy arena, despite the fact that initially the leadership of the LDLP had much less experience in foreign affairs than did the Landsbergis team. President Brazauskas presented the LDLP foreign-policy priorities for the first time at a meeting with foreign ambassadors accredited to Lithuania in May 1993, just after Lithuania's admission into the Council of Europe, declaring that "the main goal of Lithuania's foreign policy remains to improve the human rights situation and develop democracy in the country, guarantee the security of Lithuanian independence and the integrity of the state."[14] He announced that Lithuania firmly intended to continue integration into Western European security, political, and economic institutions, such as the European Union, Western European Union, and NATO. On the other hand, Brazauskas called for expansion of regional cooperation among the Baltic states and for closer links between the Nordic and Baltic Councils as well as with the four countries of the Visegrad group. Brazauskas stressed the importance of demilitarization and the establishment of a free economic zone in the Kaliningrad region. In relations with Russia and the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the president called for a European-style partnership based on mutually advantageous economic relations but not for joining the economic or political structures of the CIS. These priorities indicated that Lithuanian foreign and defense policy remained stable despite the change of the party in power.

A key foreign and defense policy issue in Lithuania during summer 1993 was the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the country. After a period of po-

litical tension, this goal was achieved on September 1, 1993. Russian troop withdrawal represented the first major foreign-policy achievement of the LDLP.

Among other positive developments in the area of foreign policy was the intensification of cooperation among the Baltic states, manifested in further institutionalization of inter-Baltic relations on the parliamentary, government, and presidential levels. The three Baltic presidents met four times in 1994, reflecting much more intense political coordination as compared with 1991–1992. The Baltic free-trade agreement, which was ratified on April 1, 1994, created new opportunities for economic cooperation. The LDLP was very successful not only in normalizing Lithuanian–Polish relations in 1993–1994 but also in encouraging Poland to become a strategic partner of Lithuania, especially in the processes of integration into NATO and the European Union. Finally, under President Brazauskas's leadership, Lithuania joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program and applied for full NATO membership.

The rule of the LDLP was not the end of history in Lithuania, as some of its political opponents had predicted. On the contrary, the processes of democratization and economic reform were expanded and stabilized throughout the 1992–1996 period.

Left-wing Parties in the Context of the Lithuanian Party System

Left-wing parties are not a historical novelty in Lithuania. The very beginning of left-wing politics was closely related to the entry into the country's political arena by the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party on the eve of the twentieth century. A century later, in the 1990s, this party became the most important competitor to the LDLP on the left side of the political spectrum. Moreover, the merger between the LSDP and LDLP into the united Lithuanian Social Democratic Party in early 2001 (detailed below) finally fully legitimized left-wing politics, putting an end to its association with the communist past, which was the reproach continually heard from center and center-right parties after 1991.

The LSDP was established as the first mass party in Lithuania in 1896. Although Lithuania's political stage during the interwar period (1918–1940) was dominated by the Christian Democratic Party and Lithuanian Nationalists' Union, the LSDP was successful enough to attract no less than 10 percent of the total votes in successive parliamentary elections. The LSDP was the third major political group in 1918–1926, and it joined the center–left coalition led by the social-liberal Peasant People's Party in 1926.

The LSDP was among the first few historical parties reestablished in 1989 and officially registered in January 1990. At that time only the Lithuanian Communist Party, Sajūdis, the Lithuanian Democratic Party, and the LSDP were officially recognized as political organizations. However, the LSDP took part in the 1990 founding elections under the umbrella of Sajūdis. As many as nine members of the LSDP were elected to the constituent parliament, the biggest share of would-be political parties among Sajūdis MPs in 1990. At the same time, four MPs represented the Green Party, the Democratic Party had three, and the Christian Democratic Party had two MPs. Most of Sajūdis's MPs were nonparty members. In June 1990 the LSDP MPs were among the principal organizers of the constituent parliament's first parliamentary faction, the Center faction of Sajūdis, formed to represent moderate positions within the Sajūdis movement.

The next parliamentary elections in 1992 showed no improvement in the LSDP electoral strength in comparison with 1990, for the party was able to win only eight seats in the Seimas. In 1996 the LSDP positions slightly improved, and its faction in the parliament had as many as twelve members. But in the 2000 Seimas elections, when the LSDP took part in a coalition with the LDLP, they won together a plurality of votes and seats, that is, 31 percent of votes and fifty-one seats in the parliament.

From an organizational point of view the LSDP was a party of small membership for a long period of time. If the average size of major Lithuanian parties in 1996 was around three thousand individual members, the LSDP—with fifteen hundred members—was significantly below this level. Only in 1999 did the individual LSDP membership increase to as many as four thousand (see Table 3.3).

Neither the LSDP nor the LDLP had a corporate membership, despite the fact that the LSDP had intensive cooperative relations with the largest Lithuanian trade union, the Center of Lithuanian Trade Unions, with about 140,000 members. Even closer relations were established between the LSDP and Union of Lithuanian Trade Unions (about forty thousand members). Since the 1996 parliamentary elections, leaders of the Union of Lithuanian Trade Unions were on the LSDP list of candidates for parliament.

The ideological foundations of the LSDP were based on two main sources, the revived ideas of Lithuanian social democracy and the influence of the Socialist International. The LSDP was the first Lithuanian party to join transnational party networks. The Socialist International recognized the LSDP as a full-fledged member as early as October 1990. The LSDP is considered to be among the most ideologically consistent parties in Lithuania.

Table 3.3. Membership of Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, 1992–2001

| Year | Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party | | | Lithuanian Social Democratic Party | | |
	Number of Individual Members	Total Membership	Proportion of Total Membership to Country's Electorate	Number of Individual Members	Total Membership	Proportion of Total Membership to Country's Electorate
1992	15,000	15,000	0.58%	500	500	0.019%
1993	8,162	8,162	0.32%	600	600	0.023%
1994	10,000	10,000	0.39%	950	950	0.037%
1995	10,000	10,000	0.39%	1,200	1,200	0.047%
1996	10,000	10,000	0.38%	1,500	1,500	0.057%
1997	9,000	9,000	0.35%	2,000	2,000	0.076%
1998	9,000	9,000	0.35%	2,000	2,000	0.076%
1999	9,000	9,000	0.35%	4,000	4,000	0.15%
2000	9,000	9,000	0.34%	4,000	4,000	0.15%
2001*	15,000	15,000	0.57%	15,000	15,000	0.57%

*Data for the united Lithuanian Social Democratic Party.

From the very beginning the LSDP firmly advocated traditional social democratic values such as solidarity, social justice, and social welfare, including expansion of jobs and municipal housing.

The LDLP was certainly the strongest left-wing party in Lithuania in 1990–2000. Only a few things might be added to the previous analysis of this party. The LDLP's development was extremely cyclical, with every vigorous upswing followed by a significant decline in popular support and political influence. Its changing parliamentary representation is the best illustration of the unstable position of the LDLP. In 1990 this party was able to secure 34 percent and in 1992 almost 52 percent of the seats in parliament. The LDLP share then decreased to as low as around 9 percent of the Seimas seats in 1996. Again the 2000 parliamentary elections lifted the LDLP and LSDP coalition into first place among the Seimas parties, with fifty-one seats. A more or less plausible explanation of these swings is the ability of the LDLP to attract a significant portion of protest votes, instead of having a broad stable partisan electorate. Brazauskas, as a charismatic leader, seemed to be a very important factor here. What will happen with the protest votes after the Brazauskas era remains a big question mark.

In 1990–2000 the LDLP and LSDP were the only left-wing parties able to enter the parliament as well as to form or participate in several governments. Juozas Olekas, a member of the LSDP, was appointed minister of health care in several governments of Sajūdis in 1990–1992. At the same time, Brazauskas was invited to the position of deputy prime minister in the 1990 Sajūdis government. The LDLP has formed three cabinets (an interim one headed by Lubys and two permanent cabinets headed by Šleževičius and Stankevičius) in 1992–1996 and, after the unification, the Brazauskas cabinet in July 2001. As of the beginning of 2002, the LSDP led all the Lithuanian parties in the number of cabinets it had formed or participated in. On the other hand, the LDLP developed a practice whereby substantial numbers of ministerial positions in its governments were filled by nonparty members, and this is why the total number of LDLP ministers was lower in comparison with the Conservative Party. In 1992 only 16.7 percent of the Lubys cabinet were LDLP members. The share of LDLP ministers increased to 33.3 percent in the Šleževičius government and to 40 percent in the Stankevičius cabinet, but still the proportion did not exceed half of the cabinet members.

The other left-wing parties such as the Lithuanian Socialist Party (LSP), Social Democracy 2000 (SD 2000), the Lithuanian People's Party (LPP), and the Lithuanian Union of Social Justice (LUSP) were not only unable to enter parliament, but they also managed to win only a few seats in local governments during the last decade of the twentieth century. A very straightfor-

ward explanation of why all these parties did poorly on the electoral stage is that all of them were so-called new claimants to the Lithuanian party system. However, the timing of the establishment of the above-mentioned parties differed slightly. The LPP and LUSP were established just when the LDLP started to face problems in power in 1995–1996. The leadership of both parties deceptively expected that some followers of the LDLP might switch to them, but this turned out not to be the case. The LSP was founded in March 1994 for several reasons. First, the LDLP ignored traditional leftist approaches, which speaking objectively had no chance to be implemented because the continuity of market reforms required a much more right-oriented policy. As a result, a few even well-known members of the LDLP joined the LSP before the 1996 elections, but on the whole this could not be called a split within the Labour Democrats. Second, the initiative to found the LSP was warmly welcomed by a few neo-communists inasmuch as the Communist Party had been banned in Lithuania after the attempted coup d'état in August 1991 in the Soviet Union. Finally, SD 2000 was established only at the beginning of 2000 as a reaction of the right-wing minority in the LSDP to the plans for unification with the LDLP. Although a majority of the LSDP members supported gradual unification with the LDLP, a minor split among the Social Democrats was manifested organizationally, and a new left-wing party thus appeared on the Lithuanian political stage.

Organizationally, these parties were all rather weak because most of them had from a few hundred to one or two thousand individual members.[15] In some cases, the small parties' membership might be lower than actually reported by the parties themselves, but there was no official intention or mechanism to check the figures.

From an ideological perspective, several differences among the small left-wing parties need to be noted. Both the LPP and the LUSP were left-wing populist parties that might be characterized as programmatically inconsistent. The LSP was an extreme leftist party with some neo-communist elements. SD 2000 was a moderate left-wing party with a well-articulated program. However, the ideological distance between SD 2000 and the LSDP was very narrow, and almost the only reason behind the existence of SD 2000 were ambitions and disagreements on a leadership level.

Electoral statistics show that, despite substantial fluctuations, the left-wing parties managed altogether to attract around one-third of the votes on the average during parliamentary elections in 1992–2000.[16] The LDLP and LSDP alone shared almost 96 percent of these left-wing votes, leaving to other left-wing parties only about 1.5 percent of the total. Performances in local elections confirm trends observed in parliamentary elections insofar as

none of the minor left-wing parties was able to challenge the dominance of the LDLP and LSDP. However, the share of the mainstream left-wing parties was lower in local government since 1995 when a proportional electoral system was introduced (see Table 3.4).[17] Still, the LDLP attained the second best position after the Conservative Party in local elections.

One qualifying remark is necessary here. The effective number of parties in local elections was about twice as high as in parliamentary elections, which meant that the respective share of all party groups was smaller and fragmentation was higher (see Table 3.5). Moreover, ranking of the LDLP and LSDP according to the number of seats in municipalities and the Seimas shows a real setback for both parties in the 2000 local elections, when they attained respectively only fifth and sixth place among all competing parties (see Table 3.6).

Total volatility is a measure of electoral instability in a party system, and most of the new democracies have high scores here (see Table 3.7). In the 2000 Seimas elections, total volatility was equal to 46.2 points.[18] Block volatility indicates the electoral strength of party blocks and has implications for political parties' office- and policy-related room to maneuver.[19] Block volatility among the left-wing parties in Lithuania was very low (reaching only a few points) because of the LDLP and LSDP dominance. The real challenge for the left-wing parties was the electoral interchange between party blocks. In 1996 these parties suffered from a slightly increased voting for the center-right and right-wing parties. However, in 1996 volatility scores did not reflect real voting behavior. Most potential left-wing voters simply did not take part in the elections, and voter turnout decreased by more than 20 percent compared with the 1992 Seimas elections. On the other hand, during the 2000 parliamentary elections the social democratic coalition suffered from a voting swing to center-based parties, mainly to the center-leftist New

Table 3.4.   Strength of Left-wing Parties in Local Government, 1990–2000

Party	1990		1995		1997		2000	
	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats	No. of Seats	% Seats
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party	2,444	34.8	297	19.9	212	14.3	172	11.0
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party			72	4.8	136	9.2	104	6.6
Total		~45.0	369	24.8	348	23.5	276	17.0

Table 3.5.   The Effective Number of Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2000

	No. of Parties	
Year	Local Elections	Parliamentary Elections
1990		1.9
1992		2.98
1995	6.04	
1996		3.32
1997	5.93	
2000	9.1	4.2

Union/Social Liberals (NU/SL) as well as to the center-rightist Lithuanian Liberal Union (LLU). Even among those who in 1996 voted for the LDLP or LSDP, in 2000 as many as 24.9 percent decided to choose the NU/SL, and 19.1 percent, the LLU.[20]

In general, the "golden age" of support for left-wing parties seems to be in the past. The "golden election" for the left-wing parties was in 1992, when together these parties captured almost a million, or more than a half of the total, votes (see Table 3.8). After 1992 competitiveness in the Lithuanian party system tended to increase, and constituencies of single parties tended to decrease. Nevertheless, after 1995 in each election, except the parliamentary elections of 2000, the left-wing parties were able to attract about 230,000 votes on the average.

Still unanswered is the question: What is the social and demographic profile of the left-wing constituency? Here it is appropriate to concentrate on data about the social bases of the LDLP and LSDP as the most representative parties of the political left.

In order to avoid a long discussion of sometimes complicated details, we may use a measure of social concentration defined as "the extent to which

Table 3.6.   Ranking of Main Left-wing Parties according to Their Seats in Local Government and Seimas, 1990–2000

	Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party		Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	
Year	Local Elections	Parliamentary Elections	Local Elections	Parliamentary Elections
1990	1	2		
1992		1		4
1995	2		6	
1996		4–5		4–5
1997	2		4	
2000	5	1–1	6	1–1

Table 3.7.   Voter Volatility and Left-wing Parties, 1996–2000

Party Blocks	Volatility Index	
	1996 Seimas Election	2000 Seimas Election
Right-wing Block (Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives, Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, Christian–Democratic Union, Young Lithuania, Union of Moderate Conservatives, Nationalists' Union, Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees)	+7.0	–30.27
Left-wing Block (Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, Social Democracy 2000)	–32.35	+22.05

party supporters are concentrated in specific subgroups within any dimension of social cleavage."[21] This measure ranges from 0, when party support comes evenly from all the groups, to 1.0, when one of the groups contributes all its supporters.[22] Social concentration was analyzed in the Vilmorus (the major public opinion research center in Lithuania) postelection surveys of 1992, 1995, 1996, and 1997, as they had figures very close to actual election results. There are two exceptions here. Data from 1989 were taken from a regular survey, and observations for the year 2000 were made without a calculation of social concentration scores. The analysis was based on six social dimensions: age, education, ethnicity, incomes, gender, and urban–rural variables.

The age dimension in new democracies is an important explanatory variable because different periods of socialization significantly affected individual party preferences. For instance, a substantial portion of the old-age cohort tended to vote for the right-wing parties because of their vivid memories of interwar independent Lithuania, on the one hand, and the experience of harsh repression by the Soviets immediately before and after World War II, on the other. Regarding the age variable, the LDLP and LSDP had very low concentration scores ranging from .04 to .10, which means that all groups tended to support these parties very evenly. In the case of the LDLP, from 1989 to 1995 most of its followers were middle-aged persons (aged thirty to forty-nine). Since 1996 two age groups, between eighteen and twenty-nine and fifty and fifty-nine, became most significant for the party. The LSDP electorate is slightly younger than those voting for the LDLP. A core support group of the LSDP was only between eighteen and twenty-nine years old in 1989–1992, but in 1997 the situation changed, and the party was attracting most voters from thirty- to thirty-nine-year-old persons.

Table 3.8. Electorate of the Left-wing Parties: Local and Parliamentary Elections, 1992–2000

Party	October 1992 Parliamentary Election	March 1995 Local Election	October 1996 Parliamentary Election	March 1997 Local Election	March 2000 Local Election	October 2000 Parliamentary Election
Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party	817,331	214,000	130,837	122,000	120,622	457,294
Lithuanian Social Democratic Party	112,410	52,000	90,756	85,000	99,250	
Social Democracy 2000						7,219
Lithuanian Union of Social Justice	9,734		12,234			21,583
Socialist Party			9,985			
Voter Turnout (%)	75.3	44.8	52.9	39.9	54.2	58.6

Common wisdom suggests that education has political implications. Along this dimension both parties had higher concentration scores in comparison to the age variable. The LDLP scored between .20 and .23 after 1992, and the LSDP scored between .10 and .14 during the same period of time. A typical supporter of the LDLP had secondary education and vocational training. The LSDP voter was similar to that of the LDLP, but the portion of persons with university education was a bit higher.

Ethnicity is a dimension on which all Lithuanian parties had very uneven concentration scores. Nevertheless, on the ethnicity variable the LDLP had the most even representation among major Lithuanian parties, scoring .43 points on the average since 1992. There were two groups, that is, Lithuanians and Russians, who contributed most to the LDLP support. The LSDP was and is the political party mainly supported by Lithuanians, with party concentration scores ranging from a low of .43 in 1989 to a high of .82 points in 1997.

Income level to a large extent defines the general social status of individuals. Along this variable both parties had two periods of development. In 1989–1992 their electorates tended to be more concentrated in social groups with low- and middle-level incomes. Since 1995 the LDLP and LSDP attracted support evenly from all social groups with concentration scores ranging from .02 to .20. Because of the different size of various social groups along this cleavage, however, most followers of both parties came from groups with the lowest or low incomes.

Gender is a politically sensitive variable only in some countries. This variable has low explanatory power in Lithuania because mainstream parties draw support of males and females very evenly. For instance, since 1995 the LDLP had a concentration score of 0. The LSDP concentration score ranged from 0 to only .02 since 1992. Nevertheless, every party that expects to win elections in Lithuania needs to know that there are more females than males in the electorate as a whole. For example, the LDLP in 1992 and the HU/LC in 1996 attracted relatively more female than male voters in their respective victories in the Seimas elections.

The urban–rural division has serious implications along the left–right political continuum in Lithuania, as rural areas tend to vote for the left-wing parties, and urban zones, for the right-wing parties. The LDLP constituency was traditionally concentrated in small towns and rural areas. The LSDP has tended to attract relatively more support from small towns and Vilnius but not much from other big cities such as Kaunas, Klaipëda, Điauliai, and Panevëþys.

At first glance the social bases of the LDLP and LSDP have many similarities. If this is true, the unification of the two parties might even have

some negative effects if both parties draw supporters from the same social subgroups. However, more precise investigation shows that along four dimensions—age, education, ethnicity, and the urban–rural spectrum—the LDLP and LSDP electorates are to a large extent complementary to each other, which means that the united party should tend to expand the ranks of its supporters. The gender variable has no clear implications for voting for the left-wing parties, and it is insignificant in this context. Only along the incomes dimension did both parties compete for voters from the same groups.

How stable are the electorates of the LDLP and LSDP? The LDLP constituency seemed to be relatively stable. In the 1996 general elections as many as 32.6 percent of LDLP supporters voted for the party compared with the 1992 elections.[23] In the 2000 Seimas elections this figure was equal to 42.6 percent. Only supporters of the Lithuanian Conservatives displayed a higher degree of cohesion, with 82.8 percent voting for the party in the elections of 2000.[24] Unfortunately, comprehensive data about the stability of the LSDP electorate are not available. Still, the measurement of the electoral stability of any party on the basis of postelection surveys is a risky job because here sociologists are dealing with short memory spans and the effects of current political conjunctures on respondents.

The last but not least question about the electorate of the left-wing parties is: How does former membership in the Lithuanian Communist Party affect political identities in a democratic environment? A common opinion is that the stable electorate above all of the LDLP was primarily based on former members of the Communist Party. Looking at this problem arithmetically, it is quite easy to suggest a direct linkage between the number of LDLP supporters and membership in the former LCP because both figures are slightly more than 200,000. However, sociological data show that more than one-half of the former communists tended to identify themselves with moderate centrist positions in the 1990s.[25] The numbers of those who identified themselves with strong left or strong right positions were small (between 1 and 2 percent) and almost the same. On the other hand, in the mid-1990s a relative majority of the former communists, or about one-half of them, was willing to vote for the LDLP but not for other parties. These findings show that the LDLP electorate was not predominantly based on the former communists, but nevertheless former LCP membership was a strong factor favoring the Labour Democrats. With the passing of years from the end of the communist rule, this factor certainly will have less and less importance for the political mobilization of left-wing voters.

The Lithuanian Left after Unification of the LDLP and LSDP

Among the major political events of the year 2000 in Lithuania, along with the two elections—local and parliamentary—was, certainly, the gradual unification of the LDLP and LSDP. Since 1990 these parties had become major players on the left wing of the Lithuanian political spectrum. But their bilateral relations for a long period of time were rather complicated.

In 1989–1990 the LSDP distanced itself from the Independent Lithuanian Communist Party not only because the Social Democrats were in the Sajūdis block. More important was the fact that only a few among the members of the LSDP were former communists, and the leadership was explicitly noncommunist. The LSDP and LDLP were, moreover, competing for the same social democratic niche in ideological terms and a very similar sociodemographic constituency. An advantage for the LSDP was that this party was able to link itself to the prewar LSDP and Lithuanian social democratic organization in exile, which was an observer to the Socialist International. The LDLP, on the other hand, inherited a relatively developed organizational network and quite an impressive number of individual members along with a lack of legitimacy as a democratic political organization.

In 1992–1996, or during the years of LDLP rule, the LSDP adopted tactics of limited cooperation in parliament but rejected all proposals to enter into the government. In general, the LSDP was more critical and confrontational toward the LDLP cabinet than cooperative. In June 1994 the LSDP parliamentary faction even initiated an unsuccessful no-confidence vote against the Šleževičius government.

After the 1996 parliamentary elections when both parties were working in opposition to the majority government of the HU/LC and Christian Democratic Party, common grounds were found between the LSDP and LDLP on a wide range of policy issues: welfare, privatization, education, and so on. Nevertheless, bilateral talks on establishing a single party were sporadic. The turning point in the gradual unification of the two parties was the 2000 local elections when the LSDP and LDLP were defeated by a political novice, the New Union/Social Liberals, and the small Lithuanian Liberal Union. The mainstream left-wing parties had failed to mobilize voters highly dissatisfied with the rule of the Conservatives and Christian Democrats. Immediately after the municipal elections, the LSDP and LDLP agreed to take part in the forthcoming parliamentary elections as a united coalition led by Brazauskas, the former LDLP leader and later president. A new impetus to the unification of the two parties was added by their success in the 2000 Seimas elections, in which they won a plurality of

votes and seats. The LSDP and LDLP agreed to form a single parliamentary faction in the Seimas. However, the NU/SL, which was considered as a potential partner of the Social Democrats before the Seimas elections, decided to form a parliamentary majority together with the LLU and a few other small centrist parties. This move of the center-leftist NU/SL came as a surprise not only to the Social Democrats but also to about two-thirds of its own electorate, who expected a postelection government with the LSDP and LDLP. Finally, the LSDP and LDLP established a united party at the beginning of 2001, electing Brazauskas as its leader and adopting the name of LSDP.

Following a NU/SL and LLU government crisis in June 2001, the parliamentary majority collapsed. This time the long-predicted coalition of the NU/SL and the newly united LSDP became a reality. Brazauskas was appointed to the prime minister position, and other positions in the government were divided almost equally between the two parties, despite the fact that the NU/SL had only twenty-nine MPs compared with fifty for the LSDP. However, the LSDP secured most of the strategic positions in the cabinet such as the ministers of finance, economy, and interior affairs.

Once again the Social Democrats had come back to power in Lithuania, despite the fact that the party had changed a lot since 1996, and now ruled the country as a coalition rather than a one-party government. In 2001 the united LSDP was even in a better position than the LDLP in 1992–1996. This time the party had Brazauskas, the most popular political leader, in the position of prime minister, which is actually more significant than the president's post in the parliamentary/presidential system of Lithuania. Organizationally, the LSDP seemed to be the strongest political party in Lithuania. Ideological coherence was improved after the unification, and the LSDP no longer had problems of legitimacy as a parliamentary and governmental party. Moreover, socioeconomic conditions were improving insofar as Lithuania had finally overcome the negative impact of Russia's 1998 economic crisis.

In addition, the LSDP was the most popular party in Lithuania in 2001 and 2002, as indicated by public opinion polls. However, political mobilization in new democracies as well as in the advanced Western democracies was becoming more complicated because of the phenomenon described by Russell Dalton as the individualization of politics or "a shift away from electoral decision making based on social group and/or party cues toward a more individualized and inwardly-oriented style of political choice."[26] Lack of experience in institutionalized methods of political participation as well as underdeveloped and weak party attachments in the new democracies were

even more favorable soil for "an eclectic and egocentric pattern of citizen action" than in Western democracies. All this has meant that "both the volatility and velocity of political change seems to be increasing, and this pattern of change has become the dominant trend of our time."[27]

What does the individualization of politics mean for the LSDP? Certainly the united LSDP as a programmatic party with parliamentary and governmental experience was and is in a more advantageous position than all other left-wing parties and most of the center-right parties except the HU/LC, the only party on the political right that had more or less the same numbers of stable supporters as the LSDP (the LDLP included) over the 1990s. Despite the fact that volatile voters seemed to dominate the Lithuanian electorate, the programmatic and relatively well-established parties, such as the LDLP/LSDP, tended to attract more "undecided" votes during the elections in comparison with nonprogrammatic and loosely linked political parties. This was true in the 1992 and 2000 parliamentary elections, when the LDLP and LSDP celebrated victories. In the case of Lithuania, the mainstream left-wing parties were the most efficient in attracting undecided votes during the decade. The undecided but participating voters in the elections might not agree with a number of proposals made by a particular party; still, they tended to vote for organizationally and ideologically stronger and more consistent—that is, reliable or relevant—parties, if they were able to address at least partially the voters' concerns.

At the same time, historically Social Democrats were known as an organizationally collectivist and strongly ideological political party. Both features of traditional social democracy need to be adjusted to the new, more individualized political behavior if these parties seek to be politically successful in the future.

Looking back on a decade of transition to democracy, there are a few things worth being summarized and stressed about the left-wing parties in Lithuania. Structurally, they were divided into mainstream Europeanized social democratic parties and a marginal populist left wing. Despite certain historical, ideological, and political differences, both mainstream left-wing parties, the LSDP and LDLP, performed the same political function of moderator of political and social conflicts during the period of political change. Their political moderation helped to increase the social and political responsiveness of the new democratic political institutions, thereby increasing the legitimacy of the democratic political system in general.

Lithuanian political dynamics during the last decade of the twentieth century were such that after each parliamentary election ruling parties were regularly ousted from power. Certainly, long-term political prediction is a very

nongratifying effort, but as of this writing in 2002 the new united LSDP still has a chance to become the leading Lithuanian party in securing governing positions after the next general election in 2004.

Notes

1. Leszek Kolakowski, "Amidst Moving Ruins," in *Exit from Communism*, ed. S. R. Graubard (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1993), p. 43.

2. S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Breakdown of Communist Regimes and Vicissitudes of Modernity," in *Exit from Communism*, ed. S. R. Graubard (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1993), p. 22.

3. These rewards typically take the form of monetary transfers or gifts, jobs in the public sector, preferential treatment in the allocation of social subsidies (housing, welfare payments, etc.), regulatory favors, government contracts, and honorary memberships and titles. See Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 48.

4. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems*, pp. 46–48.

5. Not only did Sajūdis fail to reorganize itself into a more or less programmatic party before the 1992 parliamentary elections, but as many as eight political organizations (among the seventeen party lists) emerged around or from within the Sajūdis movement and took part in the 1992 general elections as individual participants, including the Lithuanian Center Movement, the Liberal Union, the Lithuanian Movement of Moderates, the Sajūdis coalition, and so on. The Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives as a political party on the basis of Sajūdis was established only after the defeat in the 1992 parliamentary elections, that is, on May 1, 1993. At the same time, the anticommunist theme that Sajūdis strongly presented in the political discourse led in the end to intense political confrontation between Sajūdis and the LDLP. For more on "inverse legitimation," see Davide Grassi, "Democratic Consolidation in Contemporary Political Regimes: The Case of Latin America," paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Sessions, Copenhagen, April 14–19, 2000, p. 16.

6. Juan J. Linz, "Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy," in *Democracy's Victory and Crisis*, Nobel Symposium No. 93, ed. Axel Hadenius (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 416.

7. *Lietuvos Aidas*, May 26, 1992.

8. *Lithuania Today: Politics and Economics*, November 1992, p. 1.

9. The thesis on a "comeback" of the ex-communist parties to power is not sufficiently precise and correct because of the large-scale changes within these parties compared with the communist ones.

10. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, "Modernization: Theories and Facts," *World Politics* 49 (1997), pp. 155–183.

11. Grassi, "Democratic Consolidation in Contemporary Political Regimes," p. 6.

12. A person elected as president of Lithuania is constitutionally required to suspend membership in political parties.

13. Grassi, "Democratic Consolidation in Contemporary Political Regimes," p. 6.

14. *Lithuania Today: Politics and Economics*, June 1993, p. 12.

15. By Lithuanian law a single party is required to have at least four hundred individual members.

16. Since 1992 the parliamentary elections were organized according to a "mixed" formula, that is, one-half of MPs were elected in seventy-one single-member constituencies, and another half, by party lists in one multimember (seventy seats) nationwide constituency. Till the year 2000 a majority formula was used to establish a winner in the electoral districts. If no candidate was elected in the first round, a runoff election was held between the two leading candidates. Elections were only valid if at least 40 percent of the electorate cast its vote. Since the 2000 Seimas elections, the majority formula was changed to a plurality one. In the proportional system seats were distributed on the basis of the simple quotient and greatest remainders rules as well as with the thresholds of 5 percent for a single party and 7 percent for party coalitions. In order to be valid, at least 25 percent of the electorate must cast its vote.

17. Actually, the new law on local elections was passed by the Seimas in July 1994, but the first election based on the new regulations was held only in 1995. The law introduced proportional representation, whereby all candidates were nominated by political parties. The results of elections were established on the basis of the simple quotient and greatest remainders rules with a threshold of 4 percent.

18. Jūratė Novagrockienė, "Seimo rinkimai 2000: Partinės sistemos evoliucija ar transformacija?" in *Lietuva po Seimo rinkimų 2000*, ed. Algimantas Jankauskas (Kaunas: Naujasis Lankas, 2000), p. 55.

19. Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, and Jan Kleinnijenhuis, *Doing Research in Political Science* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 232.

20. Calculated from Mindaugas Degutis, "Seimo rinkimai 2000: Nauji Lietuvos rinkėjo portreto bruožai," in *Lietuva po Seimo rinkimų 2000*, ed. Algimantas Jankauskas (Kaunas: Naujasis Lankas, 2000), p. 17.

21. Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey* (New York: Free Press, 1980), p. 42.

22. Janda, *Political Parties*, p. 43.

23. Darius Žėruolis, "Rational Voters and Causes of Absenteeism," in *Lithuania's Seimas Election 1996: The Third Turnover. Analyses, Documents, and Data*, ed. Algis Krupavičius (Berlin: Ed. Sigma, 2001), p. 211.

24. Degutis, "Seimo rinkimai 2000," p. 17.

25. The extensive data collection on this topic is available from the New Baltic Barometer surveys organized by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP), University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, under the direction of Professor Richard Rose, with financial support from the European Commission Inco-Copernicus program, the

CSPP, and the British Economic and Social Research Council. Further details are available in Richard Rose, *Trends in the New Baltic Barometer*, Studies in Public Policy No. 292 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1998); or at www.cspp.strath.ac.uk.

26. Russell J. Dalton, *Democracy and Its Citizens: Patterns of Political Change* (Irvine: University of California, Center for the Study of Democracy, 1996), available at www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/dalton.htm.

27. Dalton, *Democracy and Its Citizens*.

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Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism

Thomas A. Baylis

All the former ruling parties in Eastern Europe had to face a profoundly changed environment of political and economic institutions after the cataclysm of 1989, but nowhere did these institutions change so rapidly and thoroughly as they did in eastern Germany.[1] After years of belonging to a hierarchical ruling party that was particularly insistent on the sanctity of the principles of democratic centralism, remaining members of the Socialist Unity Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands [SED]), now rechristened the Party of Democratic Socialism (Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus [PDS]), quickly had to accustom themselves to being treated as a disgraced and irrelevant minority and to learn how to function in a highly competitive political arena. That arena was especially challenging because it was dominated by west German parties with forty or more years of electoral experience. PDS members also had to face the loss of most of their party's financial base, most of its traditional supporting organizations (especially the trade unions), a mode and degree of deindustrialization that left few opportunities for the kind of "nomenklatura privatization" that benefited many of their counterparts in Poland and elsewhere,[2] and a widespread purge of administrative and educational structures that left many of them without a livelihood. Especially because the reconstruction of the east German political, economic, and social order was carried out under the auspices of what was essentially an exogenous force—the government of the Federal Republic—the members of the dethroned SED found relatively few reliable footholds for securing their places in the new German state.

Unlike the Polish Democratic Left Alliance, the Hungarian Socialist Party, or the Slovak Party of the Democratic left, the PDS has not yet returned to power in a coalition government on the national level. In 1998, however, it entered its first state (*Land*) coalition cabinet in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, four years after it had agreed to support ("tolerate") a minority government led by the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands [SPD]) in Saxony-Anhalt. It has also placed thousands of its candidates in local and district offices. After nearly doubling its support in the eastern states in the 1994 federal elections in comparison with 1990 (19.8 percent as opposed to 11.1 percent), its vote grew more modestly, to 21.6 percent, in 1998, before falling to 16.9 percent in 2002. In 1999 it placed six members in the European parliament and was able for the first time to become the largest opposition party to the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union [CDU]) in the southern east German states of Saxony and Thuringia, relegating the SPD to third place.

Perhaps the PDS's most striking successes have come in Berlin. In October 1999 it captured almost 40 percent of the vote in the eastern districts of the city (17.7 percent overall). Less than two years later it agreed to "tolerate" an interim SPD–Green Party government formed in the wake of the collapse of a long-standing CDU-SPD coalition. In the ensuing campaign, opposition politicians, former east German dissidents, and a well-funded media campaign warned darkly of the danger that former Communists might become full participants in a "red–red" coalition in the national capital following new elections. In the event, the PDS share of the vote rose again, to 48 percent in the east and 22.6 percent overall. After overcoming the resistance of Chancellor Schröder, who feared negative electoral consequences on the national level, the Berlin SPD and PDS agreed in January 2002 to form a coalition government.[3] For the PDS, accepting the risks of sharing responsibility for governing a city in dire fiscal straits was justified by its "breakthrough" in the western-dominated capital.

The PDS's overall strength in recent elections in the eastern states, between 15 and 25 percent, does not equal that of the successor party in Poland (41 percent in alliance with the Union of Labor in the 2001 parliamentary elections) or that of Hungary (42 percent in 2002). PDS support, however, has been substantially greater than that for the Czech and Slovak successor parties, at least until the 2002 elections. Its success has come in spite of the fact that, unlike the others, it has had to compete with strong and established Social Democratic and Christian Democratic rivals.[4] There are a number of ways in which the evolution of the PDS and its leadership

parallels that of other post-communist parties, but in this chapter I am more concerned to single out the differences.

From SED to PDS

The PDS was born of the crisis that brought an end to Communist rule in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and ultimately to that state itself. Its predecessor, the SED, had long been classed with the Romanian and post-1968 Czechoslovak ruling parties as among the most rigid and dogmatic, even "Stalinist," in the Soviet bloc. The reality in my view was somewhat more complex. By the end of the 1960s the regime had abandoned a modest attempt to move toward market-oriented economic reform, and its rigorous insistence on ideological conformity both within and outside the party's ranks, reinforced with the help of the ubiquitous secret police (Stasi), left little space for any sort of domestic debate. On the other hand, the regime's pragmatic approach to church–state relations created a significant refuge for dissenters, and the numerous concessions it was forced to make to obtain needed economic assistance from the Federal Republic opened the GDR up to a wide variety of Western influences.

Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, more successfully than almost any other East European party, the SED had been able to maintain the appearance of internal discipline and unity and to hold the line against the stirrings of reform elsewhere in the Soviet bloc and the seductive appeals of glasnost and perestroika. To some extent, we now know, appearances were deceptive. Stasi reports from 1988 and the first part of 1989 reveal growing discontent in the party's ranks; two thousand party members are said to have left the GDR for the Federal Republic or applied for legal permission to do so in 1988 alone.[5] A number of high officials who were aware of the GDR's mounting foreign debt feared for its continued solvency, but even the state Planning Commission head was unable to persuade an aging Politburo, dominated by Erich Honecker, his economic "czar" Günter Mittag, and the Stasi chief, Erich Mielke, to risk a radical change of course.

The immediate series of events that brought the regime down is well known.[6] The opening of the Hungarian–Austrian border to East Germans who wished to cross it led to a flood of would-be emigrants seeking to exit by that route or through West German embassies elsewhere in the region. Partly in reaction, protest demonstrations broke out in the GDR itself; the numbers of protesters marching in Leipzig following Monday church peace services grew exponentially each week, and the demonstrations quickly spread to other cities. On October 17 the Politburo removed Honecker as party general

secretary and replaced him with his putative "crown prince," Egon Krenz. On November 9, in the middle of an emergency Central Committee meeting, a brief announcement easing travel restrictions signaled the opening of the Berlin Wall.

By this time a surge of anger within the SED itself had brought a wave of resignations from its ranks and pressures for drastic change from its regional organizations.[7] Within a short time all the regional first secretaries had been replaced; on December 3 the entire Central Committee and Politburo resigned after the former had expelled Honecker, Mielke, and ten other members of the former elite from the party. The resulting "personnel vacuum" created opportunities for SED officials from the lower ranks who advocated reform and were willing to remain in the party in spite of the chaotic circumstances. A "working committee" of twenty-five, formed to prepare an extraordinary party congress for early December, included several individuals who were later to assume leadership positions in the PDS, such as Lothar Bisky, Roland Claus, Dieter Klein, and Gregor Gysi. Gysi, a lawyer who had defended east German dissidents and who had been little known in the party just a short time before, rose quickly to prominence with his quick-wittedness, intelligence, and individualistic style, qualities not often observed in earlier SED leaders. He was elected party chairman at the congress; Hans Modrow, the former Dresden party secretary who had been named GDR prime minister just a few weeks before, became a deputy chairman. The old Central Committee and Politburo were replaced by a *Vorstand* (directorate) and its presidium. A new, provisional party statute, which among other things authorized the creation of diverse "platforms" and working groups within the party, was adopted; the Leninist principle basing party organization in the workplace gave way to the residential principle more typical of democratic parties. Gysi and the other new leaders managed to block proposals for dissolving the party altogether, opting instead for legal continuity while breaking with the structures and repudiating the excesses of the past. In a compromise, the party was renamed the SED-PDS—Modrow had wanted to keep the old name, while Gysi had supported the new one.

The December congress by no means ended the party's crisis. Popular fury over Stasi revelations and the unwise effort of the Modrow government to retain some sort of internal security capability, widespread public hostility to the party and the continued massive exodus of its members, and the rapidly growing momentum toward German unification led to renewed demands from without and within for the party's dissolution. The party's collapse appeared to be only a question of time. But encouraged by the emergence of initiative groups in Berlin and elsewhere calling for radical renewal without dissolution, the leadership opted for more internal cleansing: it expelled

additional former Politburo members and candidates from the party, turned some three billion marks over to the state budget, and on February 4 decided to drop the "SED" from its name, subject to the approval of the next party congress. Facing up to the increasing irresistibility of unification, the Vorstand presidium committed the party to seeking a "progressive, social, democratic, humanistic Germany."[8]

The party managed a respectable 16.4 percent of the vote in the GDR's first democratic election in March, electing sixty-six members to the national parliament (*Volkskammer*). But its fortunes continued to decline as unification approached and after it was consummated. In the federal elections of December 1990 it captured just 11.1 percent of the east German vote and entered the Bundestag only because of a Federal Constitutional Court ruling that granted representation—for that election only—to parties winning more than 5 percent of the vote in *either* the new, east German, federal states or the old ones (normally, a party must capture 5 percent of the entire national vote or elect three deputies directly). Commentators widely forecast the party's continuing decline and ultimate disappearance. Instead, as unemployment rose and disappointment with the fruits of unification mounted among east Germans, the PDS started to pick up strength, beginning with successes in Berlin borough assembly elections in mid-1992 and culminating in its return to the Bundestag with an expanded delegation in fall 1994.[9]

Members and Voters

Today, critics of the PDS are quick to point out that most of its members—around 90 percent—belonged to the SED; in the east, four-fifths of the members are over sixty years old. It is useful, however, to view these figures from the opposite angle: the SED had some 2.3 million members before its demise, proportionately the largest in the Communist world, while the PDS in 2001 had around eighty-four thousand—a self-selected few. This figure still gives it the most east German members of any party (only 4,100 members are west Germans), but the change in scale alone makes it clear that the PDS cannot plausibly be dismissed as a party that has changed only its name.[10] To be sure, most of the remaining members appear to value the party as their only political home in an unfamiliar and often alien world, and they share a considerable nostalgia for much of what they feel they lost with the demise of the GDR. But many of them work energetically on the party's behalf, giving at least grudging support to leaders whose view of the party's past and future may depart sharply from their own.

In fact, one of the principal challenges the leadership faces is reconciling its own perspectives with both those of its members and those of its voters, whose sociological profile is quite different from that of the members.[11] The PDS draws its electoral support almost equally from different age categories; its larger rivals, the SPD and especially the CDU, do better among older groups.[12] East Germans who vote for the PDS are on average considerably better educated than their compatriots who do not. Their occupational structure deviates moderately from the east German norm, with a somewhat larger proportion categorized as white-collar workers (*Angestellte*); a somewhat smaller proportion, as blue-collar workers or independent professionals; and still fewer, as farmers. Not surprisingly, the PDS does somewhat better among the unemployed than other parties. It cannot, however, really be called a party of the "losers" from unification, at least in material terms: the income distribution of PDS voters closely parallels that of east Germans as a whole. The regional distribution of these voters is fairly even, except that the party does especially well in east Berlin and other population centers where the concentration of party and government officials was unusually high in the Communist years. It does appear that many former SED members who were not approaching retirement quit the party out of concern for their career prospects but continue to vote for its successor; however, only about one-quarter of the PDS vote is said to come from former members. In a country in which religious adherence is low overall, few PDS voters are affiliated with a church. Men and women vote for the PDS in roughly equal numbers, but in 1998 the party did especially well among women below retirement age—a group hit disproportionately by unemployment.[13]

What does distinguish PDS voters more sharply from supporters of other parties is their political and social attitudes. They are more likely to be dissatisfied with the results to date of unification than those who vote for other parties and to be alienated in some measure (the evocative German term is *politikverdrossen*) from the political system; at the same time they are more likely to characterize themselves as politically engaged. Ideologically they place themselves firmly on the left portion of the political spectrum and remain supportive of socialist ideals if not of past state socialist practice.[14] About one-quarter of those who voted for the PDS in 1998 had voted for a different party—usually the SPD or CDU—four years earlier,[15] suggesting that the party has by no means exhausted its electoral potential. The PDS is also now widely accepted by those who have not voted for it, especially in the east. It is viewed as a legitimate player in the political process and is valued for its defense of east German interests; many also regard its possible participation even in a national coalition with equanimity.[16] At the same time,

the number of citizens who view the party simply as the SED's successor has declined.[17]

Leaders

The qualitative ways in which the PDS has changed can be seen still better by examining the party's leadership, which is dominated by pragmatists and ostensible reformers.[18] In spite of the party's elderly membership, as of 2001 the median age of members of its governing Vorstand was between forty-five and forty-six, while that of its Bundestag delegation was fifty. None of the current leaders was prominent in the SED, with the exception of the honorary PDS chairman, Modrow, the GDR's last Communist prime minister; as the leader of the Dresden regional SED organization, he was once viewed as a potential German "Gorbachev," earning the suspicion of Honecker, who allegedly sought his removal. Modrow is now a member of the European parliament and serves as something of a voice for older party members, but he appears to have only limited influence in the PDS leadership. There is no figure in the PDS whose importance in both the Communist and the post-Communist eras is comparable to that of Hungary's Gyula Horn or Poland's Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller.

In 2000 the PDS leadership experienced a significant if as-yet-uncompleted generational change. The party's electoral success and its reformist course both owe a great deal to three figures. The most visible of these was and remains Gysi, until spring 2000 head of its Bundestag delegation. Gysi is the son of a former GDR culture minister and state secretary for church questions. Trained as a lawyer, the younger Gysi acted as defense attorney for some of the GDR's most prominent dissidents, including Rudolf Bahro and Barbel Böhley, but was enough a part of the GDR's legal establishment to be named chairman of the country's collegia of attorneys in 1988.[19] Like a number of other PDS figures, he has been accused of having been an informer for the state security police, the Stasi;[20] although he continues to deny these charges, some sort of Stasi connections were probably unavoidable for someone in his position. Gysi, as we have seen, was hardly familiar to many SED members when he was elected party chairman in December 1989 at the height of its crisis. But his "wit, humor, self-irony, and unconventionality" along with his media skills quickly made him the most effective spokesperson for the reconstituted party.[21]

The mass media scholar who served as PDS chairman until 2000, Lothar Bisky, taught for several years at both Berlin's Humboldt University and the SED's "think tank," the Academy for Society Sciences. He subsequently be-

came rector of the Potsdam Academy for Film and Television, where he is said to have shielded his students from political pressures. The Society Sciences Academy, which a number of PDS leaders attended, was, rather improbably, a site for reform discussions in the last years of the GDR.[22] Perhaps the most respected figure in the PDS leadership—owing in part to his conduct as chair of a state parliamentary committee investigating the politically charged accusations of Stasi collaboration against Brandenburg's SPD Minister-President Manfred Stolpe—Bisky acted as an effective conciliator of the PDS's diverse ideological tendencies.

The third key figure, in the past often characterized as the party's "chief ideologist" and strategist, is André Brie, who was trained in foreign policy at the Potsdam Institute of International Relations.[23] He might now better be characterized as a reformist gadfly, sharply attacking the PDS's failure to fully come to terms with its "totalitarian" past and calling on it to commit itself to "bourgeois democracy" and a market economy. As a result, he has become the object of bitter denunciation by the party's left.[24] Like Modrow, Brie now sits in the European parliament. As the son of a diplomat who was an emigrant in England and later served in China and North Korea, and later in his own right as a delegate to disarmament talks in Geneva, Brie has considerable international experience. For some twenty years he was also, as he belatedly admitted, an "unofficial collaborator" with the Stasi; the revelation of that fact cost him his position as party deputy chairman. In the late 1980s Brie was one of a group of scholars at Humboldt University who sought to develop proposals for a reformed socialism. One West German scholar claims that the PDS's "modern image" effectively cultivated by Gysi can in large measure be attributed to the participants in the Humboldt "socialism project."[25]

Gysi and Bisky stepped down from their positions following a contentious meeting of the PDS congress in April 2000 and were replaced by figures who were much less well known. The new party chair, Gabriele (Gabi) Zimmer (forty-six), was trained as a foreign-language interpreter but subsequently did agitational work for the SED in an East German factory producing hunting weapons; after the collapse of the old regime she became chair of the PDS's Thuringia branch. Zimmer was a compromise choice as head of the party, and press reports soon circulated that others in the party viewed her as an ineffective leader who was not persuasive in representing its views in the public arena. But she is said to be popular among east German party members, and after the PDS's Berlin election success and a strong performance at a meeting of the party congress in Dresden (September 2001) her position seemed to become more secure.[26] Roland Claus, also forty-six, who succeeded Gysi as leader of the Bundestag delegation, was trained as an engineer but worked

for eleven years as a functionary in Free German Youth (Freie Deutsche Jugend [FDJ]), the SED's official youth organization, becoming the head of the FDJ's Halle regional organization and briefly, during the fall 1989 upheaval, the region's SED first secretary. He is credited with being a skilled tactician in part responsible for the Saxony-Anhalt "toleration" arrangement.[27] Neither Zimmer nor Claus has the star power of Gysi, but the latter did not disappear; in mid-2001 he became the party's candidate for mayor of Berlin, a role that kept him highly visible on German television screens. In January 2002 he was named economics senator in the new city government.[28]

A number of the most prominent—and in some cases controversial—leaders of the party are women. They include, in addition to Zimmer, popular Berlin party leader Petra Pau (thirty-eight); the former economics minister in the transitional Modrow government, Christa Luft (sixty-three); the party's vice-chairwoman, Sylvia-Yvonne Kaufmann (forty-five), who headed the PDS's list of European parliament candidates; former "Young Comrades" leader Angela Marquardt (thirty), known for her emphasis on extraparliamentary activism; and radical "Communist Platform" leader Sahra Wagenknecht (thirty-two). Twenty-one of the PDS's thirty-seven Bundestag deputies prior to the 2002 federal election were women, as are 46 percent of all the party's members. Here again the PDS has departed from its predecessor's practice; the SED insisted rhetorically on gender equality but largely excluded women from its most influential positions. By most accounts, however, the "inner circle" of PDS decision makers remains predominantly male.

Other prominent party leaders and strategists include economist and party business manager Dietmar Bartsch, who earned his doctor's degree in Moscow in the Gorbachev years; the former Humboldt dean and protector of the "socialism project," Dieter Klein (said to be the party's "theoretician"); and the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania party leader and, since 1998, the state's deputy minister-president, Helmut Holter (forty-eight). As this list suggests, the top PDS leadership has been dominated to date by pragmatic, reform-oriented intellectuals—Gysi, Bisky, Brie, Luft, Bartsch, Kaufmann, and Klein all have doctor's degrees, and all but Gysi had primarily academic careers prior to the collapse of the GDR. Younger leaders Zimmer, Claus, Pau, and Holter do not fit this pattern, but all have university degrees, and Holter completed two courses of study in Moscow, the second at the outset of the Gorbachev era. One-third of the party's Bundestag members and eight of its eighteen Vorstand members also have doctor's degrees. Workers play almost no role, a fact mirrored in the party's modest voting support in this class. Most of the older leaders had undoubted connections with the higher echelons of the former GDR political elite, although none can be said to

have belonged to it; the younger ones appear to have been in many cases "highfliers" who might have been expected one day to reach the elite had the regime not disintegrated.

The party's choice of members of its Vorstand and of its Bundestag and Landtag candidates appears to reflect a conscious effort to distinguish itself from its forerunner. The 2000–2002 Vorstand, elected competitively by delegates to the party congress, was dominated by reformers and pragmatists but included the Communist Platform's Wagenknecht, who was obliged to deliver a conciliatory party congress speech as the price of admission.[29] Nine of its eighteen members were women, in accordance with the party's gender-parity rule, and five were west Germans. Three of its 1998–2002 Bundestag deputies were formerly activists for the Greens, and two others were former Social Democrats. At least five of its Bundestag members did not even (officially) belong to the PDS, reflecting a conscious effort by the party to use an "open list" approach to parliamentary nominations in order to broaden its appeal. One member was just sixteen years old when the Berlin Wall was opened; two others were eighteen. The party leadership thus conveys an image markedly different from that of the stolid, aging bureaucrats who presided over the SED.

The image of the PDS may also have benefited, ironically, from its well-publicized internal conflicts. The often virulent attacks from the party's left—by the Communist Platform, led by the philosophy student Wagenknecht (who was only twenty when the SED regime collapsed), and by the more traditionalist "Marxist Forum," led by the one-time reformist legal theorist Uwe-Jens Heuer—on what they regard as the excessive pragmatism of the leadership have been seized on by some commentators as evidence that the PDS has not yet shed its past. Many of the more vocal inner-party critics are veterans of west German leftist parties and sects. But the very intensity of this dispute, and internal "rightist" criticisms calling on the party to concentrate on east German local and regional issues, undermine the credibility of claims that the party somehow still remains "totalitarian."

Organizational Changes

Many of the ways in which the organization of the PDS differs from that of its ruling predecessor were forced on it by necessity; others seem to have been adopted consciously. Both, however, have facilitated the process of adaptation. In its statute and other documents the PDS explicitly identifies itself as a "pluralistic" party committed to "basis democracy" and rejects the authoritarian past of the SED.[30] The contentious reality of the party appears to con-

firm this claim, contrary to the assertion of the party's critics that it remains hostile to democracy.[31]

The SED employed about 44,000 paid officials in its apparatus; by 1994 the number of full-time employees of the PDS was just 156.[32] The party does, however, benefit from the voluntary labor of former SED members who were forced into retirement after the collapse of the Communist regime. The former dissident Jens Reich has noted that "the many academic [PDS] members dismissed or pushed into early retirement are able to arrange interesting discussion and lecture sessions and assist the party in acquiring notable skills at political articulation."[33] Many of these members are active in the party's twenty or so "working groups," which are devoted to different substantive areas of policy.

In contrast to the rigorous democratic centralism of the SED, the PDS permits the formation of internal groupings (*Zusammenschlüsse*) in addition to the working groups. Not all of the two types of groups are uncritical supporters of the leadership. Perhaps the most outspoken criticisms come from the leftist Communist Platform, but there are also groups for gays, women, young people, seniors, and Christians; a west-dominated trade union initiative group; an "ecological platform"; and several others. Additional groups, organizationally distinct from the PDS, are loosely associated with the party or contain numerous party members. These include political education groups, associations of PDS communal officials and businessmen(!),[34] and trade union branches—although the latter, as part of the pro-SPD German Trade Union Federation, generally do not welcome open PDS involvement.[35] The party also maintains a "Council of Elders," made up of senior figures from the SED era, and an educational foundation named for Rosa Luxemburg. Since early 1999 the foundation, like those of the other major German parties, has received government subsidies. While the more unrestrained of the PDS's critics see this "thick . . . network" of organizations in conspiratorial terms as a "useful tool of the subversive tactics" of the party,[36] it might equally be characterized as evidence of the PDS's heterogeneity.

The party is divided geographically into *Land* and *Kreis* (district) organizations, rooted in turn in more than five thousand "basis" units. The Land parties enjoy, and appear to exercise, considerable autonomy. Notable in this respect is the successful effort of the young, pragmatic leader of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania PDS, Holter, in preparing the party to join a governing coalition under the SPD in the state; Holter became the coalition's deputy minister-president.[37] On the municipal level, Dresden party leaders set off a small storm in the party in 1996 by advocating a "Christian-Social Union (CSU)"-style strategy for it, that is, to become an explicitly regional

party focusing on practical issues, paying greater attention to the needs of small business, and cooperating closely with other political forces.[38] At the national level, two distinct foci of leadership existed prior to the 2002 federal election: the Vorstand, chaired by Zimmer, and the thirty-seven-member PDS Bundestag delegation, led by Claus; only Bartsch and Pau belonged to both groups. Following the loss of all but two of the party's Bundestag seats, dominance shifted at least temporarily to the Vorstand.

As in most parties, the lines of influence within the party do not always correspond to its formal organizational structure.[39] The 2001 program draft announced and endorsed by Zimmer was written by three members who belonged to neither the Vorstand nor the Bundestag delegation—largely bypassing the official Program Commission, or so it appears.[40] To date the party has been dominated by its pragmatists and reformers, who have made no secret of their displeasure with what they view as the retrograde inclinations of their internal critics and even of much of the membership. The critics, for their part, have responded in vitriolic terms at party congress sessions and in statements whose texts are faithfully reproduced on the party's website. The pragmatists have been defeated on some issues—for example, attempts to reduce the role of the Communist Platform and to expel members whose attacks on themselves have been particularly unrestrained—and suffered a galling two to one defeat at Münster in April 2000 on the question of possible German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. But these are exceptions; the pragmatists have consistently been successful in winning elections to the Vorstand and dominating Bundestag nominations as well as Land leadership bodies; the ideological dissensus often displayed to the public is to that extent misleading.

As many observers have noted, this organizational structure, together with the party's large number of well-educated members in early retirement, provides the party with a "skilled force of electoral troops."[41] The PDS's extensive presence in local government allows it to demonstrate its capacity to provide practical services to its potential clientele and—on this level—to cooperate with other parties—including the Christian Democrats.[42] The SPD, by contrast, with about one-third the PDS's east German membership, sometimes has difficulty even finding enough candidates for office. Here without question is one of the more important reasons for the PDS's success.

Ideological Positioning

Observers have disagreed over just what the essential nature of the PDS is. Is it a party of the "losers" from German unification? a party of "nostalgia" for

the GDR? a "milieu party" whose strength lies in districts heavily populated by former SED officials and professionals?[43] a party of regional protest, comparable to the Italian League of the North, the Canadian Reform Party, or the Scottish National Party?[44] or a leftist "people's party" (*Volkspartei*) that has succeeded in uniting diverse voters and activists across narrow ideological and class lines?[45] Arguably, it is all of these at once, a fact that creates strategic dilemmas but also provides opportunities to the party's leadership.

One way in which it has responded is in how it has defined the party's ideological and programmatic position. Unlike the Polish and Hungarian parties, it cannot identify itself as social democratic, for that term is already the property of one of the two leading parties of the Federal Republic. Neither is it under pressure to embrace uncritically the principles of a capitalist market economy, as eastern European parties are that have won a share of national power and whose officials must therefore negotiate with the International Monetary Fund and Western investors and prepare their countries for membership in the European Union. On the other hand, no sufficiently large constituency exists, even among former SED members, for an unreconstructed Marxist-Leninist party, even were PDS leaders so inclined.

The answer they have given, instead, is to present the party as being still "socialist" but determinedly "democratic" and devoted to political freedom and human rights. According to a September 2001 Vorstand statement, "For democratic socialists freedom and equality belong just as inseparably together as democracy and social welfare."[46] If other successor parties have made "180-degree turns," as Jane Curry suggests, the PDS's ideological shift has been closer to 90 degrees.[47] While the PDS sees itself as to the left of both the SPD and the Alliance 90/Greens, most of the members of those two parties would have little difficulty in accepting most of the post-Communists' broad definition of *socialism*. In one version originally promulgated in 1993 and incorporated into the party program, it is characterized as

> a society in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. . . . [a] movement against the exploitation of man by man, against patriarchal oppression, against the plundering of nature, for the protection and development of human culture, for the realization of human rights, for a society in which human beings regulate their affairs democratically and in rational ways. Socialism for us is a value system in which freedom, equality, and solidarity, human emancipation, social justice, and the maintenance of nature and peace are inseparably joined.[48]

Socialism, since the upheavals of 1989 and 1991, and especially for those who experienced what the SED termed "real existing socialism," is a term

that demands more detailed explication than the admirable paragraph just cited provides. For Gysi, Brie, and other party leaders the preferred term is *modern socialism*, which seeks both to liberate the PDS's understanding of the term from its abuse by the SED and to infuse it with a content more appropriate, in their view, to the social, economic, and technological realities of the contemporary world. That implies a reconsideration of traditional Marxist views of capitalism and property ownership, of what were once termed "bourgeois" rights and freedoms, and of the underlying reasons for the failure of the Soviet and GDR versions of state socialism. On all of these points, the party left fiercely contests the views of the leadership.

On the sensitive issue of the party's SED past, the Vorstand has explicitly condemned the "centralistic, antidemocratic policy of the SED and of Stalinism. For us there is no returning to the political structures of the GDR. . . . The contradiction-filled history of the SED is simultaneously a burden and a starting point for renewal."[49] But as over one-half of PDS *voters* regard the GDR as having been "more good than bad," however, the party leaders have had to be selective in their criticism.[50]

Much of the PDS's rhetoric is devoted to a continuing attack on what it sees as the social injustices of the Federal Republic's version of capitalism, with particular emphasis on neoliberal economic policies, unemployment, the supposed dismantling of the welfare state, and the assault on the environment. While it applies this indictment and its recommendations for reform to the Federal Republic as a whole, it emphasizes the particular disadvantages suffered by east Germans and decries the blanket devaluation of their biographies and experience. The party has declared itself to be "in principled opposition" to the existing social order of the Federal Republic, which does not, it quickly adds, preclude the possibility of it supporting or even joining a coalition government, depending on the "time and situation."[51] The actual intensity of its "opposition" is disputed within the party. "Some of our members want to reform the system, others want to overcome it," Bisky has remarked.[52]

The party has placed special emphasis, especially since the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, on its status as, in its words, the only German "antiwar" party. While it argued that the Federal Republic should respond to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks by showing "critical solidarity" with the United States and called for punishment for the perpetrators, it opposed U.S.-led military retaliation in Afghanistan and any German participation in it. NATO, it argues, should be replaced by "collective, non-military security structures."[53] This position won it votes in the October 2001 Berlin elections but led SPD leaders, including Chancellor Schröder, to rule out any coalition

with the PDS on the federal level. In the short term, however, it served to appease the strong pacifist currents in the party that led to the leadership's defeat at its April 2000 Münster meeting. In the 2002 federal election, however, the PDS was unable to benefit from its antiwar position, when the chancellor seized the issue of opposition to the Bush administration's Iraq policy for himself.

Debate over the PDS's program has become an ongoing arena for symbolic disputes between party leftists and reformers. The "old" program approved in 1993 is undergoing a prolonged process of revision, and the leadership has put forward a new, somewhat more conciliatory, draft for discussion, written by Brie, his brother, Michael, and Dieter Klein and promptly condemned by the left.[54] Both old and new versions, like most party programs, are designed to appeal to different constituencies. The commitment to some sort of socialism and sharp condemnation of unbridled capitalism are presumably directed especially at older and more ideologically oriented former SED members, while the emphasis on democratic participation, women's rights, a pacifist foreign policy, and environmental protection is meant to attract younger voters and especially potential supporters of the Greens. The stress on economic democratization and codetermination (*Mitbestimmung*) rather than the outright nationalization of property should reassure those (such as the party's small business contingent) who regard the latter as anachronistic. The new program draft goes so far as to acknowledge the profit motive as "indispensable for an adaptable and innovative economy."[55] The special attention given to the allegedly discriminatory treatment and persistent unemployment of east Germans is meant to reinforce the PDS's reputation as the only authentic representative of east German interests, but the universalistic character of most of the program reflects the determination of PDS leaders to win support throughout the country. The strong condemnation of "Stalinism" coupled with a differentiated assessment of many of the GDR's goals and institutions seeks to steer a middle course among its more nostalgic members, potential voters, and possible future coalition partners.

With its programmatic stance, the party lays claim to a segment of ideological space that has been in large measure vacated by the SPD as that party has, in common with many of its counterparts in other Western nations, moved toward the political center and made its peace with market capitalism. In the west German states, much of that space is still occupied by the Alliance 90/Greens, but the latter party remains weak in the "new states" of the east. That fact, and the negative view of the PDS cultivated by the CDU/CSU and Free Democratic Party and much of the west German media, has to date kept the party largely a regional one.

Strategies and Impediments

For a party whose predecessor had not had to face any sort of electoral opposition since early in the period of Soviet occupation, the PDS has proven to be remarkably adept in formulating and carrying out a campaign strategy—at least until 2002. In the 1994 national Bundestag election, for example, it appears to have followed closely a prescription set forth by André Brie in 1993. Under German electoral law, a party must win either 5 percent of the nationwide vote or directly elect three or more deputies in individual constituencies. Brie identified three promising districts in Berlin and other possibilities throughout the east German states. But he also recommended a strategy by which the PDS might appeal to western voters and win enough support among them to supplement its east German base and surmount the 5 percent threshold.

As Henry Krisch, citing Brie, has noted, this required the identification of very different groups of potential supporters: "To appeal to this mixture of young, partly western radicals, un- or underemployed ex-GDR intellectuals, eastern pensioners and so forth required a targeted and differentiated election campaign; the PDS would have to stress different appeals in the old and new *Länder*."[56] Following Brie's recommendations, employing a "competent and expensive" advertising agency, and making use of large-scale polling,[57] the PDS waged an energetic and imaginative campaign. It also took advantage of resentment in the east against the CDU's "rote Socken" campaign, which sought to invoke the danger of a Social Democratic–PDS liaison with the help of posters showing red stockings on a wash line.[58] The PDS responded by appropriating the red stockings for use in its own campaign materials. On the day of the election, the PDS captured four "direct seats" in east Berlin, although it failed to win a significant portion of the west German vote and fell short of the 5 percent mark, and returned to the Bundestag with an enlarged delegation.

In the 1998 national election campaign the PDS pursued an essentially similar strategy, attacking "neoliberalism," depicting itself as the firmest advocate of "social justice," and continuing to emphasize its special role as defender of east German interests.[59] It had, however, to contend with the real possibility of an SPD victory and the formation of a national "Red–Green" coalition under Gerhard Schröder, a prospect that could well have attracted voters otherwise inclined to cast a protest vote for the PDS. While it continued to position itself as a genuinely socialist party well to the left of the SPD and Greens, it sought, so it claimed, not to displace those two parties but to push them back toward the left. Bisky, speaking at the party congress at the beginning of 1998, promised to exert pressure not *against* but, rather,

on the SPD and "under present conditions to support the creation of an SPD–Alliance 90/Green government."[60]

The election outcome placed the PDS above the 5 percent threshold for the first time, increasing its Bundestag delegation to thirty-six (later thirty-seven, following a defection from the SPD) and giving it official status as a *Fraktion* (caucus), something previously denied it. Its share of the west German vote increased from 1 percent to 1.2 percent. Four years later, the party had to face its first severe reversal since the immediate postunification period. Its nationwide vote fell to 4 percent (16.9 percent in the east and 1.1 percent in the west), and it was able to elect only two members to individual district seats (Pau and Gesine Lötzsch, both in Berlin), thus depriving it of its right to be represented proportionally in the national parliament.

The results of the last three federal elections, good and bad, underline some of the dilemmas the PDS continues to face. As noted, most east Germans, including those who do not vote for it, now seem to regard it as a "normal," democratic party and the most authentic "voice" speaking on behalf of east German interests.[61] Although it draws on a constituency that might otherwise be attracted to the SPD, it enjoys a strong advantage over that party in terms of organization and membership and is not as obliged as the SPD is to cater to west German concerns. If one believes (as I do) that the east–west economic and cultural divide will be an enduring feature of the German political landscape, the PDS's persistence for some time as a regional party would appear to be assured.

But the party's advantages in the east turn into drawbacks in the west. There the SPD is vastly superior in organization and manpower, and support for the Greens is substantial among the very groups that the PDS seeks to attract. These factors, combined with the greater receptiveness of western voters to the demonization of the party by its enemies, have frustrated the strenuous efforts of the PDS to gain a foothold.[62] Yet the party leadership remains committed to a continuing effort to strengthen the position of the PDS in the west, probably because it sees that as necessary to transcend the 5 percent threshold and thus ensure its place in the Bundestag. That commitment is costly in resources, and the short-term prospects for success appear small, but the mathematics of the situation (east Germans make up less than one-fifth of the total German population) make even minimal gains in the west useful.[63]

The success of the PDS in attracting quite varied groups of voters also contains some perils, persuasively documented by the internal disputes that have flourished throughout its history, leading Bisky at one point to complain of *Besserwisserei und Rechthaberei* (arrogance and self-righteousness) in the party's "discussion culture."[64] Leftist dissenters are troubled by the pragmatic tenor of

the leadership's approach and more particularly by its effort to reduce the influence of the Communist Platform and members of the west German Communist Party; they are also discomfited by the willingness of the leadership to enter coalitions with the SPD and Greens in order to break the power of the German right. Brie has been a special target of their wrath; in 1997 one Communist Platform member called for his expulsion from the party as an "anticommunist" who had inspired a "pogrom atmosphere" in the party.[65] As this language suggests, the assessment of the record of the GDR has been a particular focus of conflict in the PDS. Brie's use of the term *totalitarian* at the January 1999 meeting of the party congress provoked the bitter response from the party's honorary chair, Modrow, that "whether he intend[ed] it or not," Brie had insulted "millions of citizens of eastern Germany."[66] Lothar Bisky, who generally sought to moderate the conflicts between the party's wings, subsequently urged that Brie be placed ahead of Modrow on the candidacy list for the European parliament—perhaps fearing that the reverse order might be misunderstood by some potential voters. Bisky set forth his own position in a thoughtful address marking the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the GDR—held, of all places, in the "Palace of Tears," the former departure point for western visitors and for East German citizens whom the Communist authorities had permitted to leave the country. In it he noted that Bertolt Brecht had never completed a play he had begun on Rosa Luxemburg because, Brecht said, "I would in certain ways have had to argue against the party." Bisky commented, "Exactly that is what we should have done, much more often and much more resolutely."[67] More recently, Zimmer has echoed his views, most notably in a joint statement with Pau apologizing for the use of coercion in the 1946 unification of the Communists with the East German SPD and the subsequent persecution of Social Democrats.[68]

Unlike most of the other successor parties, the PDS has not split into separate reformist and conservative organizations, but the potential for such a division exists. In a surprising number of ways, the PDS resembles the German Greens of a short time ago, sharply divided between *Realos* (realists) and *Fundis* (fundamentalists). In the case of the Greens, the *Realos* ultimately triumphed without splitting the party, which has moved from being an opposition movement whose primary focus was outside the parliament to the coalition partner of the SPD following the 1998 federal elections. However, continuing internecine warfare in the Greens camp has sometimes proven damaging to it in electoral terms.

It is not hard to imagine the PDS following a similar path to political respectability, but as in the case of the Greens the disappointment of those who voted for the party as a mark of protest may be costly once it is forced to make

the compromises required by the sharing of power. Resistance to its accept-
ance on any terms, moreover, remains considerable in the west, and the
CDU still sees attacks on the actual or possible participation of the PDS in
coalition governments as a useful weapon against the SPD.[69] Even CDU
leaders, however, have announced their intention of engaging the PDS in
more "substantive argument" (*einer stärkeren inhaltlichen Auseinandersetzung*)
as (presumably) opposed to undifferentiated denunciation.[70]

Conclusions

How, then, do we explain the ability of PDS leaders to adapt with consider-
able success, in spite of their 2002 setback, to a set of institutions very dif-
ferent from those they were socialized into under Communism? Part of the
explanation resembles that applicable to other successor parties. Disappoint-
ment over the performance of the new democratic regimes and market
economies and a certain nostalgia for the security of earlier times have cre-
ated a potential body of support. The fact that social advancement in the
Communist states tended to depend on membership in the ruling party (per-
haps still more so in the GDR than in other East European states) meant that
the successor parties had available to them some of the most talented and
flexible (if opportunistic) members of society.[71] The PDS, like other succes-
sor parties, retained organizational advantages and numbers of unemployed
or underemployed supporters that new democratic parties (or, in eastern Ger-
many, the branches of west German parties) did not.

More distinctive is the presence of persistent regional resentments in
eastern Germany. Almost all major East German institutions—political, le-
gal, economic, social, educational—were liquidated in the wake of unifica-
tion and replaced with ones transferred wholesale from the west. For many
east Germans, these institutions were perceived as alien impositions that
they had great difficulty in coping with. Lacking effective political represen-
tation in the federal government, seeing their economic resources coming
largely under the control of west German firms, and in some cases finding
their homes threatened by west German claimants, many came to see them-
selves as victims of a new "colonialism."[72] When the leaders of the east Ger-
man citizens' movements proved unable to represent these grievances effec-
tively—partly because of inexperience, partly because most east German
citizens had not, like them, courageously challenged the old order—the PDS
was able to move into their place. Yet it is worth noting that all but a hand-
ful of east Germans now tell polling agencies that on balance German uni-
fication was a good thing—perhaps evidence that, as some have argued, the

PDS has actually served as an instrument of integration for its supporters into the Federal Republic.[73]

As in the case of other East European post-Communist parties, the PDS owes its success in part to the weaknesses and mistakes of its rivals. The relationship between the PDS and the German Social Democrats presents both sides with something of a dilemma, however. The parties compete in considerable measure for the same electorate, but they are also potential coalition partners—in the case of the PDS, the SPD is its only plausible partner, at least on the Land level. The electoral successes of the PDS in the 1999 state and Berlin elections and the European elections came at the expense of the SPD. The precipitous but temporary drop in the popularity of the Schröder government, intensified after it embarked on a painful austerity program, left the PDS as the strongest opposition party in three of the east German states and Berlin. Its success in the European election probably owed a great deal to its outspoken if perhaps opportunistic opposition to the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, a view shared by some 70 percent of east Germans in spite of the bombing being supported by the Red–Green government.

With the SPD's political recovery (thanks in part to CDU scandals), the task of the new PDS leadership became more difficult. In the 2001 Berlin elections it was once again helped by the discomfort of many voters with the Schröder government's support of the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan, although it insisted that its antiwar position was no obstacle to it joining an SPD-led city government. But the closeness of the 2002 federal election (presumably, many potential PDS voters turned to the SPD or Greens in order to block a conservative victory) and the chancellor's co-optation of the Iraq issue undoubtedly hurt the party. Moreover, joining in coalitions with the SPD in the east German states or Berlin, owing to their severe fiscal problems, obliges the party to endorse unpopular budget-cutting measures and restrain its populist rhetoric. Sharing government responsibility in such circumstances could well damage rather than strengthen its electoral appeal, and that appeared to be the case in September 2002.[74] Even the PDS's east German members, however, overwhelmingly accept its participation in coalitions.[75]

In explaining the PDS's success, it is also important to stress that the pragmatic leaders of the PDS were not typical SED members, and certainly not leading functionaries, the most prominent of whom had been expelled from the party in late 1989 and early 1990 in any case. Several had themselves been engaged in discussions of reform prior to fall 1989 or had experience working with dissidents or westerners. It was precisely their apparent freedom from deep involvement in the old regime that enabled them to come to the fore-

front when the SED nearly disintegrated in turmoil after the opening of the Berlin Wall. In eastern Germany, former Communists were not welcomed into newly formed democratic parties, as they were in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, for example, nor was there a large body of dissidents who had years of experience in a virtual underground "parallel state," as in Poland. Thus, the PDS was the only political option available to able young professionals who had been in the SED. The party has also benefited from the frequent inability of its principal competitors, the SPD and CDU, to find candidates and political appeals attractive to eastern voters without risking losses to their western base. And while the PDS continues to suffer some marked disabilities (e.g., the continuing distrust of many voters carried over from the Communist era, steadily decreasing membership numbers, the invariably well publicized internal divisions, and the need to compensate for the apparent loss of its media star, Gysi), the prospects that it will remain a serious force in German politics for some years to come are, on balance, favorable.

Notes

1. I have summarized these changes in Thomas A. Baylis, "Institutional Destruction and Reconstruction in Eastern Germany," in *After the Wall: Eastern Germany since 1989*, ed. Patricia J. Smith (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1998), pp. 15–31. See also Claus Offe, *Varieties of Transition: The East European and East German Experience* (Cambridg, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 182–184.

2. See Mitchell A. Orenstein, *Out of the Red* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), pp. 115–116.

3. See "Rot-rote Koalition in Berlin steht," *Berliner Zeitung*, January 8, 2002.

4. The Czech Republic is a possible exception here, but the Czech Social Democratic Party only became a major electoral force in 1996.

5. Thomas A. Baylis, "The GDR 'on the Eve,'" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 32 (June 1999), pp. 127–138; Thomas Klein, Wilfriede Otto, and Peter Grieder, *Visionen: Repression und Opposition in der SED (1949–1989)* (Frankfurt an der Oder: Frankfurt Oder Editionen, 1999), pp. 504–506.

6. See Konrad Jarausch, *The Rush to German Unity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Charles S. Maier, *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

7. For the following, see the account of Heinrich Bortfeldt, *Von der SED zur PDS* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992), pp. 90–149. See also Peter Barker, "From the SED to PDS: Continuity or Renewal?" in *The Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany*, ed. Peter Barker (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 1–17.

8. Bortfeldt, *Von der SED zur PDS*, p. 172.

9. See Gero Neugebauer and Richard Stöss, *Die PDS: Geschichte. Organisation. Wähler. Konkurrenten* (Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 1996), pp. 42–67.

10. Toralf Staud, "Die roten Panther," *Die Zeit*, June 13, 2001, p. 8.

11. See the interesting exchange on this issue between Gysi and Gabi Zimmer shortly after her nomination as PDS chairperson in Gregor Gysi, *Neue Gespräche über Gott und die Welt* (Berlin: Schwarzkopf und Schwarzkopf, 2000), p. 126. Gysi asks whether the party can deal with the "not inconsiderable contradictions" between its members and its voters; Zimmer replies that "voter interests clearly have priority over party interests."

12. Daniel Hough, "'Made in Eastern Germany': The PDS and the Articulation of Eastern German Interests," *German Politics* 9 (August 2000), p. 142; see also Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS,* p. 149.

13. See Oskar Niedermayer, "Die Stellung der PDS im ostdeutschen Parteiensystem," in *The Party of Democratic Socialism in Germany,* ed. Peter Barker (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), p. 33; Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS,* pp. 228–229; Jonathan Olsen, "Germany's PDS and Varieties of 'Post-Communist' Socialism," *Problems of Post-Communism* 45 (November–December 1998), pp. 42–53; and Wolfgang G. Gibowski, "Who Voted for Whom—and Why," in *Power Shift in Germany,* ed. David P. Conradt, Gerald R. Kleinfeld, and Christian Soe (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), p. 117.

14. See Niedermayer, "Die Stellung der PDS im ostdeutschen Parteiensystem," pp. 31–32.

15. Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS,* p. 52.

16. "Frontal 21 (ZDF) Umfrage zur PDS," available at www.pds-online.de (accessed on May 22, 2001). The survey was carried out by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.

17. Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS,* p. 50.

18. These two categories are worth distinguishing, I think, even though it is difficult to assign specific individuals to one or the other. Reformers have at least something of a vision of what they would like the party and "socialism" to be; pragmatists are motivated more by what they believe will bring the party electoral success and by short-term problem-solving concerns.

19. See the biographical data in Patrick Moreau and Jürgen Lang, *Was will die PDS?* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein Verlag, 1994), pp. 181–182; *Kürchners Volkshandbuch: Deutscher Bundestag, 14. Wahlperiode* (Rheinbreitbach: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1999); and the PDS website, at www.pds-online.de.

20. See "Kein Kirchenchor," *Der Spiegel,* February 3, 1997, p. 62.

21. Bortfeldt, *Von der SED zur PDS,* pp. 141–142. See also the interesting portrait provided in Ann Phillips, "Socialism with a New Face? The PDS in Search of Reform," *East European Politics and Society* 8 (fall 1994), pp. 525–528.

22. See Henry Krisch, "Delegitimation of the Old Regime: Reforming and Transforming Ideas in the Last Years of the GDR," in *German Unification: Processes and Outcomes,* ed. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994), pp. 55–71.

23. See André Brie, *Ich tauche nicht ab* (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1996).

24. Andreas Fraude, "Die PDS in der 'Berliner Republik,'" *Deutschland Archiv* 32 (March–April 1999), pp. 175–176.

25. Helmut Wiesenthal, as cited approvingly in Ralf Possekel, "Sozialismusreform-diskurse in der SED seit 1985," in *Die PDS—Herkunft und Selbstverständnis*, Lothar Bisky et al. (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1996), p. 146.

26. See Annette Ramelsberger, "Ein Händchen für östliche Gefühle," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 13, 2000, p. 3; and Holger Kulick, "Gabi Zimmer macht ihr Ding," *Spiegel Online*, available at www.spiegel.de (accessed on October 7, 2001).

27. Kurt Kister, "Gysi übergibt PDS-Fraktionvorsitz an Claus," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 4, 2000, p. 6.

28. In his first months in this position, Gysi is said to have won "recognition and respect" from his interlocutors in the business establishment. See Hendrik Munsberg, "Gregor, der Dominus," *Berliner Zeitung*, April 22, 2002. But his sudden resignation just a few weeks before the September 2002 federal elections—ostensibly because of his misuse of officially acquired frequent-flyer miles as a Bundestag deputy—threw the party into disarray and is believed to have contributed to its poor electoral showing.

29. Jens Schneider, "Das Ende der Gaukeleien," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 16, 2000, p. 4.

30. See, for example, "Sozialismus ist Weg, Methode, Wertorientierung und Ziel," a document approved at the party's 4th Congress in January 1995, reprinted in *Die PDS—Phönix oder Asche?* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1995), pp. 223–224.

31. In this vein, see Manfred Wilke, "Die Post-Kommunisten und die deutsche Demokratie," *German Studies Review* 20 (May 1997), pp. 293–316.

32. Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS*, p. 119.

33. Jens Reich, "Das Zünglein an der Waage," *Die Zeit*, July 4, 1997, p. 6.

34. Heinrich Bortfeldt's "Die PDS: Auf dem Wege an die Macht" (*German Studies Review* 20 [May 1997], p. 283) describes the small and medium business association Owus and notes that around 41 percent of all small businessmen in east Berlin voted for the PDS in the 1995 city elections.

35. Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS*, pp. 135–136.

36. Patrick Moreau and Jürgen P. Lang, "Aufbruch zu neuen Ufern?" *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, February 2, 1996, p. 55.

37. Nikolaus Werz and Jochen Schmidt, "Die mecklenburg-vorpommersche Landtagswahl vom 27. September 1998: Weichenstellung zur rot-roten Koalition," *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 30 (February 1999), pp. 100, 114; for the initial performance of the coalition, see Jonathan Olsen, "Seeing Red: The SPD-PDS Coalition Government in Mecklenburg/West Pomerania," *German Studies Review* (2000), pp. 557–580.

38. See Bortfeldt, "Die PDS," pp. 281–282, 288–289; and "Die Machtfrage als Spaltpilz der PDS," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, June 13, 1996, p. 4. One of the authors of the Dresden appeal, Christine Ostrowski, became a PDS Bundestag deputy in 1998. On Holter, an engineer, see Bortfeldt's "Die PDS" (pp. 288–289), which describes him as "more technocrat than ideologue."

39. See the illuminating discussion of this issue in Neugebauer and Stöss, *Die PDS*, pp. 136–146.

40. See Wilfried Schulz, "PDS-Programmentwurf—Zumutung oder Kniefall vor der SPD?" *Deutschland Archiv* 34 (July–August 2001), pp. 556–559.

41. Henry Krisch, "The Party of Democratic Socialism: Left and East," in *Germans Divided*, ed. Russell J. Dalton (Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 110.

42. "In communal politics in the new states, PDS officials have for some time been scarcely distinguishable from Social Democrats and Greens. In many places they even work together unspectacularly and without frictions with the CDU" ("Die Einzige Ostpartei," *Der Spiegel*, October 10, 1995, p. 24).

43. See Reich, "Das Zünglein an der Waage," pp. 6–7.

44. See David F. Patton, "Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism in Comparative Perspective," *East European Politics and Society* 12 (fall 1998), pp. 500–526.

45. See Gero Neugebauer, "Die PDS zwischen Kontinuität und Aufbruch," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 28, 2000, pp. 39–46. Neugebauer himself is skeptical about this perspective.

46. "Es geht auch anders: Nur Gerechtigkeit sichert Zukunft!" 2nd Session of 7th Party Congress, Dresden, October 6–7, 2001, available at www.pds-online.de.

47. Jane Curry, "The Return of the Left," *NewsNet: The Newsletter of the AAASS*, May 1997, p. 1.

48. "Beschluss des Parteivorstandes vom 29. November 1994 als Diskussionsgrundlage für den 4. Parteitag," in *Die PDS—Phönix oder Asche?* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1995), pp. 219–220; *PDS: Das Programm* (1995–1997), available at www.pds-online.de.

49. "Beschluss des Parteivorstandes vom 29. November 1994 als Diskussionsgrundlage für den 4. Parteitag," pp. 215–216.

50. Jürgen W. Falter and Markus Klein, "Die Wähler der PDS bei der Bundestagswahl 1994," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 51–52 (1994), p. 31 ff., as cited in *Zur Programmatik der Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1997), p. 282.

51. "Sozialismus ist Weg, Methode, Wertorientierung und Ziel," pp. 222–223.

52. Cited in Richard Schröder, "Nicht radikal im 'üblichen Sinn,'" *Wochenpost*, June 26, 1998, p. 11.

53. "Es geht auch anders."

54. Holger Schmale, "PDS mässigt Kapitalismus-Kritik in neuem Programmentwurf 'Signal für die Gesellschaft,'" *Berliner Zeitung*, April 26, 2001. The 1993 program, the draft of the revision, and documents relating to the current debate can be found on the PDS website at www.pds-online.de.

55. Sigrid Averesch, "Die PDS will von Staatssozialismus abrücken," *Berliner Zeitung*, April 28, 2001.

56. Krisch, "The Party of Democratic Socialism," pp. 112–115. This and the previous paragraph are based largely on Krisch's analysis of documents provided by Brie.

57. Krisch, "The Party of Democratic Socialism," p. 114.

58. The CDU poster warned: "Into the future, but not in red socks." See David P. Conradt, "The Christian Democrats: Just in Time and Just Enough," in *Germans Divided*, ed. Russell J. Dalton (Oxford: Berg, 1996), pp. 34–36. While the campaign may have won the CDU votes in the west, it was judged to have hurt the party in the east, where some CDU officials refused to use it.

59. See Richard Stöss and Gero Neugebauer, "Die SPD und die Bundestagwahl 1998," *Arbeitshefte aus dem Otto-Stammer-Zentrum* 2 (October 1998), pp. 39–46.

60. Stöss and Neugebauer, "Die SPD und die Bundestagwahl 1998," p. 44.

61. "Frontal 21 (ZDF): Umfrage zur PDS." Also see Thomas A. Baylis, "German Leadership after Unification: The Search for Voice," in *The Federal Republic of Germany at Fifty*, ed. Peter H. Merkl (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 135–146.

62. Thus, the intensive effort of the party in the Bremen state election of May 1995 yielded just 2.4 percent of the vote. The PDS nevertheless enjoys its greatest popularity in the west in the city-states of Bremen, Hamburg, and west Berlin (between 2.1 and 2.7 percent in the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections; 6.9 percent in west Berlin in city elections in 2001) and in university towns such as Marburg.

63. See the interesting study of the west German PDS by Jonathan Olsen, "Small Steps, Big Challenges: PDS Local Politics in Western Germany," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the German Studies Association, Washington, D.C., October 4–7, 2001.

64. "Zwischen Opposition und Machtstreben," Berlin *Tagesspiegel*, June 3, 1996, p. 8.

65. Manfred Gerner, "Ein 'grosser Schritt nach vorn'?" *Deutschland Archiv* 30 (March–April 1997), p. 172.

66. Fraude, "Die PDS in der 'Berliner Republik,'" p. 175.

67. "50 Jahre DDR—'Vorwärts und nicht vergessen?'" available at www.pds-online.de.

68. G. Büchner and S. Averesch, "PDS entschuldigt sich für SED-Unrecht an Sozialdemokraten," *Berliner Zeitung*, April 19, 2001. Predictably, the Communist Platform reacted angrily to the apology ("PDS streitet über 'Zwangsvereinigung,'" *Berliner Zeitung*, April 20, 2001).

69. See, for example, Tobias Miller, "Proteste gegen PDS und SPD überschatten Mauer-Gedenken," *Berliner Zeitung*, August 14, 2001.

70. *German News So*, available at www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/germnews (accessed on October 17, 1999).

71. Jennifer Yoder, on the basis of her 1997 interviews with state parliament members, has observed: "Interestingly, it was the PDS politicians who appeared to be most comfortable with conflict, consensus-building, and compromise—perhaps owing to their relatively greater exposure to political affairs. With their educational and career opportunities (often including post-graduate education and positions in some of the more important organizations in the GDR), it is not surprising that these people were

often better prepared for political-managerial roles" (*From East Germans to Germans? The New Postcommunist Elites* [Durham: Duke University Press, 1999], p. 132).

72. See, for example, Wolfgang Dümcke and Fritz Vilmar, eds., *Kolonisierung der DDR* (Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1996).

73. See the suggestive comments of Yoder, *From East Germans to Germans?* pp. 211–213; see also Schröder, "Nicht radikal im 'üblichen Sinn,'" p. 11.

74. The PDS suffered its most severe losses in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and Berlin, the two states in which it had joined an SPD-led government.

75. See Staud, "Die roten Panther," p. 8.

✦

The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists

Luke March

The final demise of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) has been regularly predicted but with equal regularity confounded. The failure of the August 1991 hard-line coup had appeared to obliterate Russian communism. It finally broke the deadlock between the unelected central Soviet state (which the putschists were attempting to save) and the newly elected Russian republican authorities, empowered but embittered by the halfhearted electoral liberalization of Gorbachev's perestroika. In a flurry of decrees, confiscations, and appropriations that amounted to a bold countercoup, Russian President Boris Yeltsin destroyed the institutional and financial bases of Soviet power that were already critically weak by the time of the coup and thoroughly discredited thereafter. The ambiguous support the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its constituent Russian republican organization, the Communist Party of the Russian Federated Soviet Socialist Republic (CP RSFSR), had shown toward the putschists was used by Yeltsin as the excuse to consign communism to history, apparently successfully. Suspended on Russian territory on August 23, 1991, and finally banned on November 6, the party hemorrhaged personnel, property, and the last vestiges of popular sympathy: suspension preempted popular reprisals against the party and provoked minimal outcry at an ignominious and apparently final collapse.

Yet a mere year after successfully overturning the ban in the Constitutional Court, the newly founded CPRF obtained a creditable 12.4 percent in the new Russian Duma (parliament) elections of December 1993, followed

two years later by a 22.3 percent performance that marked it as Russia's most successful national and regional party. But after defeat in the presidential elections of 1996 analysis increasingly focused on the party's organizational and ideological viability, with a common assumption that it might split or evolve into a noncommunist organization (either social democratic or nationalist).[1] Yet, without succumbing to these fates, the party improved its Duma vote in 1999 (24.3 percent) and in 2001 achieved a "new red wave" of gubernatorial victories that gave it influence over thirty-seven regional executives, over one-third of the total.[2] However, under Vladimir Putin the party suffered visible setbacks and internal paroxysms that only reinforced allegations that it was a "Frankensteinian monster" in terminal decline.[3]

This chapter investigates the paradox of the CPRF's long-term development, seeking answers for its apparently intertwined external longevity and internal problems. It is argued that the "anti-system" orientation of the party's culture, structure, mass membership, and electorate made its adaptation to pluralist politics problematic, much as for Western European communist parties decades earlier. Its tenacious adherence to Leninist norms continued to vitiate its evolution in a social democratic direction. Meanwhile, the CPRF's status as a former ruling party added further idiosyncrasies: the party elite's transformation into a within-system opposition was increasingly marked, but the contradiction between within-system orientation and anti-system party formation confronted it with a debilitating long-term multifaceted internal crisis. Indeed, the attainment of a new level of influence within the post-1991 Russian political regime under Putin appeared only to deepen its problems.

Soviet Origins and Their Lasting Legacy

Today's Russian communists proudly declare their origins in the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party founded in 1898, and though hardly an unbroken bloodline, this ancestry casts a long shadow. In the process of permeation into Russia in the late nineteenth century, Marxism fused with domestic populist and revolutionary traditions, assuming a more economically deterministic and rigid aspect than the often-ambiguous writings of its originators, while Marxism-Leninism emerged as a distinct doctrinaire current in the first two decades of the following century. The famed Second Congress of the Russian Social Democrats in 1903 resulted in the irrevocable schism between Lenin's Majority (the Bolsheviks), supporters of a hierarchical "vanguard" party of professional revolutionaries, and the Minority (Menshevik) supporters of a democratic mass party, which matured into the

defining division of the twentieth-century left between revolutionary communists and parliamentary social democrats.

Historians will never cease debating the stages from classical Marxism to Stalinism via Lenin, but I, at least, see more continuity than change. Even if Leninism was just one possible interpretation of Marxism then, by promising to change and not merely to interpret the bourgeois world, it was a revitalization and intensification of that philosophy's revolutionary zeal.[4] Lenin's "coldly practical," at times ruthless, dismissal of all opposition to revolutionary insurrection added an obsession with organization, discipline, and unity.[5] However contingent the lasting suppression of free debate within the CPSU at its Tenth Congress in 1921, Lenin's disparagement of pluralism and parliamentarism ("no politics is the best politics"), when practiced by an insecure self-selecting elite minority in the brutalized and demodernized postwar Russia of the early 1920s, provided the centralism, paranoia, and secrecy on which Stalinism was later able to thrive.

The Stalinist system was far more complex than the dictatorial, rigidly hierarchical, monolithic, and monopolistic police-state and party-state suggested by "totalitarianism," yet this model certainly captured the rigidity of Soviet power and ideology even after Stalin, where the aspiration for complete social and ideological control was periodically reinforced and the increasing resistance to substantive evolutionary change much exacerbated looming socioeconomic crisis. The Soviet Union represented in extreme form what Kitschelt describes as "patrimonial communist" systems, which arose in historically underdeveloped countries with little experience of democratic alternatives. These became hierarchical and repressive systems characterized by the perpetuation of pre-communist clientelism and low levels of popular-interest articulation, helping entrench the social penetration of the communist parties.[6]

The dilution of outright dictatorship after Khrushchev's reforms increased open intraparty conflict, such that "reformers" and "conservatives" became identifiable wings of the CPSU, these labels themselves concealing a number of cryptoparties far behind the official united facade.[7] However, the strength of conservative entrenchment was starkly revealed by Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, which undertook increasingly radical attempts to unleash social initiative and to force the party to relinquish its "leading and guiding role" in sociopolitical and economic management, rightly deemed to have suppressed such initiative. Gorbachev's reforms failed for many reasons, not least because the CPSU itself appeared unreformable: as a nineteen-million strong bureaucratic organization schooled in administrative leadership and concealing a plethora of cryptoparties, its interests were directly threatened by the "socialist

pluralism of opinions" Gorbachev demanded, and it was too divided, cumbersome, and inert to respond to such demands proactively. As an example, only belatedly in June 1990 did conservatives openly organize against perestroika, forming the CP RSFSR within the CPSU and electing a notoriously orthodox Gorbachev critic, Ivan Polozkov, as party boss. But this first incarnation of the CPRF was always weaker than it appeared: still deeply internally divided and averse to social pluralism and open opposition, it bled influence and personnel and symbolically was largely bypassed by the organizers of the August coup. Yet, despite such an incongruous demise, the preconditions for a communist party's reemergence were arguably already apparent.

The organizational origins of a political party maintain a significant influence on party ethos long after the party founders have ceased to do so.[8] John T. Ishiyama's controversial approach to ex-communist "successor parties" (defined as those that inherit "the preponderance of the former ruling parties' resources and personnel") highlights the influence of previous regime legacies and the internal party balance of forces during transition in affecting a party's long-term ability to adapt to post-communism.[9] The overall legacy of patrimonial communism was extensive clientelism, a hierarchical cleavage between the party-state apparatus and society, and a "lopsided power balance" favoring elements of the *ancien régime*, who may benefit from experience, connections, and organization not available to newer competitors.[10] For successor parties the patrimonial communist legacy was twofold: parties had, first, further to travel to evolve into programmatic parties committed to democratic competition (and hence in a potentially social democratic dimension) and, second, less need to because they benefited from the regime's intensive insider networks. So a comparatively "unreconstructed" party such as the CPRF remained so because it has benefited from greater organizational and ideological continuity than other competitors and was perhaps always likely to be a major post-communist actor.

We can partially agree with Sakwa that party origins and path dependency have limited utility in explaining successor party evolution, for the interaction of internal party strategy and national environment produces increasingly divergent party trajectories.[11] Indeed, many successor parties have tried to form a "nationally authentic socialism"—neither a complete return to Leninism nor a capitulation to Western models but, rather, a nationally specific and historically grounded idiom for the previously discredited domestic left.[12] Still, legacy remains important and helps explain national idiosyncrasies shown even by "orthodox" post-Soviet communist parties. Viewed in this light, current CPRF leader Gennady Zyuganov belongs to the strong Soviet protonationalist "national Bolshevik" tradition, which historically de-

fended communism less for its Marxist theoretical validity than for its contribution to superpower status.[13] In contrast, in Ukraine deep ethnolinguistic and geographical schisms meant that "nationalism and communism occupy polar extremes," making the neo-Leninist Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) far less able to exploit national communism.[14] The Czech Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia similarly espoused a conservative communism with a mere patina of nationalism.

Although Gorbachev's inability to social democratize the CPSU was not preordained, reflecting his personality and circumstances as well as the weak Soviet democratic tradition, his "humane democratic socialism" left lasting political polarization and further discredited moderate left alternatives. Ishiyama's above-cited definition of "successor parties" ignores the fact that in Russia not the CPRF but, in fact, the post-1991 Yeltsin regime's "party of power" best fits his definition, having sequestered the CPSU's property in 1991 and showing significant elite continuity at national and regional levels (as an ex-CPSU candidate Politburo member, Yeltsin himself is the obvious example). With the upper echelons of the CPSU elite deadlocked on the eve of the Soviet Union's breakup, more pragmatic members of the party's lower rung essentially seized power by divesting themselves of socialist ideology. The origins in the former communist elite (nomenklatura) of both the Russian communist successor party and its nominally "reformist" opponents was to stamp both with clientelistic state-oriented preferences and aversion to mass initiative, at its most extreme a post-Stalinist "moral ethos" of clandestine bureaucratic maneuvering and opportunism.

Conservatives who coalesced around the CP RSFSR in 1990 were not simply instinctive reactionaries but, rather, ranged from devout Leninists to anti-Marxist nationalists seeking a Russian revival within or instead of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A sharp apparatus/rank-and-file division among them was apparent in the more bureaucratic and pragmatic attitude of such CPSU functionaries as Valentin Kuptsov, whose initial support for perestroika stopped at systemic transformation, and contrasted with the ideologically radical and antinomenklatura emphasis of the lower activist stratum.[15] It was these latter who precipitated the formation of the CP RSFSR in response to the CPSU leadership's procrastination. Polozkov's election as CP RSFSR leader precisely expressed the militant Marxist-Leninist mood of many of the party's lower echelons.[16] Aghast at this outcome, most of the CP RSFSR's moderates increasingly deserted the conservative rump.

The ban (in place until November 30, 1992) winnowed this antireform rump down further while increasing the gap between leaders and ranks.

Moderates in the leadership had achieved a partial victory in the replacement of the ineffective Polozkov by Kuptsov in mid-1991 but scarcely had time to consolidate their leadership before the coup. Yet in the new post-Soviet Russian Federation they were immediately prompted to activity, contesting the ban in the Constitutional Court while carrying out clandestine activity to regenerate contacts among party members across Russia.[17] Meanwhile some half-dozen left-wing movements descended from earlier protoparties within the CPSU claimed the successor party mantle and perpetuated grassroots communist activity. The most significant of these were the moderate left Socialist Party of Workers (SPW); the radical Marxist-Leninist Russian Communist Workers' Party, headed by Viktor Tyulkin; and its front group, "Working Russia," dominated by the incendiary neo-Stalinist Viktor Anpilov.

Successful contestation of the ban meant that the CP RSFSR leadership emerged with increased unity and prestige and was able to win the ensuing race to dominate the reconstituted successor party by a mixture of manipulation (stacking the organizing committee with favored personnel and blocking competing initiatives, among other ploys) and pragmatism (formulating a vague and inclusive policy outline emphasizing communist unity), so demonstrating patrimonial communist traits.[18] Most of the competitor groups were hampered by leadership ambitions and sectarianism, while the replacement of Kuptsov as party leader by Zyuganov at the "II 'revival-unification' congress" of the CPRF (as it was now called) in February 1993 was a particular concession to pragmatism—the latter's "Russian patriotic" image was honed in party-authorized participation in radical nationalist groups in 1992–1993 and was deemed more amenable to most party tendencies than the former's more "Gorbachevite" slant. However, Kuptsov remained Zyuganov's first deputy, arguably the party's *éminence grise*, and controlled its organizational reins.

The process of the party's rebirth had further long-term effects. Both the moderate Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) and Russia's moderate SPW were used by communists as a pretext for continued legal activity, but Oleksandr Moroz was a much more effective and independent leader of the SPU than the nominal leaders of the SPW, while the Ukrainian communist hierarchy had little direct involvement with the running of the SPU. In contrast, moderate Russian communists (such as Kuptsov and Ivan Rybkin) were heavily involved in the SPW's parliamentary affairs.[19] Moroz's relative control appeared to be a reason why the SPU survived the revival of the communist "mother ship," while most of the SPW was reabsorbed by the CPRF, lastingly devastating Russia's independent center left.[20] The dominant postcongress leadership group shared a consensus on reorienting the

party toward post-Soviet conditions (such as the mixed economy and political pluralism), without divorcing it from its name, ideology, or heritage. Zyuganov's election was clearly a contingent factor, a combination of his own propaganda skills and the communists' need to exploit "patriotism" when their own ideology had just avoided a new Nuremberg, but it made the CP RSFSR's original protonationalist orientation lasting. Nonetheless, with the rank and file also relatively mobilized, the leaders exercised weak central control.

The CPRF was thus from the outset more moderate and innovative but less internally unified than the CPU. Just as for the Ukrainian communists, the ban only encouraged Russian communists to regard the post-Soviet regime as fundamentally illegitimate. However, the moderates' behavior in court (where they had used the arguments of democracy and constitutionality against Yeltsin) showed their ability to work within the existing regime. This tendency was reinforced by the leadership's decision to contest the December 1993 Duma elections, held under the recently promulgated "Yeltsin" constitution. This widened the chasm between the CPRF and the radical splinter groups but was vindicated by the CPRF's election result and the secular decline of the extraparliamentary left thereafter.

Lessons from the West European Communist Experience

Leftist critics' castigation of the CPRF's parliamentary breakthrough was seldom less than hyperbolic, but they rightly noted that its participation in the "bourgeois" political system only initiated a long-simmering crisis.[21] Analyzing how communist parties behave in pluralist systems helps us to understand this paradox. Like the British Labour Party at the turn of the twentieth century, the CPRF faced the choice of being "his Majesty's opposition" or "opposition to his Majesty,"[22] that is, the choice between within-system and anti-system opposition. As Sartori argues, within-system opposition parties form "responsible" alternative governments that do not seek to act outside the constitutional and legal "rules of the game."[23] However, anti-system parties have very little chance of being called on to govern, and so their actions need no acceptance of "rules of the game," limits of the constitution, or legality. The communist parties of Western Europe in the early postwar decades long tended toward this opposition. As "foreigners encamped in a hostile country," they followed Lenin's dictum "the worse, the better"—all policies were seen as class actions, and so anything the ruling class did was to be condemned and anything done in the name of the working class was to be approved.[24] They preferred obstructive or noncommittal opposition, refusing

all but temporary compromises with the ruling regime. Using bourgeois par-
liaments as "tribunes" for ideological demagogy, they offered purely demon-
strative nonconstructive demands meant to destabilize the capitalist system.

However, for communist anti-system parties, long-term participation in
pluralist politics is deeply problematic. As Harding argues, the consistent train
in Marxist-Leninist thought was that it was a superior systemic alternative, a
"philosophy of certainty" designed to sweep all challengers away.[25] This claim
was easier to maintain in a one-party state where Marxism-Leninism acted as
a "state religion demanding universal obeisance."[26] In contrast, pluralistic
polities demand a different role for ideology where persuasion and securing
the consent of would-be supporters and social groups become all-important.[27]
But such tactical compromises raise acute difficulties for communist ideology.
Historically Leninism's rejection of all eclecticism and all competing ideolo-
gies meant that its space for theoretical innovation was extremely narrow, and
it entered a crisis when it encountered "cultures and institutions that legit-
imize difference."[28] When the West European communist parties were chal-
lenged by the postindustrial erosion of collectivist, working-class identities
and the degeneration of Marxism-Leninism's viability as a coherent socioeco-
nomic alternative in the post-Stalin period, an intense crisis was sparked that
encompassed simultaneously the "societal" dimension of communism (party
links with society and electoral performance) and the "teleological" dimen-
sion of communism (party ideology, strategy, and organization), presaging an
inexorable decline in party support, structure, and identity.[29]

The experience of "Eurocommunism" in particular has salutary lessons for
the CPRF. This movement, promoted from the 1970s primarily by the Italian
Communist Party (ICP), Communist Party of Spain, and French Communist
Party (FCP), amounted to communism's acceptance of pluralism, often with
ambiguity or reluctance (particularly in the case of the FCP) and led to the
gradual breakdown in coherence of communism itself. Eurocommunism
marked the congruence of two major changes. First, in response to such crisis
phenomena, Eurocommunists sought to turn from Soviet practice toward na-
tional development and to seek alliances and support beyond the traditional
working class.[30] This led to tactical changes: after long periods of postwar am-
bivalence, there was the final acceptance of the legitimacy of electoral poli-
tics and evolutionism as a means of creating a noncapitalist society.[31] Second,
these tactical changes eventually fed into theoretical changes, such as the re-
jection of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Inexorably, such theoretical changes began to weaken the Eurocommu-
nists' critique of capitalism, thereby eroding their "extrasystemic" vision and
the ontological distinction between communism and social democracy.[32] Eu-

rocommunist parties such as the ICP found themselves impaled upon the dilemma of evolutionary socialism. With their tactics *becoming* their aims, the nineteenth-century German revisionist Marxist Eduard Bernstein's dictum, "the ultimate aim of socialism is nothing, but the movement is everything," came back to haunt the communists.[33] Apart from Leninist organizational structure and the communist name, their policies and practice became de facto almost indistinguishable from those of convinced social democrats.

The CPRF's Multifaceted Crises

The particular crisis affecting ex-ruling communist parties in post-communist systems has specificities. One can obviously speak of a general crisis of post-Soviet political parties, fragmented in ideology and organization and having to consolidate in rapidly changing conditions. The inherited political capital of communist parties such as those in Russia and Ukraine could make them appear vibrant compared with these. Yet the crisis of the CPRF was also worse because like the CPU it "remained steeped in the mythology of Soviet development."[34] With the post-Soviet regimes scarcely an enticing model of advanced democracy, the acceptance of the "bourgeois" system was more grudging and less philosophically driven than the Eurocommunists'. But because the political system was developing rapidly and communist ideology was losing its dynamism simultaneously, this made defining a coherent "anti-system" position still harder and led to a more intense crisis than confronted the Eurocommunists over the decades.

Crisis Tendencies in Social Support

Many of the CPRF's problems in social support result from its strongly programmatic organization. The CPRF is still an ideological party, "the party of the communist idea."[35] All other Russian parties show "charismatic" elements, but among the CPRF electorate, support for the party program is far higher than support for the party leader.[36] This is its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. On one hand, this guarantees a relatively consolidated party and stable electorate. On the other, it limits the opportunities the CPRF can gain in Russia's fluid political system.

The ideological nature of the CPRF has been reflected clearly in its electorate, which, as analysts have noted, has too hard a core and too hard a ceiling.[37] Its supporters are the most strongly ideologically committed in the Russian electorate, which even in conditions of widespread voter volatility has guaranteed the CPRF a bedrock vote of 15 to 20 percent. Yet these attitudes (mainly evidence of a Soviet-era value culture) are polarizing and perceived

negatively by an electorate that regularly expresses nostalgia for Soviet times without a desire to return to communism.[38] The long-term polarization of Russian politics into "reform" and "antireform" camps resulted in a relatively stable "antireform" camp with an absolute maximum vote of roughly 40 percent (that which Zyuganov obtained in the elections of 1996).[39] This vote guaranteed the party a strong position in the Duma contests but was insufficient to win the presidential elections without allies, a point long ago realized by the communists.

The CPRF's inflexibility also pervades its party structure. The party copied the CPSU's blueprint in diluted form, with primary party organizations formed in eighty-eight of Russia's regions, predominately on a territorial basis after Yeltsin had banned workplace organization in 1991, although this did not always hold in communist-held areas. It was governed initially by a 159-member Central Committee representing its regional and divisional leaders, itself governed by a ruling seventeen-person presidium and a varying number of deputy chairmen below Zyuganov. Internally, it operated on a relaxed Leninist "democratic centralism" reflecting its self-perception as a democratic mass party based on an activist membership and avoiding the bureaucratism of the CPSU.[40] But as many have shown, "mass parties" whose organization, program, and membership have strong organized ties with specific social strata tend to be strategically and electorally inert.[41]

Indeed, the CPRF seemed caught in a "classic constitutional bind."[42] Like so many communist parties before, it appeared unable to come to power through pluralist politics at all—a problem of which it was keenly aware.[43] The more compromises it made in order to reach power, the more it upset its core supporters and risked a party split: the more it cultivated these supporters, the more likely it was to remain in an electoral ghetto. This was a significant factor in the CPRF's defeat in the 1996 presidential elections. The party's inability to provide a coherent campaign message, to create a genuinely broad electoral coalition, to use the media proactively, and finally to change strategies midcampaign contrasted with Yeltsin's flexibility in all these areas. Yeltsin, of course, was unencumbered by a rigid party organization.

Further developments suggested that these problems were integral to the CPRF's party model. Traditional mass parties might indeed prove suboptimal in post-Soviet societies, where state and elite remain dominant in distributing political resources and "cadre" organizations with smaller mass memberships, a pronounced role for the party elite, and dependency on the state may emerge.[44] The CPRF reflected this, its formal mass organization very attenuated, regionalized, and fractured compared with the CPSU, while contradic-

tory cadre tendencies reemerged. Tiersky shows that parties based even on relaxed democratic centralism (with top leaders only indirectly elected by the party base and an emphasis on unquestioning fulfillment of leadership decisions) tend toward inert internal party life and unaccountable leadership.[45] The CPRF hierarchy formed a co-optive oligarchy around Zyuganov and Kuptsov, who despite friction formed an unshakable axis. The leadership's ability to preempt, co-opt, and suppress opposition by relying on opaque methods of informal pressure was facilitated by the insistence on unity. Zyuganov's ouster of Oleg Shenin, the leader of the ephemeral but ultratraditionalist communist successor group, the Union of Communist Parties (UCP)–CPSU, in early 2001 showed just such methods in action.[46]

By 1997, the party had allegedly become increasingly financially dependent on the state, said to provide up to 95 percent of its funding by such means as funding the approximately eight hundred parliamentary aides who doubled as the party's unofficial apparat.[47] A vast reserve of volunteers formed the base, but these were themselves impoverished, and the party was increasingly forced to negotiate with banks and entrepreneurs to substitute for capital lost in 1991. The party got mileage from funds placed in commercial structures before 1991 and channeled back through intermediaries who had benefited from the "*nomenklatura* capitalism" process.[48] These "red businessmen," such as Viktor Vidmanov and "red millionaire" and casino owner Vladimir Semago, became CPRF sponsors and were rewarded with party positions or Duma seats. This process became ever more transparent as the party's opposition to national capital eroded. In 1999 communist critics noted the presence of dozens of previously unknown businessmen on the party list, the most prominent of whom, Gennadii Semigin, became Duma deputy chair. However, business support remained weak, and the party remained dependent on its army of door-to-door election activists.[49] These kept its core vote mobilized, but those schooled in "communist banality and standard thinking" could not overcome the media's distrust or reach out to undecided strata, while "virtual" parties such as the pro-Putin Edinstvo ("Unity" political bloc) could achieve this simply through sophisticated propaganda and negligible grassroots organization.[50] Recognizing weaknesses in the coverage of its 470 regional papers, the party encouraged its members to "log on." Yet, despite the increasing professionalism of the CPRF's propaganda overall, Russia's poor wages and telecommunications drastically impeded its political parties' virtual campaigning potential.

The CPRF certainly much broadened its support in most social strata in 1993–1995. It ceased being the party of "pensioners" or "losers" alone and became also the party of the "relatively deprived," increasingly representing

managers, the Military Industrial Complex, white-collar workers, and professionals who had experienced a status decline since Soviet times or for whom such a decline had been slowly reversed (such as the red businessmen).[51] Yet even in 1999 the CPRF's support remained heavily drawn from the most socially excluded—those on lower incomes, rural voters, and the less educated, particularly those in the communist "red-belt" areas south of the 55th parallel. The party's base remained weak among the under-thirty-fives and strongest in the over-fifties.[52]

Indeed, rather than being the vanguard of the young and working class, the party proper was, according to Boris Kagarlitskii, an "apparat clientele."[53] Only some seventy thousand of the half-million membership in 1998 were not ex-CPSU.[54] Even in December 2000, twenty-one of the CPRF's twenty-four top leaders were from the CPSU apparat. Official party membership held relatively steady (see Table 5.1), and at its Seventh Congress in December 2000 the party claimed to have significantly rejuvenated its cadres. There was some increase in party support among the middle-aged strata and younger, more impoverished students in response to the party's increasing pragmatism.[55] Concentrated efforts to enlarge youth support resulted in claims of forty-eight thousand new members in 1998–2000 and twenty-five thousand from 2001 to mid-2002. The majority was said to be

Table 5.1. Trends in Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) Membership, 1993–2002

Year	Number of Members	Number of Primary Party Organizations	Average Age of Delegate to CPRF Congress
1993 (February)	450,000[a]		50[b]
1994		20,000[a]	
1995			47[b]
1996	600,000[a]		
1997		27,000[b]	46[c]
1998	550–560,000[b]		
1999	530,000[d]		
2000 (December)	547,000[e]	17,316[e]	49[b]
2002 (January)		17,812[f]	51[g]

a. J. Barth Urban and V. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder: Westview, 1997).
b. CPRF documents and interviews by the author.
c. R. Sakwa, *The Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Electoral Process* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1996).
d. S. Chernyakovskii, "The Communist Party of the Russian Federation," in M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov, *Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
e. *Kommersant*, December 2, 2000.
f. Gennady Zyuganov, report at the Seventh CPRF Congress, available at www.kprf.ru.
g. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, January 21, 2002.

in the twenty-five to forty-year-old range, with some one-third of all new members under thirty.[56] Leaders, however, admitted that this was insufficient for sustainable growth, while the party's base organizations appeared to be in decline and there was no evidence for Zyuganov's view of a party average age of thirty-five to forty-five (see Table 5.1).[57] At least part of this growth was due to a relaxation of membership requirements and an opportunistic influx of business sponsors in the 1999 elections, which contradicted the Leninist demand that communists were "better fewer but better" and led to demands for greater internal control.[58]

The CPRF asserted its preference for "vanguard" forms of nonparliamentary activity over parliamentary politics.[59] Yet some 60 percent of party members remained over sixty, and declining national demonstrations seldom mustered more than one-third of the party's membership.[60] Ultimately any attempts to regain influence over political capital lost in 1991 were vitiated by the centrifugal tendencies in Russian society and the communists' own conformist approach. Leaders acknowledged that the "vanguard was lagging" and expressed little confidence in their ability to provoke or lead social protest.[61] Many post-Soviet trade unions remained "transmission belts," more representative of management and the regime than workers they purported to represent. The largest union, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (with 95 percent of union members), sought alliances with centrist blocs and attacked the CPRF's politicized, sloganeering, and interfering approach, proclaiming in 2002 that relations had broken down irrevocably.[62] Relations with youth organizations were as critical. After a break with its allied youth league, the Komsomol, in 1997, the CPRF founded its own loyalist Union of Communist Youth (the "Sokomol") in 1999, allegedly by using dirty tactics against the Komsomol.[63] This claimed some thirty-eight thousand members through both a pragmatic approach, addressing youth's material needs (such as state support of young families), and increasing "careerist" tendencies, although many youths regarded it as a bureaucratic organization.[64]

Contradictory Tendencies in Ideology

The CPRF's ideological incoherence is illustrated by the number of labels that have been applied to it, from nationalist, to quasifascist, to social democratic. In truth it contains all such trends, reflecting its origins as a broad "antireform" coalition. The party's precise ideological makeup is shifting and obscured by the insistence on party unity, but the most persuasive broad scheme of party ideological tendencies is still that offered by Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei.[65] The "Marxist reformers," such as Valentin Kuptsov and the

Duma chairman Gennadii Seleznev, represent a modernized antibureaucratic Marxism that has social democratic elements but remains conservative and statist—unabashed social democrats are few. This group dominates the party's upper echelons but contributes little to open party debate, still vulnerable to allegations of "Gorbachevism."

Leader Gennady Zyuganov's "nationalists" (more fittingly dubbed by Sakwa "statist-patriotic communists" for their latent commitment to supraethnic principles) are the weakest party trend numerically—overt Russophilism and support for national capitalism are still party taboos.[66] The traditionalists, called "Marxist-Leninist modernizers" by Urban and Solovei, can be further subdivided—with the chief representatives being orthodox theoreticians such as Viktor Trushkov who defend a modernized Marxism-Leninism from nationalist or social democratic deviations and, unlike the former two trends, are completely antithetical to market economics. The bulk of the rank and file subscribe to a less theoretical "red patriotism" with an emotional commitment to all sacred symbols of Soviet power. This ranges from internationalist trends to the anti-Semitic national chauvinism espoused by former chair of the Duma security committee Viktor Ilyukhin, which is not antithetical to Zyuganov's position.

Ideological divisions are just one of the intraparty cleavages. The most important (as illustrated below) is the moderate–radical polarity, encompassing the sociocultural nomenklatura–mass divide and the degree of adaptation to post-communist politics.[67] Important also are institutional and resource-centered tensions, most prominently between party central committee and parliamentary fraction, regional leaders (the "*obkom* lobby") and the center, and the staffs of the key leaders, most prominently in Kuptsov's party apparatus.

Given such divisions, what unites the party? Above all is the commitment to a conservative communism, whereby in the post-Stalin manner communism is less a teleological project than an emotional attachment to symbols and institutions associated with national greatness, such as the communist name and flag.[68] Most party radicals are themselves conservatives by age and inclination, not supporting the more revolutionary stances of the radical extraparliamentary communist parties. The moderates' more pragmatic communism involves "conserving" historical continuity with the best of Soviet tradition while eliminating its worst features.[69] Overall, the CPRF is a profoundly conservative party that finds itself heir to a revolutionary tradition, a paradox exacerbated by its increasing ideological hesitancy. Valentin Kuptsov has even noted a "loss of historical optimism" afflicting the party.[70]

Nevertheless, the communist elements of party identity remain important, with the party's continued commitment to elements of the Marxist-

Leninist theoretical heritage evident. Above all the adherence to communism as an *ideology of organization* cannot be understated, with organization being described as the raison d'être of post-Leninist communism.[71] To its believers, communism remains a subcultural "moral community" imposing high activism and loyalty.[72] Moreover, the cult of unity has traditionally been not a formal aspect of party organization but, rather, a key principle internalized as a code of ethics. In the CPRF the respect for higher authority and unwillingness to risk unsanctioned activity, together with the aspiration for consensus and conflict avoidance, remain paramount.[73] These communist elements are missed by accounts that see the party as developing smoothly into a nationalist or social democratic organization. The final glue that welds the party together is its consistent notion that it is an anti-system party seeking to replace, not modify, the capitalist order.[74]

The CPRF's dilemma has been to exploit electoral politics without compromising this anti-system ideology. Historically, communist parties often sought to participate fully in pluralist electoral politics through noncommunist fronts, which allowed them to extend their electorate beyond the party faithful while preserving the integrity of their ideology from the taint of multiparty politics.[75] The front strategy was controversial, however, because it involved a constant tension between the needs of the party and those of the bloc.[76] The CPRF has taken this to extremes by the promulgation of two contradictory, intertwined, though analytically distinct ideologies side by side. These are its public and party ideologies.

Public Ideology

This is the ideology propounded by party leader Zyuganov and other "statist-patriots" such as Yurii Belov and the nonparty academic Aleksei Podberezkin, a close colleague of Zyuganov until his split from the CPRF in 1999. It appears in Zyuganov's writings, the electoral platforms of the various national-patriotic blocs from the National Salvation Front of 1992 to the National-Patriotic Union of Russia (NPUR) of 1996, and many electoral platforms of the CPRF itself. Though often regarded as identical to the CPRF's ideology, it should be seen as analytically distinct, and it is regarded as such by party members who see Zyuganov as fulfilling the specific directive from the leadership of reinventing the communist idea for the noncommunist electorate.[77] It has been supported even by party members who disagree with it ideologically, as a tactical method of overcoming the deep public scorn in which communism has been held.

The basic contours of this ideology are well known.[78] In both form and language it is derived from nineteenth-century Russian conservative

thought, the antifascist fronts used from 1942 onward by the Komintern, the national-communist ideology of the Great Patriotic War, and the electoral front strategies of the Western European communist parties after World War II. The common thread running throughout is the attempt to downplay ideological differences and the doctrine of class struggle for the sake of uniting disparate class forces against a common enemy.[79] The unifying idea is "state patriotism." This is an updated form of national bolshevism, which, as often in the Soviet era, is used to justify many of the same de facto goals as communism, such as state power, empire, and collectivism, but from a different *national-patriotic* perspective, thereby maximizing alternative sources of support while minimizing ideological compromise. All social forces are to rally round in defense of the Russian state and civilization as the bulwark against encroaching Western values.

The deviations from Marxism-Leninism are stark. To name just a few, 1917 is no longer seen as a fundamental break, and Russia's thousand-year-long history is marked by harmonious statehood, not class struggle. Communism in Zyuganov's view is a national and spiritual tradition, not a materialist doctrine, and he went so far to court the Orthodox Church that this at times looked like the "theologisation of socialism."[80] Analysts have focused on whether this is a nationalist, communist, left-wing, or right-wing ideology.[81] To a degree this is beside the point—it contains elements of all in a hegemonic rejectionist anti-modern movement, which is still consistent with Marxism-Leninism's militant opposition to liberal democracy. Zyuganov's anti-Westernism, antiliberalism, and anticapitalism are evident in his insistence that Russia is a separate civilization, diametrically opposing the alien liberal democratic values of the "anti-national regime" that the "reformers" allegedly seek to graft onto Russia. This redefines the old ideological enemy in terms amenable to noncommunists, while leaders are adept at tacking to their audience: in the public sphere, claims to respect multiparty politics, private property, and constitutionalism have a social democratic sheen.[82] In party forums, claims that class analysis is to be supplemented and not replaced reassure the party.

This ideological eclecticism is a virtue, as Tsipko notes, allowing Zyuganov to "look like a communist in the eyes of . . . Communists and . . . look like a patriot in the eyes of those who consider themselves ethnic Russians."[83] Problems arise, however, because Zyuganov's statist-patriotic orientation is part of his basic beliefs, and he has increasingly sought to make it the party's ideological cornerstone. His attempt to combine incompatible philosophies contributes to the communists' lack of future-oriented vision. This "nationalism" even lacks an unambiguous concept of nation at its core, and the Stalin question is barely mentioned.[84] In time the party's

increasing adaptation to post-communism would corrupt the intensity of its rejectionist front.

Party Ideology

Of the two ideologies, it is that expressed in the party program that is considered the basis of the party's activity and a statement of its main strategic tasks.[85] It is not considered an electoral document but, rather, an objective evaluation of the political situation. However, balancing the strategic and ideological aims of the program and the tactical aims of party platforms has been extremely problematic. The changes advocated by party moderates since 1993 were modest: participation in electoral politics and the search for new allies and tactical approaches in the absence of class activism.[86] But even modest changes invariably affected ideology. Party critics alleged that in orientating the party toward parliamentary politics, and allying with nationalists even on a temporary basis, the party was prioritizing "bourgeois" tasks.[87]

Accordingly, the first party program of 1995 had to make many concessions from the moderate leadership to the radical party base and party theorists, particularly the "Marxist-Leninist modernizer" tendency.[88] Earlier drafts' criticisms of Soviet socialism and positive references to humanism and multipartyism were excised (with state socialism's mistakes now attributed mainly to the "petit bourgeois" elite and "careerists"), although commitments to rights and freedoms were retained. The ideas of the statist-patriotic modernizers suffered significant reverses, with "developing Marxism-Leninism" and "dialectical materialism," not "state patriotism," reaffirmed as the party's guiding stars.[89] Where Zyuganov's ideas did make the grade, they tended to be couched in a more palatable theoretical language for the benefit of party activists, patriotism being explicitly linked with internationalism.

The main accent of the program was a searing and defiant attack on all things capitalist, from the Yeltsin regime to exploitative consumer economics. Concrete proposals reinforced the rejection of the post-1991 order and the claim that the conflict between capitalism and socialism was unfinished. The party's dalliance with parliamentary methods, alliances with nationalists, and forbearance toward the mixed economy were confined to the first temporary stage of a three-stage transition to a classless society. After a communist electoral victory at the end of the first stage, the party envisaged the replacement of the presidential "antipopular constitution" of 1993 with a Soviet-style constitution introducing a parliamentary republic, a system of soviets and "popular power" on the way to the resurrection of the USSR. The party's economic promises were no less maximalist, with the ultimate

aim the socialization of property and collectivization of labor led by the working class.

This represented an eclectic mix of the least controversial viewpoints of each party tendency. While it achieved an intraparty balance of interests and presented a united, aggressive facade, it showed how interlinked ideological and tactical change were and that Zyuganov's new orientation was far from universally popular. Indeed, the party's sole real innovation, the notion of global ecologically balanced "sustainable development," remained difficult for many in the party to equate with class struggle.[90]

Developments within the party after 1995 confirmed this. The party increasingly said totally different things to its core membership and wider electorate, and tensions between party and public ideology became ever more apparent. For example, the *platform* for the parliamentary election in 1995 made no reference at all to socialism or Marxism-Leninism and only referred to the existence of a separate and recently adopted party *program* in passing.[91] Still more controversial were later electoral platforms of the national-patriotic bloc such as Zyuganov's 1996 electoral platform and that of the NPUR. Populist patriotism dominated, and there was no mention of programmatic aims such as socialism, restoration of the USSR, or nationalization.[92] After the 1996 election defeat, party leaders urged theoretical renewal of the party in a more moderate direction, drawing on both patriotism and social democracy.[93] Yet the revised 1997 party program contained only minor changes in a more orthodox communist direction, and the 2002 version differed only in purely technical changes to accord with legal requirements.[94] The more the leadership engaged with post-communist politics, the greater the dissonance of public and party ideologies. Critics increasingly asserted that the reorientation toward national development, evolutionism, and pluralism implied by "state patriotism" made communism an increasingly eclectic, not comprehensive, worldview. With the class critique of the capitalist state lost, the party would repeat the Eurocommunists' mistakes.[95] Critics continually demanded that the party link communist ideology and practice.[96]

The CPRF's ideological incoherence further affected its electoral conduct. The strongly class-based position of the communist parties in the Czech Republic and Ukraine allowed them to monopolize the far left of the political spectrum while ceding the center ground to more moderate leftist forces such as the Czech Social Democrats and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. The CPRF's greater ability to draw on the matrix of national communism gave it aspirations to broaden its support beyond its niche to the national-bourgeois "right" while running the risk of being outflanked from the orthodox "left," which was less a distinct electoral threat than an ideological millstone within

the party. The CPRF would have to constantly tack between its leftist and more centrist supporters and risked satisfying neither.

The Parliamentary Pragmatists versus the Anti-system Radicals

If the CPRF's ideology was becoming increasingly incoherent, then the parliamentary road to power began to break down its viability as an anti-system force. This was barely evident in the fifth Duma of 1993–1995 because the relatively small size of the party's fraction (forty-five) allowed it to avoid sharing responsibility with the regime and to use the Duma as a "tribune" for its nonconstructive opposition, where it usually opposed the budget and expressed its condemnation of both new Duma and constitution.[97]

Yet the size of the CPRF's representation in the sixth Duma of 1996–1999 (157 seats) opened up a new dilemma. Even by donating deputies to create two loyalist satellite fractions (the Agrarian and "Popular Power" groups), the combined total of some 211 fell far short of the 300 needed to overturn a presidential veto or change the constitution but was too large to avoid sharing responsibility for key government decisions such as the budget. In fact, in this parliamentary session the party was to combine increasingly strident rhetoric with unprecedented docility, approving the renewal of Viktor Chernomyrdin's premiership, delegating its ally Aman Tuleev to his government as minister for cooperation with countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States in August 1996, and approving subsequent budgets even after foot-dragging. Whereas Lenin had insisted on the need for communists to remain true to their revolutionary purpose "through all compromises," the CPRF appeared not nearly so steadfast.[98]

Certainly, the leadership's nomenklatura background played a role. Participation in the Duma tended to foster dialogue between legislative and executive over a shared aversion to repetition of the violent events of October 1993. In the absence of the extraparliamentary possibilities and revolutionary fervor of that period, most CPRF deputies in the fifth Duma sought to maximize parliamentary possibilities and exhibited tendencies toward constructive opposition and "strategic compromise" with the regime, in order to "save what [could] be saved" of Soviet values.[99] The 1996 presidential elections marked the moment a demoralized CPRF crossed the Rubicon, showing that it lacked sufficient support among workers or the general electorate to challenge a regime that had presided over a socioeconomic disaster and that it might well be banned even should it legitimately win a presidential election.[100] Moreover, the victory of anticommunism in the 1996 election is persuasively credited by McFaul and Petrov with initiating the end of the

lasting electoral polarization between reform and antireform blocs and much bloc realignment.[101] This was to seriously weaken the salience of the CPRF's antiregime stance and exacerbate intraparty divisions, but it also offered the possibility of more pragmatic relations with previous opponents in the political elite.

Indeed, a symbiotic relationship between regime and opposition crystallized after the 1996 elections, as the party ignored the urging of its radicals to denounce the election result and vote down the premier. Instead it sought to work within the system and lobby the executive for a shift in executive power from president to parliament.[102] Thus, the communists offered power-sharing initiatives such as the "government of popular trust" with increasing frequency after the election as a way of insulating regime and communists from the instabilities of a new election. The party leaders focused explicitly on softening the party's stance by referring to the CPRF as part of the "systemic opposition" in a "two-party system."[103] Toward the end of 1996 they attempted to appease their membership by concocting the compromise formula "responsible but irreconcilable opposition"—responsible for affairs in the country but irreconcilable to the course of the regime.[104] What this meant in practice was that the political elite's need for stability was satisfied by the CPRF's moderation and the communists were guaranteed the position of the official opposition.

However, from late 1996 until late 1998, the CPRF's "responsible but irreconcilable opposition" was squeezed between party dissent and weak pressure on the regime. The CPRF's latest front, the NPUR, had the limited aim of convincing skeptical regional elites that the communists would no longer challenge the political system; seeking to "unite them around a neutral ideology," it succeeded in enmeshing the CPRF thoroughly in the regime in the gubernatorial elections of 1996–1997.[105] In these contests even more than in national votes, clientelistic elite networks drastically undermined the role of coherent parties, with 83 percent of regional electoral candidates in 1995–1997 having no party affiliation at all.[106] There was a strong tendency for personalized politics to prevail over ideological cleavages with the apolitical economic manager (the *khozyain* or "boss") suiting the interests of regional and central government. Recognizing this, the CPRF tended to support pragmatic "managerial" candidates irrespective of ideological purity to increase local leverage. Such candidates included Vadim Gustov in Leningrad, Leonid Gorbenko in Kaliningrad, and Valentin Tsvetkov in Magadan.[107] The communists sought the agreement of the local industrial and financial elite, even in "red-belt" areas like Smolensk. Moreover, they did not make much effort in "lost causes" like Saratov, often seeking a role in the local power structure in exchange for not running a strong campaign.[108]

Yet it was the poorer areas that tended to elect more radical governors, and these were the most dependent on the center for subsidy, often making drastic postelection turnabouts. This tendency for former firebrands (such as Kursk's Aleksandr Rutskoi, who left the NPUR and denounced communism and his former communist colleagues) to turn loyalist to Moscow when faced with the realities of power meant that many of them were in practice little different from centrist or industrialist managers. In many regions, governors pushed CPRF activists into local government, forcing them to become de facto executives.[109]

This incorporation of the CPRF in the regime led to tension between party leadership and regional leaders, threatening a fracturing of its electorate. For example, many CPRF supporters saw Aleksandr Lebed as a greater opponent of the center than CPRF nominee Petr Romanov and defied their leadership to vote for Lebed as Krasnoyarsk governor.[110] As election cycles repeated, there were increasing signs even in the red belt that communist support was dependent as much on administrative capability as on ideological affinity. By 1997 even steadfast opposition governors such as Tuleev of Kemerovo grew dissatisfied with reflex opposition and began to distance themselves from the CPRF. Many "red governors" sought to subordinate the CPRF to their personalized blocs.[111] So of the NPUR's nineteen "ideologically conscious" governors (out of forty-seven claimed by the opposition in total), the number of those who strongly supported the CPRF by 1999 had dropped to ten.[112] All in all, the communists risked remaining too ideological for new supporters and too pragmatic for longtime loyalists.

An increasing backlash was fomented that checked moves toward programmatic and tactical innovation. Ever more vocal, radicals criticized the CPRF's weak parliamentary opposition. They refused to accept even symbolic (in their terms "moral") responsibility for reforms. In their opinion the Duma was to be used only for antibourgeois agitation. Any hint of compromise strengthened the new political order and would lead to the collapse of the CPRF's electoral rating.[113] Their other favored bugbears were Zyuganov and Podberezkin's leanings toward "Christian democratic" and "social democratic" ideas, and their removal was increasingly suggested. This effort culminated in the formation of a "Leninist-Stalinist Platform within the CPRF" in 1998.[114] This opposition's strength was more apparent than real, but it forced the party into numerous zigzags, reiterating its hard-line credentials to avoid serious threats of a split.[115]

The CPRF remained unwilling to countenance the dissolution of parliament that its regional organizations accepted as a necessary result of principled opposition. Such caution can be easily dismissed as the craven instincts of those profiting from parliamentary perks.[116] Participation in the Duma,

hardly the epitome of a democratic parliament, exposed all deputies to un-regulated lobbying by often nefarious business interests. One of the CPRF's former sponsors, Semago, made plausible allegations that the communists and Seleznev in particular received bribes to vote with the government at key junctures, though he admitted many did not. Though such charges are impossible to verify, Duma activity made the CPRF complicit with the very crony capitalism it ostensibly aimed to replace and gave real substance to the radicals' complaints.[117]

However, the most convincing reasons for communist trepidation were pragmatic. A significant factor in the party's reemergence had been its abil-ity to convert its Duma caucus into its de facto nerve center, with the Cen-tral Committee using "the premises, resources and material supplies of the fraction."[118] It relied heavily on Duma telecommunications for its links with regions and its key leaders, the vast majority of whom were also Duma deputies. In December 2000, for example, all but one of the CPRF's presid-ium were deputies. Further, the party used parliamentary aides as its apparat and the Duma fraction for its sole institutional linkage with national-level politics, all of which would be vital in an election and denied it were the Duma disbanded. And yet, according to Russia's 1993 constitution, a suc-cessful no-confidence vote or three votes against a nominated prime minis-ter could result in Duma dissolution—as Bacon and White state, the most even a united Duma could achieve in conflict with the president was to "en-gineer its own dismissal."[119] The communists were acutely aware that the su-perpresidency deliberately limited the Duma's influence and that this made agreement with the authorities even more perilous than for Western Euro-pean communists.[120]

Indeed, policies like the CPRF-inspired no-confidence motion in late 1997, while doing little to change government policy, might give the ex-ecutive carte blanche to rule by decree until new elections, even permit-ting the sale of farmland and the breakup of natural monopolies, policies the communists had long fought hard against.[121] But backing down made the party's Duma caucus look complicit in policies such as Yeltsin's sum-mary appointment of Sergei Kirienko as prime minister in 1998, which em-phasized the CPRF's impotence and caused dismay among its electorate. The constant lack of government concessions to the communists meant that the CPRF's strategy was in tatters as it contemplated an imminent election campaign.

As even Zyuganov acknowledged, the party and its fraction were increas-ingly split into a radical "left" whose concerns were voiced by Ilyukhin and a moderate "right" whose views were most clearly expressed by Seleznev,

both of whom, though former loyalists, publicly challenged Zyuganov's leadership, Seleznev even hinting at bidding for the presidency.[122] Radicals called on the party to put the Duma fraction in order or "die as an opposition organization."[123]

However, the party received a significant reprieve from damage done to Yeltsin's authority by the August 1998 economic crash. Evgenii Primakov's postcrisis government took a much more statist approach to the economy and relied on parliamentary approval in the absence of an increasingly sick president. This was congenial to the CPRF, and the presence of relatively independent "leftists" such as communist Yurii Maslyukov and Agrarian Gennadii Kulik allowed the CPRF room to disown them if they failed and to claim credit if, as was to occur, the government achieved political and economic stability.[124] Yet the increasing vociferousness of the CPRF's radical wing, shown starkly by the overt anti-Semitic statements of radicals Makashov and Ilyukhin in autumn 1998, limited any dividends.[125] Although Zyuganov belatedly issued a mild rebuke, the Duma refused to reprimand either, which seriously damaged the CPRF's image as a moderate political party, and was criticized by potential allies such as Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov. Moreover, the CPRF's association with the Primakov government ultimately confirmed that the Duma is only strong against a weak president and is weak against a strong president. When Yeltsin returned from recuperation and fired Primakov in May 1999, the blow to the CPRF's prestige was compounded by its failure to impeach the president, one of the party's long-declared aims. Its highly militant approach to impeachment was a factor in its failure and Yeltsin's decision to remove Primakov.[126]

The 1999–2000 Elections

The 1999–2000 election campaign, overshadowed by the question of succession to an ailing President Yeltsin, offered a major test of the CPRF's ability to become a serious post-communist force. This was reflected in a tentative post-1998 "left-patriotic consensus" in society around the belief that Western-dependent political and economic "reform" needed amendment in favor of greater Russocentrist state dirigisme.[127] Because its views were increasingly mainstream, the CPRF was presented with significant opportunities, but, simultaneously, influential figures such as Luzhkov engaged in fierce competition for the "left-patriotic" vote.

With most political forces realizing that the Duma elections were but the staging post for the more powerful presidential prize, the CPRF repeated its 1995 policy of running independently to attain the role of backbone of the

opposition in the state Duma and for the presidential campaign. Given its internal disarray this was still more important than in 1995, with the party concerned to end incipient fragmentation to right and left before radically extending its vote could even be addressed.

So the leadership first conducted a ruthless purge of the more troublesome party and coalition members (including the Leninist-Stalinist platform), with regional secretaries rigorously audited. From the outset, the CPRF sought to dictate terms to its major allies in the NPUR, some of whom were seeking a looser centrist coalition in order to broaden urban support.[128] Zyuganov himself was considering a "grand coalition" with Luzhkov in autumn 1998, until the party hierarchy realized that the October 1998 NPUR congress might go so far as to nominate Luzhkov as its presidential candidate.[129] The CPRF preempted this by holding a party plenum *before* the NPUR congress and asserting that it would contest the 1999 elections independently. This answered party critics who viewed the NPUR as a national bourgeois organization or who simply did not want to share their positions on the party's electoral list.[130] Overall this election campaign showed Kuptsov's party apparatus strengthening its position over Zyuganov and the latter's diminished independence in formulating ideology and tactics.[131] Indeed, he was forced to distance himself from his national-patriotic ally Podberezkin, whose independent conduct appeared to be the last straw for the apparatus accustomed to regarding him as the "Mephistopheles seducing Faust (Zyuganov) . . . towards the path of bourgeois-reactionary patriotism."[132] Podberezkin's calls for Kuptsov's circle to resign were eventually followed by his expulsion from the party fraction in August 1999.

Then, in a convoluted process apparently reflecting significant leadership disagreement, the party first offered its allies the chance to run in separate electoral "columns" alongside the CPRF—the moderate "enlightened patriots" (Podberezkin's Spiritual Heritage and the Agrarians, perhaps with Gennadii Seleznev) and the radical patriots (Ilyukhin and his radical nationalist Movement in Support of the Army [MSA]). These groups were unlikely to do well enough to escape the CPRF's orbit, and the party calculated they would take more votes from the CPRF's challengers than the party itself. This was particularly the case with the MSA, to which the CPRF offered minimal support, hoping it would drain the most discontented and anti-Semitic radicals from the party proper and undermine the vote of independent nationalist and communist rivals.[133] But even minimal concessions to the dissidents upset regional party bosses, causing the CPRF in July 1999 to abandon the column idea and to present its allies with places in the CPRF's own electoral list (nominally the "For Victory!" patriotic bloc). Correctly

seeing that they were being offered a subordinate role as a fait accompli, the Agrarians and Spiritual Heritage refused, but this precipitated serious splits in both blocs, with some members joining the CPRF list. The party appeared resigned to sacrificing a wider bloc to obtain a smaller, absolutely loyal fraction.

With party dissent now relatively quiescent, a flexible electoral strategy was more possible, and the party sought to show its electoral learning, with a far greater emphasis on pragmatism and moderation than hitherto. The "For Victory!" bloc's parliamentary election platform followed the 1995 platform in dropping class terminology, mounting a radical attack on the "genocidal ruling regime," and projecting itself as the nucleus of the patriotic opposition, in this case by relying on Stalinist military patriotism.[134] However, in most other respects, as a critic noted, this platform was more declarative and ideologically "eroded" than ever.[135] A peaceful and legal image was prevalent. If in 1995 its key slogan was "Russia, Labor, Popular Power, Socialism," in 1999 it was "Order in the Country, Prosperity in the Home." Whereas the earlier platform had promised the abolition of the presidency, renationalization, and the resurrection of the USSR, in 1999 the aims were merely a reduction in presidential power and the creation of a Slavic union.

In the presidential election, when privately the CPRF realized it had little hope of winning, it concentrated on perfecting new campaign methods. Zyuganov presented himself as a moderate, realistic alternative with concrete proposals for governing and less emphasis on criticizing, not the declarative opposition critics like Tuleev often claimed. These concrete proposals were in the main the same as in the parliamentary election, but new departures included Zyuganov's promises to protect the middle class and democratic achievements.[136] Increased criticism of Putin's lack of a clear-cut program in the latter part of the campaign was designed to diminish his winning margin, while Zyuganov kept his supporters happy through a radical tone in the party press and mobilized through traditional door-to-door campaigning.

The need to counter the image of the party as economically incompetent was one harshly learned in 1996, and every attempt was made to stress economic experience. The party's economic platform for the parliamentary and presidential elections was drafted and presented by the youthful Sergei Glazev (once in Gaidar's government) and showed a still more marked evolution. If the electoral platform was national-patriotic, this program was social democratic. In a strongly Keynesian vein, it still called for state ownership of the commanding heights and "managed money issuing" but now talked of how to enforce property and investors' rights, of how to defend small and medium businesses, and of a pragmatic acceptance of private ownership in a "socially-orientated socialist market economy."[137]

The party's campaign methods were increasingly sophisticated. Just as in 1995, the CPRF ran a strongly targeted campaign, with regional notables prominently placed on the party-list section for the 225 parliamentary seats allocated in this fashion (the other 225 being elected in single-member districts). A prominent development in 1999 was that the candidates were becoming still less party based, with around 100 nonparty candidates on the party list of 270.[138] The CPRF sought to distance itself from allied governors who had lost popularity and to improve its contacts with popular regional leaders even in areas outside its control. Its regional campaigns sought to respond to local concerns and avoid ideological slogans.[139] This reflected the increasing local power of governors after their election and post-1998 devolution. They paid far greater attention to the regional composition of parties than in 1995, and the CPRF's candidates represented their interests as much as the party's. In the presidential election Zyuganov made an explicit push to win over undecided voters, another area of weakness in 1996. Having visited twenty-two regions in 1996, he visited only six in 2000 and concentrated instead on the youth and student vote and maintaining a profile in the mass media in Moscow.[140]

Indeed, better financing and elite contacts certainly helped the CPRF to mount an improved information campaign. The CPRF regional party committees had greater access to TV and media, particularly in areas where it had governors.[141] Compared with 1995, the party made far greater use of national campaign broadcasts, which reinforced the image of vehement opposition but constructive program. Significant also was the CPRF's improved treatment from the central media. No longer was there a solid wall of anticommunism. In the presidential campaign, although the media gave overwhelming and favorable coverage to Putin, Zyuganov's treatment was "almost tender," as he was granted long interviews on the state channels.[142]

The results of this more sophisticated campaign were, however, deeply equivocal. In the Duma contest the party once again came first. Its vote increased in both share (from 22.3 to 24.3 percent) and number (16.2 million versus 15.4 million in 1995). A feature of the 1999 elections was more sophisticated voting—far fewer votes were wasted on parties that failed to pass the 5 percent barrier designed for just that end. Consequently, Spiritual Heritage, the MSA, and the remnants of the radical communists mustered 3.5 percent among them, and the party purge appeared vindicated, with party leaders stressing that the CPRF had thwarted all rivals for the opposition niche.[143] The party's new Duma fraction was the largest (eighty-eight) and was reinforced by a satellite "agro-industrial" fraction of forty-two, headed by the loyal ex-Agrarian Kharitonov, to which the party once again delegated

members. Although the party obtained only forty-nine single-mandate victories (compared with fifty-eight in 1995), many communists won as independents, resulting in sixty-five communist single-mandate deputies in the two allied fractions and indicating success for its flexible regional policy.[144] However, six parties, rather than four as in 1995, entered the Duma and competed for party-list seats, while the loss of the broader front eradicated the satellite "Popular Power" fraction. So the leftists' overall share of the seats fell from 211 (47 percent) to 130 (29 percent).

Yet, more to the point, the CPRF's improved result had the appearance of a defeat, for, compared with 1995, it lacked momentum for the presidential race, with the real fight going on for second place between the Fatherland–All Russia bloc (FAR) headed by Luzhkov and Primakov and the pro-government Edinstvo, whose second place in the Duma vote (23.3 percent) secured its patron, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, momentum into the presidential campaign. Benign media treatment certainly reflected the CPRF's improved image—fewer people were now scared of it.[145] But it reflected too the lack of threat to the regime, which regarded FAR's opposition credentials as a more fitting target for media invective.

Indeed, there were grounds for suggestions that the regime was promoting the CPRF as a "sparring partner" over which it could achieve an easy victory. A vicious campaign of *kompromat* (compromising material) launched at FAR perhaps boosted the CPRF's final vote by up to 5 percent above earlier opinion polls.[146] An opportunistic deal between the communists and Edinstvo fractions, by which Seleznev was reelected as speaker and these fractions and their allies divided up the twenty-eight parliamentary committee chairs, violated the previous convention of sharing them proportionally among all fractions. From this deal the communists obtained nine chairs, two more than expected. Both government and communists were concerned to avoid giving Evgenii Primakov a parliamentary platform for the presidency, for his appeal was broad and he could take votes from both camps. Seleznev was a known quantity, and through alliance with the relatively disciplined communist fraction the government could placate parliamentary opposition in the election run-up. It was safer for the regime to face the communists, whom Putin could almost certainly beat, and for the communists to stick with Zyuganov, rather than supporting an electoral boycott or Primakov as their presidential candidate (their other options discussed).[147] Again the communists preferred dominance of the opposition to maximizing opposition strength. This ploy was successful, and Primakov quickly withdrew from the race, leaving Zyuganov as the only serious candidate. Essentially, the question of succession was decided, leaving the communists to fight to maximize their second-place position.

Given these less-than-ambitious aims the communists succeeded. Zyuganov's 2000 presidential vote was 29.2 percent, 3 percent less than in 1996 and far behind Putin's 52.9 percent but greater than communist expectations of 22 to 27 percent. It was also far ahead of any other challengers for leadership of the opposition camp, such as former allies Podberezkin and Tuleev, the latter of which sought explicitly to attack Zyuganov and other bureaucratic "bigwigs" ensconced in the Duma.[148] Given plausible allegations of vote massaging in Putin's favor, Zyuganov's real vote may have been somewhat higher, although unsubstantiated communist claims of seven million stolen votes appeared designed mainly to explain the defeat to the party's supporters.[149] No one denies that Putin would have won handsomely in a second round.

Closer analysis supports the view that the communist vote remained relatively stable in the aggregate but was increasingly volatile in its components. The result of the party's constructive approach was a softening of its "hardcore" without commensurate gains much beyond its niche, leaving the party still unable to mount a successful presidential bid and still vulnerable to the likely long-term decline in the pro-Soviet subculture.

Certainly the party developed a greater nationwide presence, performing well in areas outside former red-belt regions in both stages of the elections, particularly in the far East, West and East Siberia, the North, and the North Caucasus. In 2000, Zyuganov improved on his 1996 first round vote in forty regions, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. Yet in only five of the sixty-two regions (of eighty-eight) where the party increased its vote in 1999 did it exceed or even capture the total leftist vote of 1995. This indicated that the party's major gains were from attracting the vote of former allies, rather than by breaking out of the left niche.[150] Similarly, most communist winners were either incumbents or supported by incumbent communist governors, suggesting limits to the party's cadre potential. Indeed, the share of votes for the left as a whole decreased from 32 percent in 1995 to 28 percent in 1999.

In the 2000 campaign, some of the party's successes were more remarkable (for example, in Krasnoyarsk, Primore, and Novosibirsk). Such results could often be attributed to conflicts between governors and mayors against the background of a worsening economic situation. For example, in Omsk (where Zyuganov got 43.6 percent and beat Putin), the unpopularity of the regional administration and the collapse of the local machine-building and agricultural sectors increased protest tendencies.[151] This, along with the declining competition from the Liberal Democrats, increased the protest vote that Zyuganov was able to exploit and showed the party able to respond to local concerns and not merely rely on inertia.

Yet there were strong contraindications. Trends in both elections showed the party gaining and losing supporters. Some 75 percent of the CPRF's 1999 Duma vote voted again for Zyuganov in 2000, and he gained votes from former FAR and Unity supporters but lost 12 percent of his 1999 votes to Putin and 3 percent to Tuleev.[152] More damaging were losses in the "red belt," the cradle of party support for years, where opposition governors Tuleev, Chernogorov, and Shabanov had declared their support for Putin's presidential bid. Such changed allegiances significantly affected Zyuganov's 2000 vote share compared with the 1996 first round. In Krasnodar, reflecting ambiguity on the part of Governor Kondratenko, Putin got 51.5 percent of votes while Zyuganov's vote dropped from 42 percent to 37.4 percent, and there were similar stories in Stavropol, Saratov, Volgograd, Voronezh, Tambov, and even Zyuganov's home region, Orel. In many other "controlled regions" where the governors had influence over their electorates, Zyuganov's vote fell precipitously, most noticeably in Dagestan (from 63.2 percent in 1996 to 16.4 percent in 2000). Overall, whatever Zyuganov's improvements were locally, nationally he was left far in Putin's wake. Having come first in forty-five regions in the first round of 1996 and thirty-one in the second, in 2000 Zyuganov managed this in just four (Lipetsk, Omsk, the Altai Republic, and Bryansk).

What explains this result? Electoral polarization was not replaced by coherent programmatic party politics but, rather, starkly revealed the lopsided power balance and clientelistic regime tendencies, which Sakwa states might create a "cadre" party system based on intraelite negotiation and vitiate the very concept of opposition.[153] Given this and the apparent exhaustion of ideological alternatives such as communism and revolutionary liberalism, as Diligenskii argues, "there is nothing left for the ordinary voter to do but personify his choice."[154] This would clearly benefit Putin, backed by incumbency and creating an image of a decisive antiterrorist combatant. Meanwhile, for all its innovations, the CPRF remained relatively reactive, unable to anticipate the rise of Edinstvo or produce a clear campaign message when Putin also made use of patriotism. As the left had long argued, Zyuganov's patriotic image diluted communist distinctiveness while making him vulnerable to an incumbent determined to prove himself the better nationalist, rendering Zyuganov's trump cards worthless.[155]

Parliament and the Putin Paradigm

Putin threatened to "kill the communists with compromise."[156] Compared with Yeltsin's visceral anticommunism, Putin's policies were amorphous and

inclusive, appearing to support "communist" great power politics and "reformist" liberal economics simultaneously. Symptomatically, the national-patriotic paper *Zavtra* could not decide whether Putin was an ally or an "agent of influence."[157] Yet Putin was undeniably more manipulative of Russia's political institutions. The increased benefits of clientelism versus coherent opposition were everywhere apparent.

Certainly the next round of gubernatorial campaigns saw candidates developing still fuzzier ideological and party affiliations. In the forty-four elections of 2000, the greatest victory (with twenty-nine) was apparently incumbency, with both regime and opposition struggling to maintain influence in the local elite. This time the communists did not put forward candidates at all where they could reach agreement with the incumbent. They claimed twenty-six victories out of forty-one, the most significant when their regional first secretaries won in noncommunist Kursk, Ivanovo, and Kamchatka.[158] Though apparently a significant advance, it must be noted that in none of these cases was the incumbent standing. Most won on a pro-stability, pro-Putin, and certainly noncommunist platform, and Moscow proved quite willing to help communist candidates.[159] Despite the fact that nominating party bosses was designed to prove the opposite, the CPRF's connections with "its" candidates were likely to prove weaker than ever.

The new paradigm was most apparent in parliament. With a smaller fraction, uncompromising opposition might be easier for the CPRF than in 1996–1999. Yet the party was now accustomed to influence, and with no fraction now having an overall majority, the need to make (possibly unprincipled) compromises would be intensified. The initial expectation of Duma domination by a "Kremlin–communist bloc" was premature. Through their January 2000 deal with Edinstvo the communists preserved an important propaganda, gatekeeper, and patronage role. But what they gained in quantity they lost in quality, losing the strategically important Security Committee and not winning the Budget and Defense committees.[160]

Indeed, marginalization threatened. Putin's policies gradually evolved in a moderately pro-Western and economically reformist direction, for which he was often able to command a Duma majority of 270-plus even if the communist bloc was resolutely opposed.[161] Indeed, their opposition became more strident, culminating in fraction walkouts in 2001 in protest at increased land privatization and a vote of no confidence, which failed, by nearly one hundred votes. Although this militancy reflected increased internal party tensions, it also showed real problems of opposition, as indicated by Edinstvo's ultimately unrealized threat to call the communists' bluff and support the no-confidence vote, which may have prompted Duma

dissolution and brought the communists "down a couple of notches" in any new Duma.[162]

Conversely, fealty to the president would be rewarded. The Kremlin and the communists renewed talk of a stable two- or three-party system cemented by a strict law on political parties, in which Edinstvo and the communists might become the fulcrum, with more radical challengers like the liberals marginalized or engulfed.[163] Putin regularly consulted the party hierarchy, a development unthinkable under Yeltsin. However, it became clear that the Kremlin's support was conditional on the communists either becoming a "modern" and renamed social democratic party or being consigned to history—a necessity rebutted by Kuptsov.[164] The clearest evidence of this was the formation of the "patriotically oriented center-left organization" Rossiya (Russia) by Gennadii Seleznev in July 2000, with Putin's blessing.[165] Rossiya expressed open loyalty to Putin, while Seleznev adopted an extremely pro-Kremlin line in the Duma, which only exacerbated his frictional relationship with the CPRF hierarchy. Seleznev was disingenuous about Rossiya's aims, insisting it was not an attempt to split or compete with the CPRF as an independent party but, rather, was aimed at advancing new leaders and seeking new allies to improve the communists' electoral position; yet the forming of a center-left bloc autonomously of the party structure had obvious implications for its leadership. The CPRF threatened to remove Seleznev from party and parliament positions but was loath to lose the main symbol of its "red" Duma—Rossiya ultimately joined the NPUR, reflecting an uneasy stalemate.[166]

Such an impasse was always unlikely to hold in Russia's habitually volatile preelection buildup, all the more so since the communists' 2000 parliamentary "carve-up" of committee chairs made them dependent on the Kremlin's patronage. Although Kremlin officials had repeatedly indicated their intention to redress the imbalance, it nevertheless took most observers by surprise when the centrist parliamentary fractions stripped the CPRF of its most important committee chairs in April 2002. Various factors may have motivated this decision, but the electoral imperative was paramount: the centrist alliance of Edinstvo and Fatherland–All Russia (now "United Russia") was seeking to puncture the communists' steady opinion poll lead, while Kremlin officials had manufactured a steady parliamentary majority and quite simply no longer needed an ally whose opposition to neoliberalism was buttressed by committee-level obstruction.[167]

Electoral imperatives also appear to have dictated the hard-line CPRF response, as it insisted its remaining committee chairs and the parliamentary speaker quit in protest. A political sensation ensued in April–May 2002 as

three of the party's most eminent representatives, Seleznev, Svetlana Gorya-cheva (chair of the Duma Committee for Women's, Family and Youth Af-fairs), and Nikolai Gubenko (chair of the Duma Committee for Culture and Tourism), defied the party line and were expelled from both party ranks and fraction.[168] What was potentially a huge blow to the party's authority was, however, partially offset by the party's new leeway to radicalize its opposition stance and resolve internal debates during the next electoral marathon.

Ideology in the Post-Yeltsin Era: New Tasks, New Answers?

Indeed, the CPRF's Duma zigzags were but the latest manifestation of its in-ternal ideological, strategic, and organizational disorientation after Putin's election, characterized by Zyuganov as "one of the most difficult periods of our history" and involving renewed threats to his leadership.[169] The party was unsure how to respond to Rossiya, despite an unambiguously hostile of-ficial line.[170] Certain regional organizations (such as in the Moscow region) expressed open support, while some in the party hierarchy (such as Ivan Mel-nikov, Goryacheva, and allegedly Kuptsov) privately expressed a tactful neu-trality.[171] Similarly, there was no consensus over Putin: Zyuganov presented him as evidence of the decline of liberalism and anticommunism, while many others thought that Putin had simply stolen the CPRF's "state patriotism."[172]

Indeed, the period following the May 2000 plenum vividly showed Zyuganov and the party hierarchy under attack, as the party radicals led by Marxist-Leninist modernizers like Trushkov accused them of "weakness in mastering Leninist strategy and tactics," which had allegedly led the party to electoral defeat, and demanded the excision of bourgeois democratic ele-ments from the party program.[173] In response the leadership organized its broadest intraparty discussion since 1994. "The Immediate Tasks of the CPRF" was published in June 2000 and formed the focus of debate until adop-tion with minor amendments at the party's Seventh Congress that Decem-ber.[174] This document was intended to set out the party's tasks for the next two to three years. In the process of discussion, the Marxists within the party strengthened their position vis-à-vis the statist-patriotic communists with a move from "national populism" to "social populism," but the overall victors were party moderates who were able to anticipate and preempt most griev-ances, consistent with increasing manipulation by the party apparatus.[175]

Most noticeably, Zyuganov performed a volte-face to the left and auda-ciously if not mendaciously underlined that patriotism was not a separate ideological system: it simply needed clarifying that it meant patriotism to-ward a "strong workers' state." While leaders and documents were starkly

self-critical, they reaffirmed (in socialist language) the overwhelming need to innovate and find a "modern socialist ideal" to deal with postindustrial problems, caused by the modern proletariat moving "from the machine-tool to the computer." The precise nature of this ideal was unspecified, but as a concrete theoretical contribution in December 2000, Zyuganov set out his theory of *globalization* as "a new term concealing the old, openly impe-rialist policy" of the Western "New World Order."[176] Once more Zyuganov was appropriating a term with radical and contemporary relevance with which to attack transnational capitalism, which at least showed the CPRF tapping into the ideological arsenal of the postindustrial, ecologically tinged left. In the "Immediate Tasks" the party received a confidence-boosting but vague "guide to action" that did not much restrict short-term leadership maneuvering. It reiterated the party's social class essence in eva-sive terms while charging the party with more pragmatic combat tasks (like increasing influence over the trade unions). However, by substituting for but not replacing the party program, it sidestepped any clear resolution of the basic doctrinal disputes.

The December 2000 Seventh Congress resulted in a reconsolidation around Zyuganov against the threat of a party split. Rossiya appeared to weaken those trying radically to renovate the party from within, with Marx-ist reformers sympathetic to Zyuganov's ideological position towing the party line. The party's administrative resources were in full use against dissent. Se-leznev claimed *Pravda* had censored information about Rossiya.[177] The mori-bund NPUR was resurrected in September 2000, reelecting Zyuganov as leader and a "shadow cabinet" professing a nonideological platform. This was a clear attempt to outflank Rossiya in the race to the center left, advance Zyuganov's protégés, and, so it was rumored, reinvigorate the party's lobbying potential after its election defeats.[178] On the congress floor Zyuganov hard-ened his rhetoric while an apparently orchestrated parade of speakers sup-ported his invective against "the bacilli of apostasy" after every expression of dissent.[179] The congress showed again the eccentricity of the party's apparent replacement of "Marxism with Machiavellianism," with the pragmatism of its new presidium (evidenced by the election of Leonid Ivanchenko, a clas-sic regional "red director" as the party's third cochair) at a tangent with its vehement congress documents.[180] According to party bosses, the streamlined presidium and Central Committee aimed at a more effective organization; but it might rather reflect the party's clear inability to put forward alternative leaders. The downgrading of the ideological secretariat after the removal of the ideologically moderate but independent Aleksandr Kravets suggested as much.[181]

Conclusion

Nearly a decade after its refoundation and despite attrition the CPRF remained Russia's most durable, popular, and perhaps only genuine national political party, as Putin acknowledged. Yet its communist nature was increasingly eroded, and it faced an uncertain future. The crisis of the CPRF's "Russocommunism" was ideological (evidenced by the increasing incompatibility among Stalinist, social democratic, and national-patriotic faces, which it seemed endemically unable to resolve), organizational (the crisis of an attenuated communist mass party), strategic (with the party's anti-system stance undercut by the problems of working within bourgeois capitalist society), and electoral (with the party still firmly entrenched in its niche).

The party's origins cast a long shadow. Patrimonialism shaped the increasingly symbiotic relationship between the party and the supposedly "antinational" ruling elite, only exaggerating its ideological contortions and its organizational contradiction among a revolutionary party mobilized against the regime, an increasingly subjugated membership, and the conformist traits in its upper echelons. The party's origins as a mass antibureaucratic and antireform protest against the regime continued to hamper its public acceptance of regime values while posing continual problems of internal control.

The success of successor parties such as the Polish Democratic left Alliance was rooted in a "vanguard socialism," an elite-led nonideological technocratism reliant on patronage connections.[182] The CPRF partially provided a new "nationally authentic" socialism and resuscitated elite links, but its inability to complete the process was partly because of the contingency of transition, which produced a Russian elite with a strong aversion to the "ideological cockroaches" of the communists,[183] and partly because the nationally authentic Leninist tradition was itself deeply inflexible.

The effect of this tradition was everywhere felt. Although not an unreformed party trading solely on its residual legacy, the CPRF was only partially post-communist, and its pro-Soviet subculture provided a near insurmountable barrier to wide electoral maneuver. Meanwhile the party structure's stress on mass activism institutionalized upward pressure on the leadership, to which the party responded by tightening discipline. Thus, it replicated the ICP, using democratic centralism to "isolate hermetically the Marxist subculture"—to contain party debate over the divergence between party program and practice and to maintain for party members the increasingly illusory image of a revolutionary party.[184] Yet, like democratic centralism before, this only seemed to consolidate a pathologically cautious leadership group. Zyuganov's consensus-building apparatchik style and loyalty to the party hi-

erarchy marked him out as the ideal "noncharismatic personalist" leader, an indispensable conflict broker whose much derided untelegenic public image was in inverse proportion to his intraparty organizational prowess.[185]

Yet the paradox of a leader who stabilized the party status quo but who was doomed to be the "eternally second" presidential candidate intensified as Zyuganov's long-cherished national-patriotic bloc lost all significant allies and, critics argued, became no more than the CPRF's "department for social organizations."[186] But strict party discipline gave no resolution, despite approximately one-third of the party being increasingly discontented. Demands heard in December 2000 and May 2002 to share the positions of party chair, Duma fraction leader, NPUR chair, and UCP–CPSU head (all held by Zyuganov) simply promised an intensification of internal infighting without clear alternative leadership candidates backed openly by party members.[187] It was unsurprising, then, that Zyuganov was continually reelected. The CPRF's lack of charismatic leaders was an endemic function of the party's organization, making Zyuganov's replacement unlikely to lessen internal strife. The expulsion of schismatic moderates like Seleznev promised a temporary internal consolidation but threatened strengthening party radicals like Aleksandr Kuvaev, head of the Moscow city committee, and further electoral ghettoization.

The party's political environment further limited its options. Unlike the Eurocommunists, the CPRF was not being eroded by a liberal democratic regime where acceptance of regime values might directly precipitate a transition to social democracy. Compliance was rather forced by weak parliamentary and regional ability to influence the regime, financial dependency, nomenklatura background, and regime pressure, offering an increasingly stark choice between absorption and marginalization. Whereas unlike the CPU the transformation process within the CPRF began virtually on its refoundation, there were real limits to which the party wanted to and could adapt. As Putin argued, some communist leaders wanted to social democratize but felt that their constituency would see it as betrayal. Indeed, Leninist aversion to social democracy was being replaced with pragmatic rejection of it. Moderates noted that much of the socioeconomic basis for social democracy was lacking—while Russian society remained sharply polarized with a negligible middle class, there was little point in moderating the party's stance too far, which would lose the consolidated communist vote and be "political suicide."[188] Yet even Rossiya reflected the antiliberal bias of many of the CPRF's nomenklatura moderates and scarcely heralded a fully democratic left. Any social democratization of the Russian left as a whole remains difficult to envisage without the thorough liberal democratization of regime

and opposition. For the CPRF, confronting the "conservative communist" elements in party organization and ideological heritage is a necessary and probably insurmountable stage in social democratization.

However, there were strong arguments for cautious change, as the communists were caught among a maximalist electorate, a manipulative political elite, and a political system that impeded coherent opposition. The CPRF's integration into the regime was logical, protecting the party from its own supporters and giving it improved access to resources that might prolong its short- and medium-term influence. Party unity around the leader was a valuable commodity, while the moderates appeared to hope that the intraparty balance could be slowly tipped in a pragmatic direction, without escaping party control. Certainly the CPRF is hardly doomed to imminent electoral demise, particularly as most of its competitors remain even weaker. Indeed, Zyuganov's reaction to Putin's pro-Western shift in the aftermath of the September 11 attack demonstrated a return to classic Zyuganovism—a vitriolic and hyperbolic fulmination against the "Russophobia" of "liberal-fascist" global enslavement, although he was careful to avoid the most extreme flourishes of his "civilizational" analysis, consistent with the redesignation of the party as a party of social class protest from late 2000.[189] Such an approach dispensed with ambiguity to Putin, might help consolidate party ranks, and could benefit from discontent caused by imminent marketization policies such as land ownership liberalization or by excessive concessions in foreign policy.

Yet, even without such radicalization, a role for the CPRF as the fulcrum of a stable party system will be problematic. While strict new registration requirements for political parties might finally eliminate rivals like the radical communists, in the longer term there remain dangers for Russia's political stability. The potential for a democratic alternation of power to be "blocked" by the opposition's communist nature has been remarked on.[190] In Russia, the co-optability of opposition meant that the CPRF could be partially admitted to power in order to block the emergence of more radical alternatives that might upset the elite status quo. Whereas the CPRF's grudging acceptance of parliament and pluralism has helped entrench Russia's quasidemocratic institutions, it does little to challenge the bureaucratic elite domination of the political system whereby both civil society and the electorate remain poorly integrated in the regime, leaving open the possibility of a future antielite insurgency. This tendency was indicated by the gubernatorial victory of communist Gennadii Khodyrev in Nizhnii Novgorod in July 2001. Khodyrev's quasi-Blairite managerial pragmatism helped him consolidate the protest vote and win in a former liberal stronghold, but the low turnout (35 percent) also indicated deep disillusion with the democratic process.[191]

The dangers for the CPRF itself are no smaller. The incorporation in the regime leaves it neither the irreconcilable opposition many of its supporters wish nor a responsible opposition with a coherent program popular enough to gain political power. Khodyrev's resignation from the party to protest Seleznev's expulsion was just the latest example of its inability to combine governing pragmatism and revolutionary radicalism. In short, although many CPRF leaders were relatively pragmatic moderate conservatives, whose considerable tactical abilities are seldom given credit, their strategy ignored the question of whether it was possible to reform a revolutionary tradition: experience suggests there are just two paths from Leninism, retrenchment or transcendence. Despite the risks, a party split appears the only way to resolve ideological and strategic incoherence. The CPRF also persuasively demonstrates the apparent inability of Leninist parties to come to power through free politics. The February 2001 parliamentary victory of the Moldovan communists (with some 50 percent of the vote) is no real exception, being won on a humanist Marxist program in Europe's most destitute country.[192] Although this was the first country in the Commonwealth of Independent States to reelect communists, this was far from a return to communism.

An instructive warning might be the FCP, whose participation in government from 1981 to 1984 tainted it before the protest electorate, presaging the rapid usurpation of this vote by the more flexible and electable Socialists and Le Pen's far right National Front and then the communists' endemic marginalization. While the onus remains on the CPRF's rivals to organize, groups like Rossiya, although unlikely immediately to supplant it, could consign the CPRF to the far left spectrum, as the SPU has done to the CPU in Ukraine. The success of groups like FAR and Edinstvo in exploiting the "left-patriotic consensus" unleashed by August 1998 and the feeling of many younger radicals with leftist tendencies who see the CPRF as a "large decaying corpse lying in their way" mean the danger of outflanking is growing.[193] By focusing on the aim, not the movement, the vanguard of the left risks getting left far behind.

Notes

1. For example, see *Novoe Vremya* 35 (1996), pp. 16–17; and J. Barth Urban and V. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 179–194.

2. D. Pinsker, *The Russia Journal*, October 5–11, 2001.

3. *Kommersant*, March 14, 2001.

4. A detailed analysis of Leninism's debt to Marxism with which I concur is N. Harding, *Leninism* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1996).

5. The phrase is from R. Grigor Suny, *The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the USSR and the Successor States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 22.

6. This model is developed most fully in H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski, and G. Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19–76.

7. S. F. Cohen, *Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History since 1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 5.

8. A. Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 50.

9. See, for example, J. T. Ishiyama, "Sickles into Roses: The Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Politics," *Democratization* 6, no. 4 (1999), p. 52; and J. T. Ishiyama, "The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-communist Parties in Post-communist Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997), pp. 299–330.

10. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems*, pp. 19–76.

11. R. Sakwa, "The CPRF: The Powerlessness of the Powerful," in *The Communist Successor Parties in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. A. Bozóki and J. Ishiyama (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002).

12. J. D. Nagle and A. Mahr, *Democracy and Democratization* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 182.

13. For a full treatment of national bolshevism, see M. Agursky, *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1987), p. 248.

14. J. Barth Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 1 (1999), p. 122.

15. An orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspective on the formation of the CP RSFSR is in I. Osadchii, "K 10-letiyu obrazovaniya kompartii RSFSR," *Izm* 3, no. 27 (2000), pp. 17–22.

16. J. Harris, *Adrift in Turbulent Seas: The Political and Ideological Struggles of Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).

17. Detailed accounts of the court proceedings can be found in F. M. Rudinskii, "'Delo KPSS' v Konstitutsionnom Sude" (Moscow, "Bylina," 1999).

18. N. Garifullina, *Tot, kto ne predal. Oleg Shenin: Stranitsy zhizni i borby* (Moscow: Vneshtorgoizdat, 1995), particularly pp. 197–202.

19. For Kuptsov's emphasis on party control of these groups, see *Pravda Rossii*, February 11–17, 1998.

20. Andrew Wilson in "The Communist Party of Ukraine: From Soviet Man to East Slavic Brotherhood" in this volume also notes the SPU's ability to forge a different electoral base from the CPU caused by the split over the national question, not an option available to the SPW.

21. See M. Malkin, "The Red-Brown Cesspit," *Weekly Worker* (Communist Party of Great Britain), December 16, 1999.

22. See T. Astrakhankina, *Pravda 5*, October 29, 1997; and *Glasnost* 10 (1997).

23. G. Sartori, *Political Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 138–139.

24. M. Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* (London: Methuen, 1964), p. 201.

25. Harding, *Leninism*, pp. 13, 53.

26. R. Sakwa, *Gorbachev and His Reforms, 1985–1990* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Philip Allan, 1991), p. 124.

27. J. Lester, *Modern Tsars and Princes: The Struggle for Hegemony in Russia* (London: Verso, 1995), pp. 1–21.

28. Harding, *Leninism*, pp. 267–280.

29. M. Lazar, "Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s," *Journal of Communist Studies* 4, no. 3 (1988), pp. 243–257.

30. T. Bottomore, *A Dictionary of Marxist Thought*, 2d edition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 180.

31. L. Holmes, *Politics in the Communist World* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 20, 22.

32. M. J. Bull and P. Heywood, eds., *West European Communist Parties after the Revolutions of 1989* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1994), p. xviii.

33. E. Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Schocken, 1967), pp. 202–206.

34. See Wilson, "The Communist Party of Ukraine."

35. Author's interview with CPRF Central Committee Secretary for Connections with Foreign Parties and Movements Nikolai Bindyukov, December 18, 1997.

36. M. Wyman, "Developments in Russian Voting Behaviour: 1993 and 1995 Compared," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12, no. 3 (September 1996), p. 287.

37. S. White, R. Rose, and I. McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1997), pp. 230–233.

38. R. Rose and E. Tikhomirov, "Russia's Forced-Choice Presidential Election," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 12, no. 4 (October–December 1996), p. 353.

39. M. McFaul and N. Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics after Transition: Regional and National Assessments," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economics* 38, no. 9 (November 1997), pp. 507–549.

40. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 2, 1993.

41. See, for example, H. Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 36.

42. R. Sakwa, "Left or Right? The CPRF and the Problem of Democratic Consolidation in Russia," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 14, nos. 1–2 (1998), p. 145.

43. Author's interview with CPRF Central Committee Secretary for Connections with Foreign Parties and Movements Nikolai Bindyukov, September 20, 2000.

44. P. G. Lewis, *Political Parties in Post-Communist Eastern Europe* (London: Routledge, 2000).

45. R. Tiersky, *Ordinary Stalinism: Democratic Centralism and the Question of Communist Political Development* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 49.

46. The UCP-CPSU has been little more than a discussion forum for its nineteen constituent ex-Soviet communist parties. For allegations against the CPRF, see the Russian Party of Communists' website at www.sovesky.narod.ru/rpk/doc/2001/01-1.htm.

47. *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 26, 1996; *Kommersant*, November 6, 1997.

48. *Pravda 5*, January 23, 1997.

49. Seven percent of businessmen supported the CPRF according to a ROMIR poll on February 29, 2000, available at www.russiatoday.com.

50. S. Kislitsyn, V. Krikunov, and V. Kuraev, *Gennadii Zyuganov: Sled v istorii* (N.P., 1999), p. 230.

51. A. Makarkin, *Kommunisticheskaya partiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Tsentr politicheskykh tekhnologii, 1996), p. 1.

52. Eleven percent of under-thirty-fives voted for the CPRF in 1999. See N. Petrov, "Vybory i obshchestvo," in *Rossiya v izbiratelnom tsikle, 1999–2000 godov*, ed. M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000), p. 403.

53. B. Kagarlitskii, *Restavratsiya v Rossii* (M, Editorial URSS, 2000), p. 355.

54. Gennady Zyuganov, available at www.kprf.ru/pmes.htm (accessed on February 13, 1998).

55. M. Dmitriev and S. Surkov, "Chto vliyaet na politicheskii vybor Rossiyan: Itogi golosovanii i uroki na budushchee," in *Rossiiskie regiony v 1999 g.*, ed. M. McFaul and N. Petrov (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1999), p. 243.

56. *Pravda*, November 30, 2000, and June 25–26, 2002. Earlier information from author's interview with Deputy Head of the CPRF Central Committee for International Affairs A. Filippov, December 6, 1997; and Valentin Kuptsov, *SWB* SU/2899 B/2 (April 22, 1997).

57. Gennady Zyuganov, available at www.kprf.ru (accessed on October 8, 2001). In April 2001 Kuptsov argued that only fourteen of the CPRF's eighty-eight regional organizations had achieved the 10 percent annual growth rate needed (available at www.kprf.ru/plenum.htm [accessed on May 24, 2001]).

58. For such demands, see the speech of Vladislav Yurchik at the Seventh Congress, December 2000, available at www.kprf.ru.

59. Valentin Kuptsov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, February 2, 1995.

60. *Russia* 7 (1997). A significant decrease in communist grassroots activism since the elections of 2000–2001 has been noted. See *Disput*, April 2001.

61. Gennady Zyuganov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, January 17, 1996, and November 20, 1997.

62. Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia leaders called for the CPRF leadership's resignation (*Vek*, December 21, 2001).

63. Renfrey Clarke, available at www.international.se/sp/maj5.htm.

64. *Argumenty i fakty*, May 8, 2001; and *Transitions Online*, available at www.tol.cz (accessed on November 13, 2000). The party's adherence to traditional

forms of youth organization was also shown by its resurrection of the Pioneers' youth organization.

65. See Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, pp. 55–59.

66. Marxist-Leninist modernizer R. Gabidullin has asserted that Zyuganov's state patriotism was supported fully by only three or four party leaders ("O klassovom podkhode i gosudarstvennom patriotizm," *Dialog* 10 [1997], p. 10).

67. Party radical Richard Kosolapov considered the chief party cleavage to be between a radical "left" and a moderate "right," which united all CPRF leaders who supported parliamentary politics (author's interview with Richard Kosolapov, February 10, 1998).

68. See Gennady Zyuganov, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 30, 1992; Valentin Kuptsov, *Pravda Rossii*, November 4–11, 1997.

69. Author's interview with Bindyukov, December 18, 1997.

70. *Pravda*, February 13–17, 1998.

71. N. McInnes, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 97.

72. C. Shore, *Italian Communism: The Escape from Leninism* (London: Pluto Press, 1990), pp. 17, 142–143.

73. J. Barth Urban and V. Solovei, "Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie v postkommunisticheskom obshchestve," *Svobodnaya mysl* 3 (March 1997), p. 28.

74. This sentiment was consistently shared even by my moderate interviewees.

75. McInnes, *The Communist Parties of Western Europe*, pp. 12, 34.

76. S. Baburin, *Pravda 5*, October 25, 1997.

77. Valentin Kuptsov, *Pravda*, February 13–17, 1998; author's interviews with Bindyukov, December 18, 1997, and CC CPRF Secretary for Ideological Work Aleksandr Kravets, November 20, 1997.

78. Gennady Zyuganov's key works are *Drama vlasti* (Moscow: Paleya, 1993), *Derzhava* (Moscow: Informpechat, 1994), *Za gorizontom* (Orel: Veskie vody, 1995), *Rossiya i sovremennyi mir* (Moscow: Obozrevatel, 1995), and *Rossiya-rodina moya: Ideologiya gosudarstvennogo patriotizma* (Moscow: Informpechat, 1996).

79. Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, p. 73.

80. J. Lester, "Overdosing on Nationalism: Gennadii Zyuganov and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation," *New Left Review* 22 (1997), p. 38.

81. This is explored at length in Luke March, *The Communist Party in Post-Soviet Russia* (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2002).

82. Again such claims were stressed by all my moderate interviewees.

83. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, November 9, 1995.

84. Zyuganov himself had difficulty distinguishing between the term *russkii* (ethnic Russian) and *rossiiskii* (Russian citizen, irrespective of nationality) consistently (see *Rossiya-rodina moya*, pp. 231, 285).

85. This is from the party statutes, *IV sezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 19–20 aprelya 1997 goda (Materialy i dokumenty)* (Moscow, 1997), p. 93.

86. For example, Yurii Belov, *Russkaya sudba* (Moscow: Soratnik, 1995), p. 38.

87. For example, P. Lopata, "Na puti ideinogo obnovleniya," *Dialog* 2 (1997), p. 20.

88. Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, pp. 121–145.

89. *Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, prinyata III sezdom KPRF, 22 yanvarya 1995 goda* (Moscow, 1995).

90. Author's interview with Bindyukov, December 18, 1997.

91. Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, p. 162.

92. For Zyuganov's election platform, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 19, 1996. For the NPUR program, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, August 10, 1996.

93. For example, *Pravda Rossii*, December 19, 1996.

94. *IV sezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii 19–20 aprelya 1997 goda (Materialy i dokumenty)*, pp. 74, 83.

95. This was said explicitly by a local party leader in *Sovetskaya Kolomna*, September 5, 2000.

96. For just one example, see *Izm* 1, no. 6 (1995), p. 20.

97. *Segodnya*, December 8, 1995. The first four Dumas existed in pre-1917 Russia.

98. V. Lenin, "On Compromises," *Selected Works*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Progress, 1970), pp. 226–230.

99. Yurii Maslyukov, *Trud*, July 30, 1998.

100. See A. Korzhakov, *Boris Eltsin: Ot rassveta do zakata* (Moscow: Interbuk, 1997), pp. 368–369, 375.

101. McFaul and Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics after Transition," p. 543.

102. Gennady Zyuganov, *Pravda Rossii*, August 15, 1996.

103. See Aleksei Podberezkin, *Pravda 5*, February 11, 1997; Gennady Zyuganov, *Pravda*, July 6, 1996.

104. See *Pravda Rossii*, December 19, 1996; Valentin Kuptsov, *Pravda Rossii*, March 11, 1997.

105. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, August 8, 1997.

106. K. Stoner-Weiss, "The Limited Reach of Russia's Party System: Under-institutionalization in the Provinces," *PONARS Memo* 122 (2000).

107. McFaul and Petrov, "Russian Electoral Politics after Transition," pp. 523–526.

108. C. Freeland, *Financial Times*, August 30, 1996, p. 2; *Moscow News*, May 21–27, 1998.

109. *Informatsionnyi byulleten* 7, no. 48, available at www.kprf.ru (accessed on April 15, 1998).

110. See the speech of Gennady Zyuganov at the June 20, 1998, plenum, available at www.kprf.ru/news/buleten.htm.

111. G. Golosov, "Gubernatory i partiinaya politika," *Pro et Contra* 5, no. 1 (2000), p. 102; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, July 29, 1999; *Pravda*, May 25–26, 1999.

112. See *EWI Russian Regional Report* 4, no. 37 (October 7, 1999).

113. A. Kuvaev, *Zavtra* 43 (1997); A. Makashov, *Pravda Moskvy* 78 (November 1997).

114. For the text of the "Leninist-Stalinist Platform," see *Glasnost'*, May 15, 1998.

115. At the CPRF's Fourth Congress, Moscow leader Kuvaev warned of a split if the CPRF did not harden its position toward the regime (available at www.nns.ru/chronicle/sdkprf.html).

116. See Sakwa, "Left or Right?" p. 136.

117. An interesting account of communist corruption, though mixing allegation with fact, is in R. C. Otto, "Gennadii Zyuganov: The Reluctant Candidate," *Problems of Post-communism* 46, no. 5 (1999), pp. 37–47.

118. Presidium member Viktor Zorkaltsev, quoted in Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, p. 138. See also *Komsomolskaya pravda*, March 26, 1996.

119. E. T. Bacon and D. White, "Opposition and the Law on Political Parties in Russia," unpublished manuscript, 2001, p. 6.

120. The complexities of opposition in a Russian context are treated in CPRF election campaign manager Viktor Peshkov's book *Oppozitsiya i vlast* (M, ITRK, 2000), chap. 3.

121. Author's interviews with Filippov, December 6, 1997, and Bindyukov, December 18, 1997.

122. "Hero of the Day" program, NTV, February 13, 1998.

123. For the loss of party discipline, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 28, 1998.

124. Maslyukov was first deputy prime minister and Kulik was deputy prime minister. Gennadii Khodyrev (a CPRF member) also entered government as minister for antimonopoly policy.

125. *Zavtra* 42 (October 1998); *Kommersant*, November 12, 1998.

126. *Parliamentskaya gazeta*, June 8, 2000. The charges were the conclusion of the Belovezha Accords, shelling the White House in 1993, unleashing the war in Chechnya, collapse of the Russian armed forces, and genocide against the people of Russia.

127. L. Byzov, "Presidentskaya kampaniya-2000 i novyi electoralnyi zapros," in *Rossiya v izbiratelnom tsikle 1999–2000 godov*, ed. M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000), pp. 484–496.

128. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, July 4, 1998.

129. See Agrarian leader Lapshin's comments in *Kommersant*, January 6, 1998.

130. *SWB* SU/3375 B/5 (November 4, 1998).

131. *Moskovskaya Pravda* 66 (December 1999).

132. A. Podberezkin's position is expounded in *Russkii Put* (M, RAU-Universitet, 1999), p. 577.

133. S. Chernyakhovskii, "Kommunisticheskie obedineniya," in *Rossiya v izbiratelnom tsikle 1999–2000 godov*, ed. M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov (Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Center, 2000), p. 102.

134. For the platform, see "Get Up, Great Country!" available at www.kprf.ru/zapobedu.htm; and for the seventy-five-page campaign booklet, see *RFE/RL Election Report* 2 (November 12, 1999).

135. Darya Mitina, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, September 30, 1999.

136. See Gennady Zyuganov, "Appeal to the People," available at www.zyuganov.ru (accessed on February 9, 2000).

137. For the economic program, see "By Means of Creation," available at www.kprf.ru.

138. *Pravda Rossii*, September 15–21, 1999.

139. S. Chernyakhovskii, in M. McFaul, A. Ryabov, et al., *Carnegie Bulletin #2: Parliamentary Elections in Russia*, available at www.ceip.org/programs/ruseuras/Elections/elections.htm.

140. N. Petrov, "Politicheskii vkus i poslevkus," in *Carnegie Bulletin #3: Itogam vyborov 26 Marta 2000 g.*, ed. M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov, available at http://pubs.carnegie.ru/english/elections/president2000 (accessed on April 17, 2000).

141. Valentin Kuptsov, at the CPRF Sixth Congress, available at www.kprf.ru (accessed on January 15, 2000).

142. *Russia Today*, March 29, 2000; *RFE/RL Russian Election Report* 1, no. 9 (March 3, 2000).

143. *Pravda*, December 23, 1999.

144. Eleven were independents (most backed by the CPRF), and five were nominated from other parties (information available at www.fci.ru and www.duma.gov.ru). The party had endorsed up to forty independent candidates.

145. The number who would not vote for the CPRF in any circumstances declined from 70 percent in 1995 to 30 percent in 1999 (S. Chernyakhovskii, "The Communist Party of the Russian Federation," in M. McFaul, N. Petrov, and A. Ryabov, *Primer on Russia's 1999 Duma Elections* [Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999], p. 82).

146. *Segodnya*, December 22, 1999.

147. Chernyakhovskii, "Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie."

148. See, for example, www.rferl.org/elections/russia00report/tuleev.html.

149. *Moscow Times*, September 9, 2000.

150. M. McFaul, A. Rayobov, et al., *Rossiya nakanune dumskikh vyborov 1999 goda*, pp. 307–309.

151. *Parliamentskaya gazeta*, April 25, 2000; *Nezavisimaya gazeta Stsenarii*, April 12, 2000.

152. VTsIOM poll, March 31–April 3, 2000, in *Johnson's Russian List* 4241 (April 11, 2000).

153. R. Sakwa, "The Regime System in Russia," *Contemporary Politics* 3, no. 1 (1997), pp. 7-25.

154. G. Diligenskii, "Putin i rossiiskaya demokratiya (razmyshleniya po rezultatam oprosov 2000g.)," available at www.fom.ru (accessed on January 18, 2001).

155. A. Buzgalin, *Johnson's Russia List* 4205 (March 28, 2000).

156. *Johnson's Russia List* 5411 (August 27, 2001).

157. See, for example, *Zavtra* 11 (March 14, 2000) and 13 (March 28, 2000), available at www.zavtra.ru.

158. *Vybory glav ispolnitelnoi vlasti subektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii*, available at www.kprf.ru.

159. *Itogi*, December 26, 2000.

160. *Segodnya*, January 21, 2000.

161. *Segodnya*, April 4, 2000.

162. G. Pavlovskii, available at www.strana.ru (accessed on February 21, 2001).

163. The party bill demanded that each political party have at least ten thousand members nationwide with at least one hundred members in over half of Russia's regions. It was passed by the Duma on June 21, 2001.

164. Putin's press conference, July 18, 2001, *Johnson's Russia List* 5353 (July 19, 2001).

165. On Rossiya, see the official website, www.dv-rossia-seleznev.ru.

166. Author's interview with Bindyukov, September 20, 2000.

167. Interesting accounts include "U KPRF vse otobrali i podelili," in *Kalingradskaya Pravda*, April 6, 2002.

168. However, both Viktor Zorkaltsev (Committee for the Affairs of Social and Religious Organisations) and Valentin Nikitin (Committee for Nationalities' Matters for the "Agro-industrial Group"), who had not refused to resign, were tacitly left as chairs of their respective committees.

169. *Pravda*, May 11, 2000, and June 15, 2000.

170. Author's interview with Kravets, September 22, 2000; *Segodnya*, July 15, 2000.

171. Author's interview with aide to one of the party's top leaders (name withheld), September 2000. Joan Barth Urban, "Russia's Communists after Zyuganov: Forward toward Europe or Back to the 'Bright Future'?" *The New Leader*, September–October 2000.

172. Gennady Zyuganov, *Pravda*, May 18, 2000; *Pravda Rossii*, April 26–May 2, 2000. Author's interviews with Bindyukov, September 20, 2000, and Kravets, September 22, 2000.

173. Unless indicated, discussion of the May 20 party plenum is taken from *Pravda Rossii*, May 24–30, 2000. See also *Pravda*, April 20, 2000, and April 21–24, 2000; and *Pravda Rossii*, May 17–23, 2000.

174. *Ocherednye zadachi KPRF: Tezisy dlya obsuzhdeniya v partiinikh organizatsiyakh k VII sezdu partii* (Moscow, 2000). For the final version, see *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, December 7, 2000.

175. V. Solovei, "Mesto i rol kommunisticheskoi i natsionalisticheskoi oppozitsii v Rossiiskoi politike," unpublished report, March 2001.

176. The speech was published on the CPRF website, www.kprf.ru.

177. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, December 5, 2000.

178. Semigin's business background was seen as particularly beneficial in this regard. Glazev was also a prominent new member of the NPUR. See *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, September 26, 2000.

179. *Politicheskii otchet Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPRF VII sedzu i ocherednye zadachi partii*, available at www.kprf.ru.

180. This phrase is from *Obshchaya gazeta*, December 7–13, 2000.

181. Kravets's critical approach to Putin and leadership ambitions were likely the reason for his removal. See *Kommersant*, December 2, 2000. As much was suggested in my interview with a CPRF parliamentary aide in September 2000. The ideology secretary was replaced with the "secretary of informational-analytical work," a post held from April 2001 by Oleg Kulikov.

182. J. D. Nagle and A. Mahr, *Democracy and Democratization* (London: Sage, 2000), p. 181.

183. This is Putin's phrase; see N. Gevorkyan, N. Timakova, and A. Kolesnikov, *Ot pervogo litsa: Razgavory s Vladimirom Putinym* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000).

184. M. J. Bull, "Whatever Happened to Italian Communism?" *West European Politics* 14, no. 4 (1991), pp. 103–104.

185. C. K. Ansell and M. Steven Fish, "The Art of Being Indispensable: Non-charismatic Personalism in Contemporary Political Parties," *Comparative Political Studies* 32, no. 3 (May 1999), pp. 283–312.

186. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, September 22, 1999. Renegades Lapshin and Podberezkin, as well as Aman Tuleev, were finally expelled from the NPUR in June 2000.

187. For estimates of party discontent, see *Russia Today*, December 3, 2000; *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, May 27, 2002; and *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, June 1, 2002.

188. Author's interview with Kravets, September 22, 2000.

189. See, for example, Gennady Zyuganov's speech at Seventh Congress, available at www.kprf.ru/party/congress.asp (accessed in January 2002).

190. Sakwa, "Left or Right?" p. 154; Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, p. 191.

191. On Khodyrev's Blairite style and clean image, see *Profil*, August 27, 2001.

192. The Moldovan communists' program is available at www.ournet.md/~pcrm/ustav/prog.html.

193. B. Kagarlitskii, *Obshchaya gazeta*, March 8–14, 2001.

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The Communist Party of Ukraine: From Soviet Man to East Slavic Brotherhood

Andrew Wilson

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was founded in 1918, allowing its modern successor to celebrate its "eightieth anniversary" with great pride in 1998. After a short period when it was banned following the Ukrainian declaration of independence (1991–1993), the party quickly returned to become the largest in Ukraine—no longer enjoying a monopoly on power but winning roughly one-quarter of the seats at both the 1994 and the 1998 parliamentary elections. Only in the 2002 elections did the party suffer its first serious reverse. The CPU's early successes came despite it being one of the most unreconstructed successor parties in the entire post-communist world. Technically, the party is a "new" one, but it still bills its congresses in awkward duality: the "1st (29th)" in 1993 through to the "5th (33rd)" in 2000 and so on. This chapter attempts to give both a brief account of the party's original relative success and an explanation of its continuing reluctance to reform.

Soviet History

Much of the subsequent history of the Communist Party of Ukraine was already encapsulated in the first three months of its existence. One historians' faction—largely advocates of a more "Ukrainian" party—has emphasized the importance of the party's first conference (*narada*) at Tahanrih in April 1918, where delegates from Kiev led by Mykola Skrypnyk originally established the party as "formally independent and equal" with the Russian Bolsheviks in Moscow.[1] It has

also celebrated the parallel tradition of Ukraine's uniquely indigenous rival communist parties, the Borot'bisty (the "Fighters," more properly the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party of Communist Fighters, 1918–1920), and the Ukapisti (the "Ukrainian Communist Party," 1920–1925), and argued that they were instrumental in helping steer the mainstream Communist Party toward its eventual choice of a Ukrainianization policy in the early 1920s.[2]

The modern-day Communist Party, on the other hand, argues that Tahanrih was only a tactical step enforced by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (a nominally independent party for a temporarily independent Ukrainian state), subordinated to the overriding importance of maintaining the (then necessarily secret) "unity of the party and the revolutionary forces of Ukraine and Russia" against the "shameful" forces of Ukrainian nationalism backed by the occupying Germans and the "foreign bourgeoisie."[3] It was in any case immediately superseded by the party's first formal congress (z'ïzd) in Moscow in July 1918, where east Ukrainians ensured that the would-be Ukrainian "party" would henceforth act not even as a filial but as part of "a single Russian Communist Party" or RCP (bolshevik) "in subordination for all general programmatic questions to Congresses of the RCP and in general political questions to the Central Committee of the RCP."[4]

Furthermore, whereas to many Ukrainians the suppression of the Ukapisti in 1925 heralded the eventual end of the Ukrainianization movement, the modern-day Communists have argued that the rival party's "self-dissolution" came about "not because of 'pressure' or 'persecution' from the RCP(b) and CP(b)U, as bourgeois nationalist authors have asserted then and now," but because "the Leninist nationality policy" (korenizatsiia) adopted in 1923 and the need for a united front against common enemies rendered the existence of "an obscure party of the village rabble and Ukrainian populism" no longer necessary (the CPU included a "b" for bolshevik in its title until 1953). In 2000 the party journal reprinted two articles it first published in 1925 (Skrypnyk's farewell eulogy "On Ukapism" and Ukapisti leader Andrii Richyts'kyi's homily to democratic centralism "Towards a United Party") that supposedly proved the point.[5]

Why so much history? The dilemmas facing Ukrainian Communists today are starkly reminiscent of the 1920s. A "right-wing" fringe seeks true independence for itself as a party and for Ukraine as a state, whereas the vast majority of the party has still fundamentally to adjust to either fact—even more than a decade after Ukrainian independence in 1991. The dispute overshadows all questions of socioeconomic policy or, more precisely, allows the mainstream successor party to subsume such questions in nostalgia for the Soviet era. In no small part this is because, even if the modern Communist Party has

a myopic view of the 1920s, of the two rival traditions it is more broadly representative of the party's subsequent history after the final defeat of the Ukrainianization campaign in the early 1930s. Even under the relatively flexible Petro Shelest, party leader from 1963 to 1972, the party followed in the wake of changes emanating from Moscow.[6] The Communist Party "of Ukraine" remained a constituent part of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) right up until the very last days of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Although it had its own Politburo and Central Committee, it never adopted its own program or struck out on its own. In fact, it vehemently denounced the Lithuanian Communist Party for so doing in 1990. After the abolition of Article 6—the notorious guarantee of the Communist Party's "leading role"—in the Soviet constitution in 1990, the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice registered the party as the "CPU" on July 22, 1991, but—on the very eve of the August coup—the nationalist opposition was seeking to appeal the decision, as it claimed the party was still the CPSU and not the CPU.

The local regime never made any "preemptive strike." There were no roundtable negotiations with the opposition, no "transplacement" of regime.[7] Even when so-called national communists began to reach out to the former opposition, most were increasingly semidetached from the party. The CPU was therefore always an integral part of the "patrimonial communist" regime in the USSR and was always likely to pass on its culture of authoritarian statism, personalized and highly clientelistic faction politics, and *apparat* intrigue to any successor party.[8]

Echoes of the ideological ferment of 1917–1930 were eventually heard in 1989–1991. But as before, the vast majority of left-wing debate focused on the all-important national question—either the promotion of Ukrainian "sovereignty" (eventually independence) or opposition to it; there was almost no discussion of "social democratization" before 1991 that could carry any impetus into the independence period. Furthermore, Ukraine's "alternative" left traditions were largely revived outside of a party seemingly incapable of revisiting its own past. It was always the right (Rukh in 1989) or center (in 1990, when the local Democratic Platform gave up on its attempts to democratize the party from within) that left the party, which never had to face defections or new challengers to its left. The all-union conservative group Unity had a strong local presence but was tolerated within the party because its views were close to leadership sentiments.

The splits to the "right" left the party more conservative than ever and would-be reformers even more isolated. Oleksandr Moroz, the relatively pragmatic leader of the Communists' parliamentary group, called on the

leadership to "distance themselves from the center" (i.e., Moscow) in summer 1991.[9] Borys Oliinyk, a former adviser to Gorbachev who had also played a part in the foundation of Rukh, helped set up an initiative group named Fraternity to press for a properly parliamentary party committed to "building sovereignty, the defense of working people from an untamed market and achieving national [i.e., interethnic] accord." When rebuffed, he began to think out loud in the first half of 1991 about forming some kind of Ukrainian "Party of Social Justice."[10] These were isolated voices, however. The party leadership under Stanislav Hurenko was more interested in opposing Gorbachev by building links with hard-liners in Moscow.

It was only after the failure of the coup attempt in August 1991, during the very parliamentary debate that produced the Declaration of Ukrainian Independence (August 24), that Moroz promised "to take responsibility on [him]self for the organization of a Ukrainian Communist Party."[11] By then it was too late. The last official party plenum on August 26 declared that it "considers it necessary to take a decision on the full independence of the Communist Party of Ukraine";[12] but the presidium of parliament voted to suspend the party's activities on the same day and then to ban it completely on August 30. Even then, it was unclear if the plenum had actually declared the party's independence or only its intention to do so at a proposed emergency congress that was never to take place.

Revival

It has been argued elsewhere that those successor parties that emerged as a result of a long initial process of transition through bargaining with opposition elites (Poland, Hungary) are more likely to play by the new rules of the new democratic game.[13] In Ukraine this failed to happen. The previous regime legacy and the internal balance of forces during the late Soviet "transition" made it likely that a conservative successor party would emerge.[14] Moreover, the sudden political rupture in August 1991 forced the Communist Party into a two-year hibernation period when it had no real need to make any compromises. Compromisers tended to join the new "Socialist Party of Ukraine" set up by Moroz in October 1991. Some adjustments were necessary to win reregistration for the Communist Party in 1993 but not many. By then the authorities in Kiev were preoccupied with general economic and political discontent that many thought would endanger the stability of the new state itself.

The Communist Party, moreover, did not completely disappear in August 1991.[15] Many nominal members of the Socialist Party were in reality marking

time pending a proper communist revival. A second faction was the semi-secret committee entrusted by the last plenum of the old party Central Committee "to represent [the party's] interests" during "the period of temporary suspension of the activity of the party structures of the CPU"—and of course to work to overturn that "temporary suspension."[16] A third group of more impatient activists formed a series of tiny ultra-left parties in 1991–1992, in particular the hard-line Union of Communists of Ukraine, which had strong links with its Russian equivalent and made much of the running in reforming a communist grassroots in late 1992 and early 1993.[17] Ultimately, however, the first and second groups were better placed to revive the workplace networks of the Soviet era that would prove the key to the party's future success.[18] Whereas the Union of Communists was prominent at the first key revival meeting, the March 1993 "All-Ukrainian Conference of Communists" in Donets'k, its members had largely been purged (as with their counterparts in Russia) by the time the CPU's official revival congress was held in the same city in June 1993. As the presidium of the Ukrainian parliament had declared in May that "citizens of Ukraine who share communist ideas may establish party organizations in accordance with the laws of Ukraine"—but stopped short of granting permission for the revival of the party of old—the assembly was rather awkwardly billed as the party's "1st (29th)."[19]

The new party was radical enough—in many ways even more radical than the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF).[20] It gritted its teeth in formal compliance with the new order, promising to "act within the constitution and the existing laws" of Ukraine; but the party's underlying message was clear to all. It attacked the legal basis of Ukrainian statehood as the two-stage "counterrevolutionary, antisocialist coup" of August 1991 and December 1991 and called for "the rebirth on a new and exclusively voluntary basis of a union of the fraternal peoples of the independent states formed on the territory of the USSR." It made a blanket condemnation of "the forcible capitalization of all spheres of life"—even though real (partial and only partially successful) economic reform in Ukraine only began in October 1994.[21] Still, although Ukrainian nationalists immediately called for the party to be banned, they failed to notice that the more radical agenda of the Union of Communists (the party to join with the Russian Communists and declare itself the legal successor of the CPSU, demand restitution of all CPSU "property" from the state, and call for the full restoration of the USSR) had already been put to one side. The Ukrainian Communists would always be caught in two minds, almost apologizing for not really being the local branch of the CPSU but not legally allowed to be such.[22] The new party made no attempt to claim

that it had become "more Ukrainian" or to reposition itself in the national communist traditions of 1917–1920 or the Soviet 1920s.

Early Successes

It seemed the party did not need to. Soon after their revival in 1993, the Communists could once again claim to be Ukraine's largest party in membership terms, although an initial 130,000 was in no way comparable with the party of old—a peak of 3.3 million in 1989, down to 2.73 million in August 1991.[23] Nevertheless, membership crept up to 160,000 by January 2000. Only in the very late 1990s was the party overtaken in size by some of Ukraine's new "oligarchic" parties, such as the United Social Democrats, which had rather different motives for building a mass membership. However, Communist Party members were undoubtedly disproportionately elderly—67.6 percent were over fifty in 2000, and 45.1 percent were retired or unemployed.[24]

The Communists' electoral success was also fairly immediate. The party benefited from the preservation of the Soviet system of single-mandate voting for the parliamentary elections in spring 1994, which, while handicapping political parties in general, gave a comparative advantage to the party as the strongest contender in a weak field. In a highly fractured parliament, the Communists won ninety-five seats (28.1 percent of the total; only 338 of 450 constituencies were initially able to elect deputies); its nearest rival, Rukh, the main Ukrainian nationalist party, won only twenty-seven. The CPU could afford to "loan" six deputies to the Socialists and five to the Rural Party to help them form factions of their own (for which a minimum of twenty-five deputies was necessary). The Communists' initial starting strength was therefore eighty-four—still the largest faction by far.

The CPU, however, chose to sit out the presidential contest in summer 1994. The party had only been registered in October 1993; and most of its leaders, including new head Petro Symonenko, had only emerged onto the national stage as people's deputies in March. Moroz stood for the Socialists and won 13.1 percent, but this was far less than the total left vote for parliament (as the Socialists originally won another fourteen seats, and the Rural Party won eighteen, the left won 37.6 percent of the seats in all). An additional reason for remaining on the sidelines was that the Communists were prepared to pay almost any price to unseat first president Leonid Kravchuk, whom they detested for his role in the destruction of the USSR, and they backed his former prime minister Leonid Kuchma as the man most likely to achieve this aim.[25]

After a four-year farce with a quarter-empty parliament, the electoral law was changed for the next contest in 1998. Again, the Communists benefited from the new system—as in Russia 50 percent were now to be elected from single-mandate constituencies and 50 percent from a national party list. In the constituencies, the Communists slipped back, winning only thirty-eight out of 225 (16.9 percent). In the party list, however, they again easily out-paced their nascent rivals with an impressive 24.6 percent of the national vote, and 84 out of 225 seats (37.3 percent). Only one feature of the system, the adoption of a 4 percent rather than a 5 percent barrier, held the party back.[26] Overall, the party won 122 seats (27.1 percent)—largely a repetition of its performance in 1994. The Socialists won thirty-four seats in alliance with the Rural Party; Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists won sixteen. Rukh won forty-six seats, and four centrist "oligarchic" parties won a total of eighty-eight. In the consequent hung parliament, the Communists came close to securing the powerful position of chairman for Symonenko, who stood seven times in the protracted contest, coming closest on June 18, when he got 221 votes, only five short of the necessary majority. The eventual winner was Oleksandr Tkachenko of the Rural Party, a fellow traveler of the CPU. The Communists' Adam Martyniuk was appointed one of his two deputies, and Communists chaired six out of twenty-two parliamentary committees.

Marking Time

The 1999 election was a different matter. "left bloc" unity disappeared, and nascent political divisions were painfully exposed, with the leaders of all the main left parties (now four in number) running as much against one another as against President Kuchma. Electability became a more obvious issue once, in their first winner-takes-all vote in independent Ukraine, the Communist electorate was revealed as stable but inherently limited.

In narrow party terms, the Communists could still claim to be the most successful left force. Symonenko fought his way through to the second round after winning 22.2 percent in the first (Kuchma won 36.5 percent)—although this was exactly the scenario that Kuchma had long sought to engineer to maximize his chances of reelection. Socialist leader Moroz won 11.3 percent; and Nataliia Vitrenko of the breakaway "Progressive Socialists" (see below) won 11 percent. Oleksandr Tkachenko, Moroz's successor as chairman of parliament and de facto head of the Rural Party, withdrew at the last moment in favor of Symonenko (he had been polling around 2–3 percent). Symonenko was easily beaten by Kuchma in the second round, by 56.2 percent to 37.8 percent.

The Communists were not really running for victory in 1999. The party had explicitly rejected the Socialists' idea of a left-center or "popular front" strategy in 1998–1999, refusing to consider entering any "coalition of political forces" with such different "class interests" and preferring to preserve its self-image as "the only remaining political force that openly and principally stands for the Socialist perspective."[27] Only in the weeks between the two rounds did the CPU leadership make any attempt to change course, when six other leftist candidates were persuaded to sign a joint declaration with Symonenko denying any threat of a "red revanche" (the others were Moroz, Tkachenko, and the minor candidates Yurii Karmazin, Oleksandr Bazyliuk, Volodymyr Oliinyk, and Mykola Haber—Nataliia Vitrenko being the one notable absentee). Symonenko brazenly but implausibly sought to compare himself to Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, whom "nobody would think to accuse of such a political dye" (redness). Symonenko also promised a coalition government, a voluntary renunciation of some presidential power, no Bolshevik methods of persecution, "the equality of all forms of property, and [strikingly] the promotion and support of the development of private industry." Equally striking was the statement that "the aim of the program is the building of a sovereign, independent, democratic and law-based state." We "will not," Symonenko pledged, "join any [new, post-Soviet] union, which limits this sovereignty or draws it into military conflict."[28]

A week before the election was obviously too late to make such sweeping changes—or at least, they did not carry the conviction or make the dramatic impact they would have earlier in the campaign. Moroz was a much more likely Ukrainian version of Kwaśniewski and had constantly stressed that only a center-left candidate, that is, himself, was electable.[29] Symonenko's 37.8 percent in the second round was considerably less than the combined left candidates' 45.1 percent in the first and even less than the 40.7 percent Gennady Zyuganov had won in Russia in 1996.

The only hint that some Communists were seriously addressing the electability issue came with rumors that leading members, such as Heorhii Kriuchkov (the main party ideologist and head of the parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defense Issues), preferred to support Tkachenko, who was running on a more obviously East Slavic nationalist ticket, or back Moroz. After Moroz visited Moscow in September 1999, several newspaper reports claimed Zyuganov had leaned on Symonenko to withdraw in Moroz's favor.[30] Symonenko, however, stayed in the race for narrow party reasons, and the concessions made between the rounds were soon forgotten—at least by the party leadership, which preferred to blame its defeat on electoral violations and the mass media's power to persuade

"a significant part of the population to vote against their own objective interests."[31] In his postelection reports to the party Central Committee in December 1999 and March 2000 Symonenko chose to interpret the result as a demonstration of "an intensification of the class struggle" by the new Ukrainian bourgeoisie and a vindication of the party's defensive priorities. Having met the party's real goal, if not the general left interest, in maximizing a losing position, Symonenko was probably safe until 2002. He even ventured to call the campaign "a success . . . because it became a great stimulus to the growth of [our] party organization," as well as strengthening the party's "avant-garde" function and spreading its general "influence in society."[32]

The party would have to wait for generational turnover to produce real change. Relative "modernizers" like Kriuchkov in fact proposed little more than less stridency in rhetoric. At the 2000 party congress, Symonenko denied there was any need to update the 1995 party program. Its declared tasks had not been met.[33] Only a few voices sounded notes of alarm beneath the surface.[34] In reality, the Communists have grown used to the luxuries of permanent opposition. Like their Russian counterparts, they have no real desire to make the compromises that would facilitate, and of course result from, their participation in government. One Communist, Ivan Sakhan', was minister of labor under Kuchma (like Yurii Maslyukov, the Communist who was Russian first deputy prime minister in 1998–1999) but was semidetached from the rest of the party, which is safely immune from patriotic appeals to share the burdens of office.

At a local level, the Communists emerged as the largest single organized force in both 1994 and 1998, winning 168 seats on oblast councils in 1994 (out of the 333, 21.4 percent of all deputies, who were members of any party) and 273 in 1998 (councils then had more seats, but the Communist deputies actually represented a higher proportion, 33.1 percent, of the 679 who were party members).[35] The Communists also emerged as the largest single party in the Crimean Assembly after the 1998 elections with thirty-six out of 100 seats, allowing their local leader Leonid Grach to become chairman of the assembly.

After 1999, the easy optimism of 1994 or 1998 was no longer possible. Some, pointing to the 45.1 percent the left candidates had in fact achieved in the first round, stuck to the Fabian belief that support for the left was still on a rising trend (see Table 6.1).

In practice, the atmosphere had changed completely after 1999.[36] Kuchma's supporters had made it very clear they were not prepared to let the left take power. Moreover, after the election they attacked the left's

Table 6.1. Electoral Performance of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1994–2002

	Territorial Seats	% List Vote	List Seats	Total Seats	Overall
1994 Parliamentary Election	95/338			95/338	28.1%
1998 Parliamentary Election	38/225	24.6%	84/225	122/450	27.1%
1999 Presidential Election		Petro Symonenko: 22.2% first round, 37.8% second round			
2002 Parliamentary Election	6/225	20%	59/225	65/450	14.4%

Sources: Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social-Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe–Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997), p. 1303; Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, "The 1998 Ukrainian Elections: Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," *Europe–Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999), p. 1040; Oleksii Haran', Oleksandr Maiboroda et al., *Ukrains'ki livi: Mizh leninizmom i sotsial-demokratiieiu* (Kiev, 2000), pp. 182–193.

strongholds in parliament (see the section "The Political Factor" below). To Symonenko, appealing to the Socialists at their Eighth Congress in May 2000, the left's priority had to be mere survival, making the preservation of the "left bloc" strategy even more vital.[37] The Socialists, on the other hand, accepted that adaptation was the key to survival and continued to drift away from their erstwhile allies.

Dynamics of Left Competition and Support

Axes of Competition

Superficially at least, the dynamics of intra-left party competition in Ukraine differ significantly from those in Russia. First, Ukraine has competition along the Communist–Socialist axis, which has no real parallel further north or indeed in many states of the former Soviet bloc. Lithuania had both the Democratic Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party, with the latter a historical party from the interwar era—although it faced similar problems to the Ukrainian Socialists in defining an image distinct from the former Communists (Democratic Labour)—until the merger of the two parties in 2001 under the name of the Social Democratic Party.[38] In Russia, would-be socialists and social democrats tend to be found in the moderate wing of the CPRF.

Second, because in Ukraine (Ukrainian) nationalists and Communists are polar opposites, the CPU does not have to compete, as the CPRF must, with

far right parties such as Russian National Unity or Spiritual Heritage. Ukraine does have a political fringe of Russian and East Slavic nationalist parties, but to date it has remained small indeed, largely because the Communist Party itself has proved better suited to representing the vague nostalgia nationalism of Ukraine's ethnic Russian and Russophone population (see the section "Ideology" below).

Third, because the Ukrainian Communists (and superficially the Progressive Socialists) are themselves so left wing, there has been no real political space to organize on their left. In contrast to the ultraradical neo-Bolshevik Russian Communist Workers' Party, which won 4.5 percent of the vote in 1995 and 2.2 percent in 1999, none of the dozen or so fringe leftist parties in Ukraine managed to collect the 200,000 signatures needed to stand in the 1998 elections (only a couple had been really active in 1994). Nor would any meet the full definition of a "successor party."

In theory, therefore, the Ukrainian Communists ought to be most concerned with competition from the Socialists to their right. Other factors have prevented this from happening, however. First, the party leaders remain counterfactually concerned by the potential growth of a far left in southeast Ukraine, especially given their early rivalry with the Union of Communists, still eking out a perilous existence.[39] Its remaining members, including party leader Tamil' Yabrova, now have close contacts with, even shared membership in, the Russian Communist Workers' Party. Other "true" fringe parties include the several Ukrainian branches of Nina Andreeva's All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks—renamed the Party of Communists (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in 1993 in order to gain official registration. The party considers itself the true heir of the original CP(b)U, which supposedly betrayed its principles after its change of name in 1953. This is an interesting argument but, unfortunately, not even one that was made in the 1950s. The party is one of Ukraine's smallest, with only forty reported members as of January 1998. Other groupuscules include the Union of Labor set up in 1997; the Communist Party (of Workers), established in 1998; and the tiny Renovation Communist Party of Ukraine, active only in Odesa. A Trotskyist group, the Young Revolutionary Marxists, has existed since 1992.[40] The existence of such groups indicates the presence of a potential electorate in east Ukraine—but one that has been contained to date by the positioning of the Communist Party. In the 1990s there was no equivalent of the "communist pluralism" to be found in Russia. When it finally emerged in 2000–2001, it was an artificial phenomenon (see "The Political Factor" below).

There are other factors that have helped to minimize competition between the Communists and the Socialists. First, although the Socialist

Party was formed first, in its original incarnation (1991–1993) it was something of a holding operation for would-be Communists. Second, the Communist Party emerged as the dominant party on the left in 1993–1994 largely through displacement rather than competition. Half the Socialists' members (some forty thousand) simply transferred to the Communists. Adam Martyniuk, first editor of the Socialist paper *Tovarysh* (Comrade), became the first editor of its Communist rival, *Komunist*. A third factor was the "left bloc" strategy adopted in 1994. There were several instances of direct Communist–Socialist competition in the elections but considerably fewer than among the parties of the right and center (and rather more in 1998, when the two parties competed in 111 out of 225 constituencies).[41] That said, there have always been tensions over defining the nature of the "bloc." For the Communists, it is an alliance of principle, based on all the parties' "affinity in origin from a common womb—the Leninist Party of Bolsheviks, the former CPSU."[42] The Socialists, however, saw the arrangement as largely tactical and became increasingly nervous that the Communists would always dominate such a bloc. The key reason limiting Communist–Socialist competition, however, is that the two parties' support bases only partially overlap.

Bases of Support

Broadly speaking, at least until Moroz adopted his "New Course" shifting the Socialist Party in a more social democratic direction after 1998, the main difference between the Communists and Socialists (and the reason why one or two suggestions of merger in 1993–1994 were ignored) was their different line on the national question.[43] This has provided the Socialists with their most obvious niche, all the more so because on socioeconomic questions, as in Russia,[44] it has proved difficult to establish a more general profile for either democratic socialism or social democracy between the better known brand names of market reform and nostalgia communism. Consequently, the Socialists' support base is basically an ethnolinguistic and regional subset of the general "protest" electorate, tilted toward central Ukraine and rural and small-town Ukrainophones.[45] Voters with strongly negative attitudes toward the market can be found in either Communist or Socialist camp; voters who also have strongly negative attitudes toward Ukrainian nationalism tend to gravitate toward the Communists.[46] As a proxy party of ethnolinguistic protest (see below), the Ukrainian Communists have that extra edge compared with the CPRF and extra depth of support in southeast Ukraine.

Some surveys have also pointed to age as an important differentiating factor in the two parties' support bases, although here the available evidence is

more ambiguous. The left electorate as a whole is undoubtedly relatively eld-
erly. Craumer and Clem claim that the Socialist-Rural electorate in 1998 was
somewhat older than the Communist, in part because it was also more rural
and more female.[47] However, another 1998 survey found that the elderly
(fifty-five and over) were more than twice as likely to vote Communist in
1998 (37.8 percent) than voters under twenty-nine (10.8 percent), com-
pared with 50 percent more likely to vote for the Socialist-Rural bloc (5.2
percent compared with 3.4 percent) and rough equality for Rukh (10.5 per-
cent to 10.8 percent).[48] Underestimation of the Socialist-Rural electorate
may have been the problem here. My own research confirms that language
and ethnicity, region of residence, and attitudes toward "national" values are
all-important.[49] Because this is the main reason for the Socialists' existence,
however, the party does not exercise the "pull" on the Communists that it
otherwise might.

Ideology

There is an obvious threat to democratization in post-communist states if suc-
cessor parties "cling to their pre-transition political identities and organizational
practices."[50] In Ukraine it is political identities that have proved most resilient.
The Communist Party, which defines itself as "the inheritor of the *ideas and tra-
ditions* of the CPU, as it existed until its banning in August 1991,"[51] has placed
a high premium on nostalgia culture since its revival. Hence the survival of the
resolutely uncharismatic Petro Symonenko as party leader. Like Gennady
Zyuganov in Russia, he is actually an appropriate symbol for a party that seeks
to depict itself as the honest second echelon, the rank and file betrayed by the
egotistical leadership of the Gorbachev era, the honest toilers of *nasha strana*
(our country) versus the cosmopolitan elite of *eta strana* (that country).

As in many parts of the former Soviet bloc, left conservatism has sought
to revive itself through the co-option of local nationalism, but in Ukraine
this has to date meant the nationalism of a vanished state, the USSR. De-
spite the passage of time, the Communist Party has remained completely
loyal to the Soviet past, painted in particularly glowing colors in the *His-
torical Theses* produced by the party to celebrate its eightieth anniversary
in 1998.[52] The party relaunched its theoretical journal *Communist of
Ukraine* in 1999, proudly proclaiming its continuity with the original first
published in 1925, but its function is more to confirm the true faith than
to serve as a forum for new ideas.[53] The party rarely uses the word *mistakes*
in reference to the Soviet period and rarely mentions dangerous topics
such as the Purges or the Famine of 1932–1933. Indeed, the party is capable

of giving the impression that things Soviet only began to go wrong with Khrushchev's "adventurism" (as late as 1999, the party was publishing material that cast the Stalinist period in a favorable light); although its normal formula (for any period) criticizes only "departures from Leninist principles."[54] Lenin himself is still sacrosanct, the guiding genius of "the Leninist Communist Party of Ukraine," a party proud to continue "speaking in the words of Lenin."[55]

Symonenko has therefore turned the accusation of "conservatism" on its head: "Our party does not deny its history . . . the tragic events of the recent past have not swayed our devotion to true socialism, to the ideals of Great October [1917]"; "We are 'conservative' only because we keep faith in the ideas of socialism, workers' power, and a voluntary union of the peoples of a USSR that was criminally destroyed."[56] It was, moreover, "important to remember what is indisputable: a mighty economic legacy was created in the years of Soviet power that Ukraine has been living off in all the subsequent years of 'independence.'"[57] The only concession to new circumstances, buried deep in the 1995 party program, was the admission that "it would be utopian to try and revive a socio-economic system of different relations, which existed in different conditions, under different principles and different organisations of production and distribution, different social-class structures of society, a different level of consciousness."[58]

Even if circumstances had changed, the party's analytical tools—in particular the faith in historical materialism and the class struggle—had not.[59] The first convinced the party that despite the setbacks of 1989/1991, socialism was still the society of the future. If anything, the prospects for real, eventual socialism were brighter, now that careerists like Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk had left the party. The second led the party to claim that, whereas the "postindustrial West" now had only a "quasi proletariat," many parts of Ukraine were actually being *de*modernized, economically and socially disconnected by "globalization," and dramatically repauperized. "People are surviving on what they accumulated in the years of Soviet power," the party has claimed. "That is, they are not yet a classic proletariat as they still have much to lose (a flat, a car, a dacha, etc.). But their full proletarianization will come sooner or later."[60] Given the "rebirth of class antagonism and class struggle" since 1991, and the oppression of the new proletariat by "a comprador bourgeoisie . . . behind which stands world imperialism headed by the USA," there were, in short, plenty of reasons why the Ukrainian left should be "more left" than the parties of social democratic Europe.[61] There was, Symonenko therefore claimed, "no basis for social democracy of the Western type in Ukraine." The "softening of class antagonism" in the West was only pos-

sible because the local working class, as part of the "golden billion," lived "as parasites on the labor of the countries of the world periphery" to which Ukraine was rapidly being consigned. Ukraine, on the contrary, could not expect any "lessening of class antagonism, only the reverse."[62]

The Communists have opposed every aspect of economic reform in Ukraine—including all privatization, whether large, medium, or small—unless an enterprise was small enough to have no employees to "exploit."[63] Despite the 1995 program talking of support for all forms of ownership, its preferences were clear: including "the preservation of state property in basic spheres of industry," "the restoration of state and workers' control," "renationalization" of illegally privatized industry, "a savage war against shadow business," "the restoration of planned price-formation, a moratorium on price increases for basic food products," "the restoration of a state currency monopoly and a monopoly on external economic activity . . . banking activity, other financial-credit institutions."[64] In the words of Symonenko's simpler summary, "Our task is not to ameliorate capitalism, but to have done with it."[65]

Communist nostalgia is also for the culture of the lost "new civilization" of the Soviet era. According to Communist Deputy Yurii Solomatin: "We are Soviet communists; we are Soviet people; we are Soviet patriots."[66] It might be pointed out that this residual Soviet "nationalism" does not refer to a specific "nation." It is still supranational, even pancultural, wrapped in a rhetoric of "antinationalism" and "the friendship of the peoples." But insofar as it refers to a "Soviet people" (*sovetskii narod*), located in a "Soviet homeland" (*sovetskaia rodina* or *sovetskoe otechestvo*), it also refers to a specific community, with its own group myths and boundary markers, a national identity of sorts.[67] There was certainly precious little evidence of loyalty to the new Ukraine, even of "national communism" in a party that specifically condemned the "danger . . . of the attempt to revive so-called 'Ukrainian communism.'"[68] Borys Oliinyk was often touted as the potential leader of such a movement, but it had no formal existence. Oliinyk's version of Ukrainian identity was in any case predicated on assumptions of East Slavic fraternity and pan-Slavic solidarity (in 1999 he vehemently denounced the NATO Kosovo campaign in a pamphlet provocatively entitled *Who's Next?*).[69] The party normally sidesteps the issue of support for Ukrainian independence by placing it in quote marks. That is, the party would be happy to support "real," socialist independence, rather than the current neocolonial quasi state, but was in no short-term danger of having its bluff called.[70]

Internally, the Communists have promoted the idea of Ukraine as a bicultural state, without any attempt to place "the interests, rights and specific traits of one nation above those of other nations and nationalities" and in

which "the Ukrainian language" should not be "over"-privileged but, rather, left alone to enjoy "its natural development, purged of the imposed language of the diaspora. The Russian language, as the native language of half the population of Ukraine, [should be given] the status of a state language alongside Ukrainian."[71] President Kuchma was first elected on a similar, albeit vague, platform of raising the status of the Russian language in 1994. After the election, however, he opted to maintain the linguistic status quo (which favors Russian), thereby desensitizing the issue among Russophones at least—apart from the radical fringe. The issue was therefore gifted to the Communists but, in the absence of any significant Ukrainianization pressure, was not particularly salient. After the 1999 election, Kuchma initially backed a state program on "broadening the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language" in February 2000. It proceeded in fits and starts, however—particularly after the Gongadze affair (see below) deprived the president of most of his support on the nationalist right. Despite their best efforts, the Communists were therefore unable to use the issue to revive their fortunes in 2002.

Nevertheless, the Communists' mix of policies has more appeal than pure Russian nationalism in Ukraine and has won the CPU much proxy support. Ethnic Russians are more likely to vote Communist in Ukraine, but so are many ethnic Ukrainians, particularly Russophones who share Russian values of Soviet nostalgia or East Slavic nationalism.[72] The party itself is broadly representative of Ukraine outside of the western region: 64.9 percent of members are Ukrainian, and 28.7 percent are Russian.[73] However, that constituency itself has a shifting identity. Soviet nationalism is still strongly supported by the party's powerful Donbas faction, led originally by Volodymyr Moiseienko (ironically head of the parliamentary committee in Kiev on "state building"), and the semiautonomous Crimean Party, led by Leonid Grach.[74] This internal party left was instrumental in forming the Soiuz (Union) group in the Ukrainian parliament in 1995 (twenty-four out of thirty-four members were Communists) and its successor "Communists for the Revival of the USSR" (twenty-five to thirty deputies). The latter was the driving force behind the all-Ukrainian Union "For the Revival of the USSR" set up in July 1998 and led by Moiseienko.[75] Members of the party left were also keen supporters of the "Union of Communist Parties-CPSU" set up with successor parties from other post-Soviet states in 1993, seeing it as a model of confederal relations for the parent states and the potential catalyst of a new union. The Ukrainians even opposed plans put forward by the CPRF in 1995 for a change of name that would allow the Union of Communist Parties to be-

come a deterritorialized supranational coordinating body, some kind of broader (i.e., not just post-Soviet) "International"—ironically ensuring that it would be sidelined as a nostalgia forum.

East Slavic Man

Gradually and belatedly, however, the Ukrainian Communists have begun to supplement their nostalgia-heavy Soviet nationalism with a vaguer commitment to the "East Slavic idea." The latter is more likely to have more long-term appeal outside of the core territories of the Donbas and Crimea and is a more suitable vehicle for generalized nostalgia without specific policy commitment.[76] In January 2001 Moiseienko's group was succeeded by a smaller group of nineteen, "For the Union of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia"—eleven of whom were Communists.[77] The USSR is, of course, not going to be restored tomorrow (Symonenko has ruled out unity "as a protectorate of the Russian bourgeoisie").[78] Fortunately, the Ukrainian Communists have rediscovered the natural link from Soviet to East Slavic or Eurasian nationalism in the supposed common "economic civilization" and proclivity for collective labor of all the East Slavic peoples: "Soviet man . . . did not emerge from nothing—before him stood the courageous Slavic-Rusich, the labor-loving Ukrainian peasant, the self-sacrificing Cossack."[79]

The 1999 Kosovo war helped spur this gradual evolution. Symonenko and Oliinyk, as with Zyuganov, have increasingly spoken of a world naturally divided into cultural "civilizations" and of the need to defend the "unity of canonical Orthodoxy" and the "Orthodox geocultural space" as the "common riches" and cultural foundation of the eastern Slavs in the natural struggle with the Islamic South and the expansionist West. Serbia's fate was therefore only a continuation of "centuries of intrigue of Catholicism against Orthodoxy." "Catholic Poland," it is claimed, "supported the bombers and Protestant Estonia even wanted to take part in the aggression."[80]

In the Ukrainian context, the main carrier of this "civilizational tradition" (the idea that "the Orthodox cultural-historical heritage is the common riches of the Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian peoples") is the branch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that is still loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate, and the Communists have begun to speak out in its support.[81] Like the CPRF, the CPU has managed to make this transition from a militantly atheistic past largely without irony. During his keynote TV broadcast of the 1999 presidential campaign, Symonenko, having earlier revealed his youthful baptism, openly declared his sympathy for "canonical Orthodoxy," that is, the Moscow Patriarchate, the rightful representative of "the Church of Prince

Vladimir, the Zaporozhian Cossacks, Taras Shevchenko, and now—the poverty-stricken, rightless, humiliated and plundered Ukrainian people."[82] The rival Kievan Patriarchate and Autocephalous Orthodox Churches were, in contrast, condemned as "pseudo-religious groupuscules" that aimed to take "Ukraine back to the religious wars of the late Middle Ages"; while "the Greek Catholics [were simply] carrying out their [traditional] traitorous mission in the eastern strategy of the Vatican"—not to mention the Western-sponsored "totalitarian sects" and their "attacks on Ukraine's traditional faith."[83] The Communists have therefore called for "political and Orthodox [pravoslavnyi] clerical circles to unite and stand in a common front in the defence of the orthodox [ortodoksal'nyi] religion of our fatherland, our peoples and countries against the serious Euro-spiritual threat."[84]

The developing tendency toward the ideological mimicry of Zyuganovism gained extra impetus from the visit of Pope John Paul II to Ukraine in June 2001 and from the events of September 11, 2001. The CPU vehemently denounced the papal visit as an insult to the "majority" of believers in Ukraine, attacking his "Catholic proselytism," "interference" in local affairs, and "planned meetings" "with splitter-schismatics" as a violation of the spirit of Vatican II, a threat to all ecumenical dialogue (both Ukrainian and all-European) and to "social peace" in Ukraine, and a de facto breach of the constitutional separation of church and state.[85] The party joined the Moscow Patriarchate in boycotting and protesting against the visit (which was otherwise a great success).

The papal visit also prompted Symonenko (or his ghostwriters) to pen a long piece entitled "The Crusade against Ukraine," in which he takes Zyuganovite arguments further than ever. Under conditions of "globalisation and the conflict of spiritual values," he begins, "Orthodox values—collectivism, social solidarity and mutual aid" had to stand against "cosmopolitan universalism," the threat of fundamentalist Islam, and the "age-old historical opponent of Orthodoxy—Catholicism," which had always "gone to the East with fire and sword" (a reference to the popular 1999 film adaptation of Henryk Sinkiewicz's 1899 novel). Symonenko depicts all the papacy's allies in Ukraine as dupes. The Vatican was failing to help the Greek Catholics establish true independence and was manipulating the Kievan Patriarchate as its "fifth column," spreading the "myth of the 'original national' character of its Church" only as a cover for long-term Catholicization. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, on the other hand, the Kievan Patriarchate's alternative patron, was "triply dependent—on Turkey, Western Europe and the USA." Collectively, the "uncanonical" churches, which "couldn't achieve unity and accord amongst themselves," were

threatening the natural unity of the eastern Slavs with the same discord. Only the Moscow Patriarchate, again, by seeking to maintain such unity, truly represented the real "national identity of the Ukrainian people."[86]

The CPU's reaction to September 11 itself was understandably muted; but it vehemently denounced the Afghanistan campaign in the same (reverse) Huntingtonian terms it had used since 1999 as both a threat to East Slavic interests and a cover for American "mondialism," under the slogan "No to Terrorism! No to War!"[87] The Communists attacked Kuchma even for his limited role in permitting the use of Ukrainian airspace to supply Central Asian bases and joined the CPRF in its criticism of Putin for his tentative rapprochement with NATO. The CPU's anti-Americanism was given an extra edge by the party's simultaneous peddling of conspiracy theories of U.S. involvement in, or even initiation of, the Gongadze scandal. Nevertheless, as with Zyuganov, the CPU increasingly tried to site its anti-Americanism in what it perceived to be the universalizable message of antiglobalist anticapitalism.

Going Native?

It is no contradiction, however, that, cutting its cloth to suit its reduced circumstances, the Communist Party has also gradually adjusted to the new Ukraine—if largely for practical rather than ideological reasons. During the debate preceding the party's formal rebirth in 1993, Oleksandr Kotsiuba, then chairman of the Rada Committee on Legislation and Legality, was touted by many as a potential leader. Significantly, however, his stated preference for a "normal party of Ukrainian communism of a parliamentary type," which "should be a Communist party of Ukraine," not the USSR, "a party which will engage in state-building here in Ukraine," ruined his chances with a rank and file more in tune with Symonenko's Soviet patriotism (Kotsiuba was also distrusted for having originally been elected in a Kiev constituency in 1990 as a candidate of the anti-Communist "Democratic bloc").[88]

Nevertheless, de facto the Communist Party has been slowly evolving in this direction. It is not yet a "normal party of Ukrainian communism," but, though this may not always have been obvious to the party's critics, it has in fact steered a middle course since 1993. Its ultraradical wing has steadily lost influence. Leading "Soviet patriot" Moiseienko was expelled from the party in November 2000, only to set up a rival "true left" Communist Party of Workers and Peasants in April 2001.[89] Its acronym conveniently was "KPRS," the Ukrainian for CPSU.[90]

Increasingly, the party's formal documentation is in Ukrainian, although its weekly press is still mainly Russian language. The Soviet state emblem still appears on the masthead of the party journal *Komunist Ukraïny*, but the Communists have simultaneously sought to reclaim their version of Ukrainian identity, symbols, and heroes—most notably writers such as "Red" Shevchenko (1814–1861) and Ivan Franko (1856–1916), depicting them as "internationalist" advocates of the "friendship of the peoples" who were "always on the left flank, and will always remain so."[91]

The Communists' parliamentary faction has, moreover, often taken a more flexible and centrist line than the party leadership, most notably in the final vote on the new Ukrainian constitution in June 1996. The Central Committee fulminated against a "bourgeois" and "anti-Soviet" document,[92] but the party's deputies divided more or less in three, with twenty for and twenty-nine against, ten abstentions, and twenty present but not voting. Significantly, calls by party radicals for mass expulsion of the recalcitrants were initially confined to a purge of five but *did* eventually play a part in the selection of candidates for 1998.[93] That is, the rank and file remains more conservative than the leadership and can be expected to resist any wholesale change to the party's program.

However, varying numbers of Communist deputies have continued to back a variety of other government initiatives. The party's leftist critics have accused it of selling its support for a number of key privatization projects,[94] though arguably it was only logrolling with other factions as one would expect any powerful parliamentary caucus to do. Nevertheless, the party's "middle course" does not mean that formal "Ukrainianization" is likely anytime soon—despite Moiseienko's angry predictions.[95] The CPU has heaped so much scorn on the alternative Ukapisti tradition that it could hardly adopt it overnight.

New Business Influence

The party leaders are of course happy to swim as bigger fishes in a smaller pool, but the most important factor encouraging the Communists' gradual accommodation to domestic Ukrainian politics has been the search for sources of finance. Political parties in Ukraine are often shells or fronts for business interests. This trend is most marked among the often entirely virtual parties of the "center," but it has not escaped the left,[96] including the Communists, who have increasingly accepted businesspeople "parachuted" into their ranks. For businesspeople seeking a free ride into parliament, the Communists were, after all, the largest party until 2002. The Communist Party

has also continued the Soviet practice of appointing many "ordinary workers" as candidates, but these are often the most susceptible to outside pressure from new monied interests. Moiseienko has argued therefore that the only "real" Communists were elected from the constituencies in 1998—not the party list (and there were only seven of these in 2002).[97]

That said, Communist businesspeople tend to represent state behemoths (such as Volodymyr Matvieiev, deputy general director of Mykolaïv's main shipbuilding concern, and numerous mine directors) or smaller private businesses (Volodymyr Petrenko of the Kiev firm Viktoriia-RUS) rather than Ukraine's new corporate giants. Ukraine's new banking class was noticeably absent from the party's 1998 list. The Socialist Party had (at least in 1998, many left in 1999) a much higher proportion of business cadres.[98] On the other hand, many old Communists are themselves born-again businessmen, including even Stanislav Hurenko, the last leader of the old CPU in 1990–1991 and now deputy head of the metals-trading joint-venture Navasko. The need to preserve even these limited interests has often moderated the party line.

In 2002 the party seemed unable to attract as many "sponsors" onto its list—though one or two eyebrows were raised by the appearance of the unknown Mykhailo Loboda (officially a "doctor") at number thirty. Moreover, in contrast to the furor over the passage of the constitution in 1996, the party caucus had largely acted as instructed in 1998–2002, and the leadership had 113 sitting deputies to accommodate. Most businesspersons were themselves party givens, such as Agrarian boss Omelian Parubok at number two, Donets'k "trade unionist" Vasyl' Khara at number sixteen, and Alla Aleksandrovs'ka from Kharkiv at number twenty-one.

The Political Factor

It is impossible to give a true picture of left-wing politics in Ukraine without discussing the role of the purely political factor, in particular the well-practiced post-Soviet habits of political manipulation and kompromat. Under first president Leonid Kravchuk (1991–1994) there were rumors that the Communist Party was established with a degree of official connivance as an alternative to the more radical Union of Communists—though Kravchuk would clearly have preferred someone like Oleksandr Kotsiuba as leader. At the same time, the new CPU was supported by many "red directors" in eastern Ukraine, who had the opposite aim of seeking to lever Kravchuk from power.

President Kuchma (1994–?) has worked on the party from both directions. Sometimes, he has threatened its electorate through the creation of artificial

"spoiler parties." In the 1998 elections this motley crew (Working Ukraine, the Party of Defenders of the Fatherland, the All-Ukrainian Workers' Party, and the Party of Women's Initiatives) won 4.8 percent of the vote. If the Agrarian Party (3.7 percent) and Progressive Socialists (4.05 percent) are included in the same category, the total "spoiler" vote was over 12 percent. The Agrarians are an obvious rival to the Rural Party (founded in 1992, originally a reliable Communist ally), created with "administrative resources" in 1996, and have largely replaced it as the main party in the countryside.

More seriously, it has frequently been alleged that Nataliia Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party was created and supported by the presidential administration, both to split the left-wing vote and to divert its mainstream parties into an unelectable gesture politics. Moreover, Ukrainian commentators have referred to Vitrenko as "Zhirinovskii in a skirt," pointing out a similar contrast between antigovernment rhetoric and a surprisingly loyal voting record. The rest of the left cried particular foul when the Progressive Socialists failed to support a motion of no-confidence against the government in October 1998, resulting in the attempt falling twenty votes short.[99] De facto, the party has certainly seriously disrupted the relative left unity of 1994. It has always stood alone—a planned alliance with the (unregistered) Workers' and Pensioners' Parties for the 1998 elections came to naught.[100] At the same time, Vitrenko's autocratic rule over her party and her constant conflict with colleagues and regional organizations "creates the impression that [she] is doing everything possible to prevent the Progressive Socialists from becoming a real force."[101]

On the other hand, Kuchma has periodically preferred to give covert support to the Communist Party as an easily defeatable opposition. Regime pressure to divide and rule in the buildup to the 1999 presidential election certainly worked in his favor. The Kuchma administration considered, quite correctly, that Oleksandr Moroz would be a more difficult opponent than a more radical leftist and devoted most of its energies to undermining his campaign.[102] Vitrenko was encouraged as an alternative,[103] allowing the more stable Communist vote to come through in the center.

After the election, Kuchma and his advisers seemed to swing back toward attempting to cut the Communists down to size. In February 2000 Rukh deputies introduced a provocative bill to ban the party; several oblast councils in west Ukraine did so on their own turf. Six deputies left the Communists proper in the spring—given the relative discipline of the Communist faction, not that substantial a breakaway. Then came the launch of the first spoiler parties aimed directly at the Communists rather than the Socialists or the left in general. A "Ukrainian Communist Youth Union" appeared in

March 2000. Its leader, people's deputy Oleksandr Starynets', attacked the former Komsomol and "the proponents of class struggle [that] in practice has led only to the loss of millions of our fellow-countrymen" and called for the creation of a "new type" of Communist Party "based on" the principle of Ukrainian statehood.[104]

Soon after, a "Communist Party (Renewed) of Ukraine," reportedly backed by leading "oligarch" Viktor Pinchuk, held a constituent meeting in July 2000.[105] This was a modified version of the project for the revival of the "Ukrainian Communist Party," also the subject of much speculation in 2000–2001. In the Ukrainian context, the use of the adjective *Ukrainian* rather than the more neutral epithet *of Ukraine* implies a more distinctly national orientation and, of course, harks back to the history of the Ukapisti between 1920 and 1925.[106] The "Communist Party (Renewed)" committed itself to work within the Ukrainian state, although its TV advertisements unashamedly exploited nostalgia for the Soviet era. Sensing the dual threat to both his party's electorate and policy direction, Symonenko launched a preemptive attack on any rival party, which he predicted would be an artificial force that would be "pseudo-Communist, nationalist and pro-presidential."[107] In fact, there were two such "clones." The authorities were also discreetly backing Moiseienko's Communist Party of Workers and Peasants—a possible indication that they preferred the CPU to maintain a relatively left position.

Several new potential rivals to the Communists also appeared on the center left. In parliament the Socialist–Rural alliance ended, with most of the latter's deputies joining the neophyte Solidarity grouping, which was basically a vehicle to tempt as many leftists as possible into pro-government positions (Solidarity was chaired by Petro Poroshenko, a businessman who headed the Ukrainian Investment Group).[108] The Socialists suffered another split when former Moroz confidante Ivan Chyzh defected to set up an "All-Ukrainian Union of the left," known as "Justice" when it was registered in May 2000 (with three sitting deputies as members). Having served its function, the Progressive Socialist faction in the Rada was dissolved in February 2000, after defections left it without the necessary minimum fourteen members, but the party continued to exist in the country, and Vitrenko survived to compete for the protest vote in 2002.

All these maneuverings left the Communists isolated in parliament and the overall strength of the "left bloc" considerably reduced. The latter numbered 171 when Kuchma was reelected in November 1999 (122 Communists, 23 Socialists, 12 Rural Party members, 14 Progressive Socialists) but only 135 in March 2000 (115 Communists and twenty "left-center"

Socialists), plus a handful of now homeless individuals.[109] The Socialists, however, increasingly acted on their own. This was a considerable departure from the electorate's original verdict in March 1998—and a key factor enabling the creation of the pro-regime "New Majority" in January 2000.

During what the regime's supporters dubbed the "Velvet Revolution," the "New Majority" seized control of parliament from the left. The Communists lost all their leading positions on Rada committees. Their ally Oleksandr Tkachenko was forced out as chairman of parliament (he joined the CPU faction in February 2001), and their own Adam Martyniuk was forced to resign as his deputy. The Communists initially protested the constitutionality of the changes (for a time the Rada actually sat in two halves), but the party had no stomach for protracted struggle (this time Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party screamed betrayal). The "New Majority" forced through several important symbolic changes—abolishing the November revolution holiday, removing Soviet symbols from the Rada's physical facade, and renaming the then current convocation the "3rd" rather than the "14th" (that is, dating from 1990 rather than the 1920s)—and gave fresh wind to new prime minister Yushchenko's reform project—at least until the "Gongadze affair" undermined the "New Majority."

Gongadze and After

Hryhorii Gongadze was an opposition Internet journalist who disappeared in September 2000. In October 2000 his decapitated body was found in woods outside Kiev.[110] In November the Socialist leader Moroz made the sensational allegation in parliament, backed up by tape recordings supposedly secretly made in the president's office, that Kuchma or his entourage had plotted Gongadze's disappearance.[111] The Socialist Party now associated itself with rightist opponents of the president, but the CPU dragged its feet, pandering to conspiracy theories of American involvement and fretting about the supposedly greater danger of "social disorder" or a right-wing takeover. The Communists preferred to concentrate their fire on the reform government of Viktor Yushchenko, who had successfully paid off the pensions backlog and was threatening to make inroads into one of the mainstays of the party's traditional electorate.[112]

In early 2001, therefore, Kuchma needed Communist votes to weather the storm, and the party seemed to be back in favor. With liberals, nationalists, and even some former oligarchs turning against him, it once again made sense for Kuchma (and rather more vehemently, his chief of administration,

Volodymyr Lytvyn) to claim that there was only one "real" opposition in Ukraine—the Communists—and this was at the least mutually convenient for the Communist Party. Communist abstentions saved state prosecutor Mykhailo Poteben'ko from censure for his lackluster role in investigating the affair. The Communists had backed his appointment in 1998; as the last prosecutor of the old Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, he had questioned the legality both of the ban on the party in August 1991 and of the dissolution of the USSR—he subsequently appeared at number twenty on the Communists' list for the 2002 elections. Communist votes were also crucial in securing the removal of the supposedly "pro-Western" Prime Minister Yushchenko in April 2001. Communist abstentions secured his replacement with the industrial apparatchik Anatolii Kinakh in May.

The 2002 Elections

Commentators began to talk of an "oligarch-Communist majority," but it was unlikely that this would prove any more permanent than previous alignments. Kuchma failed to deliver the party any great change in government policy or greater control over parliament. Moreover, facing Yushchenko's challenge in the 2002 elections, the authorities decided they could no longer afford the luxury of such a large Communist vote. The two Communist "clones" were used to shave almost 2 percent off the CPU's 1998 total—the Communist Party (Renewed) won 1.4 percent, and the Communist Party of Workers and Peasants won 0.4 percent—and possible malpractice added 1 or 2 percent more. The official score for the CPU was around 20 percent, giving the party 59 of the 225 list seats, but a parallel count by the For Fair Elections Committee put the party at 21.2 percent.[113] Other things being equal, the dramatic population loss revealed in the 2001 census (down four million to 48.4 million) cost the party 2 or 3 percent more.[114]

Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" bloc (which included Solidarity) emerged as the overall winner with an official 23.6 percent; the government coalition "For a United Ukraine" struggled to win 11.8 percent. The Socialists were a surprise success with 6.9 percent. Vitrenko reappeared on state TV to take 3.2 percent from her rivals. "Justice," on the other hand, seemed to have been discarded as an aborted project. Bereft of serious official support, it won a minuscule 0.08 percent. However, the mainstream Social-Democratic (United) Party (the party of Kiev oligarchs) won 6.3 percent.

But the real shock for the Communists came in the other half of the election. "For a United Ukraine" deployed its "administrative resources" much more ruthlessly in the 225 territorial constituencies, winning sixty-six

compared with the "Our Ukraine" bloc's forty-two. The Communists were almost completely shut out, winning only six seats (the Socialists won three). Most significantly of all, the Donbas clan—the Party of the Regions in the "For a United Ukraine" bloc—mobilized so effectively that the CPU was only able to win one seat each in Donets'k and Luhans'k. Therefore, despite only slipping 5 percent in the list vote, the CPU's overall strength in the new parliament was almost halved, with fifty-nine plus six seats giving the party a faction of only sixty-five, only 14.4 percent of the total—possibly less than even the authorities may have wished.

On the other hand, as often in the past, a divided parliament would allow the Communists to play the pivotal role on key occasions. There was no equivalent of the deal between Unity and the CPRF in the Russian Duma after 1999, but the other opposition parties once again accused the CPU of opportunism when it seemingly welshed on a deal with Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko, and the Socialists to back a joint slate for the parliamentary leadership, allowing For a United Ukraine and the Social Democrats to win all three main positions on May 28.[115] When the Communists again received the chairs of six committees—much more than their numerical strength merited—the opposition smelled a clear reward.

In the simultaneous Crimean elections the Communists suffered further setbacks. The local Communist leader, Leonid Grach, had made some powerful enemies in 1998–2002. Kuchma was annoyed that his Russian campaign managers encouraged him to play the nationalist card, whereas in Moscow Grach's close links with Mayor Luzhkov harmed his relations with Putin; powerful local business interests (particularly in the Donbas) resented his overtures to Russian capital. Grach lost control of the local assembly, winning only twenty out of one hundred seats—having set a target of more than sixty. His campaign was spectacularly sabotaged by his own disqualification (for failing to give a correct declaration of his assets), although Symonenko may have been privately pleased that one of his main rivals for the party leadership had been publicly humiliated.

Amid the electoral disappointment, there was one piece of good news for the Communists. In December 2001 the Constitutional Court ruled the banning of the party in 1991 illegal—although it failed to address the potential consequences of the decision. The question of restitution of former party "property" remained open, but the Communists at least had a green light to revive the "original" or "canonical" CPU, holding a special "unity congress" on May 26, 2002, that announced the formal union of the "new" and "old" parties. The maneuver was not just a sop to the rank and file but, in fact, was also designed to boost morale in the wake of the March elections and, the

CPU leadership hoped, reinvigorate, if not necessarily rejuvenate, the party's ranks with "old Communists" who were so conservative they had previously held off joining the party.

Symbolic reunion was also designed to boost links with post-1991 business interests. Symonenko remained in charge, although Hurenko, as the last leader of the "old" party in 1991, strengthened his position as party financier and his powerful position in the party apparatus. Symonenko remained popular with the party grassroots (who resented Hurenko's opt out in 1993) but might need the president's support to see off any future leadership challenge. With the strong performance of the various non-Communist oppositions in 2002, it might once again be in Kuchma's interest to try to revive the party to a degree, and it is not impossible that he could switch his backing to Hurenko or even Grach.

Conclusions

Using the categories suggested by Ishiyama and Urban and Solovei, the dominant strategy of the Ukrainian Communists has to date clearly been one of "leftist retreat"—that is, highly conservative policies and a ghetto mentality.[116] Other possibilities were only just beginning to emerge in 1998–2002. The "social democratization" or "pragmatic reform" option is one that the Communists have been happy to leave to Oleksandr Moroz's Socialist Party. The 1998 election was therefore the last outing for the "left bloc" strategy that had helped to constrain potential divergence between the two main left parties since 1993–1994. The adoption by the Communists of a "Gaullist" or "national-patriotic" strategy was unlikely to involve any significant changes to the party's socioeconomic program—the main aim of which was to mobilize the nostalgia vote—although it would strengthen the party's tendency toward de facto compromise with "national business." Finally, the Ukrainian Communists' particular version of a "national-patriotic," namely, East Slavic "nationalist solution," in current circumstances was not a *governing* strategy and would not make the party any less of a pariah.

The Communist Party therefore seems likely to play its part in keeping Ukraine trapped in an alternative "blocked society" variant. Despite the authorities' demonizing the party for its "anti-system" politics, they are in fact happy to leave it blocking the path for any alternative and more vital opposition. Paradoxically or not, as yet there is little internal pressure on the party to reform. The Communist Party only seems likely to change once the political system around it has moved on.

Notes

1. Ivan Diiak, *Khto zakhystyt' nash narod i derhavu: Komunistychna partiia Ukraïny chy Ukraïns'ka komunistychna partiia? Shtrykhy do istoriï ta s'ohodennia Kompartiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 2000), p. 12.

2. Ivan Maistrenko, *Istoriia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny* (Munich: Suchasnist', 1979). According to Maistrenko, at the Tahanrih conference thirty-five delegates backed Skrypnyk's resolution calling for an independent party to be an individual member of the Comintern, and only twenty-two supported Kviring's rival motion that it be subordinate to the Russian Bolsheviks (*Istoriia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 46).

3. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)* (Kiev, 1998), pp. 7, 4.

4. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)*, p. 7.

5. See *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), pp. 68–74. The quotations are from the commentary "Pisliamova 'Komunist Ukraïny,'" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), pp. 77, 75.

6. On the last days of the old Communist Party of Ukraine, see Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), chap. 4; Zenovia Sochor, "From Liberalization to Post-Communism: The Role of the Communist Party in Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2 (1996), pp. 147–163—which carries over into the period after 1991; and Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukraïny: Diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kiev, 1994).

7. Herbert Kitschelt, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radosław Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, *Post-Communist Party Systems. Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 29; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 276.

8. Andrew Wilson, "Reinventing the Ukrainian Left: Assessing Adaptability and Change," *Slavonic and East European Review* 80, no. 1 (January 2002), pp. 21–59.

9. Oleksandr Moroz, "Zapyska v prezydiiu plenumu TsK KPU (lito 1991)," in the collection of speeches and documents, *Kudy idemo?* (Kiev, 1993), p. 115.

10. Borys Oliinyk, *Dva roky v Kremli* (Kiev, 1992), p. 37; Vasilii Sekachev, "Sotsialisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy i osobennosti ukrainskoi partiinoi sistemy," in *Ukraina i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudarstva*, ed. Dmitrii Furman (Moscow, 1997), p. 206. The latter is a useful study in its own right.

11. *Holos Ukraïny*, August 28, 1991.

12. "Postanova plenumu TsK Kompartiï Ukraïny," in *Kommunisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy: Khronika zapreta*, ed. Stanislav Hurenko et al. (Donets'k, 1992), p. 51.

13. Helga Welsh, "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 4 (1994), pp. 379–394; Michael Waller, "Adaptation of the Former Communist Parties of East Central Europe: A Case of Democratisation?" *Party Politics* 1, no. 4 (1995), pp. 473–490.

14. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems*; John T. Ishiyama, "The Sickle or the Rose? Previous Regime Types and the Evolution of the Ex-Communist Parties in Post-Communist Politics," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (1997), pp. 299–330.

15. There is very little English-language literature on the new Ukrainian Communists. A notable exception is Joan Barth Urban's *The Communist Movements in Russia and Ukraine* (Washington, D.C., 1998), which was updated as Joan Barth Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections: Similarities, Contrasts, and Interactions," *Demokratizatsiya* 7, no. 1 (1999), pp. 111–134. See also Joan Barth Urban, "Kommunisticheskie partii Rossii, Ukrainy i Belorussii (bezuspeshnyi poisk edinstva v raznobrazii)," in *Belorussiia i Rossiia: Obshchestva i gosudartsva*, ed. Dmitrii Furman (Moscow, 1998), pp. 393–415. The party now has a website at www.kpu.kiev.ua. There are two excellent studies in Ukrainian on the politics of the left in general: Oleksii Haran' and Oleksandr Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni: Chy vidbuvaiets'sia dreif do sotsial-demokratiï?* (Kiev, 1999); and Oleksii Haran', Oleksandr Maiboroda et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi: Mizh leninizmom i sotsial-demokratiieiu* (Kiev, 2000).

16. "Postanova plenumu TsK Kompartiï Ukraïny," p. 51.

17. Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), pp. 24–25.

18. Sarah Birch, "Nomenklatura Democratisation, Electoral Clientelism, and Party Formation in Post-Soviet Ukraine," *Democratization* 4, no. 4 (1997), pp. 40–62.

19. Valentyn Yakushyk, ed., *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1996), p. 44.

20. The Socialist Party cheekily reprinted a Ziuganov article on "abandoning dogmas" in the party journal *Tovarysh* 10 (1999).

21. This is from the party program developed in 1993–1994 and finalized in 1995. See Andrew Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social-Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?" *Europe–Asia Studies* 49, no. 7 (November 1997), p. 1300; and *Partiia Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsia: Dokumenty i materialy vtorogo etapa Vseukrainskoi konferentsii i s" ezd KPU* (Kherson, 1993).

22. See Petro Symonenko's introduction to the relaunch of the journal *Komunist Ukraïny*, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1, no. 787 (1999), pp. 3–7; and Petr Simonenko (Petro Symonenko), *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh . . .* (Kiev, 1999).

23. Volodymyr Lytvyn, *Politychna arena Ukraïny: Diiovi osoby ta vykonavtsi* (Kiev, 1994), p. 223.

24. "Kompartiia Ukrainy v tsifrakh," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), pp. 36, 38.

25. The CPU would later try to deny it had backed Kuchma, but the call to arms against Kravchuk published in *Komunist* 16 (1994) was a pretty clear message in a two-candidate election.

26. Only five parties would have crossed a 5 percent barrier. The CPU would then have won 104 out of 225 list seats (46.2 percent); these calculations are from *Parlament* 1 (2001), p. 23.

27. Petro Symonenko, *Tovarysh* 32 (1998). The Socialists repeated the appeal in December 2000—see *Tovarysh* 50 (2000). For the distinctly unenthusiastic reply, see the open letter, "Politychnii Radi Sotsialistychnoï partiï Ukraïny," *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2001), pp. 42–43.

28. "Do hromadian Ukraïny: Zvernennia kandydativ u Prezydenty Ukraïny," *Komunist* 45 (1999), p. 1.

29. See also Yuliia Tyshchenko, *Vybory-99: Yak i koho my obyraly* (Kiev, 1999), especially pp. 212–244.

30. *Den'*, September 15, 1999; *Kommersant'-Daily*, October 26, 1999; *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, August 27, 1999. The story was strongly denied by Valerii Mishura, then editor of *Komunist*, in an interview with the author and Sarah Birch, November 12, 1999. See also the denial of party splits in *Komunist* 42 (1999); and, for a socialist critique of Communist tactics, see Iosyp Vins'kyi, "Uroky vyboriv Prezydenta Ukraïny," *Tovarysh* 49 (1999).

31. Central Committee member Borys Novikov, speaking at the roundtable, *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), p. 21.

32. Petro Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," *Komunist* 26 (June 2000), p. 2; Petro Symonenko, "O politicheskikh itogakh vyborov Prezidenta Ukrainy," *Komunist* 49 (1999); Petro Symonenko, "O politicheskoi situatsii i zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii," *Komunist* 10 (2000), p. 3.

33. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 4.

34. As part of the party's postelection analysis, Ivan Myhovych and Oleksandr Baryshpolets' have pointed out that "the idea of Ukrainian statehood has become a serious ideological value in the east and south of the country, not just in the west," and that the party had yet to face the importance of "the growth in our society of left-center sentiments" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 1 [2000], pp. 22–23).

35. Wilson, "The Ukrainian Left," p. 1308; information from the *Ukrainian Regional Project: Data Book*, information compiled and kindly supplied by Eugene M. Fishel of the U.S. State Department, regtab. 051, 052.

36. See the speech by Iosyp Vins'kyi, head of the Moroz campaign, "Uroky vyboriv Prezydenta Ukraïny."

37. *Tovarysh* 22 and 23 (2000).

38. See the chapter on Lithuania in this volume by Algis Krupavicius, "The Leftwing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002." Cf. Charles Bukowski and Barnabas Racz, eds., *The Return of the Left in Post-Communist States: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (London: Cheltenham, 1999).

39. The party journal *Marksizm i sovremennost'* displays a clear all-Soviet mentality. See, inter alia, *Marksizm i sovremennost'* 1 (1998).

40. *Workers' Power* (United Kingdom), March 2000, p. 13.

41. Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 116.

42. "Deklaratsiia pro spil'ni diï ta yedynoho kandydata livykh syl," *Komunist* 12 (1999).

43. Sekachev, "Sotsialisticheskaia partiia Ukrainy i osobennosti ukrainskoi partiinoi sistemy," p. 213.

44. See Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads.*

45. This is argued by Oleksandr Moroz himself for the Socialists. See *Novyi kurs Ukraïny*, pp. 13–15; and *Tovarysh* 25 (1998). See also Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, pp.

124–132; and the highly detailed maps in Yurii Shaihorods'kyi, ed., *Vybory '98: Dokumenty, statystychni dani, analiz* (Kiev, 1998), end maps nos. 12, 27.

46. Andrew Wilson and Sarah Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Europe–Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999), pp. 1047–1051, 1053–1057; Peter R. Craumer and James I. Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography: A Regional Analysis of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections," *Post-Soviet Geography and Economy* 40, no. 1 (January–February 1999), pp. 18–19, 22–23; Vicki L. Hesli, William M. Reisinger, and Arthur H. Miller, "Political Party Development in Divided Societies: The Case of Ukraine," *Electoral Studies* 17, no. 2 (1998), pp. 235–256.

47. Craumer and Clem, "Ukraine's Emerging Electoral Geography," p. 18.

48. Iryna Bereshkina, "Vybory-98 yak protses politychnoho samovyznachennia naselennia," *Politychnyi portret Ukraïny* 21 (1998), p. 24.

49. Wilson and Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," pp. 1046–1049.

50. John T. Ishiyama, "Sickles into Roses? The Successor Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Politics," *Democratization* 6, no. 4 (1999), p. 70.

51. *Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1996), p. 47, emphasis added. The formulation is more typical than that appearing a few pages earlier, defining the party as both an "ideological [*ideina*] and *organizational* successor" (*Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 3, emphasis added).

52. *Tezy do 80-richchia Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (1918–1998 rr.)*. The "theses" were in fact so conservative—even more conservative than the survey published by the old party in 1990—that the party leadership decided not to publish them. See also Petro Symonenko, "O 80-letii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy," *Komunist* 29 (1998). For the 1990 version, see "Zaiava XXVIII z'izdu kompartiï Ukraïny pro stavlennia do istorychnoho mynuloho," in *Materialy XXVIII z'izdu Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny (Druhyi etap)* (Kiev, 1991), pp. 110–112. After 1999 Symonenko shifted slightly, accepting the danger of "the alienation of youth from the party" and claiming that "the Communist Party . . . has never distanced itself from the repressions and abuses which were committed in the course of building socialism"—at the same time as stressing that many of Stalin's achievements "were great, historical" ("Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 3).

53. Oleksandr Hosh, "Ideolohiia derzhavy—chy mozhlyva vona?" *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (1999), pp. 42–49.

54. *Komunist* 46 and 52 (1999); Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 234; Volodymyr Orlov, "Leninskaia partia avangardnogo tipa," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 22; Petro Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 7.

55. Symonenko, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" p. 7.

56. Symonenko, "Z vidrodzhenniam, 'Komuniste Ukraïnu'!" pp. 3, 5.

57. Volodymyr Orlov, "Takie raznye predvybornye programmy," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), p. 15. The original is in Russian, with the word *independence* mockingly printed in Ukrainian.

58. *Prohrama Komunistychnoï partiï Ukraïny*, p. 26.

Content below:

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59. Volodymyr Balenok, "Bezsmertne vchennia pro bezsmertnu ideiu," *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (1999), pp. 8–16. According to Symonenko, "The striving [by some] to avoid the class approach disorientates the workers and objectively aids the further capitalization and colonization of Ukraine" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 23).

60. Comments made by Communist Deputy Vasyl' Tereshchuk, speaking at the roundtable, in *Komunist Ukraïny* 1 (2000), p. 28.

61. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," pp. 11, 10, 15. See also the comments made by the Communist theoretician Ivan Khmil' at a roundtable in Kiev to discuss Haran' and Maiboroda's first book in September 1999, in *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), pp. 93–94. Compare the argument by Iryna Terlets'ka of the Socialist Party of Ukraine that the "Communists' links are not with any leading group or social strata, but with those people oriented to the past" (quoted in Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 17).

62. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 2.

63. However, twenty-nine Communists actually voted in support of Kuchma's October 1994 reform program (forty-six were against), totally misreading his intentions.

64. From the version of the 1995 program prepared for the 1998 elections in Hryhorii Andrushchak et al., *Vybory '98* (Kiev, 1998), p. 10; and the version in *Politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1999), p. 100.

65. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 9.

66. *Komunist Ukraïny* 4 (2000), p. 47.

67. Simonenko, *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh . . .* , pp. 35, 87. On this issue during the USSR's actual existence, compare Rogers Brubaker, who argues that the "emergent [Soviet] entity was explicitly conceived as supra-national, not national" (*Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 28); and Roman Szporluk, who states that "I continue to believe that the Soviet state tried to create a Soviet nation and in the course of several decades claimed to have succeeded" (*Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000], p. xxxv).

68. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 9.

69. Borys Oliinyk, *Khto nastupnyi?* (Kiev, 1999). See also the selection of Oliinyk's poetry under the title "Khto zh tse nashu khatu rozvalyv?" in *Tovarysh* 30 (2000).

70. Ivan Hrushchenko, "'Natsional'naia ideia.' Chto eto?" *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 52–54. After nine years of independence, the party's 2000 congress finally inserted a phrase into its traditional formula of "voluntary reunion"—that this would have to be "on the basis of preserving state independence" ("Za vriatuvannia Ukraïnu, za sotsialistychnyi shliakh rozvytku," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 44)—although in Symonenko's speech this phrase became "state sovereignty" (*Komunist Ukraïny* 3 [2000], p. 15).

71. From Symonenko's speech to the 1993 party congress, *Partiia Kommunistov vozrozhdaetsia*, p. 23; and the 1998 program, Andrushchak et al., *Vybory '98*, p. 10. *Natural development* is a euphemism for maintaining the linguistic status quo.

72. Wilson and Birch, "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock," p. 1049.

73. "Kompartiia Ukrainy v tsifrakh," p. 36.

74. Serhii Hrabovs'kyi's "Petro Symonenko oholosyv v Ukraïni rekonkistu" (*Den'*, April 22, 1997) uses the populist term *Soviet national-socialism*.

75. *Komunist* 36 (1998).

76. Serhii Syrovats'kyi, "Dukhovnoe edinstvo Sviatoi Rusi," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 55–57.

77. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, January 18, 2001. The news digest *Chto delat'?* published by the CPU now has a regular section called "Slavic Unity."

78. Symonenko, "Leninizm—nasha znamia," p. 16.

79. Serhii Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2000), p. 76.

80. Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," p. 74.

81. Petro Symonenko, "Komunisty pro tserkvu ta ïï rol' u zhytti suchasnoï Ukraïny," *Holos Ukraïny*, May 26, 1999, pp. 6–7; Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 50.

82. Vadym Halynovs'kyi, "Problemy mizhrelihiinykh stosunkiv u prohramakh kandydativ u Prezydenty Ukraïny," *Vybory-99* 1 (1999), p. 32 (referring to Symonenko's broadcast on September 28). See the Communists' preelection appeal to the faithful: "Pobeda i spasenie Rodiny budut zaviset' segodnia i ot nas s vami," *Komunist* 43 (1999). See also the declaration by the CPU parliamentary faction: "Zaiavlenie po povodu vizita Papy Rimskogo v Ukrainu," available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/2010514.htm (accessed on May 15, 2001).

83. Syrovats'kyi, "Pravoslavia i stanovlenie dukhovnykh osnov obshchestva," p. 74; Symonenko, "Komunisty pro tserkvu ta ïï rol' u zhytti suchasnoï Ukraïny"; Simonenko, *Istiny rozhdaiutsia v sporakh* . . . , pp. 214–216.

84. Vladyslav Suiarko, "Relihiinyi i politychnyi klerykalizm," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (1999), p. 43.

85. "Zaiavlenie po povodu vizita Papy Rimskogo v Ukrainu."

86. Petro Symonenko, "Krestovyi pokhod protiv Ukrainy," available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/si011205.htm (accessed on December 5, 2001).

87. See the party declaration, available at www.kpu.kiev.ua/Arhiv/2011008.htm (accessed on October 8, 2001).

88. "Komunizm: Real'nist' chy utopiia?" *Holos Ukraïny*, April 30, 1993.

89. See Volodymyr Moiseienko's interview attacking the party leadership, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

90. See "Livi takozh mozhut' blokuvatysia," *Ukraïns'ka pravda*, September 28, 2001.

91. On Shevchenko and Franko, see material from the conference "Shevchenko and Today," in *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), pp. 3–18; and Borys Shliakhov, "Sotsializm velykoho Kameniara," *Komunist Ukraïny* 3 (2001), pp. 15–26. Quotes from Polikarp Markov, "Dostoianie dvukh bratskikh narodov," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), pp. 11–13; and Borys Oliinyk, "Shevchenko—tse sama Ukraïna," *Komunist Ukraïny* 2 (2001), p. 6.

92. See the blistering attack by Petro Symonenko and Heorhii Kriuchkov, "Ne mozhna nekhtuvaty voliu narodu. Chomu komunisty ne mozhut' pidtrymaty novyi proekt Konstytutsiï?" *Holos Ukraïny*, December 26, 1995.

93. Haran' and Maiboroda, *Ideini zasady livoho rukhu v Ukraïni*, p. 14; author's interview with Valerii Mishura, November 12, 1999; Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 114.

94. For a critique of the CPU's voting record in parliament, see the article by Volodymyr Marchenko of the Progressive Socialist Party, "KPU—levaia podporka rezhima prezidenta Kuchmy," *Dosvitni ohni* 35 (2000).

95. Interview with Moiseienko, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

96. Sarah Birch and Andrew Wilson, "Political Parties in Ukraine: Virtual and Representational," in *Political Parties at the Millennium: Emergence, Adaptation and Decline in Democratic Societies*, Paul Webb et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

97. Interview with Moiseienko, in *Donetskii kriazh* 43 (November 23, 2000).

98. The Socialist Party had fully one-fifth of the thirty-three eventually elected with the Rural Party; see Haran' et al., *Ukraïns'ki livi*, p. 114.

99. See the vote analysis and consequent criticism in *Komunist* 43 (1998).

100. The two parties were originally supposed to be allocated 25 percent of the places on the Progressive Socialists' list; see Vasyl' Yablons'kyi and Yaroslav Latko, *Suchasni politychni partiï Ukraïny* (Kiev, 1999), p. 17.

101. "Nataliia Vitrenko: Nezakinchena istoriia populizmu," in *Naperedodni: Vybory '99*, ed. Volodymyr Ruban (Kiev, 1999), p. 33.

102. See the litany of complaints in *Tovarysh* 46 (1999).

103. Discerning fact from rumor is of course difficult; but, unlike Moroz, Vitrenko was extremely prominent on state TV in early 1999—only to disappear just as quickly.

104. *RFE/RL Daily Report*, March 13, 2000.

105. *Eastern Economist*, July 24–30, 2000. Would-be party leader Mykhailo Savenko, then a member of Pinchuk's faction Working Ukraine, had originally been elected as a "Progressive Socialist" in 1998.

106. Sergei Rakhmanin, "Chernaia koshka v komnate bez zerkal," *Zerkalo nedeli*, February 26, 2000; *Komunist* 10 (2000).

107. Symonenko, "Vyklyk chasu i Kompartiia Ukraïny," p. 4.

108. Sergei Rakhmanin, "Fraktsiia 'deputatskoe assorti,'" *Zerkalo nedeli*, March 4, 2000.

109. *UNIAN*, March 21, 2000; *Parlament* 1 (2001), p. 49. The Communists were down to 111 members by December 2000 but back up to 113 in July 2001 after former Rada Speaker Tkachenko joined their ranks.

110. Initially, the prosecutor's office held out the possibility that the body was Gongadze's, but they were the only party entertaining serious doubts.

111. On the Gongadze affair, see the three articles in *East European Constitutional Review*, summer 2001.

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The Post-Communist Left: Divergent Trajectories, Shared Legacies

Joan Barth Urban

The successor ex-ruling communist parties examined in this volume were all transformed in the 1990s, if only by virtue of their need to compete in new multiparty electoral systems. But as portrayed in the preceding chapters, more than a decade after the collapse of communist rule the mainstream left-of-center parties in the former Soviet bloc remained indelibly marked by the distinction between those states where Marxism-Leninism had strong indigenous roots and those where communism was imposed by force of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arms. In the former—Russia and Ukraine—neo-Leninist ideological fundamentalism retained an appeal; whereas in the latter—Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania—the social democratic orientation of the post-1917 anti-Leninist wing of European Marxism gained the ascendancy. In this second group the experience of four decades of communism kept in place by external diktat all but obliterated the fragile Marxist-Leninist sprouts of the early post–World War II years. As for the ex-communists in unified Germany's eastern states, they occupied a position midway between the above two clusters, rejecting both the neo-Leninist option and contemporary social democracy's acceptance of what postunification German leftists called "unbridled capitalism."

Yet this basic cleavage notwithstanding, the shared communist legacy of these successor parties affected all of them in vital and often similar ways. First of all, the ostracism to which just about all successor party members were initially subjected, by the early post-communist governments as well as many ordinary citizens, had the short-term effect of inducing among left-wing

activists a siege mentality, a "united we stand, divided we fall" ethos. This phenomenon—which Jane Curry so aptly calls the "crucible of rejection"—helped to contain the successor parties' incipient tendencies toward factionalism, tendencies based on conflicting interpretations of just what it now meant to be "left."

Second, deprived for the most part of material resources, at least initially, the successor leftist parties used the funds, offices, and equipment of their elected parliamentary deputies to create a new organizational base and network. While the state provided similar facilities to all members of parliament, the former communists were particularly attuned to the advantages they could derive from them. In a word, they were quick to combine these resources with their past experience as party administrators and organizers to reactivate links with onetime communist supporters at the grassroots of society.

Third, whether social democratic or neo-Leninist, in the game of competitive electoral politics these new groups were able to capitalize on the old order's one palpable achievement: provision of a minimal social safety net for all. Given the socioeconomic upheaval, income polarization, and relative impoverishment caused by all the post-communist economic transitions, the ability to play on the widespread nostalgia for lost social security was by no means a negligible advantage for the successor left parties.

On the other hand, communism's organizational legacy also had a differentiated affect on the parties analyzed in this volume. To a certain extent the ex-communist functionaries' Leninist-inspired organizational skills, whether administrative, "agitprop," or managerial, gave them a natural advantage over would-be political competitors in the post-communist order. However, that organizational legacy had a very different impact on the fortunes of the emerging social democratic Euro-left than on the neo-Leninists. As we have seen in the separate country chapters, the East-Central European ex-communist moderates routinely used their communist-era organizational skills to good effect in electoral contests with their right-of-center adversaries who—as former opponents of the communist regimes—had been excluded from public administration and agitprop functions. But such was not the case in Russia and Ukraine. In both of those former Soviet republics, throughout the 1990s and beyond, the neo-Leninists' most serious competitors were not erstwhile anticommunist oppositionists but fellow members of the ex–Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) elite, or nomenklatura, who not only inherited the same organizational skills but also had often outranked and, after 1991, outnumbered the onetime CPSU functionaries who formed the leading circles of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU). As Luke March trenchantly remarks, in Russia it was

not the CPRF but "the post-1991 Yeltsin regime's 'party of power' [that] . . . sequestered the CPSU's property in 1991 and show[ed] significant elite continuity at national and regional levels" of government.[1]

Ironic as this was, it underscored the extent to which the ideological convictions of the Soviet Union's dominant Slavic elites had been increasingly diluted by skepticism and careerism during the Brezhnev regime, a circumstance that ultimately led many of them to acquiesce in the USSR's breakup and embrace independent statehood. The exit from communism by Poland, Hungary, and Soviet Lithuania took the form of a "negotiated transition" worked out between reform communist leaders and anticommunist opposition figures who enjoyed widespread popular support. In contrast, the CPSU's loss of control over the Soviet heartland resulted from infighting among its own elites that ultimately undermined the party's apparat—the body of full-time CPSU functionaries who had tied together the Soviet Union's disparate regional units and titular republics ever since the Khrushchev era. That infighting was, in turn, triggered by the conversion to Western principles by an influential segment of the late Soviet-era intelligentsia, as cogently analyzed by Robert English in *Russia and the Idea of the West*,[2] against a backdrop of economic decline and popular disillusionment, if not disaffection, with the regime. And their Westernization, so central to Mikhail Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union's final years, was followed by the scramble by numerous other members of the CPSU nomenklatura to ensure their continued privileged status within the new post-communist political and economic orders of Russia and Ukraine.

Regardless of how they exited from the communist era, most successor parties were notably reluctant or belated in coming to terms with their complicity, however contingent, in the abuses of power under the previous communist regimes. The neo-Leninists skirted this question by emphasizing the positive balance sheet of the Soviet experience, despite some regrettable "errors," while the social democrats tried to distance themselves from the issue by denying, however implausibly, any connection whatsoever between their new parties and the old political order.

This distinction was largely due to the very different processes by which the ex-communist Euro-left parties were formed compared with the post-Soviet neo-Leninist ones. To be sure, most members of both types of successor groups had belonged to their former ruling communist parties.[3] However, an aspiring member of the reconstituted CPRF or CPU needed only to produce an old CPSU membership card to gain automatic admission, whereas membership in the social democratically oriented East-Central European successor parties called for reregistration. At party congresses in late

1989 in Hungary and Lithuania, January 1990 in Poland, and again in December 1990 in Lithuania, the previous communist parties disbanded themselves or split (in the case of Lithuania in 1989), and prospective members had officially to join the new legal entities.[4] As Diana Morlang notes with regard to the successor Hungarian Socialist Party, "The registration process enabled the new party's leadership to screen out hard-line Communists and other political liabilities," while "most of the moderate conservatives who had dominated the Communist Party in the late 1980s left the party or retired from politics."[5]

In short, while the most reformist wings of the ex-communist leaderships in Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania forged their countries' respective new left-of-center organizations, the most conservative Russian and Ukrainian members of the CPSU's apparat gravitated to the post-Soviet neo-Leninist parties. Here again the ex–East German communists occupied a middle ground. Their renamed Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) enjoyed direct legal continuity with its predecessor, the (communist) Socialist Unity Party, and in 2001 some 90 percent of its rank-and-file members had joined the party before 1989, with a solid majority being senior citizens. However, since late 1989–1990 its leaders were markedly younger, reformist, and prepared to criticize the abuses of the past.[6] Meanwhile, small old-line Marxist-Leninist rumps in Hungary and Lithuania and the left-oriented albeit more reformist Union of Polish Socialists rapidly faded into oblivion, unable to win sufficient votes to reach the minimum party-list thresholds for parliamentary representation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the policy differences between the social democrats and neo-Leninists were profound indeed, notwithstanding their circumstantial, or inherited, similarities. As elaborated below, the moderate left-wing successors in East-Central Europe (with the exception of the PDS) staked their political futures on support for West European–style free-market democracies, affiliation with the center-left Socialist International, and membership in NATO and the European Union. The neo-Leninists, in contrast, remained intransigently anti-Western in foreign policy and ideologically fundamentalist in long-range programmatic goals, all the while temporizing on immediate public policy issues. While they observed in practice the rules of electoral and parliamentary democracy, they assured party loyalists of their ultimate intent to return to what had been trumpeted in the Soviet past as the USSR's "radiant future." One might dismiss this contradictory posture as simply a futile attempt to square the circle were it not for the fact that the CPRF and the CPU regularly won about one-quarter of all party-list votes in national elections. They thus exerted a blocking effect on

the full democratization of their respective polities by preventing the normal alternation of power between competing "within-system" electoral forces. The issue of political blockage, examined by Luke March and Andrew Wilson in their chapters on Russia and Ukraine, is one to which I return when I discuss the future prospects of the neo-Leninist successor parties.

The End of Soviet-Style Ideology: Sudden Death versus Creeping Westernization

The political profiles of the successor left-wing parties examined here are plainly rooted in the diverse character of the respective ex-communist elites' earlier commitment to Marxism-Leninism. While we have no way to measure precisely the extent of ideological belief anywhere in the former Soviet bloc, the burden of anecdotal evidence and the logic of historical developments point to a profound differentiation in this regard between the imposed and indigenous regimes. The nature of party elite views may have seemed roughly similar in the very first postwar years, but the period from spring 1953 through 1956 was a critical turning point. From the perspective of most East-Central Europeans, including party members, the late Stalin-era witch-hunts for political-ideological traitors and the excesses of collectivization and industrial investment policies were viewed with widespread dissatisfaction. Nikita Khrushchev denounced the crimes of Stalin only to resurrect them in the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, prompting ripples of protest, covert and otherwise, in East-Central Europe. Yet, from the perspective of most Slavic citizens of the USSR during this same time frame (the mid-1950s), the denunciation of Stalin was identified with the end to terror, the dismantling of the gulag, and a degree of personal (as opposed to political) freedom unknown since the 1920s and earlier.

As a beginning graduate student studying and working during 1958–1959 in Poland (six months) and the Soviet Union (three months), I witnessed both sets of phenomena. Engraved in my memory is the impassioned assertion by a young Polish party member that "1956 was my ideological death!" Yet this individual's career progressed nonetheless, and after the declaration of martial law in late 1981 he became the leader of the Communist Party *aktiv* in one of Poland's premier universities. All the while he had remained a pragmatic practitioner—doing the job of university teacher for which he had been trained—rather than a true believer in Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism. As such he represented a prototype of a certain sector of the East-Central European communist elites who became ever more committed to real systemic reform in the wake of Soviet-inspired hard-line crackdowns on popular unrest.

By way of contrast, I (as one of seventy-five Russian-speaking American guides at the 1959 American National Exhibition in Moscow) only once encountered an individual deeply opposed to the Soviet regime during talks with endless streams of Soviet visitors to the exhibit and extended conversations with university-age Soviet peers in Moscow, Riga, Tbilisi, and elsewhere.[7] This was, it will be recalled, a period when ordinary Soviet citizens could mingle relatively freely with foreign visitors, compared with the earlier situation under Stalin as well as what was to follow during the twenty-year Brezhnev era. It was also a time when, under Khrushchev, the college generation, though openly derisive toward the Stalinist past, exuded optimistic faith in the future and confidence in the Soviet system.

Such impressionistic anecdotes are legion, and all are suspect regardless of pedigree. There is no denying, however, the hard historical facts associated with the year 1956, and they had diametrically opposite impacts on the populations, party members and otherwise, in East-Central Europe as opposed to the Soviet Union. In the former, many members of the new elites were jolted into disbelief in Marxism-Leninism, even if they remained pragmatic, conformist officials, for reasons of careerism or commitment to generic left-wing values such as welfare protections and social fairness. A key corollary of this new way of thinking was their growing identification with Europe, reinforced by the rapid increase in opportunities for professional contacts with Western peers for Poles after 1956 and for Hungarians as well from the mid-1960s onward. Whereas the evolution away from orthodox Soviet-style doctrines among *West European* communist activists was curiously protracted and halting, the end of Marxist-Leninist ideology for many in East-Central Europe was sudden and unequivocal.

In contrast, the doctrinal commitment of the USSR's post-Stalin generation, the "children of the Twentieth Congress" of February 1956, was galvanized by Khrushchev's strategic shift from Stalin's use of mass terror to the new leader's promise of consumer welfare to engender compliance with the communist order. It was not until well into the Brezhnev period that this situation began to change, as Robert English makes clear in his intellectual biography of the post-Stalin intelligentsia. For them the contrast between the Brezhnev regime's political regimentation and economic stagnation and the West's freedom and growing prosperity was brought home largely in the 1970s as détente-generated contacts proliferated between professionals on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Consciousness of this dichotomy led growing numbers of the Soviet educated elite to question the ideological canons inculcated in them since childhood.

The ground was thus prepared for the explosion of Western-oriented "new thinking" that accompanied Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power and the widespread rejection of traditional Marxism-Leninism soon afterward in ever wider circles of the USSR's Slavic population.[8] By 1991 large numbers of the CPSU's Russian and Ukrainian communist nomenklatura, whose ideological probity during the Brezhnev era was arguably already a blend of careerism and conviction, were ready to jump on the bandwagon pointing West. Prime examples of this tendency were Russian President (and ex-regional CPSU secretary) Boris Yeltsin and his longtime premier (and ex-Soviet natural gas tsar) Viktor Chernomyrdin along with Ukrainian President (and ex-Ukrainian communist ideological secretary) Leonid Kravchuk and his successor (and ex-Soviet missile complex mogul) Leonid Kuchma.

The end of Soviet-style ideology in what was the former Soviet bloc did not mean, however, the discrediting of the traditional left-wing values associated with the social democratic wing of European Marxism. The emerging Euro-leftists—not only the East-Central European ex-communist reform circles but also the CPSU democratizers surrounding Gorbachev—continued to share certain basic social goals with the neo-Leninist "true believers" even while sharply differing from them on the political and economic means of achieving them. These basic precepts (noted, sometimes only implicitly, in the preceding chapters) included government guarantees of a secure social safety net for working people and pensioners, equality of opportunity for individual betterment through vocational training or merit-based access to affordable systems of higher education, and a modicum of social fairness in income distribution. Commitment to such aims was as profound among many neo-Leninists as it was among many social democrats. Unlike the neo-Leninists, however, the Euro-leftists believed that these goals could best be implemented by market-based democracies grounded in political and civic pluralism and united, internally and regionally, by interclass and transnational affinities rather than exclusionary class or ethnic identities.

The Social Democratic Euro-Atlanticists versus the Anti-Western Neo-Leninists

Nationalism was central to the evolution of all ex-members of the "international" communist movement. A historically conditioned anti-Soviet nationalism—especially endemic among Hungarians, Poles, and Lithuanians (as well as the other Baltic peoples)—prompted the emerging center-left successor parties to embrace a regional variant of internationalism after 1989: Euro-Atlanticism. In contrast, the earlier orthodox Marxism-Leninism of

many neo-Leninists in Russia and Ukraine mutated during the 1990s into a form of virulent ethnocultural, or "civilizational," anti-Western nationalism that bore precious little resemblance to Lenin's tactical support for anti-imperialist nationalism. The CPRF's leader, Gennady Zyuganov, even went so far in some of his writings as to articulate a kind of Great Russian ethno-cultural exceptionalism in almost messianic terms.[9]

As the chapters on Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania make clear, the new Euro-left parties in all three countries linked their advocacy of free-market democratic reforms with ardent support for early entry into NATO and the European Union. As governing parties in the mid-1990s, the successor Polish and Hungarian social democrats actively lobbied for their countries' inclusion among the first three post-communist states to be admitted into NATO in 1999. Thereafter, when in the parliamentary opposition toward the end of the decade and again as leaders of coalition governments early in the new millennium, they continued to support compliance with the stiff criteria for eventual membership in the European Union, as did their center-left colleagues in Lithuania.

Equally important, however, was their commitment to affiliation with the historically anticommunist European social democratic movement, both as a matter of principle and as a way of distancing themselves from their own communist pasts. They thus eagerly sought membership in the Socialist International as well as close ties with its most prominent member, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). As Diana Morlang points out, the Hungarian Socialist Party (HSP) from the start "worked to be accepted as a member of the Socialist International, and Socialists modeled themselves on the Social Democratic Party of Germany." Not only that but its post-1990 leader, Gyula Horn, was a "darling" of the German government because as foreign minister in the then-communist government he had opened the Hungarian–Austrian border in mid-1989, thereby allowing (ostensibly vacationing) East Germans to flee West in droves.[10] The Hungarian Socialists became full members of the Socialist International in 1996. The following year the Socialist International accorded "provisional" membership to the Social Democratic Party of Poland as well as to the small, more leftist Union of Work.[11]

The ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), on the other hand, was at a disadvantage in this regard. Krupavicius explains that its much smaller rival, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP), "was able to link itself to the prewar LSDP and [its] . . . organization in exile, which was an observer to the Socialist International." As a result, the LSDP gained full membership in the Socialist International already in October 1990,[12] a status the LDLP was not to enjoy until its unification with the LSDP in 2001.

We may assume that the East-Central European center-left parties' urge to identify themselves with West European social democracy was also partly motivated by the need to assuage their personal qualms—as "socialists building capitalism"—as well as the doubts of their left-wing voters, disillusioned as they were by the economic traumas of the free-market transitions. This linkage with the West European center left became even more urgent once the new social democrats formed governments pursuing precisely the pro-market economic policies that were alienating the "losers" of the transition. For under those circumstances, as Morlang argues with regard to Hungary from 1994 to 1998, they endangered a major base of their political support inasmuch as they neglected the traditional leftist commitment to basic social protections. One Hungarian socialist politician poignantly tried to square the circle, saying that his party "must make a liberal policy in this four years, and then will have the opportunity to make a social liberal policy in the next four years, and then in the next century make a socialist policy"; another colleague simply conceded, with resignation, "I do not think we can be real socialists or leftists yet."[13]

Only the eastern German ex-communists rejected the neoliberal free-market bandwagon in search of what seemed to be a third way between capitalism and communism that harked back to the more radically oriented European social democracy of the 1950s and 1960s. According to Thomas Baylis, the ideological positions of the PDS included condemnation of the "social injustices of the Federal Republic's version of capitalism," on the one hand, and recognition of the economic logic of the "profit motive" on the other. All the while, the pragmatic reform-oriented PDS leaders in their forties were constantly challenged by the party intelligentsia's left wing. And the latter ran the gamut from pacifists, to the "Marxist Forum," to the radical "Communist Platform."[14] In response to this militancy, the PDS denounced NATO's 1999 air war against Serbia, opposed U.S.-led military retaliation in Afghanistan in late 2001, and called for the replacement of NATO by "collective, non-military security structures."

The mainstream East-Central European social democratic strategists, in contrast, apparently intended to garner a beneficial "coattail" effect by associating their organizations, in the minds of their potential voters, with the prosperous European social market economies of the 1990s and their center-left governing parties. The latter included the French Socialists and, in the second half of the decade, the Italian Olive Tree coalition, Tony Blair's New Labour, and the SPD. Not insignificantly, the multifaceted Euro-Atlanticism of the ex-communist successor parties in Poland and Hungary meant that ethnocultural nationalism and related foreign policies,

such as ambivalence toward E.U. membership, were championed almost exclusively by populist competitors on the right and even the center Right of the political spectrum.

Turning to the neo-Leninists, the profound anti-Westernism inherent in traditional Soviet Marxism-Leninism was magnified after 1991 by the CPRF's electioneering under the banner of Zyuganov's ethnocultural Russian patriotism and the CPU's somewhat later panegyrics to the idea of an East Slavic community embracing Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The CPRF's anti-Westernism, while rooted in neo-Leninist thinking, was reinforced by the Zyuganov group's postulation of a unique historical (and morally superior) Russian ethnocultural civilization as well as nostalgia for the USSR's superpower status. It was thus aimed at the many noncommunist Russians who shared these latter two sentiments. The CPU's anti-Westernism was at first more traditionally neo-Leninist, compounded by nostalgia for the loss of Soviet identity (even though that was a sentiment totally at odds with the Ukraine-first, pro-independence attitudes of most of the CPU's compatriots). But later, especially after the spring 1999 NATO air war over Kosovo, the Ukrainian communists' anti-Westernism merged with a heightened sense of common East Slavic identity in a world divided, as Zyuganov had long insisted and CPU leader Petro Symonenko was now increasingly wont to say, into distinct cultural "civilizations." Indeed, as Andrew Wilson argues, the CPU leader stressed "the need to defend the 'unity of canonical Orthodoxy' and the 'Orthodox geocultural space' as the . . . cultural foundation of the eastern Slavs in the natural struggle with the Islamic South and the expansionist West." This geocultural anti-Westernism only intensified after September 11, 2001.[15]

In no way, however, did the neo-Leninists reject the theoretical foundations of Marxism-Leninism, especially in their official party programs. Rather, they "retrofitted" the orthodox Soviet analysis of capitalism to accommodate Western postindustrial society. As first articulated by the CPRF in its official 1995 party program and subsequently echoed by its Ukrainian comrades in numerous documents,[16] exploitation of workers in the contemporary capitalist West was no longer imposed by subsistence wages and poor working conditions but, rather, by credit card bondage and incessant advertising hype in the mass media. Likewise, the neo-Leninists warned that the Third World of Lenin's theory of imperialism was rapidly being expanded to include the ex-republics of the USSR, transformed after 1991 into raw-material exporters. For them the notion of economic globalization was merely a stratagem devised by U.S. imperialism and international Zionism to ensure domination by the West's "golden billion" over the ever more impov-

erished global periphery. From the above litany, it was but a short step to proclaim as their ultimate programmatic aims not just the "voluntary" restoration of the USSR but also the renationalization of the economy along with state control, pricing, and protectionism in the interests of the working class.

As Luke March explains, however, this modernized version of orthodox Marxism-Leninism constituted the "party ideology" of the CPRF, the cluster of views expounded with an eye to mobilizing old-line communist loyalists. Yet there was another side to the post-Soviet Russian communists, which March calls their "public ideology."[17] In order to attract mass support during what they dubbed the first of three stages on the path back to the USSR's "radiant future," they emulated the broad-based alliance strategies of the Comintern's antifascist "popular fronts" of the 1930s, the Moscow-inspired anti-Nazi "national front" resistance movements during World War II, and the West European nonruling communist parties' campaign tactics after the war. Applied to the post-Soviet Russian context, this strategy entailed an appeal to all "patriots" to unite with the CPRF in defense of Russia against Western neoimperialism and cultural encroachment. It also meant advocating popular measures such as the restoration of Soviet-era social benefits and limitations on the immense presidential powers sanctioned by the 1993 "Yeltsin" constitution. In keeping with this duality, the CPRF's electoral platforms in both the Duma and the presidential races of the 1990s were largely silent on the party's official program, promulgated in 1995 and reaffirmed with minor revisions in 1997. In the presidential election of March 2000 the communists presented an even more moderate public face, all the while leaving intact the official party program at a key CPRF congress later that year.

Unlike the CPRF, the CPU made far less effort to project a public ideology at variance with its party ideology. It was, as Wilson emphasizes, consistently more leftist than the CPRF for several reasons. The CPU was from its reconstitution in 1993 challenged from the center left by the socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), founded by Oleksandr Moroz in October 1991. Although the two parties were tactical allies in the mid-1990s, the Moroz Socialists identified from the start with an independent Ukraine; moreover, the SPU shifted steadily in a social democratic and European direction from at least mid-1998 onward.[18] However, the SPU's membership and its electorate were only one-third as numerous as those of the CPU. More important, the bulk of its support came from central Ukraine, in contrast with the CPU's base in the country's south and east. The upshot of this regional differentiation was that the communists sought to enhance their electoral clout in the south and east by drawing votes away from other far left parties (which won over 8 percent of

the parliamentary party-list vote in 1998) rather than from the center-left Socialists in central Ukraine.[19]

By the second half of the 1990s, however, the CPRF faced no serious far left rivals, having positioned itself as the only viable opposition force in the electoral arena by astutely juggling its two ideologies or "faces." Nor was the CPRF challenged from the center left by a social democratic party of any stature or visibility. For reasons relating to the particular circumstances of Russia's exit from both communism and the USSR, circles close to the post-Soviet Yeltsin regime managed to discredit the very notion of social democracy along with its foremost champion, Mikhail Gorbachev. Thus, the CPRF, by projecting a more moderate "public face" in electoral campaigns, hoped to attract Russian voters who, though noncommunist, opposed the Yeltsin government's inept and corrupt version of free-market reforms.

Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the CPRF's "party ideology" proved to be far more salient in voters' perceptions than its "public ideology." This, in turn, greatly contributed to the Russian communists' relegation to a seemingly permanent minority status at the national level of Russian politics. With electoral support running at somewhat under 25 percent in party-list votes for the Duma and about 30 percent in the first round of presidential races, the CPRF prevented the coalescence of an effective center-left opposition challenge to the Russian political establishment while itself remaining excluded from any meaningful participation in national government. The result for the CPRF was a convenient stalemate but at the cost of the blockage of any real possibility for democratic alternation of power.

Not surprisingly, a fundamental divergence also developed between the successor social democrats and neo-Leninists regarding party organization. Both groups obviously had their roots in the Soviet-era Leninist organizational framework. But whereas the CPRF and CPU retained the Leninist vanguard structure of hierarchical, cadre-run mass parties, the new Polish, Hungarian, and Lithuanian social democratic formations and even the German PDS went through several developmental stages. As has been noted, the social democrats emerged from the reform wings of their countries' ruling communist regimes. They won their initial terms as leaders of democratic coalition governments by calling on grassroots activists from the communist past to mobilize electoral support for the new center-left parties. But once in power—especially in the Polish and Lithuanian cases—they governed through their clientelistic connections to earlier technocratic circles and new business elites. In this latter respect they somewhat resembled the right-of-center, ex-nomenklatura "parties of power" in Russia and Ukraine. By the

start of the new millennium, however, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party won a new round of parliamentary elections by campaigning on the basis of social democratic programs worked out in consultation with their numerically declining but activist rank-and-file members as well as with trade-union representatives.

In other words, the Hungarian and Lithuanian center leftists evolved from Leninist vanguard structures through a clientelistic, patronage-based stage to become programmatic and participatory social democratic parties that drew voter support from many, if not all, socioeconomic and age groups. Even the German PDS developed a vibrant form of intraparty democracy in which the post-1989 pragmatic leadership was repeatedly challenged on programmatic and policy issues by more radical membership circles. Only the Polish social democrats and their successor party, the Democratic Left Alliance, remained stuck in the middle stage, eschewing real party democratization for centralized decision making by a small and relatively self-perpetuating, nonideological elite.[20]

Shared Benefits of the Communist Legacy

Despite their vast differences in political profiles, the electoral successes of both the social democrats and the neo-Leninists can be explained, at least to some extent, by advantages derived from their shared communist past. First, the new leftists were identified in the minds of voters with the one generally recognized achievement of the old order: its maintenance of a basic social safety net. As economic grievances mounted among ever wider groups of the post-communist societies, the left-wing parties' linkage with this aspect of the past served to refurbish their public image and garner votes for them, regardless of their specific electoral platforms or programmatic goals.

Only the Polish social democrats and their electoral coalition, the Democratic Left Alliance, chose not to use their parliamentary caucus as a tribune for those most disadvantaged by the post-communist economic transitions. As Curry notes, they were so preoccupied with distancing themselves from their communist past that they shunned explicit appeals to their old constituencies among workers and state employees or to the biggest losers from Poland's 1990–1991 "shock therapy" policies: "retirees, single mothers, and the unemployed."[21] This hesitancy may well have stemmed from the anti-communist political passions aroused among Poles by the Solidarity/martial law experiences in the 1980s, still fresh in the collective public memory—in contrast to the Hungarians' fading recollections of the 1956 Revolution. But

it was probably also related to the fact that in Poland every crackdown on popular unrest had been carried out by the Polish communist regime itself, in stark contrast to the quashing of the Hungarian Revolution and the Prague Spring of 1968 by force of Soviet-led arms.

Second, ex-communist functionaries had certain organizational skills, of an administrative, managerial, and propaganda ("agitprop") nature, that they could ably use as elected parliamentary deputies to respond to constituents' needs and to apply to concrete legislative deliberations. The successor leftist deputies also deftly used the state funds and physical facilities allocated as a matter of general policy to all parliamentarians to build up their organizational infrastructures. This reflected their clear sense of the importance of organizational measures as well as the dictate of necessity. For the most part, they were cut off from their previous sources of material support, and, it goes without saying, they were hardly positioned to receive the kind of monies and advice the West was ready to shower upon the new right-of-center parties. They thus concentrated on reestablishing grassroots networks rather than relying on flashy media-oriented campaign styles that were beyond their economic reach anyway. In the end, they were rewarded for this strategic choice with the unpaid labor of untold numbers of local activists during actual election contests.

With regard to funding, Hungary was a partial exception in that the new Socialist Party did inherit the ex-communists' assets. This enabled it to use many local party offices "to build the best local chapter network" of any postcommunist Hungarian party. Nevertheless, by 1990 the Hungarian Socialist Party had divested "90 percent of its inherited assets to the state" in a move designed to preclude embarrassment and public denunciation on that account.[22] Similarly, as Germany moved toward unification, the German Communist Party (soon to be renamed the Party of Democratic Socialism) faced intense popular hostility and escalating demands for its dissolution. It thus chose to turn over some three billion marks to the state budget in early 1990 and dramatically reduce the number of its paid party workers.[23] Curry describes a somewhat similar situation in Poland. Nevertheless, even though most of the buildings, equipment, and monies belonging to the former (communist) Polish United Workers' Party were confiscated from the successor social democrats, they were still severely attacked in the early 1990s for allegedly benefiting from "ill-gotten gains."[24]

Luke March notes how the Russian communists likewise obtained essential resources during the 1990s as a result of their large representation in the Duma.[25] Denied any portion of the defunct CPSU's assets, which had been sequestered in 1991 by the administration of Russian President Yeltsin, the

CPRF transformed its Duma caucus into its "de facto nerve center." Almost all of the top twenty-odd leaders of the CPRF, including its chairman (Zyuganov), deputy chairs, and members of the presidium, were strategically placed on its party lists of electoral candidates to guarantee them seats in the Duma. The communist deputies used their Duma offices and telecommunications equipment to maintain links with the CPRF's regional committees, while many of their eight hundred or so parliamentary aides actually staffed those local party offices. In effect, these aides virtually "doubled as the party's unofficial apparat." All parliamentary representatives received equal funding from the Russian state budget. Only the communists, however, chose to distribute those monies in ways that maximized their organizational outreach to the localities, even when that meant paying lower salaries to their office staffs and running electoral campaigns on shoestring budgets. As time went by, the party also received some additional contributions from sympathetic "red businessmen," but these paled in comparison to the bounty lavished by Western friends and new Russian oligarchs on the Yeltsin establishment's campaigns.

This combination of inherited organizational skills, local networks, and latent identification in the voters' minds with communist-era social entitlements helps explain the rapid rise in electoral support and political clout of both the social democrats and the neo-Leninists. The social democrats, however, were on the whole the most successful. The Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party from 1992 to 1996 and the Hungarian Socialist Party from 1994 to 1998 were able to form center-left governments by winning solid parliamentary majorities. The Polish Democratic Left Alliance won a respectable plurality of votes in 1993, thereby enabling the Social Democratic Party of Poland (together with its communist-era partner, the Polish Peasant Party) to govern from 1993 to 1997. Moreover, by 1995 and again in 2000, the directly elected Polish presidency was won by the communist-era government minister and post-1990 social democratic leader, Aleksander Kwaśniewski. In 2001 the LDLP finally joined its smaller historic social democratic rival to form the united Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, with the LDLP's highly popular, late Soviet-era communist party head, Algirdas Brazauskas, as leader of the new united party and a parliamentary caucus comprising over one-third of the deputies. By mid-2001, Brazauskas had gained the all-important position (in the Lithuanian context) of prime minister, and the center left became again the major partner in a coalition government.[26]

Similarly, both the CPRF and the CPU, reconstituted in 1993 after being banned in late 1991, were by the mid-1990s in a position to win respectable pluralities in their respective national legislatures, the Russian State Duma

and the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada. If their backward-looking ideological postures all but precluded the attainment of governing majorities, their adroit use of their organizational attributes and identification with communist-era social welfare policies greatly contributed to their political resurgence. Thus, the CPRF gained one-third of the Duma seats in 1995, and the CPU gained one-quarter of the Rada seats in both 1994 and 1998.

For many of the same reasons, the German ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism won increasing support during the 1990s in the five reconstituted states of what had been the territory of the communist German Democratic Republic, obtaining between 20 and 25 percent of the votes by the mid-1990s. This steady revival assured the PDS of representation in the German national parliament, the Bundestag, in the 1994 and 1998 general elections. Its second-place showing in the October 2001 elections in Berlin, moreover, culminated in its entry in January 2002 into a short-lived governing coalition with Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's Social Democrats in the reestablished German capital.[27] These achievements were due in no small measure to the large number of well-educated party members, forced into early retirement by system change and German unification, who provided a "skilled force of electoral troops" in state and national campaigns.[28] At the same time, PDS voters—located almost entirely in the eastern states—were attracted more by the party's defense of eastern German regional interests than by its identification with communist-era social policies, many (though not all) of which had long existed in the Federal Republic.

In other respects the PDS electorate resembled that of the East-Central European *Euro-left* more closely than that of the CPRF and CPU. Its voters were spread fairly evenly among all age groups and income brackets and were notably strong among better-educated professionals rather than being concentrated among older, less-educated voters and, in the case of Russia particularly, the rural sectors of the population.[29] The PDS's pattern of voter support was largely true in Poland and Hungary, if not as much so in Lithuania. Curry describes how the Democratic Left Alliance drew voters initially from public-sector employees, farmers, the middle-aged, and the inhabitants of small and medium-sized towns. Thereafter its constituency gradually expanded to the new entrepreneurial middle class, workers, and even some of the youth to become a genuine "catchall" party by 2001.[30] Morlang paints a similar picture with regard to Hungary, except with a reverse trajectory from that of Poland. Over time the Hungarian Socialist Party became somewhat less a "catchall" party because workers and others most hurt by the HSP's free-market polices in the mid-1990s threw their votes to populist right-of-center parties in 1998.[31]

A third advantage that accrued to all the successor left-of-center parties from their shared communist legacy involved the high priority they put on party unity. Ironically, the intraparty unity once required by the Leninist doctrine of "democratic centralism" was now induced or reinforced by the anticommunist rhetoric and retribution to which all the successor parties were subjected, to one degree or another, after their countries' exit from communism. Curry movingly describes how in the early 1990s even members of what had been the reform wing of the Polish United Workers' Party were denigrated and scorned by the governing ex-Solidarity center rightists along with many in the general population. What Curry calls the "crucible of rejection" left former communists who wished to remain in public life no choice but to stick together in the successor Social Democratic Party of Poland, the core of the later electoral coalition (and eventually united party), the Democratic Left Alliance. Meanwhile, during the early transitional years the Polish center leftists coped with this pervasive ostracism by focusing on what they could do best (honing the details of legislation, tending to their constituents' needs) and cultivating strength in unity. Any differences of opinion were subordinated to that overriding objective.[32] This cohesion, so much in contrast to the infighting and fragmentation from the early 1990s on among former Solidarity activists as well as new politicians on the right, plainly contributed to the election victories of the Polish ex-communists.

Morlang describes a similar, if less engraving, phenomenon with regard to the Hungarian Socialist Party. Despite their solid reformist credentials dating well back into the 1970s and 1980s, new recruits were sparse, as evidenced by the fact that 90 percent of HSP members were former communists. In the public mind, at least initially, even proven reform communists were tainted by their past roles in the ex-ruling party. To help cope with the early ostracism encountered in parliament (and elsewhere), they, too, refrained from polemics with their detractors, focusing instead on creating a democratically structured grassroots network and professionally qualified party and legislative cadre.[33] Typically, however, even as the majority party heading the government in the mid-1990s, the HSP continued to promote a "culture of cohesion" within its organizational ranks.[34] This struck observers as rather incongruous because from the HSP's inception it had sanctioned different internal-party "platforms," which included both supporters of a faster pace of free-market transition as well as advocates of greater social protection for people who suffered most from declining living standards during the economic transition.

Algis Krupavicius tells an analogous story about the ex-communist Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party during the first half of the 1990s. Despite

winning one-third of the seats in the first free parliamentary elections of February 1990, the LDLP caucus had difficulty finding any other parties willing to cooperate with it in the legislature. Even after winning an outright parliamentary majority in the postindependence October 1992 contest and the presidential election in 1993, the LDLP still felt it had to form a broad-based government of technocratic professionals. It chose this option not for lack of votes but so as not to provoke unduly the simmering wrath of the deeply anticommunist Lithuanian right-wing parties.[35]

The CPRF offers an equally telling example of adversity-induced unity. Not only were the Russian communists legally banned for well over a year and shunned thereafter by large segments of younger urban dwellers,[36] but the administration of Boris Yeltsin itself unleashed a vitriolic media onslaught against them during the presidential campaign of 1996, resulting in elections that most outside observers judged to be technically free but hardly fair. All the while, the CPRF (in contrast to the CPU) was beset by deep internal cleavages that were both horizontal and vertical. They were horizontal in that the leadership group, based initially in the offices of the party's Duma caucus, included at least three major tendencies: Marxist reformers, Marxist-Leninist revivalists, and Zyuganov-style ethnocultural nationalists. At the same time, as March emphasizes, the CPRF cleavages were also of a vertical nature. If the party elite as a whole was relatively pragmatic, its rank and file tended toward activist militancy. This "moderate–radical polarity" between party leadership and base reflected a "sociocultural *nomenklatura*–mass divide," with the party leaders having solid roots in the middle echelons of the Soviet-era CPSU elite.[37] Yet, despite these multiple cleavages, or what March calls "ideological incoherence," the CPRF as a whole displayed remarkable organizational unity from its reconstitution in 1993 into the new millennium—often to the surprise of outside observers, both Russian and Western, many of whom regularly predicted a party schism.

This cohesion was the result, in part, of what March calls a relaxed form of Leninist democratic centralism, reinforced by an internalized code of ethics based on the values of Soviet-style "consensus and conflict avoidance."[38] Indeed, the CPRF statutes continued to uphold the operational rule of democratic centralism even though the ultimate sanction of expulsion was, until spring 2002, rarely imposed on those who broke ranks, in either public utterances or parliamentary votes. This latter point was underscored by the continued membership on the CPRF's Central Committee, even after its December 2000 congress, of such outspoken "deviationists" as the anti-Semitic retired General Albert Makashov, the longtime anti-Zyuganov radical leftist Tatyana Astrakhankina, and Gennadii Seleznev, the moderate

Duma speaker who boldly challenged the CPRF hierarchy in July 2000 by founding the autonomous movement "Rossiya" as a center-left partner of the CPRF.

Equally important in explaining the CPRF's unity, therefore, would seem to be the same "crucible of rejection" that conditioned the conduct of the Polish, Hungarian, and Lithuanian ex-communists. The post-Soviet Russian communists, whatever their private views,[39] had good reason to believe that their party could retain its strength only by remaining united in an otherwise hostile political environment. During conversations with ranking moderates in the CPRF leadership in May–June 2000, I was startled by their hesitancy, indeed opposition, to supporting Seleznev's proposed center-left "Rossiya" movement despite the otherwise apparent similarities in their political orientations. Yet some of these very same individuals had been quite prepared during the late 1990s to defy the rule of democratic centralism on key Duma votes when so prompted by their personal convictions. Their reluctance to endanger CPRF organizational unity thus appears to have stemmed not so much from compliance with party discipline as from feelings of solidarity with their comrades after years of shared sociopolitical ostracism. Only in late spring 2002 did three of the most outspoken moderates, including Seleznev, finally come to a parting of ways with the CPRF. Because of their refusal to heed the party leadership's directive to resign from their prominent Duma posts, they were expelled from the party by a majority vote of the CPRF Central Committee.[40]

Future Prospects in the Post–September 11 World

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon fundamentally transformed not only the international arena but also the regional political and economic contexts in which the ex-communist successor parties operated. The U.S.-led war against terrorism acted as a catalyst for right-wing mobilization in West Europe of long-simmering anti-Muslim hostilities as well as a dramatic reorientation of Russian foreign policy toward enhanced cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community.

Prior to September 11, conservative trends in Europe were gaining strength, as evidenced by the victory in Italy's May 2001 election of the rightist alliance headed by Silvio Berlusconi. All the same, the British Labour Party won a second term in office the following month, the German Social Democrats remained reasonably strong in public opinion polls, and the French presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for spring 2002 seemed too close to call.

After September 11, political challengers to center-left governments began openly to play the xenophobic card, most notably in Germany and France.[41] In local and national election campaigns as well as in party conclaves, they began to appeal to raw anti-Arab and anti-immigrant sentiments, while Prime Minister Berlusconi, in an interview in Berlin in late September 2001, urged Europe to "reconstitute itself on the basis of its Christian roots."[42] Ethnic-based tensions returned to the front burner of West European politics, both as issues of real concern to voters and as a way for opposition politicians to sidestep intractable socioeconomic problems such as entrenched youth unemployment and the aging of indigenous populations (whose birth rates lagged far behind those of Muslim and other immigrants). The social democratic and labor parties' moves to the center during the 1990s were now being matched by a conservative swing farther to the right.

The upshot was the surprise second-place showing in the first round of the French presidential race in May 2002 by Jean-Marie Le Pen, leader of the far right, xenophobic, anti-immigrant National Front. This assured the victory of the right-of-center sitting president, Jacques Chirac, in the runoff as well as a center-right victory in the elections to the French National Assembly the following month. In the equally contested German parliamentary elections of September 2002, the center-left coalition headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder just barely held its own, returning to government with a razor-thin majority in the Bundestag. Even then, as Baylis suggests, the SPD–Green Party coalition was apparently saved only by the votes of potential PDS supporters who sought to block a right-of-center victory—at the cost, however, of reducing the PDS's party-list vote to 4 percent.[43]

East-Central Europe could hardly avoid being swayed by the new political winds blowing from the West, given its Euro-Atlanticist orientation. Indeed, the April 2002 Hungarian parliamentary elections and their aftermath were characterized by a similar shift in the cutting edge of political discourse from socioeconomic policies to problems relating to national identity and ethnicity and even renewed recriminations over the "communist past." The Hungarian Socialist Party returned to government in coalition with the Free Democrats but only with a ten-vote majority in parliament.

It could be anticipated that the successor center-left parties would incline toward moderation on these new issues. Defense of interethnic brotherhood and the higher claims of a common humanity might even help them to counterbalance their earlier headlong embrace of free-market globalization and neglect of the "losers" of the post-communist transitions. Particularly under conditions of weakening economies, center-left parties throughout Europe could also be expected to emphasize once again their traditional precepts re-

garding government responsibility for economic well-being and social fairness. Still, the very concepts of left and right were changing, with national values and ethnic issues taking precedence over earlier controversies about the role of the state in economic matters.

Turning to the easternmost reaches of Europe, Vladimir Putin since the start of his presidency in May 2000 had exhibited a pro-European orientation that included shared concerns about the unilateralist foreign-policy thrust of President George W. Bush's administration during its first nine months. Putin's immediate extension of an outstretched hand to Washington on September 11 was thus somewhat unexpected. In Russia itself it prompted bewilderment even among some pro-Western circles and outrage among rightwing nationalists, key members of the professional military, and, of course, the neo-Leninists of Russia (and Ukraine). Most critical from our viewpoint, its impact on the communists was to stiffen their opposition to Putin's leadership, the West in general, and the United States above all. The above-noted expulsion of CPRF moderates in spring 2002 took place in the context of this general turn to the left.

This brings us, then, to the question of how far the blockage of the post-communist Russian, and especially Ukrainian, political systems may be attributed to the stances taken by the CPRF and CPU. The term *blocked society* was coined to describe France and Italy during the 1960s and 1970s when, as in Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s, communist parties consistently won 20 to 25 percent or more of the votes in national elections. Such electoral strength substantially reduced the scope of political space available for alternation of power among "legitimate" political blocs, those committed to West Europe's post–World War II market-based democracies. The result was the entrenchment in power for decades of Christian Democracy in Italy and predominantly Gaullist forces in France. Only after François Mitterrand's creation of the Parti Socialiste and its electoral eclipse of the French Communist Party was the Fifth French Republic able to experience real alternation of power, after 1981, between center-right and center-left coalition governments. In contrast, only after the Italian Communist Party transformed itself into a social democratic party—a process that had been under way by the late 1970s but was acknowledged by Western political establishments only after 1991—was Italy likewise able to achieve democratic alternation of power. From 1996 until 2001 Italy was governed by a center-left government, the core of which was the ex-communist democratic left.

French and Italian experience would seem to suggest two alternative solutions to the political blockage in Russia and Ukraine: the emergence of a social democratic party able to draw large numbers of voters away from the

neo-Leninists or the social democratization of the communist parties themselves. With regard to the second option, the analyses of March and Wilson hold out little prospect that either the CPRF or the CPU would soon follow the path of social democratization. Their neo-Leninist leaderships denounced Gorbachev's attempted social democratization of the CPSU as high treason, and they flatly rejected, in formal documents and personal pronouncements, the feasibility or desirability of center-left, social democratic programs in either Russia or Ukraine. Their intransigence was caused not just by reflexive ideological fundamentalism but also by the extent of socioeconomic polarization and gross impoverishment (the latter estimated at 30 percent or more) in their respective societies. In a word, for them and their followers the Marxist-Leninist canons about the evils of capitalism still rang true. This was so much the case that in the Russian electoral cycle of 1999–2000, the CPRF's losses in the rural, aging "red belt" were more than offset by its gains in the industrial rust-belt cities of southern Siberia and the Pacific littoral: its party-list vote for the Duma increased by two full percentage points from 1995. Although in the March 2002 Ukrainian parliamentary election the party-list vote for the CPU fell to about 20 percent, the political center was more fragmented than ever, leaving the presidential administration of Leonid Kuchma on the defensive but in power.

As of autumn 2002, the French solution to political blockage, the emergence of the Parti Socialiste as a center-left political force with substantial voter appeal, also seemed rather far-fetched in Russia or Ukraine. In Ukraine, Moroz's Socialist Party still held its own but could anticipate only a limited increase in electoral support in a society rent by multiple, entrenched regional and ethnic-cultural cleavages. Russia, meanwhile, appeared to be suffering from a split political personality. The educated, urban Russians on the western side of the Ural Mountains were largely attuned to mainstream European social and political-economic values. However, they were disinclined to vote for any of the many center-left formations that had appeared, only to disappear, from one electoral cycle to the next. This was due in part to their continuing disdain for Gorbachev, whom they blamed for the breakup of the USSR and subsequent Russian loss of international stature. But it was also a result, unintended perhaps, of the Yeltsinite center-right government's defensive efforts to cover up its own communist past by distancing itself from Soviet-era social policies. As for the "losers" in postcommunist Russia, those living below the official poverty line who numbered about one-third of the overall population but far more than one-third of those living east of the Urals, center-left ideas were tainted by association with the free-market policies held responsible for their plight as well as by

decades of official Soviet denunciation of "social democracy" as a subversive Western ploy.

   Thus, for Russia and Ukraine there appeared to be little likelihood of genuine alternation of power in the near or even medium term. The neo-Leninists would persevere, diminished in membership with the aging of their rank and file but with continuing appeal to protest voters if not ideologically committed new recruits. Only substantial economic growth, along with the creation of a viable social welfare safety net, and the politicization of the "silent" generation of educated, urban Russians (and Ukrainians) who came to maturity during the 1990s might spur the eventual emergence of a new political formation capable of drawing voters away from the neo-Leninists in an effort to unseat the entrenched post-Soviet elites. By then the right-of-center trends in the rest of Europe, galvanized by the reverberations from September 11, could plausibly be expected to have run their course, giving way to yet another cyclical turn to the center left that might, in time, also impact on Russia and Ukraine.

Notes

   1. See Luke March's chapter in this volume, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

   2. Robert D. English, *Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

   3. For example, in 1990, 90 percent of the Hungarian Socialist Party's members had been former communists; see Diana Morlang's chapter in this volume, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism." And in 1998 only some seventy thousand of the CPRF's five hundred fifty thousand or so members were not ex-CPSU; March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists." Cf. Algis Krupavicius's chapter in this volume, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002."

   4. Krupavicius, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002"; see also Jane Leftwich Curry's chapter, "Poland's Ex-Communists: From Pariahs to Establishment Players."

   5. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

   6. See Thomas A. Baylis's chapter in this volume, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

   7. The young man in question, named Slava, was arrested by the KGB during my last days on duty at the exhibit. As I learned from him some forty years later, he was tried and sentenced to seven years in the gulag for, among other things, consorting with "that CIA scum, Joan Barth." The following summer, I tried in vain to locate Slava with the help of a well-positioned younger member of the Soviet elite, Vladimir Posner, who all the while voiced skepticism that there could even have been such an arrest in those new times. For want of evidence, the Khrushchev regime

chose simply to denounce me as a spy after I left the country in 1960. Slava was fully rehabilitated in the early 1990s.

8. I have focused here on the USSR's Slavic peoples because the imposed nature of the original revolutionary takeovers in the Baltic and trans-Caucasian republics approximated the East-Central European experiences, while Soviet rule in Central Asia initially bore a greater resemblance to Third World colonialism.

9. See Joan Barth Urban and Valerii D. Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), p. 133; and Joan Barth Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine on the Eve of the 1999 Elections," *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 7, no. 1 (winter 1999), pp. 120–121.

10. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

11. Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

12. Krupavicius, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002."

13. Quoted in Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

14. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

15. Wilson, "The Communist Party of Ukraine: From Soviet Man to East Slavic Brotherhood."

16. *Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Moscow: Informpechat, 1995); cf. Urban and Solovei, *Russia's Communists at the Crossroads*, pp. 132–136. See also Wilson, "The Communist Party of Ukraine."

17. March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

18. Urban, "The Communist Parties of Russia and Ukraine"; cf. the SPU draft program, approved June 13, 1998, in the party's political weekly, *Tovarishch* 26 (1998), pp. 1, 3–4.

19. Wilson, "The Communist Party of Ukraine."

20. See Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism"; Krupavicius, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002"; Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism"; and Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

21. Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

22. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism," n. 4.

23. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

24. Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

25. March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

26. Krupavicius, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002."

27. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

28. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

29. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

30. Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

31. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

32. Curry, "Poland's Ex-Communists."

33. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

34. Morlang, "Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism."

35. Krupavicius, "Left-wing Parties in Lithuania, 1990–2002."

36. In late spring 1993, as I began my research on the CPRF, members still operated in a semiclandestine fashion even though the ban against them had been lifted the previous autumn and the party was legally reconstituted the following February.

37. March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

38. March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

39. During my research on the CPRF, I became acquainted with several Duma deputies who were ranking members of the Marxist reformer group. In a personal conversation in May 2000, one of them insisted to me that the CPRF must transform itself into a normal West European–style social democratic party or perish. While such a transformation showed no signs of being in the offing, the individual in question remained a part of the leadership until being expelled two years later.

40. March, "The Pragmatic Radicalism of Russia's Communists."

41. In the German city-state of Hamburg, where key perpetrators of the September 11 attacks had lived, an upstart Law and Order Party won some 20 percent of the vote in late September 2001, while in France, home to some four million Arab Muslims, presidential candidates of the far right and far left unabashedly appealed to anti-immigrant emotions.

42. From a *New York Times* article, reprinted in *International Herald Tribune*, September 27, 2001, p. 1.

43. Baylis, "Political Adaptation in Germany's Post-Communist Party of Democratic Socialism."

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Appendix

Table A.1. Parliamentary Elections: Left Parties Results

	Ukraine 1994	Lithuania 1990	Russia 1993	Poland 1991	Hungary 1990	Germany 1990
1st election	No Ukrainian party-list vote in 1994	LDLP: 34.07 Voter turnout: 71.71	Russia CP: 12.4 Voter turnout: 54.8	SLD: 11.8 Voter turnout: 43.2	Hungarian Soc.: 10.9 Voter turnout: 80.09	PDS: 2.4 Voter turnout: n/a
2nd election	1998 Ukraine CP: 24.6 Voter turnout: 75.8	1992 LDLP: 51.77 Voter turnout: 75.29	1995 Russian CP: 22.3 Voter turnout: 64.4	1993 SLD: 20.41 Voter turnout: 52.08	1994 Hungarian Soc.: 32.9 Voter turnout: 88.9	1994 PDS: 4.4 Voter turnout: 76.1
3rd election	2002 Ukraine CP: 20.0 Voter turnout: 69.4	1996 LDLP: 8.69 Voter turnout: 52.92	1999 Russian CP: 24.3 Voter turnout: 61.9	1997 SLD: 27.13 Voter turnout: 47.93	1998 Hungarian Soc.: 32.3 Voter turnout: 56.7	1998 PDS: 5.1 Voter turnout: 81.3
4th election		2000 Coalition of Social Dem.: 36.17 Voter turnout: 58.6		2001 SLD: 41 Voter turnout: 44.3	2002 Hungarian Soc.: 42.1 Voter turnout: 72.51	2002 PDS: 4.01 Voter turnout: 79.1

CP = Communist Party

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