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Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe

Guarding the Guards

Edited by Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster



Democratic Control of the Military
in Postcommunist Europe

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First published 2002 by
PALGRAVE
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world

PALGRAVE is the new global academic imprint of
St. Martin's Press LLC Scholarly and Reference Division and
Palgrave Publishers Ltd (formerly Macmillan Press Ltd).

ISBN 0–333–94624–3

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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Foreword

The collapse of communism in central and eastern Europe ushered in a series of political and economic reform challenges. Central among these was the reform of communist-era armed forces. The countries of central and eastern Europe have faced the complex challenges of securing democratic civilian control of their armed forces, instituting new structures for the management of defence policy, downsizing and restructuring their militaries and developing new patterns of international military cooperation.

Working alongside its NATO and European Union partners, the British government is actively supporting the countries of central and eastern Europe in addressing these challenges. The UK Ministry of Defence's Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe has played a central role in this process of engagement through its Outreach programme. Established in 1994, the Outreach programme aims to assist in the development throughout the region of stable, sovereign and democratic states through the reform of their military institutions.

Politically, Outreach aims to ensure that the UK remains engaged with Russia in order to build a cooperative defence relationship and to encourage the emergence of a democratic, politically stable and economically successful partner; to promote the establishment of democratically accountable armed forces throughout central and eastern Europe; to provide reassurance to countries disappointed at not yet being invited to join NATO; and to provide opportunities to work with our partners and allies in NATO and the European Union. Militarily it aims to promote efficient, democratic defence practices in central and eastern Europe; increase interoperability between the forces of NATO and its eastern partners; and develop training and exercise opportunities for UK forces in the region. The practical benefits of defence cooperation with the countries of central and eastern Europe can be seen in their contributions to the NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.

We hope that by contributing to the realization of these objectives Outreach will promote regional stability and democracy and contribute significantly to building and maintaining trust and confidence between citizens and their armed forces, and between nations that until 1989 confronted each other across the Iron Curtain. It will therefore help to reduce the risk of a reversion to confrontation in Europe.

In this context, the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe has been pleased to support the research project of which this volume is a product. With support from the UK Ministry of Defence, this research project has brought together academics, defence policy-makers and serving soldiers from both central and eastern Europe and the West to explore the challenges of reforming civil–military relations. It thus both contributes to our understanding of the challenges we face and provides a microcosm of international defence cooperation. This volume – the first of a series of four addressing different aspects of civil–military and defence reform in central and eastern Europe – is an important and policy-relevant contribution to our understanding of the problems of securing and consolidating democratic civilian control of armed forces and defence policy. As the conclusion suggests, much progress has been made in this area over the past decade but many challenges remain.

Malcolm Haworth
Director, Central and Eastern Europe,
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence

Preface

This book is the product of a research project on 'The Transformation of Civil-Military Relations in Comparative Context', funded by the Economic and Social Research Council's 'One Europe or Several?' research programme (award number L213 25 2009). The project examines the transformation of civil-military relations in the countries of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, exploring emerging patterns of civil-military relations in the region, the policy challenges these raise and the implications for more general understandings of the changing nature of civil-military relations in the contemporary world. Within this context, this book provides a comparative analysis of the experiences of the countries of postcommunist Europe in attempting to secure democratic control of armed forces. Three further volumes, also to be published in Palgrave's ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' series, will address the issue of professionalization of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe, wider military-society relations in the region and the overall challenge of reforming postcommunist militaries.

The chapters in this book were first presented at a conference on 'Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Civil-Military Relations and Defence Planning in the New Era', held in Kyiv, in March 2000. The conference was funded by the Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe of the UK Ministry of Defence and held in conjunction with the Kyiv office of the EastWest Institute. We wish to express our thanks to Oleksandr Pavliuk, director of the EastWest Institute's Kyiv office, the staff of that office, and the participants in the conference.

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster

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1

Introduction: the Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster

After the collapse of communism in 1989 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe faced the enormous challenge of making the transition from communism to an unknown future, with little or no experience of democracy, market economics or stable relations with their neighbours to build on.[1] One element of this transition was the problem of reforming communist-era armed forces and civil–military relations. The ability of postcommunist elites to secure democratic control of the armed forces, or at least the acquiescence of the military to the democratic transition, would have a significant impact on the prospects for democratization as a whole. The extent of democratic control of the military might also have a significant bearing on Central and Eastern European states' relations with the West and their prospects for integration with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The extent to and ways in which armed forces maintained influence over foreign and defence policy decisions and were intertwined with conceptions of national identity might also have major implications for relations with neighbouring states and ethnic minorities and hence for peace and security in the region.

There were reasons to be pessimistic about the prospects for securing democratic control of the armed forces in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. During the Soviet era, the military were one of the pillars of communist rule whose loyalty was secured by a combination of penetration by the communist party system, political education and the provision of substantial resources to support the armed forces. In pre-communist times, in particular during the interwar period, armed

forces intervened in the domestic politics of a number of Central and Eastern European countries, often alongside or in support of authoritarian and (extreme) nationalist political forces. The wider context of political, economic and social transition, further, meant that the challenge of reforming civil–military relations took place against a background of domestic and international instability. In these circumstances, fears of military intervention in domestic politics, whether to 'protect the achievements of socialism', 'maintain domestic order', 'secure national interests' or simply to defend the armed forces' own institutional or economic interests were not unwarranted.

As the communist regimes collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, there were real fears that the armed forces might intervene to halt the collapse of communism by force. In the event, both national armed forces and the Soviet military stood by as the *ancien régime* of which they had been a part disintegrated. In 1991, as the struggle in the Soviet Union between hardliners and reformers intensified, the military intervened to suppress the independence movements in the Baltic states and elements in the Soviet high command joined with communist hardliners in mounting the unsuccessful August coup attempt. As Yugoslavia moved towards war in 1991, the military's loyalty to the idea of a Yugoslav state and support for then Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the efforts of the other republics (in particular Croatia) to establish their own paramilitary forces played a central role in the genesis of the conflict.

This book provides a comparative analysis of the relationship between armed forces, domestic politics and defence and foreign policy in postcommunist Europe. The case study chapters that follow this introduction provide detailed analyses of the experiences of a diverse range of Central and Eastern European states in this area. Collectively these chapters provide the basis for a comparative assessment of the extent of progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces in postcommunist Europe and the factors that have influenced developments in this area – a task that is undertaken in the book's conclusion. In order to provide a framework for the country case studies and overall analysis, this introduction outlines the common communist legacy but divergent national context for civil–military relations facing the countries of the region, provides a definition of democratically controlled armed forces (against which the experiences of individual countries can be measured) and explores in general terms the range of factors that may shape the prospects for achieving democratic control of armed forces in postcommunist Europe.

Common communist legacy, divergent national paths

Civil–military relations in Central and Eastern Europe since the collapse of communism have been shaped by the interaction between the common communist legacy facing all the countries of the region and their divergent national developmental paths (reflecting both their distinct national adaptations to communism and diverse patterns of postcommunist political development). During the communist period, civil–military relations were defined by the civilian leadership's efforts to ensure the loyalty of the military to the communist system's values and institutions.[2] Like all other branches of the state, the military was subjugated to Communist Party control. A system of dual elite loyalty was established, in which all high-ranking military officers and most of the lower and middle ranks were members of the Communist Party – and hence had loyalties to both the armed forces and the Communist Party. The system was reinforced by the establishment of Party cells within the military and extensive communist political education alongside soldiers' military training. This system had two significant and to some extent contradictory legacies. First, the military was highly politicized, in the sense that it was closely tied to the ruling Communist Party and substantial efforts were made to embed communist political values and institutions within the armed forces. At the same time, however, the military was also subject to quite strong and direct civilian control and was not directly engaged in domestic politics as an institution in its own right. Indeed, communist leaders were always aware, sometimes acutely so, of the armed forces' potential role as an alternative source of political allegiance and power and a potential threat to their rule. As a consequence, while postcommunist elites have faced the challenge of breaking ties between the armed forces and the communist system, this challenge has taken place in the context of making the transition from a system of communist civilian control of the military to one of democratic civilian control. Moreover, as a number of the chapters in this volume illustrate, the experience of civilian communist control, combined with the often only skin-deep loyalty of the armed forces to the communist system, has made the transition to democratic civilian control of the military – at least as this relates to the military's relationship with domestic politics – much easier than might superficially be expected.

The communist system of civil–military relations, however, also had a second element that has left a more problematic legacy in terms of securing democratic civilian control of armed forces. Under the

communist system, in return for the military's submission to civilian control in relation to domestic politics, the armed forces were given a high degree of autonomy with regard to the development and implementation of defence policy. As a consequence, when the communist system collapsed, new governments faced weak executive/governmental control of defence policy, few systems for the financial management of defence, non-existent parliamentary oversight of defence policy, defence ministries staffed largely by the military and which were themselves effectively subordinate to separate General Staffs, and little or no civilian or non-governmental expertise in defence matters. These problems were compounded by a culture of military independence and resistance to civilian control in relation to the development and implementation of defence policy. Thus many of the chapters in this book highlight that while establishing democratic civilian control over and the political neutrality of the military in relation to domestic politics has been relatively easy, establishing effective democratic civilian control over defence policy has been – and remains – much more problematic.

While the countries of Central and Eastern Europe share a common communist civil–military legacy, their national adaptations to communism (including in the area of civil–military relations), the circumstances in which they regained their sovereignty and their broad patterns of postcommunist development have differed significantly. As a result, the various postcommunist states' departure point for efforts to secure democratic control of armed forces and subsequent developments in this area have varied greatly. The countries which used to be referred to as the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states – Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia before its division, East Germany before integration with the Federal Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania – inherited independent armed forces and thus faced the challenge of securing democratic civilian control of pre-existing national armed forces. Even during the Cold War, there had been much doubt about the loyalty of these states' armed forces to their communist regimes, suggesting that they might be relatively supportive of their countries' democratic transitions. In contrast, as newly independent states, the Baltic republics and the former Yugoslav republics other than Serbia faced the challenge of establishing armed forces, defence ministries and associated institutional infrastructure from scratch (although the former Yugoslav republics did so, in part, on the basis of pre-existing republican territorial defence forces). As the chapters on Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia in this volume show, these countries therefore faced fewer problems in terms of establishing

democratic political control of their new militaries but greater problems in developing effective defence policies. As Grigoriy Perepelitsa's analysis of Ukraine highlights, the other former Soviet republics inherited disembodied chunks of the old Soviet armed forces and have therefore faced major problems in converting these into national militaries and establishing national structures for the control of the armed forces and defence policy. As the hearts of the two communist federations, Russia and the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY – dominated by its largest component, Serbia) inherited the cores of the Soviet and Yugoslav armed forces and defence policy institutions. In both cases, however, the old/new armed forces appear to have been more highly politicized than those of the NSWP states and have become closely intertwined with their countries' domestic political transitions and the problems of imperial withdrawal from the other former Soviet and former Yugoslav republics.

The different national experiences of the postcommunist states also impinge on democratic control of the military in another way. In some countries, primarily the former NSWP states, the Baltic republics and Slovenia, the core challenge for democratic control of the military revolves essentially around the regular armed forces. In contrast, many of the other former Soviet and former Yugoslav republics inherited (or developed in the 1990s) other armed forces (internal security forces, paramilitary forces, border guards, armed intelligence forces and the like) which are as large as (in some cases even larger than) the regular armed forces, are quite heavily armed and have greater political impact and influence than the regular military. The roles and mechanisms for political control of such forces, further, are often highly opaque. Thus in Russia, Ukraine and the FRY, control of these non-regular armed forces is arguably as great a challenge for democratization as control of the regular military.

Conceptualizing democratic control of armed forces

The debate on democratic control of armed forces – in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe and more broadly – has been characterized by some conceptual confusion, with terms such as 'democratic control', 'civilian control' and 'democratization' of civil–military relations or the military often used interchangeably and with little clarity. This results in some confusion as to exactly what is being discussed and creates problems in assessing the extent of progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces. A more developed discussion of the problems

of, and extent of progress in, establishing democratic control of armed forces in postcommunist Europe, therefore, requires greater conceptual clarity.

'Civil–military relations' may best be understood as a general term encompassing all aspects of relations between armed forces (as a political, social and economic institution) and the society (and state or political/social/ethnic movement) of which they are part. The domestic political function and position of the military – that is to say, their relationship with the institutions and patterns of political power in the society concerned – forms one of the core components of civil–military relations. Within this context, we argue that 'democratic control' of armed forces should be understood in terms of political control of the military by the legitimate, democratically elected authorities of the state.

Democratic political control of the military, further, involves three distinct but interrelated issues. First, it involves the relationship between the military and domestic politics. Here, the core normative assumption of democratic control of the armed forces is that the military should not be involved in domestic politics and should remain the apolitical servant of the democratic government. The second element of democratic control of the military relates to the control of defence policy (understood as the broad direction of the development of the armed forces, encompassing defence budgeting, force structure, equipment procurement and overall military strategy). Democratic control of the armed forces implies that the definition and development of defence policy should be under the control of democratic, civilian authorities and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities. In practice, defence policy often involves a delicate balance between the maintenance of political control and respect for professional military expertise. Even the long-established democracies of Western Europe and North America experience tensions in this area.

The third element of democratic control of the military relates to the military's role in foreign policy, in particular decisions on the use of military force. Democratic control of the military implies that the state's foreign policy, including decisions on the deployment and use of force, should be under the control of the democratic civilian authorities. Again, however, decisions on the initiation and conduct of military operations raise difficult issues as to the appropriate balance between civilian political control, respect for 'professional' military advice and operational military requirements. Again, long-established democracies

often face civil–military tensions over the use of force (recently, for example, during NATO's 1999 air war against Yugoslavia).[3] In this context, academics debate whether the military are more prone than civilians to use force (and hence weak civilian control of the military may increase the likelihood of warfare) or, alternatively, modern professional armed forces are defined by an inherent conservatism regarding the use of force that makes them reluctant to engage in military adventurism.[4]

The definition advanced here implies that the central element of democratic models of civil–military relations must be political control of the military by democratically elected authorities through institutions providing for presidential, governmental and/or ministerial control of the armed forces. Building on this assumption, various authors have argued that democratic control of the military requires a number of more specific elements for it to be effective:

- constitutional, legal and/or institutional constraints forbidding the involvement of the military as an institution (as distinct from individual soldiers as voters and perhaps as candidates for election) in domestic politics;
- a clear chain of command for the armed forces, with democratically elected leaders at its head;
- a civilian Minister of Defence and a Ministry of Defence staffed at least in part by civilians (in particular at higher levels and key policy-making positions);
- the subordination of the military General Staff to the Ministry of Defence;
- a degree of transparency with regard to the defence budget.

While these institutional dimensions may be vital elements of any system of democratic control of the military, the effective functioning of such a system depends also on the existence of a general political culture and a specific military culture in which the subordination of the armed forces to civilian political control is widely accepted by civilians and the military alike and works in practice. The development of such a culture may be at least as great a challenge as reforming institutions and may be hindered by military resistance to civilian control, civilian reluctance or inability to assert effective control or a more general ineffectiveness of governmental and administrative structures.

Much thinking on civil–military relations focuses on the danger of praetorian military intervention in politics (i.e. the military's desire to

intervene in domestic politics, as, for example, in parts of Latin America in the 1970s) as the primary problem in establishing democratic control of armed forces. In practice, and certainly in postcommunist Europe, the picture is often more complicated. Civilian elites may seek to draw the military into politics, whether as an instrument of political power under the control of president, government or parliament or as a means of gaining the political legitimacy perceived to be conferred by the support of the military. Civilian political leaders (whether presidents, governments or ministers) may exploit executive control of the military for their own political ends. Domestic political divisions or conflicts (for example, between presidents, governments and parliaments) may force the military to make difficult decisions as to where their loyalty should lie. These problems may be particularly important and compounded when the wider society is characterized by deep political divisions and/or constitutional arrangements and chains of command for the control of the armed forces are unclear or contested. Democratic control over the military, therefore, involves not only securing the military's own disengagement from politics and civilian political control over the military but also establishing a civilian political consensus over the non-involvement of the military in politics and constraints on the potential for civilian political abuse of or conflict over the military. This has been a real challenge in postcommunist Europe, with disputes between different political factions and between presidents, governments and parliaments over the control of the military in a number of countries in the 1990s. In the most extreme case, conflict between President Boris Yeltsin and the parliament drew the military very directly into Russian politics in autumn 1993.

The argument developed here so far – and much of the literature on civil–military relations in general – has focused on executive (i.e. presidential, governmental and/or ministerial) control of the military. Democracy, except in the more extreme forms of delegative democracy (where virtually all decisions are delegated to a single elected ruler and which some might argue are, in fact, less than democratic), however, usually also involves a division or separation of powers between the executive and legislature (and judiciary), constraints on the (ab)use of state power and wider 'civil society' (non-state) input into politics and public policy. Thus, legislative (parliamentary) oversight, constraints on state power and wider 'civil society' input should also be considered important elements of democratic control of the military. Parliamentary oversight of the military involves two broad functions. First, parliaments act as an additional tier or mechanism alongside executives for

control of the military. Second, and equally if not even more importantly, parliaments provide oversight of the executive's control of the armed forces and defence policy. Analysts point to a number of elements that are often seen as central to effective parliamentary oversight of the military and defence policy: approval of senior military and political-military appointments (such as the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff); approval of declarations of war or states of emergency, of the overseas deployment of armed forces and of decisions on the operational use of the military; the existence of parliamentary defence or national security committees with the powers, resources and expertise necessary for meaningful oversight of defence policy; and access to necessary information (for example, details of the defence budget and the armed forces structure).

Aside from the formal institutions of state and government responsible for democratic control of the armed forces, there is also a strong case that a democratic model of civil–military relations requires an element of wider non-state or 'civil society' input into debate on the armed forces and defence policy. Such 'civil society' activity performs a number of functions. It provides an additional means for public oversight of the armed forces and the political institutions controlling the armed forces, acting as a further break against military praetorianism or political abuse of control of the military. It also contributes to informed public debate on the armed forces and defence policy. Assessing what constitutes a necessary or appropriate 'civil society' contribution to democratic control of and debate on the military is obviously problematic. Nevertheless, a number of dimensions may be pointed to: a free media, interested in and able to investigate defence issues; the existence of independent research institutes, think-tanks and academic expertise to contribute to informed debate on defence policy; and the freedom for citizens to organize non-governmental activity and protest in relation to the armed forces (such as, for example, the organizations of soldiers' mothers that have played an important role in bringing to attention the serious mistreatment of conscripts in the post-Soviet states).

Factors influencing the prospects for democratic control of armed forces in postcommunist Europe

The chapters in this book seek not only to assess how far different Central and Eastern European countries have made progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces and defence policy since the collapse of communism but also to examine the problems these

countries have faced in this area and explain the commonalties and divergences in their experiences – that is, to identify the factors which have shaped the prospects for and development of democratic control of the military. Academic analysts debate the importance of different factors, with Huntington most famously arguing that the degree of professionalization of armed forces has a major bearing on the prospects for political control of the military and Desch more recently arguing that war or a high degree of external threat facilitates such control.[5] In general, we suggest that there is no a priori reason to believe that the prospects for democratic control of the military are determined by a single factor or a common combination of factors. Instead, we argue that a wide range of domestic and international factors, outlined below, shape the prospects for democratic control of armed forces, but the relative importance of those factors varies from country to country.

Historical legacies

The historical context of any country will have a significant bearing on its civil–military relations. As was argued above, the communist era has left a particular civil–military legacy in Central and Eastern Europe – with both positive and negative consequences for efforts to establish democratic control of armed forces in the new era. Legacies from the pre-communist period may also have relevance for the countries of post-communist Europe because states and societies generally, and armed forces in particular, may either deliberately attempt to re-establish or inadvertently fall back into pre-communist national models of civil–military relations. Thus, the extent to which the military has in the past played a role in domestic politics – for example, in the late nineteenth century and the interwar years when many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (re-)gained independent statehood for the first time in the modern era – may thus have a bearing on the patterns of civil–military relations emerging in the postcommunist era.

The domestic political, economic and social context

The broad domestic political, economic and social context of the state will also have a significant impact on civil–military relations. Thus, in one of the most prominent works on civil–military relations, Finer divides states into three categories, countries of developed, low and minimal 'political culture', arguing that the likelihood of military intervention in politics is inversely proportionate to a state's level of 'political culture'.[6] While various specific domestic factors are likely to influence patterns of civil–military relations, in practice they are often

interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The interrelated problems of internally weak states, undemocratic politics, deep political and social divisions, economic deprivation and extreme nationalism and ethnic conflicts, for example, may help to create circumstances where there is a far greater likelihood of military intervention in domestic politics than would otherwise be the case. Many examples can be drawn from post-colonial Africa and Latin America. In contrast, internally strong states with established democracies, moderated political and social divisions, economic stability and prosperity, and restrained nationalism and ethnic conflicts are probably much less likely to experience military intervention in domestic politics. The countries of Western Europe after 1945 provide the most prominent examples in this case.

The internal 'strength' or 'weakness' of a state may have a significant bearing on the likelihood of military intervention in politics and on the prospects for democratic control of the military.[7] In this sense, a 'strong state' is one with effective state, governmental and political structures and a high degree of social cohesion and unity rather than an internally repressive or internationally powerful one. One consequence of an internally strong state is the likelihood that there will be few opportunities or rationales for military intervention in politics. Sweden, the Netherlands or post-1945 (West) Germany might be cited as examples. In contrast, a 'weak state' is one with ineffective state, governmental and political structures and deep social/political divisions and/or disunity. In 'weak states' there are likely to be substantial opportunities and rationales for military intervention in domestic affairs. Nigeria provides a classic example of an internally 'weak state' providing the context for repeated military intervention in domestic politics. There is obviously a range of possibilities between the ideal of an internally 'strong', democratic state and the extreme of an internally 'weak' (even 'collapsed') state – with differing implications for civil–military relations. In Central and Eastern Europe, one could argue that the Czech Republic and Poland represent relatively 'strong states', and that Albania and Serbia are examples of 'weak' ones.

Civil–military relations and the prospects for democratic control of the military also cannot be separated from the more general level of democratization in the country concerned. Countries where democratic norms, institutions and practices have become entrenched are probably unlikely to be prone to military intervention in politics. In contrast, undemocratic or partially democratic countries may be more vulnerable to such intervention. In Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it is no coincidence that countries which have made the

most progress in the process of democratization in general are also those which have made the most progress in establishing democratic control of their armed forces.

The extent to which any state is politically and socially divided can also have important implications for its civil–military relations. A politically relatively united and cohesive society, or at least one where there is a broad consensus on basic political values and institutions, may be less prone to military intervention in politics than a more divided society. In the latter case, the military may intervene on one side or the other, or political groups may attempt to gain the support of the military. As James Gow's chapter on the FRY emphasizes, the absence of an accepted, 'legitimate' political community has lain at the root of the problems of civil–military relations in the former Yugoslavia.[8] Other chapters in this volume, in particular those on Poland and Bulgaria, note the way in which sharp political divisions between (former) communists and 'democrats' (descendants of communist era democratic opposition) have generated disputes between different civilian factions over control of the military and sometimes drawn the military into politics.

Economic factors may also have a bearing on civil–military relations. Economic stability and prosperity may facilitate the development of effective state/governmental structures, democratization and the successful management of political and social divisions and hence minimize opportunities, incentives or rationales for military intervention in politics. In contrast, economic instability and poverty can weaken the state and exacerbate political and social divisions, thereby making military intervention in domestic politics more likely. In addition, choices over economic policy may influence civil–military relations. In Latin America, for example, the military often intervened in domestic politics in part to defend capitalism and the economic status quo against socialism or economic change. The chapters on Croatia and the FRY in this volume illustrate the way in which the involvement of the military in economic corruption has created military interests that have drawn the armed forces into politics in these countries.

Nationalism and ethnic divisions can play a significant role in the military establishment of a particular state, with repercussions for civil–military relations. The military can, for example, sometimes be seen as the guarantor of national unity, identity or security and this may become a rationale or justification for military intervention in politics. Again, the chapter on the FRY and Croatia emphasize how the dis-

juncture between and disputed nature of 'nation' and 'state' have drawn the military into politics in the former Yugoslavia.

The international context

External international factors can have a significant impact on patterns of civil–military relations. General, long-term international trends are creating pressures for democratic civilian control of armed forces and military disengagement from politics. These pressures stem in part from the wider, long-term development of democracy (including democratic control of the military) as an international norm. They also stem more specifically from the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, Soviet communism imposed its own particular model of civil–military relations, while the West was willing to accept military rule in Southern Europe, Latin America and Africa in order to support allies and oppose communism. In the post-Cold War world, the Soviet model has collapsed, while the rationale for Western support of anti-communist military regimes has disappeared. The impact of these factors, however, varies from case to case and countervailing pressures exist in some instances.

In Central and Eastern Europe, the predominant position of the Western 'security community' (the United States and the countries of Western Europe, embodied in the institutions of the EU and NATO) is by far the single greatest external factor shaping patterns of civil-military relations. The West's political, economic and military power, and the desire of many Central and Eastern European countries for integration with the West, provides it with enormous influence and leverage in the region. General Western support for democratization extends to the sphere of civil–military relations and has created strong pressures for states to conform to established Western norms of democratic, civilian control of armed forces. More specific Western policies such as NATO's Partnership for Peace have been designed to promote democratic, civilian control of armed forces.

The extent and nature of external security threats and ongoing conflicts may also have an impact on civil–military relations. The impact of these factors is contentious. As noted above, Desch has argued that a high degree of external threat may facilitate political control of the military by focusing civilian attention on the armed forces.[9] The existence of significant threats to national security or ongoing conflict, however, may also enhance the domestic political influence of the armed forces, make them a focus of national identity and provide a 'rationale' for

military intervention in domestic politics. The Yugoslavia conflict, for example, generated and legitimized highly politicized militaries in Serbia and Croatia. In contrast, the absence of an overt external conflict or immediate security threat has reduced the salience of civil–military relations in Ukraine.

Institutional factors

As was argued above, the existence and effectiveness of political institutions for the control of the military and defence policy can have a major impact on the prospects for democratic control of armed forces. In Central and Eastern Europe, countries have faced the challenge of replacing existing communist institutional arrangements with new democratic ones. This, moreover, has had to be done in a very short space of time. Within this context, key issues have been: the existence or otherwise of a constitutional and legal framework for control of the military and defence policy; the respective roles and powers of the President, Prime Minister, Defence Minister, government, other governmental bodies (such as a National Security Council), Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff with regard to the armed forces and defence policy; the roles and powers of the parliament and parliamentary committees in this area; and the extent to which there are effective mechanisms for control of the defence budget both in general and in detail. As was noted earlier, in all these areas the effectiveness of democratic control of the military and defence policy depends not simply on the existence and theoretical powers of relevant institutions but also on how these institutions function in practice.

Military culture and professionalism

Although difficult to define or measure empirically, distinctive national 'military cultures' and the degree of 'professionalism' in a country's armed forces (i.e. the extent to which the military view their core mission as to undertake in a professional manner the military tasks defined for them by civilian political leaders) may have a significant bearing on the prospects for democratic control of the military. In much of Central and Eastern Europe, as was argued above, decades of communist rule may have helped to generate military cultures in which the armed forces accepted the concept of civilian political control – at least as it related to domestic politics – and had little or no tradition of military intervention in politics. In Yugoslavia, however, communist rule generated a military culture defined by the armed forces' role as a defender of 'Yugoslavism', which legitimated military involvement in

politics and facilitated the transition of the military from a communist federal institution to a nationalist Serbian one once the old Yugoslavia ceased to exist.

The concept of 'military culture' also raises the issue of how such cultures are generated, sustained and changed and what policies may be put in place to shift military culture towards acceptance of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces. Thus, as a number of the chapters in this book point out, among the most immediate tasks facing new postcommunist governments were the dismantling of the institutions of communist influence within the armed forces (such as Communist Party cells), the reform of communist military education systems and the removal of those elements of the officer corps still loyal to the old system. Interestingly, many of the chapters in this book – in particular those covering the countries seeking membership of NATO and the EU – emphasize the importance of functional integration with the West (through programmes such as NATO's Partnership for Peace and participation in peace operations such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo) in helping to change national military cultures, encourage professionalism in the armed forces and introduce Western norms of civil–military cooperation.

Conclusion

After the fall of communism and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the transformation of civil–military relations was one of many challenges facing the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As events in Russia, the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s illustrated, the armed forces remain important players in the domestic politics of some postcommunist states and civil–military relations may have a significant impact on the likelihood and evolution of violent conflict in the region. Civil–military relations and especially the extent of democratic control of the military may also have an important bearing on individual Central and Eastern European countries' prospects for integration with the West in general and membership of NATO in particular.

The chapters in this book examine the problems the countries of postcommunist Europe have faced in attempting to establish democratic control of their armed forces, assess the progress they made towards this goal and explore the factors which have shaped developments in this area. In order to facilitate this comparative analysis, this introduction has sought to outline the general problems of the communist

legacy and postcommunist transformation in civil–military relations, as well as the divergent national situations of different countries; to provide a clear definition of democratic control of the military against which to assess developments in individual countries; and to outline the range of factors likely to shape the prospects for the establishment of democratic control of the military.

A number of initial conclusions may be drawn from this introductory analysis. First, while the countries of postcommunist Europe share the common legacy of communist civil–military relations, the impact of that legacy and the nature of the challenge in attempting to establish democratic control of the military varies very significantly from country to country. The former NSWP states faced the challenge of reforming established national armed forces. In contrast, countries such as the Baltic republics and Slovenia faced the problem of establishing armed forces and civil–military relations from scratch. Russia has faced the problem of reforming shrunken but still large post-imperial armed forces, while Ukraine has faced the challenge of building national armed forces on the basis of an inherited part of the old Soviet armed forces. The former Yugoslav republics have faced the problem of controlling armed forces in a context of violent state collapse and state rebuilding. Second, the concept of democratic control of the military is both problematic and multifaceted. The analysis developed here suggests that democratic control of the military is a broad objective which involves a number of more specific elements. Attempting to establish democratic control of armed forces is thus a complex, multifaceted task. Thus, while the countries of postcommunist Europe have faced a common task in this area, they may face different problems in specific aspects of pursuing this wider goal. Third, the range of factors which may influence the prospects for the establishment of democratic control of the military is quite large and many of these – including important background factors such as a country's broad domestic context and international environment – vary significantly across Central and Eastern Europe. It is against this background of common challenges and diverse national circumstances that the case studies that follow explore the challenge of establishing democratic control of the military in postcommunist Europe.

Notes

1. This introduction draws on Andrew Cottey, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster, *Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A*

Framework for Understanding Civil–Military Relations in Postcommunist Europe, Working Paper 1/99, ESRC 'One Europe or Several?' Programme (Sussex: Sussex European Institute, 1999).

2. D. R. Herspring and I. Volgyes (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978), and T. J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979).
3. E. N. Luttwak, 'From Vietnam to Desert Fox: Civil–Military Relations in Modern Democracies', *Survival*, 41(1), Spring 1999. On Kosovo, see Reuters, 'NATO's Clark Faced Internal Battle Over Bombing', *Central Europe Online* website, 21 August 1999.
4. S. P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957) 96–7.
5. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, and M. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
6. S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London and Dunmow: Pall Mall Press, 1962) 86–9.
7. B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies* (London: Harvester Wheatscheaf, 1991) 96–107.
8. See also J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter/New York: St. Martin's, Press, now Palgrave, 1992).
9. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, op. cit.

Part I
Central Europe

2

Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Poland: the Interplay of History, Political Society and Institutional Reform

Paul Latawski

For many outside observers, postcommunist Poland has been recognized as a success story in terms of its transition toward a consolidated democracy.[1] This is not to say that the country's political life and institutions are a paragon of democratic virtue, but in comparative terms, it has defied critics by its ability to stay on course in the turbulent waters of transition. Polish politics are messy, but fundamentally democratic. One of the areas that has engendered the most doubt and discussion about Poland's democratic prospects is civil–military relations, and in particular the key question of the establishment of democratic, civilian control over the armed forces. This issue has generated uncertainty both in Poland and abroad. As with Polish politics in general, initial impressions may give the picture of a less than satisfactory situation. In broad terms, it is clear that democratic control of the military exists both in principle and in practice, even if why it works can appear mysterious to outside observers. This uneasy perspective is largely due to the interplay of three major contributing factors: the historical legacy of military involvement in politics; the weakness of political and civil society in relation to the management of defence policy; and the scale and pace of constitutional-legal-institutional reform which has had to be undertaken. These factors interact in the complex political, economic and social environment of transition.

Transition tensions: the reform of the armed forces

The rapid collapse of communism in Poland in 1988–89 heralded sweeping changes to the Polish armed forces. No longer an instrument of Soviet security policy, the reborn Polish army (*Wojsko Polskie* – WP)

had to be transformed into a national institution and find a place in the new democratic order. Postcommunist reform inevitably entailed radical changes to the manpower, budget, force structure and mission of the Polish armed forces. The most immediate political task relating to the armed forces was to remove the institutions and structures most closely associated with communist power in Poland.

In the Polish armed forces, removing communist influence meant the elimination of the Main Political Department (GZP) which served to institutionalize the connection between the Polish United Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza* – PZPR) and the armed forces. Through the GZP, party influence permeated the armed forces from top to bottom. Within the armed forces, Communist Party committees existed from the military district level to the regimental level, with about 5000 'committees of primary organization' reaching the smallest units. In 1989, the scale of party affiliation within the military was enormous and included 92 per cent of officers, 66 per cent of warrant officers and 40 per cent of professional non-commissioned officers.[2]

The early postcommunist governments approached this matter cautiously, seeking a balance between decommunization driven by political necessity and continuity in personnel driven by military requirements. With the overwhelming majority of party members occupying leadership positions in the armed forces, the dismissal or retirement of too many soldiers risked gambling with national security. One Polish military analyst aptly described this risk:

> It is a complex process to renew the cadre structures of the army in such a way as to preserve the principle of competence at successive command levels. It calls for rational, long-term actions, and it takes time. The disruption of this process by a sudden verification, based on non-professional criteria, could actually become a surprising act of disarming ourselves by means of the actual elimination of army cadres for quite a number of years.[3]

In the end, Poland's postcommunist politicians opted for a selective and highly targeted decommunization of the armed forces. The GZP was disbanded, as were key elements of the armed forces security intelligence community (the Internal Military Service (*Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna* – WSW) and the 2nd Department (*Zarzad II*) of the General Staff (external intelligence)), in the early 1990s.[4] These changes eliminated the most independent and potentially dangerous elements of communist influence in the armed forces. Only about a third of the staff

from the security intelligence community were retained. After a screening process these personnel were selected for service in the successor organizations the Military Police (*Żandarmeria Wojskowa* – ŻW) and the Military Information Service (*Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne* – WSI).[5]

Apart from the dismantling of key party organizational structures and the attendant discharge from service of large numbers of their personnel, the highest echelons of the military also underwent a thorough purge of their ranks. In April 1990 around 140 generals were on active service in the armed forces. By the end of the year this number had dropped by nearly one-third to about 100.[6] In the period from 1989 to 1991, over a hundred generals left the army with only 24 new officers promoted to this rank.[7] Moreover, it is clear that the vast majority of senior officers serving before 1989 left the armed forces at this time.

In addition to dismantling old structures and shedding unsuitable personnel, efforts were also made to renationalize the WP as an institution. The most visible of these changes was the re-adoption of the Polish eagle insignia, with uniforms evocative of those worn by the Polish forces in Britain during the Second World War. Institutionally, the creation of field ordinariates (bishops in charge of military dioceses) for the Roman Catholic, Polish Autocephalous Orthodox and Protestant Churches in 1995 represented a significant new input into the armed forces and reconnected the military to the mainstream values of Polish society.[8]

Changes to the armed forces in the 1990s were not only driven by political desiderata. Military reform touched on all aspects of the armed forces. In 1988 the manpower of the Polish armed forces numbered just over 400000. Two years later this total had been slashed by a quarter. Between 1991 and 1995, manpower levels stabilized at about 280000 men although reductions continued at a slower pace. By March 1997 a 'definitive' manpower model for the Polish armed forces emerged, envisaging reductions to 180000 troops by 2003.[9] However, discussion did not end there, and policy-makers considered still deeper manpower cuts with three variants being scrutinised: 180000, 165000 or 150000. By May 2000, the 150000 variant seemed certain to be adopted by 2006 with the financial resources gained through manpower reductions directed toward modernization of the armed forces.[10]

In November 1992, the Polish government officially adopted a 'doctrinal' text setting out the security and defence policy of Poland and the new purposes and tasks of the armed forces. The 'Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland' made clear that the central purpose of the armed forces 'is to uphold the nation's sovereignty,

independence, and territorial inviolability'.[11] Although indicating that Poland faced no immediate major threat, the document articulated the long-term aim of insuring against future contingencies by seeking membership in NATO alongside an essentially renationalized *tous azimuts* defence posture. With Poland's entry into NATO in March 1999, however, it became clear that the 1992 defence doctrine was in need of revision. The adoption of a new 'Security Strategy of the Polish Republic' in January 2000 produced a document that took better account of Poland's integration into NATO and evolving European defence structures.[12]

The impact of these military reforms on the process of establishing democratic control over the Polish armed forces was to create a set of tensions. At the start of this process, a yawning culture gap existed between an armed forces long dominated by a single party and a new political community nurtured by years of opposition to communism. Bridging this gap will be a long-term process. As a consequence, transition conditions require an assertion of democratic, civilian control. Dismantling the communist apparatus in the armed forces produced a political control vacuum that conferred a wide measure of autonomy on the armed forces, since the old structures of communist control were removed more quickly than new institutions of democratic control could be established. The wider institutional and legal flux of transition did not help matters. Discarding old legal and organizational structures paralleled efforts to construct new ones. Personnel change in the armed forces served to reduce the culture gap and institutional autonomy but pointed to an acute dilemma: how can a government maintain a credible defence posture while purging significant numbers of personnel in order to make the armed forces compatible with the new political community? The severe austerity of the transition economy dictated that all of these challenges lacked the resources for anything but an incremental approach to their resolution. Some of these transitional tensions in civil–military relations could be resolved quickly but others will require considerably more time. Overlying all of these issues, however, was the long shadow of past Polish military intervention in domestic politics.

Burdens of the past: the Polish military in politics

On the face of it, the legacy of Polish military involvement in politics bode ill for the establishment of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces in postcommunist Poland. In the past two hundred years,

the country has had its share of praetorians and revolutionary soldiers who meddled in politics. To understand the history of Polish civil-military relations merely as a procession of the 'man on horseback', however, is to engage in historical reductionism. The Polish civil-military relationship today has been preceded by a complex weave of historical developments not all of which serve to undermine the prospects for establishing and maintaining democratic, civilian control. Moreover, although military involvement in politics has been a recurring feature in this century, one cannot assume that it will persist into the next.

Ironically, one of the most ancient elements of Polish civil–military relations is the subordination and limitation of the armed forces by elected authority. During the era of the 'republic of nobles' (the *Sejmocracy*) between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for example, a noble parliament (*Sejm*) had significant powers of approval over elements of the state budget including the financing of the army.[13] The end of the eighteenth century planted the seeds of the modern Polish civil–military relationship with the introduction of a reforming constitution on 3 May 1791 which created a standing army 'drawn and ordered from the general force of the nation' and recognized that the army was subordinate to the nation's government.[14] Thus these periods of Polish history bequeathed an important tradition in civil–military relations that included strong parliamentary oversight, control of the military 'purse strings' and an embryonic recognition of the principle of democratic control by legitimate democratic authority. These principles have been echoed in succeeding constitutions even if they have been unevenly practised.[15]

The 3rd of May constitution, however, was swept away by the third and final partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. This desperate struggle to preserve the Polish state led to another significant precedent being set for civil–military relations in Poland – the tradition of entrusting political and military leadership to a Supreme Commander or *Naczelny Wódź* in a time of national crisis.[16] In March 1794, this precedent was set when a Polish military figure, Tadeusz Kościuszko, in swearing an oath to the nation became Supreme Commander of the insurrection against the Russian partition of Poland.[17] Two subsequent insurrections that began in November 1830 and January 1863 produced their own Supreme Commanders.[18] The rebirth of Polish independence in November 1918 saw the emergence of a more modern version of the Supreme Commander with Józef Piłsudski receiving this title in the turbulent reconstruction of the Polish state after the First World War.[19]

Even the Polish Communist General Wojciech Jaruzelski, in his television address to the nation when he declared martial law on 13 December 1981, echoed the Supreme Commander tradition in acting to arrest the 'crisis' facing the nation.[20] The significance of the Supreme Commander model is that it provides a precedent for praetorianism. It was a strand of tradition, however, born not out of a military desire to exercise political power but rather out of the struggle to regain or protect national independence.

The struggles to recover national independence also added revolutionary national liberation soldiers to the civil–military relations tradition, which saw the line between civilians and 'soldiers' blurred. The guerrilla war of the January 1863 insurrection, the procession of partisan war theorists, the Polish Socialist Party's *Bojówki* (armed gangs) during the revolutionary crisis in Russia in 1904–05 all testify to the development of a revolutionary national liberation civil–military tradition distant from notions of democratic control of the armed forces.[21] There may have been civilian control (although who was a civilian or a combatant was unclear) but it was control without democratic legitimacy. The post-Second World War Polish People's Republic represented a kind of apogee of this tradition by its fusing of political and military power in the ideology of its ruling Communist Party and in the running of the state. As defenders of the socialist order, members of the Polish People's Army were merely communists, workers and peasants in uniform serving the party and the state. The Polish communists exercised civilian control over the armed forces in a regime that was not remotely democratic.

Post-partition Poland has also produced soldiers that have served foreign masters. From the army of the Duchy of Warsaw that served Napoleon to the Polish People's Army (*Ludowego Wojska Polskiego*) of communist Poland, examples can be found of Polish military formations organized and directed by foreign sponsors that proved to be remarkably loyal.[22] Although this loyalty of soldiers to foreign governments may be explained by what was perceived by them to be in the best interests of Poland or due to elaborate control mechanisms (the communist Main Political Administration), it also indicates that Polish soldiers are not inherently opposed to political subordination or legitimate authority.

The most visible element of Poland's civil–military history has been that of military coups. In May 1926, and arguably in December 1981, military leaders usurped or replaced civilian authority in running Poland. The 1926 Piłsudski coup was driven by its architect's view that

a weak democratic government undermined the security of the Polish state. Piłsudski remained the guiding hand in Polish politics until his death in 1935.[23] The progressive acquisition of power by General Jaruzelski culminating in his declaration of martial law in December 1981 saw military men dominating Polish politics during the 1980s even if smart suits eventually replaced the uniform in public view.[24] This second example may not fit the classic model of praetorianism, but it nevertheless represented a major shift from civilian party control to communist military dominance of the government. In terms of the Polish inheritance of civil–military relations, these two events have been the most troubling aspect of the legacy.

This most dangerous strand of the complex history of Polish civil-military relations, military praetorianism, is the one least likely to re-emerge. Direct intervention in politics has only taken place in the face of external threats or internal political instability that was perceived to undermine the capacity of the state to resist such threats. The most prominent examples of this, Piłsudski's 1926 coup and Jaruzelski's 1981 declaration of martial law, fit a pattern no longer relevant to a post-communist Poland marked by democratic political legitimacy and the security confirmed by membership in NATO. Rather, the risks from the past are associated with those historical developments that encourage the armed forces to seek institutional autonomy and resist the assertion of democratic, civilian control.

The *Naczelny Wódź* model and the experience of Polish armies serving foreign masters fuel this tendency in that they decoupled the armed forces from the political life of the country. Likewise, 'subjective control' of the armed forces in the tradition of the early modern *Sejmocracy* carries its own risks of undermining the political neutrality of the armed forces. Most recently, the communist period generally bequeathed to the armed forces a lack of immediate experience in serving a civilian government in a multi-party democratic state. Moreover, one of the consequences of Poland's limited sovereignty during the communist period was that defence policy was directed from Moscow and not by the Polish communist leadership in Warsaw. This accounts for a defence ministry structure devoid of civilian communist ministers and directed by generals more answerable to Soviet directives than their own Communist Party leadership. The breaking of ties to communist civilian leadership and Soviet direction immediately after 1989 created a de facto institutional autonomy for the armed forces. This subsequently required overcoming resistance to change from within the military and integrating the armed forces into a new system of democratic

control. For Poland's maturing political society, finding a way of avoiding both undesired institutional autonomy for the military and overly heavy-handed subordination of the armed forces to political leadership represents the most important lessons from the immediate and distant past.

Finding its role: Polish political society

In a consolidated democracy, political society may be defined as the arena 'in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus'.[25] Among the sinews of political society are elections, parties, governments and legislatures that in essence form the political establishment of a state. Thus the interface between political society and the armed forces is a crucial one. In postcommunist Poland, the weakness of political society has been the most significant obstacle to establishing durable democratic, civilian control of the armed forces. The inadequacy of political society has produced periodic temptations for politicians to draw the military into politics rather than managing the armed forces for the purposes of national defence. The problem has not been generals plotting coups, but politicians playing political games with the armed forces. At the core of the problem is the inexperience of the political establishment.

Two episodes highlight this weakness in political society. The first of these occurred in the centre-right post-Solidarity government of Jan Olszewski in 1991–92. The Defence Minister in the Olszewski government was Jan Parys. 'Staunchly nationalist and anti-Soviet in his outlook', Parys was an academic who had moved swiftly from the world of anti-communist opposition to the corridors of power.[26] Parys's deputy was Radek Sikorski, a dual-nationality (Polish-British) journalist from the United Kingdom. The controversy surrounding Sikorski's appointment was only exceeded by the political rumpus that attended Parys' efforts to introduce changes in the armed forces.[27]

During Parys's short tenure at the defence ministry, it was clear that he did not trust senior officers and sought rapid personnel changes. He forced the retirement of many senior officers associated with martial law in the early 1980s.[28] According to Sikorski, Parys wanted to purge the army of 'Soviet spies':

> Minister Parys was busy with personnel matters. At the first meeting of the Military Council, he asked for the resignation of those gener-

> als who felt they could not support the idea of Poland moving closer to NATO. Soviet spies were also given seven days to come forward with impunity. Several did. We bade them farewell with Georgian champagne, toasts and gifts of garish landscape paintings. It was the most civilised purge ever conducted.[29]

The uncompromising (some believed insensitive) line taken by Parys toward the military leadership did little to win hearts and minds in the most senior levels of the officer corps. The newly retired senior officers' views on Parys were not very enthusiastic to say the least.[30]

The effort to purge the armed forces of officers who were not seen as compatible with the new political order, however, was almost a sideshow to the more serious row that developed between Parys and the then President Lech Wałęsa over who exerted executive control over the army. The dispute flared up when one of the President's aides met a senior military officer, General Tadeusz Wilecki who was favoured by the President to be the next Chief of the General Staff.[31] Parys thought the President was usurping the prerogatives of the defence minister and portrayed the incident as a fundamental threat to Polish democracy.[32] The issue quickly became a constitutional one over control of the army. This struggle reflected the ambiguous constitutional-institutional arrangements for controlling the armed forces (see below) and, on the surface, the outcome of the crisis would determine whether the president or minister would exert dominant control over the armed forces.[33] In the course of the dispute a Parliamentary Commission examined the issue and Parys was forced to resign in May 1992, after it ruled that Presidential prerogatives exceeded his own.[34] Neither side in the dispute came out of it unsullied, but above all the Parys affair demonstrated that the new postcommunist political society had much to learn about the management and control of the armed forces. As Andrew A. Michta has argued, 'the Parys affair made it clear that the struggle for control over the armed forces was an important and ongoing part of the Polish domestic political scene'.[35]

The second major political drama regarding the armed forces occurred in autumn 1994. A lunch between President Wałęsa, Defence Minister (and retired Admiral) Piotr Kołodziejczyk, the Chief of the General Staff General Tadeusz Wilecki and other senior officers at the Drawsko-Pomorski exercise ground triggered a political furore. It appears that Wałęsa asked the assembled officers for their views on the defence minister and they reputedly expressed their lack of confidence in him. To ask senior officers their opinions about their minister seems an

unusual practice, but for them to express such a critical view is even more unusual in a democratic state. Wałęsa, it seems, was looking for an excuse to sack his defence minister and replace him in order to underscore presidential control of the armed forces. When news of the meeting broke, it created an immediate political crisis.[36]

The implication that generals, however innocently, were drawn into the political arena sent alarm bells ringing in the government and parliament. What started as a clumsy attempt by Wałęsa to score points in the evolving political struggle over constitutional arrangements concerning control of the armed forces, united both post-Solidarity and postcommunist political parties against the President. The parliament convened a special subcommittee and summoned generals and ministers alike, demanding explanations of what actually happened at Drawsko. Even Wałęsa visited the parliament to add his unrepentant voice to the debate. After a month of collecting testimony, the subcommittee produced a report that offered support for Kołodziejczyk while roundly criticizing the President.[37] The Drawsko affair was seen inside Poland and by outside observers as a serious political matter. Indeed, NATO sent clear political signals that it did not like what it was seeing in Polish civil–military relations.[38] However embarrassing at the time, Drawsko proved to be a watershed in political society's view of democratic control of the armed forces. It created a political consensus behind placing executive control of the armed forces under ministers rather than the president.[39]

Since the difficulties exemplified by the Parys and Drawsko affairs, political society has developed a more mature and consistent approach to control of the armed forces. One of the major outcomes of these two episodes was the emergence of a clear consensus for a constitutional order that would give ministers rather than the President the dominant position regarding executive control of the armed forces. Subsequent developments in the evolution of constitutional, legal and organizational structures reflected this consensus and have steadily contributed to more orderly management of the armed forces by political society.

Foundation of reform: the constitutional-legal framework

The development of a constitutional and legal framework for civil-military relations has been a long – and still evolving – process. It has been dependent on a series of changes to the constitution, statute law and ministerial regulations that have had to compete for time with a very much wider legislative reform agenda. The slow introduction of a

new constitutional, legal and institutional framework has been both a contributing factor to, and a product of, a weak political society. These changes to the 'rules' and institutions, however, are vital to consolidating a more stable approach of political society to democratic control of the armed forces.

The reforms of Poland's constitutional, legal and institutional order between 1989 and 1991 reflected the need to make immediate, even if only provisional, changes to reflect the transition from a communist to a democratic state. Under the communist system, the defence ministry was effectively answerable to the Soviet armed forces with a 'uniformed' Polish defence minister in government, while the highly centralized organs of the state concerned with defence and security were an appendage of the PZPR. Constitutional, legal and institutional reforms, therefore, had to be undertaken to establish democratic, civilian control of Poland's defence establishment.

Two changes to the constitutional-legal framework were to be a major influence on developments in Polish civil–military relations. A December 1991 amendment to the 1967 statute *Law on Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland* outlined a system for controlling the armed forces. The modified law gave the President the dominant influence over the armed forces as 'Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces' with authority to determine their 'main directions of development' and the right to appoint or dismiss senior officers. In contrast, the Minister of Defence directed the armed forces, 'development' and 'training' while overseeing 'administration'. The tone if not the intent of the 1991 law clearly gave a position of *primus inter pares* to the President in controlling and guiding the defence sphere.[40] The law, however, had a built-in ambiguity regarding the roles of President and Minister of Defence indicating that if the former was the dominant part of the executive on defence matters, it was only by the thinnest of margins. The law stated that the Defence Minister 'Commands the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland'.[41] How this differed from the commander-in-chief role of the President was not always clear. Whether or not senior officers, for example, were subordinate to the President or the defence minister in a chain of command was unclear and open to interpretation. The elimination of this ambiguity ultimately depended on changes to Poland's constitution.

The adoption of a provisional 'small' constitution in December 1992 did not markedly improve the situation. The 'small' constitution was a heavily amended version of the previous communist one and was only ever meant to serve as a stopgap until a new constitution could be

agreed. Article 34 of the 'small' constitution stated that, as under the 1991 law, the 'President shall exercise general supervision with respect to the external and internal security of the state'. Adding to the confusion, however, Article 52 stated that the Council of Ministers 'shall ensure the external and internal security of the state'. Thus the interim constitution maintained the ambiguous relationship between the defence minister and the President with regard to executive authority over the armed forces. Article 35(1) made the President 'Supreme Commander' of the Polish armed forces, but this role was not adequately defined either in the small constitution or the 1991 law. The only area where the President clearly gained influence was in the appointment of the defence minister that required 'consultation' with the President.[42] The interim constitutional changes (and the preceding changes to statute law) in practice created a tension between the President and defence minister concerning the executive's role in democratic control of the armed forces. It also led to problems between President and parliament as the two became engulfed in a competition to see their respective visions for a new postcommunist constitution implemented.

The 1997 constitution

The adoption of a new Polish constitution in 1997 did much to clarify the roles of the different political institutions charged with democratic control and oversight of the armed forces. At a most basic level, Article 26 of the constitution provided a normative benchmark for civil–military relations: 'The Armed Forces shall observe neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civil and democratic control.'[43] Significantly this article uses the term 'neutrality' regarding politics rather than 'apolitical'. Neutrality does not suggest direct involvement in politics nor does it preclude the political rights of service personnel as individual citizens. Apolitical, however, is a term that could be misconstrued as meaning institutional separateness or being outside political control. Given the legacy of Polish civil–military relations, the use of the term 'neutrality' embodies a conceptual understanding of military roles that avoids pitfalls from Poland's past.

The 1997 constitution clearly shifted the controlling executive balance toward the defence minister (Council of Ministers) and away from the President. The primacy of the defence minister during peacetime is explicitly underscored in Article 134(2) of the constitution emphasizing that the defence minister 'shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence'. In addition,

functions that the 'small' constitution had assigned to the President now became the responsibility of the Council of Ministers. Under Article 146, these include: exercising general control in the field of national defence and specifying requirements for national service; ensuring the internal security of the state and public order; and guaranteeing the external security of the state.[44] The President's role in relation to defence is reduced compared to that under the 'small constitution'. In Article 134(1): 'The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.' Unlike the American or French cases, however, the 1997 constitution does not match this high-level presidential role with more specific authority over the armed forces. Article 134(6) gives the parliament and Council of Ministers the power to define the President's function as 'Supreme Commander': 'The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command of the Armed Forces, shall be specified in detail by statute.' Throughout Article 134 of the constitution, the President's role vis-à-vis the armed forces, including appointing a commander-in-chief in wartime, making senior military appointments or conferring ranks, requires either the concurrence of the minister of defence or procedures to be 'specified by statute'.[45]

There can be little doubt that the dominant executive figure is the defence minister and the President acts more as the helmsman of the ship of state in the 1997 constitution. The fact that the President is the constitutionally named 'Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces' nevertheless underscores that he is not without influence on defence matters. Although limited to defined executive prerogatives on defence, the fact that the President does have a role inevitably requires cohabitation between the government and the President in this area. Apart from having the ability to add his voice to public debate on defence issues, under the 1997 constitution the President can bring issues to the attention of the government by convening a 'Cabinet Council' where he chairs a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The President can also deliver a message to either a joint or individual sitting of both houses of the parliament.[46] The development of a division of labour between the President and defence minister was, however, also dependent on the enactment of the statutes called for in the new constitution.

Revising statutes and institutional evolution

The process of putting into place statute law called for in the 1997 constitution was a very large task requiring the submission of upwards of 200 pieces of legislation to the *Sejm* (the lower house of the parliament).

Among the last pieces of legislation to be passed will be those concerning the elaboration of the President's role as 'Supreme Commander' and other functions on defence.[47] In 2000, the post-Solidarity government of Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek proposed legislation that would place the President's prerogatives on defence matters into strictly defined limits. The core elements of the statute on the President's defence competencies would include insuring the political neutrality of the armed forces and their subordination to civilian control. On policy matters, the President would essentially be limited to giving his opinion.[48] The government first discussed the legislation in 1998 and it aroused a significant amount of criticism from the President's team of national security advisers.[49] As the legislation progressed through the *Sejm* it appeared that consultations between the President and Prime Minister might be narrowing these differences.[50] In any case, it seems clear that the government's view will eventually prevail on the new legislation. It is certainly the view of the Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee and independent experts that the President's role in defence is more limited in the 1997 constitution.[51]

The institutional development of the national security system has reflected the tensions between the competing models of governmental and presidential executive control. During the period of the small constitution, institutional development tended to reflect stronger presidential prerogatives. The most important institution, apart from the Ministry of Defence, was the National Defence Committee (*Komitet Obrony Kraju* – KOK). An institution inherited from the communist period, the 1991 statute law discussed earlier, gave this body and the President wide powers for shaping Polish defence and security policy, effectively including law-making powers regarding the armed forces.[52] The President also acquired in this statute a National Security Office (*Bioro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* – BBN) to act as a secretariat for the KOK, with the head of the BBN serving as the secretary to the KOK.[53] The membership of KOK brought together the President, Prime Minister, key ministers and figures from the parliament. The role of the KOK and BBN vis-à-vis the Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Defence was at best duplicative, and muddled lines of responsibility.[54] By 1994, the Council of Ministers effectively developed a parallel institution to the KOK – the Committee of Defence Affairs (*Komitet Spraw Obronnych Rady Ministrów* – KSORM) – to develop defence policy at an inter-ministerial level.[55] These institutional arrangements only mirrored the lack of clear constitutional guidance on whether the President or the Council of Ministers had primacy on defence matters.

The adoption of the 1997 constitution promised to resolve the institutional duplication. On the face of it, however, the new constitution seemed to only add to the institutional confusion. It created under Article 135 yet another defence-related institution – the National Security Council (*Rada Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego* – RBN) – and stated that 'The advisory organ to the President of the Republic regarding internal and external security of the State shall be the National Security Council'.[56] The membership of the RBN is virtually identical to the KOK, with the exception of the replacement of the Chief of the General Staff by the President of the National Bank.[57] With the decisive shift in favour of the Council of Ministers under the 1997 constitution, the question that quickly emerged after the new constitution came into force was not whether KOK should disappear, but how its powers would be distributed.[58] The other institution whose future was in doubt was the BBN. The President's national security office, some argued, no longer had a role as KOK was disappearing and the primacy over defence and security policy was shifting away from the President to the Council of Ministers.[59] In practice, it seems likely that the government will inherit the lion's share of KOK's powers, with a more limited role for the RBN. The institutional design stemming from the 1997 constitution will in all likelihood grant the Council of Ministers the dominant executive authority over the armed forces.

Since the early 1990s, successive defence ministers have introduced a series of reforms designed to 'civilianize' major elements of the ministry of defence and streamline its military components. In 1993, then Minister of Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz attempted to introduce a new set of regulations and reorganize the Ministry of Defence, but this effort fell foul of political difficulties and the obstacles posed by the duality of executive control under the 'small' constitution.[60] Subsequent attempts to reorganize the defence ministry in the wake of the Drawsko affair proved more successful. By January 1996, the ministry underwent a thorough reorganization with the authority of the defence minister being enhanced and carefully outlined in a statute of December 1995. The Drawsko affair and the unhealthy autonomy the General Staff had acquired in a previous reorganization of the defence ministry drove these changes.[61] Most importantly, the new statute established an unambiguous chain of command to subordinate the most senior military officer, stating that 'the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army is directly subordinated to the Minister of National Defence' and that 'the decisions of the Minister of National Defence have the force of a military order'.[62] In spring 2000, the defence ministry produced a

proposal to radically reshape the General Staff of the Armed Forces, aiming to strengthen civilian control of the army and make the General Staff more coherent in focus and more of a planning organization in line with practices in other NATO countries.[63]

So far, this chapter has concentrated on the constitutional, legal and institutional framework for exercising control of the armed forces. Oversight is, however, a matter of equal importance. The most important institution in this area is the *Sejm*. Its control over the budget of the armed forces, power to legislate and ability to issue a vote of no confidence in the government are powerful instruments in a democratic civil–military relationship, but its ongoing oversight function is perhaps the most important element in its relationship with the armed forces.[64] Whereas the constitutional prerogatives and institutional arrangements of control have been something of an evolving muddle, oversight as exercised by the *Sejm* has been a comparative success story. Several committees have played a significant part in the process of oversight and have steadily improved their performance in this function. The National Defence Committee (*Komisja Obrony Narodowej*) has played the central role here, attracting to its membership individuals who have a strong interest in defence matters, including some ex-ministers.[65] The range of issues covered by the defence committee is comparable to those in long-standing NATO member states. The ructions of the Parys and Drawsko affairs received the full attention of the Committee and led to major reports that clearly had a positive impact. In addition to the *Sejm's* National Defence Committee, the Constitutional Tribunal (*Trybunał Konstytucyny*), the Supreme Chamber of Control (audit office) (*Najwyższy Izba Kontroli*) and the Citizen's Ombudsman (*Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich*) also have general oversight functions relating to the armed forces.[66]

The military's role in defence and foreign policy

Exerting civilian, democratic control over defence policy was never going to be particularly easy given the fact that the ministry of defence was staffed overwhelmingly by military personnel. Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the defence minister in 1993, publicly acknowledged that replacing military personnel with civilians in policy formulation areas was going to be a long and slow process.[67] The lingering presence of such a strong military input into defence policy made reform of the armed forces challenging in so far as it reinforced military autonomy and institutional inertia that made unpopular

reforms more difficult to introduce. The most difficult period was between 1992 and 1995.

This period saw a combination of factors that gave the armed forces an unhealthy degree of influence over Polish defence policy. The tensions between President and government over which branch would have the dominant voice in defence, disputes over proposed reform to the defence ministry and an assertive Chief of the General Staff, Tadeusz Wilecki, created a set of conditions that greatly frustrated efforts to establish democratic control of defence policy. The dispute between President and government over prerogatives in controlling defence created in effect a vacuum of control that reinforced military institutional autonomy. The inter-ministerial Zabinski commission, set up in the early 1990s to devise a set of options for reforming the Ministry of Defence, produced a final set of proposals that when implemented effectively divided the ministry into military and civilian components.[68] These changes made the General Staff practically autonomous and outside effective ministerial control. The independently minded and often outspoken General Wilecki did not hide his preference for these arrangements.[69] The impact of this constellation of factors mitigating against democratic control of defence policy could be seen in the slow progress made in redesigning force structure and reducing manpower levels to a model more suited to post-Cold War conditions.[70] In 1996–97, this impasse was overcome by the adoption of a new constitution, the introduction of a new statute reorganizing the defence ministry and the retirement of General Wilecki. By the late 1990s, drastic curtailment of military autonomy and the strengthened position of civilians within the Ministry of Defence meant that defence policy could be said to be firmly under civilian democratic control.

Although the lack of civilian defence expertise within government was readily apparent and contributed to the problems of control over defence policy in the mid-1990s, the picture concerning civilian influence over policy contained some positive broader features. The strands of what James Gow and Carole Birch have called 'democratic security policy communities' existed in various research institutions, universities and the press to provide independent expertise to both scrutinize and support government defence policy.[71] The civilian management of defence policy has been significantly advanced by the emergence of a number of politicians with a keen interest in defence matters – figures such as Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Bronisław Komorowski and Romuald Seremietiew – who have served as ministers in the defence ministry on various occasions and been leading members of the parliamentary

defence committee when not holding ministerial office. There has been a gradual increase in the number of civilian officials in policy-making departments within the defence ministry, although the scale of change is difficult to measure.[72]

In terms of the Polish armed forces' role in foreign policy, the military has helped to implement government policies. The military's role in supporting wider foreign policy can be seen in Poland's active contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, the NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (IFOR/SFOR and KFOR) and subregional 'defence diplomacy'. The Lithuanian-Polish and Polish-Ukrainian peacekeeping battalions (LITPOLBAT and POLUKRBAT) are important areas where efforts to foster good bilateral relations are clearly supported by military involvement.[73] International military contacts have also opened up the Polish armed forces to a range of positive influences. The most important of these have undoubtedly been NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) and since 1999 membership of NATO itself. Poland was one of the most active members of the PfP programme and its influence on the Polish armed forces provided a window on often radically different military culture and practice. Although PfP directly addressed the issue of civil–military relations through workshops and seminars, it is the wider perspective on the functioning of the armed forces of NATO member-states that provides the most important benefits in terms of reshaping the culture of Polish civil–military relations.[74]

Conclusion: assessing democratic control of armed forces

Assessing the degree to which democratic control of the armed forces has been achieved in postcommunist Poland is difficult not least because the democratic control of armed forces is itself a dynamic process, and there is no easy normative template with which to compare. Nevertheless, some broad lessons can be garnered from the evolution of Polish civil–military relations since 1989.

The most important of these is that the development of democratic control of the armed forces in postcommunist Poland has been part of the wider process of democratization. If democracy is an inherently messy business then a process of democratization is even more disorderly. This was particularly true of the efforts of political society to exercise control of the armed forces in Poland. The Parys affair in 1992 and the 'lunch at Drawsko' two years later were the products of the inexperience of Poland's political society. The two events underscored the

risks to a democratic state of politicizing or alienating the armed forces by inappropriate political behaviour. The two events, however, were vitally important for advancing the learning of politicians and soldiers alike, in understanding their roles and prerogatives within a system of democratic control of the armed forces. Marcin Król has written that 'it was relatively easy, at least in Poland, to introduce institutional democracy, but it seems to be much more difficult to introduce democratic customs and social behaviour'.[75]

A key question arising from the evolution of legal structures and institutions is the extent to which they have shaped civil–military relations or merely reflected the changing priorities of political society. This question is particularly relevant in the context of the burgeoning literature on the 'new institutionalism'.[76] In the Polish context, the laws and institutions have tended to reflect the evolution of thinking of political society on civil–military relations rather than the other way around. Institutions have not moulded the course of democratic control of the military. Instead, they have been shaped by the evolution of political discourse on the problem of establishing democratic control of the armed forces.

The negative aspects of the historical legacy of Polish civil–military relations have not had a significant impact on efforts to develop democratic control of the armed forces in the postcommunist era. The past has not haunted the present advance of civil–military relations, which indicates that the circumstances that promoted military autonomy or intervention in domestic politics are no longer relevant or have not materialized during Poland's transition.

A decade after the collapse of communism, Poland has undoubtedly made significant progress in putting into place democratic control of the armed forces. Compared with more 'mature' democracies, there is a variable geometry in the degree of consolidation of the practice and norms of democratic control. Nevertheless, however uneven the progress toward a consolidated model of democratic control of the military, it is clear that the evolution of Polish civil–military relations has been in a positive direction in terms of democracy. Democratic control of the armed forces is ultimately a state of political mind: soldiers accept their subordination to democratically elected civilian authorities and democratic politicians accept that they must play a responsible role in defence decision-making. In Poland, the consequence of a broader democratic consensus has been the establishment of an effective if occasionally untidy system of democratic control of the armed forces.

Notes

1. The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of either RMA Sandhurst or the Ministry of Defence.
2. T. Mitek, 'An Army Without Commanders', *Polska Zbrojna*, 4–6 September 1992 in: JPRS-EER-92-135 (22 September 1992).
3. T. Mitek, 'An Army . . .'
4. T. Mitek, 'The Status of Military Reforms', *Polska Zbrojna*, 6–8 November 1992 in: JPRS-EER-92-170 (17 December 1992).
5. M. Ciecierski, 'Służby specjalne niejedno noszą imię', *Polska Zbrojna*, 10 June 1996.
6. See: J. B. Grochowski, 'Who is to Defend the Security of the Country?', *Zolnierz Rzeczpospolitej*, 9 May 1990 in: JPRS-EER-90-080 (8 June 1990) and 'Interview with Col Marian Stuglik, deputy chief of the Department of Personnel', Polish Ministry of Defence, *Zolnierz Rzeczpospolitej*, 11 July 1990 in: JPRS-EER-90-130 (19 September 1990).
7. Interview with Zbigniew Skoczylas, director of personnel department, Polish Ministry of Defence, *Polityka*, 17 October 1992 in: JPRS-EER-92-159 (17 November 1992).
8. *Wojsko Polskie: Informator '95* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1995) 139–42.
9. Paweł Wronski, 'KSORM on Changes in Armed Forces', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14 March 1997 in: FBIS-EEU-97-073.
10. 'Onyszkiewicz: 150-tysięczna armia', Polish News Agency PAP, 23 May 2000. See also the following: Interview of the Polish Defence Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 'Kłopoyliwe zmiany na korzyść', *Polska Zbrojna*, 16 April 2000, 27, and Interview with the Chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, Bronisław Komorowski, *Warsaw Radia*, 27 December 1999 in: FBIS-EEU-1999–1227. For earlier developments see: Testimony of Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Minister of National Defence, to the Polish Parliamentary Defence Committee, 5 May 1998; Maj. Ryszard Choroszy, 'Przyspieszenie', *Polska Zbrojna*, 29 May 1998; and 'Onyszkiewicz: Mniej wojska, ale nie kosztem zdolności bojowych', Report of Polish news agency PAP, 12 December 1999.
11. 'Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland', 2 November 1992 in: *Wojsko Polskie: Informator '95*, 16–32.
12. *Strategia bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 4 January 2000, Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.msz.gov.pl/polzagr/strategiabezprp.html.
13. J. Lukowski, *Liberty's Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697–1795* (London: Routledge, 1991) 9–25. See also J. A. Gierowski, *The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the XVIIIth Century* (Cracow: PAU, 1996).
14. J. Kowecki (ed.), *Konstytucja 3 maja 1791* (Warsaw: PWN, 1981) 99–100.
15. P. Stawecki, 'Konstytucje Polskie a siły zbrojne (1791–1935)', *Wojskowy Przegląd Historczny*, no. 1 (Styczeń-Marzec 1991) 1–14.
16. I am using the term Supreme Commander in this discussion to embody both the *naczelny państwa* (chief of state) and *naczelny wódź* (commander in chief) titles that were typically used in the historical examples being considered.

17. S. Kieniewicz, A. Zahorski and W. Zajewski, *Trzy powstania narodowe* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1992) 38–40.
18. Kieniewicz, Zahorski and Zajewski, *Trzy powstania narodowe*, 193; and R. F. Leslie, *Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856–1865* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1963) 209.
19. A decree signed by Piłsudski on 22 November 1918 and a subsequent parliamentary resolution on 20 February 1919 confirmed him in his Supreme Commander role. See: M. Adamczyk and S. Pastuszka, *Konstytucje polskie w rozwoju dziejowym 1791–1982* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, 1985) 128–9.
20. Jaruzelski address to the nation, Polish television, 13 December 1981.
21. See the following: R. E. Blobaum, *Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904–1907* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995) 218–23; E. Halicz, *Partisan Warfare in 19th Century Poland: The Development of a Concept* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1975) 9–29; E. Kozłowski and M. Wrzosek, *Dzieja oręża polskiego* (Warsaw: MON, 1973) 258–66; and Leslie, *Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland 1856–1865*, 1–43.
22. M. Kukiel, *Zarys historii wojskowości w Polsce* (London: Puls, 1949) 197–237, and A. A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944–1988* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1990) 38–56.
23. On the Piłsudski coup see: A. Garlicki, *Przewrót majowy* (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 1979); A. Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland 1921–1939: The Crisis of Constitutional Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); M. Romeyko, *Przed i po maju* (Warsaw: MON, 1967); and J. Rothschild, *Piłsudski's Coup d'etat*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
24. On the imposition of martial law see: W. Jaruzelski, *Stan wojenny dlaczego* (Warsaw: BGW, 1992); P. C. Latawski, 'The Polish Military in Politics', in J. Bielasiak and M. D. Simon (eds), *Polish Politics Edge of the Abyss* (New York: Praeger, 1984) 268–92; Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944–1988*; and G. Sanford, *Military Rule in Poland: The Rebuilding of Communist Power 1981–1983* (London: Croom Helm, 1986).
25. J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) 8.
26. A. A. Michta *The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism* (London: Macmillan, now Palgrave, 1997) 82.
27. Patricia Clough, 'Riton's Defence Role Angers Poles', *Independent*, 29 February 1992.
28. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen* . . . , 82.
29. R. Sikorski, 'Poles Apart', *Spectator*, 27 June 1992, 10.
30. See the interview of one of these retired officers by Ireneusz Czyżewski in: 'Zabawa w wojsko', *Polityka*, 10 April 1993.
31. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen* . . . , 83.
32. See Z. Lentowicz, 'Czy wojsko będzie apolityczne', *Rzeczpospolita*, 7 April 1992, and S. Turnau, 'Minister Jan Parys oskarża o próbę obalenie democracji', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 7 April 1992.
33. See P. Clough, 'Walesa Seeks Control of the Army', *Independent*, 28 April 1992, and J. Jachowicz and A. Kublik, 'Muszę mieć kontrolę nad armią', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15 April 1992.

34. See P. Clough, 'Polish Power Struggle Ends', *Independent*, 19 May 1992, and 'Parys nie miał racji', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 16–17 May 1992.
35. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen . . .* , 85.
36. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen . . .* , 91–2.
37. P. Latawski, 'In Defence of Presidential Prerogative', *Transition*, 26 May 1995, 40–1.
38. *Janusz Onyszkiewicz ze szczytów do NATO* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1999) 209.
39. *Janusz Onyszkiewicz . . .* , 209–14.
40. A. Żebrowski, *Kontrola cywilna nad siłami zbrojnymi Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1998) 43–8.
41. 'Law on the Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland, Supplement to the Proclamation of 11 December 1991 of the Minister of National Defence, [Amendment of] Law of 21 November 1967 on the General Duty of Defending the Polish People's Republic', *Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 4, 22 January 1992, Item no. 16 in: JPRS-EER-92-111-S (20 August 1992).
42. All references to the Small Constitution are from the following: *The Rebirth of Democracy: 12 Constitutions of Central and Eastern Europe* (Council of Europe Press, 1995) 381–426.
43. See Article 26(2) in: Small Constitution in *The Rebirth . . .*
44. See Article 146(7), (8) and (11) in *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1997*.
45. See Article 134 in: *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej . . .*
46. See Articles 140, 141 and 144 in: *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej . . .*
47. See article in *Polityka*, 24 April 1999.
48. See report by the Polish News Agency PAP, 2 March 2000.
49. See reports by the Polish News Agency PAP, 10 July, 5 October and 13 November 1998 and 5–7 October 1999. The President's National Security Advisor, Marek Siwiec, published a lengthy critique of the proposed legislation. See his 'Strażnik pieczęci', *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 October 1999. For a more sympathetic view of the government's case see: P. Wroński, 'Wojna obronna', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 6 October 1999.
50. See reports by the Polish News Agency PAP, 17 February and 2 March 2000.
51. 'Komorowski o kompetencjach: doprecyzować zapisy konstytucji', Polish News Agency PAP, 7 October 1999, and *Wprost*, 12 September 1999.
52. 'Law on the Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland, Supplement to the Proclamation of 11 December 1991 of the Minister of National Defence', and Tomasz Niewiadomski, 'Jest KOK czy go nie ma', *Rzeczypospolita*, 7 July 1999.
53. 'Law on the Duty to Defend . . .'
54. S. Koziej, *Kierowanie obroną narodową Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* (Warsaw: DBM Paper no. 37, 1996) 38–67.
55. Żebrowski, *Kontrola cywilna nad siłami zbrojnymi Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 114–15.
56. See Article 135 in *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1997*.
57. See report by the Polish News Agency PAP, 20 January 1998.
58. For a comprehensive view of the status of KOK see: Niewiadomski, 'Jest KOK czy go nie ma'.
59. See P. Pytlakowski, *Polityka*, 17 January 1998.
60. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen . . .* , 87–91, and *Janusz Onyszkiewicz ze szczytów do NATO*, 203–4.

61. Michta, *The Soldier-Citizen . . .* , 92. This arrangement clearly enjoyed the support of the sometimes outspoken Chief of the General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki. Wałęsa appointed Wilecki who was seen as the President's man.
62. 'Ustawa z 14 grudnia 1995 r. o urzędzie ministra obrony narodowej', *Rzeczypospolita*, 1 February 1996.
63. 'Rewolucja w szeregach', *Rzeczypospolita*, 11 April 2000; P. Wroński, 'Cięcie po etach generalskich', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 11 April 2000; and 'Projekt ustawy o ministrze obrony – do komisji', Report by the Polish News Agency PAP, 11 May 2000.
64. See Small Constitution in: *The Rebirth . . .* , 381–426 and *Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 1997*.
65. Żebrowski, *Kontrola cywilna . . .* , 88–102.
66. Żebrowski, *Kontrola cywilna . . .* , 154–224.
67. J. Simon, *Central European Civil–Military Relations and NATO Expansion*, McNair Paper 39 (Washington: National Defence University, 1995) 58.
68. Michta *The Soldier-Citizen . . .* , 51, 86.
69. See interview of General Wilecki in: *Wprost*, 17 April 1994.
70. P. Latawski, *The Transformation of the Polish Armed Forces: Preparing for NATO* (London: RUSI, 1999) 19.
71. J. Gow and C. Birch, *Security and Democracy: Civil Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe*, London Defence Studies 40 (London: Brassey's, 1997) 37.
72. See the organizational section of the Polish Ministry of Defence website: http://www.wp.mil.pl/ktojestkim/index.html.
73. See P. Latawski, 'Bilateral and Multilateral Peacekeeping Battalions in Central and Eastern Europe', in S. Gordon and Francis T. (eds), *Aspects of Peacekeeping* (London: Cass, 2000).
74. *Integracja Polski z NATO* (Warsaw: MON, 1998) 13–22.
75. M. Król, 'Democracy in Poland', in M. Kaldor and I. Vejvoda (eds), *Democratisation in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Pinter, 1999) 67.
76. For a summary of the debates of the 'new institutionalism' see: Rosa Mulé, 'New Institutionalism: Distilling some "Hard Core" Propositions in the Works of Williamson and March and Olsen', *Politics*, 19, 1999, 145–51.

3

Democratic Control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic: a Journey from Social Isolation

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The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in the Czech Republic has necessitated the elimination of the old, communist-era methods of controlling the military, and the development of a new model of civil–military relations based on democratic politics. The most important aspects of this process have been the separation of the armed forces from the Communist Party, their depoliticization, the placement of the military under parliamentary, governmental, presidential and public control, and the creation of channels through which the military can express its institutional interests.[1] The problem of transforming totalitarian-era institutions for control of the military while at the same time coping with the societal, political and military changes brought about by the end of the Cold War has made the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces particularly complicated. This 'democratic agenda' involves addressing wider issues raised by general trends towards the professionalization of armed forces, changes in missions and force structures, and changing values in society at large.[2]

In the first decade after the collapse of communism, transformation issues were the priority of Czech society. Following the collapse of communism, it was necessary to build new institutions for civilian, executive control of the military. This task was complicated by the fact that the military was a bureaucratic institution exemplified by an unwillingness to change and a high degree of resistance to external influences which might threaten its institutional interests. Moreover, the new Czech(oslovak) civilian political leadership (and elite more broadly) lacked the experience and expertise necessary to support the transformation of the military values, standards and practices inherited from the communist period.

The attention of Czech society, further, was largely focused on the broader processes of political and economic transformation, paying relatively little attention to military issues. The reasons for this lack of interest were mostly historical. Since the Czech armed forces had never played a decisive role in the country's history, they were not perceived by the public to be an influential factor – whether negatively or positively – in the country's democratic transition. When it became apparent that the armed forces would not be employed to stop democratic reform, the interest of society turned to civilian problems. However, the fact that military issues were considered to be of lesser importance to other areas of reform did not slow down the transformation agenda.

In comparison with other postcommunist countries, the depoliticization of the then Czechoslovak military occurred relatively rapidly, with the constitutionally defined 'leading role' for the Communist Party being removed within three years. In 1990 the armed force's Main Political Administration – political departments operating both centrally and within individual units of the military – were abolished. Professional soldiers and conscripts were barred from participating in any political activity, a measure intended to eliminate the Communist Party's influence on the armed forces and to ensure that the military would remain apolitical. Thus, the basic conditions for establishment of democratic control of the armed forces were created relatively quickly. The negotiated departure of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, and the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia and its federal armed forces, reinforced these processes. The formerly totalitarian military became an apolitical institution defending the interests of the Czech state. Mechanisms for the management and control of the armed forces were gradually transferred to the civilian, political institutions established in the new Czech constitution, including the President, government, parliament, the judiciary and the Supreme Audit Office. The extent of this transformation is illustrated by the fact that, with only one exception, every Czechoslovak/Czech Minister of Defence since 1990 has been a civilian.

The armed forces and domestic politics

Institutions formally responsible for democratic control

The 1993 Czech constitution established a system under which control of the armed forces and defence policy is divided primarily between the President, the government and the parliament. Under the constitution,

the President is the supreme commander of the armed forces, appoints the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Presidential Military Office, and approves other senior military appointments. All defence-related decisions taken by the President, however, must also be endorsed by the parliament. Only in exceptional situations, when the parliament cannot be convened, can the President order a military operation without parliamentary approval. In addition, the President's influence over the appointment of the government, including the Minister of Defence, is dependent on the Prime Minister's consent.

Parliament plays a vital role in the Czech system of democratic control of the armed forces, approving defence and security legislation and playing a central role in drafting the military budget and overseeing military expenditures. Further, parliament is responsible for deploying the army in times of crises and declaring or extending a state of emergency at the request of the government. Parliament must approve any governmental decision on the participation of Czech troops in peacekeeping missions abroad, although, as of early 2001, legislation transferring some of these powers to the government to allow greater flexibility in response to crises is in the pipeline. It monitors government policy in the area of defence and may propose policies to address problems within the military. Parliament also has the power to establish commissions of inquiry into serious problems within the armed forces, although this power has not been used to date. In addition, parliament participates in the creation and implementation of the country's security policy. The principal role of the Czech parliament with regard to defence, however, relates to the budget and military expenditure. Parliament takes active part in the drafting of the defence and security budget and approves and oversees the budgets of ministries that participate in implementing security policy. Parliament also has a duty of oversight of activities carried out by all institutions responsible for national defence and security. Thus, for example, parliament examines issues concerning the modernization of armaments and must approve the acquisition of foreign military equipment. Finally, parliament must approve the government's nomination for the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (who is then appointed by the President).

The primary parliamentary body with responsibility for the armed forces and defence policy is the Defence and Security Committee (DSC). The Committee currently has 19 members and its structure reflects the distribution of power among political parties. The Committee works on a wide array of activities, including not only the military but also the

police and emergency and prison services. The DSC has three subcommittees: for the Integrated Rescue System and Civilian Planning, for Prisons and for the Intelligence Services.

The government is responsible for national defence and the armed forces through the Minister of Defence. It is in the government's power to declare a state of emergency and a state of war. The government's consultative body for security and defence policy is the State Security Council which consists of the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence and other government members. The Ministry of Defence is responsible for implementing the government's security and defence policy and the direct management of the armed forces.

As part of the depoliticization of the armed forces, independent military courts have been abolished and all legal matters now fall within the jurisdiction of civilian courts. Several other institutions also play a role in the control and management of the armed forces and defence policy, including the Supreme Audit Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry for Economic Competition and Ministry of Justice.

The State Security Council (SSC) is a particularly noteworthy element of the system of democratic control of the military and defence policy in the Czech Republic and its historical development illustrates the complications the Czech Republic has faced in this area. As a consultative body of the government constitutionally mandated to coordinate the activities of all state authorities responsible for national defence, the State Security Council has a long tradition – dating back, in various forms, to the Inter-Ministerial Institute for National Defence Matters of 1926 and the State Defence Council of the communist period. After November 1989, the right to appoint the chairman of the State Defence Council was transferred to the President, who assigned this position to the Prime Minister. When the Czech Republic was created in 1993, the State Defence Council was not included in the Act on Abolition of the Federation that allowed for the transfer of powers of the Federal Assembly and so, from a legal point of view, the State Defence Council ceased to exist at the same time as the Czechoslovak Federation. Important defence issues were discussed during meetings of the so-called economic ministers. Although President Havel appointed a new Council in 1993, its existence did not have a legal basis and in practice the institution functioned as little more than a presidential consultative body. A new constitutional law on national security was passed in 1998, placing a new State Security Council under the control of the government. However, the Council's responsibilities were defined in rather vague

terms. Moreover, under the new law the government was responsible for appointing the Council's members (who must all themselves be members of the government).

Only in 1999, in conjunction with the approval of new defence and military legislation, was the role of the SSC clarified. In addition to drafting new laws, the Council discussed the deployment of the armed forces as part of NATO's military action during the Kosovo crisis. The Constitutional Act on the Security of the Czech Republic defines the SSC as an authority consisting of the Prime Minister and other government members, whose structure is determined by the government. The Council's responsibility is to prepare draft governmental security and defence policies. The President can participate in SSC meetings and is entitled to request reports on its activities. The SSC has three permanent committees: the Committee for Defence Planning, which coordinates plans for national defence; the Committee for Civilian Emergency Planning, which coordinates plans for internal security, the defence of the population and the protection of the economy; and the Committee for the Coordination of Foreign and Security Policy, which is responsible for the internal coordination of foreign and security policy. The SSC also has as an Interdepartmental Crisis Staff which is responsible for handling crises.

The process described above testifies to the low level of political interest in defence issues and the armed forces in the Czech Republic. Until the beginning of NATO accession talks in 1997, defence and military matters remained on the periphery of the political elite's interest. Subsequently, politicians concentrated mainly on issues relating directly to the Czech Republic's membership of NATO and the SSC was considered to be of secondary importance. The government preferred cabinet-centred decision-making, and showed little interest in allowing other actors, such as experts from the Ministry of Defence, to take part in the process. However, the necessity of completing new security and military legislation and the debate over the 1999 Kosovo crisis increased the profile of the SSC and stimulated the government to take it more seriously as a consultative body. Most issues discussed by the SSC are prepared by the Ministry of Defence whose representatives participate in Council meetings as experts.

Legislative framework of democratic control of the armed forces

Up to 1998, the detailed powers of the institutions formally responsible for democratic control of the armed forces and duties and rights of soldiers were mostly defined by legislation dating from the 1950s and

the 1960s. A fundamental change of defence and military legislation was postponed because hundreds of other more pressing laws were waiting to be passed. In an attempt to excuse delays in the adoption of new laws, politicians argued that postponement would be beneficial to the quality of the new legislation and allow harmonization with the requirements stemming from the Czech Republic's membership of NATO. Indeed, preparations for NATO membership stimulated an active approach towards defence and security legislation. In 1998 and 1999, the Czech parliament passed six fundamental laws concerning security, defence and the military: the Constitutional Act on Security of the Czech Republic, which defines the terms 'state of emergency' and 'state of danger to the state'; the Act on the Extent of Military Duty and Military Administrative Authorities (Defence Act); the Act on the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic, which defines the rights and duties of state authorities in respect of the armed forces' tasks; the Act on Compulsory or Alternative Military Service, Army Manoeuvres and Some Legal Issues concerning Reservists; the Act on Professional Soldiers, which defines various aspects of professional military service; and the Act on Ensuring Defence of the Czech Republic, which defines the duties of state authorities, territorial administrative units, organizations and individuals in respect of securing national defence. The adoption of this new legislation was an important step towards the completion of the transformation of Czech civil–military relations. The next few years will illustrate whether this legislation is adequate for the management of the Czech armed forces and civil–military relations in the era of democracy.

Informal (non-governmental) players in democratic control

Defence and security policy is also influenced by a number of non-governmental actors, a free informal association of entities contributing to the national debate on defence and security issues, referred to here as the 'defence community'. The defence community in the Czech Republic consists of journalists who specialize in security and military issues; arms manufacturers, exporters and traders; independent civilian experts; representatives of non-governmental organizations; and members of military interest groups and associations.

The media are generally considered to be one of the most important informal elements of democratic oversight of the armed forces and defence policy and may have an important role in shaping public perceptions of the military. The role of journalists in shaping public attitudes to the military may be particularly important in a country such

as the Czech Republic where the number of people with personal experience of the army is declining (approximately 25 to 35 per cent of people born in a given year are conscripted into the armed forces). However, Czech journalists have never considered the military to be as 'hot' a topic as foreign policy. During the past ten years, neither politicians nor the general public have paid significant and lasting attention to security and defence matters. Consequently, the number of journalists who specialize in this area is relatively low (there are currently estimated to be about ten journalists specializing in defence issues in the Czech Republic) and security and defence are generally issues on which novice journalists learn their trade.[3]

In the first years after the fall of the communist regime, media discussion of the armed forces focused on various 'scandals'. Journalists' knowledge of security and defence issues was poor, and the army, police and intelligence services continued to be perceived as a potential threat to the young democracy. Most journalistic comment was critical, reflecting a subconscious fear of the possible misuse of the military. Sensationalist accounts – designed to provoke public interest in an obscure area and show an 'investigative' approach free of communist censorship – overshadowed more serious debate of the complex issues facing the transforming military. While a temporary improvement in this situation took place during the Czech Republic's NATO accession talks – when military issues were tackled by commentators with experience in foreign policy – unfortunately this trend did not last.

The negative way in which the media portrayed the armed forces gradually began to change in connection with the successes of Czech soldiers on foreign missions in the former Yugoslavia. Further, the army elicited a relatively positive reaction as a result of the central role it played during the extensive flooding which affected the Moravian region in the summer of 1998. Although a focus on scandal persisted, the media began to present military professionals in a manner that differed significantly from the ridiculed totalitarian army officer. The shift in media presentation of military topics is best documented in journalists' approach to peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia. While during the UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) and IFOR (Implementation Force) missions in Bosnia in the early and mid-1990s the media stressed the fact that some peacekeepers were motivated by monetary gain, reports about the Czech KFOR (Kosovo Force) unit after 1999 concentrated on the soldiers' professional skills. At present, the media portray the current SFOR (Stabilization Force, the successor to IFOR in

Bosnia) and KFOR missions relatively objectively, and have shown a willingness to acknowledge the work done by Czech servicemen and women. This positive development has been helped by the proactive attitude of the Ministry of Defence in relation to journalists covering Czech soldiers deployed in the former Yugoslavia.

The influence of non-governmental experts on defence policy is negligible in the Czech Republic, reflecting the small size of the non-governmental defence community in the Republic and mistrust of civilian non-governmental expertise by politicians. Relations between the Ministry of Defence and independent experts are based mainly on informal personal ties and the willingness of particular ministry officials to listen to independent civilian experts. Indeed, after the closure of the Strategic Studies Institute in 1992, analytical and research work in the area of defence has been limited to that undertaken by the Institute of International Relations, the Department of Public and Social Politics of the Sociological Studies Institute at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Prague's Charles University, the Brno Military Academy, and an inter-departmental research centre within the Ministry of Defence. To improve relations with this sector, however, the Ministry of Defence has invited civilian specialists to take part in drafting a revised Military Strategy. A number of other non-governmental organizations also maintain contacts with politicians and defence ministry officials, including the Czech Atlantic Commission, the Center for Democracy and Free Enterprise, and humanitarian organizations active in countries where Czech troops have been deployed (such as 'ADRA', whose name is derived from the Adriatic Sea and the Czech Catholic Charity).

The defence community in the Czech Republic is still at an early stage of development. It lacks the more extensive links and institutional base which would allow its members to coordinate their varied activities. It has no 'core' of strong personalities who would present the defence community to politicians and the public and whose prestige would attract the interest of other important interest groups. The Czech political elite clearly does not understand the potential of the defence community as a source of independent advice and input on defence matters, viewing it instead as a potential competitor with official channels for control of the military and as a body with substantial influence over public opinion but little sense of responsibility. Politicians do, however, need qualified expertise emanating from sources other than the Ministry of Defence. To date, public discussions on defence and security issues have been random, poorly informed and lacking in coherence – reflecting the weakness of the defence community.

The armed forces and defence policy

The process of adopting basic defence documents

In terms of political control of defence policy, the 1999 Act on the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic states that the 'Activities of the armed forces are controlled by constitutional institutions and authorities defined in a special legislation'. The 1995 *White Book on Defence* defines civilian control of the military in a more detailed manner, noting its importance as an aspect of the relationship between broader society and national defence and a prerequisite for NATO membership:

> Exercised by the state authorities specified in the Constitution, civilian control of the army provides feedback for the overall management of the military. This type of control consists of the collection and analysis of information on the activities and status of the army in the most important areas and the powers necessary for taking appropriate action. It is a process involving mutual open communication between government officials and the armed forces command.[4]

This definition highlights some of the problems in the perception of democratic control of the military in the Czech Republic. It emphasizes civilian political control of the military (which, of course, was also exercised by the Czechoslovak communist regime), while downplaying broader democratic input into defence and the armed forces. Thus, the above definition of 'democratic control' is limited to the formal institutions defined in the constitution and other specific laws, excluding other important actors, such as the media, non-governmental organizations, conscripts and the public. This approach also emphasizes control to the detriment of leadership and management. It does not take into account the need for the armed forces both to share in responsibility for defence policy and to acknowledge the armed forces' own legitimate interests. Democratic control, further, applies not just to the regular armed forces but also to the broader security sector (which may be defined as all institutions capable of the application of organized force including the police, secret services and paramilitary organizations). In this regard it is important to consider the increase in the financial cost of addressing non-military security threats. This is an area where armed formations other than the military, such as the police,

anti-terrorist squads and civilian defence units, are used to manage problems such as civil unrest and protests and natural disasters.

New security documents approved by the Czech government in 1999 have brought a certain shift in this narrow perception of democratic control of the military.[5] The 1999 *Security Strategy of the Czech Republic* notes that:

> The security of the Czech Republic cannot be considered as a responsibility of the Government and other constitutional institutions alone. It is a task whose success depends on an active support from the entire society. This support must be based on provision of information to the population about the Government's plans in the area of defence.[6]

In addition to foreign policy, other important aspects of the overall effort aimed at maintaining national security include economic development, social stability, the development of democracy and the protection of human rights. This does not mean that the role of the armed forces should be weakened. New elements are introduced while the traditional tasks, which consist of individual and collective defence, are preserved. However, neither the Security Strategy nor the Military Strategy of the Czech Republic adequately define these new elements, and at present, democratic control over these wider dimensions of security policy exists in declaratory form only.

Relations between politicians and the military

In comparison with other postcommunist countries, depoliticizations of the Czechoslovak/Czech military occurred relatively quickly and in a comprehensive manner. Immediately after the 1989 Velvet Revolution a number of civilians representing the new democratic political leadership began working at the Ministry of Defence. The first civilian Minister of Defence, Luboš Dobrovský, was appointed in October 1990. A former Czechoslovak dissident, he replaced General Miroslav Vacek who had discredited himself by taking part in preparations for the Communist Party's action against public demonstrations in 1989. This was an important change, asserting democratic, civilian control of the army. With the exception of the brief tenure of General Imrich Andrejèák, who occupied the post of Minister of Defence immediately before the division of the Czechoslovak federation, all of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic's postcommunist defence ministers have been civilians. The arrival of civilians at the Ministry of Defence, however, also created

some problems. Politicians and civilian officials distrusted the military, but themselves lacked sufficient knowledge of defence and security issues. Thus, in the first years after 1989, appointments were made on the basis of political considerations rather than defence expertise. Initially, further, the respective roles and powers of civilians and the military were not clearly defined, only contributing to mistrust.

Professional soldiers reacted to pressure for depoliticization of the military – and an often insensitive approach to this issue by the civilian leadership – in three ways. First, a number of young soldiers left the army for the rapidly developing private sector where they could expect success as a result of the skills they had gained in the military. The deteriorating social conditions, declining living standards and low social prestige of professional soldiers encouraged many to leave the armed forces. Second, senior officers who decided to remain in the army tried to stay clear of politics, remaining loyal in executing politicians' instructions, but carefully disassociating themselves from political decision-making. In the first years after the fall of communism, this attitude was particularly prevalent among members of the General Staff. Third, some military specialists left the army, but stayed at the Ministry of Defence as civilian executive experts. Although in recent years the number of civilian employees at the Ministry of Defence has grown by a third, and at the General Staff by a fifth, the fact that many of these 'civilians' are former soldiers makes assessments of the real balance between civilian and military personnel in these institutions problematic.

It should also be stressed, however, that, while there have been tensions between civilians and the military within the Czech defence establishment, the elected political leadership has always retained fundamental control over defence policy and decision-making within the Ministry of Defence. Senior military officers have occasionally attempted to influence political aspects of defence policy – a development that some authors view as an inevitable feature of democratic civil–military relations in practice.[7] During the discussion over the appointment of the Chief of General Staff in 1998, for example, soldiers openly expressed support for former Deputy Minister of Defence Miroslav Kalousek, and Chief of General Staff Jiří Šedivý made statements that some experts viewed as exceeding the military's legitimate sphere of competence. Media criticism of political representations made by General Staff members to the Ministry of Defence (in connection with dubious army contracts) suggests that the professional military is becoming increasingly interested in securing a degree of influence over political decisions. Under certain circumstances, the ambiguous division

of responsibility between political leaders, civilian officials and the military within the defence ministry could upset the current balance of civil–military relations in the Czech Republic.

Control of the defence budget

Control over military expenditure is one of the central means of ensuring democratic, civilian control of the armed forces and defence policy. The defence budget as a proportion of gross national product (GNP) fell from 2.61 per cent in 1993 to 1.97 per cent in 1997. Only in 1998, as a result of preparations for NATO membership, did the defence budget begin to be increased by about 0.1 per cent a year. On this basis, defence expenditure reached 2 per cent of GNP in 2000.

The defence budget is drafted by the General Staff based on the requirements of the military. The Minister of Defence submits the draft to the government which in turn presents it to parliament as part of the state budget approval procedure. In 1993, the Czech Republic became the first Central and Eastern European country to introduce the American-designed system of management of public funds that is used worldwide in various areas of the public sector. Although the country gained a system designed to provide both efficiency and transparency in the allocation of funds, problems in the management and control of military spending continue to exist.[8]

Until 1998, the Czech Republic had no institution for the coordination of security policy between various ministries. As a result, individual ministries developed the specific aspects of security within their remit in a relatively independent manner. The military budget was considered to fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence which was able to determine the overall size of the budget and the allocation of funds to different areas within the budget. The Ministry was, however, unable to manage the system effectively at a micro-level. In practice the defence budget has been to a substantial extent temporary and adjusted during each fiscal year to immediate needs and in response to available funds. This practice is, however, used throughout the public sector where budgets usually have 'hidden' reserves to deal with shortfalls. This situation has substantially strengthened the power of those Ministry of Defence departments responsible for finances, which in reality provide the management and control of the defence budget. The situation is paradoxical – despite political control at a strategic level, it is the executive management of the defence ministry and the army that essentially control the allocation and distribution of funds within the defence budget. As a consequence of

political conflicts over the approval of the state budget, however, individual departments of the army and the Ministry of Defence usually receive funds in the middle of the year – too late for them to fully use the funds (the remainder of which are returned to the state budget). In addition, unclear regulations concerning the awarding of military contracts undermine the transparency of the system for allocating defence resources and result in problems of corruption and misuse of funds – provoking criticism in the media and damaging the military's public image.

The armed forces and foreign policy

International dimension of democratic control of the armed forces

The process of accession to NATO has been a crucial factor accelerating the transformation of, and the consolidation of democratic control over, the Czech armed forces. The Czech Republic has completed the reorganization of its armed forces and adopted basic laws relating to key aspects of the military and national security. Civilian politicians' and military experts' understanding of security and defence issues has increased. Wider society has begun to pay closer attention to military issues and democratic control of the armed forces. Slowly but surely, the Czech public's very negative perception of the military has changed. Czech military and civilian experts who work within NATO have introduced Western norms and standards into the army. The pressure to prepare personnel for additional positions within the Alliance has led the Ministry of Defence to improve language and professional training for both civilians and professional soldiers. In 1999, the number of soldiers who had graduated from foreign military academies exceeded one thousand. A new law and related regulations have linked appointments to posts within both the Czech army and NATO structures to language and other specialized training. Accession to NATO has generated the need to take further legislative steps in connection with participation of Czech soldiers in foreign missions, and the introduction of legislation on the deployment of foreign forces on Czech territory. The armed forces have also played an active role in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities and in preparations for the Czech Republic's accession to NATO. The Ministry of Defence has maintained a relatively autonomous policy on specifically military issues without creating tensions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As regards accession to NATO, the military

has worked on the preparation of basic documents and adaptation to NATO standards.

Czech membership in NATO has also required and encouraged improved civil–military cooperation. Soldiers have become the bearers and executors of the political leadership's policy of integration with NATO, and have also come to play an active part in international efforts aimed at ensuring European security. Active participation in multinational peacekeeping missions has deepened the Czech Republic's experience of democratic, civilian control of armed forces, has required intense civil–military cooperation (both nationally and within international frameworks), but has also added new complications to civil–military relations. Indeed, coordinating 'democratic control' of military operations in a multinational environment where different national military institutions, cultures and legal requirements meet, international and national interests diverge, and the number of players is large, amorphous and changes over time, has become a growing challenge. Such situations can create tensions between international organizations mandating/controlling operations and troop-contributing countries, and between soldiers, civilian officials and political leaders (for example, when political sensitivity results in overly close political control of operational military matters).[9] Like other countries, the Czech Republic has not yet satisfactorily resolved how to deal with these issues.

Other factors influencing democratic control of the armed forces in the Czech Republic

Historical legacy

In modern history, the Czech soldier has been perceived as a defender of national sovereignty only after the founding of an independent Czechoslovak state in 1918. Indeed, some of the traits of the transformation of the imperial Austro-Hungarian army are similar to the current transformation of the Czech armed forces. Both cases involved the creation of an independent army with a new image. In both cases political leaders dismissed soldiers whose loyalty to the new state was uncertain, but were forced to utilize the professional potential of officers trained and educated by the previous regime. In 1918, the Good Soldier Schweik, a character created by novelist Jaroslav Hašek with the purpose of ridiculing the imperial army, the war and the warring sides, haunted the image of the Czechoslovak army. In Schweik, Hašek skilfully depicted the typical traits of an ordinary Czech who resisted

the military and war. At that time, the new sovereign state was searching for a positive model of a Czechoslovak soldier that might change society's distrust of the military. The relationship between prewar society and the armed forces was formed under the influence of the rise of Nazism in Germany. Although the Czechoslovak armed forces were actually mobilized in 1938, the decision not to use them to defend the state against the Wehrmacht – taken by politicians, against the will of most of the military and public – damaged the reputation of the military. Although the active participation of expatriate Czechoslovak soldiers in the Second World War somewhat dampened negative views of the military, the Czech public remained sceptical about the role of an army which they had supported financially but which had been largely inactive.

The communist regime placed the army entirely under its control, creating a close bond between the military elite and the communist leadership. Military doctrine and the armed forces were subordinate to the High Command of the Warsaw Pact and thorough Soviet control was exercised through a network of institutions and procedures (including the presence of Soviet military advisers in the 1950s and, after 1968, compulsory study at Russian military schools for all officers). In practice, important decisions were taken by the High Command of the Warsaw Pact, in some cases without the consent of the Czechoslovak government, such as during the deployment of nuclear missiles on Czechoslovak territory in 1983. The army became an instrument of communist power and was perceived as an institution that 're-educated enemies of socialism'.

The Prague Spring of 1968 brought an attempt to revive a national character within the armed forces. This effort, however, was not as far-reaching as those in Yugoslavia or later in Romania. Reformist politicians decided that the army would not intervene in public demonstrations at the time of the Soviet invasion in August 1968. For the communist politicians who replaced the reformers after the arrival of the Soviet army, fighting the internal enemy was at least as important as preparing to defend the country against an external attack. The extensive purges which took place in the military during the first years of 'normalization' testified to the importance placed by the communist regime on control of the armed forces. After the invasion, national interests that should have been guaranteed by the military were once again replaced with the interests of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. During the period of 'normalization', Czechoslovakia had high military spending, an oversized army and strong ties between the armed forces

and the armaments industry. Nonetheless, the army's real influence on society was limited in comparison with other communist countries as a consequence of the control exercised by domestic and foreign political leaders, and domestic political attention remained focused on the Czechoslovak economy.[10]

Although the armed forces participated in the communist regime through the military elite, they never became involved in substantial disagreements with politicians. Although the Communist Party formally proclaimed an accordance of interests and values between the Party and the military, unofficially there was widespread disapproval within the Party of the high levels of military spending, the military's isolation from society and society's lack of interest in the armed forces. The appeal of the military profession, which could have been an attractive career option for many young men, was undermined by the fact that Communist Party membership was compulsory for all professional soldiers. The army was viewed as an obedient instrument of communist power and feared in the same way as the communist regime itself. While the military generally accepted this status quo, at times of crisis it had a tendency to act in accordance with societal values rather than communist dictat. According to Zoltan Barany, the army always exhibited greater restraint than units of the Ministry of Interior and the People's Militia in its interventions in domestic politics.[11]

The communist regime only twice deployed the military against the Czech public. First, during unrest at the Skoda Pilsen plant in 1953, and second in 1969 to suppress a demonstration in the city of Brno commemorating the first anniversary of the Soviet invasion. Combined with the way in which the military had failed to defend the Czechoslovak sovereignty in 1968, these actions only strengthened the Czech public's scepticism about the armed forces. Published evidence about plans to use the armed forces to suppress demonstrations in 1989 only deepened this negative attitude, despite the ultimate decision not to deploy them. It is interesting to note, however, that one of the main reasons that the military were not utilized in 1989 was the unwillingness of most senior military commanders to support such action.

The first years after the 1989 revolution were marked by Czech society's continued distrust of the military and the exceptionally low prestige of the military profession, especially among the younger generation. In this atmosphere of mutual distrust between civilian politicians/society and the professional military it was difficult to build working relationships between civilian staff of the Ministry of Defence and the military command. As a result, and in accordance with its

tradition of steering clear of political decisions, the army isolated itself from society. Professional soldiers tried to simply retain their positions and there was widespread passivity and a lack of interest in the development of the army as an institution. Incompetent decisions taken by civilians only deepened this isolation. Thus, difficulties in overcoming society's distrust of its armed forces, the isolationist attitudes of military professionals, a loss of a military identity and the pursuit of individual interests to the detriment of the whole were some of the most serious consequences of the civil–military legacy of the communist regime.

Public opinion and the military

The interwar and communist periods left a legacy of distrust of the Czech Republic's armed forces. Radical opinions which appeared immediately after the 1989 Velvet Revolution, calling for drastic reductions, full and immediate professionalization or even the abolition of the armed forces, have faded, thanks to the rapid depoliticization of the military and widespread changes in personnel. Indeed, by the spring of 1990 only 14 per cent of the population feared possible military action compared to 21 per cent for the police and 38 per cent for the secret services.

It soon became apparent, however, that building confidence in the army involved more than simply making political declarations: the public needed concrete evidence that the formerly totalitarian institution had been transformed into the army of a democratic country. Public views of defence and the armed forces are ambiguous. Although people generally believe that national sovereignty has to be defended, they exhibit a significant degree of scepticism with regard to the practicability of actually defending the country in the event of an attack, as well as a discernible reluctance to spend money on defence. As is the case in other postcommunist countries, the Czech population is more interested in addressing environmental, social and economic problems than financing the military.

Although confidence in the military is increasing, the general perception of its merits is not positive.[12] Public confidence in the armed forces grew in 1993, as the armed forces were seen as an important element of the new Czech sovereignty. This shift in public opinion, however, proved temporary, and by the following year public views had returned to their earlier scepticism towards the military. The country's membership of NATO – beginning with the formal invitation to join the Alliance in July 1997, followed by full accession to NATO in March 1999 – has, however, resulted in the development of more positive views

of the Czech military. The armed forces are now trusted by more than half of Czech citizens and are perceived increasingly as a national institution whose role is to secure the defence of the country, fulfil NATO-related duties and provide assistance in the event of natural disasters.

General Czech perceptions of professional soldiers are not particularly positive. Although people generally trust the military's specialist skills and physical qualities, they are critical of military ethics and only a third of the population believe that professional soldiers have adequate moral standards.[13] Recently, however, public views of the military profession have become more positive. A survey conducted in 2000 among high school and university students showed that the military profession had moved to the first half of the ranking. More than two-thirds of respondents considered soldiers serving with the Czech mission at NATO headquarters, members of rapid reaction forces, military pilots and peacekeepers as attractive professions. Though the military profession does not reach the status of a professional athlete, judge, manager or television commentator, the survey suggests a considerable improvement in the perception of the Czech professional soldier in comparison with the past. The results of recent public opinion surveys indicate that the Czech Republic's accession to NATO has contributed significantly to more positive public views of the military. The previously negative image of the professional soldier is being transformed into a new image of the military that is attractive to young people, thanks largely to the army's new tasks brought about by NATO membership.

Conclusion

In the past decade the Czech Republic has succeeded in establishing the basic parameters of a system of democratic control of the armed forces. The responsibilities of the parliament, the President and the government are clearly defined by the constitution and related legislation, providing for the principal element of democratic control of the military – the prevention of the use of the armed forces against the interests of society more widely. The Czech parliament in particular has extensive powers, especially through its control of military spending. The rapid depoliticization of the armed forces after the fall of the communist regime eliminated initial fears that the military might threaten the developing democracy. After the division of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993, the independent Czech Republic already had basic institutions of political control of the military and the Czech public accepted the armed forces as a guarantor of national sovereignty.

In the following years, these basic institutions of democratic control were reinforced by the adoption of new defence and military laws that defined in detail the responsibilities and competencies of civilians and the military. Cooperation between the government, the parliament and the senior military has generally developed favourably. As part of a joint effort to complete the new legislation, politicians, civilian defence officials and the military got to know each other better than they had in the past, and old stereotypes concerning 'incompetent politicians' and 'old ministerial structures' were largely eliminated. Politicians have generally appreciated the intellectual capacity and meticulous work of civilian and military staff from the Ministry of Defence. Equally, military professionals have begun to realize that isolation from civilian political institutions and society is detrimental to their interests, and that they can be partners in political discussions and negotiations over defence issues.

The Czech Republic's participation in NATO's PfP, involvement of the military in peacekeeping missions and, above all, preparation for NATO membership played a significant role in the development of an understanding of the importance of democratic control of the armed forces. Indeed, a number of processes related to reform of the armed forces have taken place as a result of external pressures, rather than being driven by a domestic appreciation of the need for reform.

Democratic control of the military is generally viewed as a formal legislative matter that concerns only the government and other state institutions, and not wider society. Active public support for national defence exists mostly in a declaratory form. The importance of non-governmental/non-state 'civil society' as a participant in the democratic oversight of and debate on the military and defence policy, and the role of the defence community as a platform for the development of a widespread discussion on security and defence issues, is appreciated by neither politicians nor military officers. The Czech defence community is small, at an early stage in its development, lacks recognized experts and therefore does not play a particularly prominent role in public and political discussions of defence issues. There are few independent defence and security research institutions, a fact reflected in politicians' poor knowledge of these issues.

In the Czech Republic, the transformation of a formerly totalitarian institution into the armed forces of a democratic country has taken place against the background of relatively unsympathetic public attitudes to the military. Only since 1997 have public views of the armed forces and the professional military become more positive. This

situation reflects Czech society's historical scepticism towards the military's role as a protector of national sovereignty, as well as the priority given to other issues after the 1989 revolution. This has also resulted in a relatively narrow domestic debate on the armed forces, civil–military relations and defence policy. While the Czech Republic may not have resolved all its problems relating to the development of a democratic model of civil–military relations, the basic institutions and practices of democratic control of the armed forces have nevertheless been consolidated and the attitudes of politicians, civilian defence officials and the public towards the military are gradually becoming more positive.

Notes

1. A. Bebler, 'The Evaluation of Civil–Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', *NATO Review*, no. 4, 1994, 28. See also: C. Donnelly, 'Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tacking the Problem', *NATO Review*, no. 1, 1997 and R. Szemerkényi, *Central European Civil–Military Relations at Risk*, Adelphi Paper no. 306 (1996); and A. Bebler (ed.), *Civil–Military Relations in Post-communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1997) 154.
2. C. Donnelly, 'Defence Transformation . . .' For further details see C. Dandeker, *Facing Uncertainty: Flexible Forces for the Twenty-First Century* (Karlstad: National Defence College, 1999) 94.
3. *Defence Community: Final Report* (Prague: STEM, 1999) 3.
4. Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, *White Book on the Defence of the Czech Republic, 1995*, 55.
5. Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, *The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic and Military Strategy of the Czech Republic, 1999*.
6. Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic, *The Security Strategy* . . . , 3, 16.
7. See Š. Sarvaš, 'Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe', *Armed Forces and Society*, 26(1), Fall 1999, 99–118.
8. F. Ochrana, 'Economics, Politics, Defence – State and Perspectives', in Š. Sarvaš et al., *Security and Army in a Modern Society* (Prague: Faculty of Social Sciences of the Charles University 1997) 98–109.
9. M. C. Williams, *Civil–Military Relations and Peacekeeping*, Adelphi Paper No. 321 (1998) 20–93.
10. O. Pick et al., *Democratic Control over Policy and Armed Forces* (Prague: Institute for International Relations, 1995) 17–21.
11. Z. Barany, 'East European Armed Forces', *East European Quarterly*, 1, 1992.
12. The Czech Ministry of Defence conducts annual surveys of public opinion. See research reports of the Research Department of the Personnel Marketing Department of the Main Personnel Bureau at the Ministry of Defence.
13. Data collected by the State Institute for Public Opinion Research (1992, 1995 and 1997).

4

Civil–Military Relations in Hungary: No Big Deal

Pál Dunay

The nature of Hungary's transition from communism to democracy in 1989–90 was unique, sharing some similarities only with developments in Poland. In both cases reformist elements within the communist elite agreed a negotiated transition with the democratic opposition movements. This pattern differed from that in every other country of the region. In Hungary, further, the change was gradual – beginning before the dramatic events of 1989 – and took place with the active involvement of parts of the communist establishment. This created a difficult legacy for the political forces that came to power in democratic elections in 1990, as they had to cope with a degree of residual popularity for the previous regime.

Democratic consolidation proceeded more easily in Hungary than in most Central and Eastern European countries. In 1989 the Hungarian political and economic elite was relatively well prepared to establish democratic political institutions and introduce a market economy. The country was also somewhat more open and 'Westernized' than most other states in the region. A mental preparedness for a new system was present, and the private ownership of companies and multiparty politics were not completely alien concepts to many Hungarians. However, the first democratically elected government headed by Prime Minister Antall was unable to cope with many of the challenging tasks it faced. Its performance remained weak in foreign policy, ambiguous in economic policy but highly successful in establishing new institutions.

As a result of the complexity and urgency of Hungary's postcommunist system change, only issues that were seen as indispensable to the transformation were prioritized. Military matters were not among these. Indeed, since Hungary did not face any major military threat, it was

sufficient to 'neutralize' the armed forces politically. Moreover, there was a wide recognition by the population that the military would play a cooperative, low-profile role in the system change.

The transformation of the Republic of Hungary during the 1990s has generally been regarded as a success story by the world at large, and in particular by the democratic states of the West. This is understandable for several reasons. First, Hungary has identified itself with the role of a 'policy-taker' rather than a 'policy-maker' country. It has been ready to share and follow a political line largely determined by Western expectations. The adaptation process has nonetheless been painful. Between 1989 and 1992 gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 18 per cent and it was only a decade later, in 1999, that GDP returned to its 1990 level.[1] Hungary had one advantage compared to some other former Socialist countries – that there was no alternative to economic reorientation. Hungary is small, not rich in natural resources and has never had any doubt that the way forward is through integration in the world economy, primarily through the neighbouring Western democracies of the European Union (EU). It would be entirely misleading, however, to assume that the transformation process has taken place only in order to meet Western expectations. It has occurred primarily to seize the historical opportunity to carry out a change that may result in a better life for the people of Hungary. External factors – particularly Western expectations, support and assistance – have fostered this process, contributing significantly to its shape and preventing its derailment.

As with Hungary's more general democratic transition, there was a broad consensus that the country should adopt a Western model of civil–military relations. Jeffrey Sachs correctly (and exceptionally) observed that in relation to the economic models open to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 1990s: 'Sweden and Britain alike have nearly complete ownership, private financial markets, and active labour markets. Eastern Europe today has none of these institutions; for it, the alternative models of Western Europe are almost identical.'[2] Much the same could be said about civil–military relations, particularly during the early phase of transition. The political decision that Hungary's civil–military relations should resemble those of the West meant there was not much room for manoeuvre. Although various individual Western states – and particularly the UK and the US – influenced Hungarian reforms, differentiation between different Western models of civil–military relations did not play an important role in the process.

Historical legacies

Hungary has not had a particularly proud military history. In the last five centuries the armed forces of Hungary have achieved victory three times. First in 1487 when King Matthias's troops occupied Vienna. Second, in 1991 when the 40-strong Hungarian medical team that was integrated with British troops 'won' the Gulf War. Finally, in 1999, three months after joining NATO, Hungary could also record victory in Kosovo as a member of the Alliance. In light of this centuries-long period of losing one war after another, including two world wars, the armed forces have never been held in particularly high regard within Hungary. This has made life fairly easy as far as the control of the military is concerned. However, this low prestige has been problematic for the establishment of effective postcommunist armed forces.

The armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (1867–1918) were not Hungarian, and their language of command was German. As a result, this period has not served as reference point for present-day civil–military relations. During the interwar period (1919–41) the regime made an attempt to establish properly functioning armed forces. The Hungarian military's participation in wars of aggression against Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and collaboration with Nazi Germany, however, undermined the armed forces' credibility for the post-Second World War period. The year 1945 was a schism in this respect.

After the war, the strategic role of Hungary was reduced to a military springboard in the northern part of the southern tier of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Its formal role was to hold the territory of the country in the event of Western aggression until reinforcements arrived from the Soviet Union. In reality, the role was different – to support a Warsaw Treaty invasion of northern Italy and Bavaria. The former was not credible and the latter would never have enjoyed widespread popular support. What remains to be analysed, therefore, is the internal (domestic) role of the armed forces. Here, there is insufficient evidence to draw strong conclusions, as the only occasion when the military might have played an important role in domestic politics occurred in October 1956. During this period the army was disbanded – simply reflecting the fact of that most units dissolved spontaneously. In practice, the armed forces did not want to follow the instructions of the country's Stalinist leadership and fight the demonstrators. Thus the Hungarian armed forces were never directly involved in domestic politics between 1945 and 1990 and there was no public trust in the armed forces after 1956. The Kádár leadership could assume that the same

would happen in any contentious domestic political development. It was no coincidence that one of the first decisions of the Communist leadership after the suppression of the 1956 revolution by Soviet forces was to establish the so-called 'Workers' Guard' (*Munkásörség*), a paramilitary organization trusted by the new Communist rulers.

It should also be noted that the 1956 uprising was the bloodiest of all those against Soviet (and domestic) Communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe. The role played by the Hungarian armed forces not only resulted in mistrust towards the military but also carried the message that the Hungarian armed forces could not in reality be regarded as a usable instrument of power – they lacked morale and were poorly equipped. Furthermore, since it was a conscript army, the military would be affected by changes in Hungarian society more widely. Consequently, the Hungarian leadership was in no way favourably disposed towards military efforts. Kádár and his entourage were of the view that the armed forces could best contribute to the stability of the country by not costing too much. Hungary did not challenge the Soviet leadership publicly on any major international issue until 1984, but reserved the right to tacitly 'sabotage' certain steps. This was reflected in the slower pace of modernization of armaments and equipment than in other Warsaw Treaty Organization members – despite regular Soviet pressure to the contrary. Hungary simply did not invest in the armed forces, as it was fearful that doing so would undermine the domestic economic stability of the system, the most important foundation of the so-called 'Goulash Communism'. As a result of this strategy, at the time of the system change, Hungary had a comparatively poor, outmoded military, free of prestige. The only politically urgent matter concerning military and paramilitary forces in the process of system change was the dissolution of the Workers' Guard which happened in 1989. In October that year 'Hungarian army commando units raided the Workers' Guard's 180 ammunition depots and storage facilities' and 60 000 submachine guns, 53 000 handguns and 5300 machine guns were confiscated. The old party centre's 'private army' was disarmed and its personnel discharged by the government.[3]

The few studies addressing political control of the armed forces in Hungary during the period that came to an end in 1990 have offered similar conclusions, stating, for example, that 'the Communist Party exercised neither democratic, nor truly civilian control over the Army'.[4] There can be no doubt that the Communist Party did not exercise democratic control, as it was in itself an institution based on the denial of democracy. It would be difficult to argue, however, that the central party

organs and apparatus did not control the armed forces and related enforcement agencies. Thus, the phenomenon of political control was not alien to the military leadership after the system change even if the content of such control was fundamentally different to that before. In a strictly limited sense, in terms of politicians telling the military what to do, the existence of political control has to be recognized. The acceptance of a superior political structure above the military was well established.

In Hungary, the bargaining power of the military was fairly weak. Indeed, in almost all respects the armed forces were controlled by the party, if by no one else. This political control made it easy for the military to accept another type of political authority when the system change occurred. Despite this factor, however, it should be noted that the professional military had a special attitude to the system change: they were happy to get out of the ambit of two heavily disliked bodies – the Soviet military and Hungarian political officers. It was this attitude that led the military to argue in the early 1990s (and later) that nobody should interfere with military matters – since they were an area belonging exclusively to the General Staff.

The importance of understanding the specificities of the system change in the Hungarian case should not be underestimated. In Hungary it came about through an accord between the opposition movements/parties and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP). Consequently it is almost impossible to define the key turning point in the transition and when the fundamental system change actually occurred. Due to the nature of the change, there were few dramatic and symbolic events in the transition. The system change was reflected in the modification of the roles of particular institutions and bodies and the appearance of new ones. It was also followed by wide acceptance of the change by the population. This would have made it extremely hard for the armed forces to resist the changes. In light of the low prestige and low self-esteem of the military, professional military people were more concerned about their personal future than anything else.

The system change affected the management of the defence sector as well. In this area, the elements of the new system developed gradually. The new and old political establishment together faced three major tasks: first, establishing civilian, democratic control of the armed forces; second, establishing a chain of command between the head of state (the President), the cabinet and the defence minister (which required changing the constitution and passing new laws); third, eliminating the direct and indirect influence of the HSWP in the armed forces.

Institutional change and civil–military relations

Due to the evolutionary nature of the system change in Hungary, the country's political class had to develop a new institutional political framework before the change actually took place. Indeed, Hungary's institutional adaptation actually preceded the elections of spring 1990. The most fundamental changes occurred in the autumn of 1989, with subsequent reforms being lesser adaptations. The legal foundations of a democratic system were laid down through an extensive revision of the old 1949 Constitution. The scale of the constitutional change is reflected in the anecdote that the only part of the constitution that remained unchanged was that stating that 'The Capital of the Republic of Hungary is Budapest'.[5]

Under the modified constitution:

- 'the Parliament shall elect the President of the Republic for a term of five years' (Art. 29/A);
- the President 'is Chief of the armed forces' (Art. 29).

The Parliament is entitled to decide on:

- 'the declaration of a state of war and the conclusion of peace';
- 'the deployment of the armed forces both abroad and within the country'; and it can
- 'establish the National Defence Council, in the case of war, or imminent danger of armed attack by a foreign power (danger of war)' (Art. 19, para. (3), subparas (g), (j) and (h)).

The National Defence Council:

- 'shall decide on the deployment of the armed forces abroad and within the country, and on the introduction of emergency measures . . .';
- 'is chaired by the President of the Republic, and is composed of . . . the Speaker of Parliament, the leaders of the parliamentary groups of the political parties represented in Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Ministers, and the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Army' (Art. 19/B, paras (1) and (2)).

In case the Parliament is obstructed in reaching the necessary decisions:

- 'the President . . . shall have the power to declare a state of war, a state of national crisis and establish the National Defence Council, or to declare a state of emergency' (Art. 19/A, para. (1));
- in peacetime, the government 'directs the operation of the armed forces and of the police and other security organs' (Art. 35, para. (1), subpara. (h)).

The Constitution clearly defines the roles of the different enforcement agencies:

- 'the fundamental duty of the armed forces (Hungarian Army, Border Guard) is the military defence of the country. Within the ambit of its policing activities, the Border Guard shall guard the borders of the country, control border traffic, and maintain order on the borders' (Art. 40/A para. (1)).
- The 'fundamental task of the police is to maintain public safety and internal order' (Art. 40/A para. (2)).

In the framework of defence reform, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff were separated on 1 December 1989. According to the new structure the Ministry was subordinated to the Prime Minister whereas the General Staff and the command of the armed forces were subordinated to the President. The idea behind this separation of the functions was to prevent the subordination of the armed forces to the government. This step was proposed by the last HSWP government and passed by the still communist-dominated legislature against the background of the expectation of a non-communist government after the elections. At the same time, it was expected that the popular reform-communist politician Imre Pozsgay – who was more familiar to the population than opposition leaders – would win direct elections for the Presidency. This would have left the command of the armed forces under the like-minded president rather than the non-communist government. As the direct election of the President could have been prevented in a referendum, however, Pozsgay did not become President. In a deal between the two largest parties in the parliament after the spring 1990 elections (the Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), which formed the government, and the opposition liberal party, the Alliance of Free Democrats), Árpád Göncz was elected President by the parliament. As he belonged to the Alliance of Free Democrats, the seeds of inter-institutional conflict between the government (especially the Prime Minister) and the President were inherent in the system. Indeed, conflict broke out in

relation to the October 1990 taxi blockade (when taxi drivers paralysed the life of the country for a long weekend by blocking roads in protest against fuel price increases). When the government considered the possibility of using military vehicles to end the blockade, the president opposed this and a constitutional crisis developed. The constitution stated that 'only the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the National Defence Council, the Government and the responsible Minister shall have the right to direct the armed forces' (Art. 40/B para. (3)). It was apparent that not all those bodies could direct the armed forces, particularly not at the same time. The Minister of Defence asked for an interpretation from the Constitutional Court. The Court decided on the matter in September 1991, stating clearly that the 'direction of the functioning of the armed forces is in the legal power of the government'.[6] It also stated that the 'commander in chief of the armed forces . . . is leading [the armed forces] though not commanding them'. Consequently, the number of actors who had peacetime responsibility (including the President and the government) to direct the armed forces was reduced, even if the problem was not eliminated fully. On the 'dark side' of this decision, it appears that the Chief of the General Staff could interpret the situation as meaning that the only 'institution' that represents civilian control is the Minister of Defence. Bearing in mind that over the last ten years Hungary's defence ministers have not been the best prepared and most influential politicians, this arrangement potentially carries major risks. Following another decision of the Constitutional Court the functions of the Commander of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff were unified in September 1992.

The constitution sets forth that with 'the exception of military manoeuvres carried out according to international treaties and peacekeeping missions upon the request of the United Nations, the armed forces may only cross the country's borders with the prior consent of the Parliament' (Art. 40/B, para. (1)). This rule deprives the country's military leadership of some flexibility. In 1995, for example, when MiG-29 planes left for an exercise in Poland without the approval of the legislature, the Minister of Defence, György Keleti, offered his resignation for technically violating the constitution. Thus the argument for modifying the constitution to allow Hungary to become more actively and flexibly involved in NATO activities is quite compelling. After December 1998, the moderate conservative government sought to implement the necessary constitutional changes, but these proposals were blocked by the Socialist opposition due to unrelated domestic political disputes (constitutional changes require a two-thirds majority in the parliament,

and hence usually the support of the opposition).[7] As of early 2001, it remained to be seen how the issue would be resolved. It should be emphasized that Hungary does not in any manner violate NATO norms with its current constitutional regulation. It simply has less military flexibility than would be possible after a revision of the rule.

As far as political activity by members of the armed forces is concerned the rules are similarly strict: 'professional members of the armed forces, the police and the civil national security services may not be members of political parties and may not engage in political activities. Restrictions on the political activities of non-professional members of the armed forces may be established by a statute passed by a majority of two-thirds of the votes of the Members of Parliament present' (Art. 40/B, paras (4)–(5)). These rules have been interpreted strictly. Thus, for example, when the largest party of the coalition government organized a conference about defence reform in 2000, the Chief of General Staff decided that it was a professional rather than party political meeting and professional military personnel were permitted to participate.[8]

The legal foundations for democratic civil–military relations were established before the system change was completed in an institutional sense by the first multi-party elections in 1990. Throughout the 1990s, however, issues of civil–military relations were debated heavily. Interestingly, and in light of the early establishment of the foundations of the new system of civil–military relations, debates were far less vehement internationally than domestically.

Hungary was the first former Warsaw Treaty member-state to appoint a civilian defence minister in the person of Lajos Für in May 1990 (Für's predecessor, former Colonel-General Ferenc Kárpáti, was 'made' a civilian in autumn 1989 but, bearing in mind Kárpáti's long-standing professional military career, Für was the first 'real' civilian defence minister). Irrespective of Für's limited competence, this was a major step forward. There was a real problem, however, in that the new democracy understandably could not install a competent class of civilians in the Ministry of Defence to support the civilian political leadership immediately after the system change. The armed forces were suspicious of the few civilians who had acquired expertise in the field of defence. The fact that most Western support in training and retraining was offered to military professionals also contributed to the slow development of civilian expertise. The professional superiority of the military in defence matters was – and is – politically damaging. Military professionals retained significant influence on decision-making inside the Ministry of

Defence. At the same time, the weakened civilian leadership of the ministry does not and cannot credibly represent military interests at the political (governmental or parliamentary) level.

In the second democratic election of spring 1994, the Socialist Party (the successors of the HSWP) gained an absolute majority in parliament and formed a coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats. The Ministry of Defence fell into Socialist hands. György Keleti, a retired colonel and former spokesman of the Ministry of Defence, became Defence Minister. This appointment was not the healthiest signal from a country that aspired to NATO membership. It was made even more problematic when Keleti invited some of his former military colleagues to take senior positions in the ministry. This development was legitimately criticized as a remilitarization of the Ministry of Defence. The administrative state secretary and four of the five deputy state secretaries were all former uniformed professional soldiers. Most absurdly, the establishment of civilian control of the military was the task of the former Chief of the General Staff. The 'new spirit' filtered down the system and a few months later nearly all mid-career civil servant jobs in the Ministry of Defence were filled by professional soldiers.

The institutional reform that had been in its infancy was halted. The new administration revised the decision of the HDF government to merge the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, and thus 'resubordinate' the latter to the former, and the 'independence' of the General Staff was therefore maintained. The reintegration of the General Staff would have provided an opportunity to establish more effective civilian control of the armed forces. Furthermore, it would have contributed to the streamlining of military bureaucracy and the reduction of parallel structures. The problem was serious, in terms of both the composition of the personnel and the structure of the defence sector. It was certainly a set-back in the sense that years were lost without getting close to a 'modern' defence structure that could function effectively without too much redundancy and be integrated with similar structures in other NATO members. It is important to note, however, that the foundations of civil–military relations that characterize Western democracies were not fundamentally undermined. As the enlargement of NATO advanced, Hungary's Western partners increased the pressure on the Hungarian leadership to take more determined steps to modernize its defence sector. In the final months before the 1998 elections, reform efforts reappeared, primarily as a result of Hungary's invitation to join NATO, but were not backed by the necessary determination. The record

of the socialist government remained inconclusive in this field to say the least.

The moderate conservative government which came to power in the summer of 1998 placed an understandably heavy emphasis on the reform of civil–military relations. The largest party of the new coalition (the Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, FIDESZ) expressed clearly its dissatisfaction with the activity of the socialist-liberal coalition in this area. The government programme thus stated that the 'Government provides for the civilian control of the armed forces, and takes the necessary Organizational measures'.[9] Despite this, ministerial posts in the Ministry of Defence were not prized by either FIDESZ or their coalition partners, the Independent Smallholders Party (ISP). Although the Ministry of Defence was formally 're-civilianized', this policy was largely declaratory. By the autumn of 2000, the administrative state secretary as well as two of the four deputy state secretaries were still professional soldiers with long military service. When the government of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was formed, a retired two-star general was placed in charge of security and defence policy in the Prime Minister's office as political state secretary. As a result, the practice of the Orbán government hardly represented a departure from that of the 1994–98 socialist-liberal coalition. New security and defence policy principles were adopted in March 1999, however, reflecting Hungary's integration in the Atlantic Alliance.[10] The issue of civilian control of the armed forces was overshadowed by wider considerations of NATO compatibility and interoperability. Consequently, even though the importance attributed to civil–military relations was retained the issue has become part of a far broader strategic defence review.

Formally, the parliament has been at the pinnacle of defence-related decision-making since the system change. The classical functions of civilian control of the armed forces, such as the definition of the structure, size and budget of the armed forces, the development of the command and control system, the preparation of the defence act and the service law were placed under the authority of parliament and have been undertaken reasonably adequately since 1989. The parliament's role in relation to defence matters has, however, been relatively limited, reflecting the large number of other tasks requiring its attention, the general trust attached to the new leaders in government and, first and foremost, the lack of experience and basic expertise in this area. Moreover, because there is no programme budgeting in Hungary, parliamentary control of the defence budget is limited and the situation has remained chaotic in this area ever since the system change. For this

reason, one of the most important elements of parliamentary control over the armed forces remains rudimentary. More effective oversight and control of the defence budget would have been desirable, but in an atmosphere where every matter has been highly politicized and the defence committee is dominated by the governing parties this has been difficult. There has not been any noticeable difference in this respect between the three governments in office since 1989. Between 1990 and 1998 the chairmen of the Defence Committee of the Parliament and the Defence Minister came from different parties of the governing coalition. Since the Orbán government came to power in 1998, both the Defence Minister and the chairman of the parliamentary Defence Committee have come from the Smallholders' Party, further constraining the likelihood of criticism of the Defence Ministry by the Defence Committee. Even though there are some MPs who have served on the committee for many years, on the whole the traditional 'government–opposition' divide determines the reactions of the committee to the activity of the Ministry of Defence. On one occasion the current chairman of the Defence Committee pronounced 'the main duty of the Defence Committee is to carry out the programme of the government'.[11] From such a statement it is apparent that parliament generally, and the Defence Committee specifically, has not been in a position to live up to some of its functions. It has remained largely reactive and has not taken the initiative in any major issue relating to defence.

The real problems of the defence sector of a new NATO member

The decade that passed between the de facto end of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and Hungary's accession to NATO saw quite intensive reforms of civil–military relations. This process has not been free of problems, however, and there is much that could be done to improve the situation further. Most importantly, during the past decade the armed forces of Hungary have been in steady decline and the country has been left with fairly little to offer as a contributor to the security of the Alliance. If one intends to assess the situation more positively the scope of analysis has to be broadened. Namely, Hungary is widely regarded as a factor of stability and has provided a genuine strategic contribution to peace operations in the former Yugoslavia – despite the fact that it has been unable to provide for its own security by military means. Consequently, the coming years, maybe decades, will have to

focus on the real defence issues. It is thus worth looking at the 'daily reality' of the last decade of Hungarian defence efforts.

Structural developments and changes

Structural reforms during the term of office of the conservative government of the early 1990s were necessarily confined to the reorganization of institutions, if for no other reason than budgetary constraints. The situation started to change slightly during the term of the socialist-liberal coalition in order to meet the requirements of the Atlantic Alliance – or at least in order to pay lip service to them.

It took a year (1994–95) for the socialist-liberal coalition government in office to work out its comprehensive defence reform plan. This combined medium- and long-term reforms of the Hungarian Defence Forces. It was passed by the National Assembly in preparation for NATO membership and stated that: 'it is necessary that a modern armed force should come about, smaller than currently with a more credible retentive capability that can be integrated in the military organs of NATO.'[12] The government envisaged that the peacetime personnel strength of the military would equal 0.5–0.55 per cent of the population of Hungary, in the long term (by 2005). In the medium term (by 1998) it aimed to have armed forces capable of carrying out the following tasks:

- the prevention of incursions by small armed groups;
- the defence of Hungarian airspace and counter-activity against attacking air assets;
- participation in international tasks (conflict management, joint exercises, peacekeeping);
- the protection of public order, participation in disaster relief;
- following a few months' preparation, defensive operations at a strategic level;
- defending the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country in times of war.

The more ambitious plans of the moderate conservative Orbán government envisaged a three-phase reform. First, between 1999 and 2003 the consolidation of the organization will take place (to create the conditions for cooperation with NATO and to introduce those reforms necessary for the establishment of capability-based armed forces). Second, between 2003 and 2008 the basic features of capability-based armed forces are to be established. Third, between 2008 and 2013 the

capability-based forces will become dominant. Indirectly, the Defence Force 2013 document recognized that defence reform to date had been inconclusive. This was due partly to budgetary limitations which prevailed until 1998, and to the spontaneous and in many cases non-comprehensive character of the reforms. For these reasons *there was not a single area where the Hungarian Defence Forces had achieved compatibility with NATO* when the country joined the Alliance in 1999.

For these reasons, the new wave of defence reforms launched in July 1999 had to promise to be radical, comprehensive and swift. The decision required the Minister of Defence to put forward the concept of a comprehensive strategic review of national defence. The review had to take account of the totally changed strategic environment following accession to NATO and the conclusions that could be drawn from the Kosovo crisis. The government set forth two major parameters for the review: that it must not demand resources beyond the already defined budgetary limits and that it must not result in an increase of the Defence Forces' overall personnel strength.[13]

The report started out from a critical assessment of the present situation. It stated that the 'preparation of commanders and staff, the quality of troop training have all decreased radically . . . the situation of military equipment, material stocks and installations have become critical as no substantial development took place during the past ten years.' The report concluded that earlier military reforms had failed to solve the Hungarian military's fundamental structural and operational problems. In order not to exceed the budgetary constraints set forth by the government for the coming five years (until 2004) it was deemed necessary to reallocate the budget in order to free resources. This is to be achieved through 'downsizing, the transfer of certain activities outside the scope of the budget, the outsourcing of activities and the reduction of the number of installations and pieces of equipment as well as garrisons and a gradual transformation of the internal proportions of manpower'.

The report indicated the importance of transforming the higher echelons of command. The starting point of this transformation was the acknowledgment that while the peacetime personnel strength of the Hungarian Defence Forces had been reduced from 150000 to 60000, the total headcount of those working in the command organs had not changed. Even multiple transformations had not done away with duplication, operational anomalies and unnecessarily complex command levels. Additionally, despite the planned reductions and consolidation, Hungarian defence will continue to be based on a mass, conscript army.

A number of conclusions could be drawn from this analysis of the situation. The termination of the separate existence of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff of the Hungarian Defence Forces and the integration of the Defence Staff into the structures of the Ministry addressed part of the problem. All organizations active in central planning and supporting the operation of the Defence Forces should be integrated accordingly. The so-called 'background organizations' of the Ministry of Defence or the Defence Staff – those organizations that do not perform tasks closely related to armed defence – should either be transferred to other portfolios, taken out of central financing or terminated all together. Division commands will be abolished, and the subordinated units will in future be led directly by the respective Chiefs of Staff. According to the report the newly reformed integrated ministry will be based on the following principles:

- The Hungarian Defence Forces will be led by the Minister of Defence by way of the Chief of the Defence Staff. The post of Commander of the HDF will be abolished.
- The HDF Defence Staff will be integrated into the structure of the Ministry of Defence and will function as the military planning, organizational and decision preparation staff of the Minister of Defence.
- The Hungarian Defence Forces shall be led by the Chief of the Defence Staff who is directly subordinated to the Minister of Defence.
- The administrative structure of the Ministry of Defence will be directed by the Administrative State Secretary of the Ministry.
- The units of the Hungarian Defence Forces will in peacetime be led by the Chiefs of Staffs of the relevant services.

The report concluded that the following principles should be adhered to in defining the structure, the detailed personnel breakdown and the geographic deployment of the Hungarian Defence Forces:

- The total personnel strength of the defence portfolio should be 45 000 people. Within this, every effort should be made to increase the proportion of combat forces.
- The level of manning of the remaining units should be increased.
- The number of command levels should be reduced, including the abolition of divisional commands.
- Relatively high nominal costs necessitate the decommissioning of small garrisons and the concentration of the remaining troops into so-called 'base garrisons'.

- Units that do not display tangible and actual combat capabilities in peacetime should be decommissioned.
- Those functions and organizations that divert resources from the development of combat units and are not closely related to the core mission of the armed forces should be transferred outside the defence portfolio and its budget.

The report set similarly ambitious goals in other areas. It promised a more transparent system of human resource management and a development system based on continuous monitoring and evaluation of performance. Conscription will remain the basis of recruitment, but increasing the proportion of contract service personnel will also be pursued. In order to increase the ratio of non-commissioned officers and improve their training a central NCO training school will be established. Improvements will also be sought in soldiers' salaries and living, working and housing situations.

The report states realistically that in the decade following NATO accession the Hungarian armed forces will 'have to cover significant ground in order to catch up with the average level of the Allies'. However, all the critical areas cannot be addressed at the same time. Thus, the programme of the review expands to ten years and it is split into three phases. During the first phase, the main objectives are to provide the financing for the transformation, and to improve working and living conditions and the attractiveness of a military career. During the second phase, the emphasis will shift to development, with the aim of improving the level of training and readiness. In the third phase, the quality of the armed forces will be improved through the procurement of new equipment.[14]

The ambitious programme laid out in the strategic defence review serves a number of objectives. It reflects the genuine willingness of the government that came to power in 1998 to 'right the wrongs' of the previous decade. It is also important as a demonstration of a response to the mounting pressure from NATO to carry out the necessary modernization of the armed forces in the foreseeable future. Finally, it proposes a plan for the development of the armed forces that ensures a significant postponement of the most investment-intensive phase of defence reform. The presentation of the non-compatibility of the Hungarian Defence Forces with NATO standards as part of the strategic review is a shrewd and unique aspect of the current reform. It is an open question whether this will be acceptable to NATO.

While it is premature to give a firm answer, there is some evidence that NATO has already lost patience. Press reports have suggested that in the 1999 report of General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, several critical remarks were made about Hungary's adaptation to NATO standards. Specifically, it was noted that many pieces of equipment were approaching the end of their service time, and that the fulfilment of many commitments is postponed until a later stage. The combat helicopters offered during the accession talks will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance from 2002 onward only. Several units offered to NATO form part of other multinational commitments, such as the Italian-Slovenian-Hungarian brigade and the Romanian-Hungarian battalion. Such multiple international assignments are unacceptable. There are no concrete plans to host NATO reinforcements. Surface-to-air missiles and fighter aircraft, with the exception of the air wing composed of MiG-29 planes, are outdated. The MiG-29s themselves cannot operate internationally as they are not compatible with NATO aircraft. The electronic war-fighting capability of the Hungarian armed forces is limited. A military police force has not been set up and English language proficiency has hardly improved.[15] When General Clark paid a farewell visit to Hungary not much later he confirmed the existence of the report carrying the critical comments. However, he has also emphasized that the comments were made in order to encourage the development of the Hungarian armed forces and improve Hungary's defence capability.[16]

The announced strategic review aims at the establishment of a 'leaner and meaner' defence force. The idea is to have a smaller, consolidated, more effective force than at present. This raises two types of question: first, does the current strategic review contain the necessary measures to achieve these objectives? Second, is there a chance that the measures agreed will be put into practice? Are the chances better now than during earlier military reforms?

The current reform was initiated during a desperate stage in the development of Hungarian military affairs. The coexistence of three factors left no doubt that the steady deterioration in the situation of the armed forces could not continue: first, NATO accession; second, the Kosovo crisis; and third, the impossibility of continuing to finance the defence sector from the funds allocated in the state budget. The strategic review is based on a thorough analysis of the situation, and stems from the determination of the government to reverse the trend that has prevailed since the mid-1980s. It is sufficiently comprehensive to carry the promise of an improvement in the situation. The Hungarian govern-

ment has been anxious about the severe nature of the situation, for both internal and external reasons. However, there are certain dangers inherent in the reform process. Most important, the fact that the population of Hungary does not perceive any major threat means that the domestic environment is not particularly conducive to increased defence efforts. It is difficult to explain the shift from threat-based to capabilities-based armed forces to the public and thus generate the necessary support for reform. Second, no defence reform will succeed unless it has the support of all major forces of the political spectrum. It seems, however, that at least as regards the objectives of the current review this backing exists. Third, for more than a decade the defence budget was the 'softest' of the state budgets and could be reduced in case of unexpected difficulties in other portfolios. Whether the international (NATO) commitment of the country to increase the defence budget and then maintain it at a certain level of the GDP will be sufficient to fight this tendency in the future is open to question. Fourth, since the system change in 1990, the leadership of the Ministry of Defence has not been composed of the brightest and most 'heavyweight' political personalities of the government coalition, further undermining the already limited bargaining power of those in charge of defence. If this situation persists, the success of the reform process may be jeopardized in the longer run.

A number of problems that have already emerged raise doubts about the prospects for defence reform more generally. First, the establishment of a consolidated structure is problematic when the human and financial resources available are insufficient to bring the armed forces up to NATO standards and sustain them at such a level. As Jeffrey Simon put it when drawing general conclusions for the three new NATO members: they have prepared roughly 15 per cent of their armed forces to NATO standards, creating dislocations among the remaining forces and resulting in two-tier military structures.[17] In Hungary's case, a divide exists between the 'elite' land force units assigned to carry out NATO-related tasks and the rest. While it would probably not present a particular problem for the fully manned and equipped rapid reaction units to fulfil their tasks, it would almost certainly be a major challenge for the rest. This is the price Hungary pays for not departing from the concept of a mass, conscript army. In spite of the consolidation of the structure of the armed forces, including the planned closing of 18 garrisons, other units will remain heavily dependent on mobilization.[18] Indeed, there are serious doubts over the reliability of the Hungarian mobilization system (although the costs of the alternative option of switching

from conscription to a fully professional force are usually seen as prohibitive).[19]

Second, the strategic review proposes the termination of non-combat-related organizations and activities of the armed forces either through their elimination or their 'handing over' to other ministries. Whereas the former does not pose any particular problems (unless, of course, it is later concluded the activity should have been continued rather than ended), the latter does. Namely, if the organization and the activity handed over to another portfolio is not accompanied by the reassignment of the necessary budgetary resources, the 'receiving' ministry is likely to slowly but surely terminate the activity. If, on the contrary, the budget to maintain the activity leaves the defence sector, then the defence budget will shrink. In light of the obligation to increase defence spending and then maintain the defence expenditure at the increased level, such a solution would be contrary to Hungarian interests.

Defence budget

One of the fundamental assumptions of the current strategic review was that the existing military force structure could no longer be maintained by the financial resources available. This has been known for some time and had become obvious to the leadership of the Defence Ministry, according to some senior officials, by May 1999. At the same time, it became clear that the Atlantic Alliance would not tolerate a continuation of Hungary's extremely low defence budget. Furthermore, there is a major discrepancy between official estimates and real expenditure.

The defence budget was in steady decline for a full decade between 1987 and 1997. It was often emphasized in the late-1980s that the primary contribution of the defence sector to the stability of Hungary was not to absorb resources extensively or, to put it bluntly, not to waste money. In light of the major challenges posed by economic reform and a relatively benign international environment, this trend continued after the system change in 1990. This changed in the late-1990s not because of a major deterioration in Hungary's security environment, but because it was impossible to both sustain the earlier situation in the armed forces and gain membership in NATO.

As a proportion of GDP, the defence budget reached its lowest level in 1997 at only 1.22 per cent of GDP. Only with the invitation to negotiate NATO membership in 1997 did the situation begin to change. During its NATO accession talks, Hungary agreed to increase its defence budget by 0.1 per cent of GDP from 1998 to 2001 and then maintain it at 1.81 per cent of GDP. As a result, the Hungarian defence budget increased in real terms in 1998 for the first time in more than a decade.

At the same time, the obligation of the defence sector to generate some of its income was reduced. Whereas such income contributed between 12.2 and 14.7 per cent of the defence budget between 1994 and 1997, it was reduced to 11.8 per cent for 1998.

The above analysis might give the impression that everything has been put into perfect order by NATO accession as far as the Hungarian defence budget is concerned. This, however, is not the case. There are certain major as well as minor problems. First, a meaningful increase in defence spending depends on solid economic growth. Calculations have started from the assumption of significant growth in Hungarian GDP. If the expected growth does not occur, the increase in defence spending will in real terms be smaller than originally predicted. Second, the application of NATO standards in areas such as retirement benefits for professional military personnel will impose additional burdens on the defence budget. These will reduce the increase in the defence budget in real terms to the extent of nearly eliminating it. In reality, the promised 43 per cent nominal increase may not exceed 7–8 per cent increase in real terms. Third, the approaches of NATO's international staff and the Hungarian defence establishment to calculating defence expenditure differ. Hungary includes that part of the border guard that will be subordinated to the defence forces in the event of war in 'national defence spending', whereas NATO argues that no part of the border guard's budget should be counted as 'national defence spending'. This difference may account for as much as 0.2 per cent of Hungarian GDP. Last but not least there are problems with the income the defence sector is obliged to generate. NATO cannot but accept the obligation of the Hungarian defence sector to generate a certain income as part of the defence budget. If there are arrears in generating the income this will result in non-compliance with NATO's defence planning questionnaire later. In sum, while NATO greatly appreciates Hungary's commitment to substantively increase defence spending, there are doubts whether this increase can be put into practice and whether the Hungarian authorities are entirely faithful in presenting their plans. These problems also appear on another level: while the Defence Ministry is willing to implement the financial commitments agreed with NATO, the Ministry of Finance (and the Prime Minister's Office – implementing a populist economic policy) has a different set of priorities.

Defence planning and procurement

Defence planning in the Hungarian military has been heavily influenced by the country's recent membership of NATO. Only after Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were invited to begin NATO

accession negotiations in July 1997, however, did the Alliance conduct a detailed review of the prospective new members' military needs, and agree military reforms and related timescales with them. The three states were asked to complete the basic planning and reporting document used in NATO's collective force planning, the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ). Following the DPQ's publication, the new members were presented with Target Force Goals. The completion of the DPQ and the following exchange about its credibility highlighted the shortcomings of the Hungarian defence establishment in relation to collective defence planning. Hungary, in common with the other candidates, was also guilty of some '*pia frans*' on the road to NATO membership. This made it difficult to bridge the gap between official communication before accession and thereafter. The change of government in the summer of 1998 further exacerbated this situation. Two subsequent DPQs have provided sufficient evidence that a major improvement in the competence of Hungary's defence bureaucracy is an essential precondition of active, professional involvement in NATO.

Hungary is a country where the population has been unconvinced for quite some time that extensive arms procurement serves any useful purpose. Back in the late 1970s, and from time to time ever since, the political establishment tacitly shared this opinion. A closer look at Hungarian arms procurement during the 1990s suggests the following conclusions. First, the overall trend of low levels of procurement has continued. Second, Hungarian governments had no clear defence procurement policy. De facto, policy was dictated by severe resource constrains that made no major procurement possible. Third, procurement can only be based on imports as Hungary has never had a particularly highly developed defence industry. Fourth, a hesitant attitude towards procurement was counterbalanced by verbal juggling. Innovations, like the emphasis on the importance of 'human compatibility' in Hungary's approach to the Atlantic Alliance, could only temporarily compensate for the lack of a clear procurement policy. Fifth, in light of the above factors, Hungary did not make any major procurement effort during the 1990s. The most prominent items acquired by the Hungarian armed forces throughout the entire decade were 28 MiG-29 aircraft, supplied by Russia in 1993 as reimbursement for a $1.7 billion debt to Hungary and which Budapest had little alternative but to accept since Russia was offering nothing else. Since then no major new acquisition of air force equipment has been approved, and the acquisition of new planes has been postponed for maybe a full decade upon the decision of Prime Minister Orbán. This, in light of the Kosovo crisis's underlining of the

importance of air power in modern warfare, is astonishing. In the second half of the 1990s procurement against the Russian debt continued at a slower pace. In 1995 BTR-80 and BTR-80A type armoured combat vehicles were delivered and Hungary also bought 100 T-72 battle tanks from Belarus. Hungary's compatibility with NATO forces was furthered by the acquisition of an Air Sovereignty Operation Centre (ASOC) from the US.

The overwhelming majority of the Russian debt was reimbursed by 2000, and the future of Hungarian arms procurement is far less certain than in the past. As a result of continuing budget constraints, resources for procurement will effectively have to be freed from other parts of the defence budget. Three factors are worth noting here. First, a certain minimum compatibility had to be achieved by the time Hungary joined NATO in March 1999. Specific areas given this high priority were: a radar and identity friend or foe (IFF) system, communications infrastructure, and computerization. Second, the recent increase in the defence budget has created a new opportunity for modernization. For the first time in many years the funds allocated to procurement and renovation exceed 10 per cent of the defence budget. Third, however, the strategic review has postponed major armaments procurement to the third phase of its implementation.[20]

Conclusion

In Hungary, the system change from communism to democracy occurred as part of a bargain between the communist establishment and the democratic forces. In light of the fact the Hungarian military had not played a significant role in domestic politics for decades, it is not surprising that no particular attention was paid to the armed forces during the transition. With no immediate threats to national security and a vanishing Warsaw Treaty Organization, the fundamental change was that the financing of the military continued to decline. Hungary did not face major problems in civil–military relations during the 1990s and political attention therefore focused on other, more urgent matters. Fortunately enough, the preconditions of NATO membership focused on civil–military relations to a limited extent, though they did not go much beyond checking the formal constitutional conditions for democratic, civilian control of the armed forces. For these reasons, civil–military relations remained at the bottom of the list of domestic political priorities and the practical implementation of reforms in this area received little attention. The most pertinent problem in this area

is probably the development of wide-ranging civilian expertise in military matters.

Hungary became part of NATO before its armed forces met any of the major requirements for material or human interoperability with the Alliance. This has created a dilemma for Hungary since it is obliged to meet those requirements. The attempt to meet these requirements has been only partly successful. Even though – as of 2001 – the determination of the current government to achieve a breakthrough is apparent, there are significant factors, outlined above, that militate against the successful completion of the necessary reforms. Successful military reform will require consensus within the Hungarian political establishment and sustained efforts by the country's NATO allies.

The commitment to reform has been primarily political and expressed through the country's loyalty toward NATO rather than through the practical implementation of changes in the military. The successful transformation of Hungary's defence policy and armed forces, further, will require important changes in the more subjective, human elements of the defence sector. The rather one-sided focus on civilian competence in military matters (or more precisely the lack thereof) will soon be supplemented by another consideration, namely, that military professionalism (or rather its absence) remained a serious problem throughout the 1990s and will continue to characterize the armed forces of the country for many years to come. The small contingent of Western-educated officers can only slowly erode the old structure, particularly when their knowledge is not used appropriately. It is the responsibility of political leaders to prioritize the development of greater civilian and military professionalism as an indispensable condition for successful defence reform.

Notes

1. See 'Orbán Viktor miniszterelnök beszéde a Vigadóban' [The address of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán], *Vigadó*, 3 February 2000, 1; http://www.meh.hu/Kormany/Kormanyfo/2000/02/000203.htm.
2. Cited in A. Köves, *Central and East European Economies in Transition: The International Dimensions* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992) 143.
3. R. L. Tökés, *Hungary's Negotiated Revolution: Economic Reform, Social Change and Political Succession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 362.
4. R. Joó, *The Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, Chaillot Papers No. 23 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, February 1996) 12 (emphasis in the original). Similarly Z. Pecze, *Civil–Military Relations in Hungary 1989–1996*, Harmonie Papers No. 2 (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies, February 1998) 5–10.

5. The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Act XX of 1949 as revised and restated by Act XXXI of 1989, Article 74. (Further references to the constitution are made in the text.)
6. 48/1991 (IX. 26.) AB határozat. 48/1991 (26 September) decision of Constitutional Court.
7. See 'Orbán: Ellenzék nélkül is működik a Ház' [Orbán: The legislative functions without opposition as well], *Népszabadság* (2 December 1998).
8. Z. Haszán, 'Tábornokok a pártrendezvényen' [Generals at a party programme], *Magyar Hírlap*, 19 February 2000.
9. *Az új évezred küszöbén: Kormányprogram a polgári Magyarországért* [On the eve of the new millennium: Government Programme for civic Hungary] (Budapest: n.p., 1998) 64.
10. Resolution 94/1998 (28 December) OGY of the National Assembly. Reprinted in F. Gazdag (ed.), *Magyar biztonság-és védelempolitikai dokumentumok 1989–1998*, vol. 1 (Budapest: SVKI, 1998) 53–7.
11. 'Bírálat Lányi Zsoltnak' [Criticism to Zsolt Lányi], *Népszabadság*, 17 August 1999.
12. Point 2 of Decision 88/1995 (6 July) of the National Assembly about the direction of the long- and medium-term reform and personnel strength of Hungarian Defence Forces.
13. See A Kormány 2183/1999 (VII. 23.) Korm. sz. határozata a NATO 1999. évi védelmi tervezési kérdõívére adandó magyar válaszról, a 2001–2006 közötti idó1szakra szóló NATO haderò1-fejlesztési javaslatokkal kapcsolatos magyar álláspontról, valamint a honvédelmet érintő egyes kérdésekről [Resolution 2183/1999 (23 July) of the Government on the reply to the 1999 Defence Planning Questionnaire of NATO, on the Hungarian position concerning NATO defence development plans for the 2001–2006 period and certain issues of national defence].
14. Report to the Government on the Comprehensive Strategic Review of the National Defence of the Republic of Hungary, October 1999; http://www.h-m.hu/mod/rev/report.htm.
15. See 'Kemény kritika a honvédségnek' [Tough criticism of the Home Defence Forces], *Magyar Hírlap*, 6 April 2000.
16. See 'Clark: A NATO jóhiszeműen bírálja hazánkat' [Clark: NATO criticizes Hungary with good will], *Népszabadság*, 20 April 2000.
17. J. Simon, 'Partnership for Peace (PFP): After the Washington Summit and Kosovo', *Strategic Forum*, no. 167 (National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, August 1999).
18. 'Átalakulás előtt a hadsereg' [The armed forces before transformation], *Népszabadság*, 11 December 1999, and Z. Haszán, 'Tábornokok . . .'
19. See for more details Z. Haszán, 'Hosszú távon olcsóbb a hivatásos haderőre való áttérés' [In the long run it is cheaper to switch over to professional armed forces], *Magyar Hírlap*, 3 February 2000.
20. 61/2000 (VI. 21.) OGY határozat a Magyar Honvédség hosszútávú átalakításának irányairól [Decision 61/2000 (21 June) of the National Assembly about the directions of the long-term change of the Hungarian Defence Forces].

Part II
The Baltic States

5
Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Latvia

Ilmars Viksne

In so many ways independence in 1991 was a watershed for Latvia, and one of the major challenges was the need to create a national armed force where none had existed for fifty years. The context in which this challenge was taken up was the country's struggle for independence in 1990–91. The use of Soviet Interior Ministry troops against Latvian demonstrators in January 1991 was a key milestone in convincing the new Latvian government that the republic's independence could only be safeguarded with more formal defence structures. The immediate path to the creation of a Ministry of Defence and the foundation of Latvia's armed forces therefore have their origin in the 12 months of 1991, though democratic control of the armed forces has taken longer to establish and nurture.

Under pressure to take rapid decisions, within weeks of independence the government created a Department of Public Security, tasked with overseeing the creation of a national self-defence system and supervision of the formation of voluntary police units.[1] Soon after this, the Latvian government passed a Law on the Home Guard, that established the foundations for a citizen-based territorial defence force for the newly independent state. At the end of August 1991, border protection forces were created under the supervision of the Department of Public Security. In September, Home Guard units were formed, with members being drawn from national lists. On 13 November 1991 the government decided that a Ministry of Defence should replace the Department of Public Security. The new Ministry of Defence took over the property of the Department of Public Security, as well as the majority of its personnel, and the former institution was disbanded in December 1991.[2] This marked a key milestone and subsequently led to the establishment

of a regular Latvian army made up of two parallel structures, the Home Guard and the Defence Troops.

However, it took until 1994 to formalize and codify many of the decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of independence, and in particular to put in place regulations governing the National Armed Forces. Two areas of need were to authorize the formation of the United Headquarters of the National Armed Forces and to place the Home Guard under the control of the Ministry of Defence. The Latvian parliament further reinforced these developments in the Law on State Defence on 24 November 1994, which laid down guidelines for the future structure of the Defence Forces and the Home Guard. This document clearly laid out the three core missions of the armed forces, identifying these as ensuring the inviolability of Latvian territory, preventing violent opposition to the country's legitimate authorities, and committing Latvian armed forces to international peacekeeping operations.[3]

One of the distinctive features of the creation of armed forces in Latvia was the relative speed with which new structures were set up. The period since 1994 has therefore focused on making effective the key relationships which ensure democratic control of the armed forces. While progress to date has led to a positive contribution to democratic control of the armed forces, parliamentary accountability still has some way to go before its de jure powers are de facto translated into effective scrutiny and accountability. There also remains a pressing need to build wider societal support for the Latvian armed forces, not least because of the continued importance of conscription to Latvian national defence, and the need to increase defence expenditure if Latvia is to meet the technical preconditions of NATO membership. There is therefore a series of ongoing challenges to embed and consolidate democratic values within the armed forces and society as a whole.

The legal framework of Latvian civil–military relations

While the need to create a legal framework for establishing and maintaining democratic civilian control over its armed forces has been challenging, not least because of the speed with which this needed to be achieved, there have been many difficult but few contentious issues to resolve. The rights and responsibilities of the executive and the legislature (the *Saeima*) in relation to the armed forces and defence policy are laid down clearly in Latvian law, and follow the core principles of democratic civilian control over the military.

The Latvian system for control of the armed forces involves a division of responsibilities, and implicitly also cooperation between different political authorities. The *Saeima* passes legislation relating to the military, determines the overall size of the armed forces, approves the defence budget and the appointment of the Commander of the National Defence Forces, has the power to declare a state of war and to decide whether a total or limited mobilization is required in such circumstances, and must approve within 48 hours any government decision to declare a state of emergency.[4] The parliament must also endorse international agreements on defence issues and approve decisions on the participation of the armed forces in peacekeeping operations abroad.[5]

In the early and mid-1990s, the *Saeima* passed a number of laws which provide the legal basis for Latvia's armed forces, defence policy and civil–military relations more generally. The November 1992 Law on the Defence Forces and the April 1993 Law on the Home Guard define the tasks of Latvia's armed forces, their organization and recruitment procedures, as well as providing guarantees of the human and social rights of servicemen and ex-servicemen. The November 1994 Law on State Defence defines the general principles of Latvian defence policy and further details the mission of the armed forces, as well as delineating the responsibilities of the Latvian authorities for defending national sovereignty. The circumstances in which a state of emergency can be declared, together with the powers facilitated by such a declaration, are defined in a December 1992 Law on the State of Emergency. The Law on Conscript Service was passed in February 1997, defining the legal, economic and social principles of Latvia's conscription system and also aiming to increase the involvement of the Latvian people in the country's defence system. The conditions under which the Latvian armed forces may participate in international military operations and exercises and international military exercises may take place on Latvian territory are defined by a February 1995 Law on the Participation of the National Armed Forces in International Operations.

In terms of the armed forces' chain of command, the President is the Commander-in-Chief and nominates a senior military commander in wartime. The President declares war on the basis of a decision by the *Saeima* and also recommends candidates for the position of the Commander of the National Armed Forces and can initiate the dismissal of the Commander. In addition, the President can issue direct orders to the armed forces jointly with the Minister of Defence or the Prime Minister.[6]

The government implements the *Saeima*'s laws and resolutions relating to defence issues through the Cabinet of Ministers. The Cabinet of Ministers is responsible for the day-to-day operation of all state security institutions and the development of related infrastructures, and can also issue documents and regulations on defence issues. For example, in 1997, the Cabinet of Ministers approved regulations relating to discipline within the military and military career structures.[7] Moreover, the government develops and executes both the Defence Plan and the Mobilization Plan and takes decisions on the participation of the armed forces in multinational military exercises and peace support, rescue and humanitarian assistance operations. In circumstances where the country faces internal turmoil or external threat to national sovereignty, the government also has the power to declare a state of emergency for a period of up to six months, although this must be approved by the *Saeima*. Under a state of emergency, the government has the right to prohibit strikes and demonstrations, censor the mass media and suspend political parties and organizations.[8] The National Security Council functions as a governmental advisory body on defence issues and evaluates the state's security situation and advises on security policy. Its members include the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the Parliament, the Chairman of the Defence and Interior Committee of the Parliament, the Chairman of the National Security Committee of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior.[9]

The Ministry of Defence is a civilian institution, which employs both civilian and military personnel, but in practice the majority of its employees are civilians. The Ministry of Defence works within the guidelines and is responsible for the implementation of the Defence Plan defined by the government. It also has responsibility for planning and monitoring the implementation of the defence budget.[10] The Minister of Defence is a member of the government and has political responsibility for defence policy, providing the guidelines for the military authorities to fulfil its tasks. The Commander of the National Armed Forces is subordinated to the Minister of Defence, who in turn is subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers and the *Saeima*.[11] The Cabinet of Ministers has overall responsibility for the development of the armed forces, providing guidelines for the work of the Minister of Defence.[12] A State Secretary, a high-ranking civil servant whose task it is to supervise financial, logistical and personnel issues within the Ministry of Defence, acts as assistant to the Minister.[13] The Minister of Defence is answerable to both the *Saeima* and the Cabinet of Ministers.

The Latvian parliament has the role of overseeing national security and defence policy. The *Saeima* has 16 Standing Committees, including the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee. This Committee organizes debates on key issues concerning the armed forces and scrutinizes new defence legislation and the defence budget. The Committee works closely with the Ministry of Defence, has the right to request information and material from the Minister of Defence and institutions under his supervision, and may summon officials to appear before it.[14] While the formal powers of the Committee are quite robust, for most of the period since 1991 there has been some difficulty in translating these powers into effective scrutiny. In large measure this is a consequence of the understandable lack of experience and knowledge of committee members. However, two factors have gone some way towards rectifying this weakness. First, the recent appointment of members with more experience and knowledge of defence issues, notably Juris Dalbins, a former Commander of the National Armed Forces, and Janis Adamsons, a former Commander of the Border Guard, have strengthened the Committee's experience. Second, over time the Committee members have themselves become more experienced and their reports and recommendations more authoritative. As a consequence, the *Saeima*'s contribution to the scrutiny of defence decision-making has increased. Interestingly it is the Ministry of Defence which has been at the forefront of encouraging a more active role through the organization of courses and the preparation of briefing papers for Parliamentarians. Whether this very close and genuinely supportive relationship will last beyond a honeymoon period shaped by the relative inexperience of the Committee, the novelty of the Latvian armed forces rapidly created from scratch and the immediate need for defence budget increases remains an open question.

Latvian defence policy

Latvian defence policy is based on a State Defence Concept (SDC) that tasks the armed forces with ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of Latvian territory.[15] The SDC does not explicitly name particular countries as potential military threats. However, in April 2000 President Vaira Vike-Freiberga expressed concern over Russian foreign policy and warned of the possibility that Russia might use force against its neighbours at some point in the future.[16] The State Defence Concept is based on the principle of 'total territorial defence', but recognizes the limited resources available to Latvia for defence spending. As a consequence of

these twin factors, the SDC requires conscription and, in the event of war, mass mobilization. The concept of total defence implies that the country's entire resources would be mobilized for resistance against an enemy. Thus Latvia's efforts at deterrence are based not on military superiority, but rather on the armed forces' ability to impose sufficient loss of matériel and damage to morale of an enemy to outweigh the potential benefits of aggression. In terms of broader goals, the SDC also highlights the aspiration to membership of NATO and the European Union (EU) and the need for active international cooperation, particularly with the other Baltic States. All these goals contribute to the primary task of national territorial defence.

Reflecting Latvia's status as a small country with limited resources, its armed forces are geared towards rapid mobilization consisting of 50 000 personnel, with the aspiration that they will eventually all be trained and equipped to NATO standards. NATO interoperability requirements therefore play an important role in the development plans for armed forces, and one of the military's priorities as of 2000–01 is the development of new systems that meet NATO standards for command and control, military personnel management and logistics. Not only does this provide a professional benchmark but it has the added value of enhancing the country's prospects for being invited to join the Alliance.[17]

The State Defence Concept formulates the wartime, crisis and peacetime tasks of the armed forces. Wartime tasks have had the greatest impact on the defence structures and their development. There are six core tasks: first, ensuring the sovereignty and integrity of Latvia; second, organizing the territorial defence of the state; third, carrying out intelligence and security activities; fourth, ensuring the continued operation of state institutions in times of war or crisis; fifth, participating in international peace support operations; and finally conducting search-and-rescue operations, as well as other non-military tasks.

Institutionally, the Latvian armed forces do not have any links with political parties. The military is also explicitly prohibited from direct involvement in domestic politics. However, as a direct result of Latvia's territorial defence policy based on a conscript army and mass mobilization, Latvian governments have tried to strike a balance between military effectiveness on the one hand and the rights of individual freedom of servicemen on the other. According to the Law on the Defence Forces, military personnel are prohibited from taking part in political activities, joining trade unions and organizing or taking part

in strikes, but can be members of non-political organizations and associations.[18]

The military's force structure, in particular the relative advantages and disadvantages of all-volunteer versus conscript armed forces, remains a matter of ongoing debate among Latvian defence policy-makers, political parties and the electorate. In general, all-volunteer forces are seen as desirable, but questions remain over the costs of such a structure, whether sufficient numbers of volunteers could be obtained and whether a fully professional army in a country the size of Latvia could provide an effective national defence capacity. On the whole, volunteer soldiers are much better trained and have greater military proficiency. Nevertheless Latvia does not have sufficient resources for both a fully professional army and a well-developed reserve component, which is one of the crucial elements of a total defence system. As a consequence, a conscript army is seen as the most realistic means and most cost-effective way for Latvian defence while offering the additional possibility of encouraging strong links between society and the armed forces.

NATO membership: Latvia's security and defence policy priority

The challenges of providing for Latvian security were not fully resolved by the departure of the last Russian troops from its territory on 31 August 1994. To many observers, the Baltic states were left in a political and security vacuum with a strong residual Russian influence in the Baltic region. To counter this, Latvia's foreign policy objectives have explicitly been focused on securing its membership into Western political, economic and defence structures. In the absence of immediate membership, consecutive governments have sought to consolidate its politico-military independence with the support of the West and through interoperability of Latvian and NATO forces and participation in Western-led humanitarian operations.

In June 1993, the first post-Soviet parliamentary elections altered the balance of political power in Latvia, with the Latvian Way, a liberal-oriented party, obtaining a majority of seats in the *Saeima*. Three of the four major parties, the Latvian Way, the Latvian National Independence Movement and the Agrarian Union, shared broadly similar approaches to foreign policy, arguing that Latvia could only safeguard its freedom through cooperation with western security structures, including NATO and the EU. At the same time, they stressed that Latvia should strive to

normalize relations with Russia. The fourth party, the Accordance of Latvia, remained opposed to NATO membership. Subsequent *Saeima* elections in 1995 and 1998 confirmed public support for a western-oriented foreign policy. The election of October 1998 saw six parties elected to the *Saeima*. Five of these, the People's Party, the Latvian Way, the Alliance for Fatherland, Freedom/LNNK and the New Party, remained committed to a Western-oriented foreign policy. As a result of this broad consensus over a seven-year period, consecutive Latvian governments have pursued a broadly consistent policy of creating appropriate international and domestic conditions for the development of its armed forces with the goal of NATO and EU membership.[19]

The Latvian government reaffirmed the policy of integration with NATO as a priority in May 2000, stressing its commitment to meeting the preconditions for NATO membership. The government committed itself to enhancing Latvia's defence capabilities, developing the armed forces in accordance with NATO criteria, improving the defence planning system and implementing more effective financial control of the armed forces. Additionally, the defence budget will be increased to 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2003. Latvia was one of the first countries to join NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), and has developed its cooperation further through participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

Participation in peacekeeping operations has been a keystone of the strategy delivering many of the government's broader defence policy objectives. Latvia has been active in providing Latvian peacekeeping units under NATO command in operations in the former Yugoslavia. Between 1996 and 1998, five Latvian platoons took part in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission in Bosnia where they were integrated with a Danish battalion. In addition, 142 soldiers of the Latvian company of the BALTBAT peacekeeping battalion were deployed in Bosnia between October 1999 and March 2000 and participated in SFOR operations between April and October 2001.

BALTBAT, set up jointly by the Baltic states, has become an important component of the Baltic states' multinational relations with NATO. BALTBAT was initially trained, equipped and structured to perform classical United Nations peacekeeping operations.[20] From 1997, however, the emphasis of BALTBAT shifted away from traditional peacekeeping, and by the end of 2000 it was hoped that it would be developed into a light infantry battalion capable of participating in more demanding peace enforcement operations. Thus, it is envisaged that the armour, fire-support and logistics components of BALTBAT will be

strengthened. Soldiers serving in BALTBAT receive western training, use western tactical manuals and operating procedures and gain invaluable operational experience of participation in multinational missions. For Latvia (and indeed the other Baltic states) one of the key roles of BALTBAT is to act as a conduit through which western military norms and culture, including democratic models of civil–military relations, are introduced into Latvia. To achieve this personnel who have served in BALTBAT return to other units of the Latvian armed forces, bringing their experience with them, and this has proved a particularly successful means to disseminate experience.

Broadly speaking, the development of Latvia's armed forces has followed western models of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces and military development more generally. A sound legal framework has been established and force-structure reforms are under way, but there remains a need for both soldiers, civilians working in the defence sector and indeed parliamentarians to learn more about democratic civil–military relations in practice. While western military experts have positively evaluated the development of Latvia's armed forces and defence policy, they have also argued that Latvia needs to do more to develop its personnel policy, especially establishing a military career system and a more professional corps of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Concerns also remain over the protection of the social rights of soldiers as well as the quality of training.[21]

Defence budgeting and planning

The future development of Latvia's armed forces will require an increase in manpower and the procurement of additional weapons and equipment. The Latvian government has committed itself to increasing the defence budget to 2 per cent of GDP by 2003 in order to achieve this (see Table 5.1).[22] In July 1999, military salaries were increased as an incentive to retain personnel of high quality in the services. Additionally, significant investment has been allocated for improvements in infrastructure, training and equipment. However, in order to effectively manage the increased funding, the armed forces will have to improve its planning capabilities. As a result, a new Planning Department was created within the armed forces headquarters, responsible for long-term financial planning. This new planning system will involve the Ministry of Defence, the armed forces headquarters and the different services. Within a continuous planning cycle, the aim is to produce short-, medium- and long-term plans based on NATO standards.[23]

Table 5.1 The Latvian defence budget, 1999–2003

	Defence budget	
Year	*% GDP*	*million LVL*
1999	0.85	33.10
2000	1.06	44.05
2001	1.50	66.58
2002	1.75	84.33
2003	2.00	104.76

Source: G. V. Kristovskis, p. 79.
(1 USD = 0.59 LVL)

Transparency of the defence budget is clearly an essential element of democratic control of armed forces and defence policy. Since regaining independence, Latvia's governments have tried to ensure that information on defence expenditures, the armed forces and the defence planning process is publicly available. Taking into account the State Defence Concept, the Defence Plan and priorities for the armed forces for the following year as defined in medium- and long-term development plans, the Ministry of Defence drafts guidelines for the defence budget for the following year and forwards these to the armed forces headquarters. The headquarters evaluates the draft guidelines and submits suggestions and amendments to the Ministry of Defence. After a coordinating meeting between the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces headquarters, the Ministry of Defence prepares a formal budget proposal for the next year. This is integrated into the government's overall national budget proposal, which is then submitted to the *Saeima* for approval. If the budget is approved, the *Saeima* then issues national budgetary legislation for the following year. At the end of the fiscal year, the military is obliged to report on the execution of the ministerial guidelines and begin the planning process for the next year. The Ministry of Defence has also sought to improve its audit capabilities and financial control structures, introducing a new internal audit system that verifies the legality and efficiency of its finances.[24]

Aside from the annual defence budgeting system, a structured short-, medium- and long-term defence planning system has also been introduced with long-term planning looking 12 years forward, while medium-term plans are based on a four-year cycle. The 12-year long-term plan is prepared on the basis of the State Defence Concept and

determines the strategy and priorities for the development of the armed forces, wartime and peacetime force structures, the mobilization system, NATO integration plans and the necessary resource allocation. The first such plan was submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers in December 1999. This long-term plan is then modified at four-year intervals synchronized with the four-year terms of the *Saeima*. The medium-term plan is designed to contain concrete aims, objectives and activities that have to be accomplished over the following four-year period. Short-term planning allows for adjustments to the four-year plan in response to changes in priorities or circumstances.[25]

The armed forces and Latvian society

During the first few years of independence, society was rather critical of the armed forces. The media highlighted many negative aspects of the military, including financial scandals among senior officers, mistreatment of conscripts, drunkenness and well-publicized criminal activity. For its part, the military felt that the media overlooked more favourable aspects of the armed forces' activities, preferring to either ignore them or present negative stories. In practice, the general public had little information about or understanding of the armed forces and defence issues. There was little open discussion of defence issues, or indeed even a dialogue between the military and society, stemming largely from the legacy of a lack of public interest in defence or security issues during the Soviet period. However, the low level of prestige of the armed forces and the unwillingness of both politicians and society in general to take the defence issue seriously were not just the result of the difficulties of state-building or simply a cultural hangover from the Soviet period. Many of these attitudes stem from the earlier historical experience of Latvia which has influenced current public attitudes to the armed forces.

The first historical aspect concerns Latvian defence strategy on the threshold of the Second World War. In the 1930s the Latvian government attempted to enhance the country's defence capabilities. Money was invested in the military, and the Latvian army was well trained and equipped by the standards of the time, with a peacetime army of 25 200 officers and men, a 68 000 strong Home Guard, a border guard brigade of 1300, an air force of 500 men and a navy of 450 men.[26] However, after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact was signed in August 1939, which included the secret supplementary protocol agreeing to divide Eastern Europe between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Baltic states had little chance of maintaining their independence. The

governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were unable to withstand the political and military pressure applied by the Soviet Union and in October 1939 Latvia and the Soviet Union signed the so-called 'Mutual Assistance Pact' which marked Latvian capitulation to Soviet demands. In June 1940, Soviet troops formally occupied Latvia.[27] After annexation, the Soviet Union began a systematic process of Sovietization of Latvian political, social and economic life. The Latvian army was disbanded, although 14 467 former Latvian servicemen were transformed into the 24th Territorial Corps of the Red Army.[28] Initially, many Latvian citizens took up arms as anti-Soviet partisans against the Soviet regime and, after the German invasion, many Latvians served in the Wehrmacht's 'Latvian Legions'.[29]

The end of the war and the second Soviet occupation of Latvia saw continued resistance by the Latvian population against the Soviet Union. An estimated 10 000 people pursued a guerrilla war against Soviet forces.[30] Gradually, however, military losses, dwindling supplies of arms and the collectivization of the countryside made guerrilla resistance untenable, and the last groups of Latvian national partisans surrendered in 1956.

The importance of this period of Latvian history for its present-day civil–military relations is threefold. First, the capitulation of the regular Latvian army to Soviet forces in 1939–40 damaged the prestige of the military. Second, the events of 1939–40 made many Latvians sceptical of the utility of national defence. These trends were reinforced by the participation of Latvians in the wartime German and Soviet armed forces, both of which were essentially occupying forces. Third, the war itself and subsequent partisan activity inclined Latvian society to value irregular guerrilla forces and a strategy of total defence over regular, more professional armed forces.

The second historical influence on present-day Latvian civil–military relations stems from the occupation of Latvia by the Soviet army, and in particular its activities in 1988–91 when the Baltic states' struggle for independence was most intensive. As part of its opposition to independence movements in the Baltic states, the Soviet leadership established organizations to support the preservation of the Soviet Union as a unitary state and 'socialist renewal'. Although presented as 'workers' movements', in the Baltic states these organizations mainly consisted of officers, demobilized military personnel from the Soviet army, military college cadets and Communist Party activists.[31] In May 1990, 'workers' movements' organized a riot in front of the Latvian parlia-

ment, intensifying tensions between the Soviet government and pro-independence Latvians. In January 1991, as part of Soviet President Gorbachev's efforts to appease his opponents in Moscow, the more reactionary factions within the Soviet leadership obtained a free hand to use violence in Latvia. The activities of the so-called 'National Salvation Committees' against the democratically elected governments of the Baltic states and the acts of violence by special troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry were almost certainly sanctioned by the Soviet leadership and supported by regular Soviet troops.[32] Later, during the failed coup by communist hardliners in August 1991, coup supporters took wide-ranging action in Riga, with special troops of the Soviet Interior Ministry and contingents from the regular Soviet army occupying all major strategic points in the city.[33] In general, the Soviet and later Russian troops in the Baltic states were an important means through which Moscow exercised direct influence. The role of the Soviet military increased the general suspicion of Latvian society towards armed forces and helps to explain the public's apathy towards the development of post-independence armed forces.

This anti-military tendency among the Latvian people was an important element in the eventual crumbling of Soviet power structures in the country. The Latvian people were consistently opposed to all activities of the Soviet army, viewing both the behaviour of the army and the entire Soviet military system in a negative light. The Republic's authorities pursued a policy of non-cooperation with the Soviet military, helping young men to avoid conscription and then escape prosecution for desertion. Unfortunately, these attitudes continue to affect public perceptions of Latvia's armed forces. As a result, residual associations with the Soviet army and a poor understanding of the role of new national defence structures still influence general views of the military. Against this background, military service remains unpopular, with a 1994 opinion ranking the military eighteenth in a list of desired careers.[34]

Thirdly, Latvian society's perceptions of the country's post-independence armed forces have been shaped by the information provided by the mass media. As noted earlier, the media has given an often fragmentary and negative view of the military, highlighting problems without exploring their causes. The Ministry of Defence and the armed forces had limited experience of dealing with the media and were largely unsuccessful in promoting more positive attitudes towards the military and defence. However, the Ministry of Defence has belatedly recognized

the need to actively engage in public education in order to inform the public on defence issues and facilitate dialogue between the military and wider civilian society. To this end, it has developed a coordinated public relations strategy designed to improve the understanding of defence policy and the role of the armed forces in order to contribute to the development of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces, and to involve non-governmental organizations and the general public in Latvian defence policy.[35]

Recent evidence suggests that public perceptions of Latvia's armed forces have become significantly more positive, perhaps indicating that the Ministry of Defence and the armed forces' public relations campaigns have had a positive impact. Public support for the army rose from 3.7 per cent in January 1999 to 35.8 per cent in December. Indeed, only the Church and the mass media received higher confidence ratings than the military. Most other state institutions received less support, including the parliament at 8.7 per cent, the Cabinet of Ministers at 11.2 per cent and the police at 14.7 per cent.[36] These figures illustrate increasing public confidence in the armed forces – despite the country's economic problems and the public's rather critical attitude towards state institutions in general.

Conclusion

Latvia rapidly established the constitutional, legal and institutional framework for its civil–military relations after it regained independence in 1991. Thus the respective responsibilities and rights of the legislature, the executive and the armed forces were given legal form at an early stage in the country's post-independence development. The new institutional framework of civil–military relations clearly provides for democratic civilian control over the armed forces and defence policy. While the development of new structures for control of the armed forces and defence policy has not always proceeded smoothly, in general Latvia has avoided serious conflicts between the *Saeima*, the President and the government over these issues and the armed forces themselves remain politically neutral.

Almost all in Latvia agree that the development of its armed forces and civil–military relations should aspire to reflect prevailing western norms. The historical legacies of the interwar period as well as the Second World War have had relatively little impact on the structure of Latvia's new armed forces, though historical legacies have been important in shaping public opinion. The Latvian government has consis-

tently affirmed that the country's central foreign and security policy goal is integration into NATO. As a result, Latvia has tried to base its defence policy on broad western models, tried to increase defence spending and focused on military interoperability with NATO. These measures have encouraged democratic and civilian control of the Latvian armed forces.

The Latvian authorities have also put in place a legal framework for democratic civilian control of the armed forces and started down the road of establishing effective cooperation between civilians and the military in developing and managing defence policy. However, serious challenges remain in terms of consolidating democratic values within the armed forces – as well as within Latvian society as a whole. While public perceptions of the armed forces have recently improved, there remains a need for active efforts by the Ministry of Defence and the military to encourage public understanding of and debate on defence and security issues. Now more than ever, Latvia's national defence system rests on the support and participation of the Latvian people and in the next decade this will be a key challenge in ensuring that Latvia's armed forces have the support and confidence of its people.

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6

The Challenges of Civil–Military Relations and Democratic Control of Armed Forces: the Case of Lithuania

Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbonas

The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces has never been a key issue in Lithuanian politics and there have been few studies of this area.[1] Civil–military relations in Lithuania since independence have generally been characterized by relatively weak organization within the military and a strong civilian presence managing the overall national defence system (encompassing the Ministry of National Defence, the Integrated Defence Staff, the Lithuanian armed forces and other related services). Democratic, and in particular civilian, control of the armed forces has been a central feature of Lithuanian civil–military relations. When Lithuania established its independence, the Supreme Council (the Lithuanian legislative body until 1992 when it was superseded by the present-day parliament, the *Seimas*) in theory exercised control over the Department of National Defence, which in turn controlled the military. In practice, this model did not function perfectly. The exact nature of civilian control of the military was often confused and civil–military relations were more complicated than this model suggested – a situation made worse by the absence of legislation and bureaucratic procedures relating to civil–military relations. However, from the beginning of 1994, when Lithuania officially declared its goal of joining NATO, significant reforms to civil–military relations were implemented. The *Seimas* passed several important laws embodying the principle of democratic, civilian control of armed forces, which are now firmly established within the overall national defence system. While these reforms have contributed to the consolidation of democratic control of the military, they have not prevented some disputes between civilian and military authorities over defence and security matters.

The development of Lithuanian civil–military relations

The development of civil–military relations and the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in Lithuania can be divided into three periods: the struggle for independence between 1990 and 1992; a period of transition in 1993–94; and a period of stabilization since 1995.

On 11 March 1990 Lithuania declared its independence from the Soviet Union, although international recognition did not follow until September 1991. The situation in the Republic at this time was unstable and unpredictable, with Moscow putting political, economic and military pressure on the Lithuanian independence movement. In this context, the Lithuanian authorities began to establish a national defence system in order to control and defend the state's territory and borders. On 25 April 1990 the Lithuanian government established a Department of National Defence (which became the Ministry of National Defence in 1991). The Lithuanian armed forces themselves grew from the Military Technical Sports Club, which was established by the Department of National Defence at this time, and a year and a half later became the Lithuanian Rapid Reaction Brigade.

During this period, the Soviet army was still deployed on Lithuanian territory. Relations between the majority of Lithuanian citizens and Soviet servicemen were strained and there were constant tensions on the ground. In general, the vast majority of the Lithuanian public supported the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The Lithuanian government adopted a security policy of neutrality designed to facilitate the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In October 1990 the Department of National Defence prepared a draft outline of Lithuania's national security concept. The concept stated that, given the country's geographical, political and economic situation, Lithuania's security policy should aim to create a zone of increased confidence between East and West in the Baltic region and the neutrality of all countries in this zone should be recognized.[2] Similarly, in 1992, a group of scholars from the Institute of Philosophy, Sociology and Law, commissioned by the Ministry of National Defence, prepared a Draft Concept of the National Security. For the first time, the concept explicitly referred to Russia as a threat to Lithuania. Additionally, a policy of neutrality was supported, with great importance attached to a civilian-based defence – a direct result of the nature of Lithuania's struggle for independence which had taken the form of mass civil disobedience. The goal of the security policy highlighted in the concept was that of achieving maximum indepen-

dence both from East and West. Significantly at this time, and in contrast to later developments, too much westernization was viewed as a threat to Lithuanian national identity, culture and values.[3]

The years 1992 and 1993 marked a transitional phase in Lithuanian civil–military relations and were characterized by economic and financial crises. Additionally, at this time, Lithuania had an extremely limited legislative framework relating to its armed forces. Indeed, in the National Defence Statute, published by the Ministry of National Defence in 1993, there were no legal regulations on civil–military and politico-military matters. As a result of internal disputes and the failure of the Ministry of National Defence and political leaders to adequately address defence issues, discontent flourished within the military. Insufficient funding for clothing, housing and salaries for military personnel made the situation worse. As a result, the popularity of military service declined and many qualified and skilled staff left the armed forces for the much better paid commercial sector.[4] Civil–military relations during this period were also a characterized by various criminal offences – mainly involving corruption and embezzlement – committed by soldiers and defence officials. Indeed, such were the illegal actions of some high officials within the Lithuanian defence system that the chairman of the *Seimas* National Security Committee recommended that several cases be brought to court.[5] The situation within the armed forces caused widespread disillusionment and public attitudes towards the military became increasingly negative.

A high percentage of these incidents involved military personnel from the Voluntary Service of National Defence (VSND), a paramilitary force established during the 1990–91 struggle for independence and subsequently developed to prepare reserves for the armed forces, guard important state and economic assets, assist the border guards and carry out territorial defence.[6] The VSND was in theory subordinated to the Minister of National Defence, but in practice it possessed a great deal of freedom of action. Most volunteers who joined the VSND were fiercely anti-communist and personally loyal to the right-wing Homeland Union – the political party which had initially established the VSND – and its leader Vytautas Landsbergis. VSND members felt that Lithuania owed them a debt of gratitude because they had borne the brunt of Soviet intimidation in 1991 and that they had subsequently been let down by the civilian government. This sense of injustice intensified in 1992 when the former communist Democratic Labour Party (DLP) acquired a majority in the *Seimas* and formed the country's new government. Landsbergis and the Homeland Union repeatedly made

statements accusing the DLP of seeking the eventual abolition of the VSND. To make matters worse, parliamentary or governmental control over the VSND was in practice very limited. This in turn gave the VSND a free hand with regard to recruitment, resulting in former criminals and those with questionable motivations joining the Service.

The most serious crisis in Lithuania's civil–military relations resulted from the actions of VSND members. In July 1993 about a dozen VSND volunteers, led by Lieutenant Jonas Maskvytis, retreated with their weapons into the woods surrounding the city of Kaunas, demanding the removal of several senior civilian and military officials and greater VSND autonomy from the Ministry of National Defence.[7] Disputes emerged between the Defence Minister, Audrius Butkevicius, and right-wing members of parliament over how best to resolve the crisis. The latter were sympathetic to the demands of the volunteers and entered into independent negotiations with them, although this was clearly beyond their prerogative. Butkevicius ordered the volunteers to return with their weapons. When they ignored his order, he dismissed them from the Service and declared them an armed group of renegade civilians. The Minister also stated that the parliamentary deputies were undermining his authority and had no power to intervene in the situation. The parliamentary commission, however, continued to take the lead in dealing with the volunteers, and in September persuaded most of them to surrender after guaranteeing that they would not be punished. While it was eventually decided that the volunteers would be put on trial, ultimately none of them were charged.

The incident with the VSND showed that Lithuania faced problems with regard to the politicization of some elements of its armed forces in the early 1990s. In another incident, the paramilitary *Sauliu Sajunga* – a voluntary organization which aims to help raise national consciousness and prepare for civilian armed resistance in the event of war or occupation – publicly supported presidential candidate Stasys Lozoraitis during the February 1993 elections.[8] Civil–military disputes also emerged after Lithuanian airspace was violated several times by Russian military aircraft, with the Chief of the Air Force Colonel Zenonas Vegelevicius openly criticizing the government for paying insufficient attention to the problem.[9] However, these problems were limited in scale and a result of the transitional character of Lithuanian civil-military relations at this point. Different dynamics, furthermore, were visible from 1994 onwards. In October 1993 President Audrius Brazauskas appointed Linas Linkevicius as the new Lithuanian Defence Minister. Linkevicius announced that his first task was the promotion

of stability and the depoliticization of Lithuanian's armed forces – a statement seen as relating directly to the previous actions of the VSND.[10] The Homeland Union opposition again accused the DLP of seeking to abolish the VSND and debate over the service continued for several years. A solution was eventually found in 1998 when the VSND was reorganized into the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) and integrated into the structure of the regular armed forces.

This transitional period in Lithuanian security and defence policy was also shaped by the country's relations with Russia and the West. Intensive negotiations with Russia on the withdrawal of the 22 500 former Soviet troops still in Lithuania took place in the first half of 1992. Popular support for the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops was confirmed in a June 1992 referendum in which 76 per cent voted in favour of their departure. In September 1992 agreement was reached with Russia on a schedule for the withdrawal, and the last Russian forces left Lithuania in August 1993.[11] The departure of Russian troops triggered a marked change in direction for Lithuania's foreign and security policy. In January 1994 Lithuania applied for NATO membership, an action that would have been unthinkable in the first two years of independence when the Soviet army was still present on Lithuanian territory. This reflected a move away from the earlier policy of neutrality and towards the goal of integration with western security structures. The desire for integration with western structures also created intensified pressures to conform to the norms of those institutions, including the principles of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces.

Following these developments, the *Seimas* made progress in establishing a legal framework for Lithuania's armed forces and civil–military relations, approving a Law on the Fundamentals of National Security and a Law on the National Defence System Organization and Military Service. The Law on the Fundamentals of National Security of Lithuania, adopted by the *Seimas* in 1996, formally confirmed Lithuania's intention to seek integration with western institutions – in particular NATO, the European Union and the Western European Union – as the central pillar of the country's security policy. These laws also clearly established democratic control of the armed forces as one of the central principles of Lithuanian defence policy.

Factors influencing Lithuanian civil–military relations

A variety of different factors have influenced the development of civil–military relations in Lithuania since 1990–91. In terms of histori-

cal legacies, two distinct periods have had a bearing on Lithuania's post-independence civil–military relations: the Soviet era and the interwar years. As was noted earlier, Lithuania's armed forces were created in the wake of the struggle for national independence in 1990–91 and therefore did not inherit or directly take over the doctrine, status or infrastructure of the Soviet armed forces. As a result, the impact of Soviet communist military culture and practices has been much more limited in Lithuania's case than for those postcommunist countries that have faced the challenge of reforming Soviet era armed forces. Although around 1400 Lithuanian commissioned officers served in the Soviet military, there is no reliable information on how many of these entered the new Lithuanian armed forces. However, general trends suggest that the number of former Soviet Army personnel involved in the Lithuanian armed forces has been fairly limited. This was particularly the case in the VSND, whose members were made up almost entirely of young volunteers.[12] Indeed, it is possible to say that the vast majority of commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the country's armed forces have only ever served with the Lithuanian armed forces. Additionally, it is clear that those Lithuanians who had served in the Soviet army and who were later involved in the establishment of the Lithuanian armed forces and defence system were not particularly politically orientated, and certainly had little desire to undermine or influence Lithuania's post-independence politics.

Lithuania's prewar armed forces are most associated with the war for independence against Russia of 1918–20. Military leaders, however, also actively participated in a *coup d'état* in 1926, which brought an authoritarian regime to power. Following this, some high-ranking military personnel continued to exercise a significant influence upon the country's politics, and although military obedience to civilian authorities was respected in principle between 1926 and 1940, in practice the military retained a significant degree of autonomy. The partisan war against the Soviet army, which continued for almost two decades into the 1950s, has also influenced more recent civil–military relations, contributing in particular to the preference of some sectors of Lithuanian society for irregular military formations over more formal structures.

These historical legacies had a limited degree of influence on the establishment of the Lithuanian armed forces in the early 1990s. The Lithuanian military establishment was keen to transmit elements of professionalism from the prewar armed forces into the new military, and the partisan legacy fitted well with Lithuania's more recent struggle for independence in 1990–91. Overall, however, the adoption of the tradi-

tions of the prewar Lithuanian military was sporadic and varied in different services within the new Lithuanian armed forces. Political leaders differed on the degree to which interwar legacies should influence the modern Lithuanian armed forces. Kestutis Gaska, a member of the *Seimas* National Security Committee, suggested reviving the traditions of the prewar military and strengthening the position of the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, arguing that the latter, not the Ministry of National Defence, must guide the armed forces.[13] However, it was generally perceived that such an approach would be contrary to the principle of the democratic, civilian control of the military and there was very little support for it in Lithuania more widely. Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius asserted that the requirements of the present-day Lithuanian armed forces were different from those of the prewar military and that he saw no possibility of introducing some of the prewar traditions and structures.[14]

The model for the development of the Lithuanian military in the 1990s reflected the prevailing mood of Lithuanian society, which was keen to try to combine the best traditions of the country's past with modern, liberal-democratic values. As a result, although the initial units of the Lithuanian armed forces were composed of volunteers and former officers of the Soviet army, the new structure and doctrine of the Lithuanian military reflect a more western approach to military reform. Residual Soviet influence among some elements of the officer corps did, however, lead to a certain resistance to the westernization of Lithuanian military norms and values. The combination of these two influences – westernization and the historical legacy of both Lithuanian national and Soviet pasts – can be seen in the restoration of the institution of the Commander in Chief in October 1993. Colonel Jonas Andriskevicius, a former communist and head of Vilnius Military School, was nominated to take this position. In contrast to the proposal made by Gaska, however, Andriskevicius remained under the clear direction of the Ministry of National Defence.[15] With the appointment of a civilian-controlled Commander in Chief, Lithuania took the first step in what ex-President Audrius Brazauskas has called 'the eastern experience and Western direction of Lithuania's armed forces'.[16]

The international context, and in particular the strategic goal of joining NATO, has also had a significant impact on the development of civil–military relations within Lithuania. The declaration of the goal of NATO membership resulted in a qualitatively new stage in the development of Lithuanian defence policy, with the adoption of a clear legal framework for democratic control of the armed forces. Moreover,

no significant political forces questioned the principle of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces, nor was there significant opposition from within the military.

The development of international contacts and military cooperation has also been an important influence on the development of Lithuania's armed forces. This process has helped to facilitate a greater understanding of liberal-democratic norms regarding civil–military relations both within the military and among civilian defence officials. Since August 1994 Lithuanian troops have participated in the UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR and KFOR peace support missions. In all cases Lithuanian forces operated as part of multinational formations.[17] In total, more than 580 Lithuanian military personnel have participated in international missions, which, although a relatively small number, constitutes almost 10 per cent of Lithuania's professional soldiers. The number of soldiers involved in international peacekeeping missions is, furthermore, likely to increase in the future.[18] NATO member states and partner countries have also provided training for Lithuanian military and civilian personnel in their defence education establishments, allowing Lithuanian officers and civilian defence officials to become familiar with NATO norms and operating procedures.[19] In 1998, for example, nearly two hundred military and civilian personnel undertook studies and training courses abroad.[20]

The legislative framework

The establishment of a clearly codified legal framework was an important step towards the implementation of democratic, civilian control of the military in Lithuania. The 1992 Constitution contains several provisions in this area. First, it states that the main issues of national defence shall be considered and coordinated by the State Defence Council, consisting of the President, the Prime Minister, the Parliamentary Chairperson, the Defence Minister and the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. Second, it makes clear that the government, the Defence Minister, and the Commander in Chief are all ultimately responsible to the *Seimas*, which is sovereign in these matters. Third, it states that the Defence Minister may not be an active serviceman.[21] Additionally, the Constitution prohibits Lithuania from joining any new political, military, economic or other state, alliance or commonwealth formed on the basis of the former Soviet Union. In 1996, after four years of heated discussion, the *Seimas* also passed the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security.[22] This legislation explicitly states

that the democratically elected civilian government must make all decisions on defence policy and the armed forces. Chapter Eight of the Law, entitled 'Democratic Control over the Armed Forces and other National Security Institutions', details the role of the government in defence policy and the system for control of the armed forces.

The Law on National Defence System Organization and Military Service (LNDS) was adopted in May 1998 and defines the systems for the organization, management and control of Lithuania's armed forces and related bodies.[23] The law also places constraints on the involvement of the military in politics. According to the Law, servicemen on active duty are not permitted to participate in any political activity, including membership of a political party or organization. Similarly, they are forbidden from active participation in political gatherings, meetings, demonstrations or any other public activity organized by a political body where political convictions and demands are expressed. They are also not permitted to support a political party or political organization, and forbidden from making political statements, articles or speeches which publicly disagree with the officially approved policy of democratically elected public authorities.

The Law on the Fundamentals of National Security and the LNDS establish a clear chain of command for the armed forces, with the President of the Republic identified as the Supreme Commander. The chain of operational command for military operations and other defence activities begins with the President, and through the Minister of Defence extends to the Commander in Chief or, under extraordinary circumstances, directly to the Commander of Field (Ground) Forces, Commanders of other branches of the regular forces, or the Commander of the National Defence Volunteer Forces. The President makes decisions on the deployment of military units in peacetime. The President approves by decree the permanent location of military units in peacetime, territorial limits for military manoeuvres and deployments of military units away from their normal bases. Together with the *Seimas*, the President is responsible for decisions on mobilization, any declaration of a state of war, any operational deployment of the armed forces and defence in the event of armed aggression. The government takes decisions on the procurement of weapons and the development of the armed forces' logistical base.

At the operational level, the Commander of Field Forces has responsibility for planning and commanding ground defence activities. Units of ground forces (both regular and NDVF) and other forces are placed under his operational command to execute defensive tasks. In accord-

ance with the LNDS, the President or the Minister of Defence may also issue an order to deploy the armed forces to assist in rescue operations, to provide assistance to the Border Police, or to reinforce border security. In extraordinary circumstances, the armed forces may be deployed to provide assistance to the police when it is necessary to prevent violent anti-constitutional activities. Only the *Seimas* can order the deployment and use of the armed forces outside the state. Military units can only participate in international peacekeeping operations with parliamentary approval.

Decision-making processes within the Ministry of National Defence

The Law on the Fundamentals of National Security details the decision-making processes within the Ministry of National Defence. The Defence Minister is responsible at an executive level for defence policy-making and defence management. The Minister formulates and oversees the implementation of national defence policy, approves the military strategy, guides international cooperation in the defence area, provides guidance for the development of defence structures and has the right to establish structures within the national defence system.

The Commander in Chief of the armed forces is subordinated to the Defence Minister and his role is to implement the defence policy as formulated by the Minister and the Ministry of National Defence. In peacetime, the Commander in Chief is responsible for preparing military strategy and defence planning. The Defence Staff is an advisory body to the Commander in Chief. It constitutes the military component of the Ministry of National Defence, providing assistance to the Minister of Defence in preparing overall defence policy and to the Commander in Chief in fulfilling his duties. The Defence Staff, in cooperation with the armed forces, also prepares contingency, operational and mobilization plans. These areas of competence, which are defined in the Law on National Defence System Organization, constitute the extent of the military's autonomy and are aimed at ensuring discipline, efficiency and readiness within the armed forces.

In the early 1990s, the personnel of the Ministry of National Defence, including both military and civilians, had little experience in administrative and political matters. Additionally, military staff hold key positions in the Ministry, including those of Deputy Ministers. The development of an effective combination of military and civilian skills was also delayed by the practice of granting military ranks to civilians

who were not in military service and had no military education (military ranks in the past carried a higher salary than their civilian equivalents and were therefore popular within the Ministry of National Defence). This practice was subsequently reduced to a minimum. Policy decisions within the Ministry of National Defence are now taken by civilians. The Ministry of National Defence, however, still faces some problems due to a shortage of civilian personnel with relevant defence expertise.

As of 2000, various positions within the Ministry of National Defence, from desk-officers to directors of departments, are open to both civilian and military personnel. This policy is designed to achieve a balance between civilian and military personnel to make the best use of available skills. Deputy Ministers supervise the work of departments and approve or reject any decisions made at departmental level. The percentage balance between military and civilians working in the Ministry of National Defence is 52 per cent to 48 per cent respectively. At the operational and tactical levels the proportion of civilians is about 22 per cent of the total, and their function is limited to administrative and financial spheres. Ongoing reforms, however, mean that the overall trend is towards a significant increase of civilian staff within the Ministry of National Defence and related structures.

Parliamentary control

From 1990 to 1993 the development of the overall Lithuanian defence system proceeded in a somewhat confused manner and there was no clear mechanism for parliamentary oversight of the military. During this period, the legal framework to support defence reforms was inadequate or non-existent, and perhaps more importantly, both the military and civilians lacked experience in developing a defence policy. The *Seimas*'s role in providing oversight of the military and defence policy was undermined by disagreements within the parliament about both its role in this area and the appropriate direction for Lithuanian defence policy. These disagreements intensified after the DLP won the 1992 parliamentary elections, with the Homeland Union accusing the DLP of adopting a pro-eastern (i.e. pro-Russian) policy and failing to provide the armed forces with sufficient resources. One member of the *Seimas* National Security Committee, Ignacas Uzdavinys, publicly accused the Committee's chairman of incompetence and suggested that the Committee's activities were incomprehensible and irrelevant.[24]

Relations between the *Seimas* and the Ministry of National Defence were also strained during this period, with the *Seimas* National Security Committee attempting to obtain direct control over all defence and military matters in 1992–93 – a move resisted by Ministry of National Defence staff. The dominant view of the Committee – chaired by Vytautas Petkevicius, a writer with a reputation for speaking his mind – was that the Minister of Defence ignored them and tensions resulted from the personal ambitions of Ministry of National Defence staff. The Minister of Defence at the time, Linas Linkevicius, stated that the activities and accusations of the National Security Committee had little to do with actually trying to implement democratic control of the armed forces. He argued that democratic control of the armed forces required both executive control of decision-making, and the effective engagement of the legislature as a form of oversight.[25]

These political tensions over defence policy and civil–military relations were largely resolved by President Brazauskas's 1994 decision to apply for NATO membership. This decision was approved by all major parties at the time, and in January 2000 their support was reiterated in a joint declaration. The application in effect resolved Lithuania's major security policy dilemma at a stroke, and since this point domestic clashes over defence policy have decreased significantly. Indeed since 1994, arguments over Lithuanian security have ceased to be about its fundamental goals and have centred more on how best to reach the already agreed objective of NATO membership. The agreement over the primary goal of Lithuanian security policy has also served to ease the strained relations between the political parties and provided an opportunity to develop a credible military that aims to be interoperable with NATO armed forces.

Since 1994, the *Seimas* has assumed a growing role in terms of passing laws relating to security and defence, providing oversight of the government in this area and approving the defence budget. In addition in January 1999, the *Seimas* passed the Law on the Strategy of Financing of the National Defence System, which increased defence spending to 1.7–1.75 per cent of GDP for 2000 and 1.95–2.00 per cent of GDP for 2001 (the increase in defence spending was designed to improve Lithuania's prospects of gaining NATO membership).[26] In April 1999 the *Seimas* also passed a resolution on the principle structure of the armed forces, setting the size of the army at no more than two brigades, four battalions and a training regiment, and the NVDF at ten territorial defence formations, with similar limits for the air force and navy. The resolution also limited the number of high-ranking officers to four

generals and admirals, 34 colonels and sea captains and 61 lieutenant-colonels and commanders. Additionally, as was noted above, the *Seimas* is responsible for taking decisions on the deployment of Lithuanian forces for peace support operations and other missions abroad. To date, it has authorized the participation of Lithuanian peacekeepers in multinational missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Albania and Croatia.

On average the *Seimas* amends and passes about twenty legal acts a year on national security and defence matters.[27] The Ministry of National Defence drafts the majority of these, but the *Seimas* and its National Security Committee have also developed expertise on this issue, and continue to be the key institutions in the law-making process. In addition, parliamentarians can request information, clarification and briefings from the Ministry of National Defence officials on security and defence-related issues.[28] The National Security Committee has a responsibility to exercise parliamentary control of national defence, state security, civil defence, state border protection and the Special Investigations Service under the Ministry of the Interior, as well as to present proposals and recommendations on the improvement of their activities.[29] Teams of advisers, administrative staff and the information branch of the parliament support the work of the Committee.

All legislation in the defence and security sphere must undergo discussion in the National Security Committee before it can be submitted to the plenary session of the *Seimas*. In most cases the view of the Committee is of vital importance and most drafts that have been approved by the Committee later became law. The Committee holds regular discussions on national security issues. During the first half of 2000, for example, it discussed the role of the Defence Staff; the preparedness of, and procurement for, the NDVF; the future of the Lithuanian navy and the airspace surveillance system; the role of the Ministry of National Defence's Policy and Planning Department; and the duties of Lithuanian defence attachés. In addition, Committee members regularly visit units of the armed forces and meet with the Commander in Chief. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the scope of the Committee's activities has been extremely broad. This illustrates the degree to which the *Seimas* has become actively and constructively engaged in the process of parliamentary oversight of Lithuanian security policy.

Defence spending

The pursuit of NATO membership has contributed to a significant increase in the amount of resources the military have been able to claim

from the national budget. From 1997 onwards, Lithuania began to significantly increase its defence budget, which in turn has allowed an acceleration in the development of the armed forces and related defence infrastructure. Indeed, between 1995 and 1999 Lithuanian defence spending increased from 0.5 per cent to 1.14 per cent of GDP. As noted above, this allocation was set to increase further in the years 2000–01.[30]

Problems with this policy arose in 1999, however, when Lithuanian GDP fell by 2 per cent. Despite these economic problems, the government still planned to increase defence expenditure from 1.32 per cent of GDP in 1998 to 1.5 per cent in 1999. Left-wing politicians argued that the armed forces were consuming valuable resources that could better be used for education or social programmes. The Social-Liberal Party (SLP) started a petition calling for a referendum over the reallocation of funds. As a result of this pressure, defence spending for 1999 was reduced from 1.5 per cent to 1.14 per cent of GDP. By the beginning of 2000, however, the Lithuanian economy had begun to show signs of recovery and the debate over defence spending became less heated. The position of the SLP also softened after a visit to Lithuania by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson. Robertson publicly stressed the importance of NATO applicants keeping to their promises concerning increased defence expenditure, a statement that was reiterated during a meeting with the SLP's leader Arturas Paulauskas.

The effective allocation of defence spending is a key challenge for defence policy. From 2000–01 Lithuania is trying to implement a policy planning and budgetary cycle in order to ensure effective and transparent resource management. Under this cycle, the Ministry of National Defence prepares Defence Guidelines which are then submitted to the Defence Resources Board, a high-level committee chaired by the Minister of Defence, composed of senior military and civilian personnel, which provides advice to the Minister who then takes the final decisions. In the second stage of this process planned expenditures are submitted to the Ministry of Finance and the *Seimas*. The Ministry of Finance then reviews all expenditure plans, including the proposed defence budget. The *Seimas* holds open hearings on the budget, and then approves and supervises its implementation. Details of the state budget, including planned military expenditure, are freely available to the public. Parliamentarians also have a right to receive further information from the Ministry of National Defence on specific details of military expenditure if they request such. Further moves towards transparency of the defence budget are planned for the future. In particular,

a regular performance report will be published, which should allow both the *Seimas* and the general public to better evaluate the performance of the defence system.

The Lithuanian armed forces and society

According to a variety of surveys, the Lithuanian public does not perceive any military threat coming from the west, but many are concerned about a potential threat from the east. The dominant point of view expressed by the general public is that the Lithuanian armed forces would be unable to withstand a large-scale military invasion by a major power. Consequently, most Lithuanians appear to view the military more as a symbol of statehood than an important element of national power. Defence policy and civil–military relations have been raised from time to time in major newspapers, largely in connection with the mismanagement of defence resources, but they have never become a major issue on the political agenda. As far as the general public are concerned, the development of the armed forces remains in a category of 'high politics' in which they appear to have little interest.

In 1993, Robert Vitas concluded that Lithuania's armed forces suffered from a chronic lack of popular prestige.[31] This conclusion is not necessarily valid today. In 1999 one opinion poll showed that of all state institutions, the military ranked fourth in terms of public support, surpassed only by the mass media, the President and the Church.[32] Several developments have contributed to this increasingly positive public attitude towards the armed forces. The Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs have made increasing efforts to present information to the public concerning security policy and the armed forces. Senior officials from the Ministry of National Defence now appear more frequently on television and in major newspapers than they did in the past and press conferences on major defence issues are held regularly. Similarly, the Lithuanian 'Armed Forces and Society' event, in which military vehicles and equipment are placed on public display, was resurrected in 1993. Proposals from several non-governmental organizations to discuss defence-related issues with Ministry of National Defence officials have also helped to narrow the gap between the military and the public.

Significantly, western observers and officials have also frequently emphasized the successful evolution of Lithuania's armed forces, and their positive opinions have been reflected in Lithuanian society. Lithuanian participation in peacekeeping operations and international

training exercises has demonstrated Lithuania's growing military capability, while training and discipline within the armed forces have improved significantly. However, public support remains volatile. The development of new military facilities in the Training Regiment at Rukla, for example, caused controversy, with major newspapers and politicians suggesting that the funds allocated for this initiative would be better spent on education or healthcare. Similarly, some military procurement decisions – such as the purchase of 'unsuitable' M14 automatic rifles from the United State – have provoked debate. Additionally, the economic crisis of 1999 helped to further dent the armed forces' resurgent popularity. In general, though, the trend in Lithuanian military–society relations has been one of greater openness and engagement between the armed forces and the general public.

Issues of civil–military relations and defence policy have largely remained in the realm of 'high politics', dealt with by politicians and experts and of relatively little interest to the general public. With two exceptions, the Kaunas Woods incident of 1993 and the issue of defence expenditure, debates on civil–military relations and defence have never deteriorated to the degree that they have become a major issues on the political or broader public agenda. Of the two exceptions, the former has been comprehensively resolved, though the latter remains a potentially hot issue in Lithuanian politics. Significant progress has also been made in establishing civilian control over defence policy. Examples of illegal acts by the military sector, which might endanger the interests of society or the state, have disappeared as a consequence of firm control exercised by the political authorities over the national defence system. While particular incidents may still occur in future, it is likely that these will be solitary instances that it will be possible to handle on a case-by-case basis.

Conclusion

It is possible to identify two main factors that have had a fundamental impact on the evolution of Lithuanian civil–military relations. First, the fact that Lithuania had to create armed forces from nothing in the early 1990s meant that within the new Lithuanian military there was no (or only an extremely limited) legacy of political commitment to or institutional interest in retaining elements of the previous Soviet communist regime. The creation of new armed forces also meant that the military had no preconceptions about its particular relationship to civilian society or government. Within both Lithuanian society as a whole

and the armed forces, there was broad acceptance of the idea of liberal democracy and democratic, civilian control of the armed forces as a component of democracy. As a consequence, the issue of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces always had only limited potency to become a truly divisive issue in Lithuanian politics. Second, the core of Lithuania's foreign and security policy remains focused on integration with the West and meeting the accession criteria for membership of western institutions, particularly NATO. As a result, common European values and principles, including that of democratic control of armed forces, are being strictly implemented in Lithuania and their continued development remains high on the political and public agenda.

Notes

1. See also, however, R. A. Vitas. 'Civil–Military Relations in Lithuania', in C. P. Danopoulus and D. Zirker (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).
2. G. Miniotaite, *The Security Policy of Lithuania and the 'Integration Dilemma'*, COPRI Working Paper (http://www.copri.dk/menu/pumenu.htm: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, May 2000).
3. G. Miniotaite, *The Security Policy . . .*
4. G. Tamulaitis, *National Security and Defence Policy of the Lithuanian State*, UNIDR Research Paper 26 (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1994) 22.
5. R. Verseckaite, 'Vieni tiesia kelius, kiti rodykles kala', *Respublika*, 22 January 1994, 2.
6. In Lithuanian, the Savanoriskoji Krasto Apsaugos Tarnyba (SKAT).
7. R. A. Vitas, 'Civil–Military Relations . . .', 82.
8. See R. A. Vitas, 'Civil–Military Relations . . .', 84 for further details.
9. Vegelevicius again publicly criticized the Defence Minister for ignoring the Air Force in 1999.
10. R. A. Vitas, 'Civil–Military Relations . . .', 85–6.
11. 'Interview with the Minister of National Defence, Audrius Butkevicius', *Respublika*, 29 December 1992.
12. 'Interview with the Minister of National Defence, Audrius Butkevicius', *Tiesa*, 24 July 1993.
13. R. Sakalauskaite, 'LDDP frakcija grieztai egzaminuoja savo pasiulyta krasto apsaugos ministra', *Lietuvos Rytas*, 21 January 1994, 3.
14. 'Interview . . .', *Tiesa*, 24 July 1993.
15. Later Brigadier-General Jonas Andriskevicius.
16. R. A. Vitas, 'Civil–Military Relations . . .', 88.
17. The Lithuanian contingent in NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia grew from 41 to 145 personnel between April and October 1999. Seventy-seven Lithuanian troops were due to serve as part of a Danish battalion in BALTCON-5 which was expected to be become operational in autumn 2000. Lithuania also deployed its platoon of rangers within the Polish

battalion as part of NATO's KFOR mission. For further details see http://www.kam.lt/english/tarptaut.htm.
18. Homepage of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence – Lithuania's International Defence Co-operation: http://www.kam.lt/english/tarptaut.htm.
19. Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, *Defence White Paper 1999* (Vilnius: MND Publishing Centre, 1999) 39.
20. Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, *Defence White Paper 1999 . . .* , 38.
21. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Art. 140.
22. The Law on the Fundamentals of National Security was adopted on 19 December 1996, no. VIII-49.
23. The LNDS was adopted on 5 May 1998, no. VIII-723.
24. I. V. Uzdavinys, 'Petkevicius kontrole pakeite i diktata', *Lietuvos Aidas*, 16 April 1994, 9.
25. L. Linkevicius, 'Pasitraukia is Seimo Nacionalinio saugumo komiteto', *Tiesa*, 26 March 1994, 4.
26. Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania, *Defence White Paper 1999 . . .* , 42.
27. For more information on the activities of the Committee see http://www.lrs.lt/inter/plsql/www_viewer.ViewTheme?p_int_tv_id=151&p_kalb_id=2.
28. Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Art. 9.
29. Statute of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, Art. 63.
30. For more information on defence issues see 'Background information on the Lithuanian National NATO Integration Programme 1999–2000', http://www.nato.int/pfp/lt/current/nnip.html.
31. R. A. Vitas, 'Civil–Military Relations . . .', 73.
32. Polls have been conducted by *Vilmorus*. Results are published monthly by the biggest Lithuanian daily newspaper, *Lietuvos Rytas*.

Part III
South Eastern Europe

7

Defence Planning in Emerging Democracies: the Case of Romania

Ioan Mircea Pascu

More than a decade of postcommunist transition has taught us that the degree of democratic control over the military is an indispensable criterion for judging the progress of military reform. For this reason, it is also a central requirement for admission into Euro-Atlantic and European structures. Democratic control of the military has both strategic and tactical aspects. At the strategic level, democracy, especially in its infancy, might be placed at risk if democratic control of the military is not firmly established. Additionally, firm democratic control of the military constitutes a powerful guarantee that the international behaviour of the state actor will not be threatening or warlike. At the tactical level, the military establishment must adapt to a new democratic social environment.

The postcommunist experience raises two critical questions in terms of civil–military relations. First, what theory should officials charged with civil–military relations and defence management responsibilities in the emerging democracies apply? The classic template of oppositional/adversarial relations presented by Huntington and Janowitz, or the newly emerging paradigm advanced by Bland and others? Second, and more importantly, to what extent do the political recommendations purveyed by the West to the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe reflect a preoccupation with the former Soviet Union rather than an understanding of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies with their very different backgrounds? In other words, are policymakers still prisoners of the Cold War obsession with the former Soviet threat?

Another matter also requires urgent attention. Given that, for the time being at least, defence expertise among the uniformed military is still superior to that possessed by the relatively small pool of trained

and semi-trained civilians, do civilian appointments to positions of defence policy-making responsibility constitute a sufficient guarantee that the military will respect democracy? Is it sufficient to control the end product – the implementation of defence policy – when the development of that policy involves a major military contribution and the 'inputs' may also be controlled? And which is more threatening, the militarization of politics (and the military-dominated nature of defence policy-making) or the politicization of the military? These questions require detailed case-by-case analysis. Romania's situation differs markedly both from that of Russia and the other former Soviet republics and from that of the other former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states, largely as a result of its very particular relationship with the Warsaw Pact.

Romania's general environment

I have argued elsewhere that four key factors should be taken into consideration when assessing civil–military relations and democratic control of the military in Romania: the pre-existing relationship between the military and society; the legacy of civilian and/or military command over the military; civilian leadership of the primary military structures; and, most importantly, the guidelines for, and the actual execution of, parliamentary control over the military.[1] With respect to the general relationship between the military and Romanian society, there are no instances to indicate a historical propensity of the military to intervene in domestic politics and wrest political authority from civilian leaders. From this perspective, the record of the Romanian military is fairly healthy and supportive of civilian control. Thus, the reaction of the military to the political crisis of spring 2000, when Defence Minister Victor Babius resigned from the Democratic Party and the Chief of General Staff was replaced, was largely passive. Similarly, the behaviour of the military during the December 1989 revolution is also significant when considering political control of the military in Romania. In spite of the suicide of the Defence Minister, General Vasile Milea, and despite the absence of the Chief of the General Staff, General Stefan Gusa – who was in Timisoara at the time – the military managed to retain its organization and function as a unitary, coherent structure. As such, it provided a shelter which allowed the new civilian authorities to consolidate their power and form a leadership capable of taking charge of the country.

With reference to the legacy of military command over the armed forces and the need to establish civilian leadership of military structures

within the defence and interior ministries, the task of appointing civilians to head these two institutions – and particularly the defence ministry – has been treated with utmost seriousness. The initial conclusion, which has since been proven valid, was that a civilian could not effectively lead and control a purely military establishment without prior preparation of both the civilian concerned and the military establishment. Although, by pursuing this route, Romania initially bore the cost of being perceived as less reformist compared to others, in the long run this cost has been more than offset by positive results. To correct the problem created by the absence of sufficient civilian military expertise and to prepare the military for civilian command, a College of National Defence was created in 1991 and opened in March 1992 – the first such institution in Central and Eastern Europe. Entrants to the college were initially made up of one-third civilians and two-thirds military personnel. More recently, these proportions have been reversed.

Parliamentary control over the military in Romania is exercised primarily through the defence committees of both parliamentary chambers. These prepare the reports for legislation, hear civilian defence and uniformed military leaders, recommend approval of the budget to the plenum, and grant permission for participation in military exercises and operations and for the transit of foreign troops through Romanian territory and airspace.

The national security strategy

There is a logical programming–planning–execution chain in Romanian national security policy-making corresponding to the development of security strategy, defence policy, legislation, budgeting and implementation. It should be noted, however, that this pattern could not be applied to the military reform process from the very start because of the legacies confronting the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. In the Romanian case, for example, the internal restructuring of the military inevitably took precedence. This was followed by an immediate requirement for new legislation to provide a solid juridical base for the new structures, while budgeting attempted to provide the necessary resources for the implementation of reforms. The key national security and defence policy-making body, the Supreme Defence Council (chaired by the President and comprising the Prime Minister (as vice-chair), Defence, Interior and Industry Ministers, the directors of the two (internal and external) intelligence services, the Chief of the General Staff, the presidential security adviser, and the secretary of the council),

was created early in Romania's transition in 1990. In 1993–94, the Supreme Defence Council sought to establish a coherent approach to defence and security matters through approving two key documents: first, the *Integrated National Security Strategy*, prepared jointly by the Defence Ministry and Foreign Ministry, with specialized assistance from other relevant institutions; second, the *Military Doctrine,* prepared by the Defence Ministry. Both of these were presented to parliament in the autumn of 1994. However, neither were actually discussed in the chamber, officially for procedural reasons but in reality on political grounds. After the 1996 general election, both documents were withdrawn by the newly elected authorities and a new set presented to parliament without allowing for prior comment or modification.

As a result of government ordinance No. 52 of 12 August 1998, the following core documents must be presented to the Romanian Parliament: the *National Security Strategy* from the President; the *White Book* of the government, and the *Military Strategy* prepared by the Defence Ministry. Other relevant institutions – such as the Interior Ministry and Foreign Ministry – also have to prepare their respective strategies. The first two documents were presented and approved by parliament in 1999 while, at the time of writing, the third was still under preparation by the Ministry of Defence. Responsibility for the authorship of the National Security Strategy rests with the Ministry of Defence's Defence Policy Department, which comprises both civilian and military personnel and consists of three directorates for integrated defence planning, financial matters and international military relations. Before 1996, the drafts were evaluated by senior staff in the Defence and Foreign Ministries, and by the Supreme Defence Council, which devoted two sessions to their discussion. After 1996, precise information is lacking, but it appears that the driving force behind the two documents was the Defence Policy Department and the Directorate for Euro-Atlantic and European Integration in the Ministry of Defence, both of which are under the direct control of the Defence Minister himself.

According to the provisions of government ordinance No. 52/1998 the National Security Strategy is the basic document regulating defence planning. As such, it contains: an evaluation of the international security environment; a definition of Romanian national interests and security objectives; an assessment of internal and external security risks; and a plan of action for ensuring Romania's national security. The document has a medium-term horizon of four years and a long-term perspective of 4–8 years. It is crucial for estimating the resources that Romania will need to provide for security and defence.

The implementation of the National Security Strategy first requires the government to elaborate its White Book. This consists of: the tasks and missions of the institutions engaged in ensuring national security; the measures and steps to be undertaken by these institutions; and the natural, human, material and financial resources to be allotted annually in order to maintain the armed forces and other security services. The period covered by this document is four years, and it must be presented to parliament either together with the incoming government's programme or no more than four months after the government has been sworn in. On the basis of the National Security Strategy and the White Book, the ministries and the other institutions involved in ensuring national defence, public order and security must draw up their own programmes and plans designed to fulfil the objectives defined by the government. These must then be submitted for governmental approval. The Supreme Defence Council is charged with monitoring and coordinating their implementation.

In sum, this defence planning framework is designed to ensure the necessary coherence of the various actors in this domain. However, because the 1999 submission was the first time that such documents had been discussed in the Parliament, a certain deviation from the established procedures was inevitable. It is expected that the process will operate more smoothly, and 'according to the book' under the new government elected at the end of 2000.

Once these basic strategic documents are completed, effort is still required to achieve a correspondence between, on the one hand, the spectrum of threats and, on the other, the spectrum of responses to them. Consequently, it has been necessary to undertake other institutional rearrangements in order to establish a coherent continuum of mechanisms able to deal efficiently with the potential threats that might confront the country. During the Cold War, threats to Romania were mainly external, visible and military in nature, and this conferred the status of national defender almost entirely on the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. Now, with the plethora of internal/transnational, less visible and non-military threats, the Interior Ministry is also a key player in helping to ensure national security. If the spectrum of threats is defined at the one end by natural disasters and at the other end by open aggression, the spectrum of responses must include the institutions of civil defence as well as the full strength of the Romanian armed forces. This implies that civil defence might, for example, cease to be an integral part of the military establishment, assuming a more independent position (in the meantime, it has been included in

the Interior Ministry). Similarly, the Interior Ministry might be reorganized in order to deal more effectively and efficiently with the array of new risks and threats such as illegal immigration, money laundering, the smuggling of drugs, arms and radioactive materials, and organized crime. The Interior Ministry might, for example, transfer the Fire Department to Civil Defence. It might strengthen the Border Police and ensure smoother cooperation between it and the other components of the police designed to deal with the new array of threats. Given the current material advantages of the military profession, however, attempts at such institutional reorganization have taken place against a background of considerable bureaucratic resistance.

In general, a normative model of the appropriate division of responsibilities and roles between the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Defence remains contentious both in practice and from a theoretical perspective.[2] This is the case not only in postcommunist states but also in the West. Until now at least, the need for a clear division between the responsibilities of interior and defence ministries was largely ignored, with rather negative consequences for the domestic politics of the emerging democracies. Thus in many countries in the region, it is still considered permissible to employ military formations in dealing with, for example, street demonstrations and riots – a practice which can blur the distinction between a democratic regime and an authoritarian one. The Romanian record in this respect is mixed. The intervention of the military in the Targu Mures ethnic clash of March 1990 was positive, for example, because it helped to calm a potentially very dangerous situation. So was the limited military intervention against armed rioters in Bucharest in June 1990. However, because this intervention was limited, and given the weakness of the police force – the gendarmarie was re-established only afterwards, as a direct consequence of these events – the situation triggered the arrival of the miners in Bucharest, with all the ensuing negative consequences. Almost a decade later, with Interior Ministry structures now sufficiently consolidated, the use of the military to stop miners from marching to Bucharest in January 1999 was inappropriate. The case of Romania is unique, however, because of the military's role in the December 1989 Revolution. At this time, after executing the lawful orders of its political superiors, the military found that it was subsequently held legally responsible for its obedience according to a different set of laws.

Given such problems, public order should be entrusted and confined rigorously to the interior ministry forces. The police should be demilitarized, as should, in time, the gendarmerie, while the military forma-

tions of the Ministry of Defence should deal primarily with the defence of the country from external threats and peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad. Of course, if Interior Ministry forces are overwhelmed, then certain Ministry of Defence formations, preferably the territorial troops which are the functional equivalent of the US National Guard, could step in to help restore public order. This, however, should be the exception rather than the norm and it should only be considered after all other means of discussion, mediation and conflict resolution have been exhausted, and only with parliamentary approval.

Force structuring

According to the provisions of government ordinance No. 52/1998, the defence and interior ministers and the directors of the foreign and domestic intelligence services issue their own directives on strategic planning, based on the National Security Strategy and the subsequent strategies of each department. These directives cover the same period as the latter strategies, and comprise: political-military objectives, principles and options for such planning; the structures and capabilities of the components under their subordination, tailored according to the National Security Strategy and ministerial/departmental strategies; subsequent policies and programmes; and budgets for their funding.

Based on their directives on strategic planning, the Ministry of Defence, the Interior Ministry and the intelligence services issue their own strategic and operational plans regarding the use of their forces, as well as programmes to create, instruct and modernize the forces under their control. These strategic and operational plans consist of: force missions in times of peace, crisis and war; probable scenarios under which such missions are likely to be carried out, including classical military operations, special operations other than war and humanitarian operations in both a national and multinational framework; and the *mode d'emploi* for their forces. These documents are regularly updated and are drawn up and approved according to the internal regulations of each particular ministry or service.

In turn, the programmes for creating, instructing and modernizing the relevant forces comprise the measures and concrete actions necessary to: create, arm and base the military units; ensure proper living standards for the personnel; ensure adequate training; ensure logistical support and war reserves; create and maintain the necessary infrastructure for military action; and participate in international cooperation activities with other partner and/or allied countries. The time horizon

for these programmes is four years, with an additional perspective of 4–8 years. They are subject to parliamentary approval.[3]

On the basis of these programmes, and the funds made available through the budget, the Ministry of Defence, Interior Ministry and the two intelligence services draw up annual plans for the training and modernization of the forces under their control, and deliver reports on progress in fulfilling these plans. These annual plans are subject to ministerial and/or directorial approval and the reports are presented to the government. The Planning Departments of the two ministries and the intelligence services monitor the implementation of the medium and long-term programmes as well as of the annual plans. Their execution is the responsibility of the commanders of the respective structures within the ministries and services.

Procurement

In Romania, procurement is carried out by the Procurement Department of the Ministry of Defence. This consists of three directorates: the Technological Research and Endowments Programmes, Contracts Management and Endowment Resources Management. The Procurement Department elaborates procurement policy, manages research and development, and ensures the acquisition of all equipment and necessary logistical support. In implementing its task, the Procurement Department collaborates with the General Staff, which, together with the Acquisition Council, is responsible for defining weapons systems (and other military matériel and supplies) requirements. The Procurement Department employs a unitary Integrated Acquisition Management System flexible enough to absorb changes in defence policy, military doctrine and the management of the armed forces.

This integrated system has three other subsystems built into it. These are: the Council for Requirement Supervisions, which issues requirements based on the recommendations of the General Staff and the individual services; the Council for Acquisitions, which manages acquisitions based on the recommendation of the State Secretary for Procurement; and the Council for Defence Planning, under the direct control of the Minister of Defence, which is responsible for the planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation of the procurement process.

The Ministry of Defence currently runs a number of major programmes approved by the Supreme Defence Council. These have three principle aims. First, the modernization of existing weapon-systems and

military equipment according to NATO standards in order to achieve interoperability with NATO countries. Second, the acquisition of some categories of weaponry and special components for which internal production conditions are either non-existent or not efficient. Third, the acquisition of Romanian-made weapons systems and the assimilation of foreign technology for their production.

In practice, however, procurement activity is at the present severely constrained by a number of factors. These include economic instability reflected in the continuous deterioration of the exchange rate and increasing inflation, the relatively slow recovery of the national economy and the lack of sufficient funds for modernization. In particular, both Romanian and foreign investors have been reluctant to become involved in the privatization process, particularly in the defence field. Additionally, there are insufficient funds for Ministry of Defence research and development activity, and a lack of indigenous suppliers for weapons and equipment.

Budgeting

Technically, budget proposals in the defence sphere proceed from the bottom up in Romania – from the individual services to the General Staff, the Ministry of Defence, the government and then the parliament. They cover four types of expenses: personnel, equipment, operational activity and maintenance of infrastructure. The two parliamentary chambers' Committees for Defence, Public Order and National Security discuss the proposals advanced by the government in the presence of representatives from the defence and interior ministries and the other components of the national defence system. The Joint Report of the Committees is then sent to the parliamentary Budget and Finance Joint Committees, where the heads of the Defence Committees defend their proposal. These in turn prepare the Final Report for the entire budget, which is presented to the Joint Plenum of the two chambers of parliament. Although this process is meant to be the most important parliamentary instrument for ensuring democratic control over the military, in practice, and due largely to a chronic lack of financial resources, Committee responsibility is limited to the approval of government proposals with very minor changes. Thus, this theoretically very powerful instrument of civilian control is in practice rather weak.

It is hoped that the introduction of a cycle of multi-annual budgeting will lead to major improvements in the effectiveness of the management of the Romanian defence budget. This measure was approved

in government ordinance No. 52/1998 for 2000–2007. Based on assessments of likely economic growth and with a planned annual 0.05 per cent increase in the defence budget, military spending for this period was projected to be $710 million for 2000, $730 million for 2001, $770 million for 2002, $880 million for 2003, $1.02 billion for 2003, $1.12 billion for 2006 and $1.19 billion for 2006.

Conclusion

Ensuring democratic control over the military through control of defence policy is a challenging task. Consequently, conclusions are inevitably mixed. On the one hand, Romania, at least at this stage of its evolution, does not possess the competitive civilian expertise necessary to replace that of the military. On the other, the transformation of the military establishment is taking place simultaneously with that of the whole of society in Romania. This means that the lack of sufficient internal civilian control of the military can be supplemented, at least for the time being, by control over the end product, namely control over defence policy itself. In Romania, this is carried out on four levels. First, within the Ministry of Defence, defence policy is subject to the approval of the ministry's collective civilian leadership. Second, entirely civilian Foreign Ministry expertise is brought into the process, providing an additional tier of civilian oversight. Third, defence policy is subject to the approval of the Supreme Defence Council, the key governmental body responsible for the overall direction and control of defence and security policy. Fourth, the ultimate level of control over defence policy is provided by the parliament, which approves the basic direction of defence policy, the steps proposed to implement that policy and the budget.

In the Romanian case, since 22 December 1989, the principal driving force behind the reform and restructuring process in the military domain has been the military itself. A holistic evaluation of progress in establishing democratic, civilian control over the military in Romania suggests that, while the situation is still infinitely perfectible, there are enough checks and balances to prevent any precipitous descent towards militarism and authoritarianism. Of course, this does not mean that the current situation is satisfactory. There are still many aspects that need to be addressed, corrections that need to be made and mechanisms that must be improved. First, the continuation of the defence reform process will remain in doubt without economic stability and growth. Second, a national consensus on defence policy cannot be achieved in the absence

of a substantive dialogue between government and opposition, something which was almost completely absent between 1997 and 2000. Third, Romania must continue with the depoliticization of the military and establish more effective safeguards to prevent its politicization in the future. Finally, and most importantly, we must re-empower and strengthen the instruments at the disposal of the Parliamentary Defence Committees, especially regarding their powers of independent investigation and their expertise in defence matters.[4]

Notes

1. I. M. Pascu, 'Civilian Control over the Armed Forces', *Romanian Civilization*, 6 (1), Spring–Summer 1997, 55–60, and I. M. Pascu, 'Parliamentary Control over the Military', in K. W. Treptow and M. E. Ionescu (eds), *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration* (Iasi, Oxford, Portland: Center for Romanian Studies, 1999), 112–19.
2. L. L. Watts, 'Democratization, Civilianization, and Civil–Military Relations: Unpacking the Institutional Roles of the Military and the Police', in R. A. Remington (ed.), *Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe in the New Millennium: Nation, State, and Regional Integration* (forthcoming), and L. L. Watts, 'Romanian Civil–Military Relations', in H. F. Carey (ed.), *Politics and Society in Post-Communist Romania* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001).
3. At the time of writing, neither *The Military Strategy*, the *Directives for Strategic Planning* or the subsequent *Strategic and Operational Plans and Programmes* for creating, training and modernizing forces had been presented to Parliament for approval.
4. L. L. Watts, 'The Crisis in Romanian Civil–Military Relations', *Problems of Post-Communism*, January–February 2001.

8

The Changing Nature of Civil–Military Relations in Post-Totalitarian Bulgaria

Plamen Pantev

This chapter sets out to answer two core questions relating to Bulgarian civil–military relations. First, to what extent has democratic control of the armed forces been established in Bulgaria since the collapse of communism? Second, what factors have most influenced developments in Bulgarian civil–military relations and in particular the prospects for democratic control of the military?

While the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in Bulgaria remains a dynamic process which has not been without its problems, in general, significant progress has been made. Indeed, ten years after the fall of communism, the Bulgarian civil–military relationship is characterized by a reliable, manageable and evolving system of democratic, civilian control. The residual tendency to involve the armed forces in domestic politics that existed at the beginning of the 1990s has been thoroughly overcome. Moreover, while the armed forces remain a strong symbol of national pride, their status as apolitical servants of democratically elected institutions has become an established legal and political norm. Wider society is, however, the ultimate guardian of any system of democratic control over the armed forces, and as yet Bulgarian society has not absorbed this principle fully into its national consciousness. Thus, while the instincts of most Bulgarians are democratically orientated, the engagement of Bulgarian society as a whole in democratic control of their armed forces and defence and security policy remains limited. This problem is not insurmountable, but it requires that particular problems in the spheres of domestic politics and defence and foreign policy be successfully addressed. These problems are explored in more detail later in this chapter.

A combination of international, domestic, historical, cultural and institutional factors have influenced the establishment of the democra-

tic control of the armed forces in Bulgaria. The international influence of the West, the impact of Bulgaria's immediate regional security environment and the historical tradition of the Bulgarian armed forces as a guarantor of national stability, all encouraged the establishment of democratic control of the military. The Yugoslav crises in particular encouraged a responsible attitude among the military to Bulgaria's role in the Balkans. Four wars in less than ten years in neighbouring countries concentrated the minds of Bulgarian society and the military on the need to carefully assess the state's interests and objectives, friends and allies. In general, it was felt that a path of democratic reform would serve the country best in tackling both the internal and external challenges of the postcommunist period. Democratic, civilian control of the armed forces was perceived by both civilian politicians and the military as a key element of this reform process. Successful reform in this area was seen as central to earning the confidence of the European Union (EU) and NATO, as well as being a fundamental component of strengthening the Bulgarian state in the face of the challenges on its western border. Democratization of civil–military relations was viewed by both society and the military as being part of a much wider process of social change in the country, which would ultimately strengthen the Bulgarian state as a whole. In addition, the Balkan wars vividly illustrated the dangers of failing to reform the armed forces and civil-military relations.

The establishment of democratic control over Bulgaria's armed forces, however, also faced a number of serious challenges. In the early and mid-1990s, major problems of political and economic transition and poor political leadership retarded Bulgaria's efforts to move towards NATO and the EU, resulted in falling living standards for both the general population and military personnel and encouraged doubts about the desirability of democratic and free market reform. One Western critic described this period, during most of which the country was governed by the former communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), as 'seven lost years'.[1] The historical legacy of the communist era civil–military relationship and the absence of civilian defence expertise were also major obstacles to the implementation of democratic control of the military. This situation was further complicated by a lack of clarity and inconsistencies in the legal and institutional arrangements for control of the military and defence policy. Moreover, these sometimes generated tensions between civilian politicians and officials and the military. The process of establishing democratic control over the Bulgarian armed forces in the 1990s entailed addressing various issues arising from these

problems. Despite these challenges, there is good reason over the last four years to be optimistic about the future.

Democratic control of the armed forces in Bulgaria

The armed forces and domestic politics

In the period since 1989, the Bulgarian military has not attempted to intervene in domestic politics. The military sees itself as one of the fundamental pillars of the Bulgarian state, and the armed forces' behaviour has generally been politically impartial. This has had a stabilizing impact on the country's postcommunist political development. In short, there has been no serious risk of praetorian-type military threats to the process of democratization in postcommunist Bulgaria.

The transformation of the Bulgarian military into an apolitical servant of democratically elected institutions, however, did not occur overnight. The process of overcoming the residual temptation for political factions to try to involve the armed forces in domestic politics took at least half a decade. From the military's side, a number of high-ranking officers attempted to further their own political careers by openly supporting one or other of the two main political parties in postcommunist Bulgaria – the former communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the centre-right Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). However, these incidents arose not out of a desire of the military to intervene in domestic politics, but rather as a result of the efforts by some leading political factions to legitimize their policies by enlisting the public support of members of the military, which remained a highly respected national institution. The majority of officers, however, resisted the temptation to become involved in domestic politics, and this practice had largely died out by 1996–97. Thus, the military actually accepted their role as apolitical servants of democratically elected authorities more rapidly than some civilian politicians. Indeed, more widely in Bulgarian society, people remain less worried about possible military interference in domestic politics than about the potential for abuse of power by the country's civilian authorities.

The origin of the Bulgarian armed forces' transition to a popular, apolitical national institution can be found in the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1991, the democratic opposition was vocal in its criticism of the military, accusing it of being a partisan instrument of the former communist BSP. After the adoption of the new democratic constitution in July 1991, however, these criticisms faded. The constitution provides

a clear legal framework for relations between the Bulgarian state and society, including the civilian and military institutions of the state. Articles eight and nine of the constitution state that the power of the state is divided between a legislative, an executive and a judiciary, and define the role of the armed forces as being to guarantee the sovereignty, security, independence and territorial integrity of Bulgaria. This widely accepted constitutional framework created a political environment in which partisan ties between the armed forces and particular political parties were deemed officially unacceptable. As a result, the principle of the political neutrality of the armed forces came to be seen as the normal state of affairs by both the military and civilian politicians relatively early in Bulgaria's transition to democracy.

The armed forces and defence policy

Control over defence policy is one of the major criteria for a mature and effective system of democratic control of the armed forces. In the Bulgarian context, establishing democratic, civilian control of defence policy entailed addressing issues about who develops defence strategies, who determines forces structures, and perhaps most importantly who is in charge of defence spending and procurement. In practice, Bulgarian defence policy has been strongly influenced by the broader political and economic developments of the postcommunist period. Defence reforms generally proceeded at a slow pace. This reflected the slow pace of more general democratic reform under the BSP as well as a divided and ideologically confused political opposition. As a result, by 1997 when Bulgaria formally committed itself to seeking NATO membership, all official institutions concerned with defence policy, including the armed forces, were unprepared for integration with the Alliance.

Despite the largely successful introduction of formal civilian control over both the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence, meaningful civilian control of defence policy was hampered by a lack of civilian defence expertise. In particular, legislative oversight of defence policy was undermined by a lack of parliamentarians with any defence expertise, including those on the parliamentary Committee on National Security. Problems also emerged with the implementation of the executive powers of the presidency in this area, with Presidents Zheliu Zhelev and Petar Stoyanov both complaining that the absence of qualified civilian defence advisers made their role as Commander in Chief of the armed forces difficult. Without expert civilian advice, they were forced to make their decisions on the basis of advice provided by military experts alone

who in turn had a degree of vested interest in the defence policy process. Reform of the armed forces also became politicized, with both the BSP and the UDF arguing during their respective periods in opposition that defence policy was being mishandled by the government. Since 1991, the post of Minister of Defence has been held by civilian politicians (although in 1996–97 the civilian minister was a retired Vice-Admiral). In practice, however, until at least 1997, defence policy remained firmly in the hands of the military. This resulted partly from the legacy of the communist period, when defence policy was more or less wholly in military hands, and partly from the aforementioned lack of civilian defence expertise. Indeed, the continued problems in this area are vividly illustrated by the fact that the Defence Minister still relies on an advisory board made up of professional military officers.

Political control over defence policy in Bulgaria is regulated by the constitution and a set of related legal and institutional arrangements. The constitution defines the rights and the responsibilities of the parliament, President, Council of Ministers and judiciary in relation to the military. According to the constitution, the parliament – the *Narodno Sabranie* or People's Assembly which has a four-year mandate – is responsible for passing the defence budget, approving the deployment of the Bulgarian military overseas or the deployment of foreign troops on Bulgarian territory, and approving any declaration of war or state of emergency by the President or, in the case of the latter, the Council of Ministers.[2] More widely, it is tasked with providing oversight of the defence budget and defence policy in general. The parliamentary National Security, Budget and Foreign and Integration Policy Committees perform these functions and have the power to call the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff and any of their subordinates to provide evidence for their enquiries. Since this system was established in 1991, the rights of the parliamentary committees in these areas have not been blocked or directly challenged. Difficulties have emerged, however, in the ability of the committees to actually exercise their powers of oversight. Often, differing parliamentary priorities mean that defence issues are not allocated the time necessary for their full consideration, and a lack of defence expertise among parliamentarians impacts negatively on the quality of their powers of oversight.

The Bulgarian president is elected for a five-year term and can serve no more than two terms. In the sphere of defence policy, the president is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, chairs the Consultative National Security Council and, on the basis of a motion from the Council of Ministers, can appoint or dismiss the high command of the

armed forces.[3] The President has the power to declare war, martial law or a state of emergency whenever parliament is not in session and cannot be convened. Parliament must then be convened at the earliest opportunity to endorse such decisions. The President can proclaim either a general or a partial mobilization and appoints all senior military officers.[4] The Council of Ministers is the country's executive, is responsible for the formulation and execution of domestic, foreign and defence policy, and provides overall guidance to the state administration and the armed forces. It comprises the Prime Minister, Deputy Ministers and Ministers, and discusses defence issues at the initiative of either the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister, and can declare a state of emergency or martial law.[5]

In addition to the constitution, the legal basis for Bulgarian defence policy is provided by several key laws and official documents. The formal National Security Concept, adopted in 1998, states that civilian control of state security policy, and of the bodies responsible for its implementation, is fundamental to Bulgarian law.[6] The National Security Concept expands on the framework of civil–military responsibilities outlined in the constitution. In particular, it further details the responsibilities of the Council of Ministers. Paragraph 53 states that the Council of Ministers is tasked with providing a report assessing risks to national security to the parliament. It must also develop strategies and allocate the necessary resources for addressing these risks. The Council of Ministers is assisted in these tasks by the Security Council, a body comprising the Prime Minister, Minster of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of the Interior, their deputies, the Chief of General Staff and the Chiefs of the Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence organs. In addition, the President or his representatives can always participate in the work of the Council, and can demand information from it at any time.[7]

The Law on Defence and the Armed Forces, introduced in 1996 and amended in 1997, requires that the Minister of Defence and his deputies be civilians, subordinates the Chief of the General Staff to the Defence Minister and establishes a system for the rotation of senior officer positions every three years.[8] The 1999 Law on Alternative Service allows conscientious objectors to undertake service in other civilian or state sectors, although these are normally in areas of hard and unattractive labour; alternative service lasts for 24 months (as opposed to 12 months for military service). As of 2000–01, this law is subject to criticism and is likely to be amended.[9] Finally, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria, adopted in 1999, reiterates that civilian control and trans-

parency in the formulation of defence policy are core principles in the implementation of military doctrine.[10]

At a formal level, the Bulgarian armed forces meet the three core criteria for democratic, civilian control of the armed forces and defence policy. First, there is a civilian Minister of Defence, to whom the most senior military officer, the Chief of Staff, reports. Second, there are established legal procedures for parliamentary authorization of the defence budget. Third, the mission of the armed forces is clearly defined in the 1991 constitution, the 1998 National Security Concept and the 1999 National Military Doctrine. Genuine democratic control over the military and especially defence policy, however, involves more than just the introduction of formal structures for the management of civil–military relations. In the Bulgarian case, problems remain with the quality and effectiveness of democratic control of the armed forces and defence policy. In particular, there is a lack of realism in defence plans and of coherence between those plans and allocated defence budgets. Consequently, once defence plans are endorsed, they are regularly found to be unaffordable within allocated budgets.[11] As a result of these budgetary constraints, the defence policy implemented by the Ministry of Defence is in practice often very different from the plans originally approved by the parliament. Additionally, there has been an unrealistic belief among many political and military leaders that once the formal requirements for democratic control of defence policy were met, democratic control would be guaranteed in reality. In practice, this was simply not the case, largely due to a lack of clarity about the relationship between resources, force structure and the goals of defence policy.[12]

Defence planning in Bulgaria has been characterized by four major deficiencies. First, the process itself has suffered from a lack of coherence. There has, for example, been very little connection between national security objectives and existing force structures. Second, the fundamentally holistic process of defence planning has been approached in a rather piecemeal fashion, with the result that no rational mechanism existed for matching force structures to realistically available resources. This had the inevitable consequence of producing unrealistic plans for military reform that simply could not be met through existing defence allocations. Third, Bulgarian defence planning has suffered from a lack of long-term thinking, with the result that short-term quick fixes were often prioritized over more studied approaches to defence reform. Finally, Bulgarian political and military culture has not been conducive to the implementation of a democratic

control of the defence planning process. Defence planning in the Bulgarian military had always been understood rather narrowly as 'operational planning', a militarily sensitive activity carried out by a few expert military officers from the General Staff. As a result, the integration of both long-term strategic planning and operational planning in one system was a new and unfamiliar approach for many involved in the process.

In autumn 1998, however, these problems were explicitly recognized by the Bulgarian Ministry of Defence, and attempts have been made to implement a more rigorous and effective system of defence planning. This recognition, and the subsequent process of systematically thinking through ways in which to address these problems, have been positive developments in themselves. However, the entire process of reforming and civilianizing defence planning is hindered by a lack of capable military and civilian defence experts. In general, the inflow of civilians to the Ministry of Defence is still modest, and those that have been appointed are often retired military officers. In particular, there is only limited civilian input into discussion of core military and defence issues. However, ongoing reforms in the general educational system are expected to lead to major improvements in this area over time, as the number of people with management and financial (as well as dedicated defence) expertise grows.

Perhaps the most fundamental problem in the area of democratic control of defence policy in Bulgaria is the inadequate level of parliamentary expertise on defence issues. Indeed, even among those parliamentarians who are responsible for the *Narodno Sabranie*'s functions in this area, there is a strong tendency to see all military issues as being part of an exclusively military domain. This problem is reinforced by the relatively high turnover of parliamentarians after elections. Defence education programmes for members of parliament are one way of addressing this problem. The formation of a permanent civilian staff of the National Security Committee would be another.

The armed forces and foreign policy

Bulgaria's foreign policy, in particular its pursuit of regional cooperation in the Balkans, has been an asset during its transition to democracy and a free market economy. Sofia has pursued a careful, measured approach to regional problems, resisting the temptations of nationalism that have been so prominent elsewhere in the Balkans. Indeed, both the National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine stress the importance of regional stability to Bulgarian national security and are explicit in

identifying regional cooperation as a central plank of Bulgarian foreign policy.[13] Significantly, the armed forces have played an important role in shaping Bulgarian foreign policy in these areas. In the early 1990s forward-thinking experts in the Bulgarian security community advocated a key role for military diplomacy in enhancing national security. In the early and mid-1990s, bilateral confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) were negotiated with Greece, Turkey and Romania that went beyond the provisions of existing Europe-wide CSBMs and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and helped to increase trust and create a more positive atmosphere in the Balkans.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the Bulgarian military's input into the country's foreign policy debate has been its stabilizing influence. While a number of civilian politicians and political parties advocated a more nationalist and assertive foreign policy, the military promoted a more sober, peaceful and good-neighbourly regional policy. In general, despite the nationalist tendencies of some politicians, it has not been particularly difficult to reach agreement among different political factions within Bulgaria on policy towards the Yugoslav conflict, including decisions on the deployment of Bulgarian forces as part of international peacekeeping missions. Nor have there been differences between civilian politicians and the military over such issues. Bulgarian policy towards the Yugoslav conflict followed three broad phases. First, during the initial stages of the conflict, Bulgaria pursued a policy of neutrality. Second, during the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, the Bulgarian military contributed a number of engineering units to the NATO-led Implementation/Stabilization Force (I/SFOR). Finally, during Operation Allied Force and the later Kosovo Force (KFOR) deployment, Bulgaria actively supported NATO's actions. Sofia allowed NATO use of Bulgarian airspace, denied the same privilege to Russia and contributed an engineering unit to a German battalion in KFOR.

The decisions on the deployment of Bulgarian military personnel in the former Yugoslavia, or as part of United Nations missions in Cambodia and Angola, were all taken by civilian authorities. In each case, the policy was drafted by the government and approved by the parliament. The decision to allow NATO access to Bulgarian airspace was, however, both controversial and contested. On 4 May 1999, the Bulgarian parliament ratified a bilateral agreement between the government and NATO, allowing access to Bulgarian airspace for NATO aircraft during Operation Allied Force. One hundred and fifty-four MPs voted in favour of the agreement, with 83 against and one abstention, with

opposition mainly coming from left-wing parties. This decision was considered in Bulgaria to be one of the most important since the end of the Second World War, and was accompanied by popular rallies both in support of and against the agreement.

Thus, while the military have influenced Bulgarian foreign policy, this has generally been by encouraging cooperation with the country's neighbours and with the West. Indeed, the armed forces have actively supported Bulgaria's strategic reorientation towards NATO. From the beginning of the country's participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP), the military have been among the most active proponents of such co-operation with NATO, even at such times, as in 1995–97, when the BSP government was opposed to NATO membership. Similarly, when the new UDF government formally declared its intention to seek membership of NATO in 1997, the armed forces were again one of the primary engines driving the process forward. Indeed, the Ministry of Defence was the prime mover in developing contacts with pro-NATO non-governmental organizations and think-tanks, as well as in promoting the idea of NATO membership and the need for reform in society more widely. This process accelerated after the autumn of 1998 when senior figures in the defence policy section of the Ministry of Defence were replaced by pro-NATO reformers.

Factors influencing civil–military relations

The international context

Bulgaria's international environment has been perhaps the most influential factor shaping the development of its civil–military relations. Indeed, ten years of external conflicts over the country's western border served to place the roles of the various national security and defence institutions firmly on the national agenda. The question of how the Bulgarian armed forces should meet these challenges, and what sorts of reforms would be necessary for them to do so, was therefore always a central issue in the postcommunist period. There were two schools of thought on the issue. First, there was a strong sense among some Bulgarian policy-makers that a period of crisis was not the best time to initiate a wholesale reform of the armed forces. Instead, they argued that it would be more sensible for the country to prepare to counter potential military threats with the forces already available, with a view to reinforcing them at a later date. In contrast, a more reform-minded faction stressed that Bulgaria's transition to democracy could not

exclude democratic reform of the military. The second school of thought prevailed in this debate, on the basis that the direct military threats to Bulgaria were actually fairly limited in the short to medium term. Moreover, it was felt that the most effective way to avoid spillover from the conflicts in the former Yugoslav was to accelerate the process of military reform and to establish genuine democratic control over the armed forces.

A second international catalyst for the development of democratic control over the armed forces was the diminishing political and military influence of Russia. During the communist period, Bulgarian civil–military relations largely followed the Soviet model. The collapse of communism and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization opened up the political agenda to new models and policies in this sphere. The withdrawal of Soviet and later Russian influence, coupled with the broader process of democratization in Bulgaria and the ongoing conflicts on the country's western border, opened the door to a third international influence on Bulgarian civil–military relations: that of the West. Western models of civil–military relations were seen as an inherent part of the development of a much broader European security community that would serve to enhance Bulgarian national security. The establishment of democratic control over the armed forces was seen as a way of addressing the power vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Russian influence and gaining support from NATO and the EU. As a consequence, western assistance in this area – via NATO's PfP and the EU's PHARE aid programme – was eagerly received. In particular, western assistance helped to promote the idea among both civilian leaders and the military that the pursuit of national security and the democratization of civil–military relations were mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory processes. The recognition of the need to pursue both goals was a key motivation for the Bulgarian government's 1997 decision to pursue membership of NATO.

Bulgaria has also actively engaged in bilateral cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, France, Spain and Switzerland in support of its efforts at establishing democratic, civilian control of its armed forces. In particular, after the 1997 decision to pursue membership of NATO, such programmes contributed significantly to efforts to reform Bulgarian civil–military relations, with the greatest impact being on those engaged at the highest level of civil–military interaction and the armed forces themselves. Western support further helped to overcome fears within the military that democratic reforms might undermine their profes-

sional standing and threaten Bulgaria's national security. The learning process with regard to democratic control of armed forces is, however, far from over in Bulgaria. Indeed, the development of civilian defence expertise, respected by the military on the basis of merit as well as the principle of democratic control, remains a key challenge to implementing effective democratic control over Bulgaria's armed forces and defence policy.[14]

Historical legacies

Historical legacies have had less impact on the development of civil–military relations in postcommunist Bulgaria than might superficially be expected. Bulgaria has a long history of military praetorianism and politicization and the country's communist and pre-communist experiences with civil–military relations did not appear to bode well for the development of democratic control of the military.[15] During the first years of Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the military's role in the struggle for national liberation made it a highly respected and popular institution within Bulgarian society. The division of Bulgarian population and territory under the 1878 Berlin Treaty reinforced this perception, as the military were cast in the role of national liberation fighters and seen as the brightest hope for reuniting Bulgarians in a single national territory. Against this background, the Bulgarian armed forces were easily socialized towards intervention in neighbouring countries and the use of force to meet political goals, while Bulgarian society was happy to accept the military's bellicose approach to the pursuit of national unification. In the Balkan region, this gained Bulgaria and its armed forces a reputation for warmongering. Despite initial successes in 1885 and 1912, however, military victories could not be consolidated diplomatically or politically, resulting in Bulgaria losing the Second Balkan War and creating a profound national sense of frustration. This was reinforced by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, which demanded drastic cuts in the Bulgarian armed forces in order to limit their future military and interventionist potential. In response, the military establishment embraced a fascist ideology as a means of reinvigorating both its military potential and its role in Bulgarian society. As a result, during the 1923–44 period the military became extensively embroiled in domestic politics (with military coups in 1923 and 1934) and democratic, civilian control of the armed forces was entirely absent.

Bulgaria's defeat in the Second World War and the subsequent imposition of a totalitarian socialist regime brought a new pattern to the

country's civil–military relations. The Bulgarian communist regime instituted a system of civil–military relations based on the Soviet model, entailing strongly civilian – but not democratic – control of the military. Soviet influence over defence policy was all-pervading, particularly in the areas of procurement, strategy and tactics. Soviet control over Bulgarian defence policy was so strong that the actual input of Bulgarian civilian and military leaders into that policy was usually rather limited. This dependence on the Soviet Union in many key areas of defence policy created problems for Bulgaria after the collapse of communism. The collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization left the military in a motivational vacuum, as their previous *raison d'être* – the protection of the Warsaw Pact's southern flank in the event of a conflict with NATO – had disappeared. In addition, both civilian and military defence policy-makers found themselves responsible for issues which had previously been the preserve of the Soviet Union. The collapse of Soviet control of Bulgarian defence policy, therefore, opened up a policy space for new approaches to national security, defence and civil–military relations and forced the Bulgarian military to think carefully about its own role in this context. Indeed, Dimitar Dimitrov has noted that the development of the defence planning process in postcommunist Bulgaria has been as much about *domestication* as it has been about democratization.[16] As was outlined earlier, Bulgarian thinking in this area increasingly focused on integration with the West, which in turn helped to encourage the adoption of western norms of civil–military relations. Thus, despite what might have appeared to be a heavy historical legacy of civil–military relations, the break with the earlier tradition of military praetorianism at the end of the Second World War and the collapse of Soviet domination of Bulgarian defence policy at the end of the Cold War, meant that neither period has had a major influence on the country's postcommunist civil–military relations.

Bulgaria's domestic political, economic and social context

Domestically, the period since the collapse of communism in Bulgaria has been characterized by two features. First, the transition to democracy and a market economy has caused significant economic and social hardship for much of the population. Second, despite these problems, there has been a broad acceptance of democracy, coupled with a general rejection of political extremism, extreme nationalism and authoritarianism. These factors have provided the framework in which the new Bulgarian civil–military relationship has developed.

While the Bulgarian state during the transition period can hardly be described as internally strong, it never assumed the features of a very weak state either. Thus there were never incentives for the military to intervene in domestic politics to address the state's inadequacies. Where military personnel did become involved in politics in the early 1990s, this was the result of individual generals volunteering to be drawn into policy-making rather than the armed forces intervening as an institution, and the motivation was more career-oriented than praetorian. Indeed, perhaps the biggest domestic obstacle to the consolidation of democratic control over the armed forces did not relate directly to the military, but was rather the intensely polarized and antagonistic nature of Bulgaria's two major political parties, the BSP and the UDF. Indeed, this political situation introduced the spectre of disproportionate civilian interference in military affairs and threatened to deprofessionalize the Bulgarian armed forces by undermining military morale and discouraging talented young officers from continuing a military career. More positively, the Bulgarian media have been proactive and vocal in pursuing the issue of democratic control of armed forces, regularly exposing the problems of civil–military relations, bringing them into the public domain and encouraging less party political and less polarized debate on the issue.

The difficulties engendered by Bulgaria's transition to a free market economy have also had a significant impact on civil–military relations. Indeed, addressing the social repercussions of the collapse in the living standards of military personnel has turned out to be a far more difficult problem than overcoming the legacy of communist politicization of the armed forces. The Bulgarian military historically had a relatively privileged social and economic status. With the collapse of communism, the armed forces faced both the general problems of severe economic recession and a dramatic reduction in defence spending, resulting in a corresponding decline in the living standards of most military personnel. Many servicemen were forced to leave the military, with little in the way of social support to assist them once they entered the civilian world. In the late 1990s, however, the government attempted to address these problems by introducing a compensation and adaptation scheme to provide education and training for servicemen who lose their jobs. The government also supported an initiative to find civilian jobs for these personnel in the public sector and provide some financial assistance to them. While problems remain with these programmes and many ex-servicemen still face a difficult time in the new environment, the support provided to them by the government is greater than that

available to other sectors of society adversely affected by economic change. Thus, by 2000–01 the difficulties in civil–military relations that Bulgaria's economic crisis engendered were being actively addressed by the government, with the result that many of its more negative effects were being successfully assuaged.

Institutional factors

The institutional mechanisms that guarantee democratic, civilian control over Bulgaria's armed forces were established in the 1991 constitution and have been outlined above. Although these arrangements were slightly modified by new national security laws during the 1990s, the basic institutional framework for democratic control of the military was established at an early stage in Bulgaria's postcommunist development. In addition, the 1998 National Security Concept and the 1999 National Military Doctrine introduced a more detailed regulatory structure for Bulgarian civil–military relations. In most respects, this constitutional and legal framework has become an accepted fact of life for the government, parliament, Ministry of Defence and General Staff.

Despite the generally positive way in which the institutions of Bulgarian civil–military relations have developed, however, four main problem areas remain. First, if the parliament is to provide effective oversight of defence policy and contribute to debate on defence issues, greater and more constructive engagement from MPs is required. The quality of parliamentary oversight of defence and security issues would be greatly improved by better education of parliamentarians on defence issues, and particularly by a better understanding of the need to link goals with resources. Second, clearer institutional arrangements are needed for control of Bulgaria's intelligence services. A change in the Law on Defence and the Armed Forces in March 2000 substantially improved matters in this area, directly subordinating the intelligence services to the Minister of Defence. As of 2000–01, however, differences persist between the Bulgarian President and Prime Minister over the most appropriate institutional home for these services, resulting in a generally poor level of performance from these institutions, as well as inadequate civilian control of their activities. Third, the institutional arrangements for democratic, civilian control over paramilitary institutions, specifically the Ministry of the Interior and the National Police, need further improvement. The salience of this issue was highlighted in January 2000 when it was discovered that the apartment of the General Prosecutor had been bugged by the Ministry of the Interior. Finally there is also a need to increase the input of the non-

governmental sector – such as expert think-tanks, the media and non-governmental organizations – into the defence policy-making process, which at present remains limited.

Military culture and professionalism

Bulgarian military culture at the beginning of the 1990s had been shaped by the totalitarian nature of the Bulgarian state between 1923 and 1989, a factor which did not appear to bode well for the introduction of a democratic system of civil–military relations. The Yugoslav conflicts and the desire to integrate with NATO and the EU, however, both served as catalysts for a change in military culture. Indeed, as was argued above, the adoption and assimilation of a culture of political non-intervention and neutrality by the Bulgarian military occurred relatively smoothly and swiftly. The decision to pursue national security through democratization and constructive regional diplomacy helped to initiate this substantial shift in the culture of the Bulgarian armed forces. In particular, the Bulgarian military became actively involved in a series of regional confidence-building measures, as well as in UN and NATO-led peacekeeping operations. These latter activities helped to redefine Bulgarian military culture by exposing the armed forces to new kinds of military operations, as well as to the professional militaries and approaches of NATO countries. The new legal framework adopted in the 1990s also helped to reshape national military culture by introducing the principle of the rule of law into civil–military affairs. While this had not been entirely absent before, the new framework codified and institutionalized this principle in a way which strongly influenced all levels of Bulgarian politics, including civil–military relations. These factors, coupled with a natural generational change in the armed forces, are leading to a distinct shift to a new military culture of which democratic, civilian control of the armed forces is a central part.

This transition is, however, far from complete, and two main problem areas remain. First, there is a continuing tendency among civilian policy-makers in the defence and security field to rely heavily on the technical advice of military officers. This practice stems from the continuing low levels of military expertise among civilians and the small size of the civilian expert community in this field. Where civilian specialists do exist, their expertise is rarely utilized. This situation serves to reinforce a perception among the military that defence and security issues remain exclusively their domain. Second, the nuances of the principle of separation of power in the Bulgarian government are not always adequately understood by senior military officers. The notion of checks

and balances on political power is still a complex subject for officers who were used to a communist system which unified all branches of the state under the Communist Party's monopoly of power. As a result, the military have not yet fully adapted to the concept that democratic, civilian control of the armed forces involves interaction with multiple civilian actors and institutions, each of which comprises an element of the system of civilian control or oversight. In general, however, this problem is diminishing as a result of improvements in the education of both the armed forces and society more widely. Progress in this field is likely to continue following the introduction of a new system of military education in 1998–99 and the implementation of 'Plan 2004', which aims to bring the Bulgarian military in line with NATO standards by 2004.[17]

Conclusion

One of the most striking features of Bulgaria's civil–military relations in the post-totalitarian era has been the armed forces' consistent reluctance to interfere in politics. The successful depoliticization of the military between 1989 and 1991 helped to consolidate broad acceptance of the principle of the military as the apolitical servant of the democratically elected government. While there have been sporadic attempts by civilian politicians and political parties to draw the military into politics, these have had little impact on domestic politics and were not viewed positively by Bulgarian society as a whole. Bulgaria's armed forces have also been integrated into and played an important role in Bulgarian foreign policy. Bulgaria has played a key role in promoting regional cooperation in the Balkans, and has been particularly proactive in the development of politico-military confidence-building measures with its neighbours. After a new UDF-led government came to power in 1997, a clear decision was made to seek further integration with, and full membership of, NATO and the EU and to undertake the reforms necessary to achieve this goal. In all these areas, the military has played a constructive role, a factor that has fed back into the development of a more democratic and professional military culture. In terms of democratic, civilian control of defence policy, however, the picture is more mixed. In many areas, the armed forces still dominate defence policy. Even where there appears to be substantial civilian input, such as in the parliamentary National Security Committee, a lack of civilian expertise often leads to heavy reliance on military advisers. While the overall reform process, and the specific need to meet criteria for NATO mem-

bership, are slowly changing this situation, full civilian control over defence policy remains a long-term aspiration for Bulgaria.

The development of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces in Bulgaria has been shaped by two main factors. The first of these is the domestic context of a broad support for democratic reform, coupled with a rejection of authoritarianism and extreme nationalism. This environment has supported the civil–military reform process, despite political difficulties and economic crises in the first half of the 1990s. Second, the influence of the international environment has been key. In particular, the Yugoslav conflicts forced a profound reassessment of Bulgaria's security needs and resulted in a decision – under the UDF-led government – to pursue both the consolidation of democratic, civilian control of the armed forces and defence policy and membership of NATO. The de facto criteria for future accession to NATO have provided a further impetus for reform. In conclusion, while many future issues and potential problems remain, Bulgaria has already passed the longer part of the road towards implementing a working model of democratic civil–military relations.

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9

Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Slovenia

Anton Bebler

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy has greatly affected civil–military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. With the exceptions of Poland and the former Yugoslavia during its terminal years, communist Central and Eastern European states experienced various forms of civilian control of the military. The postcommunist transformation of civil–military relations in most cases therefore entailed the adaptation of civilian control of the military to democratic changes in society at large. The introduction of competitive multiparty systems and corresponding reforms to political institutions, however, did not automatically result in democratic civil–military relations. Civilian control of the military can be, and in some cases has been, associated with political abuse of the armed forces for the narrow ends of a political party, group or individual. It can also be used as a vehicle of corruption. Some aspects of civilian control might be dysfunctional from a defence perspective and thus at variance with the security interests of a democratic state. At worst, civilian control of the military might even be utilized to subvert democracy. Moreover, while formal institutional arrangements for civil–military relations are vital, democratic control of armed forces also depends upon adherence to democratic norms and the application of strong sanctions for their violation among both civilian and military leaders.[1]

Slovenia represents an interesting case of the different factors affecting the process of democratic consolidation in postcommunist Europe. The country's geopolitical position, size, level of development, historic and cultural background, relative ethnic and cultural homogeneity, short experience of independent statehood, circumstances of creation and constitutional and political set-up all shaped relations between its civil and military spheres.[2] When Slovenia became independent, civil–

military relations had in some respects to be set up anew. Slovenia's very modest military traditions played a minimal role in this undertaking, while the preceding Yugoslav experience caused an emotional and overwhelmingly negative reaction from the Slovenian people. The impression of an institutional and normative void on Slovenia's independence day would, however, also be inappropriate.

The pre-independence political and institutional background

Until its proclamation of independence in June 1991, Slovenia was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Since late 1968, the Yugoslavian armed forces had consisted of two main formations: first, a fully centralized federal standing army (the Yugoslav People's Army or JNA); and second, militia-type Territorial Defence (TO) organizations in each republic. The Yugoslav system of civil–military relations between 1945 and the mid-1980s developed from the heritage of a guerrilla war-type fusion between the political and military leaderships. This symbiotic relationship between the Communist Party and the Yugoslav army was partly modified in 1945–48, bringing the system closer to the Soviet model of communist civil–military relations while still retaining some traits originating in the wartime guerrilla experience.

Until his death in 1980, the entire Yugoslav system had been dominated for several decades by Marshal Josip Broz Tito, the former professional revolutionary and wartime guerrilla leader. Being simultaneously the head of state, leader of the ruling Communist Party and Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav armed forces, Tito served as the linchpin between the civilian and the military spheres. Tito, moreover, exercised control over the military personally, through his own relatively small presidential office, having excluded the civilian Communist Party apparatus and the civilian security and intelligence agencies from this area.

In this respect the Yugoslav system differed very significantly from the Soviet model of maintaining strong civilian (and authoritarian) control over the military. Thus, behind the façade of civilian control the Yugoslav military obtained de facto far-reaching institutional and corporate autonomy. Under Tito's personal dictatorship, which softened and liberalized towards the end of his rule, a dual system developed. On one hand President Tito, clad on ceremonial occasions in either civilian dress or marshal's uniforms of various colours, supervised, occa-

sionally reshuffled and sacked the top generals. On the other, the federal army as an institution controlled the state borders and air space, and monitored the key civilian institutions, all electronic communications, the mass media and the pockets of mostly silent opposition. The JNA directly controlled large chunks of federal real estate and managed or supervised a very extensive military-economic complex. The federal army also served as the ultimate ideological and security watchdog for the communist regime. Civilian control over the Yugoslav military deteriorated progressively and after Tito's death in May 1980 became a complete pretence. In the late 1980s an uneven condominium developed with the civilian federal leadership. The divided and bickering civilian elites very quickly became the weaker side, susceptible to blackmail by the much more homogeneous JNA leadership.

The degeneration of the Yugoslav communist order became visible in 1988–89 as a general economic, political and moral malaise turned into the state's accelerated disintegration. Political and ideological clashes between fractured and regionally and ethnically based civilian elites brought the civilian federal institutions to a deadlock. In this situation the Yugoslav military leadership moved to the centre of the political stage and started acting as ultimate political arbiter.[3] The generals publicly declared their intention to defend 'true socialism' (the Yugoslav variation of communism) against its 'internal enemies' (meaning all kinds of opposition, particularly nationalists and liberals), with arms if necessary. They also set up an unconstitutional 'Supreme Command of the Armed Forces', with the defence minister General T. Veljko Kadijevič at its head. Using psychological pressure, the JNA leadership tried to coerce a majority in Yugoslavia's collective Presidency to declare a state of emergency and grant the military extraordinary powers. In March 1991 the JNA high command sent tanks into the streets of the federal capital. Senior military officers in the JNA apparently considered and made preparations for imposing its rule through a new, military-controlled all-Yugoslav communist party but finally desisted from this intention. One of the reasons for this decision was the Yugoslav Defence Minister's failure, during a March 1991 visit to Moscow, to obtain from his Soviet counterpart a pledge of military support in case of a conflict with the West. In June 1991 the federal army tried to use force to save the federal state from disintegration. After this policy failed to prevent Slovenia's secession, the JNA put its military and matériel resources at the disposal of Slobodan Miloševič's regime in Serbia. Three predominantly Serbian armies were created from the JNA's remaining parts to serve as the principal tools for carving out a 'greater Serbia' at the

expense of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (the 'Army of Yugoslavia' in the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the armies of the *Republika Srpska Krajina* in Croatia and *Republika Srpska* in Bosnia). The JNA's short ascendancy in federal politics in 1990–91 in fact hastened the SFRY's breakdown and contributed significantly to the violent nature of Yugoslavia's demise. By 1992 the JNA's professional military leadership had lost both the communist system and, with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, the federal state they were sworn to defend. Senior officers in the JNA leadership were pensioned off, purged and replaced by Slobodan Miloševič's servile appointees. The spectre of military dictatorship, somewhat similar to Poland's 'martial law' of the early 1980s, thus dissipated in rump Yugoslavia.

During the last decade of the SFRY two Slovenian politicians served as one-year rotating Presidents of the Federal Presidency. As such they were members of the collective civilian command of the Yugoslav armed forces. Their real influence on the JNA, however, was very modest to non-existent. The Slovenian political elite's relations with the federal military had varied during the entire four and a half decades of the communist Yugoslavia's existence, and included periods of multifaceted cooperation, subdued tensions and covert conflicts (often related to defence allocations). By the late 1980s public opinion and particularly the non-communist opposition in Slovenia had become highly critical of the federal military's assimilationism, political conservatism, growing institutional emancipation and obvious ambitions for power. This period also saw unprecedented public debates on matters relating to defence, as interest in defence-related subjects increased while authoritarian constraints on public discussion of such issues largely disappeared.

Until the SFRY's demise, Slovenia was obliged to follow and to contribute (mainly financially) to the implementation of the official policy of 'total defence'. In the partly decentralized federal defence system, however, the Slovenian leadership controlled the ordinary police and shared control over the Territorial Defence organization in Slovenia with the federal military. Both the police and TO used Slovenian as their language of command, were financed by Slovenia and staffed mostly by ethnic Slovenians. The Slovenian TO organization was established in autumn 1968, soon after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was created and organized by the civilian leadership of the then ruling League of Communists of Slovenia, with its headquarters intentionally set up only two blocks away from the League's Central Committee building. This link and the civilian control exercised by the Central Committee were maintained throughout the existence of the one-party

communist regime, although they weakened towards the regime's end. Civil–military relations in Slovenia at the Territorial Defence level differed markedly from those that existed between the Slovenian civilian political elite and the federal military. For about two decades the Yugoslav military leadership tried to obtain the federal government's support for either disbanding or disarming the Territorial Defence, absorbing it into the federal army's reserve forces or placing it under federal military control. In Slovenia, the JNA leadership failed to achieve any of these goals. In April 1990, however, it came very close to doing so. Exploiting the brief period of transition to the first freely elected non-communist coalition government, the JNA almost disarmed the Slovenian TO. Moreover, at a federal level, the JNA leadership caused the deepest crisis in civil–military relations in Slovenia. In late 1990 the Slovenian government, doubting the loyalty of the TO's senior military officers, dismissed its entire high command, including three Yugoslav generals of Slovenian nationality at its top. The Slovenian government was also forced to vacate the TO headquarters, having lost effective control over its subordinate commands and units prior to dismissing the TO's high command. A reserve Major Janez Slapar was appointed new TO commander and later became the first General and Chief of Staff in independent Slovenia. As Yugoslavia's breakdown progressed, the republican police and TO became viable instruments for implementing Slovenia's security policy, even before steps to this effect were authoritatively formulated and officially proclaimed by the Slovenian parliament.

The disintegration of the SFRY led to a highly uneven distribution of the former federal military assets, defence industries and other elements of the previously integrated, relatively large and expensive military-industrial complex. Unlike the Czechoslovak case, there was no peaceful, orderly and equitable distribution of joint stocks of weapons, equipment and facilities among the new national armies. Luckily for Slovenia, the armed hostilities on its soil in late June and early July 1991 lasted for only ten days and did not cause many casualties or much direct economic damage. This brief armed conflict with the much better-armed Yugoslav federal army, however, influenced very considerably Slovenia's subsequent defence and security policy as well as its civil–military relations.

Slovenia's defence since independence

The newly established or reformed institutions of security decision-making and implementation in Slovenia have, since independence, had

to deal with a number of inherited problems as well as new challenges. Defence and security matters became 'nationalized'. This nationalization served as a proud hallmark of Slovenia's newly acquired state sovereignty and was expressed through the formation of a national army, the introduction of new uniforms, insignia and other symbols, and the development of new national security policies. After the departure of the last Yugoslav military unit from Slovenia on 25 September 1991, the Slovenian armed forces and police assumed full control over the young republic's territory, borders and airspace. The standing, reserve and territorial components of the armed forces were merged into a single organization, later renamed from the Territorial Defence to the 'Slovenian Army'.

The radical reassessment of Slovenia's international position, interests, priorities and means led to significant shifts in the country's defence system and policy. Slovenia's armed forces became more defensive in mission and more evenly distributed throughout the country. The scaling down of virtually all elements of Slovenia's military potential also meant that the social weight and the political role played by the professional military decreased dramatically compared to the situation in the rest of the former SFRY. Most of the former federal barracks and the very extensive real estate previously held by the armed forces were given up by the Slovenian military and converted to civilian use. Physical control over most land and sea borders, previously exercised by the border troops of the federal army, was transferred to uniformed civilian police. The JNA's previous role as political watchdog over society and over the state disappeared altogether. Unlike most other Central and Eastern European states, however, Slovenia had never belonged to the Warsaw Pact. As a result, during the process of transformation of the country's defence system, Slovenia has not suffered from problems relating to the former Soviet military presence, such as political penetration of the military and the influence of the Soviet system on professional soldiers, military doctrine and force structure.

The Slovenian army is today much lighter, more mobile, culturally more homogeneous and better motivated than the JNA in Slovenia prior to independence. The total strength, after mobilization, stands at around 56 000 soldiers – roughly half the size of the former JNA force based in Slovenia in 1990 – and the percentage of professionals in the Slovenian armed forces has increased considerably, particularly in the lower ranks. Overall, Slovenia has been able to reduce annual defence spending from over $900 million in 1990 to about $300 million in 2000. Taken together, these elements constitute a considerable demilitariza-

tion of the 'Ljubljana gap' – for over four decades a strategically critical area on the European continent. The development of the Slovenian defence system, however, has been uneven and at times contradictory. In part, this reflects the low political survival rate and changing party affiliations of defence ministers. As a consequence, while numerous reforms have been announced or initiated these have remained largely uncompleted.

Civil–military relations in independent Slovenia

Under the Yugoslav communist system, defence and security decision-making was concentrated at the apex of the state civilian and military bureaucracy. The system operated without effective parliamentary oversight or control. The Slovenian coalition governments under the semi-presidential (1990–92) and subsequently parliamentary systems (since 1992) have radically transformed the legal framework and actual functioning of civil–military relations. According to Slovenia's present constitution, the non-executive President of the Republic is the titular Commander-in-Chief. The Prime Minister chairs the National Security Council but has no specific powers in this area. In practice, the Defence Minister is the key defence official in peacetime. In stark contrast to the former SFRY, five civilian politicians from three different parties succeeded each other as Minister of Defence between 1990 and 2000. The Defence Minister's actions can be overruled by the Prime Minister and there were several occasions between 1992 and 2000 when Prime Minister Janez Drnovšek did indeed intervene in this way. The Defence Minister's actions have also been exposed to scrutiny and pressure from the Defence Committee of the National Assembly, which is normally chaired by an opposition MP. Parliamentary scrutiny of the defence budget was introduced after independence – again in stark contrast to the largely rubber-stamp role of the former Yugoslav Federal Assembly. Slovenia's defence system and its activities have become more transparent, with public criticism freely expressed in printed and electronic media, information on defence issues available for academic research and non-governmental inputs into the debate on such matters.

Despite being small, newly created and still relatively weak, Slovenia's armed forces enjoy a high and stable measure of trust among the population. A 1999 public opinion poll measuring public confidence in various political and social institutions on a one-to-five scale gave the Slovenian military a score of 3.42, trailing only the President of the Republic and the national currency. This was significantly ahead of

the Council of Ministers (2.78), the National Assembly (2.57), regular courts (2.65), the police (3.01), the Constitutional Court (2.96), the Roman Catholic Church and Catholic clergy (2.62) and political parties (2.3).[4] This high measure of trust – although lower than in 1991–92 – probably reflects the population's confidence in strict civilian supremacy over the military and in the armed forces' benign and neutral political posture.[5]

While the level of trust in Slovenia's armed forces remains high, the social prestige of the military profession has decreased significantly. A 2000 opinion poll of young Slovenians showed that the military officers trail far behind not only medical doctors and lawyers but also numerous other professions, including police inspectors.[6] Another paradox in the relationship between the public and the military manifests itself in the decreasing willingness of the young to serve in the armed forces. The percentage of draftees claiming the status of conscientious objector has grown steadily to around thirty per cent. This contrasts markedly with the high general support of the population for national independence and its symbols such as the military. The degree of public interest in defence matters has also fallen since independence, although all legal and political obstacles to public information and debate were eliminated. Under the old regime these notably included the pervasive system of military and state secrets and the suppression of substantive debates in parliament and the mass media. While the transparency of defence politics, pluralism and freedom of the mass media have increased greatly, there is also a greater reluctance among the general population to accept any increase in defence spending. The quality of public debate on defence matters has also declined. These shifts can only partly be explained by declining general threat perceptions following the end of the Cold War and the Balkan wars and the relative absence of qualified participants in public debates. The practical disappearance of the pacifists and the greens as potent political forces in Slovenia may also be a partial explanation for this development. The overall climate in the relations between the public and the military has thus changed dramatically since the terminal years of the previous Yugoslav regime, as both public interest in and constraints on public debate of defence have decreased dramatically.

Since its establishment the Slovenian military has undergone ideological pluralization and relative party neutralization. Professional soldiers were banned from being members of political parties and separate military courts were abolished. Military professions were opened to women, while previously widespread discrimination against known

religious believers was discontinued. The new constitution, adopted in December 1991, stipulated general defence obligations for all male citizens and the right of conscientious objectors on religious, philosophical and humanistic grounds to contribute to the country's overall security through civilian service.

In contrast to the practices at the federal level of the old Yugoslavia, the Slovenian Defence Ministry is staffed largely by civilians, with the professional military placed firmly under several layers of overwhelming civilian control. One of the most important reasons for the exceedingly high degree of civilian domination lies in the numerical and intellectual weakness of military professionals within Slovenia's defence system. Prior to independence, Slovenians were, for decades, underrepresented among Yugoslav military professionals, accounting for only 2.8 per cent of officers and non-commissioned officers despite constituting 8.2 per cent of Yugoslavia's population.[7] Moreover, the intake of Slovenians into the ranks of Yugoslav officers and non-commissioned officers effectively stopped in the late 1980s, and the numbers of those serving in the JNA dwindled rapidly due to resignations and retirements. Quite a few of the remaining Slovenians, particularly those in the Yugoslav navy and those married to non-Slovenians, stayed in Croatia and other Yugoslav successor states. In addition, of those who returned to Slovenia in the early 1990s only several dozen were commissioned into the Slovenian armed forces and this number included no more than a dozen active Yugoslav generals and admirals of Slovenian origin. Distrust of and discrimination against former officers of the federal army were much more pronounced in Slovenia than in neighbouring Croatia, where about two thousand officers from the JNA were commissioned. In their stead the officers' ranks were hastily filled up with civilians, who often had neither proper military qualifications nor professional experience.

Several other factors have contributed to this very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military. These include the widespread rejection of the previous Yugoslav model of civil–military relations (which contained both militarist and praetorian proclivities); the small size of the Slovenian armed forces; the paucity of Slovenian military traditions; the underdeveloped corporate identity of the Slovenian military officers; and the army leadership's extremely low political profile. The parliamentary system of government gave this domination its constitutional and legal foundation and form.

An elaborate system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment was erected in Slovenia. This consists of a civilian President of

the Republic as Commander-in-Chief; an entirely civilian National Assembly and Defence Committee; a civilian Prime Minister who chairs the entirely civilian National Security Council; a civilian Minister of Defence, civilian secretaries of state and other top officials in the Ministry of Defence; a largely civilian layer of medium-level and lower officials in the Ministry of Defence; an internal security service staffed mostly by civilians and subordinated to the Minister of Defence; civilian financial inspectors from the Ministry of Finance and the Court of Auditors; and a civilian judiciary and ombudsman.

The overlapping responsibilities of civil servants within the Ministry of Defence and professional soldiers within the armed forces made the operational autonomy of the military utterly impossible. This aspect of the civilian-military interface within the defence establishment has had dysfunctional consequences and will probably have to be rectified in the near future. No less important in this context has been the self-control exercised by the professional military themselves – many of them civilians until only a few years ago.

These developments, coupled with a reduced level of professionalism within the military, have radically changed Slovenian civil–military relations. In many areas of defence policy, the civil–military interface has been supplanted by de facto 'civil–civil' relations. Most defence-related matters are nowadays decided upon exclusively by civilian officials, with the military being able to convey their views and assessments on only a rather limited range of issues. The professional military can thus only partly influence the formulation of Slovenia's defence policy in a narrow sense, while in other areas (such as internal security and foreign and economic policies) they do not even have indirect influence. This weakness is due to factors such as a lack of expertise, deficient command of relevant information and an inability to provide timely analysis.

The shift from civil–military relations to largely civil–civil relations on military matters has also been reflected in defence politics. For more than a decade most defence-related political conflicts in Slovenia were generated by, revolved around or were connected with the first civilian Defence Minister Janez Janša, who held the post from 1990 to 1994 and for several months in 2000. After Slovenia gained its independence, this former professional communist youth official turned political dissident became the most controversial figure in the country's politics. Over the course of several years Janša was expelled from or voluntarily left four political parties, moving steadily in his pronouncements and positions from the radical Marxist left with a pacifist tinge to the anti-

communist, pro-clerical and nationalist right. As Defence Minister he took over the presidency of his fifth political party, the then small and weak Slovenian Social-Democratic Party, and began to promote himself through the mass media as the leader of the entire right and a potential Prime Minister. It has since been asserted in the critical press that Janša packed the top layers of the Defence Ministry and of the military with supporters of his latest political party, personal cronies and sycophants. In an open letter published in Slovenia's main newspapers, Janša's successor Jelko Kacin confirmed reports of incompetence among the civilians and junior military officers who had been promoted rapidly and in large numbers by Janša to the highest posts.[8]

Exploiting the legal void created by the new constitution (which, at the time it was introduced, was not accompanied by more detailed parallel legislation on the control of the military), the Defence Minister effectively deprived the President and Commander-in-Chief of relevant confidential information on the armed forces. The two Prime Ministers under whom Janša served had neither interest in nor knowledge of defence, and were happy to leave these matters largely to their Defence Minister. The parliamentary Defence Committee was at this point composed largely of deputies with very modest general education and with no defence expertise. Consequently it was no match for the Minister. The Committee Chairman, moreover, left his faction of the Slovenian National Party and joined the Minister's own Social-Democratic Party. Bypassing the General Staff, Janša placed a special commando unit – *Moris* – directly and solely under his control and used its members to conduct dubious clandestine operations and undertake surveillance of civilians. These acts and the shielding of the suspected military personnel from criminal police investigation brought Janša into numerous conflicts with the Ministry of Interior and its Minister Ivan Bizjak. The latter belonged to the second largest party of the governing coalition, the Christian Democrats, who had previously been Janša's most important political allies and protectors within the government.

The political tensions surrounding and created by the Defence Minister finally proved too much for the coalition government. The clash between the Defence Minister and the Minister of Interior led to the former's dismissal in March 1994. At the Prime Minister's request a majority in the National Assembly voted him out of office. The immediate occasion for Janša's downfall, amid a political scandal, was the arrest without a warrant and beating of a civilian police informant by military commandos from the *Moris* unit. Many of Janša's former political associates publicly condemned this act of brutality, which,

according to them, constituted a distasteful repudiation of the liberal democratic principles advocated by the democratic opposition to the previous communist regime. The vote in the parliament was accompanied by acrimonious protests, noisy demonstrations, sit-ins and even by a hunger strike staged by Janša's admirers from the nationalist right.

The level of political conflict related to the military subsided dramatically under Janša's successors. Perhaps the biggest accomplishment of the second civilian Defence Minister Jelko Kacin was the Slovenian military's removal from conflicts between political parties. Janša's downfall was preceded by or led to a number of resignations, transfers, retirements and dismissals in the Defence Ministry and the armed forces. Several high defence officials followed the former minister, becoming functionaries of his new political party. Notably a retired brigadier and the former commander of the *Moris* unit was appointed as the party's full-time secretary-general. These movements and the visible strengthening of the Social Democratic Party in material terms have given credence to speculation in the press that Janša abused his ministerial position for political recruitment into his party and illicitly accumulated funds to finance the party's activities.

These military-related tensions in the civilian political sphere reflected the wider socio-political context of post-authoritarian transition. The three main intended shifts affecting the civil–military interface in the entire region – relative political neutralization of the armed forces, increased professionalism in the military and the civilianization of defence decision-making – have not necessarily been mutually reinforcing. Thus the appointment of a civilian defence minister in 1990 and especially his subsequent reappointments stimulated new intrusions of party politics into the military. The civilianization of defence decision-making, furthermore, has contributed to the lowering of professionalism and competence in the Slovenian military establishment and arguably to some manifestations of military-related social pathology. The turbulence surrounding the activities of the first Defence Minister also reflected an insufficiently developed democratic political culture, deficiency in the art of developing a pluralist political consensus and a lack of tolerance among the top politicians in Slovenia. The extent and pace of democratic consolidation in Slovenia's civil–military relations has been constrained by authoritarian habits among civilian policy-makers and the limited pool of qualified civilians in the political parties, parliament and the executive branch, as well as by bureaucratic inertia.

In addition to preventing and overcoming the spill-over of civilian political conflicts into the military, Janša's three successors as Defence Minister also introduced a number of reforms arising from the Slovenian government's stated goal of joining NATO. Some of these planned changes will no doubt influence the evolution of civil–military relations in years to come. Slovenia has been an active participant in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) since 1995. PfP includes activities promoting the norms and institutional approaches to civil–military relations of the mature western democracies. Several other developments have strengthened the professional military, intellectually and organizationally, in its relations with civilians both inside and outside the defence ministry. In 2000–01, therefore, a new equilibrium in Slovenian civil–military relations appears to be emerging.

In the meantime, as a consequence of conflicting political party interests and individual high-level politicians, some key elements in the relationships between the highest level defence decision-makers remain unclear or even illogical. There are thus gross discrepancies between the constitutional provision for the President as Commander-in-Chief and some stipulations in the Law on National Defence and by-laws regulating the National Security Council (chaired by the Prime Minister). In his opinion on the draft Law on National Defence, forwarded to parliament in December 1993, the President proposed two alternative solutions to this problem: either modify the draft law and give the President the tools necessary to effectively discharge the responsibilities of Commander-in-Chief, or amend the Constitution and authorize the Defence Minister (and not the President) to command the armed forces. The Slovenian parliament chose to ignore this opinion, and did not debate or respond to it. The fact that this matter remains unresolved clearly illustrates the lack of consensus on the civilian side of the civil–military interface. The effectiveness of parliamentarian oversight of the military and defence policy has also been limited by the relatively low level of expertise in the Defence Committee of the National Assembly.

Conclusion

During the last few years of the old Yugoslavia's existence – from 1988 to 1991 – military-related matters played a very prominent role in political debates and struggles in Slovenia. Since Slovenia secured its independence and the Balkan wars were effectively brought to an end by NATO, however, the Slovenian political elite and general public

have lost interest in military matters. Slovenia has thus become a case in which the following features have been combined:

- overwhelming civilian domination of the military, with numerous instruments of democratic control;
- deep civilianization of the defence establishment;
- a diminished level of military professionalism, and a very low-profile, docile and politically neutral military;
- the absence of a pro-military lobby, and a very low level of civilian militarism and praetorianism;
- greatly diminished public interest in defence issues and the absence of sharp political disagreements between major political parties over defence and the military.

This combination of features, and the tensions and problems relating to the civil–military interface in Slovenia, underscores the complexity of the post-authoritarian transition in Central and Eastern Europe. These problems, however, in no way negate the historic significance of the change brought about by the democratic wave since 1989–90. As in other Central and Eastern European states, Slovenian civil–military relations have moved closer to West European parliamentary patterns. Civilian rule has been reaffirmed and strengthened as the norm. Unlike the communist period, this time it is a democratic variant of firm civilian control of the military.

Notes

1. For further details on the different factors shaping postcommunist civil–military relations see B. Vankovska, *Balkan Militaries in the Process of Democratization*, IUS Biennial International Conference, Baltimore, 22 October 1999, 6; Z. Barany, 'Democratic Consolidation and the Military', *Comparative Polities*, 30 (1), October 1997.
2. For other discussions of Slovenian civil–military relations see A. Bebler, 'Civil–Military Relations in Slovenia', in C. P. Danopoulos and D. Zirker (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996); and A. Grizold, 'Civil–Military Relations in Slovenia', in A. Bebler (ed.), *Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing – Praeger, 1997) 101–9.
3. On the role of the military in the break-up of Yugoslavia see A. Bebler, 'The Role of the Military in the Disintegration of Yugoslavia', in D. Ashkenazi (ed.), *The Military in the Service of Society and Democracy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994) 129–35.

4. *Politbarometer*, Center for Public Opinion Research, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, July 1999, table 5.
5. Max Kasse et al., *Zaupanje v vlado. Zaupanje Slovencev v demokratični sistem* (Ljubljana: Liberalna akademija Ljubljana, 1999) 248.
6. *Slovenian Youth and Military Occupations 2000*, Summary of the Research Project, Faculty of Social Sciences (Ljubljana: October 2000) 10.
7. A. Bebler, 'The Yugoslav People's Army and the Fragmentation of a Nation', *Military Review*, August 1993, 38–51.
8. A. Bebler, *Delo*, 17 June 1994, 2.

10

'Like Drunken Geese in the Fog': Developing Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Croatia

Alex J. Bellamy

The first decade of Croatia's independent statehood was one of perpetual change.[1] There was first a transition from communism to postcommunism and from Yugoslavia to former-Yugoslavia, marked by violence and constant threat. The second transition was from a state of war to one of peacetime authoritarianism. Towards the end of the century the legitimacy of the regime of President Franjo Tuđman began to wane amid corruption scandals, illiberal governance and an ailing economy. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Croatia entered its third transitional stage when the electorate ousted the ruling HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union), electing in its place a centre-left coalition government headed by the former reformist communist leader Ivica Račan. The people of Croatia also rejected Mate Granić, the HDZ's nomination to succeed the late President Tuđman. Stipe Mesić, who had defected from the HDZ in 1993 in protest at its policy towards Bosnia and Hercegovina, and in particular at its support of the secessionist Bosnian Croats, was elected as President. This new government is attempting to bring Croatia up to western standards of democracy and respect for human rights, and in May 2000 Croatia was admitted to NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme.

This perpetual transition has impacted upon the relationship between the military and the state. At the outset a crucial opportunity to establish democratic control of the armed forces was missed. In 1990, following the election of HDZ in Croatia's first elections, the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) insisted that Croatia disarm its territorial defence forces that had been created two decades earlier to organize indigenous resistance in case of Soviet invasion. As the political situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated and the first signs of a Serbian revolt in Croatia began to emerge, the first Croatian defence minister – Martin Špegelj –

calculated that the republic needed arming, something that could only be done clandestinely.[2] Thus, from the outset, the Croatian defence establishment developed a culture of paranoia and secrecy, fed by the JNA and the Croatian Serb attack that was launched the following year.

Throughout the duration of the war (1991–95), Croatia's armed forces came under the direct personal control of two men, President Franjo Tuđman and Defence Minister and radical émigré nationalist Gojko Šušak. As Ozren Žunec points out, civilian control of the armed forces was established 'through politicization of the armed forces via the penetration model'.[3] This was a pattern reproduced across government–state–society relations. Unlike the 'subjective' model advanced by Samuel Huntington, this relationship was generally informal and symbiotic.[4] Elite networks replaced the appointment of political officers that had been a feature of the JNA structure. During the Yugoslav period, the JNA was a constitutionally recognized political actor. In the Praesidium of the League of Communists it had enjoyed representation and voting rights identical to those of the republics.[5] Under the Croatian constitution, promulgated in 1990, the armed forces had no such formal role, nor was the politicization formal.

According to Roman Kolkowicz, there was little attempt to 'politicize military personnel through intensive indoctrination and political education', a key feature of politicization in the Soviet Union (and former Yugoslavia).[6] As this chapter argues, the strategic context of the birth of the Croatian Army (HV) meant that military education took a back seat to war-fighting training (the first military college was not opened until 1998). Instead, the Croatian case in the 1990s is indicative of the first two modes of party leadership that have been identified by Timothy Colton.[7] The first channel of leadership is command from above. The Croatian defence community was characterized by very strong channels of personal control from President Tuđman and Defence Minister Šušak. The second source of direction comes from within, through extensive party membership, particularly within the higher echelons of the armed forces. This web was held together not by the formal controls described by Kolkowicz, but by the legitimacy of the regime. The sociologist and political activist, Vesna Pusić, aptly described the Tuđman regime as a dictatorship with democratic legitimacy.[8] Thus, as Dale Herspring argues in relation to the Soviet Union, the armed forces 'accepted the role of the party as legitimate and took their guidance from it'.[9] The regime maintained its legitimacy through adherence to democratic principles. Though the party manipulated the media in order to maintain public support, the peaceful and constitutional change of regime in 2000 after

free and fair elections suggests that there was more to the democratization process than mere window dressing.[10]

The Mesić government faces the challenge of reforming the armed forces and bringing them under proper democratic and constitutional control. While there is substantial consensus about the need for reform and considerable assistance available from overseas, significant obstacles remain. Not least, the degree of penetration into the armed forces achieved by the HDZ continues to present problems. Other obstacles include reactionary war veterans' organizations and the ongoing problem of pursuing war criminals and cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague.

Understanding democracy and the Croatian military

The development of the Croatian armed forces from 1990–91 onwards was shaped by a number of specific factors that gave the country's civil–military relations a particular and problematic character. First, the Croatian armed forces were developed from nothing. Only a small fraction of JNA officers were Croats, and, since the 'Croatian Spring' movement in 1971, many Croats viewed the Yugoslav army as an illegitimate and alien power. These two factors meant that while several JNA officers did take up senior postings in the HV, there was very little institutional or bureaucratic legacy bequeathed by the JNA. What little legacy there might have been was destroyed by the JNA's attacks on Eastern Slavonia (Vukovar) and Dalmatia (Dubrovnik). These actions systematically delegitimized the JNA in the eyes of both politicians and former JNA officers. Unlike the former Soviet republics, what arms the HV did acquire had to be stolen and very often fought for. In 1991, the Croats organized a series of blockades of JNA barracks in Croatia, forcing it to withdraw and often abandon arms. On most occasions the JNA was able to withdraw with its heavy weaponry, a factor that would cause a heavy imbalance in forces in the first three years of the war.

Secondly, because of the lack of institutional legacy, the HV and Croatian state has never had a problem with loyalty. The JNA officers that served in the HV abandoned their former posts of their own volition because they accepted their new state and wanted to defend it against internal and external aggression. Initially, therefore, the military saw itself as the guardian of the transition to democracy rather than as a bulwark against transition. There was never a question that the HV would intervene to halt the collapse of communism by force, though

in 1990 the JNA drew up plans to oust the reformist Croatian communists under Ivica Račan.[11] Furthermore, because of the war with the JNA and Serb militias, the HV was constituted almost entirely of ethnic Croats (with very small minorities of ethnic Italians and Hungarians[12]) and, under an agreement reached with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES), ethnic Serbs remain exempt from service in the Croatian armed forces.[13] While a properly western and democratically controlled armed force should arguably reflect the ethnic balance of the state, the absence of Serbs has served to legitimate the military within Croatia and ensured that it became the servant of the Croatian state and ruling party.[14]

Third, the Croatian experience highlights the importance of distinguishing between democratic and civilian control of the military. The HV became a key actor in Croatian politics because of the deliberate policy of politicization enacted by HDZ. From its inception, although the Ministry of Defence had a large proportion of military officers working in it, it has to an extent been controlled by civilian officials – principally Tuđman and Šušak. The question, however, is how democratic was that civilian control? At first glance, the HV has not had undue influence on domestic, foreign and defence policies, particularly given the context of its origin. However, it was used to legitimize a particular regime and coerce acceptance of particular policies, and elements within it were used to influence intra-party struggles.

Finally, Croatia has a plethora of security services and armed forces. Other than the regular HV, which consists of professional guards brigades, local defence units, and conscripted units, there are several other armed forces that fall outside the control of the Defence Ministry. As in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the Interior Ministry controls a significant armed force, which includes armoured vehicles. In 1991, it was the Croatian MUP that took the initiative in organizing local defence and it has subsequently maintained this role. MUP forces operated alongside the HV during the 1995 Operation Storm that regained control of the Krajina region.[15] There is a sizeable Presidential Guard made up of elite troops and subordinated directly to the presidency. Two principle paramilitary organizations also had links with the HV. The first was Dobroslav Paraga's Croat Defence Forces (HOS). HOS forces aided the defence of Vukovar and fought in Bosnia, attracting large numbers of Muslim volunteers because of their espousal of a united Bosnia (which, Paraga hoped, would be incorporated by Croatia). However, once Tuđman decided upon a policy of partitioning Bosnia, Bosnian Croat forces Croat Defence Council (HVO) forcibly integrated

HOS forces into HVO its structures. Paraga argued that Tuđman's partition plan for Bosnia amounted to a betrayal of the Croats in central Bosnia, whose physical security depended upon good relations with their Muslim neighbours. He had also constantly denounced the President for his failure to defend Vukovar, which he argued was evidence of Tuđman's lack of patriotism.[16]

These four considerations are vital to understanding civil–military relations in Croatia. They suggest that there was a nexus between party, state and military, which continued the form of relations of the communist period. The key difference was that while the glue binding these elements together had been principles of 'self-management socialism' and 'brotherhood and unity', under the new regime ethnic nationalism was the guiding principle and the HDZ its vanguard.[17]

The HV in domestic politics

On one hand, the HV accepted the transition to postcommunism and indeed was a driving force of that transition. On the other, from the outset it has been deeply involved in domestic politics and was intimately related to the HDZ. James Gow argued that 'civil–military relations in Yugoslavia can be understood as a function of the interaction of regime and military legitimacies',[18] and there is little doubt that the HV was used to bolster regime legitimacy in Croatia. Opinion polls, for example, revealed that the military was one of the most trusted institutions among citizens.[19]

Creation

The Croatian armed forces were initially built upon two pre-existing institutions, both of which were associated with the republic's government and neither with the JNA or other federal entities. The first were the MUP forces. Being under the control of the Socialist Republic of Croatia rather than the Yugoslav federal authorities, the MUP established its own forces in 1991 to counter the threats emanating from Serbia and Serbs in Slavonia and Lika. These forces 'provide those functions that are not possible for the police and which do not fall under the general terms of military operations'.[20] During the homeland war, this meant 'policing' retaken territories such as the Serbian Krajina after Operation Storm. After 1995, they were frequently used to suppress internal unrest. In 1999, for example, they forcibly entered the building of the *Nacional* newspaper in a bid to seize documents implicating the HDZ in the fixing of football matches.

The second institution that fed into the HV were the reservists of the Territorial Defence Forces. General Martin Špegelj, the retiring head of the JNA Fifth Army, planned to use covert arms procurement to turn these forces into an effective Croatian fighting force, but when his illegal activities were uncovered and exposed by the JNA, Tuđman was forced to sideline him. His replacement, Gojko Šušak, shaped civil–military relations for the rest of the decade and ensured that the HV and HDZ became intimately linked.

Unlike Špegelj, who was first and foremost a professional soldier, Šušak was a radical nationalist émigré with no military experience. Indicative of his views was an answer he gave to a journalist upon appointment. Asked about his birthplace, Šušak stated that he was born in Siroki Brijeg, Croatia. Siroki Brijeg – which is actually in Bosnia – had been a stronghold of the Croatian fascist movement in the Second World War and had its name changed to Listica after the war by a government keen to eradicate all memory of the fratricide that had taken place. When asked about this statement, Šušak stated that, 'she [the interviewer] said that Siroki Brijeg didn't exist. It didn't exist in her mind, because her mind is controlled by those who in 1953 abolished the name Siroki Brijeg. . . . for me Bosnia-Hercegovina is also the state of the Croatian people and for me it is Croatia'.[21] Though not possessing great wealth himself, Šušak bought his influence by raising significant funding for the HDZ from the Croatian diaspora in North America. It is widely acknowledged that this funding aided the HDZ's election victory in 1990 and thus Šušak was able to wield a considerable amount of influence with President Tuđman.

Although the constitution created a semi-presidential system, the President was installed as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Tuđman thus exercised extensive control over the development of the HV. In order to control the internal security services, he ensured that close allies were posted to the MUP and his son – Miroslav Tuđman – served as head of the intelligence services. In addition, the Office of National Security was placed under the direct control of the President. This meant that all four intelligence organizations, anti-Yugoslav Intelligence (OBS), Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance (OSHV), Defence Ministry Intelligence (SIS) and Interior Counter Intelligence (UINS), were directly controlled by the President. Ozren Žunec revealed that in 1994 a Brigadier from the President's entourage was appointed as 'Commander of the 1st Croatian Guards Corps', a unit that did not officially exist in the HV, suggesting that several military units were controlled directly by the President.[22]

Constitutionally three of these agencies came under the remit of government ministries answerable to parliament. However, they escaped parliamentary scrutiny by answering directly to the Office of National Security. This mechanism was also used to subvert parliamentary control of the HV. Utilizing emergency powers granted to him in time of war by the constitution, Tuđman ensured that the HV also came under the control of the Office of National Security, though via the Ministry of Defence. By subverting the mechanisms for parliamentary scrutiny of the armed forces, Tuđman and Šušak created an environment that enabled them to control the military for party ends rather than for the good of the state, a factor that had a heavy impact on foreign policy during the Bosnian war.

The decision to politicize the armed forces was informed by the belief that the HDZ and the Croatian nation were one and the same. According to Tuđman, 'the HDZ appeared as a nation-wide democratic party focused on bringing together all nation-building forces'.[23] An attack on one was therefore an attack on all, a point that necessitated a politically oriented armed force. Through the Ministry of Defence and Office for National Security, military appointments and education ensured that the HDZ controlled the armed forces. As Biljana Vankovska-Cvetkovska noted:

> The leading positions in the military were filled with political activists of the HDZ, with almost no military education or professional experience. Thus, direct political influence and control over the military were established from the very beginning. The control has been strengthened by the fact that the position of the Commander-in-Chief has been held by the leader of the ruling party. Many Croat officers confirm (unofficially, of course) that the majority of the members of the military staff are HDZ members. Many of them were forced to join the party.[24]

Thus, in the period when the HV was established, the government politicized the armed forces. People with no experience of the military were appointed to positions within the Defence Ministry and military postings were also often based on political preference rather than military expertise.[25] Furthermore, Tuđman circumvented the checks and balances put in place by the constitution by directly managing the armed forces and security services. Not only was the military developed to legitimize the new state, it was also intended that it should legitimize a particular regime.

Consolidation

After the 1995 Dayton agreement signalled the end of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the role of the armed forces in domestic politics became more obvious. It was not that the HV or other services physically intervened in domestic politics, but rather that they were repeatedly used to legitimize the regime. There were widespread reports prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections that the Presidential adviser on interior affairs – the influential and hardline Ivic Pasalić – was planning to use MUP forces in case of an opposition victory.[26] As it happened, the HDZ was defeated so heavily that there was no attempt at extra-parliamentary action.

The military was used in various ways to support the regime. As was noted, it was staffed with HDZ loyalists, and this situation continued after the war. Disagreements between the civilian and military authorities were resolved by the dismissal of prominent military professionals who expressed opinions divergent from those of the regime. General Petar Stipetić, for example, was frequently given low-profile jobs despite his widely renowned expertise because of his dislike of the regime's attitude towards the armed forces.[27]

The HDZ also used the military to generate powerful lobby groups that would offer 'independent' opinions on state television. The most powerful of these is the Croatian Veterans Association (HVIDRA). During this period of consolidation, HVIDRA publicly defended the regime whenever it was criticized by the international community or opposition parties. This served to legitimate the constant refusal to cooperate with the ICTY or fulfil international demands for the return of Serbian refugees to Croatia. By using HVIDRA, the regime was able to persuade a majority of Croats to disapprove of the ICTY's activities and agree that it should have no jurisdiction to investigate crimes committed by Croatian forces during Storm, though the tribunal's statute clearly gives it such a jurisdiction.[28]

During the war, the HDZ legitimated itself by claiming to be a bastion against communist and Serbian forces. By using the rhetoric of war it was able to legitimate its stranglehold over the parliament and its unaccountable control of the armed forces. Once the war was over, the regime had to find new enemies to legitimate itself. In 1995, local elections should have returned an opposition mayor for the city of Zagreb but the President used his emergency powers to block the opposition candidate for mayor and install someone loyal to the regime. Tuđman explained that:

> It is important that our public understands that the situation in which Croatia finds itself regarding the problems of the liberation of the remaining occupied territories and the crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina is such that we cannot allow that sort of opposition which would rock Croatia's stability to take root in the city of Zagreb.[29]

The message here is unmistakable. Not only is an attack on the HDZ an attack on the Croatian state, but the President insisted that opposition could not be allowed, implying that coercion could be used to suppress the opponents of the HDZ. Indeed, at a military festival Tuđman declared that 20 per cent of Croatian citizens had, 'never accepted the Croatian state', and insisted that the HV become a force that 'the state leadership can rely on at any time'.[30]

Although the HV was not directly used in domestic politics, the MUP and intelligence services were. As was noted earlier, MUP forces were used to suppress protests and curtail the activities of the media. The intelligence services were deployed in a similar fashion. In 1998 Defence Minister Andrija Hebrang resigned after discovering that the SIS was tapping his phones and trying to undermine him. Hebrang was a reformist member of the HDZ who sought to balance the budget of the heavily indebted Defence Ministry.[31] He resigned after a party hearing unsurprisingly cleared the SIS of any wrongdoing.

Change

The task confronting the new government after the 2000 parliamentary and presidential elections presents many dilemmas. The first problem, which has no easy solution, is how to 'cleanse' the defence establishment of its HDZ orientation without being seen to be repoliticizing the military. The incoming Defence Minister, Jožo Radoš, began by dismissing seven deputy Defence Ministers. In doing so he declared that 'we intend to discontinue the practice of political activity within the Croatian Army . . . officers and civil servants within the Ministry of Defence will be allowed to belong to political parties but not to hold party functions. Our aim is to have experts in key positions of the Ministry of Defence'.[32] Another way of purging HDZ activists from the Defence Ministry is through rationalization. Complete accounts for the Ministry were not published until 1998, and even then large parts of its expenditure remained classified. Much of this classified expenditure, it seems, was spent supporting the activities of political appointees rather than core defence activities. For example, Radoš ordered an audit of cars

belonging to the Ministry. The audit found that the Ministry owned 2300 cars but that it and the armed forces required only 200–300.[33] Another example of Ministry funds going astray that was discovered by the new government was the case of Stipe Gabrić. Gabrić, a leading HDZ figure in southern Croatia, was a wholesale supplier to the HV. It was discovered that the average mark-up price of the goods he was supplying was 300 per cent.[34]

An indication of the government's determination to reform the armed forces came with the dismissal of seven serving generals in September 2000. The generals had written an open letter that noted, 'with bitterness', that the war against the Serbs was being presented by the new government as 'a crime and something filthy, while in fact it was the foundation of Croatia's freedom, independence and sovereignty'.[35] The cause of this outburst was the government's decision to cooperate with the ICTY and to accept the tribunal's jurisdiction over crimes committed by Croatian forces inside Croatia. Discontent with this cooperation became apparent when a key war crimes witness, Milan Levar, was killed by a bomb outside his home in the Croatian town of Gospić after four Croatian soldiers suspected of killing Serb civilians in Gospić in 1991 were arrested by the police. In justifying his decision to remove the generals, President Mesić insisted that 'whoever wants to be in politics has the right to do so; I won't suggest which party they should join. But while they are in the army they will not be publishing [political] pamphlets'. He went on to insist that the armed forces be 'depoliticized'.[36]

Another problem, linked to the first, is the continuing influence of the HDZ. This is particularly evident in the work of HVIDRA, which as we saw earlier was used to legitimize the regime. With the advent of a new regime, HVIDRA has adopted a stance of disruption and criticism. Proposals that veterans of all wars should receive the same pension were rejected fiercely. Announcing that the HVIDRA would take action to disrupt the summer's tourist season, its President, Marinko Liović, insisted that veterans of the recent war 'cannot agree to be equalized with the participants in the Second World War, especially Partisans'.[37] Thus, throughout summer 2000, veterans blockaded roads and disrupted shipping, striking direct blows against the government in a way that it had never previously done.

There is also a worrying continuation of the politicization of the military. Across the government, the six governing coalition members are having difficulty cohabiting and agreeing common platforms and strategies. Although Stipe Mesić was elected President on a platform

of decreasing presidential power, he has been slow in doing this. Hence, as Commander-in-Chief, he imposed his own preferred choice as Chief of Staff, General Petar Stipetić, without consulting Jožo Radoš, the Defence Minister (who is a member of a different party).[38] Some months later, Dražen Budiša (former leader of Radoš's party) attempted to undermine this decision by suggesting that he had been invited by the ICTY to provide evidence implicating Stipetić in war crimes.[39]

The new government is taking steps to reduce the politicization of the armed forces, and includes this as an objective of its defence policy. However, it is clear that problems remain. Not only are powerful interest groups working to undermine the third transition, the governing coalition is itself maintaining politicization by involving the military in its political intrigues. It is also worrying to note that military appointments may still be being made on political grounds.

The armed forces and defence policy

Because of the close synergy between party and military that existed in the 1990s, the issue of democratic control of defence policy is fairly straightforward: there was none. Figures on defence spending were not available until 1998 because issues of defence were considered too important to be debated by parliament, and to question defence policy was tantamount to treason.

Creation

Croatia's armed forces and defence strategy were created hastily and presented with an immediate task of defending the state from internal and external aggression. There was no time for careful evaluation of strategic goals or debate about defence orientation. Although these factors are understandable, they did create a non-democratic culture within the HV and the defence ministry that persisted long after the threat had disappeared across the Danube. This culture was bolstered by the enforced *covert* arms procurement that commenced in 1991 and involved around $400 million that has never been accounted for.[40] The primary sources of this weaponry were Eastern Germany and corrupt elements of the Soviet/Russian army. This material was transported to Croatia by train through sympathetic states such as Hungary.[41] Martin Špegelj was initially responsible for this policy of illicit procurement, and this function then passed to Šušak. Hence from the outset, procurement policy was by necessity conducted outside democratic

scrutiny and though this was ostensibly a civilian led operation, it mirrored the blurred lines between party, state and military.

This endemic secrecy meant that Croatia was able to embark on significant operations in Bosnia without parliamentary authorization or scrutiny, and even without the knowledge of several key officials. It is not precisely clear when the government (or, rather, when Tuđman and Šušak) decided to support the secession of 'Herceg-Bosna' from Bosnia, but Croatian support for the HVO dates back to its creation in 1991. The HVO was formed through the arming of HDZ members in Bosnia, many of whom fought in Croatia proper in 1991. It was involved in fighting the Serbs and, in 1993–94 the Muslims.[42] Because Šušak considered himself to be a *Hercegovci* (a Croat from western Hercegovina), the HV provided substantial military and financial support to the HVO. It trained HVO fighters and in 1992 deployed regular HV forces in Bosnia. These forces are widely credited with stemming the initial Serb advance in Bosnia in 1992, and were not widely used in the Croat–Muslim conflict.[43] Despite the fact that around 15 000 HV troops were deployed in Bosnia until 1995, the government steadfastly refused to admit to their presence, stifling any potential for democratic debate on defence policy.[44]

Consolidation

Given the lack of openness in the defence establishment's culture, it is perhaps unsurprising that there were no improvements in democratic control of defence policy during the period of consolidation, despite the removal of the external catalyst – Serbian aggression. In 1999, the newspaper *Novi List* had to use the 'Military Balance 1998–99', published in London by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, to determine defence spending. It was surprised to find that Croatia spent more on defence than any other former Yugoslav state – fifty per cent more than Hungary and ten times that spent by Serbia/FRY.[45] Defence continued to be a secret world of party–military relations. In 1997, Major General Josip Culetić – Commander of the Croatian air force – refused to identify the source of aircraft that the Ministry had purchased, telling an interviewer that this information remained classified.[46] The classification of information such as this could hardly be justified on grounds of national security, and served only to take such issues outside the realm of parliamentary politics.

Although the relationship between defence ministry and President remained close after Šušak's death, it is possible to discern differences

in policy, which raises questions about who was formulating and implementing defence policy. One difference emerged concerning the grand concept of Croatia's strategic position in the world. According to Pavao Miljavac, Defence Minister in 1999, Croatian defence policy should be based upon a defensive concept so that 'our main task is to defeat the enemy as close to the Croatian border as possible'.[47] This was somewhat at odds with Tuđman's strategic vision of Croatia as a regional power, with power projection capabilities particularly into Bosnia should the HV be needed to protect the Bosnian Croat community. The continued high level of defence spending after 1995, and continuing financial support for the HVO, suggests that it was the President who was determining defence strategy. There was certainly no parliamentary debate or scrutiny of strategic concepts or procurement policy.

Change

Bringing defence policy under democratic rule is something that the new government has had reasonable success with, though with significant problems particularly with the intelligence services. Here, the problem seems to be that the scope of these organizations remains elusive, even to the new political masters.

In May 2000 the defence ministry held a two-day seminar entitled 'civilian control over armed forces'. Although the title is a misnomer, because it is the lack of democratic control rather than civilian control that is the problem, this seminar clearly revealed a desire for genuine reform on the part of the new government. At the seminar, which was attended by US Ambassador William Montgomery, Radoš argued that:

> It is necessary to create a stable structure that will guarantee clear relations and good control over the armed forces. I believe we will create a relatively stable and lasting civilian-military framework that will not change with a change of authorities on the states level.[48]

He added that an expected change to the constitution would allow the passing of legislation to create structures for effective and transparent democratic control of the armed forces.

The government proposes to inculcate these values through military education. There is almost universal agreement on the need to improve the quality of education. The US government is heavily involved in this process, particularly through the private consultancy firm Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), which currently runs four programmes in Croatia. One of these is the Democracy Transition

Assistance Programme, which was set up in 1994 to assist the creation of military education. Another, the Democracy Transition/Long Range Management Programme, was set up in 1995 to promote organizational reform within the defence ministry.[49] Croatia's admittance to PfP was partly dependent on carrying forward and developing these programmes, something that the new government believes to be vitally important.

Created out of the need for an immediate response to a direct attack, Croatian defence policy remained outside democratic control. Groups within the party–state–military nexus, within which relationships between theses entities were blurred, decided upon issues of procurement, deployment and strategic doctrine. The new government has made reform of this structure a priority, and assisted by entry into PfP has gone some way to introduce democratic management of, and open up debate on, defence policy.

Factors influencing civil–military relations

The evolution of civil–military relations in Croatia, in particular the development of highly politicized armed forces, was shaped by a number of different factors. By far the most significant of these was the country's domestic political, economic and social context. Of particular importance here was the circumstance of the state's genesis and transition to democracy. The threat posed by the JNA necessitated rapid action and armament prior to the declaration and recognition of independence. Therefore, defence policy evolved in a climate of secrecy and fear, a feature that persisted long after the demise of the threat. Because the JNA was widely perceived as a *foreign* power that defended the interests of a belligerent minority – a perception that became increasingly accurate in 1991 – Croats generally considered it to be illegitimate and supported attacks against it. Because of the war and the very real physical threat it posed to many Croats, there was little interest in holding the newborn HV to democratic account. As such, extra-constitutional means were used to subvert democratic control and bring defence policy and the armed forces under the direct control of political entrepreneurs such as Tuđman and Šušak.

Another important domestic factor was the nature of the HDZ regime. In many ways, Tuđman created a system reminiscent of Tito's, under a thin democratic veneer. Tuđman used the fact of elections to legitimate a paternalistic and highly authoritarian system. Nowhere was this felt more heavily than in the field of defence policy. Because Tuđman's

ideology dictated that anybody who was an enemy of the HDZ was also an enemy of the Croatian state, his party ensured that the armed forces would be heavily politicized. As in the communist period, promotion was made dependent on party membership, strengthening the party's control of the armed forces while simultaneously weakening parliamentary control and scrutiny. The state of war heightened nationalist sentiment and mobilized people around the brand of nationalism espoused by the regime, legitimizing both the new state and temporarily legitimizing undemocratic practices. Thus, as we have seen, a powerful nexus between the party and the military developed. This precipitated profligate waste and corruption and engendered the use of the security services for internal party purposes.

Prior to the election of the new government in 2000, furthermore, the military was immune to the economic pressures felt elsewhere in the economy. The very high level of defence spending noted earlier should be placed in the context of an economy that suffered around $43 billion of direct war damages, a decrease of 39 per cent in industrial output and a halving of gross domestic product in three years.[50] While other areas of state activity – particularly education – were severely underfunded and public wages remained extremely low, the defence ministry retained a sizeable budget. While it is understandable that between 1991 and 1995 the main priority of the state would be defence, one might have expected to see a considerable peace dividend following the Dayton agreement. The money, further, was largely not spent on modernizing the armed forces: an audit ordered by the incoming government in 2000 found that more than two-thirds of the defence budget was spent on 'people costs'. These costs reflected the considerable manpower within the armed forces and the high levels of conscription.

In order to overcome these problems and modernize equipment while reducing the overall defence budget, the new government proposes to reduce the duration of compulsory service from ten to six months and cut the number of 'professional' soldiers from 9000 to 6000.[51] Given the scale of these reductions, which will reduce manpower by around one-third, it is possible to conclude that the party–military nexus of the 1990s shielded the military from economic reality, something it only now has to face. Other reforms include a reduction in the number of operational zone centres from six to four; a military education system tied to civilian education; payment and pension reforms; and improvement of living conditions, particularly for conscripts. What PfP and the election of a government approved of by the US have done, though,

is ensure considerable American support. For example, as part of the modernization of the Croatian air force, the US 'donated' several F-16 fighter jets free of charge.[52]

The Yugoslav wars and the development of a party–military nexus through the politicization of the military were the key determinants shaping civil–military relations in Croatia. The former ended over five years ago and the latter is in the process of being dismantled. Of increasing importance, therefore, will be the international context. Although Croatia worked closely with assorted foreign governments and international organizations from the mid-1990s onwards, such engagement had little impact on civil–military relations within the country until the election of the new government in 2000. Political concerns over the failure to cooperate with the ICTY, full respect for the rights of Croatian Serbs and an often obstructionist policy towards implementation of the Dayton agreement meant that Croatia was excluded from institutions such as PfP, the World Trade Organization and the EU's PHARE aid programme. This, of course, restricted the amount of influence the international community wielded over Croatia, particularly in the area of civil–military relations. The US was able to use economic pressure to coerce a degree of cooperation with the ICTY, and Croatia extradited two Bosnian Croats, Mladen 'Tuta' Naletilić and Tihomir Blaskić, to The Hague. Blaskić was later sentenced to 45 years, imprisonment for commanding the massacre of Muslims at Ahmici, but in September 2000 the new government submitted evidence in appeal which suggested that Blaskić had been used as a scapegoat to cover the complicity of Tuđman and his cohorts.[53]

The new government's keenness for Croatia to join NATO and the European Union may mean that international factors have a growing influence on civil–military relations. Entry into PfP may serve to reduce continuing threats on Croatia's borders, or at least enhance Croatia's ability to meet those threats in ways that accord with international norms. In particular, violence in Serbia and Montenegro remains possible and could spill over into Croatia. The Prevlaka peninsular issue remains contentious, and the UN continues to police the demilitarized zone between Croatia and Montenegro at the entrance to the Kotor Bay. Relations with Slovenia and the Bosnian authorities in Sarajevo have improved immensely since the new Croatian government came to power, and PfP membership means that should violence spread from what is left of Yugoslavia, Croatia can be reasonably assured of military assistance from NATO. In return, the new government believes itself to be compelled to adopt western standards of democratic control and

professionalism, and has already proved to be cooperative with the ICTY. Indeed, Prime Minister Račan argued that the pursuit of war criminals – both Croats and non-Croats – is in the country's national interest.[54]

Other factors that have shaped civil–military relations in other countries have been less important in Croatia, largely because the politicization of the military and the strong party–military nexus subverted them. While the constitution offers an impressive array of democratic controls and the parliament hosts a whole range of parliamentary committees, these institutional factors had very little effect on the armed forces or defence policy. Similarly, because it was so difficult to disentangle the party – with its attendant nationalist ideology – from the military, and the transition from the communist JNA to the nationalist HV was so sharp and sudden, it is very difficult to discern a distinct national military culture. Indeed, when the new government talks about the importance of establishing civilian control of a professional armed force it is talking about adopting the American model wholesale. This is not because the model is the most appropriate one for Croatia per se, but rather because NATO membership is seen to be absolutely vital and the road to NATO membership is paved with doing things the American way. This is undoubtedly also a result of the influence of MPRI on Croatian thinking about civil–military relations, an influence reinforced by the US government's 'train-and-equip' programme in Croatia and Bosnia.

Conclusion: challenges ahead

Throughout the first ten years of independence, civil–military relations in Croatia were characterized by two features: the politicization of the armed forces and the extra-parliamentary structures of decision-making. This was caused by a nationalist authoritarian regime that claimed democratic legitimacy, a claim bolstered by the context of war. The military was utilized extensively for domestic political purposes. Defence strategy and procurement policy were formulated and executed without the knowledge of parliament, and often without the knowledge of the foreign ministry. By the end of the 1990s, while there was civilian control of the military, there was very little democratic control. With the election of the new government and the beginning of a new period of transition in 2000, Croatia is now pointing in the right direction, even if in some areas it has not yet left the station.

Croatia still faces important problems and dilemmas in its civil–military relations. Central among these are: the depoliticization and professionalization of the armed forces; the need to disentangle the HDZ and the HV without repoliticizing the military; the need to modernize equipment and maintain capabilities while reducing defence spending; and cooperating fully with the ICTY, while maintaining domestic support for the process even when 'war heroes' are indicted. Other areas where reform is necessary, such as the development of a culture of parliamentary scrutiny and debate that matches the fine words of the constitution, are less problematic because of the consensus among the government coalition members and support of the public. Croatia, however, still has a long way to go on its path towards political, military and economic integration with the West and there remain significant problems, in particular continuing opposition to reforms in civil–military relations from reactionary elements within the military and pressure groups like HVIDRA. Nevertheless, as of 2000–01, the new government has shown the will and ability to enact an ambitious programme of civil–military and defence reform.

Notes

1. The author wishes to thanks to Tim Edmunds, Daria Mateljak Bartulin, Renata Pekorari and Vjeran Katunarić for their help in writing this chapter.
2. Špegelj was formerly a General in the JNA. For details of the clandestine arms procurement and the JNA's exposure of it see L. Silber and A. Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, for the BBC, 1995) 124–6.
3. O. Žunec, 'Democracy in the "Fog of War": Civil Military Relations in Croatia', in C. Danopoulos and D. Zirker (eds), *Civil–Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996) 219.
4. I owe this point to Tim Edmunds. See S. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967).
5. See J.B. Allcock, *Explaining Yugoslavia* (London: Hurst, 2000) 270.
6. R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967) 92
7. See T. J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority. The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) 3.
8. See V. Pusić, 'Dictatorships with Democratic Legitimacy: Democracy Versus Nation', *East European Politics and Societies*, 8 (4), 1994. Pusić first outlined this idea a year earlier in V. Pusić, 'Dictatorships with Democratic Legitimacy', *Erasmus*, 1 (1), 1993.
9. D. R. Herspring, 'Samuel Huntington and Communist Civil–Military Relations', *Armed Forces and Society*, 25 (4), 1999, 569.

10. According to some seasoned OSCE election monitors, the 2000 elections in Croatia were the fairest they had ever monitored. Author's interview with Anthony London, OSCE monitor, Nova Gradiška, Croatia. On the state's manipulation of the media throughout the 1990s see M. Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Hercegovina* (Luton: University of Luton Press, 1999).
11. See V. Meier, *Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise*, trans. S. Ramet (London: Routledge, 1999) 160–6.
12. There are still no exact figures on this. According to Z. Tomac – a former member of the government and presidential candidate – the Italian and Hungarian contributions to Croatia's armed forces were proportional to their size of the population. See Z. Tomac, *The Struggle for the Croatian State* (Zagreb: Profikon, 1993), pp. 273–94. This calculation was supported by Nenad Klapčič, parliamentary secretary for the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), in an interview with the author. Between them, the Italian and Hungarian communities make up around 1 per cent of the total Croatian population. See S. Žuljić, 'National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia', *Geojournal*, 38, 1996, 426.
13. 'Serbs in Croatian Army', *AIM Zagreb*, 18 January 2000.
14. On the relationship between military legitimation and state legitimacy see J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter, 1992).
15. See, E. Norman, 'Croatia's Special Police', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 7 (7), 1994, 291–3.
16. See M. Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (London: Yale University Press, 1997) 264–7, and L. Cohen, 'Embattled Democracy: Postcommunist Croatia in Transition', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrott (eds), *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 95–7
17. I discussed the HDZ's brand of nationalism in A. J. Bellamy, 'Breaking the Curse of King Zvonimir: The Nationalist Narrative of Franjo Tuđman', *Slovo: Journal of East European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies*, 12, 2000.
18. J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military*, 147.
19. See B. Vankovska-Cvetkovska, 'Between the Past and the Future: Civil–Military Relations in the Balkans', *Südosteuropa*, 48, 1999, 37.
20. E. Norman, 'Croatia's Special Police', 291.
21. *Hrvatsko Slovo*, 27 December 1996.
22. O. Žunec, 'Civil–Military Relations in Croatia', 221.
23. Franjo Tuđman, speech on the seventh anniversary of the first convention of the HDZ, 23 February 1997, 1.
24. B. Vankovska-Cvetkovska, 'Civil–Military Relations', 40.
25. See *AIM Zagreb*, 16 June 1999
26. *Jutarnji List*, 29 December 1999.
27. See T. Ripley, *Operation Deliberate Force: The UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia 1995* (Lancaster: CDISS, 1999) 320.
28. *Croatia Weekly*, June 1998.
29. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 2, Central Europe, The Balkans, EE/D2453/A, 1995.
30. *AIM Zagreb*, 9 June 1999.
31. *Vjesnik*, 24 September 1998.

32. Jožo Radoš, interviewed by Zoran Kuovac, *Jane's Geopolitical*, 12 April 2000.
33. *Vjesnik*, 17 March 2000.
34. *AIM Zagreb*, 29 February 2000.
35. Cited in *The Guardian*, 30 September 2000.
36. Ibid.
37. *AIM Zagreb*, 5 May 2000.
38. *Vjesnik*, 17 March 2000.
39. I owe this point to Daria Mateljak Bartulin.
40. *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 6 (9), 1994, 404–9.
41. T. Ripley, 'Croatia's Strategic Situation', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 7 (1), 1995, 29.
42. Ibid.
43. For a first-hand account of life with the HVO see J. MacPhee, *The Silent Cry: One Man's Fight for Croatia in the Bosnian War* (Manchester: Empire Publications, 2000).
44. M. Vego, 'The Croatian Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1993.
45. *Novi List*, 20 May 1999.
46. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 August 1998.
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51. *Vjesnik*, 22 February 2000.
52. *Jutarnji List*, 15 August 2000.
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11

The European Exception: Civil–Military Relations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

James Gow

On 5 October 2000, the first rays of democratic change came to Serbia, around a decade after the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The decisive elements in the revolution that removed Slobodan Milošević from office as President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro – FRY) and from power were the will of the people on the streets and the changing of the guard. The latter was crucial. This was not a change of personnel in the guard. It was a change of that which they were guarding. Both the Yugoslav Army and Serbian Interior Ministry Forces had received orders and had been mobilized to use force against the protesting Serbian people and to protect Milošević, who, against all assumptions, had lost the elections he had called as a precursor to launching an attack against Montenegro. Instead, both forces protected themselves and the people. The army's Chief of Staff, General Nebojša Pavković, previously regarded as a pro-Milošević hardliner, went to Milošević with a squad of special forces soldiers and told him to get out of office. This was the remarkable civil–military transformation that brought to an end a decade in which Milošević had repeatedly sent his various armed forces into generally losing battles. It was the culmination of something that can be described as the 'European exception'. The end of Milošević, requiring military intervention in politics, was as exceptional and against the grain of the democratic transition that had occurred elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe since the fall of communism.

The international context and democratic control of the military: the threefold exception

The FRY presents an exception to the trends and patterns of civil–military relations in the rest of Europe. Its unique position has three aspects: the absence of a clear break with communist power structures and the past pattern of civil–military relations; the correlation of armed forces to statehood; and an uncertain national–international context. The second and third of these are only shared in any way by one other country – Bosnia and Hercegovina, where the contours of the same generic problem are very different and depend, in part, on the evolution of civil–military relations in Belgrade.

First, until the end of 2000, democratic control of the military in the FRY was an absurd topic. Without democracy: there could be no sense of democratic control – and in Serbia, the larger of the FRY's constituent parts, there was no democracy: despite a veneer of democratic features, the practices of communist rule remain, spiced with nationalist ideology and Mafia customs. In the other part of the federation, Montenegro, there was also no question of democratic control, but the situation was different. The development of democracy and pro-western policies there had given rise to civil–military tension between the Montenegrin government and the FRY army that still had the shadow of the hammer and sickle on its soul, the Serbian cross with four S's in its breast and deeply anti-western values running through most of its arteries. Despite this, it was an irony of civil–military relations in the FRY that the military, or rather elements within it, provided one of the main hopes upon which a transition to democracy in Serbia – and so in the FRY as a whole – could be achieved. It was an irony for anyone engaged with the project of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces in former communist countries after the end of the Cold War that the only case of military intervention in politics – so much feared in western circles – occurred in Belgrade and its purpose, in the end, was to foster a change to democracy.

Second, nowhere is the importance of 'stateness' more important in civil–military relations than in the former Yugoslav lands, especially in the FRY and Bosnia, where the absence of a clear correlation of armed forces and statehood has created fundamental problems. Noting Martin Edmonds' truism that 'every state has one',[1] there is a fairly clear principle: one country, one armed force. The reality for Bosnia and the FRY is different. In Bosnia, there are three armed forces (two of which are extensively controlled or influenced from outside the country), two

entities and one country, with the objective being to harmonize the three armed forces into one to match the state. In the FRY, there is one formal armed force, but three distinct territories (Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo). Connected to this is a complex of other relevant forces that cannot be ignored when considering the civil–military landscape. First, each of the constituent states in the federation has its own internal security force – the *Ministerstvo Unutrašnjih Poslove* (MUP), each of which embraces police and paramilitary units. Second, the Serbian Security Service has been responsible for the organization and control of quasi-autonomous paramilitary forces and special military units. Third, on the territory of the FRY, there has been an insurgent force, the Kosova Liberation Army (UÇK) in the Serbian province of Kosovo, fighting for independence for the mainly ethnic Albanian land. Fourth, the conflict on the territory of the FRY between the UÇK and Serbian and Yugoslav Forces also led to the deployment of an international force in the province, with NATO organization at its core. Fifth, the Army of Yugoslavia (*Vojska Jugoslavije* – VJ) and the Security Service paramilitary units have been engaged in war on the territory of two neighbouring former Yugoslav states, Croatia and Bosnia. The FRY is exceptional in having such a complicated web of civil–military relationships. In large part, this tangle of civil–military relationships can be credited to a decade of war.

In terms of the FRY's exceptionalism, the third aspect is the lack of stable national–international relations. In the first instance, this resulted from engagement in a series of campaigns involving Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and the West, as well as international isolation and sanctions. Even after the fall of Milošević, these uncertainties remain because of a continuing political dynamic to dissolve the FRY. Montenegro, as a sovereign state according to its own and the FRY constitutions, is entitled to independence, should a referendum there favour such a move. While the province of Kosovo lacks that formal qualification, it is in many senses already de facto separated. At a minimum, the present status of the FRY is in question. Discussion of civil–military relations post-October 2000, whenever this becomes meaningful, is no more than seasoning on the analysis of the transition from civil–military relations in the FRY to whatever it is that emerges eventually.

After a decade of statehood-defining war, the basic civil–military question in the FRY concerns legitimation (i.e. the recognition and acceptance of political authorities as legimitate) and the need to arrive at a position where there is a correlation of statehood and regular armed forces.[2] In both the FRY and Bosnia, the legitimacy of the state is chal-

lenged because the key issue of political community is not agreed. In both cases, only when military legitimacy within the state is established (i.e. when society in general accepts the legitimacy of the political authorities' control of the military) will there be a real chance of consolidation and peace – or, indeed, the conditions for democratic control of the military. There is a need to correlate armed forces and states. It is implicit that this armed force corresponds to a more or less agreed sense of political community – its main purpose, after all, is the effective defence of that political community from outside attack. Only when there is legitimate statehood can there be any chance of democratic civil–military relations. As Samuel Finer showed in one of the earliest and still one of the best studies of civil–military relations, the relative strength or weakness of regime legitimacy will determine whether or not the conditions for undue military involvement in politics exist.[3]

The FRY did not represent an agreed political community. Until the end of 2000, there was no more than a skein of democracy in its major component state, Serbia – and there was no settled correlation between armed forces and statehood. Although there were some democratic appearances in Serbia, such as the holding of elections and some elements of free information distribution, there was no reality to this democracy. Serbian leader and FRY President Slobodan Milošević had ruled for a decade through a combination of security service and organized crime activity, domination and ultimately control of information-flows to the majority of the Serbian population, and, crucially, through the destruction and denial of alternatives.[4] Thus, Milošević's Serbia was antithetical to democracy. Where the latter was predicated on the existence of autonomous and alternative actors, in the former there were none in any conventional sense. Given this, the study of civil–military relations in this case can only be understood by analysis of how the armed forces came to be in this indeterminate situation, underpinned by the essential consideration of politics in Serbia and the FRY, just outlined. The point of departure for this is the legacy of the civil–military relations from Tito's Yugoslav federation, the warped root of the current Yugoslav army and its corruption during the 1990s by Slobodan Milošević.

Historical legacy: the role and character of the JNA in the SFRY

The armed forces of the SFRY (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) comprised two elements.[5] The first tier, the Yugoslav

People's Army (*Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija* – JNA), was a regular armed force, including ground, air and naval services. The second tier, a Territorial Defence Force (*Teritorijalne Obrane* – TO), was an irregular force, derived from the tradition of the Second World War partisans in guerrilla warfare. The Federal Secretariat for People's Defence was responsible for the JNA. Republican Secretariats for People's Defence were responsible for the various TOs. Both tiers were intended to be components of the doctrine of General People's Defence, adopted in 1969. The command structures of the JNA and the TOs were decentralized, because the maintenance of a command and control network across all SFRY territory would have been too difficult in the event of an invasion.

The origins of the JNA lie in the Second World War partisan movement that brought Tito's regime to power. Originally a guerrilla force, as the war progressed, the partisan army took the shape of a regular military and, in 1945, became the army of the new Yugoslavia, known first as the Yugoslav Army (*Jugoslovenska Armija* – JA), but renamed the Yugoslav People's Army after the 1948 Soviet–Yugoslav split. Supplemented by the territorial defence forces, the army was preoccupied with external threat. Initially, Yugoslavia perceived this threat as originating in the West and turned to the USSR for assistance.

In the 1950s, the Yugoslav military was primarily concerned with developing the military capability of the country and had no political role. Because of its emphasis on hierarchy, discipline and responsiveness to command, the JNA was regarded as being relatively successful at overcoming ethnic and political differences and therefore saw itself as a champion of 'Yugoslavism'. However, a major political role emerged in the late 1960s, beginning with JNA involvement, in alliance with Tito, in the ousting of the then interior minister and head of the state security service, Aleksandar Ranković.[6] Through 1971 constitutional amendments and the new 1974 constitution, the JNA gained a leading role within the governing party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), receiving equal status with the two autonomous provinces in the new 166-member Central Committee of the SKJ. As Yugoslavia seemed to be falling apart in 1971, the JNA leadership became essential in maintaining the stability, cohesion and authority of civilian political institutions.

The JNA's political role increased in part because it was a pan-Yugoslav institution. Its loyalty was not to any one republic, but to the Yugoslav Federation. Its legitimacy and survival depended on Yugoslavia continuing to exist. As a result, the JNA leadership was cautious about inter-

vening in politics, physically or otherwise, beyond its allotted constitutional role. The constitution was central to the military's role in the political system. In 1971, General Ivan Mišković said that 'only in cases where the constitutional order was threatened would the army become an instrument for solving internal difficulties.' As long as some central civil authority remained, the army would constitutionally be the coercively instrumental partner in an alliance with that authority and would not itself usurp the political process.

This formalized, legitimate political role for the JNA was based on the notion that it would ensure a 'pan-Yugoslav' voice in politics, inheriting Tito's mantle when he died. Tito emphasized that:

> Brotherhood and Unity are inseparably linked with our army . . . I believe that our army is still playing such a role today . . . our army must not merely watch vigilantly over our borders, but also be present inside the country . . . there are those who write that one day Yugoslavia will disintegrate. Nothing like that will happen because our army ensures that we will continue to move in the direction we have chosen for the socialist construction of our country.

This role was given substance by the appointment of generals to key government party leadership posts in the 1970s and 1980s.

In 1988, as nationalist sentiments grew stronger throughout Yugoslavia, civil–military relations deteriorated in Slovenia. In May, the JNA arrested and tried three journalists and a soldier on suspicion of betraying a military secret. The trial incited the Slovenes because it was conducted in camera and in the Serbo-Croat language rather than in Slovene. Even though the 1974 constitution assured the equality of all Yugoslav languages in the JNA (Article 243), the reality was that increasingly Serbo-Croat had become the de facto command language, used in almost all circumstances. The use of Serbo-Croat at the trial reinforced the notion among many Slovenes that an ever more vigorous Serb nationalism was emerging. It also catalysed Slovene national sentiment, decisively forcing pressure towards federal dissolution in 1991.

The JNA was increasingly enmeshed in these tensions and in March 1991 began to cooperate intensively with the Serbian political leadership. The JNA Supreme Command schemed with Serbian political leaders in Belgrade to get the Federal Presidency to declare a state of emergency and allow the army to impose martial law. At two specially convened meetings, held not in the normal Presidency building but in the cold basement of an army building, the eight members of the

Presidency were pushed to declare a state of emergency by the chair of the meeting Borisav Jović (formally President of the collective Yugoslav Presidency at that moment but also the Serbian representative on the Presidency and one of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's closest confidants) and by General Kadijević and other military leaders. After two tense meetings, in which the Croatian representative pointed out that this was effectively a move towards war and General Kadijević returned that if the Presidency would not act, the JNA would be forced to take matters into their own hands, there was a split decision. Whereas the Serbian camp – Serbia, its two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, and Montenegro – supported the action, the republican representatives from Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia rejected it. The representative from Bosnia, Bogić Bogićević, although a Serb, surprised Jović and his allies by voting against the proposal, with the result that a state of emergency was not declared.

Milošević and Jović had a fallback plan to create the conditions in which the Federal Presidency would not function, so that the Federal Secretary for Defence, General Kadijević, would become de facto commander in chief of the armed forces and be able to effect a state of emergency and martial law himself. In order to set the stage for General Kadijević's ascendance, Jović resigned as President of the collective Presidency. However, the Vice-President of the Presidency, Croatian representative Stipe Mesić, surprised the JNA and prepared to take over the Presidency in Jović's absence – which left the Presidency functioning. At the same time, General Kadijević proved unwilling to intervene and declare martial law if that meant taking the unconstitutional step of acting without a formal order from the Presidency.[7] Once it was clear that the JNA was not going to act as arranged with the Serbian political leadership, Jović quickly returned to his post after the Serbian parliament, controlled by Milošević, rejected his resignation.

A final possibility for JNA intervention in the fading political life of the Yugoslav federation occurred in May 1991, but the JNA's proposals were again rejected as the storm clouds gathered over the lands of the South Slavs. The JNA Chief of Staff, General Blagoje Adžić appears to have argued for acting without an order from the Presidency, but Kadijević opposed this. Despite Kadijević's sense of constitutional propriety, as well as his aversion to Serbian President Milošević, he and his army had become ever more aligned with Belgrade's political leaders. This occurred perhaps predominantly by force of circumstance and the institutional prejudice and culture that remembered Croatian nationalist independence leading to mass murder of Serbs. The approach and

effects of war confirmed this political drift. The army began the war in communication with Serbia's leaders by making a limited show of force in Slovenia under a limited request from the Federal Government (not its formal commander, the collective Federal Presidency). The Slovenian armed response and the absence of political support from Belgrade for the army's action in Slovenia, however, meant that the JNA quickly found itself forced to adopt a new position – a war for new borders (for which some Serbs within the army had been working). Within the SFRY, senior figures in the JNA had been granted an unusual, formal role in the political system, in contrast to the 'normal' civil–military arrangement, where the army is an instrument of the state under state control. Instead, the JNA was the defender of that which was Yugoslav. However, as the collapse of the SFRY occurred, in need of a home, JNA leaders, almost exclusively ethnic Serbs, began to confuse Yugoslavia as represented by the SFRY as a whole with a version of Yugoslavia in the Serbian idiom – a state for the Serbs in which all the Serbs would be united. These developments would see the demographic character of the army change, the JNA formally cease to exist and Milošević effecting increasing Serbian control over the army – in part, through preference for other armed forces, as will be seen below.

An internationalizing context for nationalization: new states and Serbianization

When Belgrade retired 42 generals after a meeting of the Supreme Defence Council in August 1993, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević's effective control of the Yugoslav military was confirmed and all but the last concrete traces of the JNA removed. Its principal successor, the Army of Yugoslavia (*Vojska Jugoslavije* – VJ) continued a process of Serbianization already begun in the JNA. That process meant both transformation from a multi-ethnic armed force to an almost purely Serbian organization and the accrual of command and control of the military by the Serbian President. Yet not until the Kosovo campaign of 1999 would he have generals in charge upon whom he could absolutely rely. And even then, the prospect of adverse civil–military relations remained.

In the course of the armed conflict surrounding the dissolution of the SFRY, the character of the JNA changed substantially in ethnic and ethno-political terms. Prior to 1990–91, the JNA was a mixed force of regular officers and non-commissioned officers, together with a conscript cadre. At the highest levels in the JNA, an 'ethnic key' principle operated to ensure proportional representation of all the major com-

munities in the SFRY, although the most senior posts were almost invariably held by Serbs. The middle and junior ranks of the JNA were overwhelmingly dominated by Serbs.

Through defections to Slovenia, Croatia and then other republics, resignations from disillusioned officers who could not defect and an apparent programme of retiring non-Serbs, the army progressively became Serbian dominated. In May 1992, the JNA, by then over 90 per cent Serbian in composition, was formally disestablished and divided into two (although some parts of it, especially command and control, had already been inherited by the armed forces of the Krajina Serbs in Croatia, thus maintaining Belgrade control). This followed international recognition of the independence of Bosnia at the beginning of April and the proclamation of a new Yugoslav federation, involving Serbia and Montenegro, at the end of that month. The proclamation of the new state and the division of the armed forces were made in response to the imposition of comprehensive, mandatory UN sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, the aim of which was to get the JNA to withdraw from Bosnia. Belgrade tried to sidestep the issue by dissolving the JNA and dividing its assets between the self-styled Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina (*Srpska Republika Bosne i Hercegovine* – later renamed '*Republika Srpska*') and the new FRY comprising Serbia and Montenegro. This was a move carefully conceived and planned several months beforehand. Following an assessment that Belgrade's campaign against Bosnia would meet with a hostile international response and accusations of aggression, Milošević and Jović prepared to deal with this possibility by deception.

As a result of the May division, the VJ and the Army of the Serbian Republic (*Vojska Republika Srpska* – VRS) each gained around 80 000 personnel.[8] For the most part, the units involved kept the equipment at their disposal in both cases, although the VRS did not inherit some of the old JNA's most modern capabilities – most notably aircraft. While formally divided, the chain of command within the old federal army did not change. The VRS continued to be under Belgrade's command,[9] albeit with broad operational authority given to the commander in Bosnia, General Ratko Mladić, who could be relied on to prosecute the campaign largely without reference to Belgrade, thereby enhancing the superficial fiction. Mladić and the military in Bosnia served Belgrade's purposes and clearly acted in line with Serbian nationalist political objectives. However, problems of reliability remained regarding the VJ. Great changes occurred in the VJ after the division of the JNA, engineered by Colonel General Božidar Stevanović, who became air

force chief in January 1992 and was working to an anti-Yugoslav, pro-Milošević, Serbian agenda. Stevanović organized an Air Force Intelligence operation, which was responsible for engineering greater Serbian political control of the armed forces, with the removal of 20 generals in February and a further 38 generals as 'traitors' and 'unreliable' in May. This process sought to eradicate any residual 'Yugoslav' character in the armed forces.

While Stevanović was constructing an army free from Yugoslav impurities and which would be wholly subordinate to Milošević from within, Milošević himself was strengthening the army's subordination to him from without. Command and control of the VJ was established on a different basis from that of the JNA in the old state. Significantly, the Supreme Defence Council, rather than the federal presidency, became the ultimate authority over the armed forces. Established under Article 135 of the FRY constitution, this council comprised the Presidents of the Federation, Serbia and Montenegro. The Federal President acted formally as its spokesman, but orders were, in theory, determined by the Council.

This indicated that, whatever the policies and positions of federal politicians in Belgrade, command of the military had moved significantly into the hands of the republics. Serbian President Milošević, in particular, had a degree of official, direct and formal control over the VJ – something he had not had over the JNA. Indeed, he only needed the backing of one of the other members of the presidential troika for the VJ to follow his orders, officially. Given that the appointment of the Federal President was made by the Federal Parliament – which was, in turn, controlled by Milošević's Serbian Socialist Party – the Federal President was a de facto Milošević appointment. This was confirmed when, facing the prospect that he could not constitutionally stand again as President of Serbia, Milošević had himself chosen as President of the FRY by the Federal Parliament in July 1997. His long-time political ally, Milan Milutinović, was later elected in his place as President of Serbia. More than ever before, Milošević was the key figure in Yugoslav military–political affairs.

The reality of civil–military relations was that whichever post Milošević held, in terms of power, this was the decisive position and he was the point of decision. Thus, while under Article 133 of the FRY constitution, any VJ participation in, say, UN operations was to be decided by the FRY government – the only case in which decisions might not be made formally by the Supreme Defence Council – in reality, such a decision would not have occurred, nor been implemented, without

Milošević's wishing it to be so. It was in the nature of both Serbia and the FRY under Milošević that the only cases in which there might be 'scrutiny' of defence matters in parliament or in society would be if these were orchestrated in order to invoke public pressure and shame on the essentially military Ministry of Defence and the army that filled the Ministry.

All of this meant that the formal arrangements were essentially nugatory and could, if necessary, be bypassed. This was the case, for example, over the Kosovo campaign of 1998–99, where the orders for VJ involvement and later action in defence against NATO attacks were decided without the participation of Montenegrin President Milo Djukanović, formally one of the Supreme Defence Council's three members (whose participation was deemed an obligation under Article 86 of the Montenegrin constitution). On one level, Milošević acted unconstitutionally. As President of the FRY he was commander of the VJ in times of peace and war, but technically was meant to convey orders agreed by the Supreme Defence Council, which, without Montenegrin participation, could be subject to question. In practice, this made little difference. In addition, the anti-Belgrade stance of the Montenegrin leadership might be invoked, whether reasonably or not, as a justification for ensuring that Djukanović was party to decisions. Thus anything that might notionally be provided for in the constitution, or by law, was mostly irrelevant to the manner in which civil–military relations operated in practice.

Domestic context: General Perišić and the persistence of ambiguities with the army

Although so many generals had been removed, relatively few new appointments were made. When Ratko Mladić was promoted to the rank of general in October 1991, along with four others, he was among the last to achieve this status in the JNA. During the first half of 1992, the 42 generals removed from their positions by Stevanović's Serbianization campaign gave way to only one new appointment. This was the naming of Colonel General Momčilo Perišić, formerly commander of the 3rd Army, as Chief of Staff to replace Colonel General Života Panić. The promotion of Perišić was important in the context of civil–military trends in Belgrade following the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia and the onset of war in June 1991. By far the most surprising element of the purge of generals was the retiring of General Stevanović and the appointment of General Perišić as Chief of Staff. As

the man who had been whisked from the brink of retirement by Milošević in 1991 and who had been the scourge of anything pro-Yugoslav in the military, Stevanović seemed to be set to complete his renaissance by becoming Chief of Staff. Indeed, Belgrade circles were reported to have been buzzing with news of Stevanović's appointment as Chief of Staff the day before it was announced that Perišić was to have the job.

In this context, Perišić, at 49 and with a proven record in the field, represented a new generation of militarily competent officers to shape a professional army. His appointment represented the last gasp of the old JNA and any remnants of its values: he had risen to the rank of general since the war began and was appointed Chief of Staff because out of the nine officers holding the rank of general who had survived the latest bout of purging, he was the only one with a background in the field army. Even if General Perišić was not an outright Milošević loyalist, his appointment meant the consolidation of the latter's effective control of the military. However, the Belgrade leader's control was still not necessarily absolute and, despite the Chief of Staff having the demeanour of a dutiful officer, subordinate to political command, Milošević still did not have a military that was truly his and on which he could rely on. Perišić, despite his desire to be professional and subordinate, appeared ever more uneasy with the orders being given by Milošević.

It was the issue of Kosovo that, combined with the even more distressing case of Montenegro, led to the sacking of General Perišić as Chief of Staff in November 1998. This was part of a purge that had begun the previous month. In that period Milošević, a leader who always dealt with problems cautiously and separately, had purged around 15 members of the Security Service who seem to have been regarded as potentially disloyal. Most significantly, he sacked two of the most important figures from the military–political campaigns of the 1990s: General Perišić and the Head of the Security Service, Jovica Stanišić.

General Perišić's sacking capped an uneasy relationship with President Milošević – with the latter ever-distrustful and unloving of the former and most of his colleagues. Reports in Belgrade had long suggested that Perišić was opposed to the campaign in Kosovo, just as he had been publicly reluctant in late 1996 to allow the army to be used against opposition demonstrators. This was confirmed by his being bypassed in the Kosovo campaign during 1998. The commander of the 3rd Military District at Niš, General Dušan Samardžić, was given formal command

over the VJ operation, while effective command lay with the 52nd Corps in Priština, in association with MUP commanders who took orders directly from the political leadership in Belgrade. Perišić judged the Kosovo campaign to be against the army's better interest, seeing further evidence of the President's cultivation of the MUP and a diminishing of the VJ's position given its effective subordination to the MUP. Some of his colleagues, however, drew the opposite conclusion that the army had to be more involved so as not to fall further behind the MUP in institutional standing. The latter, therefore, were keen to commit the VJ to the fray, while General Perišić attempted to limit its involvement. This was further evidence confirming Milošević's distrust of Perišić and the generals.

An even more decisive reason for Milošević's distrust and for the general's sacking concerned Montenegro. Plausible rumours regarding Perišić's links with the Montenegrin leadership linked his removal to the sacking three weeks previously of Security Service Chief Jovica Stanišić. Although no one but Milošević's wife, Mira Marković, knew more about the workings of power in the regime or its involvement in war, there had been persistent rumours over several months of strong differences of opinion between Stanišić and Serbia's Macbeth and his Lady. These involved the Security Service Chief's refusal to become involved in plans to remove the Montenegrin leadership. This tied in with Perišić's contact with Djukanović and signals that he would be reluctant to use the VJ against Montenegro. Although it appears unlikely that the two would have been conspiring against Milošević together, either of them might have been exploring such possibilities.

Perišić charged that his removal had been 'inappropriate and illegal' and that his alleged new post as adviser to Bulatović was fictitious. At the same time, he confirmed the political thrust of the sackings by adding that the country's leaders were seeking to exclude those who thought for themselves and were of high integrity. Both sackings confirmed that the Miloševićes felt deeply threatened as they sought to eliminate any potentially unreliable elements from their close circle. However, they could feel more comfortable with Perišić's successor, General Dragoljub Ojdanić. A supporter of the pro-communist JUL party run by the President's wife, his appointment put Milošević in a stronger position regarding the army than ever before. He finally had a Chief of Staff in Belgrade who was his and could be relied on to do that which the Serbian leader wanted – even if it meant leading the country and its armed forces like lemmings into an unwinnable conflict with NATO over Kosovo. In the meantime, Milošević's campaign to acquire the

means to prosecute war had seen the appearance, in name at least, of other armed forces.

Institutional factors – domestic and international: complementary and competing forces

Implementing the decision to divide the JNA greatly reduced Belgrade's open participation in the war in Bosnia. While the VRS remained to carry the Serbian war against Bosnia-Hercegovina, the VJ became the armed force of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consisted of Serbia and Montenegro. In fact, however, these two were part of a troika. An element of division had already occurred at the beginning of 1992 when the Armed Forces of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (*Oružane Snage Republika Srpska Krajina* – OS-RSK) were the manifestation of Serbian military might in Croatia after the January 1992 ceasefire there.

The most important element of this troika remained the one formally attached to Belgrade's political leadership – the VJ. The VJ comprised all three services – land, air and sea. The ground forces were organized into three armies, with headquarters at Belgrade, Podgorica and Niš. Within each of these armies, there was a corps structure. For a time, command positions in the VJ were unclear until in September 1992 the Supreme Defence Council nominated the following to become commanding officers of the three armies, the air force and the navy: Colonel General Jevrem Djokić, 1st Army; Major General Božidar Babić, 2nd Army; Major General Dušan Samarić, 3rd Army; Major General Miloje Pavlović, Air Force and Air Defence; Contra-Admiral Dojčilo Isaković, Navy. However, as noted above, none of these was to last as long as a year in post.[10] While change continued in Belgrade, the spectre of the JNA loomed in Croatia and Bosnia.

This ostensible division and the apparent distance from Belgrade were belied by events. The VJ offered great assistance to the military forces that remained in Bosnia and continued support to those in Croatia. The Krajina Serbs in Croatia had inherited a military capability and command and control structures from the JNA. The JNA also left its installations intact in Bosnia and gave significant military equipment, including tanks and ammunition, to the VRS. In contrast, when the JNA withdrew from its installations in the remainder of Croatia and in Slovenia, Macedonia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia it removed all of its equipment and destroyed everything, down to the light fixtures and electric outlets.

The OS-RSK was the successor to forces led by Milan Martić, the Serb who had been dismissed as police chief in Knin, the central town in Krajina, in July 1990. Although Martić remained a prominent figure, this was in the political sphere, as RSK leader. The armed forces themselves retained a vital linkage with Belgrade, including membership of what was, effectively, a common officer corps. Although officially the officers were part of the OS-RSK, they remained on the Belgrade military payroll and in some cases were rotated with positions in the VJ. The most notable example of this involved General Mile Mrkšić. General Mrkšić had been involved in the JNA 1st Military District siege of Vukovar in Croatia, before holding positions in the VJ, including Deputy Chief of Staff immediately before he was transferred to take command of the OS-RSK in May 1995. Although many perceived this as a move to strengthen the OS-RSK which had just suffered defeats in Western Slavonia, in reality the appointment of General Mrkšić was to manage military withdrawal from Croatia. Another example from the VRS illustrates continued VJ involvement in Bosnia after the division of the JNA. In 1996, after the Bosnian peace agreement at the end of 1995, Bosnian government forces arrested Colonel General Djordje Djukić, Chief of Logistics in the VRS, who was found to be carrying a VJ passbook.[11] Although formally Chief of Logistics in the VRS, a putatively separate force, Djukić was, in practice, co-coordinator of VJ supplies into Bosnia through the VRS Staff Headquarters at Han Pijesak.

While the JNA's officers might all have been forced into apparently different armies for the sake of Milošević's attempt at international deception, they retained common cause and common *esprit de corps*. As was seen in the discussion of General Perišić above, this did not mean that the army was wholly reliable from Milošević's point of view. Not until the Kosovo campaign of 1999 would the top levels of the regular armed forces be truly loyal to him. Even then, this loyalty focused on a small group at the top, led by Ojdanić and promoted to their positions by him. Underlying military disaffection among more junior officers that could, eventually (or *in extremis*) turn into use of armed force against the political leadership remained a potent risk for Milošević, even once he had full control of the Supreme Command. Because the army was a potential problem from the outset vis-à-vis reliability, it was always necessary for Milošević to bolster his efforts to marshal the regular military. He did so through the creation and strengthening of alternative sources of armed force. These were both complements and competition to the regular armies.

There were three reasons for President Milošević to nurture militarized alternatives to the JNA and its successors. First, the organization of 'volunteer' paramilitary units served the purposes of strategic deception and ambiguity. This meant that supposedly independent forces could be blamed for atrocities, the appearance of chaos could be maintained in the field and the army's professional reputation could be bolstered as a contrast. In operational terms, the paramilitary forces provided a cadre of infantry 'shock troops' that could carry out tasks the regular army could not be counted on to perform. This included close combat and street-to-street fighting and, crucially, the catalogue of acts that added up to ethnic cleansing: murder, mutilation, torture, rape and terrorization.

The other purposes for the use of alternatives were more political. One of these involved paramilitary groups. Irregular armed forces could be used to set the pace. This meant carrying out action that required support from the JNA or its successors, thus putting pressure on the regular army to follow the Serbian line. Similarly, paramilitary groups organized by the Milošević security service apparatus were also competitors to those Serbian formations that might have been created independently. Thus, Milošević's paramilitaries could be used not only to drag the regular army into the Serbian corner but also to burn off any competition for the Serbian mantle. In either case, the Serbian leader's control was consolidated.

The final purpose in building alternative sources of armed force was loyalty. In this context, the development of the Interior Ministry Troops in Serbia was crucial. Better trained, equipped, fed and paid than Belgrade's regular army, the MUP and its special units became Milošević's praetorian guard. The MUP as a whole was 110 000 strong – larger in manpower than the VJ – and equipped with light artillery and a variety of armoured vehicles, making it a light infantry force rather than a police force. Although it lacked the heavy armour of the VJ, it was in other regards an equal force on paper, which gained advantage from better funding and feeding. Crucially, the MUP was a vital competitor to the VJ in terms of old-style communist bureaucratic politics. One of its roles was to keep the VJ in its place. Another, more chilling role was to be the avant garde of ethnic cleansing when the Kosovo campaign came. Unlike their paramilitary counterparts, however, the MUP was a highly organized, large force, capable of action on a far greater scale than that of the various paramilitary forces that had peppered the war in Croatia and in Bosnia. First and foremost, the MUP remained

Milošević's key instrument of power and terror. Although no formal Serbian army was to emerge from the ashes of the JNA, one effectively appeared with the MUP. This was the core of the campaign to have armed forces wholly subordinated and loyal to Milošević.

While the MUP could not outgun the regular army, it was always in a position to use its cohesion and troop quality as a force multiplier in any conflict with the army. The latter would inevitably be less well prepared and likely to be divided. This and the allocation of resources and preferences to the MUP over the VJ during the 1990s ensured not only that the army would be an institutional loser and kept at bay, but that the MUP would be the force on which Milošević could rely personally – whether formally as commander via the Interior Ministry while he was President of Serbia, or more importantly, informally, through his mafia-boss hold on those in the Serbian political leadership and in the MUP more generally after he moved to be President of the FRY. With the Kosovo campaign in 1999, Milošević, by this time President of the FRY, finally gained formal control of all the armed forces together, when the MUP was subordinated to the VJ in March 1999. By now, the man who had always hated the generals was in a position to love them. He had a Chief of Staff, then Defence Minister, General Ojdanić, who was his to control, as well as others in the most senior positions whom he could afford to trust – including one of his wife's relatives by marriage, General Nebojša Pavković, as commander of the 3rd Army fighting in Kosovo and later Chief of Staff. He had ensured that both the MUP and the VJ would do his bidding in battle. However, even with his own men in command of the VJ for the first time, the MUP continued to provide Milošević with the only force that would be wholly and truly his. This, however, was still not guaranteed to be enough if circumstances – along with the people and the bulk of the army – turned against him. Most significantly, as a result of these developments, Milošević, for the first time, put himself in a position of indisputable formal and legal responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity.

Conclusion

It took Slobodan Milošević nine years finally to place all armed forces properly and officially under his control. The change in the ethnic composition of the Yugoslav military, caused by the war, had effectively put the bulk of the JNA's capability at the disposal of his Serbian cause. However, to achieve this degree of control, it had been necessary for political and practical reasons to use alternative armed forces of a more

purely Serbian orientation, as well as of a more vicious character. These were complements to and competitors for the regular army. Alongside this, it had been necessary to create a thread of those within the old JNA who could work to secure the means to Milošević's ends. When international circumstances required the JNA to be divided into three, the ghost of the old army remained, not only through personal and informal connections, but also through continuing links between personnel, command and control. Despite significant Serbianization, however, Milošević could not trust the regular army implicitly to do his bidding, as was seen with the sacking of General Perišić, as late as the end of 1998. Even then, with true loyalists running the army for the first time, it was still the MUP that offered Milošević undiluted loyalty and the means both for murder and for protection, even if the latter could not be guaranteed in all circumstances.

Notes

1. Martin Edmonds, 'Introduction', in M. Edmonds (ed.), *Central Organisations of Defence* (London: Pinter, 1985) 1.
2. For a conceptual discussion of legitimacy see James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: the Yugoslav Crisis* (London: Pinter/New York: St. Martin's Press, now Palgrave, 1992).
3. S. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978).
4. For an excellent study of this phenomenon across all spheres of society, see E. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
5. The following sections are drawn from chapter 3 of my forthcoming book *The Serbian War Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes* (London: Hurst, 2001).
6. See Gow, *Legitimacy . . .* , 23, 56.
7. *Death of Yugoslavia*, Part 2, Brian Lapping Associates for the BBC (1995).
8. M. Vego, 'Federal Army Deployments in Bosnia-Hercegovina', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, October 1992, 445.
9. See Vego, 'Federal Army Deployments'.
10. *Vojska*, 16 September 1992.
11. See E. Vulliamy, 'Serbian lies world chose to believe', *The Guardian*, 29 February 1996.

Part IV
The Former Soviet Union

12

The Evolution of Civil–Military Relations in Russia

Irina Isakova

The introduction of civilian, political control over the Russian Federation's military and security services was an essential element of democratization after 1991. Efforts to establish and consolidate civilian, political control over Russia's armed forces have passed through a number of distinct stages since 1991, with different branches of government playing the central role in civil–military relations at different points. From 1991 to 1993, the Russian parliament took the lead in efforts to secure civilian control of the military. After 1993 the upper hand passed to the executive branch, under President Boris Yeltsin. The subsequent strengthening of presidential political control of the military has itself passed through two phases. These stages in the development of civil–military relations reflected wider developments in Russian politics.

The first set of laws on civilian control of the military was introduced through the Russian parliament and was aimed at both breaking with the traditions of the Soviet Union and establishing a balance between the powers of the legislature and the executive powers in this area. Under laws introduced between 1991 and 1993, in particular a May 1991 Law On the State of Emergency and a May 1992 Law On Security, political control of the Russian military and security services was divided between the President and the Supreme Soviet (as the Russian parliament was still called at this point). The March 1992 Law On Security gave considerable powers to the Russian parliament, especially in defining 'vitally important objectives of security' and exercising control over personnel and recruitment policy in all institutions responsible for state security and defence.

Presidential control of the military and security services

The domestic political struggle between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament in 1992–93, culminating in the violence of autumn 1993, led to major changes in Russian civil–military relations. Under the new Constitution adopted after the 1993 parliamentary elections, power over the military shifted to the President. According to Vicheslav Nikonov, head of the Politica Foundation, 'in full accordance with the Constitution the system of power in Russia is fully subordinated to the President'.[1] From 1993 until President Yeltsin's resignation in 1999, a series of laws were put in place regulating relations between the federal authorities and the Ministry of Defence and the other 'power' ministries and services. Under the 1993 Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, has direct control of all military and paramilitary forces of other ministries, is solely responsible for nominating high-ranking officers, appoints the members of the Security Council, approves the main defence and security bills (including Russia's Military Doctrine) and has the power to introduce a state of marshal law and emergency rule in selected regions by Presidential Decree (although such steps must also be approved by the upper house of the parliament). The functions and powers of the President with respect to defence policy and the armed forces were specified further in the 1996 Law on Defence. The 1993 Constitution gives the Russian government only rather vague (and undefined) powers to 'exercise measures aimed to provide for the defence of the country, state security, [and] implementation of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation'. The Russian government, as distinct from the President, thus has no clear jurisdiction over defence matters. In the 1990s, the government in practice only dealt with primarily technical budgetary issues relating to defence.

The 1993–99 period was, however, characterized by significant shifts *within* the Russian executive relating to civil–military relations. The declining health of President Yeltsin, combined with competition for influence between various groups of oligarchs and centres of power within the executive, drew the government into military matters from 1995 onwards. The establishment of the post of chief military adviser to the Head of the Government symbolized a shift of practical responsibilities to the government (former Deputy Minister of Defence General Valerii Mironov was appointed to this post in 1995). The 1996 Law on Defence further specified and extended the role of the government with regard to defence and the armed forces. Under this law, the government

is responsible for: the state and maintenance of the armed forces; the preparation and submission to the State Duma of the defence budget (as part of the federal budget); the organization and control of military procurement and defence industries; and control over the export of arms, strategic materials and dual-purpose products. From 1995 to 1999, however, the system of executive control of military and security forces was characterized by political fluidity and subject to frequent changes. The expansion of the government's role in this area created several competing structures within the government and the Presidential administration.

The resignation of President Yeltsin, the election of President Vladimir Putin, and the second Chechen war and related terrorist incidents have all led to further changes in Russia's civil–military relations since 1999. The previous de facto system of dual presidential and governmental control is being replaced by the consolidation of presidential control over the power ministries (i.e. the other ministries and institutions, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the border guards, which have military or paramilitary forces) and armed forces. The consolidation of presidential control is seen as a prerequisite for successful military reform. In 2000 President Putin created a new State Council (*Gossovet*) under presidential chairmanship, with its members appointed by the President. It is expected that, after the restructuring of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament), the State Council will deal with the central elements of parliamentary control over the military, including declarations of war and peace, the introduction of emergency rule, approval of the budget and the nomination of the General Prosecutor and the determination of the election dates.[2] The State Duma is likely to be left primarily with the right to work on and adopt laws on defence and security. Within this new executive power structure the government would be left only with the management of economic plans and policies.

President Putin's efforts to assert control over Russia's regions have also had an impact on civil–military relations. A May 2000 Presidential Decree established seven federal districts, with borders coinciding with those of military districts and headed by presidentially appointed 'plenipotentiary representatives' who are also members of the Security Council. These representatives are also responsible for monitoring of all regional force structures – including those under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence and other power ministries – controlling the distribution of financial resources from the centre to the regions (again including those for the power ministries) and providing recommenda-

tions on personnel issues and assignments to senior military posts.[3] Security Council and General Staff plans also suggest that, at least in the short term, the commanders of the military districts, districts of Interior Forces, regional branches of the border guards and Ministry of Emergency Situations will be subordinated to the presidential plenipotentiaries. These steps are designed to assure central political control over the defence and security sector (and the Russian state more generally) and prevent the fragmentation of the Russian Federation.[4]

The new National Security Concept and Military Doctrine, both adopted under President Putin in 2000, also expanded the range of circumstances in which the military and other security services might use force internally within Russia, including in response to terrorism and separatist activity. The constitutional and legal framework for the authorization and use of force within Russia, however, remains vague, creating a number of actual or potential problems. First, in the absence of a clear legal mandate, the military, even if acting under presidential or ministerial orders, might be held responsible for the use of force and accused of breaching the constitution. General Anatoly Kulikov, former Commander of the Joint Group of forces in Chechnya (1994–96) and former Head of the Ministry of Interior, has argued that the military are sometimes forced to act without legal authority and could be prosecuted under criminal law for violating the constitution.[5] Second, the absence of a clear legal framework means that servicemen involved in operations may not formally receive the status of veterans and related entitlements to medical treatment, pensions and financial support for their families if they die in combat. As a result, the military is urging political authorities and the parliament to adopt relevant legislation, in particular on the status of servicemen in conflict zones and combat situations, military rule (marshal law) and emergency rule.

The changes introduced or planned by President Putin are designed to ensure strict presidential control over the military and security establishment as part of a wider policy of consolidating the Russian state in response to the major domestic and external challenges the country faces. These developments have led to arguments that it may be necessary to change the constitution to reflect the new presidentially established political structures.[6]

Parliamentary oversight

The 1993 Constitution and the 1996 Law On Defence gave the parliament rather limited powers in military affairs in comparison to those

of the President. Nevertheless, the Russian parliament (both the lower house, the State Duma, and the upper house, the Federation Council) plays a significant role in adopting the defence budget, declarations of war and legislation on the military. Laws adopted by the Duma are subject to mandatory consideration in the Federation Council but come into force only after presidential approval. The Federation Council must approve Presidential Decrees on the introduction of a state of war or emergency and give consent to Presidential Decrees on the use of the armed forces beyond Russia's borders. While the President would issue any order for the armed forces to conduct military operations, a state of war can only be legally declared by a federal law adopted by the State Duma and approved by the Federal Council.

One of the central roles of the Russian parliament in the military sphere is to approve the defence budget and its main components. The parliament's role in this area is, however, undermined by a lack of detailed information on the defence budget, resistance from the Ministry of Defence and the military and a lack of civilian expertise, as well as the more general dominance of the Presidency in Russian politics. In 1997 and 1998, the parliament appeared to be assuming a greater role in overseeing the military budget. In 1997 the parliament received the most detailed information on and breakdown of the military budget to date, with about 200 separate budget headings submitted for its consideration. In 1998, breaking with the previous practice of defining much of the defence budget as confidential – and thus open to only limited parliamentary scrutiny – only elements of the military budget dealing with procurement were given confidential status.

Since 1999–2000, however, there has been a return to greater secrecy with regard to the defence budget. This is likely to limit the parliament's role in this area. In 1999, for the first time in the post-Soviet period, the military budget as a whole was defined as confidential, thereby limiting the parliament's right to scrutinize it. With the election of President Putin and increased attention to security issues, the Duma also adopted a new procedure for considering the defence budget. From 1993 to 2000, the draft military budget was considered by both the Defence and the Budget Committees of the Duma. In July 2000, in order to 'secure confidentiality and personal responsibility for state secrecy during consideration of the annual national budget', the Duma established a joint committee on federal budget spending for defence, security and law enforcement activity. The new committee's membership includes not only Duma deputies but also representatives of the presidential administration, the Security Council, the government and the Accounting

Office. This committee is seen as the prototype of a new approach to parliamentary oversight of military spending.[7]

In practice, parliamentary oversight over the defence budget remains limited. The Duma receives only limited information on the details of the defence budget and has little capacity for independent analysis of the budget or defence policy. In adopting the military budget the Duma must also establish the figure for the overall manpower of the armed forces but in reality lacks the ability to engage in serious debate with the President, government or Ministry of Defence on this issue.

The military and domestic politics

The struggle between President Yeltsin and the parliament from 1991 to 1993 threatened to draw the Russian military into domestic politics. The military leadership, however, was aware the armed forces were themselves divided, knew that any intervention would be controversial, feared undermining the military's standing in Russian society and was therefore very reluctant to be drawn into domestic politics. The crisis of September–October 1993 eventually forced the military leadership to decide in favour of President Yeltsin, although the then Defence Minister Pavel Grachev continued to emphasize that the armed forces should be kept out of politics.[8]

Since the 1993 crisis and the adoption of the current constitution, fears of crude praetorianism – direct military intervention in domestic politics – have subsided. Nevertheless, the military and Russia's security services remain a significant factor, and perhaps actor, in domestic politics. In particular, the armed forces, security services and their supporters are a major electoral constituency in Russian politics, make up a significant proportion of the deputies in the Duma, play an important role in governmental structures and have a wider influence on public opinion. Although the constitution was designed to keep the army away from political infighting and subordinated the military to presidential control, it (and subsequent legislation) left a number of legal loopholes that offer many possibilities for political manipulation of the military community. Since the armed forces are not politically united or cohesive, however, various different political parties and movements have attempted to shape the way the military votes in order to influence the outcome of Russian elections.

The armed forces and the wider security sector of the Russian state constitute a significant proportion of the country's electorate. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, servicemen constitute 5.5 million

voters – approximately 1.2 million serving in the armed forces at any given time, plus those serving in reserve.[9] This number almost doubles if family members are included (Colonel-General Vasily Volkov, a member of the Central Election Commission, for example, suggests a figure of 10 million voters in this case). If one also includes employees of other 'power ministries', police and intelligence service officers, retired military personnel and defence industry workers, the number is much larger. According to *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* (*Independent Military Review*), the military electorate – defined as voters with a military frame of mind – may include as many as 15 to 25 million people. Of a total of 60 million eligible voters, the military and security service community may therefore constitute up to 40 per cent of the electorate.[10] The security sector of the Russian state is therefore a potentially very powerful force in the country's emerging electoral politics.

The impact of the military/security sector electorate can be seen through both the participation of military/security personnel as candidates in elections and the voting allegiances of the group as a whole. Military/security sector personnel have made up quite a significant number of both candidates and successfully elected members of parliament since 1991. In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Ministry of Defence promoted candidates constituted between 4 and 15 per cent of candidates, depending on the electoral district concerned (under Russian election law candidates must be nominated either on party lists or by a recognized institution such as the Ministry of Defence for servicemen). Candidates linked to the armed forces and the security services also stood on party lists, reflecting an effort by those parties to benefit from being associated with the military. Approximately 80 servicemen, nearly all of them generals, stood as candidates in the 1999 parliamentary elections.[11] The number of servicemen standing in the 1999 elections – whether nominated by the Ministry of Defence, other institutions or on party lists – was four times smaller than that in the 1995 elections. The number of candidates representing other power structures, such as the Ministry of Interior, the Federal Security Services, the State Customs Committee, the Federal Tax Police Service and the Ministry of Emergency, however, increased. The military bloc deputies (i.e. those, whether in active service or retired, nominated by the Ministry of Defence) won 34–36 seats and constitute approximately 8 per cent of the MPs in the Duma after the 1999 elections.

The Russian armed forces also appear to have distinct voting allegiances that have had a bearing on Russian politics and in particular on

the outcome of presidential elections. During the 1990s military and security sector personnel voted increasingly for candidates from the armed forces and security sector.[12] The impact of the military electorate was even more obvious during the presidential election campaigns. During the first presidential election campaign in 1991, two-thirds of the military voted for Boris Yeltsin, with support for Yeltsin standing at 90 per cent in some divisions. Dissatisfaction with President Yeltsin's policies and with attempts at military reform, however, subsequently split the military constituency. During the first round of the 1996 presidential elections, President Yeltsin received only 25 per cent of military votes, with 58 per cent of servicemen voting for General Alexander Lebed. In the second round, when President Yeltsin included General Lebed in his team, 50 per cent of servicemen still voted for the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov.[13]

Over 97 per cent of Russia's 1.2 million troops voted in the 2000 presidential elections.[14] According to Major General Nikolai Burbuga, Director of the Defence Ministry's education department, the overwhelming majority of these voted for Vladimir Putin.[15] In military installations over 80 per cent of personnel voted for Mr Putin – a level of support 30–50 per cent higher than in the country as a whole. Simple arithmetic demonstrates that the military's votes helped to secure Mr Putin's victory.

These results demonstrate the importance of the armed forces in Russian politics and the effect of active efforts to court the armed forces and security services during election campaigns. The armed forces are potentially therefore both a relatively independent political actor in their own right and the subject of efforts to secure their votes.

Existing electoral regulations provide significant opportunities for military/security personnel to directly participate in politics and for the military electorate to be influenced within its professional environment. The Russian constitution states that every citizen has the right to stand for election. While the Law on the Armed Forces states that active military personnel may participate only in non-political associations and organizations, there are no regulations forbidding or restricting them from standing for election. According to Lt. Col. Alexander Stukalov, a spokesman of the main Military Prosecutor's Office, all attempts to introduce amendments to the constitution to ban military personnel on active service from standing in elections have failed. Indeed, the recent tendency has been to encourage active military personnel to engage in politics without formally breaking ties with the military as a 'professional club'. A May 1997 Presidential Decree (No. 535) 'On secur-

ing the election rights of the servicemen belonging to the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Federal Tax Police Service and General Prosecution Office of the Russian Federation' further established a legal framework for a 'professional' military lobby in the parliament by confirming the situation noted above whereby servicemen may stand for election either on party lists or if nominated by a recognized institution, usually the Ministry of Defence. Elected servicemen are still kept in reserve, are not asked to retire from service, are only considered to be on leave and have the right to return to their former institution at the end of their elected term. In such circumstances, their 'return' depends very much on their record as a deputy, thus maintaining their close links to official military structures. This link was made clear after the 1999 parliamentary election, when the Ministry of Defence announced that MPs who were also reserve officers would be promoted. Thus, in April 2000 about one-third of Duma MPs (153 deputies) were promoted to higher ranks.[16]

At the same time, military personnel are also susceptible to political influence by their officers. Under the law, political campaigning on the territory of military bases and garrisons is forbidden, with the effect that military personnel have less access than ordinary voters to normal electoral campaign information from parties and candidates and are therefore more susceptible to influence by their commanders. Additionally, candidates for election from the armed forces usually include commanding officers and military education faculty – the people with the most scope to influence their troops. The election laws, further, do not ban these candidates from speaking before their troops and colleagues.

The Ministry of Defence and the Military Prosecutor's Office have acknowledged these problems, and the Central Elections Commission examined abuses and breaches of the law on political campaigning and the armed forces in November 1999. First Deputy Defence Minister Nikolai Mikhailov cited several examples of what he called 'minor violations' – cases where commanding officers had allowed campaigning to go on among their troops. The Defence Ministry, however, came under fire from the media after distributing campaign material to commanding officers in support of the Unity bloc – widely seen as the Kremlin and the government's party in the upcoming elections.

Some within the military view this politicization of the armed forces as dangerous. According to Admiral Valery Aleksin, 'this contradiction in the law brings no good'. Lt. Col. Stukalov, a spokesman from the main Military Prosecutor's Office, has argued that 'it is time to amend

the Constitution to ban military personnel in active service from standing in elections . . . But unfortunately, this is unlikely in the near future, public opinion is not yet fully aware of the inherent dangers of politicians playing with the army and other security forces'.[17]

The social and economic situation of the military

The post-1991 era has also seen a dramatic deterioration in the social and economic situation of the Russian military. The available economic data, further, indicates that servicemen are less well paid and less personally secure than comparatively qualified civilians. Problems include poor (or the complete absence of) housing, accumulated financial insecurity and limited ability or opportunities to adjust to civilian life. A Ministry of Defence poll found that the majority of servicemen felt a complete lack of social security.[18] The increased funds available under the 2000–01 defence budget, furthermore, were insufficient even to pay for the previous years' debt to the military or pay regular salaries. Thus, before the 2000 *Kursk* submarine tragedy, the Baltic Fleet had not been paid for three months.

The economic situation of the military personnel was aggravated by the adoption of a new tax system. Under the new tax system introduced in June 2000, servicemen pay income tax at a flat rate of 13 per cent. The Russian government has also removed the linkage between military salaries and the minimum wage, saving the state 26 billion roubles.[19] New government initiatives are also planned to remove benefits to the military such as payment for public transportation, public utilities (including housing) and the like. Servicemen also face major housing problems. Official statistics indicate that 210 000 families of officers, retired officers and non-commissioned officers need housing. Government resources allocated to address this problem are inadequate.

A 2000 analysis by the Ministry of Labour and Social Development also highlighted the limited employment possibilities for retired military personnel, noting their relative uncompetitiveness on the labour market and the resultant impact on their economic well-being and social status. According to the Institute of Employment of the Russian Academy of Sciences, over 70 per cent of retired officers have problems in finding civilian employment and 26 per cent admitted to being employed by criminal organizations.[20] Not surprisingly, the overall mood in the armed forces and especially among retired officers is very low: 71 per cent assess the developments of the last decade negatively,

39 per cent admit to experiencing anger and stress, and 22 per cent are ready to participate in protest actions.[21]

Abolishing special benefits to the military and placing them in the same categories as civilian federal employees indicates the desire of the authorities to bring the military and security services within state-funded civilian social programmes, thus eroding the 'exclusiveness of the military club'. At the same time, these steps emphasize the importance of strengthening political control over the military.

The military and defence and foreign policy

Under the constitution, the President and the government – which is appointed by the President – determine the direction of Russian foreign and defence policy, which must also be approved by the parliament. Since 1991, a number of structures have been put in place under presidential authority to provide political control over foreign and defence policy. In practice, however, the Russian military and security services retain significant influence over, and autonomy regarding, defence policy and some aspects of foreign policy.

Between 1992 and 1999, a complex network of institutional structures was established within or under the authority of the presidential administration and the government in order to define and control national security and defence policy. The majority of these institutions were established by presidential decisions, rather fluid in nature and dependent on presidential support – reflecting the political turmoil of the time.

The only institution that had any basis in the constitution was the Security Council. Its functions are to be determined by a Federal Law on the Security Council, which had still not been adopted by early 2001. The Security Council therefore functions on the basis of Presidential Decrees, giving the President the flexibility to define its functions and powers and establish other parallel national security and defence institutions. The Security Council was created in summer 1992, in accordance with provisions of the March 1992 Law on Security, to prepare the decisions of the President on security-related matters. Security Council decisions are taken by simple majority vote of its members, but only enter into force after approval by the President (as its chairman). The exact mandate and functions of the Security Council have changed over time, usually with the appointment of a new Secretary of the Council and dependent upon the political weight of the statesman and personal views of the Secretary. After President Yeltsin's re-election in

1996, Alexander Lebed and then Ivan Rybkin were appointed as Secretary of the Security Council and the body's functions were extended to include recommending appointments to top defence and security posts, preparing draft presidential decrees, undertaking analysis and exercising control over the execution of its instructions and orders. The ambiguous and shifting role of the Security Council and the establishment of other overlapping institutions made these bodies a focus of internal political struggle between different factions within the Yeltsin leadership, left them constantly counterbalancing one another and produced a series of competing and contradictory plans for military reform.

Initial efforts to reform national security and defence policy-making institutions and establish a unified structure began in 1998 with the abolition by Presidential Decree of the Defence Council and the State Military Inspectorate (two bodies which had been related to but distinct from the Security Council) and merge their staff with that of the Security Council. A new approach was fully introduced in 1999–2000, designed to eliminate duplication, create a single administrative structure and consolidate presidential control. The Security Council, under presidential chairmanship, is now becoming the key centre for the development of all aspects of security policy (military, economic and other), as well as for control of the military and the wider security sector. Thus the new National Security Concept, Military Doctrine, Foreign Policy Concept and Information Security Concept were all prepared by the Security Council. In addition, it is planned that the Security Council will be taken out of the presidential administration and established as a more independent institution, while still being chaired by the President. In accordance with the new priority attached to state-building, a new department – the territorial department – was also established within the presidential administration, the main function of which is to reform Russia's territorial-administrative set-up, but which (along with the political department and department of internal policies) will probably also play a role in providing political control over military and security issues.[22] As of 2001, it remains to be seen exactly how, and how effectively, these reformed institutions will function.

Aside from the Security Council and institutions within or related to the presidential administration, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are the main institutions involved in Russian defence policy. Many analysts argue that effective democratic control of defence policy requires the appointment of an elected civilian politician as Minister of Defence, a significant civilian presence within the Ministry

of Defence (in particular at its higher levels) and the clear subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of Defence. Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a situation in which the Minister of Defence was usually a senior general, the Ministry of Defence was an entirely military institution and the General Staff had considerable autonomy and was in practice more important than the Ministry of Defence in the development of defence policy.

A decade later, despite numerous plans for military reform and the appointment of a number of civilian deputy defence ministers and other officials – including the establishment in 1998 of the post of assistant to the Defence Minister responsible for coordinating and monitoring all financial and economic activities – this position remained relatively unchanged.[23] President Yeltsin was the first civilian Defence Minister in March–May 1992 when Russia's Ministry of Defence was established. After this, however, the post was held by serving or recently retired (and therefore officially 'civilian') senior generals. This tendency of appointing retired (or reserve) servicemen to the post may continue due to the cultural specifics of Russia's military community and the strong belief that only by belonging to 'the club' can a minister truly represent the interests of the profession. In addition, in 2000, military officers and servicemen from other power ministries and related institutions were appointed to the high-ranking posts. Chief of the General Staff, Army General Anatoly Kvashnin, was appointed to the Security Council by Presidential Decree, giving the armed forces two representatives on the Security Council (the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff).[24] This continues the Soviet practice of appointing military personnel to civilian political ministries and departments, including the presidential administration and the Security Council. Thus, while the President may have strategic control over security and defence policy, the military still have considerable influence over that policy, and the implementation of military reforms and perhaps also decisions on the operational use of the armed forces still depends on the acquiescence, if not the support, of the military.

The Putin administration appears to have begun a process of reforming the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, indicating on several occasions that it favours a clear division of functions and responsibilities between the two. Indeed, since April 2001 – and the appointment of the former Secretary of the Security Council, Sergei Ivanov, to the post of Minister of Defence – a civilian has headed the Ministry of Defence. The new Military Doctrine introduced in 2000 also establishes the General Staff as the operational planning institution for all the

power ministries. As of 2001, the outcome of these changes remains unclear.

Control over and transparency with regard to the defence budget are often argued to be key prerequisites for effective civilian political control over the military and defence policy. Russia inherited from the Soviet Union a system in which the political leadership had only general control over overall defence spending, the military effectively controlled the details of the defence budget and transparency was minimal. This has seriously inhibited efforts to establish both presidential/governmental control over and parliamentary oversight of military spending. During the 1990s, further efforts to establish new structures for control over defence and security spending became a subject of ongoing dispute between and within the presidential administration, government and the military. The Putin administration has initiated new efforts to establish effective control over military and security expenditure. In 2000, plans were introduced to transfer the accounts of all power ministries, including the Ministry of Defence and the Customs Service, to the Federal Treasury (Ministry of Finance).[25] This step was designed to give the executive real transparency with regard to, and hence control over, the spending of the power ministries. The Federal Treasury additionally plans to introduce a special treasury register to monitor military spending – a procedure tested in two military districts but resisted by the Ministry of Defence which opposed such strict subordination to the Ministry of Finance. Russia's regions have also assumed a growing role in funding the military and security services by the direct provision of logistical and material support to forces based on their territories as a means of covering the regions' tax debts to federal institutions. Measures introduced by the government in 1997–98 provided for control of this means of 'financing' by the Federal Treasury and set a precedent for the wider efforts by the Putin administration to secure control of Russia's regions.[26] Again, as of 2001, it remains to be seen how far these reforms will succeed in providing the Putin administration with more effective control of military and security expenditure.

The presence of a significant number of servicemen as Duma deputies gives the armed forces and security services additional influence over defence and security policy. In the 1990s, the military caucus in the Duma played an important role in passing laws supported by the Ministry of Defence that introduced mandatory basic military training in secondary educational institutions, increased the term of military service from a year and a half to two years and cancelled most defer-

ments from conscription. The military lobby also heavily influenced parliamentary decisions on Chechnya, Kosovo, the Russian military presence in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and arms control.

In a more general sense, the military and security lobby has a significant impact on the direction of Russian security and defence policy. Thus, since the late 1990s, Russian foreign and security policy has been shaped by: linkage between geopolitics, geoeconomics and military security issues; concern over conflicts and territorial disputes on Russia's periphery; a more flexible approach to security relations within the CIS (emphasizing bilateral cooperation and a continued Russian presence but at lower costs); more active efforts to pursue overseas arms sales and military–technical cooperation with international partners; demands to revise existing arms control agreements in Russia's favour; increased emphasis on nuclear deterrence (including the possible first use of nuclear weapons and extended nuclear deterrence of CIS allies); and a commitment to increase defence spending.

The most high-profile recent example of the military's influence over Russian foreign policy occurred during the 1999 Kosovo crisis. The debate on Kosovo in Moscow in spring/summer 1999 demonstrated significant differences in the positions of, and a communication gap between, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. After these disagreements became public, from 4 to 14 June 1999 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was made responsible for the political settlement in Kosovo and the overall political principles of Russian participation in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peacekeeping mission. During a private meeting between President Yeltsin, Minister of Defence Igor Sergeyev and Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov on 4 June 1999, the Ministry of Defence was given responsibility for the military and military–technical implementation of Russian participation in KFOR.[27] Following this, the so-called 'race for Pristina' occurred, with Russian troops moving rapidly from Bosnia to Kosovo's capital Pristina before NATO troops reached the city. This 'blitz operation' was formally justified by the need to secure a Russian presence in Kosovo's post-conflict restoration and protect the rights of ethnic Serbs in the province, as well as for military and strategic reasons – and in particular, to prevent the NATO states from gaining exclusive access to Pristina airport. While formal cooperation between different ministries and the leading role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were re-established at a special session of the Security Council on 14 June 1999, for the first time the Ministry of Defence as an institution had been openly involved in public foreign policy debate.[28]

Political monitoring

In the context of the network of institutions controlling Russian foreign, security and defence policy – and of Russian domestic politics more broadly – a further important development since the early 1990s has been the growing influence and political prominence of the country's internal and external security and intelligence services. This was a process that began under President Yeltsin. In 1992–93 officers of the Military Intelligence and Foreign Intelligence Services, as well as the Federal Security Services (FSB), were appointed to high posts in the government and commercial structures. The declining popularity of President Yeltsin within the armed forces during his second term encouraged him to turn further to security bodies and promote many of their officers to top state posts. The weakness of political control over the armed forces also led the executive branch to strengthen the role of other security bodies, in particular the FSB and the military counter-intelligence service. The influential Russian journal *Vek* has argued that the increased role of the security services in Russian politics was an inevitable consequence of the Yeltsin presidency and the criminalization of Russian society during the 1990s: 'It makes sense to believe that the transitional period of an authoritarian regime is needed due to the fact that a criminal society does not transform itself voluntarily into democracy.'[29]

Since President Putin's accession to power, the role of the FSB within the network of power and security institutions has also been altered, placing it in a pre-eminent position and largely exempting it from parliamentary oversight. The 2000 National Security Concept defines internal security and the struggle against terrorism and crime as a prime threat to Russia's national interests. On this basis, the FSB's functions and powers in fighting these threats can be extended on the basis of Presidential Decrees (without requiring amendments to federal law by the parliament). On the basis of Presidential Decree, the FSB was made the main security agency with authority over other power bodies, including the Ministry of Defence, and in some circumstances the right to require their direct subordination to it. Presidential Decree was also used to effectively exempt the FSB from parliamentary oversight. At the same time, an attempt to introduce a new law on security services for consideration by the Duma failed. Thus, the increased role of the security services in Russian society has become an element of the presidential policy of consolidating executive political control over the military and other power institutions.[30]

Conclusion

In 1991, Russia faced the enormous challenges of state-building and democratization after seventy years of communism and centuries of authoritarian tsarist rule before that. The new Russian armed forces, further, were the core of the old Soviet military. In these circumstances, establishing democratic, civilian control over the military was never likely to be easy. After the failed coup of August 1991, the Russian military was wary of being drawn into domestic politics. The autumn 1993 crisis in Moscow, however, placed the military in a situation where it could not avoid such an outcome and led it to support President Yeltsin. The new constitutional settlement which followed established a system of strong presidential control over the military and other power ministries and security services, but much weaker parliamentary oversight of both the military/security sector and the President's control of that sector. While direct military intervention in domestic politics appears unlikely, the military and security sector remains an important force in Russian politics and government – as a significant proportion of the electorate, as a caucus in the Duma and within the institutions involved in the development, management and execution of foreign, security and defence policy.

Since coming to power at the beginning of 2000, in response to growing concerns about the weakness of the Russian state, instability and conflict on Russia's periphery and Russia's declining international status, President Putin has sought to consolidate central control over the military and the other institutions of state power as a means of rebuilding the Russian state. An important feature of this process – and one which began under President Yeltsin – has been the growing importance and power of Russia's security and intelligence services, in particular the FSB. According to a May 2000 opinion poll examining the growing influence of the power ministries and the military, 37.7 per cent of Russians think that the new situation will lead to the re-establishment of order without undermining democracy, 22.7 per cent of people think that it will lead to the militarization of society and undermine democracy, 22.9 per cent think that the appearance of the military in power structures will not change anything, while 16.7 per cent found the question difficult to answer.[31] It is increasingly clear, however, that the changes introduced by President Putin will shape Russian civil–military relations – and perhaps Russian politics and society more broadly – for the next decade.

Notes

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2. *Interfax*, 2 September 2000; *National Electronic Library*, 2 September 2000; *Mayak*, 31 August 2000; and *Segodnya*, 4 August 2000.
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18. *Weekly Reports, Armed Forces and Interior Forces*, 17–24 June 2000.
19. *Izvestia*, 11 July 2000; *Military News Agency*, 11 July 2000.
20. *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 2 June 2000.
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23. On the 1998 civilian appointment see *Nezavisimoye Voennoe Obozrenie*, 3–9 July 1998, 1.
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27. *ORT TV*, 4 June 1999; *Kommersant-Daily*, 5 June 1999; *Segodnya*, 5 June 1999.
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13

The Development of Civil–Military Relations in Post-Soviet Ukraine

Grigoriy Perepelitsa

The historical context: the Soviet inheritance

Civil–military relations in Ukraine today are heavily influenced by the historical inheritance of the Ukrainian armed forces, in particular the fact that they developed from elements of the former Soviet military. The dissolution of the Soviet Union left a sizeable proportion of the Soviet armed forces – over 700 000 men – on Ukrainian territory.[1] After independence, the new government in Kyiv nationalized these, transforming them into the Ukrainian armed forces. This formal transformation, however, was not enough to immediately effect deep changes in the culture, ideology and traditions of the Ukrainian armed forces. These remained thoroughly Soviet. As a result, the establishment of the post-independence civil–military relationship in Ukraine took place against a background of a strong Soviet and communist legacy.

The Soviet state defined the key political principles on the basis of which a politicized, ideological Red Army was created. These can be reduced to three basic principles: civilian control over the armed forces; political control over the armed forces by the Communist Party; and the unity of the party, army and people. These principles formed the background against which Soviet civil–military relations operated. The Communist Party's monopoly over the control of the armed forces meant that all decisions of a political nature relating to the military were made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This included all major decisions relating to the establishment, the structure and the operational use of the military. Party activity was encouraged among the officer corps and almost 90 per cent of all officers were party members. In practice, CPSU membership was vital for any officer wanting promotion, although it

also served as an important mechanism through which the unity and morale of the military was reinforced. Indeed, the divisions with and divergent political loyalties of the Russian army and fleet between 1905 and 1917 had greatly undermined their effectiveness and left an indelible impression on the Soviet leadership. In contrast, by orientating the mission of the armed forces around a clearly defined set of ideological goals, the Soviet leadership hoped to avoid such divisions.

The concrete embodiment of the principle of the unity of party and army was illustrated by the coalescence of military and political elites at the very top of the CPSU hierarchy. Soviet defence ministers were, as a rule, both generals and members of the CPSU Politburo. Similarly, the highest-ranking generals and admirals were members of the CPSU Central Committee. As a result of their participation in the highest party bodies, senior Soviet officers had a significant influence on Soviet internal and foreign policies. Indeed, the influence of the military was such that when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev attempted to appoint a civilian replacement for Defence Minister Marshal Malinovsky after the latter's death, Brezhnev's efforts were frustrated and he only managed to achieve this objective a decade and a half later, with the appointment of D. F. Unstinov. The coalescence of party and military elites was also reinforced by the practice of granting military ranks to senior civilian personnel in the defence ministry as well as to directors of large industrial enterprises and scientific institutes. The principle of the unity of the armed forces and the people meant that, with the exception of the civil war period, the Soviet authorities were keen not to involve the armed forces in resolving internal problems (a function that was instead undertaken by special militarized units of the Interior Ministry). The practice of conscription reinforced this principle, by ensuring that people from all sections of Soviet society, and from all national groups, had military experience. Indeed, the armed forces were held in high regard by the majority of Soviet society, which viewed them as an institution in which a person could advance, whatever their social background.

This system of strong civilian control over the armed forces began to unravel during the final years of the Soviet Union. This resulted from the decreasing importance of communist ideology in society more widely and a shift of power within the Soviet elite away from the CPSU and towards the Supreme Council and the office of the President. The loss of political control over the Soviet army was also brought about by disputes between the top party nomenclature and intensifying tensions between its reactionary and reformist parts. By 1991, however, the reac-

tionary element of the party nomenclature had begun to dominate the central organs of the Soviet government. Despite a more general weakening of political control over the military, the armed forces found themselves increasingly pressed into service internally, in defence of the more reactionary elements of the Soviet regime (as with the use of the military against the independence movements in the Baltic states in 1990–91). Significantly, however, the army was itself deeply uncomfortable with a more internal political function, and in practice responded to this new role reluctantly. Indeed, it is illustrative that one of the main reasons for the failure of the attempted coup in August 1991 was the relatively passive behaviour of the Soviet military at the time. Similarly, the reluctance of the armed forces to involve themselves in internal Soviet politics helped to ensure the ultimately peaceful nature of the Soviet dissolution.

However unsuccessful the attempt to use Soviet troops against the Soviet republics may have been in practice, the August 1991 coup attempt did serve to highlight the potential vulnerability of the republics to the actions of Soviet military formations based on their territory. In the Ukrainian case this lesson was felt particularly keenly. During the putsch, the commanders of the Kyiv military district, Generals Chechvatov and Varenickov, presented the then Chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk with a direct ultimatum demanding his support for the coup. These events stimulated the Ukrainian administration to implement two measures to ensure republic-level political control over those units and formations of the Soviet army located on Ukrainian territory. First, Soviet army units on Ukrainian territory were nationalized and placed directly under Kravchuk's control. Second, the Supreme Council demanded the return of all Ukrainian soldiers serving in areas of conflict within the Soviet Union to Ukrainian territory.

The Ukrainian approach of nationalizing Soviet forces 'in situ' meant the newly independent Ukraine found itself, on paper at least, with one of the most powerful militaries in Europe. The new Ukrainian armed forces were 725 000 strong, and included 6374 tanks, 8060 armoured vehicles, 3864 artillery pieces, 1494 military aircraft and 229 attack helicopters.[2] Moreover, Ukraine also inherited a significant proportion of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear arsenal, including 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and a number of strategic bombers armed with around 500 air-launched nuclear missiles. Ukrainian military personnel, however, remained largely Soviet in their outlook and the new Ukrainian officer corps instituted military reforms on this basis.

The new Ukrainian armed forces were modelled on Soviet experience, an influence that affected both force structure and military culture. As a consequence, the Ukrainian military was structured around Soviet threat assessments and doctrines rather than on the basis of an assessment of Ukrainian national interests. The strong Soviet legacy in the Ukrainian armed forces also found expression in the political preferences of its personnel, with a 1994 survey identifying the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) as the most popular political party among servicemen.[3] Finally, the Ukrainian armed forces found itself burdened with a legacy of criminality and corruption among some elements of the military, with a particular problem stemming from the willingness of some servicemen to illegally sell off military equipment for their own enrichment.

The establishment of the Ukrainian armed forces

The demand for and then establishment of independent Ukrainian armed forces was part of the wider reappearance of Ukrainian nationalism which began in the late 1980s, accelerated in 1990–91 and resulted in the emergence of an independent Ukrainian state at the end of 1991. From the late 1980s, Ukrainian nationalist and democratic opposition groups began to address issues relating to the military. This process was led by the more extreme (and relatively small) nationalist groups which made outright demands for a Ukrainian army. More moderate nationalist and democratic groups (such as the main opposition movement Rukh) initially called only for greater attention to the rights of conscripts, demanding in particular that Ukrainian citizens have the right to undertake their military service in Ukraine (rather than elsewhere in the Soviet Union).

Between 1989 and 1991, support for the establishment of independent Ukrainian armed forces grew, with both the mainstream Rukh opposition and national communists within the ruling elite gradually endorsing this goal.[4] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet's declaration of sovereignty in July 1990 asserted the republic's right to an independent army and the right of Ukraine citizens to undertake military service in Ukraine (generating tensions between the Ukrainian government and the Soviet Ministry of Defence). In February 1991 the Rukh movement held a conference for the Revival of Ukraine's Armed Forces, at which the Ukrainian Officers' Association was formed. Until the failure of the coup in Moscow in August 1991, however, there was little the Ukrainian parliament or opposition could do to actually achieve the goal of

establishing armed forces, as the Soviet Ministry of Defence and General Staff retained operational control over the military forces on Ukrainian territory and simply ignored the demands for an independent Ukrainian military.

After the collapse of the August 1991 coup, steps were rapidly taken to establish independent armed forces as part of the wider process of creating a Ukrainian state. The emerging new Ukrainian leadership believed that military weakness had been a key reason for the failure of the attempt to establish an independent Ukraine at the end of the First World War. The establishment of an independent military was therefore seen as central to the larger project of Ukrainian state-building. On 3 September 1991 Soviet Major General Konstantin Morozov was appointed by the Ukrainian parliament as Defence Minister of Ukraine, left his post as Commander of the Soviet Air Forces and began planning the establishment of Ukraine's armed forces (which it was at this point hoped would be achieved through negotiation with the Soviet authorities). Morozov and the Ukrainian government, however, also sought to reassure soldiers serving in Ukraine, arguing that the transition would be gradual and would guarantee the social rights of servicemen and their families.

As Ukraine moved rapidly towards independence between August and December 1991 (when independence was formally endorsed in a popular referendum), the Ukrainian government chose a new military oath of allegiance to the people of Ukraine as the simplest and most rapid means of establishing national control over that part of the Soviet armed forces on Ukrainian territory. Defence Minister Morozov was the first to swear the oath of allegiance in December 1991 and by February 1992 nearly 80 per cent of military personnel based in Ukraine had taken the oath. Officers who refused to take the oath were faced with the options of either continuing their military service outside Ukraine or retiring. In January 1992, President Kravchuk dismissed the commanders of the Kyiv, Carpathian and Odessa military districts for refusing to take the oath and appointed new commanders. In addition, as part of a wider agreement within the CIS allowing military personnel to choose where they continued their military service, Ukrainian citizens serving elsewhere in the Soviet military were permitted to return to serve in the new Ukrainian armed forces.[5] In short, in the space of a few months between the end of 1991 and the middle of 1992, the Ukrainian leadership asserted national control of the soldiers on Ukrainian territory and the new Ukrainian armed forces were created. The development of effective national armed forces with an appropriate

defence policy and force structure – as distinct from the disembodied part of the old Soviet armed forces that remained on Ukrainian territory – was a much larger challenge, which continues to pose problems for Kyiv a decade later.

There was, further, relatively little opposition from the military to the establishment of Ukraine's armed forces. In the heady atmosphere following the failure of the August coup, there was widespread support for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state – as indicated by the 90 per cent support for independence in the December 1991 referendum. This appears to have extended to the military. Although no statistics are available on how military personnel based in Ukraine overall voted in the December referendum, even in the Black Sea Fleet 70 per cent of sailors voted for independence. The failure of the August 1991 coup had also been a decisive defeat for hardliners within the military and therefore precluded similar military intervention in politics in Moscow or Kyiv, at least in the short term, and made the removal of those commanders unwilling to take the new oath of allegiance to Ukraine relatively easy. The efforts of Defence Minister Morozov and the Ukrainian leadership to reassure officers and conscripts that their economic interests and social status would not be threatened by the changes may also have played an important role. The high percentage of soldiers in Ukraine swearing the new oath of allegiance indicated their acceptance of the transition.

Political control over the armed forces

The way in which the Ukrainian armed forces were established played an important role in shaping the mechanisms for political control over them. One of the first acts of Leonid Kravchuk after being elected in December 1991 was to assert – by presidential decree – the position of President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Thus, what emerged after 1991 was a system in which the President played the central role in controlling the armed forces – and other military and paramilitary forces under the control of the Ministry of Interior and other state institutions – and in the development and implementation of foreign, security and defence policy. This reflected the larger emerging Ukrainian political system, with the President playing the central role in appointing the Prime Minister and government and shaping many areas of policy. At the same time, the absence of a pre-existing Ukrainian officer corps and General Staff with a strong corporate identity or any history of intervention in domestic politics meant that the

military was relatively unlikely to become involved in domestic politics as a force in its own right.

The new Ukrainian constitution adopted in June 1996 consolidated the system of political control of the military and the wider security sector established in the early 1990s.[6] Under the constitution, the President: ensures the independence and security of Ukraine; represents Ukraine in international relations and administers the state's foreign policy; appoints the Prime Minister and the government; establishes, reorganizes and disbands ministries and other executive bodies; is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces; appoints senior military commanders; administers national security and defence policy; heads the Council of National Security and Defence; declares war, martial law, state of emergency and military mobilization (although these must be approved by the parliament); and has the right to initiate legislation in the parliament. The Council of National Security and Defence of Ukraine is the coordinating body for the President on national security and defence, and coordinates and controls the activities of the executive institutions in the sphere of national security and defence. The Council is chaired by the President, who determines its composition (although the Ministers of Defence, Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs and the Head of the Security Services are ex officio members) and its decisions are put into effect by presidential decree. Under the constitution, the Cabinet of Ministers is responsible to the President, appointed by the President, ensures the implementation of domestic and foreign policy, elaborates the state budget, takes measures to ensure the defence capability and national security of Ukraine, and directs and coordinates the operation of ministries and other executive bodies.

Under the Ukrainian Constitution, the powers of the *Verkhovna Rada* in relation to the armed forces and defence policy are relatively limited compared to those of the President and government. These include: adopting laws (including those relating to defence and security); approving the state budget (including the defence budget) and controlling its implementation; determining the principles of foreign policy; declaring war (following a request by the President for such a declaration) and approving presidential decisions on the use of the armed forces; giving consent to the appointment of the Prime Minister and approving the Programme of the Cabinet of Ministers; confirming the general structure and numerical strength of the armed forces, security services and other military formations; and confirming within two days of their declaration by the President the introduction of martial law, of a state of emergency or a mobilization of the armed forces.[7] In

practice, further, the ability of the *Verkhovna Rada* to exercise its powers in relation to the armed forces and defence policy in an effective or meaningful way is limited. The lack of access to detailed information (for example, on the defence budget and the structure of the armed forces), limited expertise on defence and security issues, and resistance from the President, government and the military means that parliamentary oversight of the armed forces and defence policy is rather limited. This reflects the more general character of the emerging Ukrainian political system, in which the President plays the central role and has control of most of the key elements of state power.

Nationalism and ethnicity in the Ukrainian armed forces

Given Ukraine's internal ethnic divisions, nationalism and ethnicity have been important issues with regard to the armed forces. When the Ukrainian armed forces were formed in 1991–92, parties from the right of the political spectrum, in particular the People's Movement of Ukraine (*Narodny Rukh*) and the Republican Party of Ukraine, were among the leading supporters of President Leonid Kravchuk and therefore had the greatest opportunity to actively influence the development of the new military. These groups viewed nationalism as a positive ideology and sought to replace the monopoly of the communist ideology in the armed forces with a monopoly of Ukrainian nationalism.[8] In this attempt to introduce the Ukrainian national idea from above, V. Mulyava, a former lecturer in philosophy, was appointed as director of the socio-psychological service of the armed forces within the defence ministry, appointed to the rank of general and given the task of instilling a greater sense of Ukrainian national patriotism into the armed forces.

The attempts of Mulyava to introduce a Ukrainian 'national idea' into the worldview of Ukrainian servicemen largely failed. Indeed, in most respects the Ukrainian military retains a Soviet outlook and has had considerable difficulty in reorientating its convictions and loyalties to the new context of an independent Ukraine. There are several reasons for this. First, as a result of Soviet nationalities policy – which dictated that officers of Ukrainian origin would generally not serve in Ukraine – the majority of officers and almost all the generals based in Ukraine were ethnic Russians. Indeed, when those elements of the Soviet armed forces based in Ukraine came under Ukrainian jurisdiction in 1992–93, nearly 80 per cent of officers were of Russian origin. On the initiative of Mulyava, the defence ministry tried to implement changes in the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian officers, a move that predictably created

a degree of tension within the armed forces. This tension was, however, largely diffused by a policy allowing former Soviet officers to choose which newly independent states' military they would continue to serve in. As a result, Ukrainian officers based in Russia could choose to serve with the Ukrainian military and vice versa. Tensions were further reduced by the subsequent dismissal of Mulyava.

The policy of allowing former Soviet officers to choose which country's military they served with led to a steady rebalancing of the ethnic composition of the Ukrainian armed forces to reflect the ethnic and demographic balance in the country more widely. As of December 1992, 45 per cent of officers in the Ukrainian armed forces were ethnic Ukrainians, 48 per cent ethnic Russians, with 7 per cent belonging to other ethnic groups. By December 1999, these figures had changed to 55, 39 and 6 per cent respectively. As of 2000–01, ethnic Ukrainians make up around 81 per cent of soldiers and sergeants in the Ukrainian armed forces. Among generals and admirals, 67 per cent are now ethnically Ukrainian, 26 per cent are ethnic Russians and 6 per cent are from other nationalities. As these figures illustrate, the Ukrainian armed forces remain a relatively multi-ethnic, or perhaps more accurately bi-ethnic, institution. As a consequence, the armed forces have not been particularly receptive to the inculcation of a narrowly Ukrainian nationalist ideology.

A second important reason for the limited impact of nationalism in Ukraine's armed forces has been that, in the main, servicemen of all ranks are culturally and linguistically comfortable with the ambiguities of working in a multi-ethnic environment. Regardless of the fact that Ukrainian has been designated the state language, for example, Russian continues to be the language used on a day-to-day basis and is, in practice, the working language of the armed forces. Indeed, a poll conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in 1994 found that 47 per cent of soldiers preferred to speak Russian, 10 per cent Ukrainian, and 43 per cent were happy with either depending on the circumstances. While off duty, these figures were 33, 24 and 43 per cent respectively. The same poll found that the majority of soldiers believed that it would be preferable for the armed forces to have two official languages – Russian and Ukrainian. Among officers, the linguistic situation is even more striking: 64 per cent communicate predominantly in Russian while on duty, 35 per cent communicate in either language according to the circumstances, while only 1.5 per cent prefer to use Ukrainian. Interestingly, these figures differ from those for Ukrainian society as a whole, where a higher proportion of people prefer to speak Ukrainian.[9]

The Ukrainian armed forces also continue to follow or support Soviet (and Russian) military traditions. For example, 48 per cent of officers believe that the armed forces should cultivate the traditions of the tsarist-era military (while only 7 per cent find this undesirable) and 41 per cent of officers believe that military education and training should be based on the traditions of the Soviet armed forces.[10] A 1996 survey on national self-consciousness conducted by the Kyiv Social Monitoring Centre, further found that Ukrainian patriotism came eleventh in a ranking of values among Ukrainian servicemen, while 'belonging to a powerful state' came at the very bottom of the list. Of those polled, only 14.6 per cent of soldiers, 12 per cent of junior officers and 10 per cent of senior officers viewed patriotism as an important determinant of their behaviour.[11] Although patriotism had risen from eleventh to fifth in the ranking of values among Ukrainian servicemen by 1999, it is still striking how unimportant the Ukrainian national idea appears to be among the majority of servicemen in the Ukrainian armed forces. The situation may be partially explained by a 2000 poll that found that only 6 per cent of respondents believed that patriotism was a quality valued in Ukrainian society more widely.[12]

Despite the fact that ethnic Ukrainians now make up the majority of the Ukrainian armed forces, the military continues to be Soviet and Russian in character. While this may have caused difficulties for the military in coming to terms with its role in the independent Ukrainian state, it has helped to prevent ethnic tensions in the military. This situation could change, however, if recruitment into the armed forces shifts from a national to a regional territorial basis, a policy being actively discussed in 2000–01. The territorial principle would mean, for example, that units deployed in Crimea would be manned predominantly by ethnic Russians and Tatars, to reflect the ethnic balance in that region. In this way, ethnic distribution in the armed forces would mirror the ethnic distribution 'on the ground' in Ukraine, reinforcing existing divisions and tensions. Such a move might also reignite the debate on language within the armed forces, by creating a rationale for the use of Russian in those units based in the eastern (and predominantly ethnically Russian) regions of Ukraine, and Ukrainian for those units based in the west.

A political and social portrait of Ukrainian servicemen

The establishment of an independent Ukrainian state and democratization radically changed the social and political context in which

Ukrainian servicemen live. For Ukrainian servicemen, these developments were most noticeable through the implementation of laws guaranteeing their civil rights and liberties. Indeed, the *Verkhovna Rada* passed over forty pieces of legislation on these issues during the first year of independence. As well as the more general laws such as those 'On the Defence of Ukraine' and 'On the Armed Forces of Ukraine', there were also specific regulations to protect the rights of servicemen. These included the laws 'On Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen' and 'On Pension Provision for Servicemen and their Families'. These laws provided more significant rights and protection to the military than the laws that had been in effect in the Soviet Union. These include the right of the military to form their own social organizations and the rights of servicemen to take legal actions against the unlawful behaviour of their superiors, to a pension and to a fixed working week of 41 hours, as well as longer periods of leave. Additionally, soldiers are permitted to stand for parliament. If elected, they effectively take a sabbatical from military service, but are guaranteed the right to return to their previous position after their parliamentary term is completed. In conjunction with these developments, a range of representative institutions was established within the armed forces, such as the Military Trade Union, the Union of Officers of Ukraine (OUO), and the Union of Afghanistan War Veterans. The activities of these organizations have focused on protecting the rights of soldiers and on fighting cases of brutality against servicemen by their superiors. While the activities of these organizations often caused conflicts with senior military staff, they have had the effect of raising awareness of the rights of servicemen among military authorities more generally.

The new legal rights and social guarantees for servicemen contributed to a generally positive attitude within the armed forces towards the wider process of democratization in Ukraine, as well as support for the consolidation of the country's independent statehood. The changes since 1991 have, however, also provoked some discontent within the military. A poll conducted by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences suggested that the majority of personnel (68 per cent of those polled) were not satisfied with the implications of democratization for the military or the way in which reforms have been implemented. A 1999 poll, further, suggested that 32.8 per cent of military personnel supported the idea of a 'strong arm' regime. The same poll indicated that only 6.4 per cent of Ukrainian military personnel believed that the further development of democratization would generate positive changes in society.[13]

Further analysis suggests that the Ukrainian military have not fully absorbed the wider aims and objectives of this process. Officers see the process of democratization, first of all, as an opportunity to strengthen their own social protection (70 per cent of respondents). For ordinary soldiers, democratization is seen more in terms of the establishment of a volunteer professional army that will free them from conscription (85 per cent of respondents). State officials and political leaders, in contrast, see the democratization of civil–military relations primarily as a means of removing communist influence from the armed forces and ensuring their political neutrality (54 per cent of respondents).[14] In general, the Ukrainian military appears to approach democratization primarily as a means of solving their own personal problems and realizing personal interests, rather than as a wider political and social process.

It is not just in the area of military culture that the Ukrainian armed forces remain firmly Soviet, but also in terms of their political orientation. The political sympathies of the military lie firmly on the left of the Ukrainian political spectrum. A 1999 survey revealed that 22 per cent of servicemen supported the Communist Party of Ukraine, while only 5.4 per cent supported the more right-wing *Narodny Rukh*. These left-wing sympathies stem to a large degree from the ideological nature of military education in the Soviet armed forces, a factor whose legacy continues today. Notably, the strength of support for the CPU among servicemen varies according to age and hence to the amount of time they have spent in the military. For military personnel under the age of 28, 18.8 per cent said they would vote for the CPU, whereas for those between the ages of 36 and 45, whose direct experience of the Soviet period was more extensive, the figure rose to 27 per cent. Political sympathies among military personnel are also strongly influenced by their overall views of Ukraine's political, economic and social situation. Of those identifying themselves as feeling 'apathetic and depressed', 25.9 per cent supported the CPU. Among those who were 'optimistic and enthusiastic', the proportion fell to 17.2 per cent.[15] Additionally, 20.37 per cent of servicemen polled believed that communist policies could save Ukraine from crisis and improve the population's lives, while only 9 per cent placed their faith in free market policies.

The Ukrainian armed forces also suffer from a chronic lack of prestige, both within the military itself and in wider society. In 1995, for example, only 52 per cent of servicemen felt that their profession had a positive social status, a figure that fell to 44 per cent in 1996.[16] Since at least the mid-1990s, further, in the context of Ukraine's serious

economic problems, the primary motive for pursuing a military career appears to have been financial. In 1999, 39 per cent of soldiers surveyed cited financial security as their primary motive for joining the armed forces.[17] More generally, surveys suggest that Ukrainian servicemen have negative views about developments in Ukrainian society and the armed forces. In one survey, 52 per cent of officers acknowledged being apathetic and depressed. These attitudes were particularly pronounced among senior officers with more than 25 years' service (reflecting, in part, anxiety about the prospect of retirement). Younger officers with less than five years' service were more optimistic. While the negative attitudes of Ukrainian servicemen reflect the specific problems facing the armed forces, they are also a more general reflection of the massive political and especially socio-economic problems Ukraine has faced since independence.

The prestige of the Ukrainian armed forces in the eyes of the general public is also very low. In a 1992 survey, 79 per cent of respondents said that the prestige of the armed forces was either low or very low. By 1996, this figure had reached 87 per cent, while only 0.7 per cent of respondents believed that the prestige of the armed forces was high. Further, 87 per cent of officers believe that the military profession has a low social standing in Ukraine, and that this leads to civil–military tensions. Many feel that the attitude of society to the armed forces is both disrespectful and humiliating, and that this damages the social prospects of officers.[18] These figures suggest that the recruitment of quality personnel for the Ukrainian officer corps may be difficult in future, as more promising students will be likely to opt for other, more prestigious careers.

The negative attitudes of wider civilian society towards the armed forces stem from the absence of any pressing military threats to Ukraine and the predominantly pacifist mood of the Ukrainian population at present. In Ukraine, these tendencies are unusually pronounced, however, and reflect a strong feeling in Ukrainian society that international problems and conflicts can best be solved by diplomatic and political means. This approach serves to reduce the importance of the role of the military in society, and strengthens the hand of those who question the need for large Ukrainian armed forces at all. In addition, the persistence of Soviet institutional norms and values in the Ukrainian armed forces highlights the fact that in many people's eyes the military have not yet become fully Ukrainian in spirit, language or traditions. As a consequence, many Ukrainians do not consider the Ukrainian armed forces to be fully 'their own'.

Conclusion

The establishment of Ukraine's armed forces, and hence of its civil-military relations, took place against the background of the country's Soviet, communist inheritance. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Baltic states demanded the withdrawal of (former) Soviet troops from their territory, voluntarily abandoning their 'Soviet inheritance' in this area. In contrast, Ukraine chose to nationalize the units and formations of the Soviet army on its territory. As a result, Ukraine gained the largest military force in Europe, after that of Russia. The nationalization of that part of the Soviet military on Ukrainian territory, further, was achieved with remarkably few problems.

On the basis of this nationalization of part of the old Soviet armed forces, Ukraine has also established a system of relatively clear civilian, political control of the military, with the President playing the central role in this new institutional framework. The 1996 Ukrainian constitution consolidated this new framework. Within this framework, the President has overall political control of the armed forces and other security services, plays the central role in developing national security and defence policy through the National Security Council and plays the key role in appointing the government. In contrast, the parliament has much more limited powers of oversight with regard to the armed forces and defence policy.

An important negative consequence of the Ukrainian military's 'Soviet inheritance' was that the soldiers, officers and generals were and still are largely Soviet in spirit and training and brought old Soviet traditions with them into the new Ukrainian armed forces. This has meant that the Soviet era practice of military dominance of defence policy and defence policy-making has continued in post-Soviet Ukraine, with the Ministry of Defence remaining an essentially military institution, only very limited civilian political input into defence policy and military resistance to reform.

At the same time, one of the central features of the Ukrainian military since 1991 has been its worsening economic and social situation. The combination of Ukraine's dire economic circumstances, declining defence budgets and absence of effective military reforms has created conditions in which the socio-economic circumstances of Ukrainian servicemen are very bad, dissatisfaction is widespread and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces seriously questionable. In these circumstances, the greatest problems for the Ukrainian military and civil–military relations appear to be not those of the military's

relationship to domestic politics but rather those of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and military ineffectiveness. Against this background, military reform is likely to remain a major and very difficult challenge for Ukraine.

Notes

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Part V
Conclusion

14

Soldiers, Politics and Defence in Postcommunist Europe

Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster

The case studies in this book have examined the challenges facing the countries of postcommunist Europe in establishing democratic control of their armed forces. As was noted in the introduction to this volume, when communism collapsed in Central and Eastern Europe there were fears of praetorian threats to democratic transition. The communist model of civil–military relations involved the penetration of the Communist Party into all ranks of the military and a comprehensive system of ideological education in order to secure its loyalty. As Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sought to implement *perestroika*, *glasnost* and 'new thinking' in foreign policy in the late 1980s, elements within the Soviet high command were among the constituencies opposing reform. During the revolutions of 1989, there were fears of intervention by the military and/or internal security forces to suppress the protests for democracy. When the Soviet military intervened in the Baltic republics early in 1991 it was unclear whether they were operating on the orders of President Gorbachev, independently in their own right or in coalition with other 'hardline' forces. Elements in the Soviet high command were also involved in the unsuccessful August 1991 coup against Gorbachev that triggered the break-up of the Soviet Union. As Yugoslavia began to disintegrate in 1990–91, there were fears of a military coup in Belgrade and the leadership of the Yugoslav People's Army was among the forces that advocated military action in an attempt to prevent the breakup of the Yugoslav federation and 'protect' the Serbian minorities outside Serbia. In the period between the two world wars, furthermore, military praetorianism had been quite common in Central and Eastern Europe, with military strongmen ruling directly in some cases, armed forces supporting authoritarian and nationalist regimes in others, and the military often acting as one of the 'war parties' in relations with

neighbouring states. Against this background and in the turmoil of post-communist transition, it was not surprising that there were fears of the emergence of military strongmen, military coups and armed forces becoming a component of authoritarian coalitions and a driver of regional and ethnic conflicts.

The case studies contained in this book show that fears of military praetorianism in Central and Eastern Europe were probably overwrought, but also that the challenge of building democratic civil–military relations is more complex and different in nature from that suggested by much thinking on civil–military relations. Drawing on the preceding chapters, this conclusion reviews progress in developing democratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe since the collapse of communism, examines the factors shaping developments in this area and highlights areas where continuing challenges remain.

Soldiers and politics

The case studies in this book suggest that fears of military intervention in domestic politics in Central and Eastern Europe and the military as the central actor in authoritarian, nationalist regimes – and resulting conflicts with ethnic minorities and neighbouring states – have proved exaggerated. Since the failed Soviet coup of August 1991, none of the countries of postcommunist Europe and Eurasia, including those not specifically examined in this volume such as Belarus and the Caucasian and Central Asian former Soviet republics, has experienced a coup bringing to power a military regime. None of these countries is currently ruled by a military regime.

A broad group of Central and Eastern European states – specifically the Baltic states in the north, the Visegrad states in Central Europe, and Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia in the south – furthermore, have arguably made substantial progress in establishing democratic control of armed forces. These states are the primary postcommunist candidates for membership of the EU and NATO and form the geographic core of Central and Eastern Europe (more specifically, they are also the EU Associate states currently engaged in negotiations for full membership of the Union). In these countries, the military has not to any significant degree intervened in domestic politics, nor does there appear to be much danger of this happening in the near future. The military also no longer has powerful connections with former communist parties; the armed

forces are controlled by a democratically elected civilian president and/or government; parliaments provide oversight of both the armed forces and the executive's control of the military; and there is an emerging 'civil society' (i.e. non-governmental) debate on the armed forces and defence. New institutional arrangements for democratic civilian control of the military and the management of defence policy have been put in place – and refined in the light of experience – via new constitutions, laws on the armed forces and organizational structures for defence ministries and armed forces commands. This is not to say that civil–military relations in these countries have been, or are, entirely free of difficulties. In many of these countries, deep political divisions – in particular 'Cold Wars' between centre-right parties and former communists – and new but contested political institutions have at times produced disputes between presidents, governments and parliaments over control of the military and defence policy – as Paul Latawski and Plamen Pantev's examinations of the Polish and Bulgarian cases highlight. In this context, politicians have sometimes attempted to draw the military, whether as an institution or in terms of high-profile individual generals, into politics in order to gain the perceived advantage of being supported by or associated with the armed forces. Occasionally, these problems have produced minor political crises in the countries concerned. These, however, have been the problems of transition and the trend is towards the consolidation of democratic control of the military. In no case has the principle of democratic civilian control of armed forces been seriously questioned. In no case has the military become a significant actor in the country's domestic politics. Disputes and occasional crises, further, have generally resulted in further institutional reforms that have helped to consolidate democratic civilian control of the military and build a consensus in support of new institutional arrangements.

The growth, and arguably emerging consolidation, of democratic civilian control of the armed forces in this core group of Central and Eastern European states is a significant and positive development, and is underpinned by four factors. First, the trend towards democratic control of armed forces reflects the more general trend of democratization in these countries. The delegitimization of alternatives to liberal democracy extends to the possibility of military rule, while the armed forces appear to have accepted the basic principles of democracy – including democratic civilian control of the military – just as civilian citizens have. Even where these countries have faced very severe

economic crises, most notably in Bulgaria and Romania in the mid and late 1990s, there has been no serious threat of or calls for military rule as a possible road to 'national salvation'.

Second, as was suggested in the introduction to this book, the legacy of communist era civil–military relations has not been an insuperable obstacle to, and has arguably even in some ways facilitated, democratic control of armed forces. The loyalty of the armed forces to the communist system and the Communist Party appears to have been largely skin deep and was strong, if at all, only at the very top of the military. Thus former Polish President Lech Walesa described his country's communist era armed forces as like a radish: red (communist) on the outside, but white (Polish, national) on the inside.[1] By dismissing a relatively small number of senior commanders in the early and mid-1990s, these countries were rapidly able to remove any residual threat of military intervention in domestic politics. In addition, since the communist system of civil–military relations involved quite strong civilian control of the armed forces and generally sought to preclude the military becoming an independent force in domestic politics, there was already a tradition of civilian control of the military and relatively little culture of independent military intervention in politics.

The international environment has been the third factor encouraging democratic civilian control of the military in these countries. This group of Central and Eastern European countries see themselves as unambiguously part of 'the West' and aspire to full membership of NATO and the EU. Democratic, civilian control of the armed forces has thus been part of the broader package of 'returning to Europe', generating domestic and international pressure to achieve this goal. The chapters on these countries in this book all emphasize the way in which the combination of political pressure to conform to Western norms of democratic control of the military and practical military cooperation with the West have been powerful influences on the development of civil–military relations. Democratic, civilian control of the armed forces has become a condition for Central and Eastern European membership of NATO and the EU. Although NATO has not adopted formal membership criteria, there is no doubt that democratic, civilian control of the military has become a de facto prerequisite for aspiring members. As Paul Latawski notes in his chapter, when disputes emerged over control of the military in Poland in 1995, NATO signalled that democratic, civilian control of the military must be unambiguously entrenched and Warsaw rapidly undertook the required reforms. Similarly, while the EU's broad membership criteria with regard to democracy do not specifically include

democratic civilian control of the military, there can be little doubt that any serious infringement of these standards would preclude membership of the Union. Alongside this, western aid and cooperation activities, in particular through NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and national programmes 'in the spirit of' PfP, have been directed towards supporting democratic control of armed forces by providing information, expertise, aid for specific reforms and models of democratic civil–military cooperation.

Finally, the chapters in this book suggest that domestic institutional reforms have been an important factor in consolidating democratic civilian control of the military in this core group of Central and Eastern European states. Through institutional reform, governments have formalized democratic civilian control of the military, built consensus in favour of democratic models of civil–military relations and reduced the vulnerability of civil–military relations to the vagaries of domestic political change. This process has not always been easy, with disputes often emerging over new institutions for control of the military. Since the early and mid-1990s, however, such disputes have receded and new institutional arrangements have been stabilized. As a consequence, democratic civilian control of the military has become, or is becoming, an established and largely uncontested part of the political institutions and cultures of these countries.

In contrast to developments in this core group of Central and Eastern European states, the chapters on Croatia, Yugoslavia, Russia and Ukraine indicate that these countries' experiences have been more mixed. As Alex Bellamy and James Gow illustrate, in Croatia and Yugoslavia until the fall of the Tuđman and Milošević regimes in 1999 and 2000 the armed forces were drawn into the nexus of authoritarian, nationalist politics. In neither case, however, was the country ruled – either de jure or de facto – by the military, nor were civil–military relations the central factor in their flawed or failed democratic transitions. Milošević and Tuđman (and their elite allies) built authoritarian regimes based on varying combinations of nationalism, structures and practices inherited from the communist era – a factor that was more important in Yugoslavia than in Croatia – and manipulated elections. Civilian executive control of the military was one of the key instruments of power for Milošević and Tuđman, but in both countries the military also remained a semi-autonomous actor with influence of its own. Milošević and Tuđman used various strategies to maintain the loyalty of the military but also to limit their independence and power: appointing loyalists and removing critics within the senior ranks of the military;

directing relatively high levels of state resources towards the military (compared to other sectors); supporting or turning a blind eye to military involvement in corrupt political economies; co-opting the armed forces into their nationalist projects; and building alternative military power bases in the internal security and informal paramilitary forces. With the fall of the Tuđman and Milošević regimes, establishing democratic civilian control of the military is one of the many challenges facing the new governments in Zagreb and Belgrade. Looking a little further afield, there appear to be parallels between the Yugoslav and Croatian experiences and those of Belarus and the Caucasian and Central Asian states. In these countries, (semi-)authoritarian regimes have been built on the legacy of communism, and civilian executive control of the military (and internal security forces) has been one of the instruments of authoritarian rulers but the military and security forces retain a degree of autonomy and political influence.

Irina Isakova and Grigoriy Perepelitsa's chapters suggest that the situation in Russia and Ukraine is more complex and difficult to assess but probably lies somewhere between that in the core group of Central and Eastern European states discussed earlier and the more authoritarian former Yugoslav and former Soviet states. A case can be made that in Russia and Ukraine, as in the core Central and Eastern European states, the military has not to any significant degree intervened as an independent actor in domestic politics and no longer has powerful connections with former communist parties; civilian presidential and governmental control of armed forces has been established; structures exist for parliamentary oversight of both the armed forces and the executive's control of the military; and there is an emerging 'civil society' debate on the armed forces and defence.

The situation in Russia and Ukraine is, however, in reality more complicated. First, in the Russian case at least, the military has become involved in domestic politics in a number of ways. In the early and mid-1990s, Russia's highly volatile politics, in particular the deep divisions between President Boris Yeltsin and his communist (and other) opponents in the Duma, created fears of direct military intervention in politics and led to the October 1993 parliamentary 'coup' that forced the military to choose between supporting Yeltsin or his opponents. In addition, as Irina Isakova highlights, the military and security sector remains a significant force in Russian politics – both as a large proportion of the electorate and as an important bloc in the Duma – and within Russian foreign, security and defence policy-making structures. Second, in both Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s systems of strong

presidential rule emerged, with relatively weak parliaments and rather limited constraints on presidential power, reflecting both constitutional arrangements and wider political cultures. Critics in Moscow, Kyiv and the West argue that these systems of presidential government are – or could easily become – authoritarian. In early 2001, Ukraine's 'Kuchmagate' scandal – in which President Leonid Kuchma was accused of having ordered the murder of an investigative journalist and more generally abused presidential power – indicated this latent potential for authoritarianism. One of the key components of the presidential systems in Russia and Ukraine, further, is presidential control of the military and, equally importantly, the wider security sector – including interior ministries, which in both countries have very substantial military or paramilitary forces at their disposal, and intelligence services. Combined with relatively weak parliamentary oversight of the executive and the armed forces, and poor records in terms of the rule of law and respect for human rights, executive control of the military and security sector – and that sector's continuing influence over executive policy – creates, at minimum, potential for authoritarian (ab)use of the military and security sector in Russia and Ukraine. Whether this problem represents a serious threat to the development of democracy in these two key countries or is of a more limited transitional nature is a matter for debate.

Democratic control of defence and foreign policy

As was argued in the introduction to this book, democratic control of the military involves not only regulation of the military in relation to domestic politics, but also civilian political control of defence policy (in terms of the overall strategic direction of defence policy and the related elements of force structure, defence spending and procurement) and military aspects of foreign policy, in particular decisions on the operational deployment of the armed forces and the use of military force (whether for national defence or in peacekeeping and other intervention operations).

The chapters in this book suggest that for the countries of postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe securing democratic control of defence policy has proved more problematic than securing democratic control of the armed forces in relation to domestic politics. As was argued in the introduction to this volume, the communist legacy of military autonomy in the development and implementation of defence policy has created particular problems. The absence of systems for

civilian executive control and parliamentary oversight of defence policy meant not only that governments did not have control of the details of defence policy, but also that they were in a weak position to determine and decide between the strategic defence policy choices open to them. The one effective lever that governments controlled was the overall level of defence spending, which was generally cut drastically in the early 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War but also as part of efforts to assert control over the armed forces and defence policy. As a consequence much of the real debate on postcommunist civil–military relations – both in Central and Eastern and in Western European countries trying to support reform in the region – has been not so much about control of the military in relation to domestic politics as about establishing democratic civilian control over defence policy and policy-making.

The chapters in this volume show that, since the early 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have in general taken a number of steps designed to establish democratic civilian control of defence policy and policy-making:

- the formation of governmental structures – national security councils, defence committees and the like – tasked with overseeing the strategic direction of defence policy and the armed forces;
- the appointment of civilian cabinet-level defence ministers, the civilianization and reorganization of defence ministries and the subordination of General Staffs to defence ministers, in order to ensure the independence of defence policy-making from the armed forces;
- the establishment of mechanisms and procedures for the financial oversight and management of defence spending (in detail as well as in general);
- the strengthening of parliamentary defence or national security committees in order to provide parliamentary oversight of defence (by, for example, defining their powers and rights and improving their staffing and resourcing);
- the undertaking of defence reviews to determine the strategic direction of national defence policies;
- independent and semi-independent defence and security research institutes, think-tanks and non-governmental organizations have also developed, fostering wider public debate on defence and providing an alternative source of policy ideas and advice.

Such reforms have faced significant obstacles (in particular, political indifference and/or disputes, resistance from the military, a lack of civilian defence expertise, economic constraints and the practical/technical difficulty of some of the issues involved), have proceeded at varying speeds and have not always been effective. In general, the core group of Central and Eastern European states noted above have made most progress in establishing effective democratic civilian control of defence policy. The various case studies in this volume suggest that these states' engagement in NATO's PfP, in particular the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP) and more recently Membership Action Plans (MAPs), has had a significant impact because it has required them to adopt the detailed defence planning standards and practices operating within NATO. In contrast, Russia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia and Croatia have generally made much less progress in establishing political control over defence policy. In Russia and Ukraine, defence policy-making remains very substantially influenced by – if not under the effective control of – the military, with many of the reforms which have been undertaken elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (such as the appointment of civilian defence ministers, the civilianization of defence ministries, the establishment of new mechanisms for managing the defence budget and the development of effective parliamentary oversight) unfulfilled. In Yugoslavia and Croatia, efforts to establish democratic civilian control of defence policy are likely to face not only the general problems noted above, but also the specific problem that reform will threaten the political and economic power and interests which the military developed during the conflicts of the 1990s.

While the chapters in this book note the progress that has been made in establishing democratic control of defence policy in postcommunist Europe, their authors also highlight a number of areas that remain particularly problematic. Control over the financial management of defence policy and procurement remains weak, due to the problems of having to establish systems from scratch, the complexity of the issues and systems involved and continued resistance from the military. Oversight by parliamentary committees is often relatively limited due to a lack of expertise or interest, problems of access to information and limited resources. The 'civil society'/non-governmental input into national security and defence debates is argued to be weak, largely due to the small number of and limited resources available to non-governmental groups.

With some important exceptions, the establishment of democratic, civilian control over military aspects of foreign policy – in particular, decisions on the deployment of the military and the use of force – has proved less difficult than establishing control over defence policy. In part, this reflects the fact that the core group of Central and Eastern European states noted above have simply not had to deploy military force in particularly controversial circumstances, such as for national defence or in conflicts with neighbouring states. Nevertheless, these countries have established clear constitutional and political procedures for the operational deployment of armed forces, involving decisions by the president and/or government and approval by the parliament. These states, further, have all contributed forces to NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR, deployed in Bosnia) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) operations (as well as other United Nations peacekeeping operations) and the national procedures for authorizing such deployments have worked without major problems. In Bulgaria and Romania's cases, decisions to allow NATO air forces to use their airspace during the 1999 war against Yugoslavia proved controversial but were preceded by vigorous parliamentary debate, with the governments of the day eventually securing parliamentary majorities in favour of their decisions.

In Yugoslavia and Russia, procedures for the operational deployment of the military have been much more opaque. In both cases, decisions on the use of force appear to have been shaped by combinations of executive control of the military – with little or no meaningful parliamentary oversight – and both military influence over policy-making and a significant degree of military autonomy. In the Yugoslav case, as James Gow highlights, the decisions to deploy forces in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo appear to have been taken by President Milošević, in conjunction with his advisers and senior military commanders. Political control over Serb military and paramilitary forces in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo – in particular the question of how far Belgrade had (and has) direct control of these forces – remains controversial. In the Russian case, the military appears to have had significant influence over, and perhaps substantial autonomy regarding, the decisions to launch and conduct operations in the former Soviet Union (for example, in Moldova, Georgia and Chechnya).[2]

Conclusion

A decade after the collapse of communism, this book has sought to provide a series of detailed case studies of efforts to establish demo-

cratic control of armed forces in Central and Eastern Europe and to make an interim assessment of the extent of progress towards this goal. It points to room for cautious optimism. In the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia – which are also the primary candidates for membership of the EU and NATO – substantial progress has been made in establishing democratic civilian control of armed forces and these states are now arguably moving to a phase of consolidation in this area. In these countries, despite an inevitably uneven picture, the military has not to any significant degree intervened in domestic politics, nor does there appear to be much danger of this: civilian presidential and/or governmental control of armed forces has been established; parliaments provide oversight of both the armed forces and the executive's control of the military; and there is an emerging 'civil society' debate on the armed forces and defence. This progress appears to be explained by the broader progress of democratization in these countries, the skin-deep character of previous military loyalty to the communist system, the influence of the West in encouraging democratization in this area and the implementation of institutional reforms to underpin democratic civilian control of the military. While severe political instability could draw the military into these countries' domestic politics, such a development does not currently seem likely.

In the former Soviet and former Yugoslav states, in contrast, the picture is much more mixed. In Russia and Ukraine, relatively unconstrained executive control of the military and internal security forces – combined with continuing elements of military autonomy – is a feature of the strong presidential regimes that emerged in the 1990s. Political instability in Russia or Ukraine could draw the military and security forces – in particular paramilitary police and interior ministry forces – into domestic politics, create the risk of authoritarian executive abuse of those forces and thereby perhaps threaten democratization more broadly. Indeed, in spring 2001, the 'Kuchmagate' scandal in Ukraine threatened to create just such circumstances. In Yugoslavia and Croatia, the combination of unrestrained executive control of the military and military influence over policy was one of the central features of the authoritarian Milošević and Tuđman regimes and unravelling this civil–military nexus is a major challenge for the new regimes in these countries.

While much thinking on civil–military relations has focused on the traditional concern of praetorian intervention in domestic politics, at least as great a problem in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe has been securing democratic, civilian control over defence policy, as

distinct from the armed forces' place in domestic politics. The communist legacy of largely military control of defence policy and the absence of effective institutions for the control and management of defence policy has made this area particularly problematic. Since the early 1990s, however, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken a series of steps designed to secure democratic civilian control of defence policy and put in place new institutions for the management of defence. The pace of reforms has varied in different countries and this remains an ongoing process. In general, patterns in this area are similar to those in relation to the broader democratic control of the armed forces, with the Visegrad countries, Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia having made most progress, Russia and Ukraine lagging significantly further behind and most of the other CIS and (until recently) former Yugoslav states characterized by a combination of authoritarian, executive control of the armed forces and direct military control of defence policy.

A number of further conclusions may be drawn. First, the democratization of civil–military relations cannot be separated from wider processes of democratization and political and state development. Thus, broader democratization and relative domestic stability have been key background factors behind the establishment of democratic civilian control of the military in the core Central and Eastern European states. Similarly, the patterns of civil–military relations emerging in the other postcommunist states reflect the more general patterns and problems of political and state development in these countries. Second, the international environment and Western pressure and aid have been important factors in encouraging democratic civilian control of the armed forces and defence policy. The extent of Western influence, however, varies significantly, with the West having much greater influence over those countries who see themselves unambiguously as part of the West and aspire to NATO and EU membership and much less influence over the other postcommunist states – such as Russia, Ukraine and, until the fall of Milošević, Yugoslavia. Third, institutional reform remains important because such changes entrench and depoliticize democratic civilian control of the armed forces. Fourth, while some countries still face the 'first generation' issue of securing democratic control of the military in relation to domestic politics, others have largely achieved this goal and face the 'second generation' challenges of establishing effective institutions for the control and management of defence policy and developing defence policies appropriate to their new strategic environment.

These developments also have important implications for the post-communist states relations with the West and the eastward enlargement of the EU and NATO. The relative success of the EU/NATO candidates in establishing democratic civilian control of their armed forces in relation to domestic politics suggests that civil–military relations should not be an obstacle to their membership of the EU or NATO. The greater problems these states have faced in establishing effective democratic civilian control of defence policy – and hence in developing new defence policies – however, raise difficult questions about what criteria or standards for membership NATO and the EU should set in terms of candidates' defence policies and policy-making structures. The continuing salience of these problems suggests that both the postcommunist states and the West need to think more seriously about defence reform in Central and Eastern Europe, what national contributions the post-communist states should be expected to make to collective Euro-atlantic defence capabilities, and how best to maximize these contributions. In the context of the EU's recently established Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), there is also a case that the Union should play a greater role in this area. Most of these states are likely to become full members of the EU and hence also its CESDP within the next decade. They also have the potential to contribute to the EU's military capabilities, perhaps significantly so in the case of larger states such as Poland and Romania, especially in the longer term. An EU role in helping these states to modernize their defence capabilities might also be part of a wider rebalancing of the European–United States relationship.

Elsewhere, in South-Eastern Europe it is clear that the former Yugoslav republics face major challenges, and will require ongoing Western support, in establishing democratic control of their armed forces. Civil–military developments in Russia and Ukraine also raise difficult questions about how far the West should be wary of potentially authoritarian presidential (ab)use of the military and security forces, how the West can best support reform in this area and to what extent western aid in this area (and perhaps even more generally) should be conditional on efforts to strengthen democratic civilian control of military and security forces. In different ways these issues will continue to pose significant challenges for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and their Western partners, as they attempt to establish and consolidate democracy, reform their armed forces and develop effective national security policies.

Notes

1. T. S. Szayna, *The Military in a Postcommunist Poland*, N-2209-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1991) 43.
2. J. W. R. Lepingwell, 'The Russian Military and Security Policy in the "Near Abroad"', *Survival*, 36(3), Autumn 1994, 70–92.

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