



SOCIETY IN TRANSITION
Social Change in Ukraine in
Western Perspectives

Edited by Wsevolod W. Isajiw

Society in Transition

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Preface and Acknowledgements

The chapters in this volume derive from a conference that took place in Toronto in November of 1999. The contributors were asked to prepare original papers on the volume's topic, with the aim to have the presentations published. The conference was initiated by the Shevchenko Scientific Society of Canada. It was sponsored also by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Ukrainian Canadian Foundation of Taras Shevchenko (Winnipeg), the Connaught Fund for International Symposia at the University of Toronto, and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Toronto. Their contributions made the conference possible; they are sincerely acknowledged. The conference was also co-sponsored by the Robert F. Harney Professorship at the University of Toronto, Wsevolod W. Isajiw, Chairholder and conference organizer.

Additionally to the conference, five papers, presented at the 2000 meetings of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, are included in this book. These papers thematically complete the approach to the assessment of transition in the Ukrainian society.

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Introduction: **Social Transition—** **Assessing Socio-Political Change**

WSEVOLOD W. ISAJIW

Ukraine's ten years of independence is an accomplishment in its own right. This is particularly so considering the fact that Ukrainians fought for independence in World War I, but when the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell, out of ten countries that strove for independence, Ukraine was the only one that did not obtain it. Yet, to adequately assess the ten years is not an easy task. Western analysts, as represented in this volume, see this period as one of transition. If so, then this raises the question of transition to what?

The starting point of this transition has been characterized in the following manner:

One must recall that Soviet Ukraine was no more than part of an authoritarian, oppressive empire. The state controlled every economic entity from defense monoliths to corner bread stores. Corruption was a way of life: petty corruption to get by; wholesale corruption enriching the privileged few. Suppression was the watchword for politics. There were no press freedoms, only one party, and no semblance of civil society. Human rights and religious freedoms were routinely trounced. Moscow defined political and economic life. The needs and interests of the state—as a handful of people at the top determined—were more important than the neglect of the people.¹

If this was the starting point, then what has happened in the ten-year period of transition? How far has the country

progressed from this state of affairs? Vital statistical data raise serious questions. By July 2001, the population of Ukraine was less than 49 million, down from close to 52 million in the early 1990s. The natural population growth was still negative—at -0.78 per cent, still one of the lowest in the world. The death rate (16.43 deaths per 1,000 population) has exceeded the birth rate (9.31 births per 1,000 population) by almost two times. Infant mortality was particularly high, at 21.4 deaths per 1,000 live births, as compared with Canada's 5.02 per 1,000 live births. Average life expectancy was down from the early 1990s by about three years, at 66.15 years, as compared with Canada's 79.56 years. It was particularly low for males (60.62 years) as compared with Canada's 76.16 years.² Some 25–30 per cent of the total population—and around 50 per cent in some areas of the country—lived below the poverty line in the year 2000, in some areas of the country around 50 percent. The United Nations Development Report for the year 2000 gives Ukraine 51 on its combined Human Development Index, meaning that in terms of development, there are 51 per cent of countries below it. This is down from 1992, when Ukraine was 60 in the index.³

To understand this state of transition, however, it is necessary to conceive of “transition” not simply as a category of quantitative, descriptive indices, but as a theoretical concept. That is, a concept that will offer independent and dependent variables that will have predictive value. Such explanatory principles can then be used to evaluate descriptive data and historical events. One should look then at “transition” as a theoretical concept.

Western usage of the concept of transition has been imbedded in the theory of modernization. Originally, the theory of modernization had focused on Third World societies and largely assumed that in undeveloped societies change begins with differentiation of the labour force, produced by industrialization and/or commercialization. These two have been seen as the main driving force of modernization.⁴ Modernization has thus come to be identified first and foremost with economic development, which has until now remained the starting and the central point of the theory of transition.

The early theory of modernization, however, also focused on achievement motivation and personality type as the dynamic

factors of economic development.⁵ There was the assumption that if people can be motivated to achieve as individuals, economic development of society would ensue. This implied another assumption, i.e., that society allows individuals to freely pursue their individual economic interests. In other words, the theory of modernization assumed the necessity and the existence of free markets much like those of the Western world. It is this assumption of the modernization theory that the transition theory has placed up front. The problem is that Soviet societies were already modern in terms of being highly industrialized and highly differentiated, yet pre-modern in terms of individuals not being able to pursue their economic interests in the same way as individuals in the West. Hence, when the Soviet Union's collapse took place, one of the very first demands that the Western powers made of the former Soviet countries was to privatize the economy—that is, create a free market.

Transition to a free market economy is thus a basic criterion of evaluating the change in the former Soviet countries. The former Soviet elite readily accepted the requirement of privatization. Almost overnight, a number of important public industries were turned into private enterprises, with the former top managers becoming enterprise owners, appropriating for themselves public funds and assets.⁶ Without justifying the new capitalists, it can be asked how else could the Western requirement of privatization be met quickly and who else could amass the necessary sums of money to go into private business on demand, as it were? It is quite possible that for many members of the Soviet elite, the prospect of becoming rich quickly was a factor in the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union itself.

The West, however, cried foul. It continues to see this as corruption. So do many in the former Soviet countries. The point is that transition to a market economy by itself has proven to be insufficient in effecting economic development of the countries in question and is hence an insufficient criterion in evaluating change. The transition theory had to place the concept of market economy into a broader framework—that is, a market economy without corruption is best achieved in a democratic society, presumably like the societies of the West. The former Soviet societies, however, also claim to have become democratic. They now have

regular elections of representatives and top leaders, yet corruption is endemic. Hence, not any democracy, as it exists now in the former Soviet countries, provides a proper context for uncorrupted free market economy. There are different types of democracy.

In the past, in many countries democracy had been considered not so much a rule by majority but rather a system that allowed a group or class of people to come to power by some form of demagoguery for the sake of their own interests at public expense.⁷ Likewise, there are many societies today in which the leaders have been legitimately elected, but who (after elections) have abrogated all the power to themselves. Even the Soviet Union claimed to be a democracy, a purely formal democracy, we would say. That is, elections *did* take place, even if people had no choice of candidates or voted under external compulsion.

The concept of democracy involved in the transition theory is modelled on the post-World War II Western vision of democracy.⁸ It is the notion of participatory democracy in which the government is accountable to the people. The notion assumes the existence of the "civil society." The International Monetary Fund has developed a method to evaluate a country's progress in its transition to a civil society. They established indicators that can be grouped in three categories: governmental-administrative, legal-social, and citizen-participatory. The governmental-administrative category includes government effectiveness, low regulatory burden, predictability of rule changes, information about changes of rules, and credibility of government announcements. The legal-social category includes rule of law, judicial reliability, property rights enforcement, low graft, and predictability of bribes. The citizen-participatory category includes accountability and voice, freedom from discretionary bureaucrats, and consultation.⁹ Interestingly, in most of these indicators, out of five clusters of countries (with the first representing the highest development and the fifth the lowest), Ukraine fits into the fourth cluster, together with such countries as Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and others. Freedom House, in its evaluation of countries in transition, uses similar indicators. They include democratization, rule of law, economic liberalization, political rights and civil liberties.¹⁰

While keeping these concrete indicators in mind, theoretically the concept of civil society can be understood in several ways. It can be defined as political civility, meaning “the public discourses and practices through which cohesive interaction among the members of a plural society is facilitated in ways other than (but sometimes complementary to) political domination.”¹¹ This conception assumes the limiting possibility of society being held together without the state. This, of course, is not realizable in practice because class interests, ethnic enmities, mafiosi-type organizations, and the like would ensue in an all-out war. Nevertheless, this formulation of the civil society concept focuses attention on the role of non-governmental organizations as pivotal agencies of the social order.

The opposite end of this theoretical continuum is the assumption that the state is very much a part of civil society. According to John Hall, civil society can be seen as “a form of societal self-organization which allows for cooperation with the state whilst enabling individuation.”¹² Civility is not at odds with involvement of the people in political institutions. On the contrary, the likelihood that people will behave without civility depends greatly on the extent to which they have been excluded from political participation. The tragedy of European civilization, says Hall, is that in the past too many sectors of society have been excluded from political participation. Hence, civil society consists of inclusion rather than exclusion.¹³

This notion of the civil society should not be confused with the Gramscian notion that was popular among dissident circles in communist societies and some Western left wing-oriented circles in the late 1970s and early 1980s. According to this notion, civil society consists of an autonomous sphere of non-political social activity that exists within a political state, but does not challenge its control over the main levers of power. Rather, it establishes a tacit agreement with the ruling authorities.¹⁴

At the other extreme, the concept should not be confused with the Hegelian identification of civil society with the state. For Hegel, civil society cannot be conceived without the state. Civil society—meaning plurality of individuals, each pursuing his or her own ends and endeavouring to satisfy his or her own needs—could not function without the state. It would become a

realm of private vice. Only through the state that can civil society become a repository of civic virtue. Hence, the state and the civil society are mutually permeable. The state is "the self-conscious ethical substance" and as such is the highest expression of the spirit of civil society.¹⁵

Both of the above conceptions of the civil society fall outside the range of definitions that can be useful as criteria for evaluating transitions. They both assume an unquestioned supremacy of the state. For the transition process, they indicate the opposite direction. Both conceptions are foreign to the notion of civil society that serves as a theoretical model of social transition today. Jeffrey Alexander sums up what this model involves:

Civil society should be conceived ... as a solidary sphere in which a certain kind of universalizing community comes gradually to be defined and to some degree enforced. To the degree that solidary community exists, it is exhibited by "public opinion," possesses its own cultural codes and narratives in a democratic idiom, is patterned by a set of peculiar institutions, most notably legal and journalistic ones, and is visible in historically distinctive sets of interactional practices like civility, equality, criticism and respect.¹⁶

Alexander hastens to say that this kind of civil community can never exist in its fullness. It can exist only to some degree. This definition of civil society emphasizes solidarity. In the history of social thought, solidarity had been identified with Toennies's discussions of transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* and with the Durkheimian notion of the "moral community." But Toennies's own analysis of the meaning of his two concepts had focused on the social psychological question of confidence and trust.¹⁷ This is also the approach of the contemporary sociological theory. The question of social solidarity is approached in terms of the concept of trust. The main difference, however, between the classical continental European and the contemporary approach is that while Toennies and Durkheim associated the concept of trust mainly with a traditional or well-integrated community, the contemporary (particularly the Anglo-American) approach links it with the notion of the autonomous individual. As Adam Seligman put it:

For trust to make sense, to be necessary, what is required is the free and autonomous, hence unknowable individual. The same self-regarding self who stands at the fount of the new terms of civility and of friendship that define the modern age. For it is precisely the terms of friendship and of civility that now mediate between individuals no longer tied by long-standing, traditional and ascribed sets of obligations and responsibilities.¹⁸

The problem of trust is especially acute in post-Soviet societies. It is a matter not only of a lack of trust among individuals, but also a lack of trust in existing social institutions. Piotr Sztompka defined trust as the “bet on future contingent actions of others.”¹⁹ In post-communist societies, it has not been safe to make any such bets. Sztompka brought results of empirical surveys in Poland to show that throughout the early 1990s people in that society were reluctant to plan and think of the future in a long-term perspective and mistrusted legal regulations, banks, their own currency, their own manufactured products, public services, public schools, governmental promises, governmental reforms, even democratic institutions, and much more.²⁰ The same can be said about Ukraine and a number of other post-communist societies. Among the IMF indicators of transition mentioned earlier, seven have to do with lack of trust. Thus, the central measure of evaluation of the process of transition and the central measure of creation of a civil society has to do with how well individuals are able to trust their institutions. At the same time, it is unclear if there is any one method by which such trust can be rebuilt.

Last but not least in evaluating change in post-Soviet societies is the cultural factor. The idea of civil society embodies a normative, ethical vision of social order or, as one theoretician put it, a synthesis of values in search of the “good life.”²¹ This ethical vision covers the norms of civility, tolerance, co-operation, and so on. In short, it refers to normative expression of values in interaction between individuals and institutions in society. It includes a religious dimension, as many cultural values and norms are rooted in religious belief systems and religion can inspire individuals to pursue and maintain them. Norms are applicable to many or even all aspects of interaction, but they

may be followed out in practice or they may be only ideal statements, masking a gap—sometimes very large—between the ideal and the real. The measure of this gap and the ways in which it is reduced, if at all, is an important part of assessing social change. Subject to assessment is also the degree of readiness to modify accepted norms and values prevalent in the population for the sake of bringing them closer to either the real practices or to new practices.

Cultural values closely intertwine with identity. Culture is both an expression of identity and a vehicle of its development and maintenance. Inevitably, a newly established independent state has to articulate a new national identity. The problem for all post-colonial nations is that the new national identity has to articulate cultural values in a manner that would be inclusive rather than exclusive of all the diverse identities extant in the previously colonial society. In other words, the cultural values with which people are to identify must be general enough to allow for public recognition or harmonious incorporation of diverse identities. The problem with such societies as Ukraine is that during its existence the Soviet regime had suppressed the expression of Ukrainian identity and imposed a generalized “Soviet” identity that in actuality expressed the main symbols of Russian identity. Hence, in the process of new identity construction, society has to reclaim Ukrainian identity by recapturing past cultural and historical symbols. On the other hand, it has to generalize this identity by creating new elements of Ukrainian culture to which all other identities in Ukraine could relate and which would communicate an optimism to create trust in the nation’s institutions.

Fine arts (particularly literature, if widely read) can be the vanguard of cultural development. It is important to assess its tone, preoccupation, symbolic heroes, or failures, etc., as part of the measure of the process of transition.

To sum up, social transition is made up of at least four basic processes: (1) transition to a free market economy, (2) transition to a democracy based on civil society, (3) development of social trust, and (4) development of culture that articulates basic values and norms and creates new symbols that reinforce previously suppressed identities and symbols to which all members of soci-

ety can comfortably relate. These four processes constitute the framework in which transition can be assessed and evaluated.

The essays in this volume are organized according to the four basic transition processes discussed earlier. The volume also includes two essays, each presenting an empirical study, showing failures of the transition process. They suggest that the transition process in Ukraine may not proceed entirely according to Western criteria. The authors in this volume fully accept the transition model in principle. However, they criticize their Western transitology colleagues for failing to take into account a number of factors that make the transition process in Ukraine different from that in other societies, particularly the Central Eastern European post-communist countries like Poland or the Czech Republic. Attention is drawn to the fact that Ukraine was under the Soviet system much longer than were the Central Eastern European countries; Ukraine's peasantry suffered a major demographic demise as a result of the government-engineered famine in 1932–1933; and, unlike in the above-mentioned countries, Ukraine's agriculture was collectivized since the end of the 1920s. Further, in their process of transition, the other countries could assume the existence of a relatively unified conjunction of the nation as a unit of identity and the state as a unit of political administration. Ukraine, however, is only now going through the process of developing and solidifying this conjunction. The authors believe that in the case of Ukraine, the transitology model cannot be applied in exactly the same way as in the other above-mentioned countries. It has to be qualified to allow for conditions specific to Ukraine.

Other elements also make this volume different. Rarely discussed in the transitology literature are religion and the Church. They are given ample attention in this volume for a number of reasons. Among these is the fact that historically in Eastern Europe and particularly in the Russian sphere of influence, the Church has often been an instrument of the regime's policies, even during the Soviet era, and as such has had an important influence in political and social affairs.

Alexander Motyl suggests that the problems of national development can be approached on at least four vertically related

levels. One can look at leadership and assess the performance of specific leaders since independence. If this does not produce an adequate explanation as to why the transition has been slow, then it is necessary to go to deeper levels. The existing policies must be examined, followed by the scrutiny of long-standing and newly established institutions. If this still fails to produce adequate answers, the broader structure of society has to be examined. Is it necessary to proceed to all four levels to assess the development of Ukraine since independence and find the roots of its problems, if any?

The analysts agree with Motyl that leadership in Ukraine, as in Russia and other post-Soviet countries, is still far from the open, democratic, transparent form that the ideal of Western democracy upholds. Rather, while democracy exists formally, the top leadership tends to be semi-authoritarian and the real power is held by "oligarchs," representing a number of half-hidden "clans" that dominate the country's economic activities. Theoretically, the country is committed to a market economy. But has it met the preconditions for it or is it doomed to remain an undeveloped, even if stable, system similarly to many Third World countries?

The answer to this question requires much more than the assessment of leadership and its policies. A thorough institutional and structural analysis is necessary.

By nature, such analysis is bound to be complex. Can a market economy be established when the state is weak and lacks a consolidated unity? Taras Kuzio points out that as an effective unit, the state presupposes also the existence of a civil society that is able to articulate its ethnic identity. Hence, according to him, a national cultural identity must precede political and economic reform. In the Soviet period, however, any previously existing socio-cultural, pluralistic civil society and independent economic actors were largely destroyed. Likewise, attitudes toward the past that play a decisive role in formulating attitudes toward the future are regionally divided. Hence, development of a national cultural identity is an essential part of nation building and a prerequisite for economic and political development.

Historically, however, long-standing institutions and structures often resist change. In the domain of the economy, it has

been difficult to shake off the old Soviet socialist system. As Volodimir Bandera points out, while attempting to privatize the economy, the best that has been done so far is to develop a quasi-capitalist system. The worst problem in this development is the inability to implement in practice the rules of the market because of the lack of enforcement of laws to guide the new economic development, especially the enforcement of contracts. Foreign creditors and investors have been maltreated by broken contracts, and litigation by Western bodies has not been able to achieve any compensation for them. Bandera considers the lack of law enforcement to be the major structural weakness of the economy.

Yet, what is interesting is that the export/import relationship has been quite favourable for Ukraine. Ukraine has been exporting more goods and services than it has imported, becoming similar in this respect to Canada and Brazil. In view of the relatively low standard of living of most of the population, it is obvious that they have not been profiting much from this favourable relationship. Yet again, in this respect the country has been more like a Third World country. Still, Bandera points out that the potential for economic growth and development in Ukraine remains substantial.

Oleh Havrylyshyn lists several impediments to Ukraine's economic growth, among them the "phoenix-new elite and their cronies," who favour financial stability and a large and generous government to support their new enterprises by, for example, insuring low energy prices and special tax privileges. They will, however, strongly oppose complete liberalization of the market to new competition either from the outside or from new small enterprises from within. Thus, the transition to market economy is frozen halfway. A form of capitalism is introduced, but one that is characterized by a monopolistic structure, supported by the state.

The problem is further complicated by the widespread existence of an informal underground economy. Since much of this economy is based on bribes and other questionable activities, it is not officially recognized and is ostensibly illegal, yet many citizens participate in it because their survival often depends on it. The informal economy is highly correlated with a bureaucratically complex but inefficient government. Havrylyshyn, however,

points out that the government's inefficiency, especially in its failure to enforce existing laws, enables the informal economy to function. An efficient intervention by the government would drive the economy even further underground, creating even greater difficulties in the everyday lives of citizens.

There are, however, some areas of the economy in Ukraine that have been exceptionally successful. Ostap Hawaleshka points to a specific technological project of a large scope that has been successful in achieving progress toward a closer integration with the Western economy. Among the project's significant features that cut across the corruption barriers of the economy is the practical idea of joint ventures administered by Western organized institutions located and working in Ukraine. While this has been the principle behind a number of Western organized institutions operating in Ukraine (like those funded by Soros and others), the technological scientific institutions whose work has immediate practical application appear to have had the most success in moving the old intractable system toward change. Yet, the permanence of these ventures when external funding is removed still remains problematic.

A serious impediment to the development of independent private enterprise, especially when external funding is removed, as pointed out by Havrylyshyn, is a conviction that freedom of private economic activity is a privilege allowed or granted by government bureaucracy and not a right of individuals.

Since oligarchic vested interests have grown stronger as a result of delays in economic reform, Havrylyshyn recommends a much more determined effort at reforming the market economy. There should be a substantial effort to make the judicial system work quickly and fairly in enforcing laws and making private economic activity the right of individuals rather than a privilege granted by bureaucrats. Membership in the European Community may also contribute to a faster transition.

While enforcing existing laws is a basic problem in Ukraine, it had been complicated by the delayed development of the legal system, and the procedure of writing the new constitution was confusing, if not chaotic. This was because in all legal matters during the Soviet era, the Ukrainian Communist Party simply followed directives from the Central Committee of the Commu-

nist Party in Moscow. Martha Trofimenko points out that with independence, the parliamentary deputies had to take the responsibility of writing and passing legislation on their own. As a result, new laws were tagged onto old laws that had no real relevance but were still on the books. There was no effective procedure for repealing old laws. Thus, fragments of the old nominal legal base mingled with new hastily drafted legislation. Similar problems arose with the use of legal terms that in the Soviet context had meanings different from those in the new reality, yet still were used in the new legislation.

Trofimenko echoes Kuzio in insisting that a consolidated state requires a unifying identity that is more than just an identity with the political powers at the top. A more deeply unifying identity requires not only some shared basic values, but also shared conceptions as to which national values and ethical or moral positions are to be reflected in the law. After a long history of the Soviet regime's questioning of and campaigning against traditional values, sharing these deeper conceptions has been a serious problem for Ukraine.

The question of consistency and effectiveness of law is not simply a post-Soviet problem in Ukraine and those countries of Eastern Europe that historically have been under Russian hegemony. It is a historically long-standing problem predating the Soviet Union. As pointed out in Isajiw's essay, concern with the effectiveness of law and with the problem of upholding public values as a precondition for the development of civil society was a major concern of outstanding social thinkers in Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth and in the early twentieth century. The intelligentsia in the Czarist Empire had little respect for law because any equality before the law was nonexistent. Instead of emphasizing and developing legal consciousness, the intelligentsia of the time were more prone to follow the ideologies that made power rather than law the supreme principle of building the social order.²² In its seventy years of existence, the Soviet Union failed to approach this problem. As a result, the basic problem underlying the establishment of a civil society in Ukraine has remained unsolved until today.

A facilitating factor in establishing the foundations for a civil society may be a closer rapprochement with Western Europe.

Procyk asserts that there is a keen interest in Ukraine in the idea of Europe and things European that takes the form of a search for Ukraine's European roots. The impetus for this search results from a desire to raise the Ukrainian cultural level and a need to reinforce the foundations of Ukrainian national identity. According to Procyk, many Ukrainians feel that what is truly national is inevitably also European. She points out, however, that this pro-European sentiment is not inherently anti-Russian. Rather, it sustains an identity that is neither pro- nor anti-Russian, but simply Ukrainian.

Identity derives from a feeling and knowledge of belonging to a community. As already mentioned, it presupposes some sharing of values and self-conceptions with that community and some feelings of obligation, connectedness, and trust.²³ The traditional institutions in society concerned with transmission and propagation of basic values are religious congregations and the Church. Since its independence, Ukraine has accepted a division between Church and state, but the legacy of the past political relationship between the two and the policy of atheism has left its mark on the relationship between the churches and congregations themselves. The problem is that much—indeed most—energy and effort among the largest religious institutions have been devoted to religious politics rather than to value propagation.

In 1996, about 53 per cent of the population were of the Orthodox affiliation comprising mainly three major churches, 23 per cent various Protestant churches, 18 per cent Ukrainian-Greek Catholic Church, 1 per cent Muslim, 0.5 per cent Jewish communities, and the rest other religious communities. Overall, the number of religious communities has been increasing since independence, especially in large cities like Kyiv and Lviv, but the increase has not been even. In the early years of independence it was surprisingly rapid, but has slowed since the middle of the decade.²⁴ The most hotly debated religious issues have been questions of ecclesiastical rights and jurisdiction, unification of Churches, ownership of church buildings—all matters of Church politics rather than belief and values.

Among the Orthodox Churches, the predominant issues have been those of canonicity, the patriarchy's independence from Moscow, and Church unification. Oleh Gerus compares the ap-

proaches to these issues by the Orthodox Church in Ukraine and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Canada. He points out that the implications of whether the Church is “canonical” or “uncanonical” are far-reaching for believers since it influences the validity of the sacraments dispensed by the Church and consequently the salvation of the faithful. Connected with it is the question of establishing the Orthodox Church as the officially recognized national church of Ukraine, independent of the Moscow patriarchate. The problem is complicated because of a disunity between the three major Orthodox Churches that has often turned bitter and that apparently can be resolved only with the help of the state.

As in the case of the Orthodox Church but even more so, the problems of development of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Ukraine have to be understood in the UCC's relation to the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West. Since the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine in 1944 and until the Soviet collapse in 1991, the UCC was outlawed and went underground. The émigré UCC in the West, however, kept in clandestine contact with the underground Church especially since the end of the 1970s. As Andrii Krawchuk points out, since independence the contacts and the exchange of personnel have become more common, and the Western UCC had taken an active role in re-establishing the UCC in Ukraine. The transition of the Church from being an underground to a legal institution, however, has proven to be painful in a number of ways. Krawchuk draws attention to the UCC's conflict with the Orthodox Church; the uneasy return to the Catholic Church of the clergy who during the Soviet era were forced to join the Moscow-controlled Orthodox Church; the reclamation of parishes and church buildings that were taken over by the official Orthodox Church during the Soviet era; residual antipathies toward leftovers of the communist past, and other vexing problems. All these problems have distracted the Church from its main mission of, as Krawchuk puts, “recovering an authoritative, spiritual voice for humanization in the post-Soviet period.”

The role and the problems of Protestantism in Ukraine are quite different from those of the other Churches. As Eugene Lemcio points out, the emphasis on the local congregation rather

than on the nationwide or broader Church structure is what characterizes the Baptists, the most active Protestant denomination in Ukraine. Further, while other Churches' link with the West has been mostly through Ukrainian churches in the West, the link of the Protestant congregations with the West has been largely through non-Ukrainian congregations. This has given Protestant congregations an access to wider resources and has also exposed adherents in Ukraine more directly to the values and cultural styles typical of Western Protestantism. Lemcio shows, however, that Ukrainian congregations have not favourably received all of these styles. Protestantism in Ukraine has had to face objections that it is bringing in foreign elements that, in the context of Ukraine's history of subjugation to outside powers, may have injurious consequences for Ukrainian identity. As a result, many Western ways—such as, for example, the simplicity of church interiors and the manner of evangelizing—have had to be modified and integrated with more traditional Ukrainian styles. Still, Protestantism has been successful in injecting a number of Western values into Ukraine, particularly those of local organizational initiatives and an emphasis on the present and future rather than on the past.

The status of the Jewish community in Ukraine indicates another attitude change. In his review of empirical studies, Henry Abramson shows that with the achievement of statehood, the old anti-Semitic stereotypes among Ukrainians and the Ukrainophobic stereotypes among Jews in Ukraine have outlived their social purpose. In general, there is an attitude of acceptance on both sides that is noticeable, supported by the government's enlightened policy of minority relations. Yet, while externally the Jewish community is experiencing a certain renaissance, internally it is going through competition for organizational membership and accompanying community strife. Ironically, while there is more social acceptance, the Jewish community itself is rapidly becoming smaller as greater numbers of its members emigrate to Israel and to the West.

Education is the institution primarily concerned with inculcation and transmission of the attitudes, values, and skills of civil society. This includes the occupational skills necessary to prepare new members of society to take their place in the labour

force. But it also includes deeper values that instill feelings of human dignity, fair play, and self-worth and guide people in their relations with one another. In a “free” society, education, especially higher education, is also seen as the cradle of new ideas and hence valued as the forum for free and open exchange of ideas. Popular education—that is, educational opportunities on all levels for everybody—is considered in the West to be a *sine qua non* of a democratic society. Student interest and enrolment in institutions of higher learning have increased substantially since independence. A significant development was the establishment of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kyiv and of the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, spearheading the introduction of privately owned universities in Ukraine. It involved many faculty from the West, an emphasis on broader rather than purely technical education, and the use of Ukrainian and English as languages of instruction. The government also introduced a number of significant reforms to raise the level of higher education.

Yet the new developments, significant as they may be, have not changed the old basic infrastructure of higher education. As Olga Andriewsky points out, this has not only frustrated many efforts at innovation, but also contributed to a decrease in scholarly research and even reversals to the old centrally supervised system. The responsible state ministries have not been able to provide the necessary funds for both the teaching faculty and the researchers, and the bribery system has continued to flourish. As a consequence, there has been an exodus of intellectual talent (often the best) out of academia and even out of the country.

Dennis Soltys likewise points to the persistence of significant elements of the Soviet educational structure through the ten-year period of Ukrainian independence that have impeded the progress of secondary education. The elements of this structure have contributed to the persistence of a “subject political culture” and to a highly uneven and unjust civic integration and self-development of significant sectors of the population. Ukrainian-speaking rural populations who make up a large percentage of the country’s total population have been particularly disadvantaged. Notwithstanding a few striking innovations on

the postsecondary school level, one can expect change in the structure of education to be slow in coming. It may require an energetic social movement to accelerate it.

An acid test of a developed civil society is the free media. In one sense, the free media is an extension of a free and open educational system. In another sense, a flourishing free media is an indication that civil society is above the state. That is, underlying political institutions is the belief that the state—meaning the government and the political elite—exist for the sake of the people rather than the other way around.

The movement for an independent press in Ukraine began even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it developed rapidly after 1990. As Marta Dyczok points out, a special role in this development has been played by Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Younger, reform-minded journalists in Ukraine have readily welcomed these efforts. With NGO assistance, new newspapers sprang up and a number of independent television networks and radio stations were established, employing upgraded transmission equipment and Western broadcasting techniques. Dyczok shows how different NGO groups employed different strategies in their efforts to democratize the media. Yet, before long all these efforts faced the same limitations. Restricted financing has been a serious problem, especially since expansion of the mass media requires substantial increases in resources from one year to the next. But even more serious has been pressure on journalists from the government, the various political parties, “oligarchs,” and other influential bodies to restrict critical reporting, eliminate investigative journalism, and toe the line of one or another power group. Punishment for not doing so can be severe, including arbitrary acts of the government and violence.

The case of the journalist Georgy Gongadze, an outspoken critic of the government, whose mutilated body was found in the woods near Kyiv in the fall of 2000, was an event that not only precipitated mass demonstrations against Ukraine’s president, but also indirectly revealed the extent of the difficulty in establishing a genuine civil society. This case and other deaths or arrests of opposition leaders, businessmen, and even research-

ers of recent Soviet history reveal the presence of an extra-legal system in the use of force. Those in legal positions of power and those without such positions, but with resources can rely equally on that system.

In a broad sense, sharing a culture is sharing the symbolic means that enables trust to develop. In periods of change, it is important that culture itself develops new, creative forms that articulate the changing aspirations, the changing psychological and spiritual needs of the people. These new creative forms of articulation would interpret the present and the past collective experience of people in a new light. After ten years of independence, has Ukrainian culture developed new forms that articulate the new aspirations and needs of the people and that throw a new light on their collective experience?

In examining the fine arts and literature in Ukraine since independence, George Grabowicz passes somber judgment. While there have been considerable achievements in terms of individual artistic and intellectual efforts, performances, publications, and so on, the overall picture is spotty at best. This is because the institutional base for this creativity remains totally unreformed. Yet, "high" culture requires institutional support. The same can be said about other forms of culture, in particular political culture. Above all, there appears to be a stubborn resistance to interpreting the immediate historical past. Grabowicz calls it the "amnesia project," almost a collective attempt to forget the Soviet past. Yet, questions as to how foreign or how native the Soviet experience and its ideology were must be dealt with sooner or later. There is also the question of responsibility for the tremendous loss of life and denial of human rights suffered by millions during that period.

It should be noted that in the West, after the defeat of Nazi Germany, there was a wealth of films; literary, critical, and scholarly writings; exhibits, and monuments to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to interpret and understand how such an inhuman system could emerge in a "civilized" country. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, very few literary or scholarly attempts commemorating the victims and interpreting the inhuman experience of the Soviet system have appeared in Eastern Europe.

Cultural development can also be examined in detail by looking at individual forms of art. Larissa Onyshkevych examined the content of dramas written by a new generation of writers in the 1990s. These writings show an individual search for the self and for self-fulfillment, a concern with not having a clear picture of oneself, and skepticism of any shared values or shared identities and even attempts to escape them. There is a lament about one's "lost or stolen individuality," being disconnected from society, being on the margins of society, being helpless, and being only "a little person."

Still the "little person," in his or her search for identity, looks to the collective historical past. This is both a critical and a positive look. Much of the critical look focuses on the present, particularly on the corruption, deceit, and disregard of ethical values by individuals who have used the early years of Ukrainian independence for personal gain. A few dramas do deal with remote historical events and some get a positive treatment. The tragic events, such as the Great Famine, are seen as representing the Ukrainian "stations of the cross." Issues of religion hold a significant place in the plays discussed by Onyshkevych. Biblical references are often made, biblical symbolism employed, and issues of conscience come to be discussed in general terms by the characters portrayed.

The final indicator of the development of society is its vital demographic profile, its standard of living, especially the extent of its level of poverty and the level of respect for human life and dignity, in particular, its level of crime against women. All these can be considered a combined consequence of the solution, or lack of it, to the problems discussed earlier. Two empirical studies assess these consequences. Jane Rudd's study presents evidence (often not easily available) of the shocking extent of trafficking in women in Ukraine. One factor, though not the only one, responsible for this is poverty. Stephen Whitefield's empirical study assesses the extent of poverty, which is also shocking. The studies indicate that there are serious failures in the process of transition in which many of the most vulnerable members of society are exploited and neglected.

Are there solutions to Ukraine's development problems pointed out in the essays of this volume? The Gongadze case and the dismissal of the prime-minister and the appointment of a new one by the republic's president in the spring of 2001 have revealed that the oligarchic substructure of society and its effects on the public social structure must be considered if any solution to the societal structural problems is to be found. As was pointed out earlier, this substructure is a system of indirect exercise of state power by a group of people who previously were functionaries of the state, but who, with the collapse of the communist system, have become wealthy capitalists. The problem with this substructure is that, as in all oligarchic systems, the oligarchs tend to put their own interests before or in place of the public interest. Corruption by public officials, a product of this type of substructure, is an endemic process connected with all aspects of societal structure and cannot be easily eradicated.

Notwithstanding the rootedness of this substructure of society, the key to the development of a free market economy is not this class of nouveau riche elite but the middle class—that is, the independent proprietors of small- and medium-size businesses and the professionals related to them. Historically, the success of the Western free market economy is due primarily to the development of a large middle class. But while in the post-communist world the middle class has been developing, it has not developed in the same way or to the same extent everywhere. As Silviu Brucan has pointed out, the striking difference has been between the middle class in Central European nations and the middle class in the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, in spite of four decades of communism, a relatively high percentage of the middle class has survived from the pre-communist period. In Hungary, there was even a Communist Party policy that favoured market economy. In Central European countries, the farmers themselves were much better prepared for the market economy than were the Soviet *kolkhozniki*. Russia, however, as well as other countries of the Soviet Union, was seriously hampered in economic development by its lack of a significant middle class. After seventy years of communism in Russia, Ukraine, and other Soviet countries, virtually no trace of the pre-revolutionary bourgeois remained. Brucan states that in the

historical process of social development in Europe, Russia seems to have always been one class behind. In 1917 when the socialist revolution took place, the social agent that was to bring about the change—the proletariat—was missing. Today, when the problem is setting up a market economy, it is the middle class that is missing.²⁵

Development of this type of middle class, however, is seriously hampered by the oligarchical substructure of society. In looking for solutions to this structural problem, one can ask several questions. Could the international community create conditions under which it would become more profitable for the oligarchs to reinvest in the country rather than export their profits to foreign countries and under which it would be to their advantage to abide by the country's taxation and other laws? Or would one have to wait until the oligarchs begin to threaten each other so that laws would be respected for the sake of oligarch's own security? Or can conditions be created under which the oligarchs would become civilized and promote the public interest?

Although ultimately, the solutions to these problems must come from various sectors in Ukraine itself, Western efforts in facilitating solutions are absolutely necessary. As pointed out by several authors in this volume, many such efforts in economics, technological development, education, social welfare, religion, and the media, while not solving all the problems, have nevertheless been quite helpful in approaching them. One can look also at the Baltic states, where such Western efforts have had even greater success.

As a number of authors in this volume point out, there have been important and promising developments in Ukraine. Relatively successful currency stabilization and the positive and successful minority relations policy are some outstanding examples. There are also many notable individuals in government and politics who are intent on introducing and maintaining democratic legislation and supporting democratic measures to enforce it. There have been new universities and academies of higher learning established that have introduced new programs and have cultivated contacts with the West. Despite restrictive pressures, new newspapers, broadcasting channels, and programs have appeared and persisted. Above all, young people have

formed literary, cultural, religious, and other groups, and individuals and communities have maintained a strong orientation toward development of a civil society in Ukraine. It is important that the West maintains and increases its contacts and support of these groups for some time to come. Likewise in the sphere of international relations, it is important to move more courageously, in spite of temporal setbacks, to involve Ukraine in NATO and the European Community and Western Europe in general. In the post-Soviet period when Europe is still undergoing changes, Ukraine holds a central place in the development of democracy and peace in Eastern Europe.

NOTES

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Part One

Political Transition:

What Progress?

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1

Theorizing Ukraine: Pessimistic Prognoses, Optimistic Rejoinders, and a Provocation or Two

ALEXANDER J. MOTYL

Social science thinking about the post-communist states is strikingly similar to social science thinking about the post-colonial states of the 1950s and 1960s. Although this fact is of obvious relevance to questions of theory formation, theory validation, and theory circulation, I shall not discuss the implications of these similarities for social science metatheorizing.¹ Instead, this chapter attempts to draw out the implications of this theoretical isomorphism for the post-communist states in general and Ukraine in particular. I shall do this by examining how the two theoretical paradigms can be interpreted to support both pessimistic and optimistic evaluations of Ukraine and its future. I conclude by inviting Ukraine's policy makers to consider taking two policy "tests" and thereby lend credence to one of these evaluative approaches.

PARADIGMATIC SIMILARITIES

The emergence of a host of new states in the aftermath of decolonization spurred Western social scientists and policy makers to develop theories and policies that would promote their "development" and "modernization." Both terms had many frequently disparate meanings, but development was generally understood as involving the construction of effective *political* and *economic* systems in place of the "undeveloped" or "under-

developed” colonial entities that had attained formal independence, while modernization was usually taken to refer to the replacement of “traditional” *social* and *cultural* values, norms, beliefs, and behaviours with their “modern” counterparts. Developed polities were supposed to be democratic nation-states, while developed economies were supposed to be capitalist; modern people were supposed to be rational, secular, goal-oriented, active, and participatory. Development necessitated the formation of a national identity and an effective state apparatus with “legitimacy” and “capacity,” the introduction of popular “participation,” and the effective “distribution” of material resources.² In turn, modern values, norms, beliefs, and behaviours could be inculcated by means of, above all, education, communication, and urbanization.

Development and modernization find their post-Soviet counterparts in “transitions” and “globalization.” Here, too, the literature is enormous—and growing at a seemingly exponential rate—and definitional disagreements abound, but scholars and policy makers generally agree that transition entails movement from non-market, non-democratic systems lacking rule of law and civil society to market-based, democratic, and rule-of-law systems with vibrant civil societies.³ By the same token, globalization (as the cross-border flow of people, ideas, products, and capital) is supposed to transform people’s values, norms, beliefs, and behaviours in a way that makes them “global”—that is, open to change, flexible, tolerant, secular, and active.⁴

The terminology is somewhat different, but the conceptual underpinnings and theoretical approaches embodied in development/modernization thinking on the one hand and transitions/globalization thinking on the other hand are virtually identical. Both paradigms are explicitly about the construction of states, nations, markets, and democracies; whereas the former speaks of legitimacy, capacity, participation, and distribution, the latter speaks of their broad equivalents—the rule of law, states, democracy and civil society, and markets. Both primarily define modern and global values, norms, beliefs, and behaviours in terms of what they are not—pre-modern and pre-global. Both paradigms thus rest on a binary opposition between “us” and “them,” where “we” are everything that “they” should become but

are not. Both assume that the ultimate goal of becoming like us can be best pursued by behaving like us. And both assume that the goods they posit do not contradict one another, but instead “go together.” In sum, both paradigms rest on an optimistic interpretation of historical change.

Equally striking are the circumstances in which both paradigms emerged, the failures that they encountered, and the responses that they generated. Then as now, scholars and policy makers confronted a new world that had arisen as a result of a major historical caesura—World War II and decolonization then, and the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire now. At both times, the United States was the hegemonic power that served as the model for the rest of the world. At both times, euphoria was ubiquitous, the potential for change seemed limitless, and the solutions to the world’s problems appeared to have universal validity. Francis Fukuyama’s essay on “the end of history” is the quintessential statement of that vision in the post-cold war period.⁵ Then as now, the reality of change belied the theories of change. Development was hijacked by tin-pot dictators and officers; modernization had unexpected consequences, intensifying rather than moderating such supposed features of tradition as ethnicity. Democracy stalled in all but a few post-communist states; marketization resulted in poverty, massive disparities of wealth, and few genuine markets; and globalization appears to have been as disruptive as it promised to have been constructive.

Who or what was at fault for these disappointing results? Four types of answers were, and still are, possible:

1. *policy makers* in the developing/transitional states and/or in the West;
2. the *policies* pursued by developing/transitional and/or Western policy makers;
3. the *institutions* existing in the developing/transitional states and/or in the West;
4. the structure of the *system* encompassing the developing/transitional states and the West.

Note, first, that the magnitude and complexity of the problems increase in descending order because each level incorporates

those above it. By the same token, the policy solutions required increase in magnitude, complexity, and *radicalism* in descending order. Note as well that the analysis resembles that applied to the Soviet Union: Was the problem Stalin or Khrushchev or Brezhnev? Or industrial or agricultural or nationality policy? Or the Communist Party and the Soviets? Or communism itself? Finally, note that these four factors dovetail nicely with the debate over the theoretical primacy of agents versus the theoretical primacy of structures.⁶ Not surprisingly, supporters of both paradigms—hereafter referred to as optimists—generally resorted to the first two factors as explanations of failure: in their view, the paradigms were right; only the implementers or forms of implementation were wrong. In contrast, critics of both paradigms—hereafter, pessimists—generally resorted to the last two factors: policy makers and policies, even if superb, could do little to overcome the intractable difficulties represented by institutions and structures.

Criticism of both paradigms has focused on all four factors. Accordingly, developing and modernizing elites—be they Third World nationalists or Western liberals—must have made mistakes or were unqualified to lead. If the leaders were visionary, but things still went badly, then the policies they adopted must have been inappropriate. If the policies seemed right, but development still lagged, then lack of success must have had something to do with recalcitrant post-colonial institutions. If, finally, nothing seemed to work, then the system at large was evidently at fault. Not surprisingly, Third World critics tended to blame Western policy makers, policies, institutions, and structures, while their Western counterparts preferred to point the finger at their Third World critics. More important, mainstream Western social science generally focused on Third World institutions and political culture, while mainstream Third World social science eventually came to favour *dependencia* theories that argued that the structure of the capitalist world system as such necessarily promoted their countries' underdevelopment, and that the only way to develop was to withdraw from capitalism and adopt socialism.⁷

Criticism of the transitions/globalization paradigm has been similar. At first, fingers were pointed at leaders—dissidents made

poor presidents, elites were ignorant, former communists were venal—and policies such as shock therapy, voucher privatization, and the like. Over time, the critique began shifting toward institutions. The World Bank in particular has placed great emphasis on institutional change as a precondition of development, while its former chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has been especially vocal in his criticism of Western policy for ignoring institutions in Russia.⁸ It has now become part of the conventional wisdom to argue that no policies can be ultimately successful if rule of law—i.e., a whole set of institutions—is in place. A structural critique also exists, but it has, for the most part, been relegated to the margins of political respectability. Ukrainian and Russian communists have blamed their countries' troubles on rapacious Western capitalism; Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and others like him see the culprit in American imperialism.

But the makings of a serious radical critique are already at hand. Many Western critics of globalization emphasize, among other things, that the very structure of the world economic system has the potential to devastate developing economies and societies.⁹ In contrast to *dependencia* theorists, however, these critics generally believe that such devastation is potential: it may happen only if suitable precautions, restrictions, and policies are not adopted. Capitalism, therefore, can presumably be made to work to every country's benefit if capitalists are wise enough—or if popular pressure is strong enough to force them—to make it work to everyone's benefit. A radical critique would go further, arguing that capitalism-as-globalization has, on the one hand, so undermined states as to make them well-nigh powerless to contain it and, on the other, so reinforced the power and hegemony of the developed West—i.e., the United States—as to make it unlikely if not impossible that they would undermine the sources of their own power.

The central problem facing a contemporary radical critique is the apparent lack of alternatives to capitalism. Although many *dependencia* theorists were critical of the Soviet Union's political and economic system, the mere fact that—however “degenerate” or “revisionist”—something called socialism existed suggested that alternatives to capitalism were thinkable and therefore possible. Following the collapse of communism in 1989–1991, however,

and the subsequent adoption by European social democrats of “third ways” and “new middles,” there seems to be no obvious, coherent intellectual alternative to capitalist development in general and American-style development in particular. If history is any guide to the future, an alternative or alternatives will eventually emerge; for the time being, however, serious criticism of the transitions/globalization paradigm is unlikely to go much further than the third, institutional, level. Naturally, the fact that social scientists and intellectuals can conceive of no coherent alternative to capitalism will not dissuade policy makers from trying. Communism seems unlikely to make a comeback anytime soon, but authoritarianism and hypernationalism, especially when cloaked in market rhetoric and possibly even committed to capitalist policies, may emerge as the favourites of elites unable to cope with the failures of transition.

In suggesting that there has been a logical, and possibly temporal, progression in the four levels of failure and four types of criticism, I have implied that the core of the problem for both paradigms is institutional, structural, or both. In other words, I belong to the pessimistic camp. Central to this view is the fact that neither institutions nor structures are—by definition—easily amenable to change.¹⁰ Both evolve over time, both are “sticky,” and both resist and obstruct change. Seen from this perspective, optimists paid, and still pay, insufficient attention to institutions and structures and therefore unavoidably engage in unpersuasive theorizing and poor policy making. The view that becoming like us presupposes behaving like us ignores the history and culture of both us and them and implies that movement from them to us is linear and unidirectional. The assumption that all good things go together is heartening but wrong, as liberals concerned with reconciling the imperatives of liberty with those of equality know all too well.¹¹ I suggested earlier that both paradigms suffered from excessive optimism. In that sense, their flaw was not, and is not, to suggest that the goals of modernization, development, transition, and globalization—functioning states, nations, civil societies, and markets—are desirable, but to argue that they are more or less easily and more or less quickly attainable by, to put it somewhat crudely, a few wise leaders promoting a few wise policies.

Although the pessimists have a strong case to make, optimists are not, as I show later, without good arguments of their own. Suffice to say for the time being that they would rebut my suggestion that euphoria bred exalted expectations by arguing that similar circumstances bred similar solutions precisely because they were the correct solutions to those circumstances. Indeed, optimists might suggest that the transitions/globalization paradigm is not a rehash of its predecessor, but its vindication.¹² And they would, of course, have a point.

BAD NEWS FOR UKRAINE?

But first the pessimistic account of Ukraine's transition. When it attained independence in 1991, Ukraine was widely expected to be one of the post-communist front-runners. Indeed, Deutsche Bank famously predicted that Ukraine's economy would do especially well. Development, modernization, transition, globalization—all seemed within easy reach. Within a year or two that expectation proved to be completely unfounded. The economy went into a tailspin, the state remained ineffective, civil society refused to rear its head, corruption was rampant, and rule of law was obviously nowhere to be seen. Who was at fault? Fingers were pointed at Ukraine's policy makers: the former dissidents were poor administrators, the ex-communists were still communists, President Leonid Kravchuk was inconclusive, President Leonid Kuchma was corrupt. Of course, their policies were also at fault. Policies were insufficiently radical; policies were incoherent; policies favoured elites; policies promoted corruption; policies stifled initiative. In the course of the 1990s, institutional and structural critiques joined the fray. What could you expect from a country and a people that lacked all the institutional underpinnings of democracy and the market? Alternatively, what could you expect from a country and a people that had to cope with the protectionist practices, closed borders, and political-economic hegemony of the Europeans and the Americans?¹³

Although poor leaders and poor policies have surely contributed to Ukraine's current plight, it is hard to argue that they suffice for it. Stable, undeveloped systems have become the norm in much of the Third World *and* in the former Soviet bloc—and

not just in Ukraine. The reasons for such uniformity must go beyond policy makers and policies—unless one believes that these countries have had extraordinarily bad luck in producing bad policy makers and bad policies—and be institutional and structural.¹⁴ Thus, the institutional legacies of colonialism and totalitarian communism on the one hand and the structural disadvantages of peripheral location in the world capitalist and globalized economic system on the other may have created massive obstacles to the successful construction of states, nations, democracies, markets, civil societies, and rule of law in the aftermath of imperial collapse in the 1950s and the 1990s.¹⁵ Failure may not have been preordained, but success could have been possible only in the presence of especially favourable concatenations of initial conditions. South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia appear to have developed and modernized successfully because they privileged economic change over democracy, were spared human rights criticism at the time of their most egregious violations, and enjoyed the status of Western protectorates during the cold war. Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and the Czech and Slovak republics appear to have undergone successful transitions because their institutions had begun to deviate from the Soviet model in the 1950s and 1960s and because geographical proximity and advanced de-communization made them targets for Western investment, tourism, and institutional (NATO and European Union) enlargement. In contrast, the majority of post-Soviet states and a fair number of former East-Central European satellites did not have these institutional and structural advantages and are now paying the price for their inauspicious makeup and neighbourhood.¹⁶

What are the implications of this pessimistic analysis for Ukraine and other post-communist states? First, it is probably safe to say that the “transition” in Ukraine, Russia, and the other post-Soviet states is over. The last decade has witnessed the emergence in most post-communist countries of stable political-economic systems that are neither communist nor capitalist, neither totalitarian nor democratic. Markets are poorly developed, democracy is formal, civil society is weak, national identity is fuzzy, states are fragmented, and rule of law is mostly fictional. Instead, political and economic power is held by “clans,” regional elites, and a parasitic bureaucracy dominated by a semi-authoritarian presidency.¹⁷

The similarity of such systems with those that emerged in many countries of Africa is, as Mark Beissinger and Crawford Young point out, striking.¹⁸ Although such closed systems—which can be termed “parasitic authoritarian”—may be incapable of vigorous economic growth and thus may be inclined to longer-term ineffectiveness, they can be expected to survive, in their present form, for many years to come. The majority of post-colonial states still exist: some have failed, some are barely alive, and most muddle along. That Ukraine is currently on the same level of development as Zimbabwe is both slightly encouraging—after all, Zimbabwe survived for several decades after independence—and profoundly discouraging.¹⁹

Even if Ukraine is not doomed to permanent stagnation, decay, and decline, economic growth can easily have negative side effects.²⁰ Thus, it is unlikely to be even, favouring all sectors of the population in the same way and to the same degree. Quite the contrary, a booming Ukraine is likely to witness even greater long-term income disparities than at present. Indeed, economic growth could even accentuate the already deepening differences between Ukrainians and Russians and between Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, as the competition for scarce but growing resources induces political entrepreneurs to politicize ethnicity, promote competing visions of the “nation,” and make incompatible demands on the state. Economic growth can also produce a variety of social tensions and dislocations, ranging from strikes to land seizures to mass layoffs. And rapid economic growth, in combination with growing social tensions, has, in the past at least, encouraged leaders to abandon democracy and adopt authoritarianism. In sum, an economically booming Ukraine could—like contemporary China—be far less stable and possibly far less peaceful than it currently is.

Second, such parasitic authoritarian systems will not become members of NATO and the European Union anytime soon. With Europe in the process of constructing an interlocking set of highly sophisticated institutions related to democracy, rule of law, civil society, and the market, it will obviously take a long time—probably measured in decades, and not years—for parasitic authoritarian states to become sufficiently law-governed, democratic, prosperous, and stable to qualify for membership. The expansion of both the EU and NATO into East-Central Europe is therefore

nothing less than the extension of already formidable European institutional boundaries eastward.

Third, such closed systems are likely to be less capable of coping with the destabilizing consequences of globalization. As Europe's institutions respond and adapt to globalization more or less successfully, those of the East will either stagnate, relatively, or experience indigenous forms of development different from and possibly even inimical to those in Europe.²¹ As a result, a tendency to seek "third ways" involving greater state intervention may take hold. Authoritarian solutions are especially likely if and when relative economic stagnation continues and "confining conditions" appear to require "revolutionary breakthroughs."²² Finally, both developments are likely to enhance their isolation from more developed countries and their dependence on one another—and especially on Russia, the former core and current military and economic power.

Fourth, most post-Soviet states will recede in importance for the Europeans and Americans in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States. The US-led "war on terrorism" has transformed Russia from a problem state into an ally. That status may be less stable than it seems, but there is no reason to think it will not survive at least as long as Vladimir Putin remains president of the Russian Federation. The implications for Ukraine of Washington's focus on terrorism on the one hand and its embrace of Moscow on the other are not entirely encouraging. Until September 11, Ukraine enjoyed the status of a self-declared "strategic asset" of the United States, which was concerned with balancing Russian power and creating a zone of friendly states in East-Central Europe. Russia's transformation into an ally means that Ukraine's relevance to American strategic concerns has fallen substantially. Indeed, there is even a case to be made that the Russo-American strategic partnership essentially relegates Ukraine to Russia's "sphere of influence." Although such a status need not threaten Ukraine's official independence, it could reduce it to a formality and Ukraine to a vassal state of Russia.

Fifth, although Russian-Ukrainian relations have remained peaceful in Ukraine thus far, the experience of the twentieth

century suggests that if there is one sure bet, it is that potentially powerful ethnic groups will eventually mobilize and make political and economic demands. Experience also suggests that once a group mobilizes, it will not demobilize, at least not in the short to medium term and especially when it enjoys the protection and solicitude of a powerful neighbour just across the border.²³ In sum, Ukraine's Russian population will at some point mobilize, and a mobilized Russian population will become a "problem." A politicized Russian minority will make demands on the economy—by insisting on subsidies for rust-belt industries and thereby undermining liberalizing reform—and it will have the potential to threaten the legitimacy of the state, transform Ukraine's fledgling democracy into a cutthroat competition among ethnic elites, and feed Ukrainians' obsession with Russia. Of course, even if none of these dire eventualities transpires, a politicized and mobilized Russian minority will deflect elite attention from the pressing business of internal reform.

GOOD NEWS FOR UKRAINE?

Optimists will remain unfazed by these arguments. Their counterattack might first focus on the general proposition that institutions and structures account for the emergence of bad leaders and bad policies in so many post-communist states. Thus, they could argue that the diversity of political and economic outcomes in both leading and lagging countries belies the claim that institutions and structures have the same effect across the board. In addition, there are too many anomalies: Kyrgyzstan should be just as backward as its Central Asian neighbours; Russia, as the centre of both the empire and the totalitarian state, should not have been capable of any kind of significant reform; in contrast, Yugoslavia and its successor states should, as the least communist societies, have done extremely well; and both Poland and the Czech Republic should not be doing worse than Hungary, which never really got rid of its communists. Last but not least, optimists can claim that institutional and structural arguments smack of determinism and thereby flirt with denying the importance of human agency and have nothing to offer policy makers, who, for better or for worse, must craft policies.

Optimists might also respond with the following rejoinders

to the individual claims made earlier.

First, history shows that even stagnant Third World countries can grow economically and thus develop and modernize. The Asian “tigers” have exceptional records that may be beyond Ukraine’s reach, but there is no reason that Ukraine should not be able to replicate India’s recent economic experience. After the Indian government adopted a variety of liberalizing economic measures in the mid-1990s—reducing taxation, cutting red tape and bureaucratic regulation, simplifying business procedures, and encouraging trade—India managed to achieve growth rates in gross domestic product in the order of 6–8 per cent annually.²⁴ If quasi-socialist, overly bureaucratic, and profoundly inefficient India can move toward growth, then so, too, can Ukraine—a point emphasized by Anders Aslund.²⁵ And, indeed, it has, as the impressive growth rates since 2000—even if to a certain degree a function of Russia’s growth—suggest.

Second, although the European Community’s enlargement would create the functional equivalent of an iron curtain between itself and the *dyke pole* to its east, there is some reason to expect that Euroland will not be able to integrate the East-Central European states quite as rapidly as they might wish and as Eurocrats publicly proclaim. Most of the East-Central European candidates still have some way to go to making their polities, societies, and economies fully compatible with the increasingly stringent requirements of EU membership. Poland, for instance, has an enormous, as well as an enormously inefficient, agricultural sector; modernizing it is a precondition of membership, but moving over 20 per cent of the population from the countryside to cities is no easy task in the best of circumstances, and it is especially arduous as Poland must also modernize its grossly inefficient heavy industry. The Czech Republic has an equally inefficient industrial sector. By the same token, the European Union—its flowery rhetoric to the contrary—is still unprepared to integrate fully the East-Central Europeans. The EU’s budget would not sustain the kind of agricultural and developmental subsidies that would have to be apportioned to a wave of poor members; no less problematic, the EU’s governance machinery might break down if five to ten bona fide new members were to join its institutions and disrupt currently existing alliances, voting procedures, and the like. All

this suggests that, although Europe will expand to include a substantial number of East-Central European states, it is highly likely that they will have the status of second-tier, if not quite second-class, citizens. As long as that is the case, Ukraine will not be left out completely in the cold.

Third, the prospect of Ukraine's growing isolation from a rapidly integrating world presupposes that globalization will proceed inexorably, but that need not be the case. Even if it is true that people and governments have no choice but to submit to globalization, we know from history that some people and some governments will always refuse to accept the "inevitable"—recall the dissidents in the Soviet Union—and rebel. They may be right to do so, or they may be wrong; all that matters is that they will "inevitably" resist. Even if globalization is an irresistible force, therefore, it will, sooner or later, meet an immovable object that, for better or for worse, will change its trajectory and thus the nature of globalization itself.²⁶ If and when globalization "stalls," countries such as Ukraine may win some time to develop their domestic institutions and put their house in order. Of course, globalization's deceleration will also mean less foreign direct investment, but for Ukraine, which has tiny amounts thereof, such an eventuality will not be an immediate concern.

Fourth, although Ukraine is likely to become even more dependent on Russia in the future than it is now, this need not mean tragedy. If Russian elites remain pro-Western and continue developing their country in a more or less democratic and market-oriented fashion, such a relationship would resemble that between, optimally, the United States and Canada and, less optimally, the United States and Mexico. Pessimists may suggest that Russia faces even greater institutional and structural obstacles to democratization and marketization than Ukraine; optimists could then counter with the argument that, if and when Russia does indeed backtrack once again, Western policy makers are likely to step in and re-establish closer relations with Ukraine—provided, the pessimists could counter, that prolonged association with a parasitic authoritarian Russia has not made Ukraine even more resistant to reform.

Fifth, the claim that the Russians and Russian speakers of Ukraine will at some point mobilize and become a problem is as plausible as the counter-claim that they will either remain docile

or adopt a Ukrainian or, as David Laitin suggests, some other kind of non-Russian identity.²⁷ And even if they do become a problem, there is no reason necessarily to conclude that they will become a fifth column. Quite the contrary, if Ukraine's policy makers are wise and their policies are correct, the Russians and Russian speakers could just as easily become an asset—contributing to Ukraine's diversity and thus enhancing its economic competitiveness, civic dynamism, and democratic vitality.

TWO TESTS FOR UKRAINE'S ELITES

If one believes, as I do, that the two paradigms discussed earlier illustrate how theoretical debates are rarely resolved in the social sciences and that conceptual breakthroughs are therefore as unlikely as theoretical progress, then one will not expect the debate between pessimists and optimists ever to be resolved. Each side will always have a rejoinder to the other side's arguments. Alternatively, if one believes that the theoretical isomorphism is an indication of theoretical progress, then of course the issue will at some point be resolved—presumably in favour of the optimists.²⁸

If optimism is to become the overriding determinant of Ukraine's future, both the quality of its leaders and the quality of its policies will have to improve radically—and fast. If globalization, European enlargement, and Russian-American rapprochement proceed undeterred, Ukraine's "window of opportunity" for setting its institutional house in order will be small indeed. If, as I have suggested, globalization stalls, enlargement falters, and Russian hegemony proves to be benign, that window will be slightly larger. Either way, the perilous and potentially destabilizing business of economic reform and institutional change will be unavoidable.

Since the case for optimism rests on the ability of Ukrainian elites to act as genuine elites—and not as thieves and thugs—and to craft genuine policies, let me suggest two tests of their competence, vision, and ability to make leaps of faith. In a word, let *them* put their money where their mouths are. Neither test is outlandish—indeed, both involve meekly following their enlightened neighbours' footsteps—and neither recommends radical

economic reform, but both are difficult and will, I suspect, unleash howls of protest.

The first test is simple. If President Putin was able to embark on a boldly pro-Western course in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—despite opposition from many elites and ambivalence on the part of the general population—then why should President Kuchma not be able to do the same? The advantages of aligning Ukraine solidly with the West in general and the United States in particular are obvious. Ukraine's integration into the West would be accelerated and the negative consequences of Russia's rapprochement with the United States would be overcome. The advantages of following Russia's lead are equally obvious. Russia could not possibly object and Ukraine's Russians and Russian speakers would be hard pressed to criticize Ukraine's slavish imitation of Moscow's initiative. Are Ukrainian elites capable of such a breakthrough? Kyiv's formal declaration in late May 2002 of its intention to seek membership in NATO was a small step in this direction. Rather more impressive would be Ukraine's formal declaration of a partnership in the US-led war on terrorism.

The second test is, frankly, a provocation. What if Ukraine were to follow the Czech Republic's example and let—perhaps even insist that—Ukraine's Russians separate? Such an exercise in what Ian Lustick calls “rightsizing”²⁹ would make eminent sense. Ukraine's current borders were inherited from the Soviet Union: there is surely nothing holy about them. A smaller Ukraine would be smaller, but it would also be more legitimate and stable, better equipped to pursue modernization and development, and, thus, to become richer and more democratic. Relations with Russia are likely to improve, if only because Russian nationalists would be deprived of a popular issue and would instead have to get down to the difficult task of actually improving their new citizens' lives; relations with the separatist regions are also likely to get better once the thorny issue of language preference is set aside and elites and populations can concentrate on trade. Indeed, there is no reason why Ukraine's new eastern borders should not be as “transparent” as they are now. Last but not least, both Europe and the international community would have to be impressed by Ukraine's willingness to exchange territory for democracy and prosperity. They might even be more willing to hasten such a reasonable Ukraine's

integration into the European Union.

Could such a proposal be seriously entertained in Ukraine today? There are some grounds for optimism. After all, Ukraine's current elites had little regard for the sacredness of national boundaries in their earlier incarnation as communist *apparatchiks*. Ukrainian nationalists have an even equally problematic record. The Galicians turned their back on *Velyka Ukraina* in their flirtations with General Denikin, while Symon Petliura sacrificed Galicia to his alliance with Jozef Pilsudski.³⁰ Even the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists abandoned its hopes of a Ukrainian state encompassing all Ukrainian "ethnographic" territories extending from the San River to the Kuban. Of course, the grounds for pessimism may be even stronger. After all, such a bold move would require vision and courage—qualities in short supply in the corridors of power in Kyiv. Besides, how many political clans would be willing to forsake the wealth they derive from the subsidized, inefficient, and corrupt economy that dominates in Ukraine's eastern oblasts for something as abstract as democracy, the market, and rule of law?

In the final analysis, the question is not whether or not aligning Ukraine with the United States or right-sizing Ukraine is the best possible policy for Kyiv to pursue. The real question is whether Ukrainian elites are capable of considering radical measures such as these with equanimity, intelligence, and purpose and without mudslinging and catcalls. If they can, then they will have exhibited a degree of sophistication that was unimaginable in 1991—and may still be unimaginable in 2002. If they cannot, then we can expect little in the way of visionary policy changes—with regard to the state, the economy, and civil society—from them in the foreseeable future. In that case, the pessimists may still not have been proven right, but the optimists will, alas, have been proven wrong.

NOTES

- 1 See Donald W. Fiske and Richard A. Shweder, *Metatheory in Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
- 2 For excellent discussions, see David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Fred W. Riggs, "Development," in *Social Science Concepts*, edited by Giovanni Sartori (Beverly Hills: Sage,

- 1984), 125–202; Irene L. Gendzier, *Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1985); W.W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
- 3 See Valerie Bunce, “Should Transitologists Be Grounded?” *Slavic Review* 54 (Spring 1995), 111–127.
 - 4 See Ulrich Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997).
 - 5 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in *The New Shape of World Politics*, edited by Fareed Zakaria (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1997), 1–27.
 - 6 On the agent-structure debate, see Arthur C. Danto, *Narration and Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 257–284; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
 - 7 See Ronald H. Chilcote, *Theories of Comparative Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1981); Charles K. Wilber, ed., *The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment*, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1988).
 - 8 See The World Bank, *Entering the 21st Century: World Development Report 1999/2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New York: Norton, 2002).
 - 9 See *Is Global Capitalism Working? A Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
 - 10 Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
 - 11 See Isaiah Berlin, *The Proper Study of Mankind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), 1–16.
 - 12 See Lucian W. Pye, “Modernization,” in *The Encyclopedia of Nationalism*, vol. 1, edited by Alexander J. Motyl (San Diego: Academic Press, 2001), 507–520. For a critical view of “development,” see Metta Spencer and John Bacher, “Development,” in Motyl, *Encyclopaedia*, 121–143.
 - 13 See Paul D’Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, and Taras Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder: Westview, 1999).
 - 14 See Andreas Pickel and Helmut Wiesenthal, *The Grand Experiment* (Boulder: Westview, 1997).
 - 15 See Alexander J. Motyl, “Ten Years after the Soviet Collapse: Persistence of the Past and Prospects for the Future,” in *Nations in Transit*, edited by Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander J. Motyl, and Amanda Schnetzer (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 36–44.
 - 16 See Alexander J. Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 51–66.
 - 17 For a useful comparison of Ukraine’s standing vis-à-vis other countries, see Ihor Burakovs’kyi, ed., *Desiat’ rokiu sotsial’no-ekonomichnykh peretvoren’v*

- Ukraini: sproba neuperedzhenoi otsinky* (Kyiv: KIS, 2002).
- 18 Mark R. Beissinger and Crawford Young, eds., *Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002).
 - 19 See Mykola Riabchuk, "Ukraina bez Mugab(e)," *Krytyka* 6 (March 2002), 2–4.
 - 20 The argument derives from Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).
 - 21 See Alexander J. Motyl, *Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
 - 22 Otto Kirchheimer, "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," *American Political Science Review* 4 (December 1965), 964–974.
 - 23 See John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder: Westview, 1994).
 - 24 See Clive Crook, "A Survey of India: Time to Let Go," *Economist* (February 22, 1997).
 - 25 Anders Aslund, "Soviet Transformation," *Financial Times* (September 11, 2001); *Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
 - 26 See Clive Crook, "A Survey of Globalisation: Globalisation and Its critics," *Economist* (September 29, 2001).
 - 27 See David D. Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
 - 28 Motyl, *Revolutions, Nations, Empires*, 15–18.
 - 29 See Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). See also Brendan O'Leary, Ian Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, eds., *Right-sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
 - 30 See Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Developments of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1979).

2

Ukraine's Post-Soviet Transition: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective

TARAS KUZIO

“Transitology” within the former communist world has traditionally focused only upon democratization and marketization, although more recently scholars have attempted to add stateness. This is a welcome development, but this chapter argues that the study of post-communist transition in general, as well as stateness as a separate factor, cannot be divorced from considerations of nationality.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the discipline of “transitology” with reference to stateness and nationality. The second surveys the link between nationalism and modernization. The final section outlines the link between national identity and civil society.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR “TRANSITOLOGY”

When the communist bloc disintegrated between 1989 and 1991, Western experience with transition had been largely influenced by authoritarian transition in Latin America and Southern Europe since the 1960s. The four-volume classic survey of transitions from authoritarian rule does not mention stateness or the national question.¹ However, the question of stateness within the post-Soviet transition cannot be ignored when studying Ukraine. President Kuchma reminded a meeting of European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) directors in Kyiv that

“just several years ago we did not have anything required for a full-fledged state ...”²

When discussing the incompatibility of “simultaneous transition,” scholars often address only the problem of creating a market economy at a time of democratization.³ Rarely do scholars discuss the incompatibility of state-institution and civic nation building with democratization and marketization. One reason is that, as Claus Offe points out, “This upheaval is a revolution without a historical model and a revolution without a revolutionary theory.” The different aspects of the transition process “occasions not only gigantic decision-making burdens, but also mutual effects of obstruction.”⁴

The unwillingness of transitology to discuss stateness and nationality was—and remains a fundamental error because of two factors:

1. *Post-authoritarian transition* in Latin America and Southern Europe largely focused only upon democratization and, to a lesser extent, marketization. State-institution and civic nation building played no role in these transitions. In the former outer Soviet empire of Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, transition is post-authoritarian democratization, as it was in Latin America and Southern Europe. Unlike these regions, though, only some elements of a market economy existed in a few of these states (e.g., the service sector and private agriculture in Poland). Some of the states in the former outer Soviet empire that had been part of federations (e.g., Slovakia, Macedonia) also face quadruple transitions because state-institution and civic nation building also feature in their transformations. Nevertheless, they have a head start over the former Soviet states as they were part of confederations (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia), not a totalitarian empire that had attempted to erase their national identities.
2. *Post-colonial transition* best fits the quadruple nature of transition in the former USSR and, to a lesser extent, in some Central-Eastern European countries. This quadruple transition includes democratization, marketization, state-institution, and civic nation building.⁵ Although

many of the components of this transition took place elsewhere, one Ukrainian author pointed out that they “did not have to resolve these problems at the same time.”⁶

Leslie Holmes believes that the “comprehensiveness and pace of change” distinguishes post-communist transition from others. This “means that caution must be exercised in relation to much of the 1980s comparative literature on transitions ... to post communism.”⁷ Holmes describes thirteen factors that make post-communist transition more all-embracing than that attempted earlier in other regions of the world⁸:

- growth of sovereignty and nationalism;
- poor development of democratic political culture and immature societies;
- high expectations and excessive faith in leaders, yet their ability to introduce rapid change is limited;
- disrespect for institutions: there is a need to nurture communal faith in the notion of the state, the rule of law, and the constitution;
- skepticism of “grand theories”;
- ideological vacuum with no underlying, widely accepted ideology and ground rules;
- moral confusion and vacuum;
- a comprehensive, all-embracing revolution;
- lack of dynamism in the transition process;
- instability: there is no broad consensus of the pace and sequencing of change and there are frequent government changes;
- a widespread sense of insecurity;
- less international assistance is available than during earlier transitions; and
- legitimization problems: the elites of the *ancien regime* remain in place and are distrusted.

When comparing Latin America and Southern Europe with post-communist Europe, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan see additional obstacles to the transition process in the latter that did not exist in the former:

- limited sovereignty: an external hegemon prevented democratic transition;
- the simultaneity of, and contradiction between, democratization and marketization;
- the impact of totalitarianism (Linz and Stepan believe that only Poland escaped totalitarianism);
- civil society was flattened and/or penetrated and tied to the state (e.g., the Writer's Union);
- orthodoxy did not become a vehicle for opposition activity because it historically depended upon the state (unlike Catholicism and Protestantism);
- political parties are viewed negatively and find it difficult therefore to forge alternative visions;
- lack of a tradition of the rule of law and constitutional culture⁹;
- lack of a usable state;
- serviceability of the old bureaucracy to the new state and the lack of elite turnover¹⁰;
- lack of a clear distinction between the state and the Communist Party;
- informer legacy that has created social disunity and mistrust; and
- lack of a regulatory framework.¹¹

Western scholars of transition in the former communist bloc have largely ignored state-institution and civic nation building, assuming—wrongly—that these should not be factored into studies of the transition process. When scholars such as Claus Offe,¹² Linz, and Stepan have discussed the “triple transition,” they invariably included under their heading of “state building” both stateness and national factors. John Hall talks of a “double transition” by focusing upon democratization/marketization, on the one hand, and nation building, on the other.¹³

Nevertheless, Linz and Stepan admit that even stateness is undertheorized in transitology and believe that henceforth it should become central to all discussions of post-communist transformation.¹⁴ Although it is welcome that scholars are now “bringing the state” into transitology, this cannot be undertaken without also bringing in the “nation.” Such a fourfold transition

is therefore best described as a “quadruple transition” (as opposed to a “double” or “triple” transition).

Adam Przeworski believes that the role of the state has been undertheorized in transitology because Western assistance has been provided with advice from experts, consultants, and governments who subscribe to the neo-liberal prescription dominant in the 1980s and 1990s, yet an “effective” and “viable” state are essential to the proper functioning of a democracy and market economy.¹⁵ Neo-liberal views:

underestimate the role of state institutions in organising both the public and the private life of groups and individuals. If democracy is to be sustained, the state must guarantee territorial integrity and physical security, it must maintain the conditions necessary for an effective exercise of citizenship, it must mobilise public savings, co-ordinate resource allocation, and correct income distribution. And if state institutions are to be capable of performing these tasks, they must be reorganised, rather than simply reduced.¹⁶

The triadic relationship between the modern state, nation, and democracy remains undertheorized for long-established Western states, so there has been a gap in the theoretical literature when scholars have investigated post-communist states.¹⁷ The introduction of a market economy at the same time as democratization is difficult enough; the historical record in Latin America and Southern Europe suggests that the creation of a market economy should precede democratization (as in Poland and Hungary under communism). In these post-authoritarian transitions, a market economy of sorts was already in place and the democratization of public space could build on the legacies of a middle class, a robust civil society, private business sectors, independent trade unions, and student groups. Many of these elements provided by an emerging market economy had been introduced in the outer Soviet empire from the 1960s (e.g., “goulash communism” in Hungary), but not in the former USSR.

Few scholars have grappled with the added complication of a newly independent state, such as Ukraine, not only introducing political and economic reform simultaneously, but also building

institutions and a state while forging a unified nation-state.¹⁸ Can a market economy and a democracy be established in the absence of a state or, if it exists, as in Ukraine, when it is weak?¹⁹ Robert Dahl has pointed out that “the democratic process presupposes a unit.”²⁰ Such a unit encapsulates both a bounded state *and* a civic nation because all states are composed of both civic and ethnocultural factors.

Dankwart Rustow suggested three decades ago that agreed boundaries and national unity are a “background condition” that must precede political and economic reform.²¹ Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl also point out the need for “prior consensus on overarching national identity and boundaries” before transition can be consolidated.²² If we were to follow Rustow’s, Schmitter’s, and Karl’s advice, then the proper sequencing for post-communist transition should be, firstly, state and nation building; secondly, establishing a market economy; and, finally, a democracy. Instead, we have all four processes occurring simultaneously.²³

Gertrude Schroeder believes that, “a populace strongly supportive of independence and willing to tolerate the initial hardships of adjusting to the state’s new status is vital to sustaining the process of achieving economic progress.”²⁴ This is particularly relevant to states that have regions with low levels of national identity. In these regions, such as eastern Ukraine, the tolerance threshold is low, which leads to blaming the independent state for having destroyed the USSR. This translates into support for the Communist Party and overall opposition to the quadruple transition.

The absence of an overarching national identity and uncontested boundaries make post-Soviet transition very different to that undertaken earlier in Latin America. Ukraine’s borders were not finally recognized until as late as February 1999, seven years after the USSR disintegrated, when the upper house of the Russian Parliament followed the lower house’s example two months earlier in ratifying the Russian-Ukrainian treaty²⁵:

Many postcommunist states suffer the additional, and enormous, problem that not even their geographic boundaries are beyond dispute and that various ethnic and religious cleavages prevent

minimal degrees of allegiance to the respective states. In this sense, while several Latin American countries are undergoing processes of acute erosion of an already existing nation-state, several post-communist ones are facing the even more vexing problem of beginning to build, under very uncongenial economic and social circumstances, a nation-state.²⁶

In Ukraine, in contrast to Latin America and Southern Europe, a socio-cultural pluralistic civil society and independent economic actors were largely destroyed. Civil society therefore must be “reinvented,” not simply resurrected.²⁷ Valerie Bunce’s call to her fellow scholars to make state, nation, and identity central to the process of democratic change in post-communist Europe has largely fallen on deaf ears.²⁸ Few scholars of post-communist transition have sought to develop a theoretical framework that encapsulates all four aspects of the quadruple transition referred to earlier.

National unity and consolidation were proclaimed as state goals by both Leonid Kravchuk, president from December 1991 to July 1994, and by President Leonid Kuchma (July 1994–October 2004). Ukraine inherited a disunited polity that had acted only as a single territorial unit within the USSR. Regional and linguistic divisions remain pronounced. Attitudes toward the past, which play a decisive role in formulating one’s attitude to the future, are regionally divided. On coming to power, Kuchma devolved greater power to the regions to decide linguistic, national, and historiographical questions.²⁹ However, this seemingly more liberal policy has squarely contradicted his desire for national consolidation and thwarted attempts to make policy implementation by the centre in the periphery more efficient and effective.

NATIONALISM AND MODERNIZATION

Having brought the state and nation back into our discussion of post-Soviet transition, our next step is to establish if there is a link between modernization and nationalism. If we find evidence that there has been a link historically, how is this relationship affected if both nationalism *and* civil society are weak?

This is the conundrum facing post-Soviet states such as Ukraine where the three factors that could mobilize the population for modernization—the state, society, and national identity—are *all* weak. Inevitably, this negatively influences the speed and success of democratization and marketization. Popular mobilization proved crucial in forcing through political-economic transformation in Latin America and Southern Europe.³⁰ Such mobilization in post-communist countries occurred only where national identity was strong (e.g., Poland, the Czech Republic, the three Baltic states, and western Ukraine). Where territorial identities were stronger than ethnic ones (e.g., eastern-southern Ukraine and the Russian SFSR), mobilization was weaker because such identities “are not expected to form nearly as potent a base for the social movement emerging in the late Soviet period as national and ethnic identity.”³¹

Until the advent of Nazism and fascism in the 1930s, nationalism was linked to democracy and the two were not seen as contradictory. This liberation-seeking nationalism set in motion by such nineteenth-century nationalists as Italy's G. Mazzini was regarded as progressive and a positive influence upon modernization. Similarly, nationalism in post-colonial Africa and Asia has “characteristically represented a drive towards modernization, constituting a breach with the past than its preservation or restoration.” Nationalism in such settings was “forward-looking and not a reactionary force, a spur to revolution and not a bulwark of the status quo.”³² Nationalism was equated with the transition to the modern world. Similarly, nationalism in Ukraine “is an instrumental force pushing for change and reform rather than for maintaining a traditional orientation.”³³

The close link between nationalism and democracy has existed for over four centuries. Ever since the Thirty Years War, the American War of Independence, through Third World revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the overthrow of the Soviet empire, “Constitution, nation building and modernisation have been spread by, and are the leading processes of, the historical movement of liberation from imperial rule and the building of states. ...”³⁴ In Malaysia, for example: “The economic transformation has accompanied, and probably encouraged, a strong sense of community that has greatly

reduced the ethnic animosities that once made Malaysia a tense battle zone of competing racial groups."³⁶ Nationalism, Ernest Gellner argued, is an unavoidable consequence of the drive to modernity.³⁶ Leonard Binder argued that because nationalism had become the "rationale of the modern developed state," the central "issue to be resolved is one of identity."³⁷ Modernity is therefore defined by nationalism, Liah Greenfeld believes.³⁸ Modernization and nation building through the consolidation of a political community within a bounded territory inevitably went hand in hand.³⁹ Nation building will therefore increase the potential for societal mobilization because of the link discussed later between nationality and civil society.⁴⁰ Any discussion of democratization in post-Soviet countries cannot divorce itself from questions of nationality, which defines the size, strength, activism, and mobilization potential of civil society.

Why has Viktor Yushchenko's popularity not been transformed into a nationwide mass movement? In other words, why did Yushchenko's bloc not become a Ukrainian equivalent of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) headed by Vojislav Kostunica, who was able to mobilize both democratic and nationalist anti-communist mass opposition to former President Slobodan Milosovic in October 2000?

In Ukraine, the creation of a similar mass movement is made more difficult because of the national question that prevents Yushchenko and his Our Ukraine bloc from capturing the same levels of high support elsewhere in the country that it already enjoys in western and central Ukraine. A November–December 2000 International Foundation for Electoral Systems poll found that approximately the same number of ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians suffered as a result of a decade of social change. Nevertheless, only 26 per cent of Russian respondents, compared with 45 per cent of Ukrainians, in the poll said they trusted Yushchenko.

In the late Soviet era, the national democrats in Ukraine were strong enough to propel the country to independence, but not to take power. In the 1990s they were nonetheless able to prevent Ukraine from fully sliding into authoritarianism, a regression that has been the norm in the remainder of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The opposition

movement that developed during the Kuchmagate scandal in winter 2000–spring 2001 was based in the same regions as the anti-Soviet, nationalist movement of the late Soviet era, namely western and central Ukraine.

If the Ukraine without Kuchma movement had been able to mobilize countrywide support, as Kostunica did in Serbia, it is doubtful that Kuchma would still be in power today, but, as in the late Soviet era, eastern and southern Ukraine remained passive. As Russophile activists Mykhailo Pogrebynsky and Vladimir Malynkowitch bemoaned in a roundtable convened at the Russian newspaper *Nezavisimaya gazeta* in April 2001, civil society is closely linked to national identity in Ukraine. Consequently, an active civil society exists only in western and central Ukraine, while the east is passive. Eastern and southern Ukrainians become involved in politics only in the run-up to national elections when their more numerous votes in regions such as the Donbas (with its 10 million population) are sought after by election blocs.

Because the national democrats were not able to take power in Ukraine, they were therefore unable to ensure that Ukraine undertook the radical reform and the “return to Europe” strategy adopted by the three Baltic states and post-Milosovic Serbia. Instead, Ukraine has muddled along with “third way” and “multivector” policies favoured by the former Soviet Ukrainian elite-turned-oligarchs.

The link between national identity and civil society that makes Ukraine so different from Yugoslavia is reflected in a January poll by the Ukrainian Center for Economic and Political Research (UCEPS). Not surprisingly, Our Ukraine is strongest in western and central Ukraine, where it commanded 51.9 and 20 per cent support. These were the only two regions where Our Ukraine had pushed the Communist Party into second place. In the north, east, and south Our Ukraine’s popularity dropped to second place after the Communist Party with 9.5 per cent, 7.9 per cent, and 11.6 per cent respectively.

The two radical anti-presidential Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party election blocs were more geographically restricted to western and central Ukraine. The Tymoshenko bloc, although led by a party with its origins in the eastern Ukrainian city of Dnipropetrovsk, is popular only in western and central Ukraine, while the Socialists are confined to

Ukrainophone central Ukraine. Opposition newspapers, such as Tymoshenko's *Veчерne Vesti*, are able to obtain printing facilities only in western Ukraine.

Western and central Ukraine are the strongholds of the opposition movement against Kuchma and the oligarchs. According to the UCEPS poll, seven blocs would pass the 4 per cent threshold for the 225 seats elected by proportional voting. In western Ukraine only four of these seven would pass the threshold, and of these Our Ukraine and the Tymoshenko bloc top the list. In central Ukraine, seven blocs would pass the threshold, of which the top four are national democratic or in the opposition camp (Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko bloc, Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko's Unity, and the Socialists).

For a United Ukraine, the bloc favoured by President Leonid Kuchma that includes five "parties of power," would not pass the threshold in either western or central Ukraine. In Kyiv, a city with a large number of state officials, For a United Ukraine would manage to scrape through with only 4.3 per cent.

National identity, reform, and civil society are therefore closely linked in Ukraine, as they are in other post-communist states. Ukraine's regional and linguistic divisions inhibit national integration and a civil society encompassing the entire country. Meanwhile, the more pervasive Soviet legacy in eastern and southern Ukraine has led to a passive population and a weak civil society. This, in turn, prevented Yushchenko's Our Ukraine from becoming a mass movement throughout Ukraine in the same manner as Kostunica's DOS did in Serbia. The popularity of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine in Western and central Ukraine reflects the region's role as Ukraine's main engine for reform, a bastion of opposition to the Communist Party and oligarchs.

Is there a conflict between nationalism and democracy? If political and economic transition are being successfully introduced simultaneously in the drive to modernity, the resultant nationalism should become civic. This is not always the case—as it was not in the West—when during the drive to modernity ethnic nationalism was often more predominant.⁴¹ Where civic and democratic traditions are weak, nationalism is unlikely to be civic.⁴²

Regional identities were regarded by many Western states as "backward" and therefore often brutally suppressed in the

drive to create a homogenous nation-state (e.g., in Italy, Spain, Greece, and France). In post-communist states, if a civil society is absent, mobilization is also more likely to be along ethnic than civic lines.⁴³ The unleashing of nationalism in the drive to modernization therefore must be undertaken within a civic framework.

Mobilization by civil society in multiethnic societies, or those where the titular nation is divided, as in Ukraine, is made more difficult. Democracies can be created in multiethnic societies, but these may require the construction of consociational arrangements that stifle radical reform in favour of "centrist" consensus (i.e., Ukraine). This negatively affects the political-economic transition by reducing the possibility for societal mobilization in support of post-Soviet change.⁴⁴

Popular opposition in the late Soviet era was "national-liberationary" in that it combined elements of nationalism and democracy. In Ukraine the "spirit of 1991" was "national romanticism," in contrast to the cosmopolitan and market romanticism of Russia.⁴⁵ Nationalist mobilization was greatest in the non-Russian republics, not the Russian SFSR, where ethnic identity is weak (no popular front emerged throughout its territory).⁴⁶ As Bohdan Krawchenko has pointed out, "In the Baltics, in Byelorussia, and in Ukraine, there is no reform current outside the national movement." The nationalist movement in the Baltics and Ukraine "incorporated and hegemonised the democratic discourse in the widest sense of the word."⁴⁷

Nevertheless, nationalism in post-communist Europe is perceived as "negative." This perception fails to take into account the close interrelationship between nationalism and modernization in the West and the centrality of ethnicity to ostensibly civic states. Negativity toward "eastern" nationalism also displays a willingness to accept nationalism and has played a positive role in the drive to modernity for post-colonial countries. These may be additional factors explaining why nationality has been ignored by transitologists. Nationality cannot be ignored by post-communist states that have privileged independence over democracy, thereby fashioning transition as "national liberation." This, Linz and Stepan believe, "almost pushed matters of democratic crafting off the normative and institutional agenda of politics."⁴⁸

The link between reform and national identity makes it imperative to compare post-communist countries not with Latin America and Southern Europe but with the post-colonial world. The drive to modernity through creating a democracy, market economy, state, institutions, and united civic nation is forward looking, and seeks to emulate Western liberal democracies (e.g., Ukraine's desire to "return to Europe") as post-colonial countries did after achieving independence. The alternative to this quadruple transition seeks to block the transition and return to the past (e.g., Belarus). All four aspects of the quadruple transition are therefore closely bound together.⁴⁹ The Russian scholar Aleksei Arbatov is consequently critical of his colleagues to restore the Soviet Union or the Tsarist empire because in either case this presupposes a return to totalitarianism or authoritarianism, something incompatible with a democracy and a market economy.⁵⁰

This close correlation between all four aspects of the quadruple transition has also remained consistent in the Ukrainian case. Of those who hold "liberal" views in Kyiv, 90 per cent backed Ukraine's state independence; 100 per cent, 91 per cent, and 43 per cent respectively of the extreme right, centre right, and socialists/communists backed independence.⁵¹ President Kuchma therefore believes that: "At issue is the assertion of the main principle of nation-building, which states that our sovereignty can only exist on the basis of the transition to a market economy."⁵²

On a different occasion Kuchma argued that on no account will Ukraine "leave the road of democratisation in public life, deep economic transformation, and give up the aims declared with the proclamation of independence."⁵³

Of course, in the Ukrainian case, democratization has regressed since the late 1990s and Kuchma has deviated from his declared objective above.

Ukraine's elites have long recognized the link between civic nationalism and modernization, recognizing that reform will be faster and easier in countries with stronger national identities. The "scale of the problems" facing Ukraine and Poland "are fundamentally different" and elites in both countries find it difficult to understand each other.⁵⁴ Volodymyr Polokhalo, editor of the journal *Politychna Dumka*, is therefore critically disposed toward

those commentators who feel that Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary undertook their transitions “with greater skills.” The reason, he believes, is simpler—after the disintegration of the Soviet bloc, they possessed “better starting conditions than Ukraine.”⁵⁵ These three central European countries preserved their “national, cultural, and spiritual elites” who “were always oriented towards the development of national culture” while the “class of small producers” was not destroyed in these countries. Ukraine, meanwhile, endured two famines and political purges “that led to the physical elimination of the nation.”⁵⁶

Looking to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states, President Kuchma also recognized the link between national unity and modernization:

The states where society consolidated and accepted a common viewpoint on where their prospects were able to launch reforms earlier and to conduct them actively and dynamically. As a result, they made a powerful spurt, went through the phase of inevitable problems sooner and now have tangible vivid results.⁵⁷

On a different occasion Kuchma added “We have not achieved success because of an absence of understanding between the branches of power. For economic growth we need political consolidation and political stability.”⁵⁸ Again, it is a moot point whether Kuchma’s policies have increased Ukraine’s national consolidation.

Many scholars are now arriving at the conclusion that it is precisely the weakness of civic nationalism that is providing a negative influence on the post-Soviet transition process. In the absence of a legitimizing ideology for political-economic reform, the transition process lacks mobilizational potential and can be attacked and derailed by ethnic nationalists and communists on both extremes of the political spectrum.⁵⁹ Civic nation building is therefore central to the political-economic transition process. A territorial loyalty to only the state per se, similar to Jürgen Habermas’s Constitutional Patriotism,⁶⁰ will be less successful in uniting and winning the allegiance of a population than an ideology that combines both territorial-civic *and* ethnic-cultural factors.⁶¹ This is clearly seen in the close correlation between high

national consciousness and support for the Yushchenko Our Ukraine reformist, patriotic bloc in the March 2002 elections.

The creation of a polity based solely on “participation politics” and territoriality, without common moral and primordial uniting actors, “has proved to be untenable.”⁶² When discussing transition in post-communist countries, we therefore need to look not only at questions of stateness but also those within the national domain, such as identity, internal consolidation, regionalism, and minorities.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY⁶³

Is there a link between national identity and civil society? If such a relationship does indeed exist, we can examine how the drive to modernity is affected when we have a weak state, civil society, and national identity.

Robert Putnam’s well-known work on Italy concluded that civicness in the north of the country since the eleventh century was the main factor that allowed the region to pull ahead socio-economically from the south in the twentieth century.⁶⁴ Looking toward the former communist states, he finds they resemble southern Italy more closely than the north because they also lack social capital, have strong elements of clientalism, and have a lack of respect for the rule of law, inefficient government, economic stagnation, and amoral familism. “Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the key to making democracy work,” Putnam argues.⁶⁵

It is the contention of this chapter that civicness, the strength of civil society, and national identity are closely interlinked. Nationalist mobilization against communism was greater in those regions where national identity was higher. The highly urbanized and industrialized eastern and southern Ukraine, where identity is weak, played *no* role (except for sporadic strikes by coal miners) in the drive to Ukrainian independence in the late Soviet era. In the upheaval caused by the “Kuchmagate” scandal in winter 2000–spring 2001, eastern Ukraine was again passive. During the March 2002 elections, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine obtained its least support in eastern-southern Ukraine.

Edward Shils believes that it is precisely the nation or nationality that “provides the cohesion which would otherwise have been lacking in those civil societies” in the nineteenth century.⁶⁶ In inclusive political communities, such as most Western liberal democracies, all of its inhabitants are citizens and therefore members of the civic nation. In such inclusive states, where civic nationalism predominates, the nation and civil society are “coterminous.” The granting of citizenship assumes that the citizen will become a member of the civic nation (political community) and that a “particular nationality” (usually defined as the titular or core) will have “precedence” over all others within the bounded territory of the community. In the Ukrainian case, this was not decided until June 1996 when the constitution was adopted and declared that Ukrainians were the sole titular nation and Russians one of many national minorities. Nevertheless, this normal process of defining the symbols, language, historiography, and culture in the core of Ukraine’s identity and civil society has been criticized as tantamount to a “nationalizing state” and therefore by implication “ethnic” and “illiberal.”⁶⁷

How does the absence of a nation affect civil society? Shils believes that “without a nation there can be no civil society.”⁶⁸ If a country, such as Ukraine, is in the throes of nation building, a civic nation does not therefore exist. The absence of national unity generated by the existence of such a nation will therefore directly affect civil society because it is “oriented by nationhood. Civil society is one of the institutional manifestations of the nation.”⁶⁹ Without nationality, Shils believes that the state does not possess the necessary preconditions to create a civil society, an effective constitution, laws, or citizenship.⁷⁰ The core of civil society is the “dominant nation.”

But how will civil society be affected if this “dominant nation” is itself divided, as in Ukraine? Ukraine’s regional and linguistic and political divisions create obstacles to national integration and therefore the creation of a unified civil society and national will. A divided titular nation impedes the formation of national integration and therefore by default the rise of civil society.

The link between civil society and national identity as a force promoting positive change against foreign and domestic despotic

rule is a modern phenomenon. Modernity unleashes the logic of identity.⁷¹ Questions of nationalism, national identity, and civil society are therefore central to the drive by Ukraine and other states for post-Soviet modernization and their “return to Europe.”

The disintegration of empires leads many sectors of society to fall back on local identities in the absence of an all-embracing national one.⁷² Such an outcome, as seen in eastern and southern Ukraine, has left a legacy of territorial attachment to Ukraine (based on the Ukrainian SSR) with an unclear cultural-ethnic identity. Such a confused post-Soviet environment is not conducive to promoting civil society and national integration as trust across regions is lacking and eastern Ukrainians are passive. Russophone Ukrainians and Russians may encompass a large segment of the Ukrainian population, but their ability to organize collective action is weak. Andrew Wilson admits that this is likely to persist because of a lack of “a clear-cut sense of identity.”⁷³ Ukrainophones, he believes, have therefore a clear advantage over Russophones in organizing civil society, thereby attesting to a close correlation between national identity, civil society, and mobilization. Civil society is consequently more active in western-central Ukraine.⁷⁴ Even in the most ethnic Russian region of Ukraine, the Crimea, ethnic mobilization proved short-lived and weak.⁷⁵

In the mid-1990s it was popular among Western scholars, journalists, and intelligence agencies to divide Ukraine into two roughly equal linguistic groups based on daily language use and not “native language” as in the Soviet census. This perception of a country divided along linguistic lines was seemingly made plausible by the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections in July 1994 when western-central Ukraine voted for the incumbent, Leonid Kravchuk, and eastern-southern Ukraine for Kuchma.

Upon being elected in 1994, Kuchma promised to make Russian into an official language while keeping Ukrainian as the state language. The distinction between state and official is meaningless, even though Russian has been made an official language in Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova. Kuchma never went on to fulfill his election pledge, but in a December 2001 interview in *Trud*, he reiterated his belief that Russian should not be defined

as a foreign language in Ukraine and should therefore have an official status. Such an act would institutionalize a situation that already exists.

In November 2001 the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (SDPUo) introduced a new draft law "On Languages" to replace the 1989 law, which included a provision making Russian an "official language." But the issue died away when a vote of no confidence in Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the SDPUo, lost him the position of first deputy speaker. Support for Russian as an official language also comes from the Greens, the Socialists, Yabluko, and Women for the Future. The Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU) calls for Russian to be made a second state language. Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko bloc, and the pro-Kuchma For a United Kuchma oppose Russian as an official or state language.

Recent studies have shown that dividing Ukraine into two linguistic groups is convenient for Western political scientists, but does not reflect the complexity and fluidity in reality. Many people use Ukrainian and Russian interchangeably, as seen in Kyiv, where one-third use Ukrainian, another third Russian, and the remainder use both languages. A recent study by Lowell Barrington found that 57 per cent of Ukrainians based their identity upon citizenship, followed by ethnicity (34 per cent), and only finally on language (13 per cent).⁷⁶ Unluckily for the Russian bloc, the latter group are more likely to vote for the KPU.

Another difficulty lies in overessentializing ethnicity in the former USSR, a region where nineteenth-century-style nation building is in process. A 1997 US Bureau of the Census study predicted that the figure of 22 per cent of Russians recorded in the 1989 census as living in Ukraine would decline to 10.89 (and not rise to 50 per cent as the Russian bloc believe).

Russian nationalist parties using language as an election issue, such as the Russian bloc in the March 2002 elections, cannot mobilize Russians in Ukraine or initiate a mass Russian ethnic movement. Throughout the former USSR, ethnic Russian nationalism has been unable to mobilize the 25 million Russians living outside Russia in the manner of Serbian nationalism in the former Yugoslavia. In the March 1998 elections, the Social-Liberal (SLON) Russophile bloc, which also campaigned in

defence of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, failed miserably and obtained only 0.9 per cent of the vote. The Soiuz Party obtained even less at 0.7 per cent.

Language is not an issue for Ukrainian voters. The main political force that successfully unites Soviet internationalism with Russian nationalism is the KPU, not pure Russian nationalist movements such as the Russian bloc.

The socio-economic crisis has additionally contributed to this outlook because citizens' contractual obligations to the state (and vice versa) is absent. Socio-economic and, to some degree, political, rights outlined in the June 1996 constitution are therefore not honoured by the state to which citizens consequently feel little sense of respect and duty.⁷⁷ Trust in state institutions is low. This hampers state and nation building, which further impedes the overall transition process.

All civic states are composed of *both* civic and ethnic-cultural factors.⁷⁸ Civic states are most commonly defined as nation-states (although some authors prefer "state nations" or "national states") because nationness is inseparable from political consciousness.⁷⁹ The terms "nation" and "people" (in the Ukrainian language *narod* can be translated as either) are used interchangeably in legal and political terms.⁸⁰ Political identity in the modern era is linked to national identity because political awareness implies a conscious national loyalty.⁸¹

Gellner, echoing John Stuart Mill, believed that civil society was therefore easier to establish in culturally homogenous societies and where the "modular man" exists who "is no longer tied to a social niche, but to a culturally defined pool."⁸² Civil society and nationalism came from the same source and were allies during opposition to despotic foreign or domestic rule. Democracy is government by the people and self-rule is possible only if the people are also a nation. Members should therefore share not only a sense of political allegiance to the territory (i.e., Habermas's "constitutional patriotism" and Kuchma's "ideology of state building") but also loyalty to common national-cultural factors.⁸³

The relationship between civil society and national identity lies at the heart of the transition process in former communist states. Nationalism is an "occasional friend" and not an "eternal foe" of civil society. When both are opposed to a despotic regime

and/or colonial rule, they are natural allies, referring to the inclusive civic nationalism commonly found in liberal democracies. If nationalism is ethnic, exclusive, and integral, it is more than likely to oppose civil society.⁸⁴

Studies of transition in post-communist countries should therefore not ignore or condemn nationalism *per se* but see how nationalism and identity can be mobilized along civic (not ethnic) lines in order for it to reinforce (not suppress) civil society. As I have argued elsewhere, the Ukrainian and Belarusian cases are examples of post-communist states where the problem was too little—not too much—civic nationalism.⁸⁵

Transitologists have perhaps been unwilling to bring the “nation” back in along the lines of stateness because nationalism is often defined as an ally of ethnic exclusivity and xenophobia, but to deny the centrality of national questions to post-communist transitions is to negate the close interrelationship between civil society and identity.⁸⁶ Without a common identity and group solidarity that presupposes trust, societal mobilization for the goals of political-economic modernization are not possible. An atomized population, regionally divided, cynically disposed in their ability to affect change, and lacking trust in other citizens in the same country are unlikely to generate either a vibrant civil society or societal mobilization toward stated goals. The collective self-consciousness sustains civil society because “Concern for one’s nation reinforces the concern for the common good.”⁸⁷ National unity and integration therefore play a central role in sustaining civil society⁸⁸ and generating mobilization:

Moreover, for the collective actor to be able to calculate the costs and benefits of collective action and act strategically, his identity has to be established. The process of the creation of identity occurs through collective interaction itself, within and between groups.⁸⁹

Cultural identity is the anchor for self-identity. A people’s self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which the group is held: “If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened.”⁹⁰ In the Ukrainian case, this has direct relevance because of the manner in which its culture, language, and history were perverted and

defined as “backward” with no future prospects in the Soviet era. Cultural nationalism is not necessarily “illiberal,” John Plamentaz reminds us, because “A human being becomes an individual, a rational and a moral person capable of thinking and acting for himself, in the process of acquiring the language and the culture of his people.”⁹¹

Although communist regimes undertook large-scale modernization drives, these, as Ghia Nodia rightly points out, killed “its soul” because they destroyed “the human capacity for autonomous action.” This “perversion” of modernization deformed national culture, divided titular nations, and inculcated moral degradation and cynicism. Altering the psyche of *homo sovieticus* and creating a new political culture that would be useful for an independent, democratic state is traditionally ignored by transitologists who do not discuss human capital.⁹²

Transition in post-communist countries such as Ukraine is therefore all embracing as it requires a far greater degree of changes in attitude than that which occurred earlier in Latin America or Southern or Central-Eastern Europe. Such a change in attitude is a medium-, not a short-term, problem. In a speech to the Scientific and Economic conference on the presidential 2010 program, President Kuchma said that, “The changes that we are to implement, including in people’s mentality and the moral-psychological atmosphere of our society, are much more difficult.”⁹³ The state and its institutions play a central role in this process of attitude change. Kuchma warned the Ukrainian Parliament that Ukraine could not have it both ways—trying to overcome “backwardness” in the drive to reach “civilized development” without, at the same time, “changing radically our approaches to this issue.”⁹⁴ Ukraine not only had to transform its command administrative system into a social-market economy, the state had to promote change “in the mentality of the Ukrainian people.”⁹⁵

CONCLUSION

Although bringing the state back into “transitology” is welcome, this chapter has argued that studies of post-communist—and particularly post-Soviet—transition cannot ignore the centrality

of nationality as well. In contrast to a “triple transition,” we should therefore discuss transition in the former USSR and some countries in Central-Eastern Europe as “quadruple” in nature. The link between national identity, support for reform, and civil society especially applies to Ukraine where a weak identity has negatively affected the transition process. This makes post-Soviet transition more akin to that undertaken in the post-colonial world and not the post-authoritarian transition in Latin America and Southern Europe.

Within the context of this fourfold transition, this chapter has pointed to seven key factors that are negatively influencing post-Soviet transition in Ukraine. The Soviet legacy of totalitarianism gave Ukraine a different starting point for transition that is different from that in Eastern and Southern Europe or Latin America.⁹⁶ A multiethnic society means that democratic consolidation is also more difficult to achieve. Ukraine has not only a weak state, still in the throes of being constructed, but also poorly functioning institutions.⁹⁷ Ukraine also has a weak civil society that could only be strengthened by national unity and more efficient institutions, yet national integration and civil society will remain difficult to achieve as long as Ukraine possesses a divided titular nation by region and language. Finally, Ukraine has contested political and cultural boundaries with Russia (although now legally codified) and a majority of Russians in the Russian Federation still find it difficult to accept Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group. Ukraine’s quadruple transition (especially its state and nation-building projects) are therefore closely tied to similar processes in the Russian Federation.

This chapter points to two conclusions for further research into post-Soviet transition. First, bringing the state back into studies of post-communist transition is an important development, but will transitologists be willing to go one step further and include nationality, thereby recognizing that civic nationalism is as central as stateness to the success of the quadruple transition in post-communist states such as Ukraine? After all, nationality remains central to the vitality and efficient functioning of Western civic states, liberal democracies, and civil societies.⁹⁸ It is therefore incumbent upon those who study transition in post-communist states, such as Ukraine, to also place nationhood and nationality at the centre of their focus.

Second, post-Soviet transitology would also greatly benefit from a shift in comparative studies. Currently, such studies are conducted with post-authoritarian transition in Southern Europe and Latin America. Comparative studies should shift their focus to the post-colonial world (including colonies within Europe, such as Ireland, which experienced even far longer periods of foreign rule). Such a shift in comparative studies would require the integration of post-Soviet transitology within post-colonial theory.⁹⁹ This would inevitably place stateness and nationness at the centre of research and study into post-communist transitions. It would be far more productive than current comparative studies that compare post-Soviet states with former centres of empire (e.g., Spain or Portugal) or those that achieved their independence in the nineteenth century and had therefore long undertaken their state and nation-building projects (e.g., Latin America).

NOTES

- 1 Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
- 2 Radio Ukraine World Service (May 12, 1998).
- 3 Leslie E. Armijo, Thomas J. Biersteker, and Abraham F. Lowenthal, "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions," *Journal of Democracy* 5, no. 4 (October 1994), 161–175.
- 4 Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," *Social Research* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1991), 872.
- 5 See Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition," in *Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, edited by T. Kuzio (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 165–180; Taras Kuzio, "The National Factor in Ukraine's Quadruple Transition," *Contemporary Politics* 6, no. 2 (June 2000), 143–164; Taras Kuzio, "Transition in Post-Communist States: Triple or Quadruple?," *Politics* 21, no. 3 (September 2001), 101–110.
- 6 Fedir Kanak, "Natsional'nyi prohres I derzhavnist' v Ukraïini," *Rozbudova Derzhava* no. 10 (October 1993), 30.
- 7 Leslie Holmes, *Post-Communism: An Introduction* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 19.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 15–21.

- 9 Linz and Stepan point out that in Chile, Portugal, and Spain, "most of the principles of Western democratic laws, while abused or put into practice, were not fundamentally challenged, normatively or theoretically, by a completely new system of laws and general thinking." Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1996), 250.
- 10 A "competent central bureaucracy" is essential to manage economic reform. See Arnijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal, "The Problems of Simultaneous Transitions," 172.
- 11 See Chapter 15, "Post-Communism's Prehistories" in Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 235–254.
- 12 While discussing the "triple transition," Offe also includes such factors as defining the "we" (identity, citizenship, territory, social, and cultural boundaries of the nation-state) and rules, procedures, and rights within the new constitutional and institutional framework. See Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design?," op cit.
- 13 John A. Hall, "In search of Civil Society," in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, edited by J.A. Hall (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 22.
- 14 Linz and Stepan argue that "stateness problems must increasingly be a central concern of political activists and theorists alike," Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 366.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 18; R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 207.
- 16 Adam Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 12. See also Guillermo O'Donnell, "On the State, Democracy and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some Postcommunist Countries," *World Development* 21, no. 8 (August 1993), 1358.
- 17 See T. Kuzio, "Stateness and Institutions in Ukraine: A Theoretical and Comparative Introduction," in *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, edited by T. Kuzio, Robert S. Kravchuk, and Paul D'Anieri (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 1–24.
- 18 Roger D. Markwick, "A Discipline in Transition?: From Sovietology to 'Transitology'," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 12, no. 3 (September 1996), 265.
- 19 See Chapter Four, "Ukraine's Weak State," in P. D'Anieri, R. Kravchuk, and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder: Westview, 1999), 90–140.
- 20 Robert Dahl, *Democracy, Liberty, and Equality* (Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1986), 122.

- 21 Dankwart Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970), 337–363.
- 22 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "The Conceptual Travel of Transitologists and Consolidologists: How Far to the East Should They attempt to Go?," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 1 (Spring 1994), 184.
- 23 Philip G. Roeder, "Peoples and States after 1989: The Political Costs of Incomplete National Revolutions," *Slavic Review* 58, no. 4 (Winter 1999), 854–881.
- 24 Gertrude E. Schroeder, "On the Economic Viability of New Nation-States," *Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (Winter 1992), 551. See also Alexander J. Motyl, "The Conceptual President: Leonid Kravchuk and the Politics of Surrealism," in *Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership*, edited by Timothy J. Colton and Robert C. Tucker (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 114.
- 25 Russia and Romania were the last two of Ukraine's neighbours to sign treaties with Ukraine, which recognized existing borders in May and June 1997 respectively. The Russian Parliament's State Duma and Federation Council, lower and upper houses respectively, ratified the treaty only in December 1998 and February 1999.
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- 27 Gerardo L. Munck, "Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 3 (April 1994), 355–375.
- 28 Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists be Grounded?," *Slavic Review* 54, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 111–127.
- 29 Volodymyr Kulyk, *Ukrains'kyi Natsionalizm u Nezalezhnyi Ukraini* (Kyiv: Kyiv Mohyla Academy, 1998), 49.
- 30 O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 56.
- 31 Jane I. Dawson, *Eco-Nationalism. Anti-nuclear Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 24. See also George Schopflin, "National Identity in the Soviet Union and East Central Europe," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 14, no. 1 (January 1991), 10.
- 32 Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 203, 206.
- 33 Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, "Comparing Citizen and Elite Belief Systems in Post-Soviet Russia and Ukraine," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (Spring 1995), 29.
- 34 James Tully, "The Crisis of Identification: The Case of Canada," *Political Studies* 42, Special Issue (1994), 82–832.
- 35 T.R. Reid, "Malaysia," *National Geographic* (August 1997), 104.
- 36 See Mordechai Tamarkin, "Culture and Politics in Africa: Legitimizing Ethnicity, Rehabilitating the Post-Colonial State," *Nationalism and Ethnic*

- Politics* 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 372; Craig Calhoun, "Nationalism and Ethnicity," in *Annual Review of Sociology* 19 (1993), 211–239; Frank B. Tipton, "Nationalism and Economic Development in Nineteenth Century Europe," in *Nationalism and Postcommunism: A Collection of Essays*, edited by Aleksandar Pavkovic, Halyna Koscharsky, and Adam Czarnota (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 19–38; Eugene Kamenka, "Political Nationalism—The Evolution of the Idea," in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, edited by E. Kamenka (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974), 3–20.
- 37 Leonard Binder, "National Integration and Political Development," *American Political Science Review* 58, no. 3 (September 1964), 628.
- 38 Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 18.
- 39 Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 37–38; Will Kymlicka, "The Sources of Nationalism," in *The Morality of Nationalism*, edited by Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 57.
- 40 Margarat Canovan points out that the success or otherwise of mobilization is dependent upon "whether or not a nation actually exists." See Margarat Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 74.
- 41 See T. Kuzio, "The Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn's Framework for Understanding Nationalism," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no. 1 (January 2002), 25–39.
- 42 Emerson, *From Empire to Nation*, 213; Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design?," 876.
- 43 Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design?," 877.
- 44 Hudson Meadwell, "Ethnic Nationalism and Collective Choice Theory," *Comparative Political Studies* 22, no. 2 (July 1989), 149.
- 45 Dmytryj Furman, "Ukraine I My," *Svobodnaya Mysl* no.1 (1995), 82.
- 46 See Anatol Lieven, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism," *Survival* 41, no. 2 (Summer 1999), 53–70.
- 47 Bohdan Krawchenko, "Economic Reform, Democracy and National Movements in the USSR," *Regional Politics and Policy* 1, no. 2 (Summer 1991), 187, 188. See also Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst, 1998), 188, 194. Mykola Riabchouk links the growth of civil society and national identity to the desire for national emancipation in the late Soviet era. See Mykola Riabchouk, "Hromadians'ke Suspil'stvo I natsional'na emansipatsiya," *Filosofs'ka I Sotsiologichna Dumka* no. 12 (1991), 18.
- 48 Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*, 387.
- 49 In a speech to the scientific-economic conference on the 2010 program, President Kuchma warned that attempts to change the course of economic

- reform “in a backward direction” pose a threat to “statehood and national security,” *Uriadovyi Kurier* (March 10, 1999).
- 50 Aleksei Arbatov, “The National Idea and National Security,” *Mirovaya Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* no.5 (May 1998), 5–21.
 - 51 *Uriadovyi Kurier* (February 18, 1996).
 - 52 L. Kuchma to a conference entitled “A Concept of and a Strategy for Economic Growth, 1999–2005,” Ukrainian Television 1 (March 17, 1998).
 - 53 Kuchma to an economic forum of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine in Rzeszow, *Interfax* (May 25, 1998).
 - 54 *Zerkalo Nedeli* (October 31, 1998).
 - 55 *Ukraina moloda* (November 6, 1998).
 - 56 Ibid.
 - 57 Kuchma speaking at a military officers’ meeting in Kyiv, *Uriadovyi Kurier* (July 15, 1999).
 - 58 Kuchma to the All-Ukrainian Council of Businessmen conference in Kyiv, *The Ukrainian Weekly* (February 15, 1998). Yuriy Yekhanurov, then head of the State Committee on the Development of Entrepreneurship, pointed out the differences between Poles and Ukrainians. Poles, unlike Ukrainians, do not discuss whether their country should exist or whether there should be private property, *Uriadovyi Kurier* (March 18, 1998). He believed that it would take up to fifteen years for such a political culture similar to Poland’s to emerge in Ukraine.
 - 59 Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia: Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953–1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 261–262.
 - 60 Jurgen Habermas, “The European Nation-State—Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship,” in *Mapping the Nation*, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan and Benedict Anderson (London: Verso, 1996), 281–294. Habermas argues in favour of states where people’s allegiance is to the constitution, laws, and main institutions. It seems more applicable to post-industrial Western liberal democracies than to post-communist countries.
 - 61 Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Smoliy believes that “This must be an ideology that unites society on fundamental, vital, critical principles. At present, there is no doubt that the idea of statehood is such an ideology,” *Uriadovyi Kurier* (March 3, 1999). But statehood and purely civic institutions cannot provide the depth of national consolidation to unite a population to the degree that unity can based upon ethnic-cultural factors. See Chapter Two, “Nation Building and National Identity,” in D’Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, 45–70.
 - 62 Adam B. Seligman, “Animadversions upon Civil Society and Civic Virtue in the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century,” in Hall (ed.), *Civil Society*, 215.

- 63 See Chapter Seven, "National Identity and Civil Society," in T. Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge, 1998), 144–166; T. Kuzio, "Defining the Political Community in Ukraine: State, Nation and the Transition to Modernity," in Kuzio, Kravchuk, and D'Aneiri (eds.), *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, 213–244; M. Ryabcuk, "Between Civil Society and the New Etatism: Democracy in the Making and State Building in Ukraine," in *Envisioning Eastern Europe*, edited by Michael D. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994), 125–147.
- 64 Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 153, 154.
- 65 *Ibid.*, 185.
- 66 Edward Shils, "The Virtue of Civil Society," *Government and Opposition* 26, no. 1 (Winter 1991), 7. See also Nicos Mouzelis, "Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society," in Hall (ed.), *Civil Society*, 237.
- 67 See T. Kuzio, "Nationalising States or Nation Building: A Review of the Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, Part 2 (April 2001), 135–154.
- 68 E. Shils, "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society," *Nations and Nationalism* 1, no. 1 (March 1995), 118.
- 69 *Ibid.*, 111.
- 70 *Ibid.* See also Oxana Prisiajniouk, "The State of Civil Society in Independent Ukraine," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 20, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1995), 172.
- 71 S. Hall, "Ethnicity: Identity and Difference," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 341.
- 72 David B. Knight, "Identity and Territory: Geographic Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 72, no. 4 (1982), 516.
- 73 A. Wilson, "Redefining Ethnic and Linguistic Boundaries in Ukraine: Indigenes, Settlers and Russophone Ukrainians," in *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identity*, edited by Graham Smith et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 135. See also G. Smith and A. Wilson, "Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilization in Eastern Ukraine and North-East Estonia," *Europe-Asia Studies* 49, no. 5 (July 1997), 855.
- 74 *Kievskiy vedomosti* (February 19, 1998).
- 75 Lievan, "The Weakness of Russian Nationalism"; T. Kuzio and David J. Meyer, "The Donbas and Crimea: An Institutional and Demographic Approach to Ethnic Mobilization in Two Ukrainian Regions," in Kuzio, Kravchuk, and D'Anieri (eds.), *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, 297–324.

- 76 Lowell Barrington, "Russian-Speakers in Ukraine and Kazakhstan: 'Nationality,' 'Population,' or Neither?," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 17, no. 2 (April–June 2001), 129–158.
- 77 As A. Przeworski points out, "A mutual set of obligations must be defined between the state and the citizen. If, on the one hand, the state does not enforce the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and if, on the other hand, citizens do not organise to make their rights effective and to compel the state to acquit itself of its responsibilities, the very concept of citizenship is rendered ineffectual." Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*, 35.
- 78 M. Canovan discusses the centrality of nationality in Western civic liberal democracies in Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*.
- 79 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 135.
- 80 J. Habermas, "The European Nation-State," in Balakrishnan and Anderson (eds.), *Mapping the Nation*, 282.
- 81 Tim Snyder, "Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz (1872–1905): A Pioneering Scholar of Modern Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism* 3, part 2 (July 1997), 240.
- 82 E. Gellner, "The Importance of Being Modular," in Hall (ed.), *Civil Society*, 54.
- 83 J.S. Mill is cited in W. Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 52.
- 84 Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," 12.
- 85 T. Kuzio, "Ukraine: The Victory of Civic Nationalism," in *Nationalism after Independence*, edited by Lowell Barrington (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); Taraz Kuzio, "Nationalism in Ukraine: Towards a New Theoretical and Comparative Framework," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 7, no. 2 (June 2002).
- 86 Fedir Kanakh argues that "a populace who live on a certain territory become a people after which at least some elements of civil society are formed," "Natsional'na Ideya ...," 42.
- 87 Shils, "Nation, Nationality, Nationalism and Civil Society," 116.
- 88 *Ibid.*, 93.
- 89 Jean L. Cohen, "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements," *Social Research* 52, no. 4 (Winter 1985), 692.
- 90 Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship*, 89.
- 91 John Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism*, 27
- 92 Ghia Nodia, "How Different Are Postcommunist Transitions?," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 4 (October 1996), 15–29.
- 93 *Uriadovyi Kurier* (March 10, 1999).

- 94 Cited from Kuchma's annual address to Parliament, *Holos Ukrainy* (March 25, 1997).
- 95 Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko to the World Economic Forum in Davos, *Uriadovyi Kurier* (February 3, 1998).
- 96 See T. Kuzio, "Ukraine: Coming to Terms with the Soviet Legacy," *The Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics* 14, no. 4 (December 1998), 1–27.
- 97 As A. Przeworski points out, mistakes are inevitable: "Conflicts over institutions are likely to be protracted. The actors bargaining over the institutions are unlikely to 'get it right' the first time, it often takes several attempts before a stable framework emerges." Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*, 49.
- 98 Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*. See also Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civic Nation," in *Theorizing Nationalism*, edited by Ronald Beiner (Albany: State University of New York, 1999), 103–118.
- 99 For the application of post-colonial theory to Ukraine, see Marko Pavlyshyn, "Post-Colonial Features in Contemporary Ukrainian Culture," *Australian Slavonic and East European Review* 6, no. 2 (1992), 41–55; Serhy Yekelchuk, "The Location of Nation: Postcolonial Perspectives on Ukrainian Historical Debates," *Australian Slavonic and East European Studies* 11, nos. 1–2 (1997), 161–184; T. Kuzio "History, Memory and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space," *Nationalities Papers* 30, no. 2 (June 2002). For an alternative framework that places Ukraine within the context of nineteenth-century state and nation building, see Paul R. Magosci, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* XVI, nos. 1–2 (1989), 45–62.

Part Two

**Toward Economic
and Business
Development**

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3

Formation of a Market-Oriented Social Economy of Ukraine

VOLODIMIR N. BANDERA

A NEW COUNTRY STRIVES FOR A NEW ECONOMIC SYSTEM

With the collapse of communism and the dismemberment of the USSR, Ukraine has become a major European country with considerable potential in the global economy. The proclamation of independence by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on August 24, 1991, ended seven decades of the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as part of a highly centralized command economy of the USSR. The newly independent state, embracing democracy and turning to a free market system, has claimed its rightful place as a member of the international community of nations.

Encompassing 233,100 square miles, or 603,700 square kilometres, Ukraine is slightly larger than France. Ukraine's population of 50.4 million people (in 1997) is smaller than that of France (56 million) but larger than Poland's (38 million). Situated just north of the Black Sea, the country is positioned between the economically integrated European Union and the Eurasian region dominated by Russia. While retaining its inherited economic ties with Russia and other post-Soviet successor states, Ukraine has declared its strategic European orientation and, more broadly, a global orientation as an open economy.

Today Ukraine is an industrialized country with a strong agricultural base. It is well endowed with fertile land, rich mineral resources, and a well-educated labour force. As the second

largest former Soviet republic, Ukraine produced 17 per cent of the Soviet Union's industrial and 24 per cent of agricultural output. Toward the end of the Soviet era, the level of Ukraine's economic development and the standard of living compared favourably to those of European countries (see Table 3.1). For 1998, Western estimates based on purchasing power estimates showed Ukraine's GDP at \$108.5 billion, and per capita GDP at \$2,200 (Central Intelligence Agency 1999). These figures reflect a painful depression of production and real income by some 50 per cent since independence. Such deep and prolonged depression, reminiscent of the Great Depression of 1933 in the United States and Europe, involves wasteful unemployment of labour and other productive resources, so about 50 per cent of the families are below the poverty line. Such are the hardships resulting from the abrupt collapse of the entrenched planning and command system, the transition to a novel private enterprise market system, and the separation from the integrated "imperial" Soviet economy.

The present study evaluates the salient features of the evolving market-oriented system. I propose to classify Ukraine as a mixed system of social economy. It involves capitalist private enterprise and socialist institutions, while the label "social economy" reflects the retention of substantial social welfare measures like retirement pensions, public education, and free medical services. It will be argued that the main pillars of the new system are in place, and as it attains its full potential, the economy will reach a socially acceptable sustainable economic growth with a welcome improvement in the standard of living.

BACKGROUND STUDIES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Economic studies and business reports pertaining to Ukraine have been increasingly available in the West, although they are still not well systematized and readily accessible. Published reports by the World Bank (1999), the Central Intelligence Agency (2000), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1999), as well as several recent books and articles in collected volumes, describe and evaluate the transitional process in the young country (Banaian 1999; Bandera 1994); Cornelius and

Table 3.1
International Comparison of Per Capita Output of Key Products, 1989

Image not available

Source: Derzhavnyi Komitet Ukr. RSR po Statystytsi, *Ukrainska RSR u 1990 rotsi*, Kyiv, 1991.

Lenain 1997; Dabrowski and Antczak 1996; Dyczok 2000; Kubicek 2000; Kuzio 2000). Such recent publications focus in particular on the country's business environment, privatization, budgetary issues, and the successful formation of the monetary system based on a stable monetary unit, the *hryvnia*.

Current surveys of country risk and business climate are provided by such consulting firms as the Economist International Intelligence Unit, Wharton Research Associates, Deutsche Bank, and Stanley Morgan. A CD-ROM, "Ukraine: A Look to the 21st

Century,” provides a comprehensive survey in English or in Ukrainian of the economic, business, and social conditions in the country. Also, the Internet offers many relevant sites pertaining to Ukraine’s economy and business (Bandera and Jatsura 1999).

Economic studies, business surveys, and statistical periodicals are increasingly published in Ukraine, sometimes with English summaries. The statistical series and surveys published by the State Statistical Committee of Ukraine and other agencies are quite extensive, and they conform to international definitions and methodology. To be sure, Western students must note carefully whether and how the published economic data take into account “the unofficial shadow economy” (Popovych 1998).

It should be kept in mind, however, that recent Western sources concerning Ukraine tend to be narrowly focused on current issues, changing national policies, and business concerns about the performance and potential of this newly independent state. For a broader historical and geopolitical perspective, such reports should be supplemented by earlier contributions by such economists as I.S. Koropecy (1977, 1992), P. Wiles (in Bandera 1973), G. Schroeder (in Koropecy 1992), and V.N. Bandera (1973), who tried to evaluate Ukraine’s economy as a distinct and vital region of the USSR. One should also consider the comprehensive five-volume *Encyclopedia of Ukraine* (Kubijovyc and Struk 1984–1993), which contains numerous entries on Ukraine’s economy, among them articles on transportation, various industries, resources, and foreign trade.

INTERPRETATION OF THE EMERGING SYSTEM

Scholarly research and textbooks dealing with comparative economic systems categorize the post-Soviet countries as “transitional economies.” Many articles and business reports try to assess the performance of Ukraine after independence, and in particular its attainments, problems, and potential as a partner in international business. However, the publications of the early 1990s do not fully appreciate the system from which Ukraine is emerging and into what system Ukraine is being transformed.

The fundamental changes that we observe were brought about by what Lester Thurow (1996) regards as an earth-shaking event, namely, the collapse of communism along with the implosion of the USSR. Indeed, Ukraine's difficulties and opportunities stem from this duality of the collapse of the communist system of command economy and the collapse of the Soviet empire, which allowed the transformation of Ukraine into a sovereign political economy.

In order to comprehend Ukraine's transitional state, we should keep in mind its former status as a component Soviet republic. This heritage conditions the process of change that became possible (some would say inevitable) due to the dismemberment of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the collapse of the centrally planned command economy offers the country an opportunity to construct its new economic system.

In the West, little attention was paid to Soviet Ukraine simply because it was only an economic region tightly integrated into a centralized planned economy. Thus, from the standpoint of geopolitics, or country evaluation, or international business, it seemed sufficient to interpret the performance and the potential of the USSR as an entity. However, with the attainment of independence, the "nation building" involves not only the transformation of the command system but also the formation—often from ground zero—of institutional infrastructure needed to manage the political economy of a sovereign country.

Thus, the situation in Ukraine differs from that in Poland where the essence of the "transition" lies primarily in the systemic change from a command system to a market capitalist system, and only to a relatively small degree does it require the adjustments due to the dissolution of the Soviet bloc with its rather feeble Council for Mutual Economic Assistance arrangements. Similarly, China has been transforming its economy from a Soviet model into a market system, but perpetuating its nationhood; it merely adapts socio-economic institutions.

With regard to Russia, that country is also undergoing a fundamental transformation of its command economy, but, as the core of the Soviet empire and of the earlier Tsarist empire, the country is reshaping rather than creating its statehood.

When Western textbooks refer to Ukraine as a transitional economy, they mean it is converting its inherited Soviet economy into some sort of a market capitalist system. In fact, since his election in 1994, President Kuchma has pledged to pursue "radical reforms" aimed at constructing a market-oriented social economy. And, most recently, the conference sponsored by the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, the Ministry of the Economy, and several related ministries formulated the strategic objective "Ukraine 2010," which has the goal of completing and refining the model of "free-market social economy" (see Halchynskiy 1999).

In Ukraine, the interpretation of the political economy of the country has progressed beyond the analysis of the policies of transition. Several recent publications delineate and evaluate the performance and potential of the new economic system that replaced the command economy. Thus, the survey by Heyets and Kvasniuk (1999) interprets the transformation of the inherited Soviet productive structure and socio-economic institutions, paying special attention to the inherent weaknesses that must be overcome. Kononenko (1999) evaluates the scope of the government's economic functions. While Popovych (1999) deals primarily with economic lawlessness and criminality, he provides an insight into the entrenchment of the shadow economy in the system, not unlike that experienced by Italy and Latin American countries. Of great interest are the volumes by Sokolenko (1999) and Bilorus (1998), which explore the experience and potential of Ukraine's participation in the global economy. As can be seen, there is a growing awareness of Ukraine's economy as a complex system dependent on market-oriented business activity, extensive intrusion of the government, and the broader environment of international business.

The thesis elaborated in this chapter is that the structural pillars of the new system, however wobbly, are now in place. In the West, we would classify that model as some kind of "mixed economy" or, simply, "free market socialism." Even if the new system appears to lack institutional details and is still performing rather poorly, it seems to be viable and unlikely to engender a reversal of privatization or a similar radical change. One can hardly accept the pessimistic prognoses sometimes voiced in the

London Economist and *Financial Times* that the persistent economic depression and political uncertainty might bring the return of market-denying socialism. In my view, however, the political sanity will allow the completion and refinement of the model of "social market economy." Ukraine's economic performance in 2000 under Prime Minister Victor Yushenko demonstrates that positive—though not necessarily rapid—economic growth is already quite feasible under the new system.

In support of this thesis, we shall evaluate the following four pillars of the economic system in the making:

1. the legal foundations of the market mechanism, especially as they pertain to property rights and contracts;
2. the division of productive enterprises into private, collective, and public (state) sectors;
3. the country's participation in the global economy; and
4. the scope of the government.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE POST-SOVIET SYSTEM

The Nobel Prize economist Douglas North has illuminated the systemic importance of economic institutions. Consisting of a set of rules, constraints, and modes of behaviour, the institutions facilitate the interaction between economic actors such as households, firms, and the government. Granted that the deeply rooted informal institutions like customs and moral norms play an important role, we shall focus here on the explicit legal codes and their enforcement. I have just completed, with W. Jatsura of Lviv University, a survey of the legal framework of ownership and property rights relating to business in Ukraine (Bandera and Jatsura 1999). Let me summarize here our conclusions.

By now, the formal legal framework appears comprehensive indeed. At the outset of independence, "The Declaration of Sovereignty" (July 16, 1990) and "The Law Regulating Economic Sovereignty of Ukraine" (August 3, 1990) reflected the will of Parliament to reform the inherited defunct planned-command system.

The crucial institution of ownership is delineated in the code "On Forms of Ownership" (enacted July 2, 1991). This code

defines three types of property: private, collective, and state (or governmental). It should be noted that "collective ownership" means ownership by the employees of industrial or agricultural enterprises resulting from the ongoing privatization, so the resulting "collective enterprises" are only "quasi-socialist" in nature. Property and business enterprises may be owned by foreign citizens and companies. It is noteworthy that this code clearly delineates intellectual property rights. However, the code regards land and other national resources, as well as transportation facilities and other types of public infrastructure, as the property of the "people of Ukraine." Thus, this notion of the wealth of the people of Ukraine or societal ownership is in fact preserving a significant socialist element in the evolving economic system, making it "quasi-socialist" or, if you prefer, "quasi-capitalist."

A related code "On Enterprises" (January 27, 1991) allows Western-type corporate and proprietary forms of business, and delineates foreign participation in several types of joint ventures. Furthermore, the code "On the Leasing of State Property" (March 14, 1995) and the code "On Leasing" (December 17, 1997) provide even more specific and detailed delineation of property rights as related to contracts and business practices.

However, the implementation of the market rules of the game and the enforcement of the law, especially the enforcement of contracts, is still lacking by Western standards. Thus, the laws relating to foreign direct investment have been often modified, and the consummation of direct investment contracts requires complicated governmental approvals. Moreover, inevitable conflicts and breaches of contract are difficult to litigate. Even the Kuchma-Gore Commission on United States-Ukraine co-operation was unable to compensate the maltreated U.S. investors. Thus foreign creditors and investors perceive Ukraine as a high-risk country. Indeed, the non-enforcement of laws presently constitutes a major structural weakness of the economy.

PRIVATIZATION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

The country inherited an economy based on the deeply entrenched state or collectivist ownership of virtually the entire productive apparatus. By now, extensive privatization and

corporatization has been implemented under by the new laws, creating a peculiar mixture of ownership and management. As can be seen in Table 3.2, the dominant organizational form is now the peculiar collective enterprise (56 per cent of the total). About one-third (29 per cent) of economic entities are classified as private, and only 14 per cent are outright state-owned (see Table 3.2).

At the present, the collectives in the industrial and agricultural sectors are similar to the Chinese corporation-like village collectives and urban collectives. In Ukraine, to the extent that the ownership of former state enterprises and collective farms was privatized and marketized, property rights were transferred to the employees, that is, the management and the workers. In practice, however, the former communist managers and functionaries succeeded in acquiring considerable wealth and control over productive enterprises and natural resources. These so-called oligarchs have been prone to engage in such illegal activities as the bribery of officials, monopolistic pricing, and international money laundering. In the larger privatized urban collective enterprises and public utility sectors like railroads, a portion of the stock shares has been also retained by the government to protect public interests.

To be sure, the worker-owned collective enterprises are likely to raise difficulties in their management and competitive efficiency as in Yugoslavia in the 1970s, but they could learn to function in the market economy. It is significant that, by law, all corporatized entities should be free from state interference in their management and would therefore act in accordance with the market rules of the game.

The new *agricultural collectives* are supposed to function like profit-seeking co-operatives. However this sector clings to its Soviet structure and has difficulties in adapting to the free-enterprise market system. In the agricultural sector "the farmer-like" or truly private farms are under 10 per cent, and the sector is dominated by worker-owned "collective entities." However, the Soviet-like dependence of these collectives on the state remains. They function under contracts to deliver large quotas of their output to the state at preset prices. They depend on short-term financing from the state, and receive in barter such vital inputs

Table 3.2
Productive Enterprises According to Type of Ownership, 1998

Image not available

Source: Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, *Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1997 rik*, (Kyiv, 1999)

as fuels, fertilizer, and farm equipment. Moreover, the right to sell output surpluses in the free markets is hampered by the absence of a market infrastructure and other inherited institutional barriers. Thus, the agricultural sector, which was very inefficient under the Soviets by international standards, seems to lag behind the rest of the economy in the extent of systemic restructuring. So far, the government and the pro-collectives majority in the Parliament rationalize that at least the country can feed itself without needing to import grain.

Thus, it remains to be seen whether and when the reform-minded leaders will succeed in extending the free market and free-enterprise mechanism into agriculture, and to what extent they will encourage competition in the highly monopolized "collective" industrial sector. Perhaps as sheer pre-election expediency, this issue has not been addressed in the otherwise comprehensive blueprint for the social market economy in "Ukraine 2010" (NAN Ukrainy & Ministerstvo Ekonomiky Ukrainy 1999). The officials made only passing allusions about "the need to refine the ownership provisions" in agriculture and elsewhere. However, immediately after winning the elections for his second term, President Kuchma issued a decree on December 3, 1999 that all collective farms have until April 2000 to turn over their land to the workers and give them ownership certificates.

FOREIGN SECTOR IN THE OPEN ECONOMY

On the eve of independence, Ukraine found itself outside the market-driven global economy (See Bandera 1977 and Kubilovyc and Struk 1984–1993). To be sure, the republic exchanged as much as one-third of its output with the rest of the Soviet Union and the outside world. But only after it attained sovereignty did Ukraine become an open economy linked to international markets through its foreign sector. Now the domestic markets are exposed to foreign competition, and domestic producers have the opportunity to compete in foreign markets. Moreover, Ukraine has begun to participate in international financial markets, engage in portfolio-type inward and outward capital movements, as well as interact with multinational corporations through direct foreign investments.

Both the international capital movements and trade in goods and services are facilitated by a fair degree of currency stability and convertibility.

A set of laws and regulations delineates Ukraine's participation in international business. This includes the laws: "On External Transactions," "On Conditions of Foreign Investment," on "Free Economic Zones," and various more specific regulations.

In its foreign policy, Ukraine has made a concerted effort to join the intricate network of international treaties and institutions. Thus, the new country became a member of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It has also entered into a comprehensive treaty on trade and co-operation with the Commonwealth of Independent States, avoiding, however, any substantial political integration with the Commonwealth of Independent States. On the whole, the new country has been quite successful in concluding bilateral commercial treaties with China, India, Brazil, and numerous other countries. Moreover, it has been trying hard to initiate a relationship with the two most important trade-promoting arrangements: the European Union and the World Trade Organization. Unfortunately, so far the efforts to overcome the barriers to find accommodation with these crucial international organizations are quite disappointing.

On the whole, however, the commitment to openness is reflected in empirical evidence. In 1997, with exports of goods and services being 21 per cent and imports 18 per cent of the GDP, Ukraine's external sector is similar to that of Canada and Brazil.

Direction of Trade

Ukraine has repeatedly stated its strategic European orientation and its intention of maintaining the inherited trade relations with Russia and other former Soviet republics. Thus, Russia's share of Ukraine's trade is still high, being 46 per cent of Ukraine's imports and 27 per cent of exports. As it is dependent on oil and gas imports from Russia, Ukraine struggles to sell and barter maximum exports in exchange. Moreover, Ukraine for the time being must continue its specialization imposed on it by the former Moscow-imposed plans and directives. But the data show that

Ukraine already has had some success in developing its trade relations with the outside world (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3

Direction of Ukraine's Trade before and after Independence

Image not available

Sources: a. V.N. Bandera, 1973.

b. *Ukraina v tsyfrakh*, 1996.

c. Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, *Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy rik*, (Kyiv, 1999). These estimates are most reliable.

Desiring to take advantage of global opportunities for trade, Ukraine has tried to escape the constraints of Soviet-era specialization, and take advantage of the potential markets in Europe, Asia, and developing countries. The evidence shows some success. But it is difficult to escape the inherited pattern of trade, particularly the structural dependence on oil and gas supplies from Russia and Turkmenistan where rich deposits were developed with the help of huge amounts of capital resources extracted from Soviet Ukraine, presumably for the benefit of the entire Soviet Union.¹

Presently Ukraine is burdened with structural dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia. At the same time, it is otherwise difficult to reorient its trade westward since Ukraine must overcome institutional and policy barriers in advanced countries that are hardly anxious to extend the trading privileges to potential competitors. These realities certainly impede Ukraine's efforts to marketize, privatize, and corporatize its economic system in ways that would make the country competitive in international markets.

Composition of Trade

Although Soviet Ukraine exported directly and indirectly all sorts of industrial machinery, hydroelectric equipment, and military

hardware, the republic was a net importer of machinery, manufactures, and textiles. External trade was predominantly with Council for Mutual Economic Assistance countries, with Ukraine's exports concentrated in iron, steel, and other metallurgical inputs, while exports of machinery (17 per cent of total) were rising in importance.

On the import side, Ukraine inherited heavy dependence on oil and gas imports from Russia and Turkmenistan, which often require barter-like deals involving agricultural commodities and industrial inputs that were established by rigid Soviet economic plans. Nonetheless, Ukraine is making inroads into the markets of Asia and developing countries as a supplier of heavy industrial equipment and military hardware. Moreover, the country is able to participate in international joint high-tech ventures involving space rocketry and aircraft (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4
Composition of Merchandise Trade

Image not available

- Sources: a. V.N. Bandera, 1973.
b. *Ukraina v tsyfrakh*, 1996.
c. F. Root and A. Filipenko, *Mizhnarodna torhivnia* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1998).
-

Overall, Ukraine's competitiveness in global markets is hampered by the inherited inattention to quality and consumer needs, a lack of marketing know-how, and a lack of financial and related commercial infrastructure. Western observers are surprised that Ukraine has not reasserted its pre-eminence as an agricul-

tural exporter, and *Financial Times* even characterized the country as "Europe's empty bread basket."

Thus, Ukraine's strategic objective of improving its composition of imports by reducing its dependence on oil imports and substituting domestic products for the favoured imported consumer durables has been failing. Also it proves difficult to maintain old markets for Ukraine's machinery except, perhaps, the markets for military hardware. To a great extent, Ukraine's difficulties in participating in international business reflect the failure to privatize its agriculture, to corporatize and de-monopolize large state enterprises and otherwise adapt its economic institutions to the requirements of a competitive, ever-changing global market system.

Openness to Foreign Investment and Multinational Enterprise (MNE)

Strategic development program formulated by President Kuchma, the Gore-Kuchma Commission, and policy institutes in Ukraine envisage Ukraine as an open market economy admitting foreign capital and enterprise to enhance economic reconstruction and development. In my view, however, Ukraine's leaders do not fully appreciate that multinational enterprises not only contribute the needed capital to jump-start or restructure obsolete enterprises, but also provide the essential managerial and marketing know-how, as well as open the doors to international markets.

By now, Ukraine has formulated a comprehensive legal framework offering domestic status to foreign investors and special incentives to foreign investors in free trade zones and other priority projects. But restraints on private and especially foreign ownership of "sacred" natural resources, policies restricting foreign majority control, repeated modifications in the legal framework, and unreliable graft-ridden enforcement of existing laws have all contributed to a relatively unattractive investment climate. Thus, even though many MNEs established their token presence in Ukraine, total foreign investment in 1998 was only around \$2 billion (see Table 3.5).

International Economic Policies and Global Realities

We must point out at least briefly the importance of Ukraine's efforts to engage in all sorts of international treaties, agreements,

Table 3.5
Openness of the Economy: Trade/GDP Ratios

Image not available

Sources: a. V.N. Bandera, 1973.

b. Central Intelligence Agency, *World Factbook*, 1999 (Washington: CIA, 1999).

c. *Ukraina v tsyfrakh*, 1996. Assume GDP = \$125 billion.

d. Derzhavnyi komitet statystyky Ukrainy, *Statystychnyi shchorichnyk Ukrainy za 1997 rik* (Kyiv, 1999). These estimates are most reliable.

and institutional co-operation. This includes numerous bilateral agreements on economic co-operation, the bilateral partnership with the United States through the Gore-Kuchma Commission, economic co-operation with the Commonwealth of Independent States, failure to attain the associate status in the European Union, and the rather substantive participation in financial aid programs of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. But so far, Ukraine has failed to attain at least associate status in the EU, and it has made only a formal application for membership in the World Trade Organization. On the whole, Ukraine's determined and purposeful efforts to develop international institutional participation helps to engage the country in the globally oriented market process and promotes Western orientation of its economy. With the support of the United States and dominant but friendly Western countries, Ukraine is slowly overcoming the handicaps of a novice in international diplomacy and business. To be sure, political scandals, graft, and the suppression of independent free press spoil Ukraine's international image and thus impede the acceptance of the country as reliable partner in substantive international economic institutions.

From the standpoint of strengthening the market system, the engagement in international markets and the interaction

with capitalist countries are quite beneficial. Trade provides the needed competition and encourages specialization according to comparative advantage. Thus, in addition to exporting nickel, steel, and other products that reflect Ukraine's endowment with natural resources, the country has been able to export also heavy machinery, military hardware, and fashion goods. While enjoying the benefits from trade, Ukraine's fledgling market economy hopes to benefit from the participation in international equity and debt markets as well as from exposure to multinational forms of business.

Unfortunately, internal and external conditions are not always favourable to the full attainment of potential benefits by a novice country in the international arena. Thus, Ukraine's enterprises lack the experience in international marketing, management, and finance. And the country lacks the infrastructure of commercial banking, up-to-date communication facilities, and an efficient state bureaucracy. So far, low country rating and the reputation of high risk have discouraged potential foreign investors, especially foreign direct investments by multinational corporations. Inadequate credit facilities and burdensome taxation have led to extensive reliance on barter trade. Since the shadow economy also involves external business, money laundering and capital flight are believed to be considerable, though less than in Russia.

Last but not least, Ukraine has difficulties in overcoming considerable non-tariff barriers, especially in the European countries. The European Union as a preferential regional free-trade bloc is by its nature discriminatory toward non-member countries. The barriers to Ukraine involve agricultural produce as well as heavy machinery, military hardware, and a whole range of services. Unfortunately, as it is not a member of the trade-promoting World Trade Organization, Ukraine does not enjoy the beneficial mutual most-favoured nation treatment available to over 180 signatories of that agreement. Even with its openness and market orientation, Ukraine might be relegated to the periphery of the booming global economy, so that its economic system will be doomed to function below the potential optimum.

SCOPE OF THE GOVERNMENT

From the systemic viewpoint, it is best to begin the interpretation of the size or scope of the government with the assessment of its budget and related quantitative indicators of government activity (Kononenko 1999; Mykhasiuk 1999). We then proceed to evaluate the various economic functions of the government, especially as they relate to the market mechanism.

Compared with the preceding Soviet centralized command system, by now the scope of the government has been reduced considerably so that it does not overwhelm the market mechanism. On the contrary, the stated objective of the program "Ukraine 2010" is to foster market institutions. Quite significantly the government pursues the attainment of public objectives like social security and equity in the context of the market system rather than through the plan-command process.

By now, the state-owned sector has declined considerably. The number of enterprises in this category has declined from 6,394 in 1992 to 2,426 in 1997, and now it is 35 per cent of the total number of enterprises. In the same period, the number of workers employed by the state has declined from 15.0 million to 7.9 million. By 1997, the state share of capital assets dropped to 25 per cent and the share of total output to 34.7 per cent (see Table 3.2).

The size and relative importance of the government in the economy is further reflected by the magnitude and content on the national budget. In 1997, with the GDP equal to 103.9 billion *hryvnia*, the tax revenue was 30.4 per cent, government outlay 37.1 per cent, and budget deficit 6.7 per cent of the GDP. Thus, on the surface, the size of the budget seems to be on par with that of most European capitalist countries, and definitely below that of the Scandinavian welfare states. However, it is widely perceived that the tax burden has a crushing impact in Ukraine's depressed economy. For not only does it stifle the fledgling private enterprise, but also suffocates the newly corporatized collective enterprises.

The perennial deficit spending is by now well imbedded in the budget process, thus extending the government's claim on national output beyond the limits allowed by tax revenues. To

be sure, Ukraine seems to be committed to avoiding money emission in the financing of excessive government spending and relies instead on the creation of internal and foreign debt. With the budget deficit target now reduced to a tolerable level of about 5 per cent of the GDP, the country does not behave worse than Italy, Greece, and other “normal” capitalist countries. Still, the persistent financing of the deficit competes with private and collective enterprises for the scarce domestic and foreign financial capital. This situation may be regarded as one of the undesirable features of the fragile market system.

In modern market-oriented systems, the purpose of state ownership of productive facilities and governmental intrusion into the free market process through taxation and government spending is to enable the government to perform certain essential economic functions. They include in our case (1) the maintenance of the legal, monetary, and other institutional infrastructure; (2) the attainment of social security and equity through income redistribution and the provision of public goods and services; and (3) the attainment of full employment and price stability. Let us characterize the fulfillment of these functions in Ukraine.

Maintenance of the Infrastructure

Our previous outline of the comprehensive formal legal framework of the economy showed that the government is deficient in its task of upholding economic codes and commercial laws. Thus, the implementation of the market rules of the game—especially the enforcement of contracts—is still lacking by Western standards. Not surprisingly, foreign creditors and investors perceive Ukraine as a high-risk country. Moreover, the state employs extensive but inefficient officialdom and bureaucracy. This is accompanied by Mafia elements permeating the world of business. In such environment, illegal acquisition of public and private assets during privatization and corporatization has amounted to outright theft of national wealth. Some Western experts observing a similar but even more widespread and institutionalized criminalization of the economy in Russia have branded it “the system of kleptocracy.” Perhaps Ukraine does not yet deserve that reputation. Nevertheless, the government in Ukraine seems

to be inefficient in promoting and protecting the free enterprise system.

With regard to other essential institutions, the government has finally succeeded in establishing, pretty much from scratch, an effective monetary system. Under a reasonably independent central bank, The National Bank of Ukraine, the *hryvnia* currency has attained relative stability while enjoying a fair degree of convertibility and reasonably stable exchange rates. This has been achieved in spite of meagre international reserves and severe conditions imposed by the IMF in return for its support.

The importance of stable money is, of course, essential in the transition to a market system. After all, Ukraine must transform from a Soviet system and mentality where money was irrelevant in the allocation of resources, and where arbitrary prices did not serve as signals for rational choices by households and producers. Now, with stable market-determined prices, money can serve as a medium of exchange and a unit of account. It is also beginning to be used as a means of deferred payments in credit and capital markets. With time, it is likely to be trusted as a store of value.

Promotion of Social Security and Income Equalization

The second fundamental function of the state is the promotion of social security and equity (World Bank 1999). President Kuchma's label "the social economy" for his model is not merely a populist ploy but reflects the consensus of the people that, in the Ukrainian variant of market capitalism, the government has the duty to provide the safety net for retired, sick, and unemployed citizens, as well as to reduce the inequalities in incomes (NAN Ukrainy & Ministerstvo Ekonomiky Ukrainy 1999). Presently, the declared, though by no means actual, social security and welfare programs (like the retirement age of sixty-two) appear to be very generous and perhaps even unrealistic. In due time, however, the social and public dimension in the otherwise market-oriented free enterprise economy is likely to find its equilibrium level, one that is acceptable to, and affordable by, the society, as well as compatible with the free enterprise system. Comparison of experiences of various countries demonstrates that the socialist-egalitarian intensity of various systems might

affect the performance but need not subvert the viability of the economy.

Macromanagement for Stability and Growth

The third key function of the government is to aid the market economy to achieve full employment of resources, economic growth, and stable prices. For the open economy of Ukraine, we would add the objective of maintaining external balance under a stable rate of exchange. Historically, these macroeconomic goals together constitute the most recent governmental task, one that is pursued by various countries with different degrees of wisdom, political will, and success. It is very significant, however, that Ukraine, having rejected centralized economic planning and command mechanism, now has at its disposal fiscal and monetary policy instruments that can be used to pursue these main macroeconomic objectives.

During the past several years, the government has been preoccupied with the conversion into a self-regulating market model, so that inflation and underemployment of labour, as well as negative economic growth, have been accepted as the cost of structural transformation. But if price stabilization succeeded, why are the other goals so elusive?

A short but evasive answer is that there are more macroeconomic goals than the two policy instruments, the monetary and fiscal levers. Sometimes the goals happen to conflict with each other. Especially in the short run, the pursuit of price stability conflicts with the goal of full employment. Thus, we observe that the tight money policy of the National Bank of Ukraine has been used to stabilize prices, but has choked off economic expansion. On the other hand, according to the Keynesian theory, the current fiscal policy involving deficit spending should, and probably is, expansionary. But some critics are quick to point out that, due to the IMF pressure, deficit spending is too modest while heavy taxation is bankrupting the businesses. There is wide disagreement whether the government should incur even more domestic and foreign debts. Then why not print more money? Well, sorry! At the beginning of the paragraph we indicated that the country is committed to tight money in order to stabilize prices.

However, our purpose here is not to explain the persistence of the deep depression and negative growth, nor do we aim to evaluate governmental stabilization efforts. This would surely lead us into the thicket of controversy between the Keynesians and the monetarists. However, we note the significant achievement that the modern market-based monetary and fiscal policy instruments are available and are already being used in the new system. The policy makers and their advisers are certainly aware of the relevant macroeconomic theories. But the magnitude of transformation into a new system as well the complexity of conflicting objectives are so overwhelming that it is difficult to guide the imperfect market economy that fails to deliver the desired results.

CONCLUSION: THE PROSPECTS FOR SYSTEMIC SUCCESS

Like most economies in the world today, Ukraine is by now a mixed economic system, a variant that may well be labeled “social market economy.” The main pillars of that model, however insecure, consist of:

- a system of laws codifying private and social property rights in the context of market rules of the game;
- the division of ownership of productive resources and wealth into private and collective-social;
- a high degree of openness to international business; and
- the government sustaining the infrastructure of this market system and macro-managing the economy.

Barring unforeseen developments, this economy is capable of attaining what may be called “a systemic equilibrium,” a state of self-sustained growth that would allow an acceptable standard of living for citizens. In the past, a similar market-oriented system of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s (as it existed in Ukraine and other republics of the USSR) proved itself a viable variant of the mixed economy. Contrary to the still prevailing Soviet interpretation, the market-respecting economy of NEP, which combined private and state ownership of produc-

tive resources, was capable of generating self-sustained economic growth. It was, however, rejected for ideological reasons and replaced by the Stalinist command economy (see Bandera 1964 and his "New Economic Policy" in Kubijovyc 1993). There is no basis to believe that the history will repeat itself in the twenty-first century of the triumphant market capitalism: The economic transformation of the newly independent Ukraine is widely believed to be irreversible.

At the present time, on the basis of our knowledge of comparative economic systems and the realities of political economy in the post-Soviet world, we believe that the success and viability of Ukraine's mixed economy depends crucially on the following requirements:

- the ability of the nation's leaders to ensure compliance with the formal legal framework;
- the ability to overcome the inherited monopolistic concentration in key industries and many markets, in many cases by diminishing the inefficiency and power of the oligarchs and, perhaps, by encouraging foreign competition;
- the will of the people and national leaders to diminish the pervasive collectivism in industry and especially in agriculture in order to unshackle market incentives; and
- the ability to promote the country's full participation in international trade and finance so as to take full advantage of the ongoing globalization and technological revolution.

As we enter the new millennium, Ukraine nurtures great expectations for developing the nation's full economic potential. The people hope that their country will remain a democracy with a high degree of socio-economic stability. However, future prosperity depends on the nation's ability to implement fully a dynamic "social market economy." To do that, Ukraine needs the acceptance and support of the international community.

NOTE

- 1 During the 1960s and 1970s, as much as 10 per cent of Ukraine's GDP was extracted annually and transferred to the eastern regions, mainly to develop Siberian natural resources. Although during the Soviet years this loss of capital entitled Ukraine to cheap supplies of energy, that benefit terminated with the collapse of the USSR and Ukraine became dependent on expensive imports of oil and gas from Russia. The loss of Ukraine's savings in Moscow's Union banks, about which we hear many appeals today, conforms to other evidence about Ukraine's loss of capital after World War II. This aspect is analyzed in Bandera (1977) and his "Balance of Payments" in Kubijovyc (1984).

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4

What Makes Ukraine Not Grow? Political, Economic, and Historical Factors That Hamper Economic Growth

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INTRODUCTION¹

It will soon be a decade since the demise of central planning and the Soviet Union opened the door to a new era for the twenty-five or so countries of the old Soviet bloc. The opportunity provided by independence and the freedom to establish a market system was expected to result in a blossoming of democracy and economic prosperity. For most of Central Europe and the Baltics, this promise is being fulfilled, even if slower than hoped. For many of the new countries further east, the process of economic recovery is more limited but at least begun. But for a small number, Ukraine key among them, the economic recovery is still just a hope for the future.

Many factors have been adduced to explain why some economies grow faster than others, and some even suffer long periods of decline. One can read or hear the following explanations for poor growth performance in several countries including Ukraine: unfavourable initial conditions such as a large military-industrial complex; geographical and historical distance from market systems (e.g., Poland is closer to the West and had a shorter history of communism); the lack of energy resources; lack of knowledge about and relevant skills to run a market economy; a high degree of corruption in the system; inadequate financial stability (high inflation, volatile exchange rate); the slow progress in market reforms; the capture of government process by anti-

reform vested interests; the preoccupation of government (and national elites) with non-economic tasks such as wars, civil strife, nation building, etc. The paper examines these explanations and, in particular, compares Ukraine with other transition countries.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief overview of economic growth in transition countries in the period 1990–98, while Section III summarizes recent studies of what determines economic growth in transition countries. The next three sections discuss the three groups of factors that may explain the lack of economic growth in Ukraine, focusing in turn on historical legacy (Section IV), inadequacies of economic policy and reform (Section V), and underdeveloped institutions of governance (Section VI). Section VII draws some conclusions.

I. THE RECORD OF GROWTH IN TRANSITION COUNTRIES

The process of transition is a unique historical event, and analyzing it is not easy since this is a complex, multidimensional process encompassing not only economic changes but also profound changes in political and social relations. While not intending to take a categorical “economic determinism” view, I would suggest one useful simplifying core theme. A common thread tying together the different country experiences of transition is the objective of improved economic well-being of the population, in a word, economic growth. It has been nearly a decade since the transition began—first in Central Europe in 1989–1990, then further east—and a glance at statistics would suggest growth is becoming widespread (Table 4.1), with only two countries, Ukraine and Turkmenistan, still experiencing a continuous decline through 1997. Three others, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, experienced a (perhaps) premature burst of growth in the mid-1990s, then suffered a reversal in 1996–1997. But even for the others, the growth rates are with a few exceptions (Estonia, Georgia, Poland) not extraordinarily high by historical standards—certainly not high enough to allow these countries to catch up quickly even to low-income Western European countries.²

The statistics of GDP growth in Table 4.1 are “officially measured” GDP, and critics are right to say these are inaccurate,

Table 4.1
GDP Growth in Transition Economies

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Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates.

indeed they strongly underestimate actual economic activity since they largely exclude the “underground” economy.³ There are, however, three counterarguments that justify using such official data if any cross-country comparisons over a long period of time are to be done. First, unofficial economy estimates exist, but are, unfortunately, much less comprehensive in coverage of countries or years and are not systematic. As underground activity is by definition not measurable directly, different methodologies are used to estimate the value, and they do not always come up with the same results. Second, this paper discusses the *growth* in GDP, not its level, hence the underestimation is not as serious a problem if we are looking for a trend or direction. Third, and perhaps most important, the very existence of a large underground sector is a reflection of serious economic policy shortcomings that affect future growth prospects. An underground economy exists because the climate for official activity is not welcoming: great difficulties to register as businesses, high and unpredictable taxes; harassment by tax and other inspectors—all in the context of an “easy” life for the large existing state enterprises or even the newly privatized but privileged ones. But to stay underground, one must stay small; by definition, then, an underground economy is not a good basis for long-term sustained growth. Indeed, there is no historical example of an economy that achieved a high degree of prosperity by booming underground activity. Italy may be a case in point: for a decade or two after World War II, it too experienced extensive underground activity. Its period of prosperity came, not coincidentally, in the 1970s as underground enterprises (such as Benetton) surfaced, became official, and grew by leaps and bounds. This is not to say that the underground activities are wasted for when conditions for coming out of the underground are right, these activities become a catalyst for a real, sustained economic boom.

While the average growth rate for the twenty growing countries was, in 1997, 4.8 per cent, in seven countries the rate was below 3 per cent. Further, the recovery is very recent as only eleven countries have entered a period of sustained growth of three or more years, and only in 1995 did half of the twenty-five transition countries reach positive growth. Growth is also still fragile, as demonstrated by the three cases of reversal in the

mid-1990s, and the reversals in Russia and several neighbouring countries after the August 1998 financial crisis. Therefore, this chapter asks what factors are associated with recovery (or lack of it) in transition economies, in order to draw some conclusions for appropriate policies to promote sustained growth.

The early years of transition were characterized by a sharp contraction in output following the disruption of traditional and financial links, and the abandonment of old central plan lines of production. This was generally followed by attempts to maintain production and employment at previous levels by government subsidies, which meant running large fiscal and quasi-fiscal deficits (i.e., cheap unpayable Central Bank credit), resulting in high rates of inflation—particularly after countries had introduced their own currencies—and further collapses in output. After this common experience, most transition countries engaged in comprehensive stabilization and reform programs, often supported by the IMF and the World Bank.

Although most countries generally succeeded in lowering inflation by about 1995–1996, the success in achieving sustained growth has been more varied. Those that started stabilization earlier experienced earlier recovery, but the timing, strength, and sustainability of growth also depended on progress in structural reforms.

Table 4.2, shows that for Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltics,⁴ inflation reached its peak in 1992 and reasonably low rates of inflation were established in 1994, the same year in which growth resumed. In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries,⁵ this process took place on average two years later, with growth resuming only in 1996–1997. To presage some of the later discussion, it is useful to observe the broad correlation of growth and/or progress in market reforms, as measured by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The index of reform is scaled from 0 to 1.0, the first being a central plan economy, the second a fully open functioning market economy. Table 4.2 also shows that countries in Central and Eastern Europe started earlier in implementing structural reforms and, on average, have made considerably more progress, as indicated by the higher level of the reform index. Progress in structural reforms in CIS

Table 4.2
Summary Statistics of Growth, Inflation, and Structural Reforms in Transition
Countries

Image not available

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Sources: national authorities, de Melo et al (1996), EBRD Transition Reports; and IMF staff estimates.

countries has been much slower, with the median value of the reform index in 1997 still only at the 1991 level of Central and Eastern European countries. Although this hasn't prevented the resumption of growth, on average two to three years after the start of the disinflation process, the economic rebound in the CIS countries has been weaker. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the group average for the CIS became positive only in 1997, at 1.3 per cent, whereas in the Baltics, it has been positive for three years averaging 4.9 per cent and in Central and Eastern Europe for four years averaging 2.6 per cent. While slower progress in reforms is one possible explanation, another is less favourable initial conditions in CIS countries compared to Central and Eastern European countries.

Table 4.3 updates some growth statistics for Ukraine, where we can see that 1998 and 1999 continue to be years of negative growth or stagnation, with some moderate signs of recovery in the second half of 1999.

Table 4.3

Ukraine: Indicators of Economic Growth, year-on-year, percentage changes

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II. RECENT STUDIES OF GROWTH DETERMINANTS

As early as the first Dubrovnik Conference on Transition in 1995, de Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1997) presented a paper analyzing patterns of transition, including growth, to that date. Their econometric analysis of growth provided a clear new direction for subsequent efforts to explain recovery and growth in transition by showing that while inflation stabilization was a necessary condition, an equally important condition was progress on economic liberalization. In later work, de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev (1997) added a detailed analysis of the role of initial conditions. Broadly similar results are obtained in Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996). The now much larger literature on recovery in transition⁶ tries to explain growth difference in terms of three main categories of explanatory factors:

1. macroeconomic stability as indicated by the level of inflation and the size of the budget deficit;
2. progress made with structural reforms, in particular market liberalization and privatization;

3. initial conditions, such as the degree of macroeconomic and structural distortions at the beginning of transition (e.g., a large military-industrial complex), wars, and internal conflict.

Subsequent studies such as Wolf (1997); Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998); and Berg, Borensztein, Sahay, and Zettelmeyer (1999) have combined these three categories and extended the period of study to determine their relative importance in explaining both the U-shaped time profile of output (output first declined in all transition countries, then recovered) as well as the cross-country differences in growth performance. These more recent studies broadly confirm the earlier conclusions about the need for stabilization and the crucial importance of economic liberalization, but also reach new conclusions on the importance of initial conditions and on the time-lag effects. Thus, while de Melo et al. (1997) showed a strong effect of initial conditions, both Berg et al. (1999) and Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) conclude that the effect has declined over time. The latter further demonstrate that any negative effect of initial conditions (such as a high degree of industrialization) can be compensated by more liberalization. The magnitude of this tradeoff is illustrated in Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, van Rooden (1998a). Adverse initial conditions reduce growth by a substantial amount compared to a sample of twenty-five countries: -1.4 percentage points for Ukraine, and -0.8 percentage points for Russia. This disadvantage is, however, easily offset by a little more structural reform. The EBRD index of reform (taking values 0 to 1.0) market would need to rise from 0.50 to 0.64 in Ukraine, or Russia from 0.70 to 0.74 to compensate for this. These later studies also show that negative effects on output of early and rapid liberalization at first contributes to output decline, and old industry inefficiencies are revealed by proper market prices; after 2 to 4 years, countries with earliest and greatest reform progress experience a rebound in production. Berg et al. (1999) capture this technically through a long lag structures specification; Havrylyshyn et al. show this by separating the period into that of "destruction" (1990–1993) and "creation" (1994 onwards); in

the later period, one sees more clearly the long-term, strongly positive effects of liberalization on growth, and that for the creation (or growth) period, the role of initial conditions, while still statistically significant, is much diminished.

III. IMPEDIMENTS TO GROWTH: A HISTORICAL LEGACY

It would be a mistake to ignore the initial historical conditions of any given country and argue that if only the right steps toward a market economy are quickly taken, all will be well; in Ukraine, this is labeled the “romantic view.” But one must also avoid the opposite mistake: attributing all difficulties to the inherited burdens of the past; one might label this the “historical fatalist” view. There are several risks to the latter view. First, it is an unnecessarily fatalistic—even defeatist—attitude that diminishes efforts to overcome past burdens, and misses the opportunities implied in the well-known advertising slogan of Avis: “If you’re No. 2, you try harder.” Second, it is the first convenient refuge of vested interests opposed to democratic or economic reform progress; for example, when a Kolkhoz director states “the farmers are not yet ready for private ownership,” does it not really mean that the director is not ready to give up the benefits of his position? Third, excessive emphasis on the inherited burdens can be easily exaggerated: over time, for example, the relative importance of the military-industrial complex necessarily diminishes as this sector declines in comparison to others. In general, it is too easy to fall prey to a negativist view that “our nation-building problems are bigger than theirs,” or “our lack of international financial expertise was worse than theirs.”

With this warning, let us go on to consider more fully a few specific “burdens of the past.”

The priority of nation building is often stated as an argument for delaying attention to economic policies and reforms. It is probably correct to state this as a historical fact and to say further that the consequent delays on the economic side slowed the efforts at inflation control and economic liberalization. Indeed, the delay may have allowed a reconsolidation of old elites into new anti-reform vested interests.⁷ But to say it happened is not to say that it was inevitable or justifiable.

From a basic and even an amateur knowledge of world history, it seems evident that one of the foundations of a nation must be the economy. From a comparison with others, it is further evident that new nations *can* work simultaneously on both the political and economic institutions. Thus, the three Baltic countries, Slovenia, Croatia, were able to build the political machinery as well bring budget deficits and inflation under control not later than by 1993–1994, and to proceed substantially on privatization and reorientation of exports to more promising Western markets. In one case, a simultaneous war effort of considerable cost was also undertaken. Indeed, even with the non-Baltic Former Soviet Union group, several new nations were able, by 1995, to advance further than Ukraine on economic liberalization and privatization: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova (see Table 4.4).

Indeed, some of the new nations faced the additional problem of civil wars and conflicts, which Ukraine was spared, and among them several have gone further with economic reform (as Section V will show). These include Armenia, Georgia, Croatia, and Moldova.

I will not, in this chapter, explore the reasons why nation building was perceived as a task that could justify delay in building the economy, but it would seem there are two possible explanations. For some members of the influential elites, financial (or bureaucratic) self-interest made them opposed to reform, and the notion of needing to build national political institutions first provided a convenient cover. For others, it may have been a simple judgment error. For still others, it was perhaps *infra dig* to worry about *koubasna-polityka*.⁸

As important as the reasons for giving priority to non-economic dimensions of nation building are the consequences. Section V addresses this directly, but here it may be useful to provide a thumbnail sketch of the circular causation between nation building, economic reforms, and performance (see Box 4.1).

The shortages of skilled officials, financial experts is considered as another negative historical burden. Thus, an early governor of the National Bank of Ukraine is reputed to have

Table 4.4
Structural Reform Indices

Image not available

Sources: de Melo et al. (1996) and EBRD Transition Reports.

said: "If only a few of the Ukrainians working in Moscow banks were to come back, we could immediately staff the NBU fully." In a broader sweep, Nativska (1997) argues that foreign advice was misspent in Ukraine because "the government lacked the skills needed to fulfill its new role in a market economy."

Box 4.1**A Tale of Delayed Market Reforms**

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As with nation-building arguments, the strongest counter-argument is comparison with other new nations. All the former Soviet Union states (with the possible exception of Russia in some areas as international finance) had the same skills inventory. Further, even the substance of the skill-shortage argument may be questioned. If administrative-bureaucratic skills (in the good sense of the word “bureaucratic”) are considered, it simply cannot be reasonable to say that the Soviet legacy did not provide these. It is precisely because it did that the Rukh forces and their

associates decided in 1991–1992 to turn over government operations to the old party elite in return for a promise to support independence (see Kuzio and Wilson 1994). If financial skills are in question, the alacrity with which the new financial capitalist elite of Ukraine, Russia, and other countries learned to make profits—and to stash some outside the country—is answer enough. Furthermore, to the extent that special “market” skills were not available or could not be developed quickly, they could have been borrowed from outside, or, even as happened to a great deal in the Baltics and Armenia, “absorbed” from the diaspora communities.

Perhaps the story of skills is more one of political will to move to the market. Where the will to reform was strong (Baltics, Armenia), these skills were self-developed and/or brought in from outside. Where the will to reform was weak, available opportunities to use, develop, borrow, or absorb skilled individuals were not fully exploited.

The excessive burden of inefficient heavy industry was a fact for many of the new nations, and Ukraine was among those with the greatest such legacy. The negative impact of such unfavourable initial conditions upon growth has indeed been confirmed by statistical analysis, for example, in de Melo, Denizer, Gelb, and Tenev (1997). But Ukraine is not the only country suffering from this—even Poland had a heavy legacy of old inefficient steel, coal, metallurgy. More recent statistical analysis of factors that determine growth by Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998) provide an estimate of the magnitude of this effect. They show, as did earlier studies, that adverse initial conditions do hamper growth, other things being equal; this resulted in about 1.5 per cent less GDP growth in Ukraine (and 0.8 per cent less in Russia) than other CIS countries. But a bit more progress on market reforms could offset this disadvantage. Thus, a move in Ukraine from its position just below the average for the CIS to about the CIS average would have been enough to turn Ukraine’s –1.7 per cent GDP growth in 1998 into at least a zero if not positive value.⁹ However, and equally important, the study also shows that over time the echo effect of this legacy declines, and that a moderate amount of additional progress on economic reforms in general offsets this negative effect.

One could go even further in the counter-argument and make the case that the burden of a military-industrial complex has a positive side: the cumulated scientific knowledge and capability. The impressive scientific achievements in Ukraine, in particular, are detailed in another chapter of this volume by Hawaleshka. The relevant point for this chapter is that the potential for economic growth inherent in this human and scientific capital remains underutilized because of the lack of the market reforms, which would stimulate more entrepreneurial activity, foreign investment, and restructuring of the old military-industrial complex.

Lack of a rich resource base is often thought to hamper growth and prosperity. In fact, economic writings on growth (in all countries, not just transition economies) come to a more nuanced conclusion. Thus, for example, Sachs and Warner (1995) do not deny the possible benefits of good agricultural land or mineral resources. But they and others note that resources, such as petroleum, are as often a bane as they are a boon (cf. Norway versus Venezuela and Nigeria). Furthermore, of the prosperous or prospering countries today, while many are resource-rich (the United States, Canada, and Australia), many others are resource poor (Japan, South Korea, and most of Europe). Furthermore, there are many countries that are resource-rich but not prospering, such as Brazil, Congo, and Zaire. For Ukraine, one might speculate a bit on energy and agricultural land. The lack of good energy resources is a big problem, which has led to a large accumulated debt for natural gas to Russia and Turkmenistan, and, in the latter case, a shutting-off of the flows. But as the evidence of many energy-poor and prosperous countries attests (Japan key among them, and most of Western Europe), this is a matter of being able to generate exports to pay for the energy imports. In agriculture, the lack of progress in privatization and liberalization of farm markets has meant a tremendous opportunity missed to re-establish at least partly the historical status of a European granary.

Distance from Western markets is the most popular argument to explain the better performance of Central Europe. A case is made that Ukraine is *farther from the knowledge of and access to Western markets* than Central European countries. A literal,

geographic distance interpretation cannot be a serious argument; the additional 500–1,000 kilometers is nearly meaningless for water transport via the Black Sea, and for road/air transport easily overcome by some combination of state and private investments in transport. If this means “historical” distance, the argument is more complex, and I won’t go into it beyond saying that like all historical legacies, they can be overcome unless they are allowed to be deterministic and in effect become a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the issue is closed markets in Western markets, this is a reality, but again one that others face and others have overcome. Taiwan, Korea, and China were not invited to export steel, clothing, and electronics to US and European markets; their exporters faced very high barriers and anti-dumping actions by importing governments. Yet they steadily increased the volume of their exports to today’s enormous levels. For Poland, Hungary, and other Central European countries, EU markets are only slowly being opened as they move from preferential trade agreements to partial free trade as EU Associate countries. But they too were not invited by the EU to become members—to the contrary, the political efforts to push for membership were enormous. A legitimate question may be asked: Why didn’t Ukraine request EU membership early on? Had it done so, would exports to the EU already be higher?

There is no simple answer to either question, but that is not the main point. The main point is that distance, like most other initial conditions (discussed in Section IV), are not rigid, immutable barriers; there are many political and economic policy measures that can be taken to overcome them. There are circumstances of very rigid initial conditions, like the land-locked, high transport-cost situation of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Fortunately for Ukraine, it does not face such insurmountable barriers.

Impediments to Growth: Inadequacies of Economic Policy and Reform

Financial stability is almost universally regarded as a *sine qua non* for economic growth (see Section III). Under conditions of hyperinflation and a volatile national currency that does not hold the confidence of economic actors, investors are loathe to invest,

producers fear taking new risks, bankers avoid lending to entrepreneurs, and individuals cushion themselves for the uncertain future by hoarding goods and foreign currency. Indeed, all who are able take their wealth out of the country or, at a minimum, out of the banks, resulting in the phenomenon of capital flight. The best economic news in Ukraine since 1995 is the attainment of a substantial degree of such financial stabilization. Inflation, which had reached 10,000 per cent annually in 1993–1994, was brought under control in 1995–1996, and by 1998 was a mere 11 per cent. Even with some rebound in 1999 as an echo of the August 1998 Russia financial crisis, this year's rate is not likely to exceed 25 per cent; in comparison, Russia's inflation may be more like 40 per cent.¹⁰ At the same time, the exchange rate of Ukraine's currency also stabilized, allowing a smooth introduction of the new *hryvnia* in September 1996. The rate of 1.76 Hr/\$ did depreciate steadily, but until August 1998 (the Russia financial crisis), this was a very low depreciation, less than inflation, so that the nominal value of 2.19 Hr/\$ in August 1998 meant the real value of the *hryvnia* vis-à-vis the dollar (after accounting for differences in inflation) appreciated. As the Russia crisis inevitably spilled over into Ukraine and other neighbours closely integrated with Russia's economy,¹¹ the *hryvnia* depreciated much more sharply, reaching about 4.5 Hr/\$ in October 1999. Nevertheless, this was less severe than in Russia, where the ruble fell from about 6 Rs/\$ in August 1998 to about 26Rs/\$ in October 1999.

Thus, apart from some inevitable impact from the Russia storm since August 1998, the last three years have shown a remarkable achievement in macroeconomic stability in Ukraine. Yet, as noted earlier, the GDP continues to decline even in 1999. Why is this so? The literature on growth in transition countries gives a succinct answer: financial stability is a *necessary but not sufficient condition* for the economy to recover and achieve sustained growth; in addition, there must be sufficient progress on market reforms, privatization, and an attractive business climate.

Progress on reforms toward a functioning market economy is the area where Ukraine lags behind most, as Table 4.4 demonstrates. This is not to say that no progress has been made, or that Ukraine is the least reformed of the post-Soviet economies.

The EBRD index in Table 4.4 is an amalgam of various detailed measures of progress¹² and Ukraine scores better on some and worse on others. For 1998, the values were, for illustration purposes, as follows:

- private sector share of GDP (Ukraine 55 per cent; Hungary 80 per cent; Turkmenistan 25 per cent)
- large-scale privatization (On the scale, Ukraine scores 4, Hungary and Poland 4+, Belarus 1)
- small-scale privatization (Ukraine 3+; most of Central Europe 4+, except Balkan states with 3 and 3+; Belarus and Turkmenistan 2)
- price liberalization (Ukraine 3; Poland 3+, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Turkmenistan 2)
- trade and foreign exchange liberalization (Ukraine -3; most of Central Europe 4 to 4+; Belarus, Turkmenistan 1)
- competition policy (Ukraine 2; Central Europe 3; Turkmenistan 1)
- banking sector reform (Ukraine 2; Hungary 4; Belarus, Turkmenistan 1)
- development of securities markets (Ukraine 2; Hungary; Poland 3+; Turkmenistan 1)

In some areas where the EBRD does not provide detail, like agricultural sector privatization, Ukraine is perhaps even further back in the list. Land privatization has proceeded to a far greater degree in several FSU countries: in the Baltics and Armenia, it is virtually complete; in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and the Kyrgyz Republic (and even recently Tajikistan), it is well advanced, although land surveys, formal registration of deeds, and the legality of using land as collateral are not fully in place. The measurement of progress in transition to the market is not a precise science, and a general bias exists in subjective measures like those of the EBRD, giving too much weight to *de jure* changes in laws, regulations, and too little weight to the *de facto* implementation of new “freedoms” in the economy. Export or import licences, which are meant to be automatic, can be delayed for petty bureaucratic reasons; freedom to set up a business

can be made so complex and fraught with bureaucratic hurdles and ineffective bribing that it is a hollow freedom. Such biases may be greater in the CIS countries than in Central Europe, but there is no reason to believe that they are greater in Ukraine than in any of its CIS neighbours, hence in the relative comparison, these biases make little difference.¹³

On balance—and even accounting for the inaccuracies of the EBRD scores—it is clear that Ukraine's progress toward the market is far behind that of Central Europe and the Baltics; is probably behind the more advanced CIS reformers like Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova; and is perhaps similar to the lagging CIS countries like Russia and Azerbaijan. The only countries that are clearly even further behind are Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.¹⁴ The studies on growth in transition summarized in Section III all agree on the overwhelming importance of advanced market reforms in explaining the ability of, for example, Central European countries to achieve growth rates of GDP since the mid-1990s of 3–6 per cent per annum. The limited progress in market reforms is thus one of the most important explanations for Ukraine's continued poor economic performance.

In an earlier study, Havrylyshyn (1998) has outlined an argument explaining why reforms were delayed, and the consequent buildup of opposition to reforms. Here, only a thumbnail sketch will be presented. Reforms are delayed perhaps because of uncertainty and fear of what a rapid move to the market may do, and/or because of a "nation-building" view that other elements are more important and the economy can wait. The old Soviet elites as well as the bureaucracy, which at first may have feared for their position, feel a renewed strength in controlling the process. As some elements of capitalism are now open (indeed were opened by *perestroika*), a "new capitalist" elite develops, largely by limited but gradual insider privatization (privatization in the worst case) and largely based on the old elite. Their renewed power permits them to influence or even capture the political process, and ensure that any move toward the market is beneficial to them rather than inimical. This means they will soon agree to a basic financial stability (as hyperinflation is destructive of productive capacity), a gradual but controlled

privatization of state assets transferring ownership to the hands of this new elite and their cronies. But they will also favour a large and generous government that can support their new enterprises by, for example, ensuring *de facto* low energy prices or special tax privileges. And they will strongly oppose a complete liberalization of the markets to new competition, either from outside, or from *de novo* small enterprises that, if successful and dynamic, can grow to be big enterprises and threaten the status quo. Thus, the transition to market is frozen halfway, with some new capitalism, but a monopolistic, state-aided economic structure prevailing, instead of a capitalism open to all, small and large, old and new, domestic and foreign. Such a capturing or, at a minimum, influencing of economic policy by inefficient vested interests not only delays reform, but makes any future effort to restart reforms very difficult.

Impediments to Growth: Underdeveloped Institutions of Governance

Just as achievement of financial stability is not enough to ensure economic growth and prosperity, so too formal changes in legislation to allow freedom of private economic activity are not enough to motivate vibrant entrepreneurial activity. The limited progress on market reforms discussed in the previous section may in fact overstate the degree to which government has disengaged from intervention in economic activity. Bureaucratic complexities, arbitrariness, favouritism, and corruption, together with poor enforcement of commercial law and newly legal property rights, can be a great impediment to new entrepreneurial activity and hence economic growth. On the other hand, there are examples when governance problems emerge because of the vacuum of government, i.e., its inability to enforce the law against petty racketeering, fair and accessible implementation of contract law, and recourse to legal system against arbitrary government actions. A catch-all phrase for this area of government activity is "governance." Recent assessments of achievements in transition so far have put considerable emphasis on the shortcomings of such an open, even-handed, and effective legal framework.¹⁵ This problem is particularly acute in CIS countries, including, although not particularly, Ukraine. The

nature of governance makes it necessarily difficult to measure, hence it is difficult to place Ukraine in any “ranking” within the CIS. A possible indirect measure of poor governance in transition countries is the degree of underground activity. This is so because the greater the burden of government intervention, the more likely that entrepreneurs will hide in the informal sector. Kaufman and Johnson (1998) attempt to measure both the extent of the bureaucratic burden and the degree of underground activity, and find that the two are indeed highly correlated. Furthermore, they find that CIS countries have a much greater problem than Central Europe and the Baltics, and that Ukraine has one of the highest degrees of informal economy levels.

Another way to measure this is through expert surveys or rankings of business climate, ease of dealing with government, corruption, etc. Perhaps a dozen or more such surveys exist worldwide. Figure 4.2 provides a summary of nine such measures and it is clear they all generally place Ukraine toward the bottom.¹⁶

Corruption is not a separate factor but part of the governance problem. In the economics profession, corruption is not viewed as primarily a historical or cultural characteristic more prevalent in some countries or regions. While historical-cultural inertia may play a role in economic analysis, corruption is thought to be primarily the result of excessive government activity, which results in bureaucratic power of “approval” for private sector activities.¹⁷ In a word, where freedom of private economic activity is treated as a privilege to be allowed by the government (the bureaucracy) and not as a right, there is considerable room for bribery and corruption. Thus, for many economists, a separate measurement of the degree of corruption and separate discussion of corruption is, in some sense, unnecessary. It is the entire “governance package” that matters, and within that should be included special measures addressed at corruption such as *effective* laws on conflict of interest and meaningful procuratorial action on cases of bribery. Indeed, the ranking of a country on narrowly defined corruption scoring is generally highly correlated with its ranking for more direct measures of governance quality. Thus, given Ukraine’s low ranking on governance, it comes as no surprise to see the resulting low ranking on corruption.

Figure 4.1
The Impact of Reform and Inflation on Growth—Cross-Sectional
Results¹

Image not available

Sources: Author's estimates and EBRD (1997)

Figure 4.2

Institutional, Political, and Economic Reform Indicators

Image not available

Sources: Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Euromoney, EBRD, Worldbank.
Note: rescaled 1997 values

III. CONCLUSIONS AND WAYS FORWARD

This chapter has examined a wide variety of factors that may explain the continued economic stagnation in Ukraine. Whether or not there is new economic growth in Ukraine can be debated, since official statistics of GDP may not capture a thriving underground economic activity. But even if there is more growth in underground activity than there is decline above ground, two arguments can be made that all is not well with the economy. First, the very fact that so much activity is driven underground reflects an inhospitable climate for new entrepreneurial initiatives, hence poor prospects for sustained and dynamic growth. Second, even after accounting for any such underground activity, it is clear that Ukraine's performance ranks very much in the lower end of a group of twenty-five transition countries.

The first conclusion to draw from this chapter is that no single factor can fully or even primarily explain the lack of economic growth in Ukraine. Thus, no single panacea or solution can be recommended.

But the second conclusion is perhaps more operational and constructive; of the many factors discussed, only a small handful are truly important, and indeed one factor—too slow progress on market reforms—may be more important than any other factor. Besides slow reforms, it appears clear that some unfavourable initial conditions have hampered growth. Thus, an above-average legacy of heavy industry did make it more difficult to transform the economy. However, there is no magic solution for this, and indeed the only effective way to deal with this is to apply a strong and steady dose of market reforms, accepting the fact that their effect will take longer than, for example, in the Baltics where less heavy industry existed. If you are No. 2, you try harder. Another factor of some importance was the priority for nation building. While not unique to Ukraine, it is possible that it was (perhaps mistakenly) used as a reason to delay reforms. But this is now a bygone, and the time has surely come to redress the imbalance and pay more attention to building the economic pillar of the nation.

Finally, a third conclusion relates to the delay of economic reforms. It is now clear that delaying economic reforms to build

the political-institutional pillars of a new nation was not without cost. The cost is not only a few years of lost growth; the bigger cost is that the delay allowed many anti-reform interests to develop—or regenerate, as the case may be. Thus, the old Soviet bureaucracy, only somewhat modified or renamed, realized their days were not over. Further, the new capitalists who, often through insider deals, took over private control of the old state assets, found it preferable to maintain a quasi-monopolistic control and opposed a truly competitive environment. At the same time, the old managerial elites of the still unprivatized assets (much of heavy industry and coal, agriculture, and much of the utilities sector) learned new ways of getting support from government—cheap credits instead of direct subsidies, cheap energy via non-payment, and tax exemptions. This process led to a “capture” of government by anti-reform interests and a freezing of the transition, so the real cost of the delay is that further progress on market reforms now faces far strong opposition.

Any analyst looking forward in this situation can take a predictive or prescriptive approach—or both. I will focus on the prescriptive, and note only the following in a predictive vein. While the recent re-election of President Kuchma presents a new opportunity to restart the stalled reform process, the effort will not be at all easy, inasmuch as the new oligarchic vested interests have grown stronger as a result of the past delays in economic reform. If the will to reform is there, however, and the new opportunity is to be seized, what should be done? Let me propose three recommendations. The first, and quite general one, is not new: there must be a much more determined effort at reforms aimed at creating a functioning market economy. The recipe’s details are too well known to need retelling here.

Two other recommendations are more narrow and specific, and intended to answer the (possible) question a reforming politician would put to an economist. “If I can do only *two* things to break open this situation, what would they be?” One would be a radical simplification and easing of all government regulations for small, new entrepreneurs. This should range from making very simple the process of registering and starting a new business, to a lifting of the excessive burden of inspection by tax

authorities, building control agencies, fire and health regulators, etc. It should also include a substantial effort to make the judiciary system work quickly and fairly in commercial law matters. The basic goal is to make doing business a right of individuals and not a privilege granted by bureaucrats, and to make the law even-handed for all, small or large, influential or unimportant. If a political catchphrase is needed to capture this, it might be “capitalism for all.”

Another action with considerable potential leverage would be a committed effort to re-engage the EU in discussions for Ukraine’s eventual association and membership. While today this seems far-fetched, there is no legal impediment to it, “merely” a political one on both sides. The difficulties are well known, but the prize is surely worth considerable effort. It is, furthermore, clear from the experience of countries that are now on track for EU membership that the benefits of this anchor—not least of which is making a member country attractive to foreign investors—are considerable and begin well in advance of actual membership.

NOTES

- 1 I wish to thank Bogdan Lissovlik for his assistance on some recent details of economic developments in Ukraine, as well as for his comments. Useful suggestions were also provided by Martin Petri and conference participants. I am also grateful to Joan Campayne for producing a clean text. Remaining errors and views expressed in the paper are those of the author alone; they do not necessarily reflect the position of the International Monetary Fund or its Executive Board.
- 2 On catch-up, see Fischer, Sahay, and Vegh (1996) and Sachs and Warner (1996). The former, for example, calculate that with a per capita growth rate of 4.75 per cent annually, it would take on average thirty-five years to catch up to the average OECD level. With a growth rate of 4 per cent, it would take forty-five years.
- 3 In fact, for recent years official GDP estimates include a small upward adjustment of about 10 per cent for underground activities, but most economists agree that this is far too little.
- 4 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, FYR of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

- 5 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
- 6 This literature is reviewed in Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1999).
- 7 This argument elaborated in Havrylyshyn (1997); a preliminary version of this article was presented in an earlier Toronto conference on Ukraine, at York University in 1994.
- 8 Or “sausage-politics” in literal translation. In the early days before independence, the reference was to promoting interest in an independent Ukraine by arguing that this would bring better economic conditions. Many dissidents, who formed a core of pro-independence forces, found this approach compelling.
- 9 Technically, in a regression analysis, the coefficient values are such that moving forward on reforms from an actual index of 0.57 (on a scale of 0 to 1.0—see Section VI and Table 4.4) to 0.64 (which is below Russia’s 0.70 and far below Poland’s 0.85), would offset the growth loss due to adverse conditions. Moving to Polish reform levels would have given 1997–1998 growth of 4–5 per cent per annum—*almost* Polish growth.
- 10 These are annual average inflation, used for comparison with the hyperinflation periods. For economic specialists, the more useful rate is the intra-year comparison; these values for 1998 and 1999 (estimated) are 20 per cent and 15–17 per cent respectively.
- 11 Ukraine’s trade with Russia was in 1998 about 35 per cent. This high dependence is itself evidence of limited structural changes in the economy. However, even if more diversification to Western markets had taken place, an impact would still have been felt. Thus, for example, Latvia’s, whose trade with Russia had declined to below 20 per cent, felt the August 1998 shock as several banks failed, and GDP growth fell from 6 per cent in 1997–1998 to 2 per cent in 1998–1999.
- 12 The EBRD index is not without shortcomings, partly because it combines objective measures (per cent privatized, existence of laws) with subjective ones (meaningful privatization; effective implementation of laws). On balance, as discussed in Kaufman, Kraay, and Lobaton (1999) and Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1999), the broad rankings it shows are widely reflected in many other similar indicators and expert views.
- 13 The size of a country’s bureaucracy in per capita terms could be a proxy for such biases of de facto implementation. Unfortunately, reliable numbers for this, including the all-important regional and local governments, are not available. A crude approximation may be government expenditures as a per cent of GDP (though this is clearly *not* the same as the size of a bureaucracy). Havrylyshyn, Izvorski, and van Rooden (1998) demonstrated that in a

statistical analysis of growth in transition, a smaller share of government to GDP led to higher growth.

- 14 While Table 4.4 shows a value of 0.46 for Tajikistan, in 1998, since the peace agreement, much has changed in Tajikistan with considerable privatization and liberalization.
- 15 Sugisaki, Chapter 12 in Havrylyshyn and Nsouli, 2000.
- 16 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Lobaton (1999) describe those various measures as do Havrylyshyn and van Rooden (1999). The best-known ones are those of Transparency International, *Wall Street Journal*, The Freedom House, and The Heritage Foundation. The above two studies come to the similar conclusion that these surveys, despite their possible subjectivity, are well founded, solid, and generally very consistent. The strong consistency can be seen in Figure 4.2, where the solid line is the average for all of them, and others are specific individual surveys.
- 17 A good example is Mauro (1998).

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5

Ukrainian Science and Its Conversion from Military to Peaceful, Economically Useful Purposes

OSTAP HAWALESHKA

BACKGROUND

The collapse in 1991 and subsequent dismemberment of the Soviet Union into separate, independent republics temporarily removed the frightening prospect of an all-out nuclear confrontation between the two superpowers. There were great hopes that the former formidable enemy and the other newly emerged independent nations would soon transform themselves into democratic, market-oriented, and prosperous nation-states ready to join their Western colleagues on an equal footing. Unfortunately, for most of the former Soviet republics this proved to be a somewhat premature dream. Over seventy years of communism had seriously stunted their ability to recover from its mentality. This resulted in severely reduced economies with near total disruption of previous industrial ties and relationships. Due to the almost complete collapse of industrial production and their inability to identify income and collect appropriate taxes, the new, inexperienced governments were unable to pay for the extensive industrial and human infrastructure they had inherited. It became commonplace for teachers, bureaucrats, medical personnel, and other government employees to be unpaid for months on end, sometimes for up to a year. Since most industries were also not operating, their workers faced similar difficulties.

The same situation existed in the scientific (research and academic) world. The powerful National Academy of Sciences of

Ukraine, with its over 170 major research institutes and establishments, teetered on verge of bankruptcy but continued to exist in large measure due to the willpower of its leadership and the collective goodwill and dedication of its members to continue working in their respective scientific spheres. This they somehow managed to do, at a very reduced level, overcoming the near absence of real governmental funding.

With time, conditions became progressively worse. The formerly proud research institutes found themselves without heat, electricity, funds for the maintenance of their expensive scientific equipment or for any badly needed newer equipment, and without means to pay their staff.

It is therefore not surprising that under such conditions the scientific establishment underwent traumatic changes. Many (especially younger, promising members) left to try their luck in various "business activities." Although this avenue may have provided them a means of personal survival and is contributing to the eventual economic restart of the nation, it has resulted in a tremendous loss of scientific knowledge and capability for the country's future.

Such were the conditions that engendered the establishment of the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine.

INTRODUCTION

The Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) is an intergovernmental organization, the first and only one of its kind established in Ukraine. It was created by an agreement signed on October 15, 1993, by four founding parties: Canada, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United States of America. This signed agreement was put into force by President L. Kravchuk's decree #202 of May 4, 1994. The STCU began its first organizational steps with the arrival of its first Canadian executive director, the author of this article, Professor Ostap Hawaleshka, who was responsible for its formal establishment, staffing, and development into a full operation. Deputy executive directors from Ukraine, Sweden, and the United States came on board somewhat later, as did the chief financial officer from the United States and the chief administrative officer from Canada. All other members of

the staff were Ukrainian. The STCU became fully registered in Ukraine on February 14, 1995. Its main mission, as paraphrased from the agreement, is as follows:

To support research and development (R&D) activities proposed by Ukrainian scientists and engineers, formerly involved with the development of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as part of the general process of conversion from a largely centralized military planning environment to a civilian, market-driven, competitive environment.

The main part of the rationale for this center was the West's hope that this would help Ukraine keep its considerable pool of talented scientists in the country, rather than having them leave for better remunerated positions elsewhere, including countries that want to develop such weapons. The West also wanted to convert former Ukrainian weapons-of-mass-destruction scientists' orientation of their work and their attitudes and ways of working from the one common in the former Soviet Union to that generally prevalent in competitive and market-driven economies. It was also important to integrate these scientists and their activities into the general world community by partnering them with similar research or industrial organizations in the donor countries, parties to the STCU agreement. A similar rationale had led, two years earlier, to the establishment of the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), in Moscow, to serve the needs of weapons scientists from Russia and from most of the other former Soviet republics, except for Ukraine.

The total initial funding of the STCU amounted to about Can. \$27,000,000, and grew over the years to exceed Can. \$50,000,000 by the end of 1999 with the accession of the European Communities, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, as well as direct involvement of Japan. By mid-1998, the STCU supported over 5,000 top former Ukrainian weapons scientists and engineers working on approximately 250 scientific, industrially oriented R&D projects. Particularly noteworthy is that a significant portion of these R&D projects was done in collaboration with many Western research and industrial organizations under the STCU's Partnership Program.

As a result of its work, the STCU has been recognized as probably the greatest single contributor toward the maintenance of Ukrainian scientific and technological capabilities during this traumatic period of transition from a politically centralized to a competitive and democratic market environment.

The first executive director was succeeded in 1998 by another Canadian, Leo Owsiacski, of Sudbury, Ontario, who furthered the STCU's success by extending its reach to other countries and convincing the STCU partners to significantly increase their funding commitments to the centre. A particularly noteworthy thrust was the STCU's effective support and management (together with the government of Ukraine) of any possible Y2K problems at Ukrainian nuclear power-generating stations. Although prevailing circumstances were not the easiest, this was carried out very successfully.

This chapter presents a brief overview of selected scientific and technological capabilities of Ukraine, its present situation, and its opportunities in the twenty-first century. The contributions of the STCU to the maintenance and continued development of Ukrainian science and its integration into the world community will be highlighted.

THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE

Ukrainian scientific research and much of its technological development activities operated under the aegis of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU), as well as of the Soviet Academy of Sciences during former times. This powerful and highly respected organization was for many years headed by the academician E.O. Paton (of the world-famous E.O. Paton Welding Institute) and is still led by his son, academician Borys E. Paton. Its membership included over 170 major research and development institutes, including elements of several major technological design bureaus. A perusal of its annual reports (which recently became available on the Internet at <www.nasu.gov.ua>) shows that over 80,000 high-calibre scientists and engineers worked under NASU's umbrella. They were a formidable scientific force, particularly in the military sphere.

In addition to NASU establishments, there were many other academic and industrial organizations closely involved in research

and development of weapons of mass destruction. All in all, it was estimated that approximately 20,000–30,000 Ukrainian scientists and engineers had been fully committed to the development of such weapons (nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and biological) and their means of delivery (missiles). It was this scientific and technical cohort that the STCU was established “to serve and convert”!

SELECTED UKRAINIAN SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS

Here are just a few of the many significant achievements of Ukrainian science and technology that illustrate Ukraine’s past contributions and potential for contributing even more in the future:

- The very first nuclear reaction in continental Europe took place in the former capital of Ukraine, Kharkiv, in its famous Kharkiv Physico-Technical Institute, which was until recently off limits to Western visitors.
- The first digital computer in continental Europe was invented and created at one of the world’s largest computing research centres, the Hlushkov Institute of Cybernetics in Kyiv, the present capital of Ukraine.
- The co-period discoverer of X-rays was the eminent Ukrainian scientist, Ivan Puluy, who was finally recognized in 1996 with a statue in his honour.
- The world’s largest rocket design and manufacturing establishment, the Southern Pivdenne (previously Yuzhnoye) Design Bureau and Factory in Dnipropetrovsk in southern Ukraine, was responsible for the design and production of over half of the Soviet Union’s space and military rocket systems, including the feared SS-18 intercontinental missile. (Even today, only a dozen or so countries in the world can design and build their own rocket systems.)
- The control systems for Buran, the Soviet equivalent of the US Space Shuttle, came from Khartron in Kharkiv.

- The greatly admired automatic docking mechanism for rockets used by Soviet space missions to the various orbiting satellites and stations such as the famous (and long-suffering) *Mir Station* is a product of Khartron and the Kyiv Radio Factory.
- The amazingly successful Soviet rocket and space program—responsible for such immense breakthroughs as the world's first orbiting satellite, the world's first animal in orbit, and the world's first human in orbit, the first unmanned landings on the Moon and on Venus, and the world's first orbiting space station—was headed by the famous Ukrainian scientist-engineer Serhij Koroliw (Sergej Koroliov), the counterpart of Germany's and the United States' Wernher von Braun of the *V-2* and *Apollo* Program fame. Koroliv was born just west of Kyiv, in historic Zhytomyr, where a modest aerospace museum honours their most famous son and his many achievements.
- The world's largest airplane, the gigantic AN-225 *Mriya* that was designed and built by Antonov Airplane Co. of Kyiv, was also responsible for many of the Soviet Union's military and civilian transport aircraft. Many of its huge AN-224 *Ruslan* aircraft are regularly used on UN relief missions or transporting oversize air cargo around the world. (Again, probably fewer than ten countries could develop such aircraft today.) Antonov is remembered particularly for the AN-2, the equivalent of the world-famous Canadian De Havilland *Beaver* bush plane. Both were designed to operate effectively and safely in similar extreme, remote, and northern environments. The new AN-70 military transport is being considered as a heavy transport by several European states.
- The highly specialized welding system to be used in the inhospitable environment of the *International Space Station* that is presently being assembled in orbit has been invented and will be supplied by Ukraine's Paton Welding Institute in Kyiv, widely considered to be the world's premier welding research centre.
- Ukraine's Southern Rocket Corporation has joined Boeing Co. of the United States, Russia's RSC Energia Co., and

Norway's Kvaerner Maritime Co. to form the "Sea Launch" Consortium to use Ukrainian ZENIT rockets (a civilian version of the feared SS-18) to launch heavy communication satellites from a floating ocean platform into orbits up to 22,000 miles high. From its launch location near the equator in the middle of the South Pacific Ocean, such launches can take advantage of the Earth's rotation to reduce fuel requirements and costs and thus create a very competitive and profitable enterprise. Two successful launches have already taken place.

- One of the world's most sophisticated deep space communication centres is located at Eupatoria, on the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine. The National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU), under the direction of Oleksander Nehoda, is proposing the establishment of an "international space city" at that location.
- Ukraine, having taken over Britain's Antarctic Research Station in 1996, has joined the extremely small and elite group of nations actively carrying out research on that last remote continent.

Although in this partial listing we limited ourselves to certain selected fields of application, it still gives us an indication of the considerable depth and breadth of Ukrainian capabilities in scientific and technical areas.

Some other recognized major strengths of Ukrainian science can be found in material technologies (titanium, ceramics), semiconductor technologies (large crystals, integrated circuits), detection and telecommunications (over-the-horizon and deep space radar, lasers, communication, and control), and cybernetics (hardware and software for control systems).

OUTLINE OF THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES OF THE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN UKRAINE

The STCU was established to act as a typical granting agency for scientific research, akin to the United States' National Science Foundation (NSF) or Canada's Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC). As indicated earlier, its budget

to the year 2000 exceeded Can. \$50,000,000. The process started with a call for research proposals from Ukrainian weapons scientists. This appeared as an advertisement in governmental newspapers, a rather novel idea at the time. Interested scientists were encouraged to contact the centre to obtain ground rules, procedures, and application forms. These had to be completed in Ukrainian and English, the centre's two official languages, as stipulated in the STCU's agreement and statute. Although it was feared this requirement might cause some initial difficulties for those scientists who had been solely educated in Russian (the Soviet Union's operating language), these fears proved groundless as applying scientists adapted very readily. Necessity proved to be an excellent teacher.

It soon became painfully obvious that most applying scientists really had no idea of how to structure research proposals so that they would have some chance of success in a peer-evaluated, competitive environment. They were not used to highlighting their past achievements (which were mostly "secret" under the previous regime), presenting a logical plan of action, plausible and justifiable budgets, manpower and equipment requirements, and attainable timetables and goals. Much time and effort had to be spent to guide them in these matters. Although most of the STCU's project staff were quite young, its members rose to the occasion and were often complimented later by the scientists themselves for their help. These scientists later used these newly learned techniques to successfully obtain additional research grants from many other Western granting and research supporting agencies.

Because all projects were based on formerly classified leading-edge military research, the Ukrainian government was justifiably leery of having certain proprietary knowledge and technologies widely disseminated. Therefore, every project, before review by the STCU, had to be evaluated by the State Committee on Classified Material and by the State Committee for the Export of Technical Information. This was quite complex and difficult for the newly established Ukrainian governmental agencies to handle. The STCU developed a very good relationship with them and, in fact, assisted them by providing computing equipment and staff assistance.

Once approved by the Ukrainian authorities, the STCU project officers assisted the scientists in improving the presentation of their proposals. Once they were deemed to be in satisfactory, they were then sent for scientific and commercial review by their scientific professional peers in the donor countries: Canada, Sweden, and the United States initially and later the EC. In Canada this peer evaluation was done through NSERC, which did a very professional job. Sweden handled this through its Defense Research Agency. The US scientific evaluation was done mostly through the US National Laboratories Network (at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore). These labs, with their own experience in classified matters, were also able to determine what the United States considered paramount in its evaluation—the proportion of actual former Ukrainian weapons scientists scheduled to work on any one project. This proportion, called Purity of Objective, had to be at least 50 per cent in order for the project be accepted for funding to meet the “conversion” criteria of US aid originating from their so-called “Nunn-Lugar” funding allocation.

When all parties had made their priority selections, they gathered in Kyiv prior to each formal meeting of the governing board to consider the priorities indicated by the Ukrainian government for that particular series of projects. In a negotiating session, the parties would come to an agreement as to which projects any one of them would wish to support in full or in partnership with others and which they were unable to support. The initial success rate ranged from 30–40 per cent, indicating the high calibre of the Ukrainian projects.

This final selection of winning (accepted) research projects would then be formally announced at the governing board meeting and published in government papers. This was followed by an exhausting series of discussions with the winning scientists in order to hammer out an acceptable work plan, schedule, milestones, and achievable goals. With time, it also became a prerequisite to identify some Western industrial organization willing to work with the Ukrainian scientists on their project. Once everything was deemed acceptable, the project was signed off and financing would start flowing.

One of the most interesting (and time-consuming) aspects of the STCU's work was that instead of sending funds to institutes

or project managers, all scientists, engineers, and other staff employed on the projects were paid directly from the centre. This approach greatly simplified subsequent auditing procedures. Equipment purchased with project funds remained the ownership of the STCU until successful completion of the project, at which point it could be donated to the research group.

Regular reports had to be provided and evaluated. Furthermore, each project underwent several in-person audits at the work site.

It was hoped that a good proportion of accepted projects would result in new, patentable products that could be commercialized by the Ukrainian research teams—by themselves or in conjunction with their Western co-operating organizations. The Ukrainian research group kept the rights to all intellectual property it developed.

In order to better serve the scientific clients with project preparation, provide a base for contacts, and to facilitate ongoing auditing activities, the STCU established three regional offices. The first was established in 1995 in Lviv to encourage participation of scientists from western Ukraine. Shortly after, two centres were established, one in Kharkiv for eastern Ukraine and the other in Dnipropetrovsk to handle the southern region and Crimea. These last two were located in very active military research regions. All were co-ordinated from the head office in Kyiv.

SOME RESULTS OBTAINED BY THE STCU

The first CFP competition, in 1995, brought in 346 research proposals. The second, in 1997, generated over 1,400! This was a tremendous response, indicating that the Ukrainian scientific community had come to trust the STCU. They saw that the STCU did not only promise but actually delivered.

The average project funded by the STCU amounted to approximately US \$120,000. This is a very significant amount, particularly when one considers prevalent Ukrainian conditions. A conservative estimate of a comparable figure for a North American (Canadian) context would be fifteen to twenty times that.

By the end of the ninth meeting of the governing board in December 1999, the STCU announced that nearly 5,000 former

Ukrainian weapons-of-mass-destruction scientists and engineers were being supported on over 250 advanced, fundamental, developmental, and commercial R&D projects for a total sum exceeding Can. \$ 45,000,000. By that time the STCU was recognized as the largest single source of real R&D support to the Ukrainian scientific community. This was no mean achievement!

One of the most encouraging aspects of the STCU's efforts was the signing of an important number of partnership agreements between Ukrainian researchers (working on STCU projects) and interested co-operating Western governmental and industrial R&D organizations. This is particularly satisfying because it is expected that the research project will produce a marketable product that will benefit both parties.

A review of the STCU's activities and achievements makes it obvious that the STCU is fully meeting its original aims and objectives of reducing the risk of weapons knowledge proliferation and encouraging Ukraine's considerable scientific talent pool to continue working within Ukraine, jointly with their counterparts overseas, and thus join the world scientific community. It is no wonder then, that a message from the US ambassador to Ukraine to the US secretary of state described the STCU as a prime example of a successful aid project that, under very difficult circumstances, fulfilled all aspects of its mandate under strict financial and managerial control.

The STCU's success was recognized and rewarded by the parties to its agreement by continuing their commitment to the STCU and increasing the funds allocated to it, thus securing its continued work for the beginning of the twenty-first century.

There can be no doubt that the founding parties to the STCU agreement—Ukraine, Canada, Sweden, and the United States and joined later by the European Communities, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, and assisted by Japan—can be justly proud to have contributed to this success.

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Part Three

Possibility of

Civil Society

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6

Preconditions of a Civil Society in Ukraine: The Relevance of the Early Twentieth-Century Ukrainian Social Thought

WSEVOLOD W. ISAJIW

One of the most obvious and urgent problems of development in Ukraine since its independence has been that of economic change and economic stability. Economic change has meant the necessity of privatizing economic activities. Sociologically, this means lodging economic activities in the civil society rather than in the state. This process, however, has proved to be extremely slow, wrought with corruption, abuse of public money, and crime. Concern with the possibility of existence of civil society is nothing new. This question of social order in which normal economic activities can take place has been a concern of a number of social and sociological theorists in the past. Emile Durkheim raised the issue as to whether economics that require contractual agreements can proceed without some underlying preconditions. In the early twentieth century before the Russian Revolution, several Ukrainian social thinkers raised the same issue about nation building in Ukraine. Among these were Bohdan Kistiakivsky (1868–1920) and Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) whom I consider to be the foremost representatives of Ukrainian early twentieth-century sociological thought. Both of them were concerned with the question of civil social order in Ukraine, the former with the preconditions of a sound legal system, and the latter with the preconditions of a responsible elite structure of society.

In proposing to look at Kistiakivsky's and Lypynsky's analysis of the problem of establishing a civil society in Ukraine, my contention is that, in essence, this problem is the same as it was

eighty years ago. Serious thinkers had tried to find a solution to it at that time. In its seventy years of existence, the Soviet Union not only did not approach this problem, but greatly contributed to the destruction of any existing preconditions of a civil social order. As a result, the basic problem underlying the establishment of a civil society in Ukraine has remained unsolved until today. Hence, it can be useful to look at how serious social thinkers approached this problem before the coming of the Soviet Union. At the end we will ask to what extent their ideas are still applicable to present-day Ukraine.

Kistiakivsky's and Lypynsky's are two quite different approaches to the problem of social order, developed by two completely different men with different backgrounds, each with a different starting point. Yet, they shared a common concern with what we call nation building and developed ideas that, in the final analysis, come to the same conclusions.

Kistiakivsky's sociological thought combined three main elements: a methodology of studying society, a theory of law as the basis for social order, and an analysis of Ukrainian culture and society in relation to Russian culture and society. Although these three subjects of Kistiakivsky's thought may appear to be different, in his theory they were intricately intertwined. The main body of his theory, however, is sociology of law and his main concern with law is its significance as the basis of social order in society. Kistiakivsky asked the question and addressed himself to the debate of the time as to what constituted law. Kistiakivsky distinguishes five major approaches to understanding the nature of law: (1) conception of law in terms of state organization or state authority; (2) sociological conception of law, i.e., law as it comes to be fulfilled and lived in society; (3) the psychological concept of law as the consciousness of the importance of following laws in one's behaviour; (4) normative conception of law, i.e., the total set of norms that embody the idea of what is rightful in human relations; and (5) a technical or practical concept of law dealing with the question of "how" in concrete circumstances or in providing direction for establishing new norms in the face of new needs (Depenchuk 1996:97-170).

Kistiakivsky saw all these approaches as complementary to each other, but his main concern was with the sociological and

the psychological conceptions of law. The two approaches constituted a dialectic that defined the reality of law. The sociological conception was, according to him, essential because it constitutes the law's *objective* reality. This objective reality consists of regular fulfillment of the norms of law in everyday life. It consists thus not in the written-down legal paragraphs, but in people's behaviour and their lawful or unlawful deeds. Law thus is what Emile Durkheim called a social fact (Depenchuk 1996:179–182).

By defining the objective reality of law in sociological terms, however, Kistiakivsky was not giving up the importance of its subjective, psychological aspects. He repeats again that the essence of law does not consist of the articles and paragraphs published in codexes, court decisions, or government legislation. Rather, in addition to its objective reality, its essence resides in the consciousness of the entire society and its individual members. Kistiakivsky criticizes those scholars of law who define its psychological roots as just impulses toward good behaviour. He conceives the psychological nature of law to consist of consciousness of norms to which we give superindividual meaning and which give birth in our consciousness to demands of rightfulness and duty (Depenchuk 1996:97–170). In his work on the Russian intelligentsia, he points out that law becomes pre-eminently social because it is able to instill self-discipline in people. According to Kistiakivsky, only when people take law seriously can social discipline be created, and it is this self-discipline that creates individual freedom, even if the law originates from outside the individual. Kistiakivsky says that the problem is, however, the Russian intelligentsia has never developed a sound legal consciousness and hence has had little respect for the law. Law was the least important of all the cultural values for the intelligentsia. Russian public consciousness had never advanced the ideal of the legal person and the two aspects of this ideal: the person self-disciplined by law and a stable legal order and the person endowed with all rights and freely enjoying them. Such ideals, stated Kistiakivsky, are alien to the Russian intelligentsia's mentality. He goes so far as to state that the entire intelligentsia fails to understand the relevance of law for social life (Kistiakovskii 1994; Kistiakivsky 1994).

What is interesting here is that Kistiakivsky brings in the significance of the role of the intelligentsia who would develop consciousness of law in society. This becomes for him a prerequisite for establishing the objective reality of law. Thus, we have the two elements of law—the sociological and the psychological—brought together through the medium of the intelligentsia. That is, the objective reality of law exists in the sociological reality of people *de facto* living the law, but this reality is not possible unless there is a subjective, psychological consciousness of the value of the law fostered by society's intelligentsia.

Kistiakivsky explains why the intelligentsia had failed in this important role. He quoted Alexander Herzen, who as far back as 1850 observed the problem of legal insecurity in Russia. Talking about the people submitting to the law, Herzen noted: "In submitting, they are submitting only to force; the flagrant injustice of one part of the laws has led them to scorn the other. Complete inequality before the law has killed the bud of respect for legality in them. The Russian, whatever his class, breaks the law wherever he can do so with impunity; the government acts in the same way" (Kistiakovskii 1994:94). Kistiakivsky points out that, only with some exceptions, Russian intelligentsia, instead of emphasizing and developing legal consciousness, was more prone to follow the ideology of such ideologues as G.V. Plekhanov, who regarded power rather than law as the supreme principle of building the social order.

The problem of the Russian intelligentsia led Kistiakivsky to a debate with members of this intelligentsia in defence of the Ukrainian culture's right to integrity in the Russian empire. At first, Kistiakivsky argued that Ukrainian people were closely bound with the Russian people and should preserve this link. However, he saw the greatest obstacle to this unity to be the chauvinism of the Russian intelligentsia, who showed a disdain for and hostility toward the autonomous Ukrainian culture and who supported the czar's policy of Russification. He insisted that Ukrainian culture not only had the right to be autonomous, but possessed "a particular will and some sort of mystical power, stimulating this nation to defend its unique national individuality" (Kistiakovsky 1911). Interestingly, in 1918 when Ukraine proclaimed its independence, Kistiakivsky changed his position

on the unity of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and became part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia who tried to establish independent Ukrainian institutions. He participated in drafting new laws concerning citizenship and higher education in Ukraine.

It is in the theory of the intelligentsia's role that Kistiakivsky's and Lypynsky's ideas begin to meet. As was already pointed out, Lypynsky was a completely different man from Kistiakivsky. His writings have more of a publicist than scientific character, yet behind his journalistic language and a somewhat disjointed style, there is a systematic theory of nation building and as part of it, a theory of the social order. According to Lypynsky, the social order is made up of the relationships between different social classes. Social classes, however, are not defined in the Marxist sense as referring to those who own and those who do not own the means of production. For Marx, the relationship between the working class and the capitalist class was defined by an opposition of two types of structurally contradictory interests, that is, labour's interest in maximizing its wage and capital's interest in maximizing its profits. Lypynsky did not have much use for Marx, even though some of his ideas seem to be almost Marxist. According to him, it is obvious that whatever the motivations of individual capitalists or workers, there is no structural contradiction between the two. On the contrary, there is structural complementarity. Both need each other. The capitalists provide the opportunity for work, while the workers provide the work. It is interesting to note that many Western commentators and critics of Marx had failed to see this basic flaw in his thought.

Lypynsky's concept of the social structure reflects the state of East European societies at the end of the nineteenth century. For him, the components of social structure—or, as he called them, the actors in the internal history of society—were the productive and non-productive classes. Productive classes were comprised of the agrarian class, the producer-bourgeoisie class, and the proletariat. The non-productive classes were the capitalist-financial and commercial bourgeoisie, the clergy, and the intelligentsia. Lypynsky did not discuss systematically all aspects of each of these classes. His interest was in the agrarian class and the intelligentsia. His approach to the other classes was not uniformly

objective. He was very negative toward the financial and commercial bourgeoisie. His critique of democracy, particularly as exemplified by the United States, was based on this negative orientation toward the financial and commercial class (Lypynsky 1954:150-154).

The order among the classes, Lypynsky argued, was kept by the societal elites. Lypynsky developed his own theory of elites that showed a deep concern with their legitimacy. His conception also reflected a critique of "otamanshchyna," that is, a pattern, often appearing in Eastern European societies, of temporary usurpers of power who may represent an often unstable political group that could be replaced tomorrow by somebody else representing another such group. This pattern, he felt, disrupted the social order because the legitimacy of such usurpers was always in question.

For Lypynsky, the question of legitimate power is linked to the presupposition that all collectivities are made up of two types of people: passive or static, and active or dynamic ones. The active people are always the minority of the population, and the passive the majority. The active minority possesses an inherent tendency to rule, lead, or organize others. The passive majority, in turn, may or may not accept the rule or leadership or form of organization given by the active minority. But if they do not accept it from one specific active minority, they will have to accept it from another active minority, stronger than the one whose rule, leadership, or form of organization it has rejected.

A significant corollary of this presupposition is another presupposition dealing with the strength or weakness of the active minority. The active minority derives its strength from within itself, and the process of ruling or leading others ultimately depends on this inner strength. By the same token, when this inner strength of the ruling minority collapses, their rule over the majority will invariably also collapse. Lypynsky's idea of the "inner strength" of the ruling minority is distinguished from the ruling minority's "outer strength." Outer strength is purely material power, i.e., control of means of coercion. This control, according to Lypynsky, is itself insufficient for insuring permanent rule by the active minority. It requires the main component of inner strength, i.e., authoritativeness, which is rootedness and

subordination to law that is accepted by and equally binding for those who are strong and those who are weak, i.e., equally binding for the active minority and the passive majority. At the same time, with regard to the "outer strength," Lypynsky posited that it is important that the material interests of the elite coincide with the good of the people.

Lypynsky's theory provides the basis for the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Here also, Lypynsky's theory begins to deal with the same issue that Kistiakivsky's theory emphasizes—respect for the law. For Lypynsky, the "inner strength" and the legitimacy of power that it conveys was most naturally connected with the aristocratic class and the aristocratic elite. It is here that Lypynsky shows his conservatism. He argued that it was the aristocracy who formed the basis for modern constitutional governments. Even in democratic societies such as France and the United States, the principles of the constitution and state rule were originally created by the aristocracy.

The concept of aristocracy went through a certain evolution in Lypynsky's work. In his earlier writings, Lypynsky talks about the concrete historical hereditary nobility as the carrier of the tradition that is shared also by other people in society and hence provides the necessary legitimacy. He argued that the republics that have emerged as a consequence of revolutions against the aristocratic monarchical order have persisted after the revolution only with the help of those sectors of the old aristocracy that did not degenerate, but were able to revitalize themselves in new social forms. Hence, the Ukrainian state also cannot be built without the involvement of the healthy, active remnants of aristocracy, including the Russified and Polonized Ukrainian hereditary nobility as well as the Polish and Russian former colonial nobility who reside in Ukraine.

In Lypynsky's later formulation, the concept of aristocracy becomes more abstract. The idea of aristocratic elite as the active carrier of tradition is no longer emphasized. Rather, the basis of the elite's legitimacy of power comes to be defined as their abiding dedication to law and morality. Aristocracy now is redefined to mean that active minority that includes the most active and the best members of any social class, presumably including also the proletariat. Thus, the concept comes to be reformulated in

terms of merit. Having done this, Lypynsky faced a much more complex problem of dealing with the legitimacy of power. He went on to point out that in order to be effective and legitimate, a "national" aristocracy must have both material power and moral authoritativeness. Hence, those who are most suited to be in charge of organizing social life, i.e., to be the ruling elite, are members of the productive classes because they have the most direct stake in the material well-being of society. The non-productive classes have a role to play, but it is a more supportive role.

It is here that Lypynsky devoted much writing to the intelligentsia. He sharply criticized the role of the intelligentsia in society in general, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in particular. The main theme of his critique is based on the assumption that the natural role of the intelligentsia is not direct state building or the wielding of political power, but the mediation between social classes through cultural and intellectual work. Lypynsky criticized the intelligentsia for their predilection to take part in ideological movements. Using some of Georges Sorel's ideas, he argued that those who do so usually see themselves as future leaders who will fill one or another post in a new government. This, he argued, is not the intelligentsia's natural role in society. Rather than creating ideological movements, the intelligentsia's natural role is to develop a culture and a commitment to basic cultural values.

Lypynsky's and Kistiakivsky's ideas meet at this point. For Lypynsky, respect for the law was related to commitment to basic cultural values. The one was not possible without the other. For Kistiakivsky, in order for social order to exist, the legal system of society must be more than a coercive structure, it must command a respect rooted in the deeper mores of society. Democracy and its main product, i.e., the guarantee of individual rights, are possible only if there is a respect for law. There is no evidence that the two scholars knew each other or read each other's work. While Kistiakivsky's work represents a careful scholarly analysis of the question of law and the social order, Lypynsky's work is more polemical, addressed to the intelligentsia of the time who were engulfed in ideological discussions.

Eighty or so years later, with the emergence of independent Ukraine and other states in Eastern Europe and with the process of globalization presenting a challenge to all societies worldwide, are the basic arguments of Kistiakivsky's and Lypynsky's theories still relevant? I think they are. It is now generally accepted knowledge that the basis of civil social order is observance of the law. Of the five aspects of law as distinguished by Kistiakivsky, three are clearly present in Ukraine: (1) state legislation, (2) a system of legal norms, and (3) technical procedural provisions for carrying out the law or modifying it. There is no shortage of legislation, and the state apparatus for law enforcement measures is well in place. However, the two central aspects of law with which both Kistiakivsky and Lypynsky were most concerned are still very problematic or altogether missing in Ukraine and in other former Soviet states. This is the sociological aspect of law—people living the law in practice, including strict enforcement of the law and a respect for the law ingrained in people's (particularly the ruling elite's) consciousness. The prevalent functional system that is more likely to guarantee survival appears to be cynical about the law. It is also a system that rewards the ability to circumvent the law and resort to hustling by means of informal networks regardless of the law, a system called by some the crony-debrouillard system and psychological orientation (Morawska 1999).

Is formation and respect for the law a realistic possibility in the foreseeable future? While one can be optimistic about it, the problem is that the crony-debrouillard system has become self-perpetuating. Opting out of the system or refusing to play by its informal rules in any area of social life (and particularly in the economic life) can threaten the social system itself as well as the survival of individuals. Lypynsky's theory calls for the intelligentsia to take an active role in fostering the basic moral values that would back up positive attitudes regarding the law. But is the intelligentsia in Ukraine able to rise above the vicious circle of the system? Can the political elite do it? I am concluding with questions rather than answers. But it is important for those concerned with the establishment of a democratic civil social order in Ukraine to appreciate that this concern has been long-standing in Ukrainian intellectual history.

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7

Law as Infrastructure: Overcoming Obstacles to Development of a Democratic State

MARTHA B. TROFIMENKO

To comprehend the transformation of Ukraine into a new democratic independent state in the 1990s, one must attempt to reconcile the contradictory approaches to issues of constitutionality, the principle of the rule of law, democracy, and rapid transition to a market-oriented economy as part of the process of building a new state. However summary, this overview must be placed in the context of certain general principles, historical facts, and the current cultural and political climate in Ukraine. It must also be anchored to the immediate practical challenges facing the Ukrainian state.

A careful overview of the legal infrastructure as it emerged haltingly and laboriously, overcoming seemingly insurmountable obstacles, reveals the complexity of the inevitable synchronization of all the new legal initiatives needed to build a new political system, a new societal structure, and the necessary financial and market mechanisms to replace the suddenly defunct command economy. Initially, both the Supreme Soviet of the still Soviet Ukrainian Republic and, after independence, the Verkhovna Rada, were able to fall back in their orientation on the proposals in the program developed by the Popular Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring, popularly called Rukh. Published by *Literaturna Ukraina* on February 16, 1989, "... [t]he programme called for fundamental changes in the political, economic, social, cultural and ecological spheres ...," but "In the economic sphere, the programme was rather more vague."¹ A whole new legal system had to be constructed—all at once.

Critical assessments of the success or failure of any particular law must also consider the prevailing legal culture, which indirectly forms part of the legal infrastructure. Most harsh criticism, so often leveled at Ukraine by international experts, usually suggests specific changes in the laws and regulations, but fails to take into account the whole legal infrastructure and the overall consequences of the proposed changes. Despite the best intentions, a country without a distinct legal tradition of its own following such piecemeal advice might cause disruptions in the development of a fledgling legal system.

LAW AS INFRASTRUCTURE

The old Roman maxim "*Non est regula ius summatum, sed ex jure, quod est regula, fiat,*" reminds us that it is not the rules and regulations that are superior to the general law, but that the law produces rules and regulations. In Western legal thinking, rooted in Roman law, there are individual laws (in Latin: *leges*), there are rules and regulations (*regulae*), and there is law (*ius*).

Based on Roman notions of contract and private ownership of personal property and land, the more or less democratic but clearly market-oriented Western legal systems generate legislation in a variety of forms with varied degrees of formality.

Statutes, regulations, court decisions, and decrees may provide the means and process for resolving conflicts arising in the daily life of human societies and may be subject to frequent changes. Many are administered and enforced by a plethora of state officials usually referred to as "the bureaucracy." There is frequent legal activity whenever the political and socio-economic relations between various social actors are working out their dependence patterns. The state offers its coercive enforcement procedures, to be triggered by individual or corporate citizens turning to it for assistance.

A more visibly normative category of laws, much less ad hoc and transient (except in France, which has a distinct constitutional philosophy), project in their totality a balanced treatment of the interests of individuals and social groups vis-à-vis one another and vis-à-vis the state and its government. Usually enshrined in a written constitution, a basic law, or a charter or bill

of rights, these laws express the rule of law principle prevailing in the state, which itself is constituted and limited in its powers by them. In more open democratic societies, they grant easy access to securely established procedures for redress of any infringement by the state on the rights of the governed, as well as of usurpation of the state's powers by any social or political actors. They delineate the coercive power of the state and usually provide (except in France) for judicial review of their validity by the highest court in the land or a specialized constitutional court. This category of laws forms the cornerstone of the legal infrastructure on which rests all political, social, and economic life of the country.

Although legal scholars do not often discuss law as infrastructure, remembering that the legal system has the nature of an infrastructure can be a valuable tool for analysis of new states and new regimes. Such an approach compels us to examine the system's capability of sustaining development of specific legal areas such as economic laws or some procedures for the protection of human rights. As soon as the still Soviet Ukrainian Parliament proclaimed that Ukraine was a sovereign state, Ukraine was plunged into the hustle and bustle of constructing its new, very own legal infrastructure. This proved a formidable task as much because of external as internal circumstances.

THE QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY

A state, whether we call it just "state" or "nation state," is, of course, not an object but a juristic and territorial concept developed over the last two centuries and historically thought of as possessing *plenitudo potestatis*—internal and external sovereignty. There are many definitions, containing various levels of analysis. A state can be defined in terms of what it looks like institutionally or what it does functionally. Alfred Cobban believes that the French revolutionaries have fundamentally altered the prevailing conception of the state. "It was through the combination of the revolutionary idea of democratic sovereignty with the new importance attached to national differences that the nation state ... became the subject of a theory."² In plain terms, the state is "an organization of persons" in the form of a special-

ized corporation, in international law a *juris persona* in its own right, but unlike organizations incorporated by existing incorporation laws, it is self-constitutive yet subject to international constitutive recognition.³ Once internationally recognized, the state acquires in the international community certain inalienable rights.⁴

It was legitimate to ask whether Ukraine, after such a gigantic leap into unfamiliar territory—a democratic form of governance—would be able to govern effectively as a state must do. It would be natural to question whether Ukraine would have the professional knowledge and sophistication to promulgate the needed laws and the requisite monopoly of coercive force to enforce them when necessary. Would the new Ukraine attain that internal strength and domestic effectiveness of a democratic state that derives from the coherence and transparency of its legal infrastructure?⁵ It is this transparency as well as the availability of means of redress that permits members of a civil society to monitor the use of the state's infrastructural power, that is, "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm."⁶ Putting a transparent legal and political structure of a sovereign state in place was essential for the new Ukraine in order to make a clear break with the still very recent totalitarian Communist Party rule, but that required much professional and philosophical preparation as well as a favourable internal and external environment. On both counts, Ukraine was facing a strange new milieu. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, suggested to some that the traditional idea of a sovereign state has lost its significance in the very same free world that newly independent Ukraine was poised to join.⁷

Ukraine could find consolation in the fact that all the former Soviet republics, beginning with the Baltic states, opted for independent statehood, which attested to the value of this form of international organization. Many national and ethnic populations around the world were, and still are, making ardent attempts to become states. Despite the globalization doomsayers' view that states are on the verge of extinction, there are no signs that any states are disappearing voluntarily. In fact, there is an ever-increasing concern that international or supranational busi-

ness and financial elites—who advocate global investment and trade and, consequently, urge rapid changes in the laws and political systems of various countries to accommodate the international market—do not pay enough attention to the cultural interests of the populations affected and thus create a backlash.⁸ The very nationalistic reactions and pressures on many states by their populations to distance themselves from rampant commercial cosmopolitanism appear not only in poor countries on various continents, but in countries of the European Union even though those states termed “nation-state” had already acquired a political rather than exclusively ethno-cultural meaning.⁹

In this new global milieu, Ukraine, like every state that wishes to remain independent, must safeguard its sovereignty and independent continuity. While the Westphalian model of state sovereignty has given way to *sovereignty-cum-pacta sunt servanda* because many international treaties, mostly in the commercial sphere, exert authority over what used to be national prerogatives, the policies of most states foster the development of strong bodies of “nationals” whose interests coincide with the preservation of the state as an independent entity.¹⁰ The government of a state must be ever vigilant for any *pacta* that would encroach on its primary obligation to govern for the benefit of all its inhabitants. To do so, it needs to have a strong and stable legal infrastructure to rely on. Making itself vulnerable and dependent on any outside forces for its primary governing functions would signal that it is not exercising its sovereignty and would jeopardize its own survival and continuity as a state.

The state must also be able to protect itself from infringements of its internal capacity to carry out the mandate given by its constituting documents. When confrontations among conflicting groups constitute a threat to the unity of a socially and ethnically diverse state, its political system, or to others within the state, or when such tensions result in a stalemate, some political theorists consider it reasonable that the state should be able to exercise some autonomous powers for protecting its population and for its self-preservation. Many express a concern that a free spontaneous exercise of the will of its citizens in a plebiscitarian democracy, such as a majority pursuing a minority in “ethnic cleansing,” or the threat of a general vote without

public deliberation and debate for the dissolution of the state, ought to trigger some restraining response from those governing on behalf of the state.¹¹

A minimum of state internal autonomy has been accepted in contemporary practice. Now considered a structural part of the principle of self-determination, autonomous power to take unilateral action may at times be vital to the preservation of the state itself.¹² That is the case at least with respect to safeguarding its sovereignty, however broadly or narrowly that sovereignty is conceived.¹³

There is no agreement as to where this power resides. In a democracy, there is likely to be some “unoccupied space,” an area neither specifically delegated to the state by the electorate, nor assigned to other actors by the basic law of the country. Can we interpret this as allowing the state to exercise autonomous power, whether inherent or residual, in the interest of the state as a whole, rather than any one of the political actors? Such an exercise, of course, would and should be subject to the test of legitimacy. In an open democracy, the constitutional infrastructure based on the rule of law and the means of its implementation ought to be ascertainable and transparent to all. It should provide for procedures accessible to private citizens through which they could verify the appropriateness of any such unilateral action by the government acting on behalf of the state and for mechanisms to question its substantive legitimacy and procedural propriety.

AFTER THE FALL: *UT FIAT LUX!*

Focusing on the situation in Ukraine, we need to recall that the first multi-candidate election in Soviet Ukraine took place on March 4, 1990. It sent a strong democratic opposition to the Supreme Soviet—the Ukrainian Parliament (hereafter Verkhovna Rada or Rada).¹⁴ This democratic faction persuaded the Rada to declare Ukraine a sovereign state on July 16, 1990. This unilateral action by Soviet Ukraine followed declarations of sovereignty in other Soviet republics, notably the Baltics, and was accepted as normatively unambiguous, being in conformity with the then existing constitution of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-

lic.¹⁵ The Democratic Bloc debated strongly in favour of independence. It became clear to the existing Communist Party members controlling the administration at that time that if they were to continue in power, they must go along with the pro-independence agenda.

A Declaration of Independence followed on August 24, 1991. On December 1, 1991, the Declaration of Independence was confirmed by a general referendum and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet at that time, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected president of Ukraine. That the transition conformed to all ascertainable nominal normative requirements, and that it was orderly and peaceful, can be credited to the wisdom of planning and the inclusive humanist position of Rukh, the cautious restraint exercised by the whole Democratic Bloc, and the political skills of the Communist Party functionaries involved.

There was no great “fall” in Ukraine, nothing crashed, not even the Communist Party, which knew quite well how to spread its safety net. It was the former centre—the USSR—the “Outside” as far as the Ukrainian Rada of 1990 was concerned, that crashed.

In Ukraine, the old Supreme Soviet (the “Parliament”) was not disbanded as would be usual in transitions from totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, such as in Latin America. It became the “new” Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) of the now independent Ukraine and continued with a large communist majority. As in any rapid transition, expedient solutions for known as well as for surprising new problems had to be worked out and compromises made. The Rada went into a flurry of hasty law-making in order to avoid any lull that could turn the unpredictability of events into ugly confrontations.

The legal system, however, was in disarray. The old directive-driven “floating infrastructure,” which the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had been sending down from Moscow to Ukraine through the Ukrainian Communist Party, disappeared. Although these directives from Moscow had never been even nominally consonant with the Ukrainian Communist Constitution then in place, in reality, the Communist Party had something to implement “in strict obedience to party instructions” and some statutory material to enter in the

parliamentary record. Now, suddenly, the deputies had to take responsibility for passing real legislation.

Edicts of the “new” administration, together with the often conflicting regulations fashioned by the continuing Rada, were piling up on top of these old “paper laws,” which had no relevance to the now independent state, but were still on the books. There was no effective procedure in place for repeal. Fragments of the old nominal legal base mingled with hastily drafted regulations. “Unfortunately, these legislative problems which effectively mixed-up legal, political, moral and recently religious norms, are still practiced today by Ukrainian legislators ...,” wrote Professor Volodymyr Butkevich in 1993, then the director of the Centre for Human Rights in Kyiv and member of the Verkhovna Rada, who later became a judge in the Court of Human Rights, in Strasbourg.¹⁶

The obvious need for a solid legal base with a new constitution prompted the establishment of a constitutional commission, but the Rada, dominated by 239 communist leftover deputies, balked at adopting one. The resulting mistrust and uncertainty, so typical of regimes in transition, underscored the need for a civil society and precipitated a search for the soul of the Ukrainian nation. Motyl and Krawchenko state it succinctly:

The collapse of totalitarianism left an institutional vacuum within the Ukrainian society and economy, while the collapse of empire left an institutional vacuum within the Ukrainian polity. Ukraine lacked a civil society, a market, and a state, and without these it could hardly have had a coherent sense of national identity, democracy, and rule of law. The task before Ukraine was immense: the construction of all the characteristics of a “normal” country.¹⁷

The democratic forces prevailed after many dramatic debates in the Rada. The new constitution of Ukraine, adopted on June 28, 1996, by a vote of 315 to thirty-six, with twelve abstentions, ushered in what was perceived to be a binding promise of a coherent normative order, which would embody the political philosophy of a democracy based on the rule of law. A solid, transparent infrastructure was now emerging.

The new constitution enshrined many human rights and democratic freedoms and won praises from around the world. It

enunciated clear principles, but mostly in statements and declarations, some very general, some appearing to be conflicting as a result of many compromises in the Rada. New laws were needed to translate these principles into more specific and enforceable provisions. Many common cultural and humanitarian values of the Ukrainian people found expression in the legislation that followed. Subsequent events showed, however, that much still remained to be done.

Translating Infrastructure into a Language of Laws

Written law is made up of words. Whatever their meaning in ordinary parlance, many words used in a legal text acquire a special legal meaning, becoming legal terms. This meaning is not academic jargon, but results from the legal doctrines prevailing in the system, the context of the subject matter of the legislation, and the substance of individual provisions. Since they regulate the conduct of daily life in a society, legal terms must be understood and palatable to the social groups that are directly affected by them, even if they are not always accepted as “right.”¹⁸

Post-Soviet law-making in Ukraine continues to face the problem of choosing from the existing lexicon terms that would be “baggage free” for the general population. In order to create a legal system based on the principle of the rule of law and appropriate for a modern state with a nascent market-oriented economic system, the first challenge is to get past the hurdle of inherited Soviet ideolinguistic modes with their labels of compressed connotations and allusions.¹⁹

Another challenge is the acquisition of technical legal language skills, the ability to discern the elements of the former applied philosophy and moralizing that clutter up many leftover Soviet laws and that keep sneaking into post-Soviet legislation, and solid knowledge and understanding of current Western legal concepts.²⁰

Is it possible to shed in a few years the seventy-year-old tradition of ideological harnessing of language and the moulding of minds in creating “the Soviet man”? Habits of mind acquired during the reign of terror, not to mention the psychological states engendered by dictated patterns of thinking, seem to require a protracted period of deprogramming. For years after

independence, the Ukrainian Parliament was still dominated by old-style communist legislators. For years, therefore, apart from having to contend with ideological obstructionism, trying to create a legal infrastructure out of words and phrases that continued to mean different things to different lawmakers was a formidable undertaking for reform-minded legislators. Many communist deputies continued to use the Russian language during parliamentary deliberations. Many Ukrainian-speaking deputies found it difficult to conceptualize the new social, economic, and political relationships that were so foreign to the system in which they were brought up and in which they had learned to function.²¹ And yet, members of the democratic faction persevered and their efforts in building the new Ukrainian state culminated in a constitution of which Ukraine can indeed be proud.

LAW AND IDENTITY INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The new constitution created expectations of a permanent Ukrainian national content in social institutions and political arrangements. From what could be seen as fragmentary identity, divided loyalties, ethnic competition, and heterogeneous makeup of the political centre in the beginning, a Ukrainian identity—one of being in unity with the new independent Ukraine—began establishing itself on its very own legal base. It comprised a whole spectrum of Ukrainian national elements, but was strongly inclusive of all ethnic, cultural, and religious minority expressions. One wonders whether this common identity based on identifying with the state (which appears to be firmly devoted to retaining political power *qua* state) will continue to be strong despite the Russian domination in the region and intrusions into Ukrainian life. Such unifying identity would require some generally shared conceptions as to which national values, as well as ethical and moral positions, are to be reflected in the law and in public political life. A conscious effort to make such commonly shared conceptions penetrate the interaction between various segments of the polity would likely produce an open understanding and tolerance of their particular aspirations. The resulting increased security of their individual identities might supplant the various bankrupting, but still oppressive, ideologi-

cal orientations and permit a more broadly based democratic polity to support a strong Ukrainian national content in its developing state.²² Before that can happen, however, the basic functions of all branches of the government (as in any modern state) need to be legitimated, that is, institutionalized.²³

Institutionalization also pertains to individual basic laws. If social groups reconcile their beliefs and values with what the law provides and with the political actors that control the public order, they accept the law and grant it legitimacy, permitting its tenets to be institutionalized.

Ukraine has adopted the position, advocated by proponents of open democracy, that dissent should also be institutionalized. An individual voicing dissent should know how to proceed without disrupting the system and should be perceived as doing something that the system has made room for in its basic structure.²⁴ In the case of Ukraine, this position, however laudable from a democratic point of view, has been interpreted by some groups as an invitation to keep voicing dissent. It has reinforced the interethnic, interreligious, and intercultural tensions that may threaten identity with the state. In response, the government actively seeks legitimation from the dissenting players in the political field and ends up walking a very fine line between maintaining a common identity in high profile and at the same time professing not to neglect the rather modest Ukrainian national aspirations: to have predominantly Ukrainian content in cultural, educational, and political institutions of the state.

Indeed, to be accorded genuine legitimacy by Ukrainians who are still conscious of their national identity after seventy years of being forcefully moulded into becoming Russian-speaking "Soviet citizens," the government needs to develop a comprehensive policy to legally institutionalize Ukrainian national elements of political, social, and cultural life, in particular the Ukrainian language. The Russian minority's insistent demands to diminish the use of the Ukrainian language will probably continue. With appropriate educational programs in place, however, the Russian minority might begin to understand that after so many years of forcibly relegating Ukrainian language to "village talk," it would be honourable for Russians in Ukraine to support the use of Ukrainian in public life.

For many it does not seem decent that the government is not actively protecting the besieged native language of its own state. Governmental officials' wavering creates confusion and is likely to harm this natural process of the resurgence of Ukrainian. Only by the continued and customary practice of using Ukrainian language in public life could Ukrainian officials help institutionalize the Ukrainian language—and the need for doing so is increasing every day. Even such a respected body as the Constitutional Court, by now clearly legitimated, elicited protests from parliamentary caucuses of the Communist and the Peasant parties because of the court's ruling that required the use of the Ukrainian language when transacting official business.²⁵

SLOW PROCESS TO CIVIL SOCIETY

The new legal and political order created almost unlimited opportunities for private social organization and the consequent emergence of a civil society. The ability and the will to take advantage of the new freedoms and empowerment, however, especially among nationally conscious Ukrainians, seem limited. Groups aided from outside Ukraine, mostly ethnic and national minorities, seem to feel more free to form associations, but, just like most non-governmental organizations registered in Ukraine (all private organizations, however small, must register in order to be permitted to carry on any group activity), usually have a specific narrow focus and rarely interact.

The fear of showing initiative for any issue-related gathering in unofficial groups, deeply ingrained under the Soviet regime, still lingers on among Ukrainians. After all, not that long ago—in 1989, Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, a long-time party chief of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and a feared Brezhnevite who “brutally suppressed any and all manifestations of popular front activity” still held his seat in the Politburo.²⁶ The memories of the brutality are still haunting people and the fear of showing one's identity and speaking in Ukrainian is quite obvious.

During visits to Ukraine, my colleagues and I were shocked again and again by the pathological extent of hedging and evasion in response to simple questions about membership in any Ukrainian organizations or clubs. In over twenty interviews with

professional women of various ages, in four different cities, the fear of responding openly to questions was still evident in 1998, and sometimes was even acknowledged.²⁷ As for answers to questions whether these women belonged to any women's organizations, social clubs, or parents' groups, only four replied in the affirmative, followed by brief and for some reason halting descriptions of the organizations. Most women complained that the government "stopped organizing and funding organizations and clubs" so, therefore, they could not belong to any. Several professional women answered that their husbands did not consider it "proper" for their wives to privately gather for discussions or to belong to discussion clubs.

Out of a handful of randomly chosen middle-aged professional men queried in October 1998 about belonging to non-governmental organizations, only one was active in one social and one political organization. He was organizing "community improvement-oriented" projects with neighbours and young people, but was, he said, reproached for this activity by the co-workers in his office. They complained that he might bring disfavour upon all of them because his organizations were not funded by the government and therefore could be "suspect."

Obviously it would be naive to expect a spontaneous birth of a civil society at the moment of independence. Ten years later, however, progress is still very slow. Unless the international community and the Ukrainian government are willing to play the good midwife to the few Ukrainian fledgling groups, a civil society that is aware of its rights will be long in coming. That would be most unfortunate: an active civil society is vital if Ukraine is to continue its development into an open democratic society. Perhaps the younger generation, which appears to feel the need for creating societies and clubs, will create their own form of a civil society.²⁸

Laws and Economic Reforms

To put some of Ukraine's problems in its ten years of independence into perspective, one should recall that right after the Declaration of Independence, many Western institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, called for immediate and drastic economic reforms in Ukraine. Inter-

national business experts and individual economic consultants joined the chorus. The "big bang" strategy, somewhat Machiavellian in nature, was invariably considered the right approach for all newly independent states.²⁹ The gradualist theories were ignored.³⁰ Of course, the old command economy was on the way out and some immediate changes in the economic sector had to be made to keep some economic life in Ukraine afloat and the country running. But the radical changes indicated by the consultants were on a different scale. They were to turn the system into a free market economy almost overnight. The consequent hardships for the ordinary population were seen as necessary sacrifices to the long-term goals.

In reality, this meant extensive radical changes by legislation and presidential decree in various areas of law and administrative regulations. This, it was alleged, would free the country from the constraints impeding foreign investment and the development of Ukraine's internal and external trading capability. Unfortunately, few foreign advisers troubled to analyze the fragmented legal infrastructure to see on what ground the new hastily crafted laws and regulations were to be planted. Had they done so, they would have understood that proceeding slowly can mean getting there faster.³¹

Business does not exist in a vacuum. It is carried on by people in a real environment. The environment has to be ready for it. All participants in the commercial sector must understand the nuts and bolts of bona fide transactions in ordinary business ventures. There is a world of difference between a command economy that depended, regarding economic planning and decisions, on the fiat of central planning authorities in Moscow and ordinary Western business practices and concepts. Except for privileged individuals who had experience with foreign partners in the joint ventures that proliferated in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, few people were familiar with Western business activity of any kind. A total changeover, such as was proposed for Ukraine, required training management and psychologically preparing a whole new business class and a multitude of government officials.

Equally unfortunate was the fact that many consultants, well trained in economics and finance, knew well what they meant

by the phrase “economic reforms,” but did not know within what legal frame of reference their Ukrainian advisees and the lawmakers were able to interpret the idea of reforms. To overcome the culture shock on both sides, the legislators and the officials in the various ministries should have been provided with crash courses in comparative economic legal concepts and economic principles as practised in the West. The consultants, on the other hand, should have undergone rigorous training in the basics of the actual economic and legal realities existing in Ukraine. Perhaps then the parties involved with reforms would have been able to come to some mutual understanding as to the feasibility of specific objectives to be achieved.³²

Much cumulatory criticism has been leveled at Ukraine for its “inability to carry out the necessary reforms” and for its bureaucratic red tape. Cumulatory criticism often misses the mark because it tends to lump unrelated items together. A holistic approach would be a better choice as it would highlight all the circumstances of the suddenly disrupted way of life. Personal freedom was welcomed in Ukraine, of course, but freedom that compels the making of choices may be a heavy burden for those who are not accustomed to making their own decisions. Many legislators had difficulties comprehending all the choices available before voting on proposed legislation.³³

In retrospect, much of the criticism seems to be the result of a two-sided culture shock and the disappointment of those who, committed to the big bang theory, did not take time to examine the realities of a post-Soviet legal vacuum. Inevitably there is much annoyance at not having foreseen the results of hasty jumping into untested waters. If this has slowed the pace of foreign investment in Ukrainian economy, the blame lies not entirely with Ukraine.

All that by itself would not be catastrophic. What is much more serious is that the pundits were unable to assess the force of the backlash from the leaders of the communist bloc. Nostalgic for the “old party days” of centralized economic planning in Moscow, they could now point to the economic slumps as an inevitable result of the new democracy and market reforms. It became easier for them to persuade many in the general population that to bring back the old communist ideology meant to bring back good

pensions, regular pay, military glory, and economic stability. These slogans still resonate with the unsophisticated segments of the population and the communist bloc remains a serious obstacle to the attainment of all the needed market reforms.³⁴

Ukrainians certainly do not take the threat of reverting to the old system lightly. The horrors of communist rule have not been forgotten, and many mass graves have only recently been uncovered. The results of the parliamentary elections attest to the majority's desire to live in an economically viable, modern democratic state.

"Despite fears and all sorts of gloomy predictions, the country has held together and stood its ground," writes Nahaylo optimistically.³⁵ Indeed it has, although foreign legal practitioners and scholars are baffled by the incongruities in Ukrainian law resulting from hasty piecemeal reform legislation. More baffling and of greater concern is the emerging uncertainty with regard to the very cornerstone of the legal infrastructure, the 1996 constitution. For a short time it appeared that the fundamental stage of state building had been completed with the new constitution in place.³⁶ The constitution was believed to have entrenched the most significant basic part of a solid, stable, predictable, and transparent legal infrastructure. Unfortunately, the referendum on proposed constitutional amendments, held on April 16, 2000, has shaken that belief considerably.³⁷

There are many obstacles to overcome before a truly Ukrainian state, one for all the people of Ukraine—ethnic Ukrainians and non-ethnic Ukrainians alike—is solidly established on the foundation of democratic principles and the rule of law. As Taras Kuzio aptly observed: "Political, economic, state and national transformation in Ukraine would inevitably be bumpy."³⁸

NOTES

- 1 Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), 167–175.
- 2 Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970), 33. Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (New York: Blackwell, 1988), 4.

- 3 James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); the Montevideo Convention defines in Art. 1 the qualifications for statehood as being the possession of
 - (a) a permanent population, preferably with common cultural and linguistic elements;
 - (b) a defined territory;
 - (c) a government capable of exercising effective control; and
 - (d) capacity (sovereign independent power) to enter into relations with other independent states.
- 4 UN Charter Art. 2, Para 1; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
- 5 Alexander Motyl and Bohdan Krawchenko, "Ukraine: From Empire to Statehood," in *New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, edited by I. Bremmer and R. Taras (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 258–259.
- 6 Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, n. 2, p. 5.
- 7 L. Ali Khan, *The Extinction of Nation-States: A World without Borders* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 99–136; Hugh Collins, "European Private Law and the Cultural Identity of States," *European Review of Private Law* 3, no. 2 (1995), 353.
- 8 Samuel P. Huntington citing Kofi Annan, "Robust Nationalism," *The National Interest* no. 58 (Winter 1999/2000), 31, at 39.
- 9 The terms "nation" and consequently "nation-state" fluctuated with ideas of time and place. The "father of nationalism," Johann Gottfried von Herder, proclaimed near the end of the eighteenth century that a state should consist of one nationality with a common culture and language, inclinations, and character: "An empire formed by forcing together a hundred nationalities, and a hundred and fifty provinces, is no body politic, but a monstrosity." Robert R. Ergang, *Herder and the Foundations of German Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931), 244–245. In 1878, however, the *Dictionary of Academie Francaise* had as a primary definition of nation "the totality of persons born or naturalized in a country and living under a single government," Alfred Cobban, *The Nation State and National Self-Determination* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1970), 30.
- 10 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992, creating the EU, was widely debated and provided for participation by member states in various administrative, legislative, and judicial bodies of the EU.
- 11 The need for some self-constraints on the powers of direct plebiscitarian voting has been recognized by many analysts of democracy: "[i]n general, a

democracy choosing to destroy the framework in which non-violent disagreement and conflict-resolution can occur would be acting suicidally. ... Self-binding becomes not only permissible, but obligatory." S. Holmes, "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy," in *Constitutionalism and Democracy*, edited by J. Elster and R. Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 239.

- 12 Whether the internal autonomy principle is related to sovereignty is a question for further investigation. The old militarist tradition of state theory granted autonomy to the state as the physical force that must *a priori* hold supremacy over any political and economic social or administrative structures. Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, 1–32.
- 13 P. King, "Sovereignty," in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought*, edited by D. Miller, J. Coleman, W. Connolly, and A. Ryan (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987), 491–495; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, 153–157: "If sovereignty is the rightful capacity to take political decisions and to enact the law within a given community with some degree of finality, it must be entrenched in certain rules and institutions from which it cannot free itself."
- 14 They won 110 seats. The vote was 355 for, 4 against, with 1 absentee. Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, n. 1, p. 257, 298.
- 15 Articles 13 and 14.
- 16 Volodymyr Butkevich, "Human Rights in Ukraine," in *1993 Yearbook of Human Rights*, 108.
- 17 Motyl and Krawchenko, "Ukraine: From Empire to Statehood," n. 5, p. 258.
- 18 If the particular social group perceives the language of a legislation as having a positive connotation, positive feelings will be evoked, which will facilitate compliance. The perception of connotations as positive or negative depends on the experience, cognitive skills, actual knowledge, and prejudices of a social group.
- 19 In the Soviet system, the approved patterns of speaking and thinking were not a game, but a part of the survival technique. In dealing with this question, A.P. Cowie used the terms "phraseonomics," "phraseonomy," and "phrasicon." By this he meant a whole inventory of idioms and phrases that he saw as part of Soviet party rhetoric: labels composed of specific phrases and sequenced in such order as to show which progression was to be deemed "logical" and therefore accepted as leading to certain conclusions.

Much of this depended, says Cowie, on connotation, which is a semantic marker associated with value judgment of the particular circle of language users—usually a socially or politically predetermined group, often referred to as "a speech community." "Connotations are supplementary to the denotation of a word or phrase ... they enrich their cognitive content by means of emotive and/or attitudinal semantic markers." A.P. Cowie,

Phraseology, Theory, Analysis and Application (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 128–129.

Michael S. Gorham, in his discussion of the phenomenon of identity creation in early Soviet times, points out how the authority of the language was linked to the authority of the state. The notion of mastery, for example, was amended to “Bolshevik mastery” in order to distinguish the new Soviet language from models perceived to be too subservient to the “bourgeois West.” To free it from “reactionary nationalistic attitudes,” the literary term “purism” was refined by modifying it with the most popular epithet “revolutionary” to produce “revolutionary purism.” Gorham quotes Communist Party members who acted as critics of the day and who added a new “author” and model texts to the pantheon of classics: “The Soviet writer will find the key to understanding the new socialist content in language in the decisions of the party, in the pronouncements of comrade Stalin.” Michael S. Gorham, “Mastering the Perverse: State Building and Language ‘Purification’ in Early Soviet Russia,” *Slavic Review* 58, no. 1 (1998), 133, 148–149.

- 20 Butkevich, “Human Rights in Ukraine,” n. 16, pp. 121–123. The many newly published business, management, and economic dictionaries, as well as dictionaries of new legal terms, could not keep with the demand.
- 21 Olexandr Ponomariv, “To Learn the Norms, and Not to Create Own Ones,” *Polityka I Chas* nos. 3–4 (2000), 94–95 (my translation).
- 22 Maxim Rozumnyj, “The Challenge of Civilization,” in *Moloda Natsia* 10 (1999), 3 (my translation and transliteration from Ukrainian).
- 23 “Patterns defining the political, legal, and administrative system must be known and understood, must be practised customarily over time and thus earn acceptance by all the ‘participants’ in the process.” Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), n. 1, 73.
- 24 James Luther Adams, “Mediating Structures and the Separation of Powers,” in *Democracy and Mediating Structures, A Theological Inquiry*, edited by M. Novak (The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 31.
- 25 Interfax reported on December 21, 1999 that the parliamentary caucuses of the Communist Party and the Peasant Party have protested the recent Constitutional Court ruling that obliges state officials to use the Ukrainian language while engaging in official state business. Electronic *RFE/RL Newslines*, Part II, December 23, 1999.
- 26 Gordon B. Smith, *Reforming the Russian Legal System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 201.
- 27 Except for five interviews that took place in private homes in Lviv in September 1996, the interviews were conducted at various professional

and academic meetings. Eight took place in Kyiv and Yalta in October 1996, five in Lviv in September 1998, and three in Kyiv in early November 1998. Without exception, these young professional women asked not to be identified either by name or place of work and answered questions only after being assured that they will remain anonymous.

- 28 V. Shatilo, "Civil Society, the Road to a State Based on the Rule of Law," *Moloda Natsia* 3 (1996), 220. Shatilo expounds the democratic conception of civil society and its role in the state. The thrust of his article seems to be that civil society is indispensable to a true democracy based on the rule of law. See also Rozumnyj, "The Challenge of Civilization," n. 22.
- 29 "The predominant paradigm in Western Economic Theory favoured big bang strategies. Involved was a certain portion of Machiavellism: necessary cruelties should be committed at once and systematically. Gradualism was suspected to raise illusions. ..." Klaus von Beyme, *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), 89–90.
- 30 Analyzing Russian transition, R.I. McKinnon writes: "It was a major mistake for the Russian Federation, in January 1992, to suddenly decontrol virtually all prices within the state sector and to stop trying to enforce normal patterns of delivery within that sector. As we have seen, this big-bang approach was very different from Chinese gradualism." Ronald I. McKinnon, *The Order of Economic Liberalization*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
- 31 With respect to economic reforms in the Russian Federation, Gordon B. Smith says: "The difficulties the Russian economy has encountered during the transition to a market system have been exacerbated by the haphazardness and inadequacy of the legal infrastructure and law enforcement mechanisms." Gordon B. Smith, *Reforming the Russian Legal System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 187–189.
- 32 Even familiarity with such basic matters as differences between systems of accounting in Soviet business or Soviet banking and the Western or international accounting standards was often lacking. Changing over to Western accounting standards required a tremendous amount of preparation. The National Bank of Ukraine used the old Soviet accounting standards until early 1998, and only then did it switch over and introduced Western-type quarterly international auditing reports. Statement of the Embassy of Ukraine in the United States, in *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Sunday, March 26, 2000), 6.
- 33 O.M. Tkachenko, "Legal Reform in Ukraine and the Problems of Harmonizing National Legislation with International Law," in *Problems of Harmonization of Legislation of Ukraine with International Law* (in Ukrainian), edited by V.F. Opryshko et al. (Kiev: The Institute of Legislation of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 1998), 6–10; V.K. Zabihaylo, "Comparative Study of Law:

- Theory and Method of Development of the Legal System of Ukraine,” in *Problems of Harmonization*, 93–95; Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), 137, 140, 165.
- 34 Andrew Wilson, *The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 187–193.
- 35 Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, n. 1, 550.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 525.
- 37 The presidentially initiated referendum could not be dismissed as “unconstitutional,” as the 1996 constitution provides in Art. 5 that the people exercise their sovereignty and rule directly as well as through the state and local government, and the Constitutional Court of Ukraine spoke on the subject, holding some questions constitutional and others not. Nevertheless, the referendum raises questions regarding the constitutional philosophy, if any, prevailing in Ukraine: Has the constitution now become subject to change by the majority at will, without serious deliberations and debates?
- 38 Taras Kuzio, *Ukraine: State and Nation Building* (London: Routledge Studies of Societies in Transition, 1998), 236.

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8

“Europeanness” as a Factor of Identity

ANNA PROCYK

The excessive preoccupation with the essence of European culture and “Europeanness” in the intellectual discourse throughout the post-communist world during the 1990s was undoubtedly a direct reaction to the decades of isolation, Sovietization, and vandalization of what was considered an authentic European culture. Vadym Skurativskyj, a keen observer of the socio-cultural currents in Ukraine, exclaimed with astonishment at the beginning of the decade: “It seems that throughout this century at no time has the term ‘Europe’ and its derivative ‘European’ been used as often as today. These words have literally captured the press, the air-waves, the screen and the very ear and vocabulary of our contemporary.”¹ This emphasis on Europe and “Europeanness” had not subsided as the decade was coming to a close. It continued to inundate every level of elitist and popular discourse beginning with the pages of *Suchasnist’*, *Krytyka*, *Yi*, and *Geneza* through the East Ukrainian (yet unequivocally pro-European) journal *Kurrier Kryvbasa* and ending with popular and youth journals such as *Ukraiina* and *Smoloskyp Ukrainy*. Commenting on this phenomenon at the beginning of the new century, Stefania Andrusiv, a professor at Ivan Franko University in Lviv, expressed the same amazement as Vadym Skurativskyj did almost a decade earlier: “Ukrainian newspapers and journals glitter with headings containing the word ‘Europe’ in all its variants and in all ideological contexts. ... Europe is unchangeably present in the works of our intellectuals—artists, scientists, publicists.”²

Although the term "Europe" and what it means to be European has been and continues to be a rather ambiguous, ill-defined concept in the minds of most participants of these discussions, one can discern two basic approaches. On a more general level, the term "European" appears to connote everything that is civilized, democratic, dignified, or co-operative vis-à-vis Western Europe in political, economic, and cultural terms.³ On a more thoughtful, scholarly level, it conveys everything that has direct or indirect ties with the roots of Western civilization: Greek thought, Roman law, Christian moral principles, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the ideology of the *Risorgimento*.⁴ The intellectuals do not see a dichotomy between what is considered European and what is Ukrainian. "That what is truly national, is inevitably also European," writes the literary scholar Oksana Pakhlovska.⁵

The most commonly discussed themes on this subject tend to focus on the harmful, stultifying effects of the Russo-Soviet cultural hegemony in the past. The culture's loss of its European roots is often stressed and, more recently, complaints regarding Western Europe's lack of sensitivity toward its legitimate but lightheartedly abandoned offspring have been appearing with greater frequency. But in addition to these themes—so common to the intellectual discussions in the formerly communist-dominated Europe—Ukrainians are also devoting a great deal of attention to what they consider the immediate threat to their cultural development and thus to their identity in contemporary Ukraine. They search for their European roots, not only to raise Ukrainian culture from stagnant provincialism, but to strengthen and reinforce the foundations of their national identity.

Thus, in Ukraine the emphasis on "Europeanness" in addition to being an expression of condemnation of the corrosive consequences of Soviet-Russian cultural hegemony is also an assertion of Ukrainian national identity vis-à-vis the Russians. It represents, so to speak, a new version of Mykola Khvylovyj's bold appeal in his political pamphlets of the 1920s: "Het' vid Moskvu" (Away from Moscow) "Vsi vikna na Evropu" (All Windows toward Europe).⁶ By rediscovering their European roots, Ukrainians are simultaneously asserting their separateness from Eurasia.

What other message could one expect from a symposium organized by the Kiev City Council to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the introduction of the Magdeburg law in the Ukrainian capital, a medieval law of city self-government brought to Ukraine in the fourteenth century from Saxony but, as an article in the popular journal *Ukraina* did not fail to note, a law that had its origins in northern Italy.⁷ The law managed to survive until the nineteenth century even after the annexation of parts of Ukraine to Russia. It culturally ties Ukraine not only with Central Europe—a fact everyone seems to be aware of by now—but with the very source of Western European civilization, the early medieval Italian city states, the immediate successors of classical Rome. The symposium—organized by the bureaucrats rather than the intellectual elite of Kiev—represented only the first step for a festive celebration. The commemoration ceremonies were crowned with an international conference in May 1999.

The influence on Ukraine of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the birth of modern nationalism centred in the *Risorgimento* continue to be subjects discussed with great enthusiasm in the more scholarly, sophisticated journals regardless whether these important cultural currents are presented as strong or weak, obvious or hidden, and the overall impact of these discussions inevitably leads to an assertion of Ukraine's European identity and separateness from Russia. Furthermore, what most authors tend to emphasize is not so much Ukraine's integration into the European community but rather its reintegration into what is considered its rightful homeland.⁸

Impatient with the hidden or not immediately visible, authors of popular literature tend to focus primarily on the concrete. They emphasize those aspects of Ukraine's ties with Europe that appear, on the surface at least, factually irrefutable. Among the favourite are theories supported by geopolitical determinism. They stress that the centre of Europe, determined by precise measurements, is unmistakably in Ukraine. Or, as a member of the Young Republicans enthusiastically pointed out in a youth journal, the territory of Ukraine was tied to Western Europe from time immemorial through its rivers, which flow into the Black-Mediterranean-Atlantic basin. The Russian state, on the

other hand, from its very inception was tied to Volga and through it to the Caspian Sea. From this the young author concludes, supporting his arguments with quotations from Russian historians, Muscovy was inevitably tied to the East: Russia had no choice but to have her face turned toward Asia.⁹ The subtext is clear: Ukrainians are Europeans, and thus distinct from Russians.

Assertion of Ukraine's "Europeanness" is so all-pervasive that one is somewhat taken aback by an occasional expression of doubt, such as, for example, a question posed in a recent article: "Could it be really true that we have nothing in common with the East?" or an unexpected quotation from nineteenth-century literature: "Ukrainians, some ethnographers say," states a character in Panteleimon Kulish's novel, "have been positioned with their head in Europe and their feet in Asia."¹⁰ In most instances, even if there is an allusion to some connection to Eurasia, the message generally implies that Ukrainians had been held by force in Asiatic Russia but only "by their feet" so to speak. In a recently published collection of essays on philosophical thought in Ukraine, Vadym Skurativskyj while attempting to explain the "Eurasian syndrome," focuses exclusively on Russian authors and political leaders.¹¹

Thus, one may conclude, as Natalka Bilotserkivets's observes, that in Ukraine the "Eurasian idea *nespratsiuvala* (has failed to work out)." Ukraine's instinctive gravitation toward Europe is so obvious and natural, writes Bilotserkivets, as the yearning of a child for its mother, no matter how neglectful this parent may appear.¹² This natural gravitation toward Europe, reassures the well-known poet-essayist, in no way threatens Ukrainian national identity, since national identity encompasses supranational identifications as well. One can simultaneously identify oneself as a Ukrainian, a Hutsul, a Slav, a European, and a citizen of the world. But this higher form of national self-identification presupposes full equality of all its components, i.e., subnational, national, and supranational. Since such an equality is far from being a reality today and since Europe failed to greet its abandoned offspring with outstretched arms, the author of a celebrated poem of the 1980s, in which she poignantly expressed her longing for European culture ("We will not die in Paris"), a decade

later arrives at the conclusion that Ukrainians, instead of being overly concerned with their culture's deficiencies, should venture to find their very own, unique cultural path. Once Ukraine is reintegrated into Europe, notes Bilotserkivets, what Europeans will find most valuable will be the uniqueness of Ukrainian culture.¹³

Echoes of Czech émigré writer Milan Kundera's disillusionment or frustration with the West reverberate quite frequently today among Ukrainian intellectuals. Charges are leveled that the West, in its quest for new ideas, is shamelessly hunting for "Eastern" scientists and artists in order to squeeze them out as lemons for its own cocktails.¹⁴ By the beginning of the twenty-first century, Ukrainians have become fully aware of what Vaclav Havel had pointed out so succinctly in his essay in the *New York Review of Books* a number of years ago, namely, that not everything that Eastern Europe had received from its Western counterpart had been positive. As a striking illustration, Havel singled out Marxism!¹⁵ A gravely pessimistic evaluation of the general trends in the current European thought by the Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski did not escape the notice of Ukrainian intellectuals.¹⁶ Kolakowski's warning that Western technological expansion is inevitably leading to the demise of small cultural entities and languages is a grim reminder that today Ukrainian identity is threatened not only by Russification but also through the ever-expanding process of globalization. Their arguments on this subject fully concur with Kolakowski's observation that "If it were to be our fate to erase the variety of cultures of the world in the name of some-kind of 'planet-wide' civilization, it would mean a catastrophe for human civilization."¹⁷ Ukrainian authors are equally concerned with the incursions into their language by both Russian and English.¹⁸

Disillusionment with the selfish, materialistic, uncaring West notwithstanding, the general tone of recent arguments on this subject seems to be as follows: the integration or, to be more precise, reintegration of Ukraine into Europe is a natural process. Even if Ukraine in the course of its reintegration becomes a colony of the West, such an eventuality will be unfortunate, but it will be more preferable than Ukraine becoming one of the "lifeless" provinces of Russia.¹⁹

One might ask what effect this at first highly optimistic, now somewhat dampened but still unmistakably pro-European enthusiasm has had on Ukrainians' attitude toward Russia, on the sensitive issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations within the state. After all, Ukraine's age-old enemy, the Russian White or Red dragon, continues to be considered the most serious danger to Ukrainian culture, even though the lethal force of the dragon's claws and teeth has been considerably toned down by the recent dethronement of the imperial culture.

A perusal of recent discussions in scholarly and popular journals indicates that the emphasis on Europeaness or separateness from Russia has produced no perceptible signs of Russophobia. As one observer tersely put it, "Ukraine, alas, is no longer pro-Russian, but at the same time, she is not anti-Russian either, she is simply Ukrainian."²⁰ This assessment of the present situation reminds us of one of the first Western commentaries on Ukrainian dissident literature in the 1960s, Viacheslav Chornovil's edition of *Lykho z Rozumu* in particular: Ukrainian nationalism, Western commentators appeared to agree, has reached a higher, dignified level: it seeks cultural parity and national dignity without expressing animosity toward Russia. The amicable relations between Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian dissidents—including the Russians—have been well documented during the two succeeding decades of repression. The Ukrainian intelligentsia today is treading on the path of this tradition.

The present climate of opinion among the Ukrainian intelligentsia vis-à-vis the Russians is highly reminiscent of Wolfgang Goethe's sentiment when Napoleon's forces left Prussia in 1814. The German poet was exuberant that the French political and cultural hegemony was finally over, but at the same time, he did not fail to appreciate what was lofty and valuable in the French culture.²¹ Like Goethe at the beginning of the eighteenth century, Ukrainian intelligentsia today is taking steps to raise its national culture from stagnating provincialism and isolation (twentieth century without Freud!) by endeavouring to unearth both its European roots and its unique indigenous treasures. That these endeavours reinforce Ukrainian national consciousness or identity is so obvious that they need no elaboration. The restrained tone with which these discussions have been conducted undoubtedly facilitates the receptivity of this mode of thought

both within the Ukrainian and the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine even though the recent clearly pro-Russian orientation taken by the government both with respect to foreign policy and culture may introduce a note of discord between these groups. This eventuality, however, will in no way undermine "Europeanness" as a factor of reinforcement of Ukrainian national identity.

NOTES

- 1 Vadym Skurativskiy, "Ukraine—Via Europe," *Suchasnist'* (June 1992), 144.
- 2 Stefania Andrusiv, "Mifolohema Evropy v suchasnij ukrainskij kulturnij svidomosti," *Suchasnist'* (February 2001), 110.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 110–113.
- 4 See, for example, Oksana Pakhlovska, "Z Ukrainy v Evropu cherez Konstanyopol," *Suchasnist'* (January 1994), 54–68, and (February 1994), 101–116; Vadym Skurativskiy, "Ukraine—Via Europe," *Suchasnist'* (June 1992), 144–146; and Taras Vozniak, "The Complexity of a Human Being and the Nation," *Suchasnist'* (September 1992), 141–144; Oleksandr Kikhno, "Ukrain's'ka idea: Dolia ukrain's'koi kul'tury v evropejs'komu i svitovomu konteksti," *Geneza* (January 3, 1995), 66–72; Vadym Skurativskiy, "Svitovyi kontekst ukrain's'koi istorii," *Geneza* (January 3, 1995), 130–134; Oksana Zabuzhko, "Filosofia natsionalnoi idei: Ukraina i Europa," *Zustrichi* Warsaw (February 1991), 93–101; Oksana Pakhlovska "Binom—Ukraina—Diaspora' sohodni: kryza i perspektyvy," *Suchasnist'* (May 2002), 76–97; conversations with literary scholars Tamara Hundorova, Eleonora Solovey, Natalia Chchel, the poet Ihor Pavliuk, and others.
- 5 Oksana Pakhlovska, "Z Ukrainy v Evropu cherez Konstanyopol," *Suchasnist'* (January 1994), 116.
- 6 *Mykola Khvylovyy: Tvory v piatokh tomakh*, Vol. IV (New York: Smoloskyp, 1983).
- 7 The Magdeburg law was first introduced in Sanok in 1339; in Lviv in 1356 "Magdeburz'ke pravo," *Ukraina* (January 1999), 18–19.
- 8 Andrusiv, "Mifolohema Evropy ..."
- 9 Petro Vozniuk, "De mezha Evropy?" *Smoloskyp Ukrainy* 40, no. 11 (November 1998), 2–3. It must have been on the basis of these calculations that a prominent Ukrainian political activist confidently asserted at a conference at Harvard in 1998: "[Ukraine's pivotal position in Europe] is not a myth but a fact. The center of Europe is situated on our territory." Volodymyr Dibrova, "Iz tsykladu 'Chaini zamalovky'," *Krytyka* (March 2001), 27.

- 10 Olya Hnatiuk, "Heopolityka v ukraïns'kij literaturi," *Krytyka* (December 1998), 20–23.
- 11 Vadym Skuratiwskyj, "Syndrom euroazjatzki," *Colloquia, Communia: Ukrain'ska Przerstren' Filozoficzna Wczoraj i Dzis'* 68, no. 1 (January–March 1998), 75–84.
- 12 Natalka Bilotserkivets, "Kryven'ka kachechka, abo shche raz pro tragediiu Central'no-Skhidnoii Evropy," *Krytyka* (February 1998), 4–6.
- 13 Ibid. This point of view appears to appeal to a youthful group of writers from Lutsk who place a strong emphasis on the indigenous roots of Ukrainian culture. This was elucidated in a paper by Olha Hnatiuk at the Shevchenko Scientific Society in New York, February 16, 2002.
- 14 Ibid. See also Yuriy Andrukhovych's article in *Chetver* no. 3 (1992), quoted in Olia Hnatiuk, "Heopolityka v ukraïns'kij literaturi," *Krytyka* (December 1998), 2.
- 15 *The New York Review of Books* (June 1996).
- 16 Leszek Kolakowski, "U poshukakh varvara, (omany kulturnoho universalizmu)," *Krytyka* (September 2001), 12–17.
- 17 Ibid., 14–15.
- 18 Pakhlovska, "Binom'Ukraïina—Diasora' sohodni: kryza i perspeytyvy," 95.
- 19 Ibid., 80.
- 20 *Krytyka* (January 1997), quoted in Bohumyla Berdykhovs'ka, "Try iliustratsii do ukraïns'kykh shukan'," *Krytyka* (October 1998), 24–27.
- 21 The pertinent passage is as follows: "How could I write hate-songs without hatred? And between ourselves, I did not hate the French, though I thanked God when we were free of them. How could I hate a nation which is among the most cultivated on earth and to which I owe so great a part of acquirement?"

Part Four

Religion at the

Crossroads of

Development

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9

In Search of a National Ukrainian Church: Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Canada and Ukraine

OLEH W. GERUS

Normally ecclesiastical structures are founded by spiritual or theological considerations. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada and the Ukrainian Orthodox Independence (autocephalic) Church movement in Ukraine, however, were driven largely by the forces of Ukrainian nationalism. Their formation first and foremost represented a political rather than a religious statement. This seeming anomaly is less contradictory than it appears because universal Orthodoxy has always been a delicate balance of faith and local nationalism. Historically, the search for ecclesiastical self-determination of Orthodox nations has always been connected to the emerging national self-consciousness. In the experience of the Ukrainian people, for centuries dominated by Russia, the goal of these separate but parallel developments synthesized in the ideal of a Ukrainian national Orthodox Church, one that would become a catalyst of Ukrainian nationhood and independent statehood. Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the issues of Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Church-state relations have been a subject of intense and occasionally violent national debate as the majority of the Ukrainian population professes the Orthodox faith.¹ In Canada, where over a million Canadians are of Ukrainian ancestry, a nationalistically inspired Orthodox Church emerged as a guardian of ethnicity and traditions of the Ukrainian settlers in the face of assimilative forces.

One should understand that in the area of Orthodox ecclesiastical politics, the ambiguities of the Church's ancient canon law have allowed that law to be abused for political and personal purposes.² The weapon most frequently used by a dominant Church against dissent is the pronouncement of "uncanonicity," that is, of illegitimacy. When an Orthodox Church is not recognized as canonical by the Orthodox ecclesiastical establishment, its bishops and clergy are deemed uncanonical or illegitimate, that is, not in accordance with the canon law and thus schismatic. Such a Church is stigmatized and shunned by other Orthodox Churches. More importantly for the believer, the designation "uncanonical" not only compromises the faith but invalidates the sacraments and thus jeopardizes the salvation of the faithful. The common result of the canonical versus uncanonical controversy, as witnessed in contemporary Ukraine, is spiritual apprehension, community instability, jurisdictional rivalry, and external interference. Sadly for Ukraine, the antiquated canon law and the lack of consensus on its meaning have combined with political imperatives to frustrate the canonical recognition of a Ukrainian autocephalous national Orthodox Church.

In the twentieth century, the issue of canonical autocephaly—that is, of administrative-judicial independence—has been crucial to Ukrainian Orthodoxy, aspiring to separate from the Russian Church into which it had been politically incorporated in 1686. Although there is no prescribed method for acquiring canonical autocephaly, in practice, the vehicle by which subordinated or emerging Orthodox Churches won their independence included the following prerequisites: national sovereignty, a unified Church, and political will. In the Balkans, for instance, national governments played a decisive role in this process as they used effective political pressure to win the coveted autocephalous status from their overlord, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, in whose jurisdiction they had been. As far as it can be determined, no national Orthodox Church has ever gained canonical autocephaly without a direct and forceful involvement of its government. Perhaps therein lies an object lesson for post-Soviet Ukraine.

Like most contemporary Ukrainian issues, the current Orthodox situation in Canada and Ukraine can be better

comprehended when one looks at the roots of the respective Church movements.

CANADA

The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada (UOCC, formerly known as Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox) is unique among Orthodox Churches.³ Its distinctiveness lies in its formation and character. The formation of the UOCC was primarily a political statement made by Ukrainian Catholic lay dissidents who had arrived from the Austro-Hungarian province of Halychyna and settled in western Canada. Unlike other Orthodox denominations in North America, the UOCC is not an extension of a European mother Church, but made in Canada, specifically on the Prairies. The determining role of the laity in its formation and its administration has given the Canadian Church a strong democratic character, one that has contrasted sharply with the traditional hierarchical power structure in the Orthodox world. Its indigenous Canadian birth notwithstanding, the UOCC has not been isolationist and has had a history of relations with Orthodoxy in Ukraine. For example, from 1924 to 1986, all primates of the UOCC were born and educated in Ukraine. Furthermore, the Canadian Church and its faithful have steadfastly supported the ideal of a Ukrainian national Orthodox Church for their ancestral homeland.

How was it that the UOCC was born in such an unusual fashion? The answer lies in the peculiar circumstances of Ukrainian settlement and colonization of western Canada.⁴ By World War I, the large Ukrainian immigration had given rise to a small but highly motivated secular intelligentsia. Galician-born and Canadian-educated, this pioneer elite assumed a community leadership role in Canada that normally had been exercised by parish clergy in the Old Country. The young populists-nationalists were alarmed by the apparent readiness of the Ukrainian immigrants to assimilate and angered by the perceived failure of the recently established Ukrainian Catholic Church to assert its Ukrainian character. The activists clashed with their Church over issues of national identity, clerical authority, and education.

In the period 1914–1918, the Ukrainian Canadian community, discriminated and harassed by the authorities because of its Austro-Hungarian origins, was only vaguely aware of the unfolding independence struggle in Ukraine. The decision of the Catholic dissidents to create their own Orthodox Church was not inspired by the events in Ukraine but by local conditions. It was primarily a political statement directed at the leadership of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Canada. In July 1918 in Saskatoon, the founders denounced their traditional Catholic Church for its alleged lack of Ukrainian national orientation and declared that they were returning to the Orthodox roots of their ancestors. To them, only Orthodoxy symbolized Ukrainian national identity. Thus was born the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada, the first modern Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the world, as an expression of Canadian secularism and Ukrainian nationalism.

The use of Ukrainian in place of Church Slavonic as the liturgical language became the early national hallmark of the neophyte Church. The UOCC was temporarily and nominally headed by a canonical bishop from the Syrian (Antiochian) Church. The real power, however, was in the hands of the Church's founders, the Orthodox Brotherhood. The entire ecclesiastical structure that evolved, ranging from local parish councils to the executive-administrative body (the consistory) to the supreme authority (*sobor* or general council) was lay-dominated, representative, and democratic. The democratic character of the Canadian Church distinguished it from other Orthodox jurisdictions. At the beginning, the UOCC depended on the crossover clergy from the Russian and Catholic jurisdictions. Later the Church established its own seminary.⁵

The Canadian Church was initially underpinned by a brotherhood that evolved into the Ukrainian Self-Reliance League (USRL), arguably the most influential Ukrainian community organization in the interwar period.⁶ The USRL and its organ, the *Ukrainian Voice*, aggressively and effectively promoted the virtues of Ukrainian national pride, participatory Canadian citizenship, and Orthodoxy as the true guardian of Ukrainian national values. The UOCC-USRL combination proved to be essential to the successful growth of the Church, which eventually

encompassed about a third of Ukrainian Canadians, mainly at the expense of the Russian Mission in Canada and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The success of the UOCC, however, came at a price as it initially divided and polarized the Ukrainian community along religious lines. At the same time, there is evidence that the Orthodox-Catholic rivalry in Canada did enhance the sense of distinct Ukrainian Canadian identity, a positive development that, in time, facilitated interreligious respect and community co-operation.

UKRAINE

While a segment of the Ukrainian Canadian community was organizing its own Orthodox Church, parallel events were taking place in Ukraine. The Russian Revolution of 1917 unleashed the Ukrainian independence movement. The drive for a separate Ukrainian Orthodox Church was an integral part of this national revival and state building.⁷ The Ukrainian Orthodox Church movement, however, was not uniform in its objectives; it was divided between those who wanted to remain an integral part of the Russian Church, those who wanted a degree of self-rule or autonomy within the Moscow Patriarchate, and those who insisted on complete independence or autocephaly for a Ukrainian national Church.

The leadership of Ukraine's first national government, the Central Rada, failed to recognize the historic and political importance of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The socialist ideology of the government insisted on the policy of Church-state separation. As a result, the predominantly spontaneous national Church movement was left to its own resources. Without government support, the autocephalists, mainly the lower clergy and the intelligentsia, were at a serious disadvantage against the entrenched Russophile Church hierarchy, which was fundamentally and actively anti-Ukrainian.

During the conservative Skoropadsky regime in 1918, Church-state relations in Ukraine changed dramatically as that government declared Orthodoxy the state religion. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine received a degree of self-administration from the reformed Moscow Patriarchate, but efforts to

Ukrainianize the Russian Church failed in the face of Russophilic hierarchy, now reinforced by anti-Bolshevik refugees from Soviet Russia. The canonical Church of Ukraine became a major foe of Ukrainian independence. It was clear that autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church would not come from Moscow and its promoters turned the Patriarchate of Constantinople, under whose canonical jurisdiction the old Ukrainian Church (Kyivan Metropolia) had enjoyed a great deal of autonomy before its arbitrary transfer to Moscow's authority in 1689. The government mission to Constantinople requesting autocephaly for Ukraine, however, came too late, at the time of Skoropadsky's collapse.⁸

The last government of independent Ukraine, the Directory, finally made the question of a national autocephalous Orthodox Church a matter of state policy. Its decree of January 1919 disallowed any foreign control over a Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The responsibility for organizing a Ukrainian Church in those chaotic times was assigned to the minister of religious affairs, Ivan Ohienko, a prominent scholar and the future primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada. But as history conspired against Ukraine, Ohienko's imaginative projects for the establishment of an autocephalous national Church remained unrealized. Nonetheless, his ecclesiastical ideology is worthy of reflection, particularly by Ukrainian churchmen today who are striving to create a unified and relevant autocephalous Church.

In Ohienko's scheme, approved by the Directory, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church would be the national state Church while other denominations would enjoy full religious freedom.⁹ As a state institution, the Orthodox Church would have two vital functions: spiritual and political. In the difficult circumstances of 1919, Ohienko emphasized the Church's political function, that is, its role as a promoter of Ukrainian national consciousness and as a building block of Ukrainian statehood. A student of the history of the Balkan Orthodox movements, Ohienko was impressed with the power of Church-state partnership. His main goal for Ukraine was to convert the hostile but powerful Russian ecclesiastic infrastructure into a patriotic and supportive partner of the fledgling Ukrainian state. Accordingly, Ohienko's ministry of religious affairs launched a series of initiatives to win the support of the clergy and the public in the drive to de-Russify the

Church in the regions under the Directory's control. The introduction of the Ukrainian language into church services, administration, and theological education lay at the core of the reform program. This meant an extensive translation and publication effort. The church language issue—whether Ukrainian was worthy enough language to replace the sacred Church Slavonic—was deemed a canonical issue by the conservative and Russophile elements and created a serious schism in the Church movement.

The governance of the proposed national Church, like that of the Canadian Church, would be democratic, with the laity being a key factor at local parish councils and with the clergy rather than the bishops having a decisive role at national councils (*sobors*). The democratic concept sharply reduced the traditional power of the episcopate because Minister Ohienko distrusted the princely prerogatives of the hierarchy. Years later, however, as Metropolitan Ilarion, Ohienko would reconsider this outburst of his youthful radicalism.¹⁰ The elected all-Ukrainian *sobor* of the episcopate, the clergy, and the laity would constitute the supreme authority of the Church. The executive organ, the Holy Ukrainian Synod, would be chaired by the Metropolitan of Kyiv as head of the Church. The office of the patriarch would come into being at some future date. Most important, the synod would include the minister of religion. In other words, the government would have direct input into, if not actual control of, Church affairs.

For the advocates of autocephaly in 1919, a viable Ukrainian ecclesiastical structure with canonical hierarchy was the essential precondition for Constantinople's recognition. Here Ohienko encountered an immovable obstacle. The conservative and Russified hierarchy in Ukraine was adamantly opposed to the very idea of a distinct Ukrainian Church and effectively sabotaged the government's efforts for recognition. The desperate search for a canonical bishop to head the proposed Church and thus establish its canonicity was an utter failure. This frustration with constant opposition, similar to that experienced by the Canadian founders of the UOCC, eventually drove the autocephalous movement to take a drastic step and create its own Church and hierarchy. Ironically, it was under the Soviet

regime that the controversial Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) was finally formed. Headed by Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, the UAOC was roundly condemned by its critics, especially by the Moscow Patriarchate, as uncanonical and schismatic.¹¹ Despite this serious handicap, the UAOC's national and reformist character had a definite appeal to the patriotic Ukrainians adjusting to Soviet power. The popularity and nationalism of the UAOC also proved to be its undoing, as its profoundly Ukrainian character was unacceptable to the communist regime. In 1930 Stalin liquidated the Church with his patented brutality.¹²

Had Ukraine been able to remain independent, it's quite likely that Ohienko would have found the elusive canonical hierarch and, responding to the Ukrainian government, the Ecumenical Patriarchate, would have granted the coveted autocephaly despite Moscow's opposition. The experience of interwar Poland illustrates the importance of political will in the pursuit of autocephaly. Catholic Poland had a large Orthodox population, mainly Ukrainian, over which the Moscow Patriarchate claimed jurisdiction. To eliminate Moscow's influence in Poland, the Polish government initiated the organization of the Orthodox Church of Poland and then used diplomacy to obtain canonical autocephaly from Constantinople in 1924.¹³ The Polish success was due to the fact that in Warsaw, Orthodox autocephaly was a matter of state policy. Moscow, incidentally, never recognized the Polish Church.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE UOCC

Contact between the newborn UOCC and Ohienko, minister of religion of the Ukrainian government-in-exile residing in Poland, was established in 1920. The Canadian Church was looking for a Ukrainian bishop and requested Ohienko to find a suitable candidate. The potential candidates were Bishop Oleksiy Hromadsky and Arkhimandrite Polikarp Sikorsky of the Orthodox Church being formed in Poland. However, as it turned out, neither emigrated to Canada. Given the fact that during World War II, both of these men would head rival Ukrainian Churches, Oleksiy the autonomous and Polikarp the second edition of the

autocephalous, it is tempting to speculate whether the course of the fractious wartime Ukrainian Church history would have been different had either of the candidates come to Canada.

Negotiations with Ohienko ended when the secular leadership of the Canadian Church decided to turn to Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivsky, who had assigned a bishop to the United States. Ohienko cautioned the Canadian Church not to compromise its own canonical status by linking with the reformed and uncanonical UAOC. But the Canadians were more concerned with the Ukrainian character of their future bishop than with the confusing canonical issue. In 1924 the *sobor* of the UOCC elected the American-based Archbishop Ioan Teodorovych, formerly of the UAOC, as Canada's primate. Until 1947, Teodorovych presided over two jurisdictions, American and Canadian. His role in Canada was largely ceremonial. Although the UOCC specifically did not adopt the radical Kyivan canons of 1921, its acceptance of Teodorovych, however, did imply such acceptance and definitely compromised its canonical status in the eyes of world Orthodoxy, but not among the faithful, who respected their primate's integrity and Ukrainian patriotism.

While in the interwar period the Ukrainian Church movement had been violently repressed by the Soviet regime, it found opportunities for growth in the Orthodox Church of Poland. Soviet persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church, however, ended with the outbreak of World War II. In fact, the Russian Church became an instrument of Soviet western expansion. The initial Soviet occupation of western Ukraine in 1939 witnessed the imposition of the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate over Volhyn, a Ukrainian region formerly administered by the Orthodox Church of Poland. All local hierarchs, with the exception of Bishop Pilkarp Sikorsky, pledged their allegiance to Moscow.¹⁴ At the same time, in German-occupied Poland, the Orthodox Church was also allowed to function. Professor Ohienko, who had served the Ukrainian national and Orthodox cause by literary means, now aspired to the leadership of the Church and was canonically consecrated as Archbishop Ilarion of Kholm by the primate, Metropolitan Dionisij Vladensky.¹⁵

With the German invasion of Ukraine in 1941, the Orthodox hierarchy, the clergy, and the faithful there were again

divided on the thorny issues of Church jurisdiction and canonicity.¹⁶ The nationalist faction, led by Polikarp Sikorsky, renounced the Moscow Patriarchate, re-established its canonical ties with Metropolitan Dionisy, and proclaimed itself the new UAOC. The conservative bloc, headed by Archbishop Oleksiy Hromadsky, remained within the nominal jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate. The painful and seemingly unsolvable dilemma of divided loyalties, of patriotism and of faith again plagued the Ukrainian Orthodox community and would continue to do so in the future.¹⁷

After the war the episcopate and many priests of the UAOC found themselves in Western Europe as political refugees and displaced persons. There the UAOC, denounced by the Moscow Patriarchate as uncanonical, failed to win recognition from the traditional Orthodox Churches, which accepted Moscow's view. Thus isolated, it began to fragment into rival factions. With so many Ukrainian Orthodox hierarchs available in Europe, the consistory of the Canadian Church decided to replace the authority of Archbishop Ioan Teodorovych with a Canadian-based primate and turned to Europe. Initially the consistory of the UOCC intended to invite Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko, their long-time acquaintance then in Switzerland, to head the Church.¹⁸ However, as both sides disagreed on a number of key canonical issues, the Canadian Church opted for one of the UAOC's younger bishops, the dynamic and authoritarian Mstyslav Skrypnyk, a former politician in Poland. Ilarion also emigrated to Canada in 1947, but under the private sponsorship of a renegade Winnipeg parish. Both Mstyslav and Ilarion were based in Winnipeg, then the centre of Ukrainian life in Canada.

Mstyslav's tenure in Canada was turbulent and short. Serious disagreements erupted between archbishop Mstyslav and the consistory, as the two contradictory concepts of Church authority—monarchical and democratic—now clashed in Canada. The democratic principle won and Mstyslav left Canada in 1950 for the United States, where he eventually headed one of the Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and promoted Orthodox unity in the diaspora. In the meantime, the consistory and Ilarion Ohienko reconciled their differences and a special *sobor* elected Ilarion primate of the UOCC and appointed two more bishops. The

Church now became a self-sustaining metropolia with three hierarchs. The inclusion of Ilarion was a determining step in the evolution of the Canadian Church as his persona gave the UOCC a major intellectual force and enhanced its canonical status, although that crucial status still remained somewhat ambiguous.

Until his death in 1972, Ilarion concentrated on finding an acceptable way by which the UOCC could gain full canonical recognition without sacrificing its unique character and independence. An autonomous relationship with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, similar to that of the old Kyivan Church and one that would make the Canadian Church the nucleus of the future autocephalous Church of free Ukraine, was explored. For a time, the realization of a canonical connection with Constantinople was frustrated by internal and external Church politics. But by 1990, at the time of the revival of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Ukraine, the prevalent Canadian philosophy of total independence had waned. There was a strong desire, especially on the part of the younger clergy, to be able to interact with other Orthodox denominations in Canada. The UOCC reached an historical agreement with Constantinople at the time of the revival of Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Ukraine. According to the agreement, which was approved in July 1990 by a special *sobor*, the Canadian Church was accepted into the canonical jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in its current form.¹⁹ The UOCC got what it wanted; it retained its domestic autonomy and authority while becoming a member in good standing of the Orthodox fraternity, the first modern Ukrainian Church to achieve this status. It is interesting to speculate what direction the UOCC would have taken had the independence of Ukraine occurred earlier than it did.

The Canadian deal with Constantinople coincided with the revival of the autocephalous movement in Soviet Ukraine. As the communist system began to disintegrate with Gorbachev's *perestroika*, the banned forces of the Ukrainian liberation reappeared. With the escalating nationalist and independence fervour, the parish of Sts. Peter and Paul in the city of Lviv was the first among the Orthodox to declare, in 1989, its separation from the official Russian Orthodox Church. Led by Father

Volodymyr Yarema, the future Patriarch Dmytriy, the parish placed itself under the authority of the metropolitan of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States (former primate of the Ukrainian Canadian Church), Mstyslav Skrypnyk, who also headed the loosely structured Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the diaspora. It was, however, the daring declaration of Church independence by Bishop Ivan Bodnarchuk of Zhytomyr that provided the emerging Ukrainian Orthodox Church movement with initial leadership and a sense of purpose.²⁰ Dozens of priests and several bishops in western Ukraine followed Bodnarchuk's example in abandoning the Russian Church. Naturally, the unfolding events in Ukraine were welcomed by the anxious Ukrainian diaspora, which was surprised, if not shocked, by the rapidity of the Soviet collapse and the dramatic conversion of the pro-Moscow communists to the concepts of Ukrainian patriotism and state sovereignty.

In January 1990 the worried Moscow Patriarchate (MP) launched a strategic pre-emptive strike by renaming its Church in Ukraine (the exarchate) as a separate Ukrainian Orthodox Church with limited self-rule under Moscow's jurisdiction. The metropolitan of Kyiv, Filaret Denysenko, an outspoken opponent of Ukrainian nationalism with close connections to the communist establishment, was appointed the primate of the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC/MP). The move to cover a Russian Church with a Ukrainian face, however, did not stifle the growth of the autocephalous movement, although it did place a serious obstacle on its road to canonical legitimacy. In the Orthodox tradition, there can be only one canonical national Church in a given country. The politically created UOC/MP was recognized by the Orthodox world as such a Church. This meant that other Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in Ukraine would automatically be deemed uncanonical.

In June 1990, nationalistic autocephalous forces convened in Kyiv the all-Ukrainian Church *sobor*, the first since 1930, and formalized the third Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church as the Kyivan Patriarchate. The elderly (ninety-three) but still feisty Metropolitan Mstyslav was elected in *absentia* as Ukraine's first patriarch and in November enthroned in a tel-

vised ceremony in the renowned Cathedral of St. Sophia. Mstyslav, as the last surviving hierarch of the wartime UAOC, had become a crucial historical symbol of continuity for the national Church movement. The rapidly expanding UAOC was vehemently denounced by Moscow and Filaret as a political sham church. However, when the communist leader Leonid Krawchuk embraced the cause of Ukraine's independence in the summer of 1991, he decided to use the UOC/MP to rally public support for the December independence referendum and his own presidential election. Always respectful of power, Filaret obliged. He became a born-again Ukrainian patriot and accepted the popular slogan, "Independent church in an independent state" as his goal. The ensuing tension and conflict between Filaret and his superior, Moscow Patriarch Alexei II, led to the removal and later excommunication of Filaret and his replacement by Metropolitan Volodymyr Slobodan, originally from Halychyna.

The fact that the majority of hierarchs of the UOC/MP failed to follow Filaret upset President Krawchuk's scheme of creating a united semi-official national Orthodox Church. Hasty and not well thought out government initiatives to form such a Church, however, continued. The end result was a union in 1992 between Filaret's supporters and the UAOC. The ailing Patriarch Mstyslav (d. 1993) was circumvented and the Filaret-inspired Ukrainian Orthodox Church/Kyivan Patriarchate replaced the UAOC. Unfortunately for the promoters of a state Church and Ukrainian Orthodoxy in general, this somewhat arbitrary unification process backfired and caused a bitter schism in the autocephalous movement. The diehard adherents of the UAOC refused to recognize the new Church, mainly because of their distrust of Filaret, and created a rival patriarchate in Lviv, headed by a pioneer of the autocephalous movement, Dmytri Yarema. With the election of Leonid Kuchma to the presidency in 1994, Krawchuk's failed concept of a state Church was abandoned. This change of policy was reflected in the 1996 constitution, which established a clear separation of Church and state. The continuing and mutually damaging inter-Orthodox strife, however, has obliged Kuchma's reluctant government to get involved in the destabilizing politics of religion and to begin promoting Orthodox Church unity, but without giving any obvious support to

any of the combatants. While there has been much discussion, disunity continues.

In the early twenty-first century, the Orthodox situation in Ukraine is something like this: there are three feuding churches.²¹ The UOC/Kyiv Patriarchate (KP), headed by patriarch Filaret since 1995, is generally considered to be the national Ukrainian Church, but it is not recognized by any other Orthodox Church and is thus uncanonical. It claims the support of the majority of nationally conscious Ukrainians. It even has sympathizers in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada. Minority voices have been heard in eastern Canada, arguing on understandably patriotic grounds that dismiss the importance of canon law, for a switch to the Kyivan Patriarchate. The canonical status of the UOC/KP has thus caused certain domestic problems for the Canadian Church because its canonical connection to Constantinople precludes on its part any formal relations with the Kyivan Patriarchate. Nonetheless, unofficial relations, including the admission of Ukrainian theology students to St. Andrew's College in Winnipeg, have been maintained. Officially, the UOCC has maintained neutrality while strongly supporting the goal of canonical autocephaly for a unified Ukrainian Church and lobbying Constantinople to become proactive in Ukraine's affairs.²²

The UOC/MP is a combination of conservatives, Russophiles, and ethnic Russians and claims the largest following in Ukraine. In fact, for the Moscow Patriarchate the UOC/MP represents most of its functioning parishes and, it is believed, a major source of revenue. The loss of this most valuable jurisdiction, Moscow's cash cow, would dramatically reduce the size, prestige, and power of the Russian Church. Naturally, Moscow is not in the hurry to grant the UOC/MP the vaguely promised autonomy. As far as the nature of the UOC/MP constituency is concerned, anecdotal evidence suggests that its core consists of unsophisticated rural Ukrainians, predominantly women. They do not know any other Orthodox Church but the Russian, which they had sustained at a definite risk during communism. These militant *babusi* are religious to the point of superstition and, as such, have been manipulated by the clergy hostile to the Kyivan Patriarchate and the UAOC.

The UAOC, the smallest jurisdiction, sees itself as the true embodiment of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Centred in western Ukraine, it is fervently nationalistic and distrustful of Filaret. Following the death of Patriarch Dmytriy in February 2000, the UAOC, in accordance with his testament, made an unusual move and placed itself under Metropolitan Constantine of the United States, the successor of Mstyslav, whose American Church had recently entered the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. The connection between the UAOC and the American Church was facilitated by the Canadian Church through the Standing Conference of Ukrainian Orthodox Bishops Outside of Ukraine.²³ The formalization of this unusual alliance is still pending. In the meantime, it has provoked a strong negative reaction from Moscow, accusing Constantinople of meddling.

With three rival Orthodox Churches competing for the hearts and minds of the believers, as well as for Church properties, jurisdiction, and power, Ukrainian Orthodoxy is in a state of confusion and ecclesiastical *otamanshchyna*. Its moral and spiritual function has been seriously compromised in a society where militant atheism had ruled for so long. Ukrainian Protestantism and a variety of religious cults have been the main beneficiaries among the religious.²⁴ Given the fact that the majority of the population (estimated at 35–37 million) profess Orthodoxy, if only nominally, the Church dilemma has become a political and national one. Kuchma's government has intensified its efforts to resolve the religious issue by pressuring the three groups to join its All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and discuss seriously reconciliation and unity. Official overtures have been extended to Constantinople and Moscow. Ukraine's politicians, parliamentarians, and civic organizations have also been promoting Orthodox unity.

So, is there a solution to the Orthodox disunity? In the long run a unified Ukrainian Orthodox Church appears inevitable. The underlying cause of current Church disunity has been the historic absence of Ukrainian statehood. The colonial status of Ukraine enabled Moscow to usurp much of Ukraine's elite, cultural heritage, and its traditional Orthodox Church. The very logic of Ukraine's independence and of the ensuing state-building process dictates Orthodox Church unity and

autocephaly. The public wants it and the three branches of the Church want it, although at the moment they cannot decide on whose terms. Equally important to the consolidation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy is the fact that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is indeed preparing the groundwork for the long-awaited Orthodox ecumenical council at which the thorny question of autocephaly undoubtedly will be on the agenda.

In the meantime, the major obstacles to early Orthodox unity are the key players in this drama themselves: Patriarch Filaret, the Moscow Patriarchate, the Ecumenical (Constantinople) Patriarchate, and President Kuchma. The persona of Filaret has been the source of controversy from the very beginning of the Church revival. His well-known checkered past and his authoritarian character are at the root of his present difficulties. His excommunication by Moscow, albeit for political reasons, has made him untouchable as far as any meaningful negotiations between the UOC/MP and the Kyivan Patriarchate are concerned. It is assumed that his retirement would quite likely facilitate a reconciliation dialogue.

The status of the UOC/MP is that of a canonical autonomous Church. Although often depicted as the last vestige of Russia's imperialism in Ukraine, the UOC/MP is more complex than that. Its hierarchy and clergy represent an uneasy coalition of Ukrainian patriots, such as Metropolitan Volodymyr Slobodan and the Russophiles. Their antipathy toward Filaret keeps them together for the time being. While the pro-Ukrainian elements have been lobbying for canonical autocephaly from Moscow, the Russophiles, encouraged by Moscow, continue insisting on the status quo. This covert disharmony in the UOC/MP has allowed Moscow to procrastinate on the autocephaly question and to maintain its control over its largest constituency.

Constantinople's attitude with regard to Ukraine was initially deliberately ambivalent. This traditionally cautious approach is due mainly to the reality of ecclesiastical and political power. Today the Moscow Patriarchate is the largest and richest Orthodox Church in the world. It is also the official Church of the Russian Federation and enjoys strong government support. Constantinople, its historical prestige and leadership ambitions notwithstanding, generally has been obliged to defer to Moscow's pre-eminence. But on the issue of Ukraine,

Constantinople has acknowledged the wrongful and uncanonical transfer of the Ukrainian Church to Moscow and has questioned the territorial parameters of the Russian Church. In fact, in June 2000, Patriarch Bartholomew I declared that Ukraine lies within Constantinople's canonical jurisdiction. Moscow, however, has steadfastly rejected Constantinople's interpretation of history and canon law. Mutual relations have been tense.²⁵ Constantinople understands very well that a unified autocephalous Ukrainian Church would dramatically reduce Moscow's authority and change the entire inter-Orthodox balance of power. In the new scenario, Ukraine would become a major player and this development would definitely favour Constantinople. The dilemma for Constantinople is how to break Moscow's hold on Ukraine without creating a schism.

Kuchma's government has been advocating Church unity, but lacks decisiveness. It could force the issue of unification by taking legal steps to redesignate the UOC/MP as a Russian Church in Ukraine. This would strip the Church of its questionable Ukrainian identity. In addition, the government could persuade Filaret to resign or retire. The removal of Filaret would clear the way for serious reconciliation between the Kyivan Patriarchate, the UAOC, and the pro-Ukrainian elements of the former UOC/MP. At the moment, however, President Kuchma lacks the political will to face the consequences of engaging the Moscow Patriarchate, strongly supported by the Communist Party, in a head-on confrontation. Instead, quiet diplomacy is pursued in the belief that it is only a matter of time before the Moscow Patriarchate finally recognizes the political reality of Ukraine's independence and abandons its imperial mentality and relinquishes its hold on the UOC/MP.²⁶

History clearly demonstrates that the acquisition of canonical autocephaly by national Orthodox Churches has been a long and frustrating contest of power politics. It takes time, patience, and state power. It took Moscow itself 140 years to have its autocephalous status recognized by Constantinople. The Ukrainian initiative is only thirteen years old. A new generation of Church leaders, free of the Soviet mentality, should be able to end the chronic Orthodox disunity and bring a national Ukrainian Orthodox Church into the family of the fourteen canonical

autocephalous Churches. From a comparative perspective, it is clear that the small Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada in eighty-four years has evolved into a stable ecclesiastical jurisdiction that ministers to the spiritual and ethnocultural needs of its community. In contrast, Ukrainian Orthodoxy in Ukraine, having survived brutal repression for most of the twentieth century, has yet to fulfill its national potential. It is still a work in progress.

NOTES

- 1 Ukraine's media devotes much attention to the Church issue, especially the subject of Orthodox disunity. For instance, the Internet Web site, Russian Intercessory Prayer Network, has fifty-eight press reports and articles <www.ripnet.org/ukrainian.htm>.
- 2 The Orthodox canon law is discussed in the following: J.M. Hussey, *The Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (London: J. Clarke, 1957); T. Ware, *The Orthodox Church* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963); S.W. Sawchuk, *Tserkovni kanony v teorii i praktytsi* (Winnipeg: Ekklesia, 1955); O. Lototsky, *Ukrainski dzherela tserkovnoho prava* (Warsaw: Ukrainskyj Naukovyi Instytut, 1931).

The Orthodox canon law is based largely on the Seven Ecumenical Councils, the last held in 787. History and the inherent conservatism of the faith have worked against the updating of the law. As a result, there is no one collection of canon law that is accepted by all Orthodox Churches in the same way. Each national Church can interpret as it sees fit. Thus, the meaning of canonicity, like beauty, seems to lie in the eye of the beholder.
- 3 The official history of the UOCC is a four-volume effort produced by I. Mulyk-Lutsyk, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v Kanadi* (Winnipeg: Ekklesia, 1984–1989); Also useful are P. Yuzyk, *The Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada, 1918–1951* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1981); O.W. Gerus, "The Reverend Semen Sawchuk and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada," *Journal of Ukrainians Studies* 16, nos.12 (1991), 62–88; Special issue of *Vira i kultura/Faith and Culture*, no. 12 (1999–2000): *Ukrainian Religious Tradition in Canada*; "The Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada: The Formative Years," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* LVIII, nos. 1–2 (Spring-Summer 2001), 65–90.
- 4 Interest in the pioneer phase of the Ukrainian Canadian experience has produced extensive literature. Perhaps the most incisive study is O. Martynowych, *Ukrainians in Canada: The Formative Period* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1991).

- 5 The seminary became St. Andrew's College in Winnipeg, and its Arts Faculty affiliated with the University of Manitoba as the Centre for Ukrainian Canadian Studies.
- 6 O.W. Gerus, "Consolidating the Community: The Ukrainian Self-Reliance League," in *Canada's Ukrainians: Negotiating an Identity*, edited by L. Luciuk and S. Hryniuk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); O.W. Gerus, "Konsolidatsiia ukrainskoi suspilnosti v Kanadi," in *Zhyttievyi dosvid ukrainsiv v Kanadi*, edited by O. Gerus et al. (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Canada, 1994).
- 7 The late Bohdan Bociurkiw produced a number of scholarly articles about the autocephalous movement: "The Autocephalous Church Movement in Ukraine: The Formative Stage, 1917–1921," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* XVI, no. 3 (1960), 201–223; "The Church and the Ukrainian Revolution: The Central Rada Period," in *The Ukraine 1917–1921: The Study in Revolution*, edited by T. Hunczak (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 1977), 220–246; "The Politics of Religion in Ukraine: The Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1919," Occasional Paper no. 202 (Washington: Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 1985); other important studies include Metropolitan V. Lypkivsky, *Istoriia ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy: vidrodzhenia ukrainskoi tserkvy* (Winnipeg: I. Gryshchuk Foundation, 1961); M. Iavdas, *The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church* (Munich: UAOC of Federal Republic of Germany, 1956); I. Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii ukrainskoi pravoslavnoi tserkvy*, Vol. IV, Part I (New York: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of U.S.A., 1966).
- 8 Lototsky's diplomatic mission has received recent attention in A. Partykevich, *Between Kyiv and Constantinople: Oleksander Lototsky and the Quest for Ukrainian Autocephaly* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1998); Lototsky's own recollection can be had in *Storinky mynuloho: v Tsarhorodi*, Vol. 4 (Bound Brook: Ukrainian Orthodox Church of U.S.A., 1966). See also V. Trembitsky, "Znosyny ukrainskoi drezhavy 1918–1922 rokiv z tsarhorodskoiu patriariarkhiieiu," *Bohoslovia* 29 (1965), 50–65.
- 9 Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko's rich archive at the Consistory of the UOCC (Winnipeg) contains a number of copies of ministerial decrees and reports of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). See I. Ohienko's, "Diialnist Ministerstva Ispovidan."
- 10 Ohienko's Ukrainian traditionalism is clearly seen in his special message to the Ukrainian episcopate, "Riatuimo ukrainsku tserkvy," (1946), in the Ohienko archives at the UOCC Winnipeg Consistory.
- 11 In the Orthodox Church the bishop is the chief spiritual guide of his faithful. The bishop's office is seen as a direct successor of the office of the apostles. As such, it is considered the symbol and guarantee of the unbroken continuity

of the Church of Christ. The original apostles passed the office on to their successors by the sacramental laying of hands. Orthodox canon law calls for no less than two bishops to consecrate a new bishop. The proponents of the Ukrainian autocephalous Church tried hard, but could not find one Ukrainian bishop who had the courage to head their Church or two sympathetic bishops who would consecrate a suitable candidate. In desperation, the UAOC *sobor* revived the so-called Alexandrian method, by which the clergy and laity consecrated the activist priest, Vasyl Lypkivsky, as their bishop. The next day Metropolitan Lypkivsky consecrated six new bishops as the nucleus of the UAOC hierarchy. Unfortunately, the ancient Egyptian practice had been declared uncanonical by the First Ecumenical Council in 325, so the UAOC was not recognized by other Orthodox Churches as legitimate and its bishops were derided as *samosviaty*, self-ordainers.

- 12 Following the official liquidation of the UAOC, the majority of its episcopate and clergy, including Lypkivsky, were either murdered or imprisoned. O. Zinkevych and T. Lonchyna, eds., *Martyrolohiia ukrainskykh tserkov*, Vol. I, *Ukrainska pravoslavna tserkva* (Toronto-Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1987), 29–537.
- 13 The important document that gave Poland autocephaly, the Patriarchal Tomos (November 13, 1924) considered the Polish Orthodox Church as the historical extension of the historic Kyivan Metropolia, over which Constantinople and not Moscow had canonical jurisdiction. The Moscow Patriarchate disagreed, and after World War II forced the Polish Orthodox Church to renounce the 1924 autocephaly in favour of a new autocephaly from Moscow.

Literature on the Orthodox Church of Poland is varied. A Ukrainian Orthodox perspective is provided by I. Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii ukrainskoi ...*, Vol. IV, Part 2; I. Mulyk-Lutsyk, *Istoriia Ukrainskoi Hreko-Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy v Kanadi*, Vol. I, 307–583. For a Catholic view, see O. Kupranets, *Pravoslavna tserkva v mizhvoienii Polshchi* (Rome: Analects Ordinis S. Basilii Magni, 1974); for a Russian perspective, see A. Svitich, *Pravoslavnaia tserkov v Polshche i ee avtokefaliia* (Buenos Aires: Nasha Strana, 1959).

- 14 Wlasowsky, *Narys istorii ukrainskoi ...*, Vol. IV, Part 2, 203.
- 15 In addition to his extensive scholarly activity, which included a professorship at Warsaw University, Ohienko edited and published in Poland two influential Ukrainian journals, *Ridna mova* and *Nasha kultura*.
- 16 See Oleh W. Gerus, “The Ukrainian Orthodox Disunity in a Historical Context,” *The Ukrainian Quarterly* LIII (Winter 1997), 301–321.
- 17 A letter (July 30, 1942) written to Metropolitan Ilarion by a village priest, Oleksander Biletsky, reflected the moral and national quandary faced by many Orthodox believers: “one conscience tells us to support Metropolitan

Oleksiy because he is striving to safeguard the purity of Orthodoxy and to establish the Ukrainian Orthodox church on firm canonical foundations whereas the other side [UAOC] has strayed from the path of Orthodoxy. However, another conscience tells us that Polikarp and his followers are indeed more Ukrainian. We have thus two conflicting consciences. The canonical conscience orders us to be with Oleksiy while the Ukrainian conscience pushes us in the direction of Polikarp. This uncertainty has caused such confusion that we [the clergy] do not know what to tell our people, who so far have not been heard." Ilarion archive.

- 18 A discussion of Ilarion's Church activities in Canada can be found in Oleh W. Gerus, "Metropolitan Ilarion Ohienko and the Ukrainian Greek-Orthodox Church of Canada," in *Millennium of Christianity in Ukraine, 988-1988*, edited by O.W. Gerus and A. Baran (Winnipeg: Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Canada, 1989), 239-273.
- 19 "Articles of Agreement between the UOC of Canada and Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople," *Visnyk/The Herald* (organ of the UOCC), June 15-30, 2000.
- 20 Bodnarchuk made a powerful appeal to the frustrated sense of Ukrainian national dignity: "To the freedom-loving Ukrainian nation! How much longer will you remain a slave in your own home? How much longer will you submit to foreign spiritual leaders-oppressors? How much longer will the foreigners bully you in your own home?" *Visnyk/The Herald* (December 1-15, 1989). For a discussion of the revival, see Oleh W. Gerus, "Church Politics in Contemporary Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* LII (Spring 1996), 28-46 and Taras Kuzio, "In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine's Orthodox Churches," *Religion, State & Society* 25, no. 7 (1997), 393-415.
- 21 Although statistical data from Ukraine is not always reliable, this was the distribution of parishes among the three Orthodox Churches in 1996: UOC/MP 6,564; UOC/KP 3,332; UAOC 1,209 parishes, *Ukrainske ravoslavne slovo* nos. 7-8 (1996). More recent data gives the UOC/MP around 9,000 parishes, the UOC/KP 3,000, and the UAOC 1,500, *Kyiv Post* (January 18, 2000). As parishes vary in size, the exact number of Orthodox faithful in each jurisdiction is difficult to determine.
- 22 Regular readers of *Visnyk/The Herald*, the official organ of the UOCC, have noticed on its pages the UOCC's delicate balancing act toward the feuding Ukrainian Churches since 1990 as well as the emotional frustration that it has caused the Canadian supporters of the Kyivan Patriarchate.
- 23 *Visnyk/The Herald* (January 31, 2000).
- 24 In 1996 various Ukrainian Baptist/Protestant Churches had 3,994 congregations, while the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, located almost exclusively in western Ukraine, had 3,079 parishes. There were also 694 Roman Catholic parishes. *Vechirniy Kyiv* (October 2, 1996).

- 25 Two current areas of canonical or power disagreement between Moscow and Constantinople are the tiny Estonian Orthodox Church, whose autocephaly Constantinople recognized but Moscow has not, and the multiethnic Orthodox Church of America (OCA). Moscow has granted the OCA autocephaly, but Constantinople refuses to recognize its status because it rejects Moscow's claims over America. Constantinople's interpretation of canon law places the new lands in which Orthodoxy has been established, such as America, exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
- 26 Interview with Ukraine's then vice premier, Mykola Zhulynsky. *Visnyk/The Herald* (July 15–31, 2000).

10

The Ukrainian Catholic Church and Identity in Transition: A Canadian Perspective

ANDRII KRAWCHUK

The legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church (UCC)¹ and Ukraine's subsequent independence shifted the focus of discussion about the Church from human rights concerns to an immense project of institutional restoration. As the Church emerged from the underground and was "born again," it has been watched, accompanied, and assisted by co-religionists throughout the many countries of the Ukrainian diaspora, including Canada. Prayers of entreaty were replaced with prayers of thanksgiving for the freedom that had been given to the mother Church. Ukrainian Catholics in the diaspora were, for a time, caught up in an irresistible wave of euphoria, stemming from a vicarious sense of relief and liberation, and from a personal sense of empowerment—an opportunity to break through a cloud of nostalgic idealization of the past and to reconnect with the living source of their historically rooted, ethnoreligious identity.

From the middle of the twentieth century, the identity of the UCC was shaped to a significant degree by the traumas of World War II (successive occupations by totalitarian regimes, forced evacuations, and migrations) and by a pivotal event that took place in 1946. The KGB, after arresting all the UCC's bishops and recalcitrant priests, rounded up several hundred of the remaining priests, had new bishops consecrated, and staged a "synod" that unanimously voted in favour of submitting the UCC to the authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Synod of L'viv was thus a coerced parting of ways for three groups of

Ukrainian Catholics. In Ukraine, one group gave in to pressure and became Orthodox (in some cases, crypto-Catholic), while another group stood fast, either in the underground or in the gulag. In the West, the émigré Church was free, but isolated geographically and institutionally from its ancestral roots. This tripartite breakup left its deep imprint on the collective self-awareness of the UCC.

For much of the post-war period, the diaspora communities of the UCC existed as local churches with an extraterritorial leadership. A pivotal moment occurred in the early 1960s, when Yosyf Cardinal Slipyj was freed from the Soviet gulag and permitted to settle in Rome as head of the UCC worldwide. For more than twenty years, the UCC diaspora was headed by this confessor, who personally represented a living link with the mother Church. With his death in 1984, the UCC again felt the isolation and fragmentation of severed institutional ties. At the same time, a “patriarchal movement” continued to raise questions of ecclesiology and identity, with both consolidating and divisive effects. Self-determination became a battle cry, and the Vatican was lobbied for increased autonomy for the UCC worldwide, while Soviet persecution of the mother Church was placed squarely on the international human rights agenda. Sometimes the assertiveness became aggressive, and sometimes that aggression led the UCC to turn inward upon itself with a heavy hand, as when militant laity decided that certain bishops who did not subscribe to the patriarchal ecclesiology had to be “taught a lesson.” Yet, despite the best efforts to keep the links with the mother Church alive and to resist assimilation in the West, a half century of living in various cultural contexts also left its mark upon the identity of the diaspora UCC.

In Canada, the UCC became a unique branch of the diaspora community. Its sizable, organized, and active constituency, together with an official policy of multiculturalism, gave it a very visible presence in the social and political mainstream—one that was unmatched elsewhere. The particular status of a minority with a voice made it possible for the UCC in Canada to attain a high level of effectiveness and achievement, both internally and on the international scene. For the better part of the latter twentieth century, the Church played a leading, proactive role in the

practical reflection about émigré Ukrainian ethnoreligious identity. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else, the UCC became a spiritual bridge across the continental, cultural, and ideological divides that separated its people from the homeland. A Canadian perspective may therefore shed valuable light on the current situation in Ukraine, and on the changing relationship between diasporas and the mother Church.

The present analysis began with a study of major patterns in the religious demographics of the UCC in Canada and in Ukraine from official census and statistical data, but its aim is to go beyond the quantitative dimension—to identify and discuss related substantive issues. The dissolution of the Soviet Union brought an end to the politically imposed breakup of the UCC into three ecclesiological stances and experiences (resistance, compromise, and emigration). But today, more than a decade after the beginning of that far-reaching political transformation, the reunification of the three parts of the UCC is still very much a work in progress. Indeed, it is arguably the primary challenge that the Church faces—to formulate a unifying ecclesial identity and vision for the future, within which each of these three distinctive stories can be recognized and heard. A greater or lesser attentiveness to these stories will determine the future shape of the UCC's identity, either as a restored unity of purpose or as separate entities.

RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE: THE ECLIPSE OF A REGIONAL CHURCH

In order to understand the state of the UCC in the first decade after its legalization, it is helpful to situate it within the overall demographic picture of religion in Ukraine. From 1988 to 1999, religious life in Ukraine underwent a veritable quantum leap in growth and diversification. The magnitude of this transformation is reflected in official statistics compiled by the State Committee for Religious Affairs. In addition to indicating the numerical growth of religious communities nationwide, these figures also confirm the continuing high level of religious adherence in the western provinces, for centuries the heartland of the UCC. Table 10.1 summarizes the rates of increase in Ukraine and three

Table 10.1
Religious Communities, Registered and Non-registered, for All
Religious Denominations in Ukraine and Selected Western Oblasts
(numerical and percentage increases, 1988–1999)

Image not available

Sources: For the years 1998 through 1995, the figures are based on those given in Borys Gudziak, "Table 1: Regional Statistics for Religious Communities in Ukraine," in his "Ukrainian Religious Life During the First Five Years of Independence," *Towards a New Ukraine I: Ukraine and the New World Order, 1991–1996*, edited by Theofil Kis, Irena Makaryk, and Roman Weretelnik (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998), 62. Some corrections of calculations account for several differences between Gudziak's table and the one given above. The 1996–1999 figures are from "Relihiini orhanizatsii v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia ..." in *Liudyna i svit* (Kyiv) for the respective years.

western oblasts during three segments of the pivotal decade: 1988–1991, 1992–1995, and 1996–1999.

Throughout the country, the rate of growth moderated from 75.7 per cent to 26.4 per cent and 19.8 per cent in each of the three subperiods respectively; thus, the peak of growth was reached rapidly in the first years, and it declined progressively and steadily in subsequent years.

In the three oblasts of western Ukraine in which the UCC is most highly concentrated—L'viv, Ternopil', and Ivano-

Frankivs'k—the numerical growth of religious communities outpaced the national rate in 1988–1991. In the L'viv oblast alone, it was almost 2.5 times the national rate. But the subsequent drop in numerical growth from 1992 onward was also greater in the western region, as compared with national trends. In other words, both patterns—the dramatic rise in 1988–1991 and the subsequent fall in 1992–1998—were far more pronounced in western Ukraine than in the rest of the country. Indeed, while one may speak of a boom and moderate growth on the national scene, in the western oblasts what appears to have occurred is a boom and bust.² Bearing in mind the differences in historical experience and religious culture of the western oblasts and the rest of Ukraine, the sharp religious discrepancy in the first years of the post-Soviet period is scarcely surprising. The re-entry from the underground into a public, legal mode of existence was a heady historical moment, attended by a unique psychodynamic of euphoria that drove and shaped the early stage of the UCC's return to its traditional place in western Ukraine. Nothing similar had occurred, nor indeed could have occurred in quite the same way in the east.

Early assessments of the UCC at the Ukraine-wide level (my own in 1999 and the Razumkov Center's in 2001) were that this Church would likely remain, by and large, a regional fact, limited to a presence in only Galicia and Transcarpathia.³ Indeed, by the year 2000 the UCC continued to be heavily weighted (96–100 per cent) in the four western oblasts in a number of key sectors: communities, church buildings under construction, educational institutions, and periodical publications.

But before the first decade after legalization was over, the UCC began to take advantage of yet another unexpected gift—an open door to the rest of Ukraine. The end of the prohibition on the UCC's eastward expansion has revealed the “regional” image of the UCC for what it really was—the result not of natural processes, but of the joint efforts of Russian Orthodox and Soviet religious policies.⁴ Thus, by the year 2000, the map of the UCC's distribution in Ukraine indicated a breakthrough of near-revolutionary significance: for the first time in the twentieth century, the Church had a presence in Volhynia (Luts'k), Bukovyna (Chernivtsi), and points east of the Zbruch River.

Numerically (124 communities, representing a mere 3.8 per cent of the nationwide UCC total), that presence does not yet appear to be significant, but one should not be misled by that appearance. Far more important is the precedent-setting penetration and the very wide distribution of UCC communities—in twenty-one of the twenty-two eastern oblasts. By the time of the July 2002 *sobor* in L'viv, four further steps were on the agenda of this eastward move: (1) the construction of a *sobor*-church, (2) the convocation of the 2002 UCC synod of bishops in the capital city, (3) the anticipated proclamation—and Vatican recognition—of a patriarchate of the UCC, and (4) the transfer of the Church's (patriarchal) headquarters from L'viv to Kyiv. Considering the host of practical, organizational, and logistical considerations attendant upon such a transfer (and the very distinct possibility of internal organizational resistance by certain vested interests in western Ukraine), its planning and implementation would probably require at least five to seven years. Despite the daunting task ahead, the move of headquarters to Kyiv appears very similar to the move from Rome to L'viv just over a decade earlier—only a matter of time.⁵

ASSIMILATION IN THE CANADIAN MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT

The UCC's historical experience and sense of identity in Canada have also been shaped by long-term processes of demographic change. Census-based compendia on the religious affiliations of Ukrainians in Canada from 1931 through 1981 point to patterns that have been observed in the overall population, in particular deconfessionalization and pluralization.⁶ While the UCC and the Ukrainian community have continued to grow, that growth has occurred at different rates, and ever lower proportions of the Ukrainian Canadian population are declaring themselves to be Greek Catholic or members of the UCC: 58 per cent in 1931, and only 30 per cent in 1981. Ukrainian Orthodox figures reveal a similar, though more moderate decline—from 24.6 per cent to 18.6 per cent of Ukrainian Canadians in the same period. Combining the two, we have 82.6 per cent of Ukrainian Canadians in 1931 declaring themselves to be affiliated with

one of the two "traditional" denominations as opposed to only 48.6 per cent in 1981.⁷

The UCC's relatively slower growth rate cannot be abstracted from the social integration and assimilation of its members into the Canadian mainstream. Transfers of Church affiliation have resulted in the departure of ethnic Ukrainian members but also the arrival of non-Ukrainian members in the UCC, which in turn has transformed the Church's ethnic composition from a more or less monolithic one into a multicultural one. In 1931, 13.4 per cent of Ukrainian Canadians declared religious affiliation with the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, or the United Church, while in 1971 the figure was 33.8 per cent or almost 130,000 of the 580,000 Ukrainians in Canada.⁸ Nor is the increasingly multiethnic composition of the UCC in Canada limited to the laity; it is readily evident also in the ranks of the clergy. So too with bishops: the pioneers were Ukrainian-born and they were followed by Canadian-born Ukrainians; but in time, following the pattern that is firmly in place among the laity and the clergy, it will hardly be surprising to see the episcopal ranks of the Canadian UCC filled by non-Ukrainians.

At a pastoral level, the Church's leadership is facing, or will soon face, the question of how to reconcile its traditional value of an exclusively Ukrainian ethnic identity with the fact of a growing non-Ukrainian constituency. Unlike some Orthodox denominations, notably the Orthodox Church in America, which dispensed with ethnic identity as a matter of policy very early in their North American incarnations, the UCC has a strong record of defending Ukrainian ethnic identity and national rights. It may well choose to continue to do so, but that will be at the risk of alienating significant segments, including Ukrainian segments, of its flock.⁹

The UCC in Canada, which for decades bore a symbolic émigré torch for the persecuted mother Church and which forged an ethnoreligious identity, no longer constitutes a majority of the Ukrainian Canadian population. Its representative voice in the Ukrainian Canadian socio-political scene may soon become more nostalgic than real. Within the internal forum, a choice must be made: either to embrace the new, pluralistic reality as good and to build on that foundation, or to reject it and risk a terminal

cycle of alienations. The choice is a hard one: at stake is the Church's socio-religious identity and its prospects for lasting relations with the mother Church in Ukraine. Perhaps more than ever before, creative leadership is needed to bridge gaps between seemingly irreconcilable tendencies and the residual fragmentations of former times.

A CHURCH IN TRANSITION: OBSERVATIONS AND QUESTIONS

The legalization of the UCC in the former USSR and its subsequent restoration of formal ties with the diaspora Church radically altered the priorities of each and the nature of the relationship between them.¹⁰

In Ukraine, the transition from an underground to a legal existence was a trying, sometimes painful process that took place under the shadow of lingering antipathies toward carryovers from a painful past—Communist Party members who may have had a hand in persecution, or Orthodox affiliates of the Moscow Patriarchate, who could be vilified as “collaborators with evil.” While Western media coverage has focused almost exclusively on the resulting interdenominational tensions and conflicts between Catholics and Orthodox, a neglected factor in the UCC's uneasy transition has been the difficult reintegration of returning crypto-Catholics, who in the Soviet period had been priests, seminarians, and faithful of the Orthodox Church, but who now returned to the UCC.¹¹ The Catholic-Orthodox divide in Ukraine must also be distinguished in its two types: as an ethnically based division between Ukrainians and Russians, and as a denominationally based division between Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox. Along with these external social considerations, the UCC in Ukraine has also faced immense challenges of internal institutional restoration, and the diaspora has been attentive and responsive to the emergent needs.

In Canada, seminarians of the UCC in the 1980s followed very closely the unfolding process of religious normalization in Ukraine, especially when Bishop Isidore Borecky of Toronto travelled to Ukraine in order to concelebrate with Archbishop Sterniuk at the ordinations of married Canadian men. The controversial issue had its own history in the West, from the Vatican's one-

time-only canonical loophole after World War II permitting married priests to serve in Canada, to clandestine ordinations by Bishop Gabriel Bukatko in Yugoslavia and later by Cardinal Josyf Slipyj in Rome (until his death in 1984). Thus, as the Soviet period waned, it was quite natural for the first encounters of the émigré Church with the homeland to have involved the former turning to Ukraine for help in the unresolved matter of the ordination of married men.

Subsequent developments in the relationship between the diaspora and the native branches of the UCC permit us to propose some tentative observations. First, the restoration of direct, personal contacts has entailed a transition from spiritual and symbolic links to physical, institutional integration (e.g., the synod of bishops and *sobors*, now regularly held in Ukraine), and the pooling and exchange of human resources (e.g., Canadians who have moved to Ukraine in order to serve the Church there, or vice versa). Second, the relationship has evolved from simple dependence toward a more complex, mutual interdependence, with give and take on both sides, and a commitment for the long term. Third, the ongoing process of mutual discovery has already enabled an appreciation of distinctive cultural-historical experiences that shaped the UCC differently in Canada and in Ukraine during the twentieth century, a fact that requires special sensitivity in shared decision making on a range of pastoral and canonical questions. In short, the relationship between the two branches has deepened and some fundamental prerequisites of harmonious, long-term co-operation are being addressed.

Within different historical time zones and different socio-political cultures, the UCC nevertheless faces very similar challenges in Canada and in Ukraine—as growth has levelled off or even dropped, the UCC's ethnic composition has become more and more pluralistic, and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue. In western Ukraine, half a century of struggle against the Soviet yoke intensified an already potent mix of spiritual and ethnic identity. Whereas before World War II the Church had held sufficient moral authority to affirm Christian values even in the face of misguided “patriotic” extremism, nearly five decades of anti-Soviet moral opposition in the West and in Ukraine have eroded the Church's critical sense of social

mission. Having fought for the cause of ethnic survival—in the face of assimilation in the West and of persecution in the former USSR—the Church must now regroup and recover an authoritative, authentically spiritual voice for humanization in a post-Soviet world.

The necessary move away from ethnocentrism will not be achieved easily. The sustained focus on identity-defence certainly left its mark on the Ukrainian Catholic psyche: a religious world view intertwined with national values and suspicious of Christian universalism; a spirit of “ritual correctness” that turns liturgical worship into ideology; and anti-intellectual mystification centred on providence rather than personal responsibility. To varying degrees, these and other related tendencies remain obstacles in the way of the UCC’s ecclesial maturation and entry into the global community.

The Canada–Ukraine relationship within the UCC holds great promise in this regard. Ukrainian Catholics from Canada and other Western countries are present today in Ukraine and are actively involved in virtually every sphere of Church life. Whether in publishing or in the teaching of theology, whether as bishops, priests, or as student volunteers, whether in social work or in the pastoral sphere, the diversity and the scope of involvement by Ukrainian Catholics from the West has been astonishing. Living in post-Soviet Ukraine, many have acquired a liberated sense of ethnic identity and connectedness with the past, affirming and promoting cultural particularities, but situating them firmly within a Christian universalism and fraternalism, and categorically excluding ethnoreligious chauvinism. No longer bearing a torch for persecuted and remote brothers and sisters but living alongside them, they may yet play an important role in comprehending and addressing several momentous questions that the Church faces at this historical juncture:

- As the UCC moves to Kyiv and regions where others adapt their ministry and preaching to a predominantly Russian and/or Russified population, should Ukrainian ethnicity continue to be an inviolable, defining feature of its identity?

- Can the Church become more ethnically inclusive in the face of inevitable resistance from those who uphold an exclusivist ideal of Ukrainian Catholicism?
- Will a patriarchate bolster an ethnocentric ecclesial identity, or will it embrace the Russian demographic fact in eastern Ukraine, the Transcarpathian (Rusyn) fact in western Ukraine, and—in Canada—the growing non-Slavic fact?
- Having survived persecution in the East and assimilation in the West, what is to be the unifying vision of the UCC for the future?

NOTES

- 1 I employ the term “Ukrainian Catholic Church” here for the sake of simplicity and following Canadian usage. However, it should be noted that the official name of the Church in Ukraine is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church.
- 2 The boom and bust cycle of the UCC in Ukraine is confirmed by official statistics. From January 1990 to January 1991, the number of registered communities (roughly equivalent to parishes) rose from 298 to 2,001, representing a growth of 571.5 per cent. Subsequent years were as follows: 1992 = 2,644 (+32.1 per cent), 1993 = 2,807 (+6.2 per cent), 1994 = 2,932 (+4.5 per cent), 1995 = 3,032 (+3.4 per cent). See Borys Gudziak, “Table 2: Number and Growth of Religious Communities in Ukraine,” in his “Ukrainian Religious Life During the First Five Years of Independence,” *Towards a New Ukraine 1: Ukraine and the New World Order, 1991–1996*, edited by Theofil Kis, Irena Makaryk, and Roman Weretelnyk (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1998), 63. More recent figures also bear this out: 1998 = 3,151 (+1.7 per cent), 1999 = 3,212 (+1.9 per cent), 2000 = 3,240 (+0.8 per cent), 2001 = 3,317 (+2.3 per cent), 2002 = 3,336 (+0.6 per cent). See the annual reports published under the rubric “Relihiini orhanizatsii v Ukraini stanom na 1 sichnia ...” in *Liudyna i svit* (Kyiv) from 1997 onward.

Although the tally of “communities” is not a direct indicator of membership growth, the UCC’s approach to near-zero growth in the latter 1990s appears to be confirmed by membership estimates submitted by the Church to the *Annuario Pontificio*. A review of this annual directory reveals the following membership figures for four key eparchies (in millions):

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
L'viv	1.607	1.607	1.607	1.607	1.607
Ternopil'	.594	.594	.590	.590	.598
Ivano-Frankivs'k	.640	.640	.615	.615	.615
Zboriv	.3743	.3743	.3748	.3748	.375

- 3 In an earlier version of this chapter, before the eastward move of the UCC had become a well-established fact, my observation was that “as a church whose membership is located primarily in the western oblasts, the UCC’s voice is and will in the foreseeable future remain regional.” Cf. also: “the consolidation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church’s status as a regional church may be considered to be beyond doubt, at least in the immediate future.” In “Tserkovno-relihiina sytuatsiia v Ukraini. Stan i tendentsii rozvytku,” in *Tsentr Razumkova 2000*, edited by Liudmyla Shanhina (Kyiv: Zapovit, 2001), 217. A useful overview of the religious situation in Ukraine in the year 2000 is given in the larger section “Tserkva i suspil’stvo v Ukraini: problemy vzaiemovidnosyn,” in *Tsentr Razumkova 2000*, edited by Liudmyla Shanhina (Kyiv: Zapovit, 2001), 204–288.
- 4 With the demise of the Soviet Union, legal barriers to the UCC’s eastward expansion disappeared. The Russian Orthodox Exarchate in Ukraine continued to object to such “incursions,” but to no avail. Even the Vatican, in a relatively short time, yielded new ground to the UCC. In the decade after legalization, four successive documents marked significant shifts in the official position of the Holy See: the first limited the UCC’s jurisdiction to areas west of the Zbruch River (any UCC parishes to the east of the Zbruch were to be strictly under Roman Catholic jurisdiction); the second gave Myroslav Ivan Cardinal Lubachivskyj personal, non-transferable (*ad personam*) jurisdiction over the eastern territory of Ukraine; the third document granted “ordinary” transferable jurisdiction (but the creation of exarchates of the UCC in eastern Ukraine, as in the case of the eparchy of Kyiv-Vysh-horod, still required Vatican approval); and, finally, the fourth document recognized the right of the major archbishop and the synod of the UCC to have full jurisdiction over all the territories of Ukraine (except Transcarpathia, reporting directly to the Holy See), including the right to create their own exarchates and eparchies, as in the case of the exarchates of Donetsk-Kharkiv and Odessa-Crimea.
- 5 In an official statement, Lubomyr Cardinal Husar gave an early explanation of the rationale for the move to Kyiv: “It is a matter of bringing together all the parts of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, whose faithful were violently scattered by the Soviet regime throughout the entire territory of Ukraine, which today is covered by our eparchies and exarchates. In addition to [providing] internal unity, the relocation of our center to the capital, where other churches and religious organizations have their centers, will also enhance our church’s external relations. In this connection, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, after two centuries outside of Kyiv, wishes to transfer the see of its Head to the capital of Ukraine and to build an appropriate church and residence.” Lubomyr Cardinal Husar, “Zvernennia ... z pryvodu sporudzhennia khramu Ukrain’skoi Herko-Katolyts’koi Tserkvy v Kyievi,”

L'viv, January 10, 2002. At the official Web site: <www.ugcc.org.ua/ukr/press-releases/article;22/>.

- 6 Paul Yuzyk, "Religious Denominations," in *A Statistical Compendium on the Ukrainians in Canada, 1891–1976*, edited by William Darcovich and Paul Yuzyk (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1980), 165–211; Bohdan S. Kordan, "Religion," in his *Ukrainians and the 1981 Canada Census: A Data Handbook. Research Report No. 9* (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, The University of Alberta, 1985), 55–83.
- 7 Bohdan Kordan's cautionary advice on intercensus comparisons is well-founded: in light of the distinction introduced in 1981 between single- and multiple-origin ethnic identity, many such comparisons have become problematical. However, to adjust the base figure of single-origin Ukrainians in Canada in 1981 (529,615) in order to include multiple-origin Ukrainians (225,360) is to increase it. This, in turn, lowers even further the percentage of Ukrainian Canadians declaring themselves to be affiliated with the UCC. The percentage decline is thus independent of the single- /multiple-origin distinction.
- 8 Yuzyk, Series 30.1–12: Population of Ukrainian Ethnic Origin, by Religious Denominations, Sex and Rural-Urban Status, Canada and the Provinces, 1931–1971, in "Religious Denominations," 177.
- 9 Ukrainians in Canada have not been spared from the alienating effects of traditionalist policies in the Church, viz.: the transfers to Roman Catholic and other churches of parishioners whose command of the mother tongue decreased with passing generations and whose requests for services in English were rebuffed.
- 10 Official relations were restored in the summer of 1990, when the entire episcopate of the UCC in Ukraine, headed by Metropolitan Volodymyr Sterniuk, visited Rome.
- 11 The reintegration of crypto-Catholic priests was generally not a problem for bishops. Metropolitan Sterniuk, for one, was known for welcoming virtually all comers. But that policy was criticized by many of his own clergy and faithful, who could not easily break through the barrier of distrust and righteous indignation that had developed during the Soviet period—between the persecuted, underground Church and the crypto-Catholics, operating under the aegis of the Moscow Patriarchate.
- 12 Discussions at the 2002 *Sobor* of the UCC led to a proposal for linguistic pluralism in eastern Ukraine, but the ethnocultural criterion of ecclesial identity remains an open question, quite probably still too hot to handle.

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11

Shouldering the Burdens of History: The Ukrainian-Jewish Encounter Since Independence

HENRY ABRAMSON

Among the many cultural aspects common to Ukrainian and Jewish history is the existential experience of exile: in the case of the Jews, a millennial exile since Roman times, and, in the case of the Ukrainians, a centuries-old existence as an internal colony with a more recent conventional diaspora in Western Europe, North America, and Australia. Also common to both groups is the end of this diaspora condition in modern times with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and with the declaration of Ukrainian independence in late 1991. For the thousand-odd years that Ukrainians and Jews shared ethnolinguistic territory, they have spent much of it developing strategies for maintaining group integrity under these conditions of diaspora, and in so doing both nationalities constructed mythic archetypes of the other that have only tangential connections to historical realities. In other words, both Jews and Ukrainians constructed caricatures of each other as part of a larger subconscious strategy to rationalize the fact of exile. The anti-Semitic caricature paints this mythic Jew as the eternal corruptor of Ukrainian society, either through exploitative economic practices or through nefarious involvement with communism. The Ukrainophobic caricature depicts the mythic Ukrainian as the drunken pogromist, gleefully assisting the Nazis in their destruction of the Jews. By placing each other in such negative paradigms, Ukrainians and Jews could define themselves as martyred

victims of oppression, worthy of eventual redemption in the political and even in the spiritual sense.

With the achievement of statehood, however, this mythic relationship has outlived much of its social purpose, and Jews and Ukrainians must come to terms with each other in a more realistic fashion. This is most critical in Ukraine, where the fact of Ukraine's multinational heritage and demography must be accommodated, and in Israel, which must maintain regular diplomatic relations with an important Eastern European state with which it has significant political, economic, and demographic considerations. Furthermore, Ukrainian Jewry has to develop an alternative, coherent historical narrative if it is to maintain its demographic integrity in the face of widespread assimilation and massive emigration.¹ The reconstruction of mythic identities is less pressing for Jews and Ukrainians in their respective diasporas, but change is nonetheless afoot, if only due to generational factors: diaspora-born Ukrainians and Jews have no need to carry about excessive European psychological baggage, and their consciousness of each other's stereotype is fading as they adapt to the new existential realities of North American prosperity and attendant rates of assimilation. The declaration of Ukrainian independence has similarly occasioned an opportunity for Ukrainians and Jews to take a serious look at their mutual histories, and to revise the caricatures that are no longer relevant to the maintenance of their communal integrity.

The first issue to address is demographic in nature: just how many Jews live in contemporary Ukraine? The population size of Ukrainian Jewry is regularly inflated in popular discourse. The most recent census data reveals 487,000 Jews in 1989, of which some 107,000 live in Kyiv.² Taking into account emigration figures, Robert Brym estimated that the figure dropped to 389,000 in Ukraine and 89,000 in Kyiv respectively in 1993.³ A survey of Ukrainian Jews in the mid-1990s revealed that roughly 32 per cent planned to leave, and assuming that these people acted upon their stated intentions, the current Jewish population of Ukraine is about 250,000 people, roughly equivalent to the Jewish population of Argentina, somewhat smaller than the Jewish populations of Canada or the United Kingdom.⁴ Moreover, while the population of Ukrainian ethnolinguistic territory

has reflected a relatively stable proportion of roughly one non-ethnic Ukrainian for every three ethnic Ukrainians for over a century, the relative population of Jews in Ukraine has declined precipitously. In 1897, Jews made up just over 9 per cent of the total population, declining to 6.5 per cent in 1932 (primarily due to large-scale emigration to America) and 2 per cent in 1959 (reflecting the huge demographic losses of the Holocaust). The 1989 census records that Jews constitute less than 1 per cent of the population of Ukraine.⁵ The Russian share of the population, on the other hand, has grown considerably—from 9 per cent in 1897 to 22 per cent in 1989.⁶ Relations between Ukrainians and the Jewish minority have great import in the symbolic and moral sphere; on the political level, however, relations between Ukrainians and Russians is of far greater significance. In a recent poll conducted by the US State Department, for example, 53 per cent supported closer security relations with the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, while only 14 per cent favoured the US-dominated NATO.⁷

These small numbers, however, do not minimize the importance of Jews in the perception of the Ukrainian mind, primarily because of the consciousness of anti-Ukrainian attitudes in the Western world that associate the term “Ukrainian” with persecution of Jews. This problem is exacerbated by the irony that many of the most prominent Ukrainian heroes—Khmel’nyts’kyi, Gonta, Petliura, and Bandera—are considered villains by Jews, and thus Jewish perceptions of celebrations of Ukrainian identity and political struggle are inexorably bound up with fears of anti-Semitic violence.

One of the more encouraging aspects of the Ukrainian attempt to construct a post-Soviet civil identity has been its efforts to rid itself of this image and to maintain firmly that anti-Jewish agitation is not to be tolerated in an independent Ukraine. This is in great contrast to the post-Soviet climate in Russia, which witnessed the birth and development of the notoriously anti-Semitic *Pamyat’*, with its explicit calls for pogrom violence.⁸ The Ukrainian movements, spearheaded by *Rukh*, were successful in projecting an image of Ukraine as a modern, multi-ethnic state rather than ethnonationalist state of the integral variety.⁹ Pro-Jewish declarations, heavy with symbolic significance, were made

by Ukrainian officials, including President Kravchuk's famous 1991 speech at Babyn Yar, acknowledging a Ukrainian role in the Holocaust, and these things were not lost on the Jewish population: Ukraine and Moldova were the only territories of the former Soviet Union where Jews reported a drop in perceptions of anti-Semitism between 1990 and 1992.¹⁰

To be sure, there was a fringe element of anti-Semitism in some of the Ukrainian political movements, particularly in western regions. Several parties paraded in black shirts, wore twisted *tryzubys* that were uncomfortably reminiscent of swastikas, shouted slogans like "Ukraine for the Ukrainians!" and advocated an end to intermarriage and the deportation of non-Ukrainians.¹¹ These parties received only five out of 338 seats in the 1994 election, reflecting their marginal impact on Ukrainian society.¹² Despite the apprehensions of many Jews in the diaspora, anti-Semitism has rarely appeared as an obvious element of Ukrainian civic discourse.¹³ There are notable exceptions, such as some propaganda directed against Gregory Surkis, a Jewish candidate in the Kyivan mayoral race of 1999 and the anti-Semitic vandalism of a Jewish cemetery in Chernivtsi.¹⁴ On the whole, however, Ukrainian-Jewish relations since independence have been relatively free of anti-Semitic incident.

There is a distinction, however, between the expression of anti-Semitic attitudes and their elimination. One of the themes well known to historians of the Jewish people in Ukraine is the unusual dichotomy between enlightened, philo-Semitic attitudes among the Ukrainian intelligentsia—figures such as Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi serve as examples—and darker, more violent anti-Jewish attitudes lurking in the population at large.¹⁵ It is the consciousness of this social reality that has driven many researchers with Ukrainian sympathies to publicize periods of high co-operation between Ukrainians and Jews, so much that this constitutes a distinct historiographic trend. The first work of this nature to be published in the closing months of the Soviet Union was Israel Kleiner's translation of the writings of the well-known Zionist Volodymyr (Ze'ev) Zhabotins'kyi on the nationalism in Ukraine.¹⁶ This small booklet sold out immediately.¹⁷ Other examples of this trend—often published in co-operation with official

Ukrainian government organs—are Yakiv Sus’lenskyi’s study of Ukrainian rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust and, more recently, O. Naiman’s work on Jewish parties in the Ukrainian governments of 1917–1925.¹⁸ At their best, works in this trend are useful correctives to the negative stereotypes surrounding Ukrainian attitudes to Jews, and they make maximal use of the comparatively unlimited access to archives while Western scholars struggle to cover large amounts of material on all-too-brief research trips.¹⁹ While they are often marred by an unacceptable degree of sensationalism, which seems to be an unavoidable element of post-Soviet works, and they remain largely unaware of historiographic advances made in Western languages, these works are often very useful for their exploitation of archival resources. At their worst, this historiographic trend represents an apologetic revisionism that seeks to acquit Ukrainians (and Jews) of any wrong. In the words of Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, a researcher of post-Soviet Ukrainian Jewish life at Brandeis University:

the revisionists rewrite Ukrainian history, tending to retrospectively acquit Ukraine from any sort of guilt for the harm caused to the Ukrainian Jews. Khmel’nyts’kyi targeted the Poles, not Jews; 1881 pogroms were orchestrated by Russian authorities and 1904 pogroms by Black Hundreds. Petliura was nice to Jews and was sympathetic to Zionism while 1919 pogroms were unleashed by Denikin’s army. The hunger of 1932 in Ukraine (*Holodomor*) was not perpetrated by Communist Jews who wanted to pay the Ukrainians back for the Civil War pogroms; rather it was a campaign of anti-Ukrainian genocide orchestrated by the Kremlin.²⁰

On the other hand, a series of publications—typically not published by official Ukrainian organs—adopts an equally unacceptable polemic tone with regard to Ukrainians in their relations with Jews, particularly popular studies of the Holocaust. Some of these works are more tentative in their criticism than others, particularly those published soon after independence.²¹ Significantly, there is often a linguistic distinction between these works—those sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause often are published in Ukrainian, and works antagonistic appear in Russian.²²

While both historiographic trends have their uses, their approach to controversial topics is often excessively coloured by contemporary political concerns, and does not "shoulder the burdens of history," which scholarship demands. It is also worthy to note that a trend almost completely absent in post-Soviet literature is a treatment of contemporary relations between Ukrainians and Jews.²³ Perhaps the relations are too tentative, as if the social climate is not yet mature enough to deal with a frank discussion of these painful historical issues.

Whatever deficiencies there may be in the scholarly output on Ukrainian-Jewish relations, they must be placed in the context of the tremendous upheaval Ukrainians and Jews have gone through since 1991, with its political change, economic chaos, and massive emigration of Jews to Israel and America. On an organizational level, the Jewish community is still struggling to define itself and delineate a clear leadership and vehicle to express their communal views and needs. For most of the past decade, Ukrainian Jewry lacked a common leadership, with Jews organizing local groups, often centred on common religious or literary interests and expanding their activities from there. One of the most prominent figures, on the national level, was Rabbi Yaakov Dov Bleich, an American Hasid, who assumed the position of chief rabbi of Kyiv and Ukraine in the context of the collapse of the USSR and has been a tireless advocate of the Jewish community, organizing a variety of educational ventures and co-ordinating a massive aid effort to provide Ukrainian Jews with economic assistance. By 1996, the scattered Jewish organizations managed put together a joint delegation from Ukraine to the World Jewish Congress.²⁴

Centralization received a boost in April 1997, when Vadim Rabinovich, a wealthy but controversial Ukrainian Jew who had settled in Israel, returned to Ukraine, formed the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress and was promptly installed as its president.²⁵ Promising large contributions from his own funds, Mr. Rabinovich and the existing weaker organizations hammered out an agreement to amalgamate their organizations that fell apart within months, in part because Mr. Rabinovich has difficult relations with the United States government, which would impede representation to this very important Jewish community.²⁶ Moreover,

Rabinovich's "application to the European Jewish Congress was not approved on suspicion of forgery of signatures."²⁷ The various groups disagreed on issues such as the length of term of the presidency—Rabinovich wanted seven without right of re-election, the others wanted four—and several groups left the All-Ukrainian Jewish Congress.²⁸ Rabbi Bleich and the other groups organized a conference of Jewish organizations and formed a new umbrella group to represent Ukrainian Jewry, called Jewish Confederation of Ukraine. Recognized by the World Jewish Congress and with greetings from the president of Ukraine and the prime minister of Israel, it claims to be the legitimate voice of Ukrainian Jewry. Rabinovich responded by organizing a rival conference that took place a week earlier and attracted a similar number of delegates, many of whom would also attend the Jewish Confederation of Ukraine conference. One prominent Ukrainian Jewish activist, Rudolf Mirsky, commented "It's a tragedy. People are lost. They don't understand what's going on."²⁹

The Ukrainian Jewish community is likely to face still greater challenges in its attempt to achieve a level of civic normalcy in these rapidly changing circumstances. An example of one of the potential areas for tension is the return of synagogues to the Jewish community, which has significant economic implications. The Progressive movement, known as the Reform movement here in North America, made a petition to receive such a structure. Rabbi Bleich protested, pointing to the fact that with a few exceptions in western Ukraine, the Reform movement only appeared in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, which sparked a small controversy overseas as well.³⁰

The agenda for scholarship in Ukrainian-Jewish history is clear, and the points of controversy that require clear-headed analysis are readily evident, particularly the twentieth-century issues associated with the *Holodomor* and the Holocaust. It is perhaps premature to expect this new democracy to produce dispassionate works of scholarship while it is still struggling with more fundamental and immediate issues such as the economy and relations with Russia. Until Ukraine achieves sufficient stability, the comparatively wealthy West must take on the burden of providing Ukrainian scholars with the wherewithal of our libraries through travel grants, and computers capable of

delivering the benefits of Internet research. Shouldering the burdens of history is a massive endeavour yet, in the words of Rabbi Tarfon, “it is not upon you to complete the task—but neither are you free to abandon it.”

NOTES

- 1 I discuss the role of a Jewish historical narrative in “The End of Intimate Insularity: New Narratives of Jewish History in the Post-Soviet Era,” unpublished paper presented at a conference entitled Construction and Deconstruction of National Histories in Slavic Eurasia, Hokkaido University, July 2002.
- 2 Sidney Hetman, “Jews in the 1989 USSR Census,” *Soviet Jewish Affairs* 20, no. 1 (1990), 23–30, cited in Robert J. Brym and Rozalina Ryvkina, *The Jews of Moscow, Kiev and Minsk: Identity, Antisemitism, Emigration* (New York: New York University Press, and Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1994), 3.
- 3 Brym and Ryvkina, *The Jews*, 23.
- 4 *Ibid.*, Table 5.6, 83; Nicholas de Lange, *Atlas of the Jewish World* (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1984), 141, 158, 167.
- 5 Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s: A Minority Faith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Table 1.1., 22. See also Mordechai Altshuler, *Soviet Jewry Since the Second World War: Population and Social Structure*, Series: Studies in Population and Urban Demography 5 (New York: Greenwood, 1987).
- 6 Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, Table 1.1, 22.
- 7 Yaro Bihun, “Congressional Hearing Focuses on Ukraine’s Presidential Election,” *The Ukrainian Weekly* 67, no. 43 (Sunday, October 24, 1999), 23.
- 8 See my op-ed article, “Standing Up for Ukrainian Jews,” *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto edition, May 4, 1990), A7. See also Bohdan Krawchenko, “Ukraine: The Politics of Independence,” in *Nation and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, edited by Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 86.
- 9 See Julian Birch, “Ukraine—a Nation State or a State of Nations?” in *Ukraine: Developing a Democratic Polity, Essays in Honour of Peter J. Potichnyj*, edited by Stefania Szlek Miller (also published as *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2) (Edmonton: 1996), 109–124.
- 10 Brym and Ryvkina, *The Jews*, 56.
- 11 Birch, “Ukraine,” 116–118.
- 12 Roman Szporluk, “Reflections on Ukraine after 1994: The Dilemmas of Nationhood,” *The Harriman Review* 7, nos. 7–9 (1994), 2.
- 13 See the sporadic examples provided in R. Mirs’kyi, Ya. Khonigsman, and O. Naiman, *Iudofobiia proty Ukrainy (stari zabobony i moderni vyhadky)* (L’viv:

- “Bnei Bryt Leopoldis” imeni Emilia Dombergera, L'vivs'ka Antydyfamatsiina Liga, L'vivs'kyi Tsentri Iudaiky, 1998), 9–19. Anecdotal accounts indicate that this vandalism might have been economically motivated, as some brass fittings were apparently removed from gravestones for recycling, and this might mediate somewhat against the anti-Semitic character of such damage to a Jewish holy place.
- 14 Elli Wohlgernter, “Antisemitism mars Kiev mayoral election,” *Jerusalem Post* Internet edition (May 28, 1999), <www.jpost.com/com/Archive/28.May.1999/News/Article/htm>; <www.jewish.kiev.ua/vandalism.htm>.
 - 15 This theme is explored in my recently published study, *A Prayer for the Government: Jews and Ukrainians in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute and the Center for Jewish Studies at Harvard, 1999).
 - 16 Volodymyr Zhabotyns'kyi, *Vybrani statyi z natsional'noho pytannia* (Kyiv: Respublikans'ka Asotsiatsiia Ukrainoznavtsiv, 1991).
 - 17 Yohanan Petrovsky-Shtern, “The Revival of University Studies of Judaica in Ukraine and General Cultural Life,” in *Jewish Life after the USSR: A Community in Transition*, edited by Zvi Gitelman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002). I am grateful to Dr. Petrovsky-Shtern for sharing his research with me, and his helpful suggestions with this chapter as well. Dr. Petrovsky-Shtern is currently working on a monographic study of post-Soviet Ukrainian Jewry, under the working title of *A Fragile Utopia: The Jewish-Ukrainian Rapprochement, 1991–2001*.
 - 18 Yakiv Suslens'kyi, *Spravzni heroi: pro uchast' hromadian Ukrainy u riatuvanni yevreiv vid fashysts'koho henotsidu* (Kyiv: Ministerstvo Osvity Ukrainy, Instytut Natsional'nykh vidnosyn I politolohii Akademii Nauk Ukrainy, Tovarystvo “Ukraina,” Mizhnarodne Tovarystvo “Ukraina-Israil,” “Tovarystvo Yevreis'koi Kultury Ukrainy” 1993); O. Ya. Naiman, *Yevreis'ki partii ta ob'yednannia Ukrainy (1917–1925)* (Kyiv: Natsional'na Akademiia Nauk Ukrainy, Instytut Politychnykh I Etnonatsional'nykh Doslidzhen, Mizhnarodnyi Solomoniv Universytet, Akademiia Istorii ta Kul'tury Yevreiv Ukrainy im. Shymona Dubnova, 1998).
 - 19 See, for example, Volodymyr Serhiichuk, *Pohromy v Ukraini: 1914–1920, vid shtuchnykh stereotypiv do hirkoi pravdy, prykhovuvanoi v radians'kykh arkhivakh* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo imeni Oleny Telihi, 1998).
 - 20 Petrovsky-Shtern, “The Revival of University Studies.”
 - 21 See, for example, Iu. Liakhovitskii, ed., *Poprannaia mezuz: Kniga Drobitskogo Iara, svidetel'stva, fakty, dokumenty o natsistskom genotside Yevreiskogo naseleattia Khar'kova v period okkupatsii 1941–1942*, Part 1 (Kharkiv: Osnova, 1991); Iu. Liakhovitskii, ed. *Zheltaia kniga: Svidetel'stva, fakty, dokumenty o natsistskom genotside Yevreiskogo naseleattia Khar'kova v period okkupatsii 1941–1943*, Part 2 (Kharkov: Bensiakh, 1992).

- 22 Petrovsky-Shtern, "The Revival of University Studies," observes a general trend toward using Ukrainian in scholarly works dealing with Jews.
- 23 Exceptions include the short work by Mir's'kyi, Khonigsman, Naiman, *Iudofobiia proty Ukrainy*; Petr Rabinovich, "Evrei v sovremennoi Ukraine: Problemy natsional'noi identifikatsii," in *Yevreis'ka istoriia ta kul'tura v Ukraini: materialy konferentsii Kyiv 8-9 hrudnia 1994*, edited by H. Aronov (Kiev: Asotsiatsiia Yevreis'kykh Orhanizatsii ta Obschyn Ukrainy, Asotsiatsiia Iudaiky—Naukovo-doslidnyi tsentr, 1995), 164–170; Vitaliy Kytyk, "Yevrei v Ukraini: korinnyi narod abo natsional'na menshyna?" in *Yevreis'ka istoriia ta kul'tura v Ukraini: materialy konferentsii Kyiv 2-5 versnia 1996*, edited by H. Aronov (Kyiv: Institut Iudaiky, 1997), 66–69; Zynoviyi Antoniuk, "Chy potriben iudeo-khrystianskyi dialoh s'ohodni?" *Yehupets* 4 (1998), 210–227.
- 24 Yaakov Dov Bleich, "Rabinovich Doesn't Represent Us," reprinted from "Kiev Post" in <www.jewish.kiev.ua/Kpost.htm>.
- 25 Lev Krichevsky, "Ukraine's Jews Confront Schism as Two Umbrella Groups Compete," Jewish Telegraphic Agency report, reprinted from *New Jersey Jewish News* in <www.njewishnews.com/issues/4_22_99/mw/world/text/story9.html>. See also Lev Krichevsky, "Wealthy Ukrainian Jews Create Plan for Community," Jewish Telegraphic Agency Report (April 3, 1998), reprinted from *Jewish Bulletin of Northern California* in <<http://shamash.org/jb/bk980403/icreate.htm>>.
- 26 Rabinovich, who spent several years in a Soviet prison for economic crimes (his record has since been wiped clean—see <www.jewish.kiev.ua/influen.htm>), "was on the US Immigration and Naturalization 'lookout' list, meaning he was ineligible for US entry," *Washington Times* report reprinted in *Russia Reform Monitor* no. 356, <<http://afpc.org/rrm/rrm356.htm>>. A major article on Rabinovich's history in the context of a joint venture with magnate Ronald Lauder was published in the *New York Times* (April 5, 1997), reprinted in <<http://ukrainet.org/periodicals/NYT1.html>>. Bleich, "Rabinovich," also claims that he could not represent Ukrainian Jews in Israel; the reasons for this are less clear.
- 27 Bleich, "Rabinovich." This is not an unusual phenomenon in Ukrainian politics; see, for example, Roman Woronowycz, "Supreme Court Overrules Election Commission, Admits More Candidates into Presidential Race," *The Ukrainian Weekly* 67, no. 33 (Sunday, August 15, 1999), 1.
- 28 Bleich, "Rabinovich."
- 29 Krichevsky, "Ukraine's Jews."
- 30 Relevant documents are provided in <www.shamash.org/reform/arzawuna/ukraine.html>.

12

Problems and Prospects for a Developing Protestantism in Ukraine: A View from the United States

EUGENE E. LEMCIO

INTRODUCTION

The title of the conference for which an earlier version of this chapter was first read is more problematic and complex than meets the eye. For example, it all depends on one's view of "development." The word means one thing to a real estate company and quite something else to an environmentalist. What one regards as a positive aspect to development, the other will regard as problematic, so one must constantly ask about development: "From whose perspective?" Are the problems real or perceived? by which criteria? according to whom? The answers to these questions will determine the nature of the solutions. Therefore, this chapter will try to be alert to the fact that there will be more than a single notion of (a) where Protestantism is, (b) where it needs to go, and (c) how it should get there. This complex issue requires sensitivity because members of traditional Churches will have one set of ideas; and Protestants may differ among themselves. In what follows, I shall attempt to converse with them all while developing my own point of view regarding the present state, future goal, and implementing processes.

For my own analysis of problems and prospects, I shall appeal to biblical-theological criteria rather than social-scientific standards and models. There are two reasons. First, my expertise does not lie in social science. Second, the only formal norm by which Protestants will continue or adjust their practices is a

biblical-theological one. However, I shall show that Protestants in Ukraine have been selective in their use of the very scripture that they claim as the only normative basis for faith and practice, for belief and behaviour. More particularly, I shall argue that the Old Testament, the scriptures of Judaism (and the Bible of the earliest Christians), have been particularly ignored or idiosyncratically interpreted. This is also endemic to evangelical Protestantism worldwide (with some significant isolated exceptions). In so doing, I shall be both descriptive as well as prescriptive, diagnostic and prognostic.

This puts me in an awkward position. Readers outside the Protestant tradition may suspect me of being insufficiently objective and thorough in applying these standards. Fellow Protestants might well accuse me of being hypercritical and disloyal. However, this may be the best place to stand: an empathetically critical observer who will speak candidly from within. If I seem to Protestants to be in opposition, it will be that of the loyal opposition. Our own Protestant heritage calls me to invoke the ideal of the Founders: "Ecclesia Semper Reformanda," or "the Church in Continuous Reformation." Protestants, wanting this to be true of the Roman Catholic and Eastern Churches, have been less vigorous in applying the standard to themselves. So, with these disclaimers in place, let me proceed to keep faith with the aims of the conference and the title of this chapter. After defining terms and sketching an historical context, I will take up several issues vital to the development of Protestantism in a developing Ukraine: ecumenism, internationalism (and Westernization), logocentrism and rationalism, patriotism (language and politics), and evangelism.

DEFINITIONS AND CONTEXT

All Protestants, wherever they might be, embrace the ecumenical creeds that historically have expressed for Christians the definitive statements about their faith. So, although Protestants often bear the stigma of being sectarians, they regard themselves as mainstream. We share those great convictions that were hammered out when the Church was still one.

One of the facts often not known or easily forgotten, even by Protestants, is that their movement began as, and wished to re-

main, an internal one. The goal of Martin Luther was reformation, not separation. However, excommunication followed his insistence that Christ alone was necessary for salvation, granted by grace alone. One received the gift by faith alone, not by one's merit or achievement. Finally, the Bible alone was the sole authority for belief and behaviour, not councils, popes, or patriarchs (each of which had erred at one time or another, as subsequent controversies and moral failures had fully demonstrated).

Before long, Protestantism began fragmenting. Within Lutheranism itself, the Magisterial (or Main) Reformation struggled with the so-called Radical, left-wing Reformation. In the latter case, its proponents advocated returning to the roots, to the point of entry into faith—baptism itself. Thus, the emergence of the Anabaptists: those who insisted that those Protestants who deliberately and self-consciously embraced Christian faith be rebaptized as adults. These folk also removed themselves from civic and political life and developed the classic pacifist doctrine against the use of armed force. So far were they from the Protestant mainstream that they endured persecution and death at the hands of Protestants themselves.

One branch of Anabaptists, named Mennonites after their leader, Menno Simon, immigrated in masses to Imperial Russia in the eighteenth century at the invitation of Catherine the Great to farm the steppes and valleys of Ukraine and southern Russia. These German settlers got the name of "Stundists," from the word meaning "hour," designating their time of meeting for prayer. (It is an epithet and expletive by which Baptist Protestants are known to this day in certain circles.) Although these German Mennonites kept pretty much to their agricultural ghettos, their way of life and religious outlook made a substantial impact on the local populations.

However, the Rev. Dr. Levko Zhabko-Potapovych (1890–1975) has argued that the primary impetus of the evangelical Christian movement, to which Baptists joined later, was the philosopher-polymath Hryhorij Savych Skovoroda (1722–1794), who criss-crossed Ukraine on foot, sharing his learning and Christian piety with peasants and labourers, who heard him gladly. Zhabko-Potapovych makes the case that Protestants of this homegrown variety have been around for at least a couple of

centuries—that theirs is neither a cult nor a new religion. They are as indigenous as Skovoroda himself.¹

Pentecostals came later, at the turn of the last century, stressing the empowerment and gifting of the Holy Spirit, who descended on the earliest Christians on the day of Pentecost. Both they and the Baptists keep ecclesiastical organization to a bare minimum. Whereas sacraments take priority over the preached word in the traditional Churches, the opposite is true for Baptists and Pentecostals.² Both groups embrace the term “evangelical” because spreading the Evangel, the Gospel, rapidly beyond the four walls of a church is a priority. Further, laypeople, not clergy alone, are deeply involved in worship and evangelism. The point is to help each person encounter the living God in moment-by-moment transformation by Him. Like their hero, Skovoroda, evangelicals take to the streets, villages, and fields to make this good news accessible to the most humble listener. Their parish is the hospital, orphanage, military barrack, and prison.³

THE ARGUMENT

Ecumenism

Problems

Christian leaders and alert laity recognize that the divided state of the Church throughout the world is a scandal. They cite Jesus’s final prayer that his followers be completely united, that this union is to match the unity that exists within the godhead itself, and that such oneness should testify that God loved and sent Jesus into the world (John 17:11, 20–23). The failure of Jesus’s followers to measure up to that high standard has posed an obstacle to the proclamation of the Gospel when ordinary people, even in the remotest corners of the globe, ask awkward questions of missionaries regarding the proliferation of denominations and the variety of confessions. The problem is further exacerbated when a denomination or confession splits into diverse subgroups. Of course, Ukraine has its own version of this sad story, given the tensions between Greco-Catholics and Roman Catholics, between Greco-Catholics and Orthodox, and

among the Orthodox themselves in the current three-way split.⁴ Add the varieties of Protestantism to the mix, and the outsider is tempted to wish a plague on all their houses or to ignore them altogether.

Historically, evangelical Protestants (to be distinguished from mainline Protestantism) avoided formal efforts in the twentieth century to create visible unity among Christians. They alleged doctrinal compromises and political naiveté, especially the World Council of Churches' efforts to welcome delegates from the Russian Orthodox Church during the cold war period. The more "progressive" evangelicals, such as Billy Graham and his associates, were eager to fulfill Jesus's prayer by recognizing the invisible, spiritual unity that bound Christians worldwide, regardless of denomination or confession.

Ukrainian evangelicals tend to stand within the latter tradition. However, given their history under czars and commissars (when they risked harassment—at best—from political authorities and from the state-sanctioned Russian Orthodox hierarchy), Baptist and Pentecostal leaders have not given high priority to engaging in formal, ecumenical talks with the hierarchs of traditional Churches. Nor, to my knowledge, has there been any similar effort forthcoming from the Orthodox or Greco-Catholic leadership. So much for the problems facing those who would welcome even invisible, spiritual unity among all self-conscious Christians in Ukraine.

Prospects

Nevertheless, the prospects for gospel-mandated unity seem somewhat brighter at the unofficial, grassroots level where phenomena have occurred quietly and dramatically within the last five years. For example, not long ago, *Nasha Vira*, the monthly paper of the Ukrainian Autocephalus Orthodox Church, reported the gathering in Kyiv of youth from eight confessions on the subject of living together as brothers and sisters in Christ who are mandated to love one another. How could this even begin, they asked, unless they first got to know one another?⁵

As important as this single occasion was (and is), the steady inclusion of articles in *Nasha Vira* by non-Orthodox contributors needs to be cited. One can see the magnanimous and revered

editor, Yevhen Sverstyuk, devoting full-page coverage, month after month, to the writings of the late Dutch Roman Catholic, Henri Nouwen⁶ and the Anglican lay theologian, C.S. Lewis, the darling of British and American evangelicals.⁷ In one issue, there is even a full-page excerpt of the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail!"⁸ Somewhat smaller, but still quite prominent, is a series of quotations from the Baptist monthly magazine, *Yevanhel'ska Nyva*.⁹ Those citations are preceded by the editor's comments: "There is much worthwhile reading here. For one thing, they're not involved in political wrangling and aren't strident like the radio preachers."¹⁰ That he thinks so is a real relief, I assure you!

From the other end of the country, and this time from the Pentecostals, was a deeply moving article that appeared in *Yevanhel'skyj Holos* in January 1996.¹¹ This is the kind of data that researchers find hard to come by. The author recounts how, during the first days of Christmas services in Vyshnivec' (Ternopil'shchyna Oblast), a group of Orthodox believers, led by their priest, visited a congregation of evangelicals, who warmly welcomed them. Moved by this hospitable reception, the priest invited the entire congregation to join their service, which they did a couple of days later. While the liturgy was still in progress, the priest arranged for a pulpit to be brought in so that the pastors and deacons could preach. The Protestant choir sang Christmas carols and led the packed church in "Viryu Ya," the Credo, which (among other fundamental convictions) affirmed the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. Word about this profound experience of God's presence spread like wildfire to neighbouring parishes and to the city administration. The next joint celebration had to be held in the town square in order to accommodate the crowds, who included many curious professionals. Such joint services would have been unheard of much earlier. In fact, at the end of the Gorbachev era, when an orthodox priest had initiated such contact, he was quickly removed. Who knows what the hierarchy of each side thought about this spontaneous effort?

In L'viv, another kind of high drama: my dear friend, Vasyl' Bosovych, head of the company Halychyna Fil'm, has been a producer, director, and dramatist for twenty-five years. In 1993,

he joined the congregation of the main Pentecostal church in that city (on Dekabrystiv Vulycyia). A year later, Vasyl's play, *Jesus, Son of the Living God*, was in rehearsals at the Zan'kovets'ky Theatre. Because I had to leave for Kyiv to lecture at Taras Shevchenko University before opening night, he took me to several rehearsals and introduced me to the production staff and actors, many them distinguished "State Laureates" and "People's Artists." Fedir Stryhun was directing; his wife Tayisa Lytvynenko played the Mother of Jesus; Myron Kyprian designed the scenes.¹² I later read the critics' rave reviews and the report that Bosovych himself had been granted laureate honours in the Order of Kotlyarevs'ky. However, his proudest achievement was that the hierarchs of all traditions and rites in L'viv had officially supported the production—another dramatic instance of interconfessional co-operation. So far as I am aware, there is nothing like this kind of ecumenism within the Ukrainian diaspora in North America.¹³ Such initial co-operation among the major confessions has recently gone a step farther. Bosovych now heads the all-Ukrainian, interdenominational organization, Society for the Christian Rebirth of Ukraine. One of its educational goals is to establish a television channel whose programming will touch upon every aspect of contemporary life from historic, non-sectarian Christian perspectives.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of ecumenical co-operation about which I know is occurring in Chernivtsi. About a decade ago, Pastor Jerry Theckston of the Midway Covenant Church in Des Moines, Washington, began a ministry to the poorest of the poor in that city. He deliberately avoided referring to his denominational connection. As his twice yearly visits to Chernivtsi began to grow and an all-Ukrainian core group was established there, he managed to involve all of the Christian groups in a venture where the identity of their confessional connections were suppressed in favour of performing this service in the name and after the example of Jesus. The integrity of the operation has had such a profound impact upon the city's and oblast's administration that a 30-acre former Comsomol camp in Chernivtsi has been donated as the base of operations for meeting the most pressing needs of its citizens.

Internationalism (and Westernization)

Problems

This issue faces Ukraine on all fronts. Even those leaders who embrace the inclusion of the country into European political and economic institutions have to contend with a significant minority who warn against the compromise of sovereignty and the destruction or dilution of national identity. Just when the Narod has the chance to escape from a long history of foreign domination by Hapsburgs, Romanovs, and Marxist-Leninists, it faces a more subtle threat from the capitalist West, led by America.

The concern also extends to the religious sphere, as I discovered on a walk in the Carpathian Mountains in September 1993 during my first visit to Ukraine. My hosts for this pleasant weekend were an autocephalus Orthodox friend from Kyiv and her daughter's Greco-Catholic godmother from L'viv. I was feeling good about myself, having discovered relatives in Rozhyska, a micro *selo* on the Zbruch River, where my grandfather was born. Ninety years after he had immigrated to the United States, I, his grandson, the first of my family to return, had just lectured at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and Taras Shevchenko University. Suddenly, the L'vivianka turned to me (or rather, on me) with the accusation, "Because you Baptists are internationalists, you're a double threat to Ukraine. And our historic enemy knows how to exploit this internationalism!"

Stunned by this unexpected attack (because our visit had been so pleasant until now), I tried not to be offended nor to give offence. Feebly, I replied, "Well, Pani, since Christianity is a world religion, I suppose that Baptists are internationalists. But so are Roman Catholics. Orthodoxy is a worldwide phenomenon, too." Later, I reflected on this charge, which, of course, is even more vehemently being made in Russia. Out with the foreigners; out with the Westerners; away with their new religions, cults, and sects! There are similar sentiments in Ukraine, though not as shrill or dangerous. They have dogged Christianity and every other religious movement that has reached beyond its place of origin. Crossing boundaries has always been a double jeopardy: losing something of the original quality and introducing something new (foreign) into the receiving culture (and being affected

by it). When Christianity became a state religion in the middle of the fourth century, it ran the risk of importing and sanctifying the Empire's political and economic agendas as well. So, sensitive Ukrainians of all persuasions, but especially those of the traditional Churches, have rightly reacted with alarm and disgust at the hordes of (mostly) Protestant mission groups from the West who have inundated the land with messages and methods quite foreign to their experience. This is quite apart from the incursion of cults and sects. Another legitimate, related concern is the matter of control: that foreign financial support will dictate the directions that national Churches will take.

Prospects

Of course, thoughtful Protestants cannot and do not condone disregard for heritage, culture, people's sensibilities, and especially the millennial-long presence of Christianity in Ukraine. And it is this very history, and the recognition of current efforts to do it right, that can enable internationalism, rightly conceived, to support the right kind of national aspirations.

All realize that Christianity in Ukraine goes back earlier than 988. And its geopolitical setting at the crossroads of the compass made it the site of international traffic in commerce, culture, and ideas—Germans from the West, Scandinavians from the North, Khazar Jews and Muslims from the East, and Greeks from the South. Even if we regard the account of Ukraine's baptism under Volodymyr the Great with suitable historical caution, the familiar account of his choosing between four religious options is itself instructive. He reportedly considered the distinctives of Roman-rite Christianity and Eastern-rite Christianity along with Judaism and Islam!

It does not take much imagination to recreate what the priests of Perun were thinking as they watched from the banks of the Dnipro: "Ce ne nashe, vono inozemne, iz Pivdnya." Not ours. Foreign. From the South. It's Greek to us! And it is the same lament being raised by modern advocates of returning the Narod to paganism: its true, native religion. Even the casual and occasional reader of religion@infoukes.com hears the claim being made both here and there. In other words, the primitivist arguments that the Orthodox have used against Greco-Catholics and that

spokespersons for these Churches have in turn levelled against Protestants for being newcomers and latecomers to Ukraine are now being turned by non-Christians against all Christians: the original, the earliest, is better. Discouraging as these developments may be, they nevertheless present an unparalleled opportunity for getting beyond the primitivist assertion. Now the discussion can concentrate on the only question worth debating: what (not which) is true?

In addition to the prospects opened up by the historical-theological approach to the internationalist question, there are the positive examples of the good that can be done when people and churches experience contact and linkages beyond their borders. I have in mind here the partnering of congregations in the Baptist Association of the State of Minnesota with those in Ukraine. Such connections provide an economic lifeline. But support is comprehensive and mutual: members correspond and uphold one another in prayer. Ties between the North Carolina branch of the Southern Baptist Convention occur at the administrative level as well, channelling resources to support ministries of the Evangelical Baptist Union, including the Kyiv and Odesa Theological Seminaries. While the alert reader might understandably suspect that such financial support inevitably exacts a cost, it is important to realize that, although receiving support from churches in the West, Ukrainian Protestants are not controlled by them, either administratively or financially. Consider this telling example of Ukrainian ecclesiastical independence: a stone in the throat of western Baptists is a rather fundamental doctrinal difference. Put rather crudely, Ukrainian Baptists do not share the "once-saved, always-saved" outlook of Christian security held by their Western counterparts. I've heard American Southern Baptists express concern that they are subsidizing heresy!

Even though Ukrainian Baptists are members in good standing of the World Baptist Association, the local congregation is the heart of Baptist ecclesiology. This fiercely independent heritage emerged in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse. Whereas the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate (one of three divisions of Orthodoxy), controls most of the Orthodox congregations in Ukraine, this is not the case with Baptists and Pentecostals. Each former republic's Protestant union is autono-

mous. To be sure, fraternal relations exist among them, but no one jurisdiction holds sway as the "First Among Equals" or as the capital or home base. Moscow does not control Kyiv anymore.

One criterion for evaluating the activities of Protestant organizations on Ukrainian soil is the nature of their commitment, both quantitatively and qualitatively speaking. By way of illustration, I cite the work of Roger and Diane McMurrin who, for most of their professional lives, have been church musicians within the Presbyterian tradition. Roger has had an impressive career in the states. Eight years ago, this couple fell in love with Ukraine on their first visit. Then and there, they made a decision that, for at least the next decade, they would serve the country by making available to its people the classics of Western and Eastern sacred music. The great works so long forbidden and unknown would become a part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of Ukraine.

And so the Kyiv Symphony Orchestra and Chorus was born. The two Americans began from scratch, with next to nothing but their talents to offer, and with only two friends in the capital. They endured all of the inefficiencies and degradation of living in Stalinist-era apartment housing. In time, with the help of stateside family, friends, and colleagues, the McMurrins established Music Mission Kyiv, whose proceeds generate support to pay a regular, livable salary for professional musicians drawn from former state-supported performing groups. These are the artists upon whom President Kuchma calls to entertain the Clintons and other visiting heads of state at the Opera and Ballet Theatre. Televised weekly broadcasts make the music available to the masses.

Concert tours of North America and Western Europe and the sale of several CDs fund multifaceted projects, including the full support of over several hundred widows and as many orphans. Plans are now being drawn up for a Christian centre, which will include a place of worship, hospital, performance centre, athletic facility for youth, and dormitories for the neediest of Kyiv's citizens. The massive complex will be sensitive to native architectural taste. By the way, drawing from students at the Conservatory of Music (where Roger has been appointed professor), the McMurrins recently produced the first-ever performance

of *West Side Story* in Ukraine, and *Fiddler on the Roof* is to follow (both in Ukrainian).¹⁴

Rationalism and Logocentrism

Problems

It has been the case that Protestants in general, and the Puritan tradition in England and America in particular, have been liturgically and aesthetically minimalist, to put it mildly. It is common to refer to the “smells and bells” of Roman Catholic and Orthodox ritual. Evangelicals have focused on the written and spoken word rather than on the enacted sacrament. Plain speaking for ordinary people has been the ideal. Everything thought to obscure the natural meaning of the text and the simplicity of the Gospel message had, since the Reformation, been jettisoned. Furthermore, to the extent that Protestantism regarded itself as a people’s movement (as opposed to an institution of hierarchs), it tended to “cut costs,” especially in those regions where it had become “disestablished” and no longer able to depend upon state support. “Box churches” became boringly typical. In the process, beauty and symbols as vehicles for knowing and experiencing the Word of God were lost. Aesthetics was to be studied as a branch of philosophy.

Even now, Baptist and Pentecostal churches in America are rather functional structures. They are usually devoid of symbols such as statuary, icons, and even crosses. One will often find a large, open Bible between candles or chalices on the communion table. It’s not unusual these days to find a banner or two. Stained glass is a novelty. The walls are flat and smooth, without colour or image. You will more often than not find state-of-the-art technology in larger sanctuaries. Thus, Protestants have been accused, on the one hand, of failing to take into account the sensual dimension of the Slavic soul and, on the other hand, of injecting a foreign rationalism in its emphasis on the spoken word.

Prospects

But there’s a difference in Ukraine, and things are changing. Occasionally, one will encounter stained glass. Even in more

humble buildings, the ceiling will be moulded, the windows adorned with beautiful flowers. Embroidered *rushnyks* grace pulpits and communion furniture. This aesthetic sense is not always appreciated by American supporters. I heard about a leader from the Southern Baptist Convention express concern about the filigreed plaster ceiling in Ukrainian churches. This is not what the donors had in mind. Wouldn't plain drywall and cinder block do? Without apology, the pastor expressed the people's desire to beautify God's House.

A greater departure from traditional Baptist architecture (or lack thereof) is taking place in the exteriors. In 1996, I saw modified cupolas taking the place of steeples. The plans for a Bible Institute in Kyiv called for a decidedly Eastern character in the construction of buildings that will house classrooms and dormitories. Of course, a cynic would say that this is merely strategy to entice the unsuspecting into a trap for proselytizing. But this would be to mistake a more fundamental move to identify more closely with people and culture (a point I shall develop separately). And it may well be that the Lutheran tradition, with its emphasis on word and sacrament, on sight and sound, will emerge as the agency by which treasures of the liturgical tradition are mediated and appropriated by other Protestants. One of my most moving experiences in Ukraine was worshipping with the Lutherans in Kyiv on Easter morning after visiting Velykden celebrations at the Orthodox churches in Podil. Here was a priest in embroidered vestments concluding the liturgy with an evangelical sermon!

Furthermore, Protestants will have to become more assertive in their defence of the spoken word by citing the experience of the ancient Church. To hear some people talk, one would suspect that the Slavic soul is incapable of rational thought or that it is capable but disinclined to use it very much. Yet, whose liturgy do Ukrainian Catholics and Orthodox use? None other than that of St. John Chrysostom, the Golden-Tongued, the greatest preacher of his day from Constantinople.¹⁵ Ready to be rediscovered is this great but forgotten or diminished legacy of the early fathers, both West and East, as great pulpit orators. And there is also the great response of the masses to Protestant evangelism to

consider seriously. Ordinary people feel valued and empowered when entrusted with argument and evidence steeped in deep conviction and emotion. The experience of Hryhorij Skovoroda comes to mind here. Educated in the West as well as the East, but no more at home than when he wandered far and wide across Ukraine, he shared his mind and heart with the Narod, which was ready and able to receive them.

Patriotism: Language

Problems

For those who see the use of Ukrainian language as the sign both of true patriotism and true religious sensibilities, the Protestants' pragmatic, ad hoc approach to the matter might appear to verge on betrayal. Language and loyalty go together. To a large extent, the use of Ukrainian in Protestant churches could be accounted for according to the demographic situation: more in the west than in the centre and east. Even where Russian dominates, there is likely to be some brother or sister who preaches or prays in Ukrainian. (One must realize that, during a two-hour service of prayer and choir and congregational hymn singing, three or four laypeople will preach before the main sermon!) The explanation for the use of Russian, even where Ukrainian prevails overall, goes along these lines: the availability of Bibles under the Soviets was limited. And these had to be in Russian only. One can imagine the effect upon this scripture-oriented people.

Western Protestant missionary efforts come under fire for their use of Russian-language materials. Their justification occurs along these lines: it is unclear how long opportunities for spreading the Gospel will last. So, the goal is to get the word out to most people as quickly as possible. And there is the theological factor, too: as important as local languages may be, it is the language of the Holy Spirit, the Word of God conveyed in human words, that carries the higher priority. The argument can, of course, be turned on its head: because the Word of God comes by way of human words, the language of the people should be the primary vehicle of its communication.

Prospects

But things are changing gradually, if not quickly. Just as a visitor to Kyiv will have noticed more Ukrainian being spoken on Kreshchatyk from year to year, so also one can hear Ukrainian more frequently in Baptist and Pentecostal churches. (It's changing in Seattle. Parents tell me that, because they speak Ukrainian exclusively to their children at home, they're not able to understand the occasional hymn or sermon in Russian, so Ukrainian will eventually rule.) As Bibles and tools for biblical study in Ukrainian become increasingly available, so will their use in the services.¹⁶

This is not necessarily the case in the seminaries. Here is the rationale. Although each former republic has its own Baptist or Pentecostal Union, they are in close communication and fraternal relation. Since the seminaries are few, they serve their denominations across republics. This virtually requires that instruction be done in the language understood by all: Russian. You can imagine my surprise and chagrin that, in 1996, I, a foreigner, was the only lecturer at Kyiv Theological Seminary teaching in the official language of the country. The other professors were either Ukrainian nationals speaking Russian or visiting American professors who communicated in that language through an interpreter.

Of course, Western mission agencies differ in their policies. Those of European origin are more sensitive to the language problem. A shining American example is the Wycliffe Bible Translators, who render the scriptures into unwritten languages, even though indigenous groups are able to communicate in the language of the dominant culture.

A word about English. More and more courses are being offered in English for the practical reason that most of the biblical commentaries and theological works are available in this language. Since one does not know how long it will take to make those resources available in Ukrainian, it is more efficient for students to learn the lingua franca of biblical scholarship.

Patriotism: Politics

Problems

Having been historically excluded from the corridors of political power, Protestants are flush with freedom and access. Two years ago, a Pentecostal friend of mine and his family returned to Rivne for the first time since they immigrated nearly ten years ago. On visiting their home church, Ihor and Ruslana were astonished to hear the parishioners praying aloud for the well-being of President Kuchma and other government leaders. This, of course, would have been unheard of a decade ago. He observed, "They are more progressive than we are in the diaspora!" The Baptist leadership is in regular, informal contact with the minister of religious affairs. They join clergy from other confessions in advising President Kuchma on matters of national concern. This can be heady stuff. But it has risks, for the government has a stake in keeping in touch with the clergy of all faiths: monitoring interconfessional strife is a function of the Ministry for State Security.¹⁷

Prospects

But, so far as I can tell, their prior experiences under Imperial and Soviet leaders have made Protestants cautious and wary about the pitfalls of identifying too closely with the powers that be, who are so much more shrewd in manipulating and co-opting religion for their own ends. However, since Baptist and Pentecostal churches never been a national Church (anywhere), their historic independence can help Christians of all confessions to avoid the downside of such arrangements. The prophetic experience of Judaism is vital to draw on. Standing solidly with the people, the prophets thundered against their own leaders, who arrogantly took upon themselves the prerogatives that belonged to God alone. Such political hubris carried with it the exploitation of the poor, the stranger, the orphan, and the widow—the most vulnerable of the Narod.

Another way in which Protestantism can contribute to Ukraine's development as a democratic state is by its radical egalitarianism, which grows out of its theology. Everybody stands equally alienated from God, who has graciously provided one

means of reconciliation for all, regardless of race, gender, or class. If there is no difference before God, why should there be among human beings? So, the common form of address is not "Pan" or "Pani," but "Brat i Sestra." Mindful that Judas betrayed his Lord with a kiss, such betrayal is more difficult when believers greet each other in this way. Whether or not individual Protestants ever join a political party or hold public office is not known at this time. However, as this sense of equality and responsibility for doing the right thing spreads throughout the electorate, the citizens who do cast their vote will bring to the ballot box and the debate forum increasing integrity and self-consciousness.

Evangelism

Problems

Particularly irksome to Ukrainians outside the Protestant tradition is the importation of Western methods of evangelism. In North America, we have become jaded by the TV evangelists with their slick formats, heavily made-up wives, and the insatiable need to raise and spend huge sums of money for questionable projects. It does not help to see even honourable people using the techniques and equipment so effective on our continent: the mass rally, sentimental or sensational music with insipid lyrics, electronic wizardry, and the final highly emotional appeal. The evangelistic team comes and goes, leaving to others the long, hard task of changing instantaneous converts into lifelong disciples of Jesus and members of a community of beloved brothers and sisters in Christ. Even homegrown evangelists imitate their Western (and usually American) exemplars. Consequently, one occasionally hears so-and-so described as "the Ukrainian Billy Graham," a description that is unfair to both. These are serious matters indeed. But there is another more important problem. To the extent that Protestantism retains a model of evangelism that has as its goal the salvation of souls for eternal life in another world, it will have ignored a fundamental tenet of biblical teaching and will have failed to incarnate Jesus's message on Ukrainian soil. I now proceed to perhaps the most controversial part of this chapter.

Prospects

In that Carpathian autumn ten years ago, my hostess from L'viv also posed a second question to me (or demanded of me): "What are you Baptists going to contribute to the building of the new Ukraine?!" Typically, the response to such a question would have gone something like this: "Well, good people make good citizens. If we change people internally, their external actions will follow suit. The heart-conversion of individuals will change the society as a whole." Without, for a moment, denying the validity of such sentiments, I nevertheless have come to believe that a broader base and deeper foundation is needed. The following suggestions (merely the outline of what could be a fuller independent treatment) are an attempt in the closing pages of this chapter to convert inherent problems into realizable prospects.

(1) The Present and the Future

Protestant evangelism will change dramatically if the scripture's full commitment to the present is recovered. God has invested so heavily in the now of human experience that whatever happens in the future will be a direct result of what He and his people do in the present.

(2) Earth, Not Heaven

The Good News that Protestants proclaim will do full justice to the Bible, which they regard as the only authority for faith and practice, when they can affirm with Genesis that humans were made from and for the earth, which is to be their lasting home (and God's), according to the Apocalypse of St. John. Therefore, there is not the slightest excuse for world denial or withdrawal.

(3) Body and Spirit

This commitment to the original goodness of creation has its counterpart in the affirmation of embodied human existence (the only kind we know). If we are to use classical language, we must deny that humans "have" souls and recognize that they "are" souls. Christian confession about the incarnation of God's Son (*utilennya*) and his bodily resurrection should be enough to settle this issue.

(4) Human and Divine

Directly related to this is *ucholovichennya*. Classical Christian doctrine puts equal emphasis on the humanity of Jesus as well as his divinity. This then must extend to Protestants' affirmation of humanity in general as well as what humans create in arts, literature, and science. So, the offering of humanitarian aid is not to be regarded as an optional add-on to the preaching of the Gospel (or as carrot or reward). It is a gift from a gracious God, the restriction of whose bounty and largesse is itself a sin of which we must repent.

(5) National and International

That the God-human was born in a particular place and time in the midst of a particular people should affirm the particularity of nations and their cultures in all places and all times. Throughout scripture and at its conclusion, national groups are to bring their glory to the (new) City of God.

(6) Society and the Individual

Finally, the radical individualism of the West in general and of Protestantism in particular will have to be subjected to the Bible's full witness. We have to think more deeply about the dynamic interaction between individuals and communities. Our separate identities came about because both parents committed a social act. In scripture, redeemed individuals were called to create redeemed communities. This should not be surprising because the Christian doctrine of God affirms the Trinity, a society of Persons who exist in a relation of mutual love. Thus, there is unity, multiplicity, and diversity in the essential nature of Being itself.

Here is more than enough justification for avoiding the radical, false dichotomy between evangelism and social or humanitarian concern. The Bible maintains that God is King over all of human experience, which has been fractured by sin in its entirety. The full Gospel, the complete Good News, is that God's grace is greater than all of our sins. Thus, life lived under His Rule must concern itself with restored relations between persons in family and neighbourhood, especially the marginalized (whose neglect and abuse concern Him deeply). What of the

alien and stranger at our gates? How one uses money and the land are fundamentally moral issues. Nothing is neutral; all belongs to the realm of spirit.

(7) *Churches and the Church*

Surely the prayer of Jesus referred to above should provide sufficient warrants for a generous attitude toward various Christian confessions. However, Protestants should be able to appeal to the multiplicity and diversity of scripture itself. There are four gospel documents, not one. St. Peter headed the Jewish branch of Christianity based in Jerusalem, while St. Paul's mission to the Gentiles was centred at Antioch, according to the Acts of the Apostles. The letters of both branches of early Christianity were included in the New Testament. Such diversity could be accommodated so long as all parties confessed that God had raised Jesus bodily from the dead. This was the centrepiece of earliest Christian preaching, its non-negotiable element (I Corinthians 15). As long as such common ground is in place, there should be no room for interconfessional. Love will find a way.

Such a fuller appropriation of scripture (which Protestants have been accused of viewing as their "Paper Pope") has the potential of renewing Protestantism in Ukraine. Despite problems past and present, the present and future prospects are bright as long as honesty, courage, and will prevail in recovering "the whole counsel of God for the entire people of God." In so doing, they will be able to bequeath an everlasting legacy to the Church and to the Narod.

NOTES

- 1 A chapter is devoted to Skovoroda in Zhabko-Potapovych's *Khrystove Svitlo v Ukrayini* (Winnipeg, AL and Chester, PA: Ukrainian Evangelical-Baptist Alliance, 1952), 50–64. But the following chapter, "Skovorodynci" (pp. 65–69) is also relevant. See also the tribute by Volodymyr Domashovec, "Doktor Levko Zhabko-Potapovych," *Pislanec' Pravdy* 11–12 (lystopad-hruden', 1990), 35–37. The term "evangelical" is a slippery one. In North America, uncritical users equate the term with "fundamentalist" or associate it with right-wing conservative Christianity. In Germany, *evangelische* means simply "non-Catholic" or "Protestant." However, the majority of evangelicals want the word to convey their concern for the rapid spread and personal

- appropriation of the *Evangel* (Gospel, Good News). This has led evangelical Protestants in Germany to invent the expression *evangelikalisch* in order to distinguish themselves from non-evangelical ones.
- 2 Evangelicals have looked to Taras Shevchenko for justification of their negative attitude toward top-heavy hierarchical structure and elaborate ritual. Their oppression by the Imperial Russian Orthodox Church only strengthened this conviction. Shevchenko criticized liturgical form and ecclesiastical organization when they become barriers to the Gospel and the good of the *Narod*, when ceremony and institution become ends rather than means. Their citation of him is useful for apologetic purposes: if Shevchenko, whose patriotism cannot be impugned, could take this position, so can they (without having their loyalty doubted). For this estimate of the Bard (but not the latter defence), see Dmytro Chyzhevsky, "Shevchenko and Religion," in *Shevchenko and the Critics 1861–1980*, edited by George S.N. Luckyj (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies and University of Toronto Press, 1980), 250–265 (esp. 251, 254, 256–257).
 - 3 A dramatic example of this is the ministry of two brothers, based in the Pentecostal church in Rivne. Ulyan Holovatyuk, a former officer of the Soviet Army in Afghanistan, operates a wide-ranging mission for widows, orphans, prisoners, and military personnel. The recent appearance of the Methodist tradition on Ukrainian soil (United Methodist, Free Methodist, and Church of the Nazarene) will focus even greater attention to the "least of these my brothers."
 - 4 For a recent assessment of the situation within Orthodoxy, see Taras Kuzio, "In Search of Unity and Autocephaly: Ukraine's Orthodox Churches," *Religion, State, and Society* 25, no. 4 (1997), 393–415.
 - 5 Olena Skrypnyk, "Pospishajmo na ekumenichnyj znimok," *Nasha Vira* 10, no. 138 (zhovten' 1999), 2. See also the article in the same issue by Myroslava Marynovych, "Kil'ka notatok iz forumu khrystyjans'koyi molodi," 4.
 - 6 Henri Dzh. M. Nouen, "Iz samoty. Try medytacyi pro khrystyjans'ke zhyttya," *Nasha Vira* 10, no. 126 (zhovten' 1998), 5.
 - 7 Klajv L'yuyis, "Dobro i zlo yak klyuch do densu svitu," *Nasha Vira* 6, no. 122 (cherven' 1998), 9.
 - 8 Martyn Lyuter King-molodshyj, "Lyst z Birminghems'koyi Vyaznyci," *Nasha Vira* 4, no. 132 (kviten' 1999), 8–9.
 - 9 *Yevanhel'ska Nyva*, (sichen' 1998).
 - 10 "Khrystyjans'ki vydannya v Ukrayini," *Nasha Vira* 10, no. 126 (zhovten' 1998), 6. Most of the page is devoted to this discussion and to an article, "Boh Lyubovy i problema zla," by Anatolij Prokopchuk, president of the Kyiv Theological (Baptist) Seminary (although he is not identified as such).
 - 11 Ihor Filyk, "Nezvyhajna Podiia," *Yevanhel'skyj Holos* 1–2 (sichen'-cherven' 1996), 39–42.

- 12 See the review of the premier by Maja Harbuzyuk, "Scenichna versiya Yevanheliya," *Vysokyj Zamok*, subota (7 travnya 1994).
- 13 In this connection, I need to mention a different kind of experiment in such co-operation. Although it began in the late 1920s, its influence continues to this day. Nearly a century before, the British and Foreign Bible Society had published Kulish's translation. In the 1930s, Ukrainian Protestants in western Ukraine, supported by those in Switzerland and Germany, persuaded the same Bible Society to undertake a new translation. In 1936, the Ukrainian Protestant delegates promoted as translator Professor Ivan Ohienko (perhaps the most distinguished scholar of his day and later Metropolyt Ilarion of Canada). Together, Protestant and Orthodox scholars served on the editorial commission. Although interrupted by World War II and the dispersal and death of team members, the work was completed in 1955 (although not published until 1962). Among the few Protestants on the panel was the Rev. Dr. Levko Zhabko-Potapovych, who pastored our little Baptist congregation of mainly pre-World War I immigrants in Chester, Pennsylvania, from the late 1940s until the early 1970s. As final editor and corrector, he used to bring galley proofs to church in order to keep us updated. Even now, I am astonished by the erudition involved. Footnotes contain explanations in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and Church Slavonic!

Although several translations of varying quality are currently available in Ukraine and its diaspora (including the millennial version of 1988), the Ohienko Bible, published by the Ukrainian Bible Society in Kyiv, still serves the People of God. What an enduring legacy of interconfessional co-operation. In concluding this point, I must note that the Bible Society's original stated purpose for the project was twofold: the *spiritual* growth of the Ukrainian people and the development of their *culture*.

- 14 The moving story is recounted by Diane McMurrin in *The Splendor of His Music* (Mukilteo: WinePress Publishing, 1998). She also edits the monthly *Gazetta*.
- 15 J.N.D. Kelly, *Golden Mouth. The Story of St. John Chrysostom—Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).
- 16 The articles in *Yevanhel'ska Nyva* (Baptist) and *Yevanhel'skyj Holos* (Pentecostal) are published in Ukrainian, except for rare items in Russian.
- 17 See the unpublished paper delivered in May 1999 by Andriy Yurash at the Pacific Northwest Regional Meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Tacoma, Washington, entitled, "Religion as a Non-traditional Component of the National Security Problem."
- 18 Maintaining contact with the Jewish community in Ukraine will be vital if one is to observe this linkage to the Old Testament within a living tradition. Evangelicals in America deeply value this connection. A significant majority supports the United States' policy toward Israel. As one moves to the

theological left, support for Palestinian aspirations increases. Moving to the far right of evangelicals, one encounters the most vitriolic anti-Semitism (along with anti-Catholicism) manifested in the proliferating White supremacist groups. Not long ago, a North American professor of religion and rabbi (whose ancestors left Ukraine) revealed to me that he has more in common with evangelicals than with secular Jews. Christians in general have more in common with Islam than most realize since the Koran teaches that Jesus was the Virgin-conceived Messiah who was taken up to God. However, Muslims refuse to acknowledge his death by crucifixion. Serious as this (and other) differences are, there remain enough similarities to enable all who regard themselves as "People of the Book" to engage in serious dialogue.

- 19 Because St. Matthew tends to use the expression "the Kingdom of Heaven," we should not suppose that it is the exact equivalent to heaven itself. The expression enables the pious Jew (via a substitution) to avoid pronouncing the sacred name of God. In English, we say, "Heaven help you if you do that again!" or "Good heavens, what a surprise!" or "For heaven's sake, stop that at once!" In each instance, we are substituting the place where God dwells for his name. Throughout the gospels, Jesus expresses the conviction that God rules from heaven upon the earth. As one of my students once suggested, although his seat is in heaven, God's feet are firmly planted on the ground.

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Part Five
Knowledge
and Information
Dissemination:
Toward an
Open Structure

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13

The Paradoxes of Reform: Higher Education in Post-Soviet Ukraine

OLGA ANDRIEWSKY

Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?

Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?

—T.S. Eliot, Choruses from “The Rock”

After 1991, until quite recently, the Ukrainian educational system remained one of the few bright spots on an otherwise often bleak political, social, and economic landscape. Despite a dramatic decline in government spending on education—and well-publicized problems with wage arrears and corruption—public confidence in the school system stayed remarkably high.¹ According to a poll conducted in 1999 by the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, 80 per cent of the respondents agreed that Ukrainian education is “as good as, or even better than, education in developed countries.”² As Viktor Andrushchenko, a former assistant minister of education, has stated, “In its basic outlines, the national system of education created in Ukraine is not only not inferior to analogous systems in the developed countries of the world, but according to reliable indicators, is in many respects superior.”³

Is such confidence justified? As numerous Western observers attest, the Ukrainian school system does indeed produce students who, in terms of their basic preparation, seriousness, and desire to learn, easily rival their counterparts in Canada, the United States, and Western Europe.⁴ What I propose to do in this chapter, however, is to shift the discussion away from its

usual emphasis on the primary and secondary school system—that is, on formal basic education—and away from the usual benchmark of success for many Ukrainians—student performance—in order to examine the higher reaches of the education system. In particular, I want to focus on the system of higher education in Ukraine and the changes that have taken place—and not taken place—over the last decade. Despite a number of reforms—and some noteworthy individual initiatives—Ukraine’s universities and research institutes, I will argue, are in the throes of a profound crisis that, in the long run, threatens the long-term viability and success of the entire system. My analysis, I should add, is informed in no small measure by my own experience as a historian teaching in Ukraine under the auspices of the US Fulbright Program (1995–1997). It is not intended to disparage the abilities of individual instructors—or their dedication to research and scholarship. Rather, it is my hope that this chapter will add to the ongoing discussion on a subject—the direction and quality of higher education in Ukraine—that now, more than ever, deserves serious public attention.⁵

A DECADE OF GROWTH AND CHANGE

On a certain level, the growth of the university sector over the past decade has been impressive. In 1990–1991, there were 853,100 students enrolled in 149 post-secondary schools in Ukraine, including 110,000 students attending the ten “classical” universities. By 1998–1999, according to the Ministry of Education, there were 1.7 million students enrolled in 955 post-secondary institutions in Ukraine. Half a million students attended 657 colleges and technical schools (educational institutions with an accreditation level of I or II), while the vast majority—1.2 million students—were enrolled in 206 public and 92 private universities, academies, and institutes (level III or IV institutions), including 14 “classical” state universities (see Figure 13.1).⁶ These numbers, in fact, represent a significant shift in participation rates in post-secondary education in general, and university education in particular.⁷ In less than ten years, the number of students enrolled in universities and academies (level III and IV institutions) doubled and, by 1998–1999, constituted

over 70 per cent of the student population in all institutions of higher education (see Figure 13.2).⁸ Today, there are more students studying in many more Ukrainian universities than ever before.

Figure 13.1
Students in Higher Education Institutions in Ukraine in the 1990s

Image not available

Figure 13.2
Percentage of Students by Level of Higher Education Institution

Image not available

Undoubtedly, the most visible emblem of this change has been the creation, or rather rebirth, of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (officially Natsional'nyi universytet Kyievo-Mohylians'ka Akademiia or The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy).⁹ Originally founded in 1632, the Academy was a leading centre of scholarship and learning for nearly two centuries and served, until 1817 when it was closed down by Russian authori-

ties, as a training ground for several generations of the civil and ecclesiastical elite of Ukraine. The Academy was revived in 1991, in the midst of the Ukrainian national renaissance, largely on the personal initiative of Viatcheslav Briukhovetsky and a group of colleagues from the Academy of Sciences as a small, independently governed university with a strong liberal arts emphasis. In keeping with the spirit of its original founders—and in contrast to the specialized, technical approach to university education traditionally followed in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union—the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy promotes a broad general education combined with intensive study. “Our focus is on the development of individuality and individualism,” Briukhovetsky noted in 1998. “A student has an obligation to make individual choices, and this cultivates a sense of personal responsibility and develops the sense of a self-made personality.”¹⁰ Indeed, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy was the first university in post-Soviet Ukraine to embrace the notion of electives, the idea that students could have some choice in their program of study—a radical innovation in a university system in which higher education was—and still largely is—treated as occupational training.

In less than a decade, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy has quickly established itself as a premier educational and research institution in Ukraine with a growing international reputation. This reputation has much to do with the quality of its programs and instructors as well as its innovative approach and structure. From its inception, the Academy offered a diversified curriculum with a particular emphasis on those areas—the humanities and social sciences, economics, environmental sciences—that had been underdeveloped or completely neglected within the old Soviet curriculum. (The Academy currently has six faculties: Humanities and Social Sciences, Natural Sciences, Economics, Sociology and Social Work, Law, and Computer Sciences. A Graduate School of Journalism opened in 2000–2001.) At the same time, the Academy was able to recruit many of the best known, most respected scholars in Ukraine—both senior scholars and younger faculty. No less important was the decision, taken at the very start, to designate both Ukrainian *and* English as official languages of instruction. (Proficiency in English is a requirement

for admissions to the Academy.) This, in combination with a system of elective courses, meant that the Academy could, in effect, integrate foreign instructors (e.g., Fulbright, Civic Education Project, British Council lecturers, and others) into its regular academic programs and thus enhance its curriculum and staff on an ongoing basis. To date, more than 200 foreign scholars have taught at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

The reputation of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy also owes much to the exceptional quality of its students. The Academy was the first post-secondary institution in Ukraine to introduce a system of blind entrance exams. Students are selected on the basis of merit or, as Briukhovetsky likes to point out, "No one is admitted on the basis of a 'phone call from upstairs'." In this way, the Academy has managed to avoid the admissions scandals that have plagued many of the institutions of higher education in Ukraine. Competition for admission to the Academy is, in fact, very stiff—by 1998, there were approximately 4,000 applicants for fewer than 500 places.¹¹ Kyiv-Mohyla Academy students are, by all accounts, bright, ambitious, eager to learn, and generally brimming with self-confidence.¹² Indeed, having worked with the students at the Academy, an American colleague of mine confessed that he could not imagine returning to his university in the Midwest, to students who often regard university as a rite of passage rather than an important intellectual endeavour.

The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy is merely the best known and most conspicuous example of the positive changes that have taken place in higher education in Ukraine over the course of the last decade. Since 1991, a multitude of new institutions and programs have been created. Some, like the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, the Ostrih Academy (Ostrozs'ka Akademiia), and the Greek Catholic L'viv Theological Academy (Bohoslovs'ka Akademiia) are revivals of older institutions. (The Ostrih Academy, one of the first institutions of higher learning in Ukraine [1576–1636], is today modelled on the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, while the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in L'viv, which was closed down by Soviet authorities in 1944, has resumed its traditional emphasis on theology, church history, and canon law and classical humanist studies.¹³ Entirely new universities, like the International Solomon University (Mizhnarodnyi Solomoniv Universytet)

have been founded as well. (Solomon University [est. 1992] is the first Jewish university in Ukraine and offers courses in Jewish and rabbinical studies as well as a wide range of science, social studies, and humanities courses.) Many existing post-secondary institutions—like the Kyiv and L'viv Polytechnical Institutes, the Institute of Physical Education and Sports in Kyiv, the Institute of Civil Aviation, and the Kyiv Pedagogical Institute—have been designated as “universities.”¹⁴ A host of new technical and professional schools, especially business schools, have also been established. The most notable of these are the International Management Institute (Mizhnarodnyi institut menedzhmentu),¹⁵ the first business school—and the first certified private institution of higher education—in Ukraine (est. 1989), and the Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration (est. 1993, and since 1995 officially named *Ukrains'ka Akademiia Derzhavnoho Upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukrainy* or The Ukrainian Academy of Public Administration, Office of the President of Ukraine), the first program for the training of public servants in post-Soviet Ukraine. In fact, most new post-secondary institutions founded since 1991, and especially the new private institutions, specialize in some form of business, economics, and/or management training.¹⁶

Even within the traditional universities, academies, and institutes, the curriculum has been significantly revised. Programs and courses in scientific communism, the history of the Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and Marxist political economy—obligatory in all institutions of higher education during the Soviet era—have long since been abolished. Many programs have been created and/or expanded, especially those related to the perceived needs of “state building” (international relations, law, political science, administrative studies, economics, and Ukrainian studies). Of special interest are the new Jewish studies departments and/or programs established at the universities of Kiev, Odessa, and L'viv. Other new programs and courses of note are those relating to sociology, ecology, and environmental studies.

In addition, the Ministry of Education has, over the course of the last decade, undertaken a number of reforms meant to insure the quality of higher education in Ukraine and to bring it

more in line with international practice. Beginning in 1992, for example, the Ministry introduced a system of licensing and accreditation for all institutions of higher education, both public and private. All public and many private institutions in Ukraine underwent review and were ultimately assigned an accreditation level (I–IV) and classified according to one of six categories: university, academy, institute, conservatory, college, and technical school. (In 1995, yet another category was added, the “national” university, though, as several observers have commented, the criteria by which institutions were evaluated for this new category remain unclear.)¹⁷ In 1997–1998, the Ministry also introduced—or, rather, superimposed—a system of internationally recognized degrees (the bachelor’s and master’s degrees) on top of the existing degree structure (candidate’s and doctor of sciences degrees). The efficacy of this reform is also debatable.¹⁸ Perhaps the most radical and far-reaching reform in higher education, however, was the introduction of the contract employment system in all public institutions of higher education in 1993. In an effort to give university administrators greater flexibility in the hiring of instructors, the Ministry decreed that all university personnel would be hired only on limited term contracts. Instructors are now hired on a per-course basis by deans, who, in turn, are appointed by rectors (university heads). The rectors themselves are approved by the Minister of Education.¹⁹

A DECADE OF DECLINE AND ATTRITION

These changes notwithstanding, there has been little in the way of systemic reform of higher education in Ukraine since 1991. On the contrary, the success of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the creation of a flurry of new institutions and programs in the early 1990s created the illusion of progress in a system that preserved many of the most regressive features of the old Soviet system. Most students continued to attend state institutions that, in terms of structure and organization, had changed little since the 1980s. This ultra-conservative approach to university reform, combined with a decade-long economic crisis, have significantly affected the development of higher education in Ukraine and led to a dramatic decline in the country’s research capacity. In

effect, Ukraine has perpetuated an academic infrastructure²⁰ that it can no longer afford—and that ultimately was designed to meet the specialized demands of an authoritarian, centrally planned state rather than to serve the complex needs of a modern civil society or a dynamic market economy.

In this respect, perhaps the most distinctive feature of the university system in Ukraine is the remarkable degree of *centralization*—and the absence of any tradition of university autonomy, self-regulation, and academic freedom. A measure of autonomy was introduced for the first time in 1987–1988, when, throughout the USSR, institutions of higher education were granted the right to regulate their own teaching and research activities, to allocate resources, and to establish direct contacts with other institutions, agencies, and businesses.²¹ Between 1993–1996, however, despite frequent references to the democratization of higher education, the state, in fact, reasserted central control over higher education. The contract system of employment introduced in 1993, while enabling universities to reduce their faculty complement at a time of economic crisis, effectively precluded the notion of autonomous academic units by putting all personnel—and thus curriculum—decisions firmly in the hands of university administrators and Ministry officials. Indeed, within universities, rectors now exercise almost unrestricted executive authority, while various other stakeholders—faculty, students, and non-academic staff—have no official say in the governance of the institution.²² This trend toward recentralization was set in motion in 1996 with the new Regulations on State Higher Educational Institutions, which gave the Ministry of Education considerable discretion in determining the academic policies and governance structure of individual institutions and, in the words of one Ukrainian expert, “completely strengthened the unlimited power of the Ministry of Education over higher educational institutions.”²³ The Ministry is thus not only responsible for setting academic standards and developing policy directions for institutions of higher education, but, in certain respects, has become involved in the most minute details of academic planning. In 1998–1999, for example, the Ministry of Education introduced twelve required courses for all university students in Ukraine, going so far as to specify the exact number of class hours per

year, forms and frequency of testing, and number of students per instructor(see Table 13.1).²⁴ The state, in other words, reaffirmed its right to control the very content and organization of university programs, not simply their quality and standards. Whatever the original intentions, in the long run, this degree of centralization renders the system vulnerable to constant political interference. Perhaps as important, it also perpetuates a passive—if not docile—university culture and does little to promote innovation, flexibility, and individual involvement, essential qualities for a dynamic learning, teaching, and research environment.

Table 13.1
University Courses Required by the Ministry of Education of Ukraine²⁵

Image not available

Another striking feature of the Ukrainian system of higher education—also a legacy of the Soviet era—is the relatively *rigid distinction between research and teaching*. The apex of this system is, of course, the Academy of Sciences, the highest institution of learning in Ukraine. Historically, advanced research in all

fields of knowledge—and most notably the technical sciences—has been concentrated around the Academy and its complex of institutes, while the primary duty of the universities has been pedagogical—to prepare young specialists for the workforce.²⁶ Despite repeated references by education officials to the need to integrate research and teaching more closely, the Academy of Sciences and the universities continue to function as separate—and vast—domains, each largely defined by their original mission. (As of 1998, the Academy of Sciences officially employed 45,233 people.)²⁷ Universities in Ukraine, in short, serve as centres of teaching rather than research *per se*. Teaching loads are extremely heavy by Western standards—a full university teaching load (*stavka*) for an assistant professor, as fixed by the Ministry of Education, is 950 hours or as many as thirty hours per week—and instructors are paid on a per-course basis.²⁸ In fact, Ukrainian universities offer comparatively few resources and facilities—paid research time, laboratory and office space, and travel allowances—to promote serious research (or professional development) on the part of faculty.²⁹ Thus, university courses, and particularly the new social science courses introduced as part of the universal curriculum in 1998–1999, are sometimes taught by non-specialists with no advanced training in the fields that they teach.³⁰ Since the early 1990s, to be sure, some of the country's leading scholars have migrated to the universities, forced by dropping wages and chronic wage arrears to supplement their incomes from the Academy of Sciences through university teaching.³¹ (In Kyiv and other major cities in Ukraine, it is not unusual for senior scholars to divide their time between two or three different jobs.) In recent years, a number of universities in Ukraine have also begun to create research units under the auspices of their own institutions. (The Kyiv-Mohyla Academy leads the way in this regard with eight new research institutes.)³² Nonetheless, research and university teaching in Ukraine remain, by design, separate and often unconnected activities. As Elena Kovaleva, of the Donetsk State Technical University, has argued, the gap between research and teaching has, in fact, grown during the 1990s and research is now, more than ever, pursued *outside* (and despite) universities.³³

Indeed, one aspect of the current crisis of higher education in Ukraine is the sharp decline—one is tempted to use the word “collapse”—in research since 1991. Massive budget cuts, combined with inflation, have greatly diminished Ukraine’s research productivity over the last decade. In his annual report for 1998, Borys Paton, the long-standing president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, estimated that state funding levels for the Academy of Sciences were approximately 40 per cent of the yearly minimal requirement—funding levels that, in his own words, are “absolutely insufficient for the normal functioning of our institutions.”³⁴ Until late 1999, moreover, repeated delays in the transfer of funds from the Ministry of Finance further complicated an already difficult situation. (During 1996, for example, the Ministry of Finance simply ran out of money and failed to deliver 27.4 per cent of the promised budget to the Academy of Sciences.)³⁵ Thus, throughout much of the 1990s, the Academy of Sciences and the universities—like all state institutions in Ukraine in general—struggled just to pay wages and often fell behind even in that. The deterioration of the overall research infrastructure in Ukraine—including severe limitations on such basic necessities as journal subscriptions and library acquisitions, laboratory equipment, and publishing—has meant that many scholars have been unable to keep pace with the advances in their fields, much less to contribute to their international development.

Hardest hit, of course, have been the technical sciences. Once the pride and joy of the Soviet system, Ukrainian scientific institutions—and especially those associated with nuclear and rocket science—played a prominent role in the vast military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union. Since they commanded the lion’s share of resources, they have borne the brunt of the budget cuts. Despite attempts to sustain research in such fields as computer science, solid state physics, materials science, chemistry, energy technology, and bioengineering and environmental health through a system of targeted funding and competitive grants, funding levels remain low and perilously unstable—a point that Borys Paton continues to make every year in his annual report.³⁶ Of particular concern to many scientists is the volatility—if not capriciousness—of state funding levels and grants. Despite an

agreement that spending on research (*nauka*) would be maintained at 1.35 per cent of GDP, budget allocations for 2000 and 2001 have fallen far short of that figure.³⁷

Yet, in certain respects, the situation in the humanities and social sciences is even more critical. Precisely because these disciplines were so politicized, so isolated from the mainstream of international scholarship, and so underdeveloped for so long—in the Soviet system, they were generally treated as academic adjuncts of Marxist-Leninist philosophy—their development has been rather skewed. Decades of intellectual seclusion have left many crucial gaps in learning and research, gaps that even today continue to influence the content, methods, and direction of the humanities and social sciences in Ukraine. Some universities, for example, still do not have departments of political science, sociology, and/or psychology, while most of the existing departments have been created only in the last ten years—often simply by transferring individuals, without retraining, from the now defunct programs of scientific communism, the history of the Communist Party, and Marxist-Leninist philosophy.³⁸ Within existing departments of humanities and social sciences, moreover, there is still relatively little diversity in research specialties and graduate training. Since 1991, for example, the study of history and literature have become, quite naturally, Ukraine-centred—but they have done so often in the absence of contemporary theoretical, cross-cultural, and transnational perspectives.³⁹ Moreover, even this research, especially at the graduate level, is often conducted without regard to similar or even identical work that has already been done outside Ukraine. In general, there are very few specialists (i.e., individuals engaged in advanced research) in the humanities and social sciences who have had the opportunity, the language skills, and the resources to catch up successfully with the broader trends and theoretical literature in their discipline and to integrate their research into an international scholarly discourse. Certainly, such scholars do exist—and continue to work largely with the help of international grants (International Renaissance Foundation, Fulbright Program, International Research and Exchanges Board, Central European University, International Higher Education Support Program, Eastern Scholar Program, and Civic

Education Project)—but they as yet constitute rare exceptions. Research in the humanities and social sciences, even today, continues to work, in many cases—especially outside Kyiv and L'viv—within a theoretical and informational vacuum.

Another disquieting aspect of the current crisis of higher education in Ukraine is the exodus of young scholars from the profession. Between 1992 and 1998, thousands of instructors and researchers—of all ages—left Ukraine's universities and research institutions (see Figure 13.3). According to one estimate, Kyiv Polytechnical University alone lost 20 per cent of its faculty during this period.)⁴⁰ Most were forced out by continuous wage arrears, declining wages due to inflation, and unplanned staff reductions.⁴¹ But younger scholars—those between the ages twenty-five and forty—have been leaving in disproportionately higher numbers. In the rigidly hierarchical system of Ukrainian higher education, junior faculty carry the heaviest teaching loads, are the lowest paid, and generally have a more difficult time gaining access to professional resources, events, and opportunities (conferences, publications, etc.).⁴² The academic profession, at one time considered a very desirable and prestigious career option for university graduates, has become substantially less attractive. As the International Centre for Policy Studies has observed, "A serious generation gap exists in science and education, as fewer and fewer young people are willing to devote themselves to teaching and research."⁴³ According to Borys Paton, the Academy of Sciences has had a hard time recruiting and retaining talented graduate students and researchers in recent years. Many more young researchers leave every year than the Academy is able to take in. In fact, despite the introduction in 1997 of special stipends meant to increase the number of junior researchers, the mean age of Academy of Sciences researchers has risen from forty-two to fifty years of age—for doctors of sciences, it now stands at fifty-nine.⁴⁴ In both the Academy and the universities, there has been a noticeable "greying" of the academic profession—a trend that, if not reversed, will soon have dire consequences for research and higher education in Ukraine as a large wave of retirements hit the system in the next fifteen years.

Figure 13.3
Researchers in the Academy of Sciences

Image not available

Cheating and corruption have also become widespread problems at all levels of the Ukrainian educational system, including at the universities. Undoubtedly this phenomenon is tied in part to the desperate economic situation in which many instructors find themselves and it may perhaps appear unseemly to pass judgment on people who have been forced to go for months without being paid, but clearly bribery and corruption are issues that greatly weigh down the system. Much has been written about admissions bribes to institutions of higher education—several years ago, the newspaper *Den'* (The Day) went so far as to publish a list of bribery rates by program and discipline (ironically, faculties of law ranked first in terms of price).⁴⁵ Indeed, it has become an article of faith among high school students that graft is a normal part of the entrance process. A survey of 600 high school students in Kyiv in 1998 revealed that more than half (55 per cent) did not believe that one could be admitted to an institution of higher education without paying a bribe, and 43 per cent of the respondents were prepared to pay a bribe if it helped them gain entry into a desired program.⁴⁶ For this reason, some education officials have been pushing for the use of blind entrance examinations, similar to those employed by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.⁴⁷

There has been comparatively less publicity regarding corruption and cheating *within* institutions of higher learning,

though this too has become a serious matter in recent years. In 1998, for example, police in Zhytomyr arrested a group of instructors who were taking 5–10 *hryvnias* (US \$1–2) per student before exams.⁴⁸ Certainly this is not a unique case—in 1997, Ukrainian authorities investigated some 189 cases of bribery in schools, a figure that many observers believe is symptomatic of a much deeper problem, especially when non-monetary “gifts” are taken into account. “The school of small bribes in the universities,” Valentyn Husiev, pro-rector at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, has noted, “is a school of corruption. ... Going out into the world, [students] already know that any problem can be resolved by giving [someone] a bottle of liquor or money. The amount or number is immaterial. The worst thing is that bribery in institutions of higher education ruins the normal psychological atmosphere of learning and transforms the lecture hall into a kind of marketplace.”⁴⁹ No less corrosive to the atmosphere in higher education is the trend among politicians and government officials of earning advanced degrees (candidate and/or doctoral degrees) for dissertations allegedly written while still in office. (Indeed, there is now an entire underground industry of dissertation writers to service this sector.)⁵⁰ At the very least, it raises questions about the dedication of these public officials to their jobs; at worst, it serves to undermine the integrity and credibility of the degree-granting process.

Underfunding is, of course, a large part of the problem. The prolonged economic crisis of the last decade has had a ruinous impact on all levels of the educational system. (According to one source, Ukraine’s GNP dropped by approximately 10 per cent every year between 1992 to 1998).⁵¹ Though reliable statistics are very difficult to come by—among other things, the budget for research (*nauka*) is separate from the education budget (*osvita*)—there can be little doubt that funding cuts to higher education and research in the 1990s were deep and substantial. By one estimate, expenditures on higher education were reduced in real terms by as much as 80 per cent between 1992 and 1998.⁵² According to another source, Ukraine, by 1996, was spending about US \$182 per university student (level III and IV institutions)—a figure well below that of Turkey and Spain, and a fraction of

what is spent on higher education in Great Britain, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States.⁵³ Yet in relative terms, the commitment to education remains very strong. Throughout the 1990s, Ukraine continued to devote a high percentage of its budget to education. According to the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv, between 1992 and 1997, budget expenditures on education made up 4.2–5.4 per cent of the GDP or 11.7–14.7 per cent of the budget of Ukraine. In budgetary terms, this represents twice as much as Poland spent on education in 1996, when expenditures on education comprised 6–7 per cent of the state budget.⁵⁴

Part of the problem is also the sheer size of the academic enterprise in Ukraine. As late as 1995, according to the Academy of Sciences, there were 6,761 “scientific employees” (*naukovi spivrobotnyky*) for every million of the population of Ukraine. (France, by comparison, averages 2,537, the United Kingdom 2,417.) Taking into account the staff reductions that have taken place since 1995, Ukraine still continues to employ proportionally more scientific workers—indeed, significantly more—than any Western or East-Central European country, including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania (1,285 to 1,083 per million population).⁵⁵ Similarly, student/faculty ratios are remarkably low—a World Bank study in 1994 estimated that there were, on average, 4.8 students per faculty in Ukraine, about one-third the average in Canada (15:1) and the United States (15.6:1), and one-fifth of the French average (24.4:1).⁵⁶ While other East-Central European countries like Poland and the Czech Republic have taken active measures since 1989 to reduce and reorganize their academic complement, Ukraine has, for the most part, avoided making these kinds of decisions, investing almost all of its dwindling education and research budget into salaries (which themselves plummeted because of inflation).⁵⁷ In short, Ukraine continues to employ many more people in research, teaching, and university administration than do other countries—and many more than it can afford. (In fact, the economic turmoil of the 1990s notwithstanding, the number of university administrators in Ukraine has increased.)⁵⁸

In this respect, it is a system that, despite the cataclysmic economic changes that have taken place in Ukraine over the

course of the last decade (or perhaps precisely because of them), has a very strong tendency toward inertia, a system that continues to value stability and control over innovation and original research, and jobs over efficiency and cost effectiveness.⁵⁹ During my two years of teaching in Ukraine, I was repeatedly struck by, among other things, the inflexibility of the academic regime, the tenacity of old routines and structures, and the frequent duplication of effort in most of the old and new universities.⁶⁰ Viatcheslav Briukhovetsky, the founding president of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, once likened Ukrainian university education to a long, narrow corridor in which it is possible to travel “only in one direction ... and only as part of a group, as assigned.”⁶¹ To a large degree, that is fitting analogy for the entire system of higher learning today. Although the context of university education in Ukraine has changed, and changed quite dramatically, the form has remained largely the same.

RE-IMAGINING THE EMPIRE OF KNOWLEDGE

Ukraine’s universities and research institutes are at a critical juncture in their history and development. A prolonged period of economic collapse has significantly eroded the vast human and physical infrastructure inherited from the Soviet era, yet the system—originally designed to serve the needs of an authoritarian state and a command economy—remains largely intact. While tinkering with certain aspects of this system throughout the 1990s, the Ukrainian government avoided making any hard choices regarding the organization, governance, funding, and management of higher education, preferring, by and large, to maintain traditional commitments and arrangements, albeit in a perilously weakened financial state. It essentially pursued a policy of “natural attrition,” in effect, starving the entire system of higher education at a similar, if not uniform, rate. In the coming years, moreover, Ukraine’s universities and research institutes will face new challenges as well as continuing problems: persistent uncertainty about future funding levels; a chronic “brain drain” and increasing trouble retaining young talent; ever greater difficulty in achieving and/or maintaining international standards of quality; and a large wave of retirements and departures

that will begin to have consequences over within the next decade. Indeed, without meaningful systemic reform, Ukraine runs the risk of squandering its reserves of intellectual capital, capital accumulated over many generations and sometimes at a very high price.

What kind of system of higher education does Ukraine need? This is clearly a question for Ukrainians themselves. In a sense, there is no “right” answer—there is no universal curriculum, no single model of higher education, either Canadian, American, or West European, that will magically meet all of Ukraine’s needs. On the contrary, Ukraine has its own particular history, its own specific needs and requirements, its own academic assets and diverse strengths, assets and strengths that should be recognized, valued, and fostered. But what is required is a dynamic vision of the academic enterprise—a vision of the creative role that higher education can and ought to play in the social, economic, and cultural development of Ukrainian society, as well as of the kinds of knowledge and skills necessary to address the needs of the country in a rapidly changing world. And above all, what is required is a set of firm strategies on how to achieve these goals most effectively—how to transform the universities into centres of innovation and how to do so in an environment of greatly diminished public funding.

In this respect, there are a number of guiding principles that have been identified by various Ukrainian educators and that warrant serious attention:

- *The integration of research and teaching:* Research is inherent in the very nature of the modern university and forms the groundwork for the teaching and learning process. The segregation of research and teaching dramatically diminishes the quality of teaching and academic programs and perpetuates the two-tiered system of the Soviet era, when research was almost exclusively oriented toward the needs of a now-defunct state military-industrial complex. For innovation to flourish, research and teaching have to be integrated closely and universities must once again become a main focus of the academic enterprise, filling faculty positions with the very

best candidates in each field. This means providing a supportive environment for high-quality teaching and research (adequate equipment and library materials, reasonable workloads, limited bureaucratic and regulatory constraints, and the opportunity for special support in developing research and teaching strengths) so that both faculty and students have the opportunity to keep pace with the advances in their fields, collaborate across traditional disciplinary boundaries, and contribute to the further development of science and scholarship.

- *University autonomy and self-regulation:* Institutional autonomy and self-regulation are the foundations of modern higher education in an open society. They are crucial to the continuing vitality of institutions of higher learning, and to their ability to respond rapidly to advances in research, the needs of various stakeholders (students, faculty, employers, and other representatives of society and the state), and the changing requirements of a market economy. The authority and responsibility for defining the specific mission, program mix, academic specialization, and research focus ought therefore to lie with the governing bodies of individual institutions (board of trustees, the Academic Council),⁶² rather than with the state itself. The state—through the Ministry of Education and Research—certainly has an essential role to play in developing policy directions, maintaining academic standards (licensing, accreditation, and attestation), distributing funds allocated by the state, as well as overseeing financial audits. Control, however, must be exercised indirectly, through adjudication by expert, independent teams. In other words, the state must not usurp the professional authority of the academic community, their ability to make appointments and to determine the content and organization of teaching and research.
- *Quality enhancement:* Many factors affect the quality of higher education—general funding levels, institutional organization and morale, physical resources, and the abilities and motivation of students—but none is more

important than the quality of the academic staff. Thus, the problem of sustaining and improving the quality of higher education in Ukraine is closely tied to institutional issues of faculty recruitment, professional development, and performance evaluation. *Open, fair, and standardized search procedures* for finding and attracting first-rate teachers and researchers are critical. Likewise, a framework of support and *incentives for faculty* to keep pace with advances in their field is essential. Finally, *regular assessment of performance*, both internal and external (student evaluations, peer reviews linked to hiring and promotion, external department and program appraisals, professional accreditation reviews), is vital to the continued improvement of the system of higher education. The Ministry of Education also has a special role to play in this regard, in assisting universities in the development of a set of institutional indicators, helping to identify systemic gaps and weaknesses (particularly in the social sciences and humanities), and providing targeted funding for strategic areas. This kind of systemic analysis will also greatly aid international funding agencies in their efforts to assist the development of higher education in Ukraine.

- *Faculty renewal*: Faculty renewal will be a major challenge in Ukraine in the coming decade. The looming wave of retirements, combined with the continued exodus of promising young talent from academia, threaten to undermine the work and effectiveness of Ukraine's universities and research institutes. They also present a unique opportunity, however, a chance to restructure the system of higher education and enhance its quality—to *downsize the vast academic infrastructure* and, at the same time, to *reinvest those savings into an improved research and teaching environment*. This will require an immediate plan of action that includes aggressively recruiting the best and the brightest young scholars, improving research and teaching conditions for junior faculty, and providing a system of incentives for exceptional quality. It is critical to the future of higher education in Ukraine that this opportunity not be missed.

- *Accessibility:* Accessibility has become a key public issue as demand for higher education, and in particular for professional programs in law, medicine, and business, has grown in Ukraine over the last decade. In the wake of widespread stories about admissions bribes, the idea of some form of *universal, standardized, and blind university entrance examinations* (comparable to the Educational Testing Service's Scholastic Aptitude Test and the more specialized Advanced Placement examinations) has gained support among Ukrainian educators. Such exams would indeed help make the university admissions process more transparent, but would not entirely eliminate equity issues, i.e., the question of access and affordability for disadvantaged students (students from rural schools, for example). Nonetheless, universal educational testing has considerable value and could be used as an important diagnostic tool. In the long run, however, it is vital that Ukraine maintain its commitment to a system of higher education that is both accessible and affordable for all segments of the population.
- *Greater efficiency in resource use:* Improving internal cost efficiencies is essential to the successful management of Ukraine's institutions of higher education. This includes regularly evaluating and restructuring institutional operations to optimize the use of human and physical resources. Of particular importance is the issue of *downsizing*, that is, raising student/faculty ratios to international levels, reducing expenditures on administration, achieving economies of scale, and giving institutions greater freedom to dispose of assets (and their associated costs) that are not necessary to the fulfillment of their mission as a way of generating revenue for other purposes. For its part, the Ministry of Education and Research can promote greater efficiency and responsibility by developing an accountability framework: collecting reliable financial and performance information and analyzing and determining the effectiveness of the system of higher education.

- *Tuition reform and student assistance:* Rapidly declining state funding levels for higher education have been the focus of greatest concern in higher education over the last ten years. The problem of financing higher education is, of course, closely linked to the state of the economy, but it is also connected to the size and structure of the system of higher education as well as to the almost exclusive reliance on state funding. Alternative sources of revenue generation—such as tuition fees—would help to reorient higher education away from its complete dependency on (and control by) the state and would introduce a new measure of accountability (the notion of “value for money”) into the system. The idea of tuition fees is a radical departure from the concept of free education enshrined in the Soviet system and has met with considerable resistance on the part of the public, who naturally fear that this will severely limit accessibility and program choice for most students. But, combined with an extensive program of tuition scholarships and student assistance (which, in effect, has always been the state’s practice), the introduction of tuition fees would not affect accessibility and, on the contrary, would allow universities to generate extra income to improve the quality of education and ultimately to create additional scholarships for disadvantaged students. (This approach has been used in a modified form by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and has proven to be quite successful.)

In the words of one prognosticator, “The future belongs to societies that organize themselves for learning. ... More than ever before, nations that want high incomes and full employment must develop policies that emphasize the acquisition of knowledge and skills by everyone, not just a select few. The prize will go to those countries that are organized as national learning systems and where all institutions are organized to learn and to act on what they learn.”⁶³ Ukraine’s greatest asset is, in fact, her long-standing tradition of reverence for learning and scholarship, a tradition that dates back many centuries and that is still apparent today. If that tradition can be translated into a dy-

namic vision of higher education as an engine of innovation and change—with a clear set of goals, standards, and policies—then Ukraine’s progress toward an open, free, and prosperous society will be greatly accelerated. If, on the other hand, the opportunity remains wasted—if corruption, cronyism, narrow-mindedness, and cynicism continue to triumph here as elsewhere—then the continuing degradation of Ukrainian society will be difficult, if not impossible, to stop. Higher education remains one of the main battlefronts of the new Ukraine.

POSTSCRIPT: “KUCHMAGATE” AND THE UNIVERSITIES

This chapter was originally presented in 1999, nearly a year before the beginning of “Kuchmagate,” the political crisis precipitated by revelations of secret recordings allegedly linking President Kuchma to various serious crimes, including the disappearance of the maverick journalist, Heorhii Gongadze. Since November 2000, when the charges against President Kuchma and his circle were first made public, hopes for significant reform of the system of higher education have dimmed. Indeed, “Kuchmagate” has not only affected politics in Ukraine in a narrow sense, but has profoundly influenced almost all areas of public policy as well. The crisis has, in effect, accelerated the politicization, centralization, and corruption of the university system in Ukraine as the focus of attention has shifted away from issues of reform and development to problems of personal loyalty, social control, and political survival. Particularly fearful of the mass participation of students and faculty in public demonstrations, the presidential administration has, through the Ministry of Education, reinforced its power over the education system. At the height of the crisis, for example, teachers throughout Ukraine were pressured to report on the political opinions and activities of their students, and institutions were expected to ensure the political obedience of their students and instructors—a practice that continued through the parliamentary elections in March 2002.

Emblematic of this new political atmosphere—and the continued degradation of academic standards—was the plagiarism

scandal surrounding the head of the presidential administration, now speaker of the Parliament, Volodymyr Lytvyn. A published historian, member of the National Academy of Sciences, and former vice-rector of Kyiv University, Lytvyn himself was exposed for plagiarizing the work of an American author, Thomas Carothers, in a “think-piece” on civil society published in the newspaper, *Fakty i Komentarii* (“Hromadians’ke suspil’stvo: mify i real’nist”) (“Civil Society; Myths and Reality,” January 19, 2002). This was followed by revelations that Lytvyn had a history of plagiarized work dating back to at least 1990.⁶⁴ Much more telling, however, was the public reaction in Ukraine—or rather the lack thereof. The media and most of the academic world sidestepped the story or, as in the case of Volodymyr Semynozhenko, the vice prime minister of Ukraine on humanitarian policy and a fellow academic, simply dismissed the overwhelming evidence of intellectual dishonesty as mere “political intrigue.”⁶⁵ Understandably, in the current climate, any serious discussion about university autonomy and improving university standards is simply not on the agenda.

As of this writing (August 2002), it remains unclear when—and if—reform of higher education will again return to the centre of attention. Much depends, undoubtedly, on the resolution of the ongoing crisis of authority and the recovery, at the highest levels, of the political will to move beyond mere rhetoric toward substantive reform. It is not a question of foreign aid, foreign advisers, or formulating the “correct” policy or slogans. Rather, for Ukraine, first and foremost, it is a matter of *political leadership*, of articulating and communicating a clear national program of reform, of marshalling public support, and of overcoming the paralysis—and resistance—of the status quo. University reform, in this respect, is now part of a much broader challenge. As Ukraine’s recent experience has vividly illustrated, without this leadership at the very top, the system of higher education—like the country itself—is destined to lurch from crisis to crisis.

NOTES

- 1 Serhii Ivaniuk and Leonid Sereda, “Chy mozhna v Ukraini vstupyty do vuzu bez khabara?” *Polityka i kul’tura* no. 18/53 (May 19–25, 2000) <www.pic.com.ua/18-53/atema/t1.htm>.

- 2 International Centre for Policy Studies (Mizhnarodnyi tsentr perspektyvnykh doslidzhen'), "Development of Ukrainian Society Requires Reforms in Education," unpublished paper, Kyiv, 1999.
- 3 Quoted in Dana Romanets', "Al'ma-materyns'kyi instinkt," *Polityka I kul'tura* no. 6/41 (February 17–24, 2000), <www.pic.com.ua/6-41/TEMA/01.html>; for the UNESCO EFA 2000 Assessment of the Ukrainian educational system, see <www2.unesco.org/wef/>.
- 4 The evidence is largely anecdotal, but it is a widely held belief among those foreign lecturers who have taught in Ukraine. See, for example, my article, "Spovid' chuzhozemnoho vykladacha," *Den'* (February 4, 1997).
- 5 The draft ("Zakon Ukrainy pro Vyshchu Osvitu") was prepared by the Committee on Education and Research of the Cabinet of Ministers and released in October 1999. At the time of writing, the bill was still undergoing revisions. For an analysis of the original draft, see Mizhnarodnyi tsentr perspektyvnykh doslidzhen', "Polityka rozvytku vyshchoi osvity Ukrainy," <www.icps.kiev.ua/ukrainian/education/project.htm>; Johanna Crighton and Boris Galabov, "Comments on Ukraine: Draft Law on Higher Education dated October 7, 1999," Institute of Educational Policy, Open Society Institute (Budapest, February 2000), <www.irf.kiev.ua/comments.html>; Dr. Marek Kwiek, "Report on the 'Law of Ukraine—On Higher Education,'" <www.irf.kiev.ua/exp.html>; "Obhruntuvannia zmin ta dopovnen' do proektu Zakonu Ukrainy 'Pro vyshchu osvitu,'" <www.irf.kiev.ua/ukr/news/index.html>.
- 6 The four-level classification scheme was introduced in 1996. Institutions with an accreditation level of IV have the right to supervise at the doctoral and candidate degree level, while those with an accreditation level of III can supervise master's degree students.
- 7 Between 1993 and 1996 alone, enrolment rates in institutions of higher learning rose from 14.5 per cent to 17.9 per cent for the eighteen to twenty-two age group. See Crighton and Galabov, "Comments on Ukraine."
- 8 "Students," *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol. 5, edited by Danylo Husar Struk (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 80; "Al'ma-materyns'kyi instinkt," *Ukraine in Figures in 1997: Short Statistical Abstract* (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1998), 144; Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi Stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Reformuvannia vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini: problemy finansuvannia" (1997), <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1997.html>; *Navchal'ni zaklady Ukrainy* (Kyiv: Femina, 1996). For a list of institutions of higher learning in Ukraine, see <www.ukma.kiev.ua/ICC/wwwscint.html#_univ>. Unfortunately, it is not a complete list.
- 9 See the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Web site at <www.ukma.kiev.ua>.
- 10 Viatcheslav Briukhovetsky, "The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy: Symbol of the Rebirth of Ukraine," *The Ukrainian Weekly* (November 22, 1998).

- 11 Ibid.
- 12 See, for example, Vitalii Moroz, "Dumka Studenta: Pravda pro Mohylianku," *Polityka i Kul'tura* no. 18/53 (May 19–25, 2000) <www.pic.com.ua/18-53/atemala/t1.htm>.
- 13 On the Ostrih Academy, see the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol. 3, pp. 731–732, and <www.uosa.uar.net/>. For information on the L'viv Theological Academy see, the *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, Vol. 2, pp. 93–94 and the Academy Web site at <www.lta.lviv.ua/>.
- 14 As used in the Ukrainian system, the term "university" signifies that an institution has the right to confer graduate and professional degrees, in addition to undergraduate degrees. It is not defined by the breadth of the curriculum. See note 7 above.
- 15 See the Institute's Web site at <www.mim.kiev.ua/>.
- 16 *Navchal'ni zaklady*, 139–149.
- 17 The one common feature of all five original "national" universities was that they were all located in Kyiv—a fact that understandably disturbed many university officials outside of Kyiv, especially because the designation was tied to extra funding. Since 1995, several of universities outside Kyiv have been designated "national" universities, yet the exact criteria remain unclear. According to Art. 15 of the new draft law on higher education, a national university is an institute of higher education with a level IV accreditation, "which has the highest achievements with regard to the exploitation of the intellectual potential of the nation, the realization of the idea of national renaissance and the development of Ukraine, and the introduction of the state language and is a leader in its field." The status of national university is awarded by decree of the president of Ukraine. ("Zakon Ukrainy pro Vyshchu Osvitu.") See also Rarog, "Structural Reforms" (Unpublished article); Crighton and Galabov, "Comments on Ukraine."
- 18 The way in which this reform was done creates the impression that it was intended to preserve the status of the existing system rather than to harmonize the Ukrainian system with international standards. Ukraine now has a five-degree system: the bachelor's degree, which is awarded after the fourth year of a regular five-year university program; the specialists' degree (at the end of five years); the master's degree; and the candidate's degree (*Kandydats'ka*), a three-year graduate degree program, which has been designated the equivalent of a PhD. Since the Ministry of Education continues to recognize a more advanced degree, the doctor of sciences (*Doktors'ka*), and sets levels of accreditation according to the number and percentage of doctors of sciences on staff, this puts any institution that employs significant numbers of foreign scholars, like the L'viv Theological Academy, at a distinct disadvantage. (By this logic, Harvard University would not be accredited as either a level III or level IV institution in Ukraine.)

The doctorate in Ukraine has sometimes been compared to that of Germany, where in addition to the doctoral degree, there is also a Habilitation award. The Habilitation, however, does not officially constitute a degree in its own right, but is considered as “proof of ability to represent an academic discipline in terms of teaching and research” and is necessary to qualify for a professorship (i.e., to hold a chair) at a German university. The Ukrainian degree system, in fact, is much more comparable to the Polish one, where there are two doctorate degrees—a first doctorate and a senior doctorate (*doctor habilitowany*), though the Polish system makes no attempt at direct equivalency with the Western degree system. See Dr. Oleg Kouptsev, comp., *The Doctorate in the Europe Region* (Bucharest: UNESCO, European Centre for Higher Education, 1994), 80–81, 146–147.

At the same time, the five-degree system penalizes young Ukrainians by requiring them to complete an additional requirement, the master’s degree, before proceeding to the candidate level. In effect, this reform enhances the value of a candidate degree received before 1998. Among others, Ivan Vakarchuk, the rector of L’viv University, has proposed adopting the international three-degree system: bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD. Ivan Vakarchuk, “Zauvazhennia ta propozytsii do proiektu zakonu Ukrainy ‘Pro Vyshchu Osvitu,’” *Polityka rozvytku vyshchoi osvity Ukrainy* <www.icps.kiev.ua/ukrainian/education/project.htm>.

- 19 Y.V. Rarog, “The Contract System in Ukrainian Universities,” unpublished article, 1999.
- 20 Here I have in mind the entire complex of higher education, research, and scholarship, not simply the Academy of Sciences.
- 21 Rarog, “The Contract System.”
- 22 Faculty councils do exist in many universities, but generally play only an advisory role.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Elena Kovaleva, “Progress and Issues Reforming Social Science Curricula in Ukraine,” (September 23, 2000) <www.cep.org.hu/discussion/discbu.html>.
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 The Academy of Science Web site can be found at <www.nas.gov.ua/>. The Academy has always been involved to some degree, of course, in advanced graduate training, and university instructors were always expected to conduct research. But the main focus of the Academy is research, while for the universities it is teaching, and each was organized around its main function.
- 27 “Ukraine’s National Higher Education System,” <www.ednu.kiev.ua/index_e.htm>.
- 28 Kovaleva, “Progress and Issues.”
- 29 Romanets’, “Al’ma-materyns’kyi instynkt.”

- 30 Ibid; Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, *Kruhlyi Stil Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Stratehiia uspihu vyshchoho navchal'noho zakladu," (March 27, 1997) <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1997.html>.
- 31 It is estimated that, in terms of purchasing power, the wages of university faculty are now about one-third of what they were in 1991.
- 32 In 2000, the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy included the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, Center for Studies of Ukrainian Population, Ukrainian-Polish Center of Science and Arts, European Humanities Research Center, Center for Social and Political Research, Ecological Research Centre, Research Center (Heritage of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy), and the Institute for Civil Education of University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
- 33 Kovaleva, "Progress and Issues."
- 34 B.E. Paton, "Main Results for 1998" <www.nas.gov.ua/zvit1998/r1.html>.
- 35 B.E. Paton, "Main Results for 1996" <www.nas.gov.ua/zvit1996/r2.html>.
- 36 Valentyna Hatash, "Na krutomu virazhi zahubyly ... nauku," *Zerkalo tyzhdnia* no. 35 (September 9, 2000) <www.mirror.kiev.ua/paper/2000/35/1251u/sci.html>. See also Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, "Statistical Indices: Distribution of Budget by Sources," <www.nas.gov.ua/zvit1998/pi11.html>.
- 37 "Naukovtsi proty 0,36% na nauku"; Hatash, "Na krutomu virazhi zahubyly. ..."
- 38 In universities without such departments, the required courses in sociology, psychology, and political science are taught by instructors from "interfaculty" chairs, that is, by non-specialists. Kovaleva, "Progress and Issues."
- 39 The Faculty of History of L'viv University is perhaps the only history department in Ukraine currently offering a broad program of advanced courses that include European, world, and women's history, as well as the history of Ukraine. See their Web site at <www.franko.lviv.ua/faculty/istor.html#2>.
- 40 Rarog, "The Contract System."
- 41 As of 2000, the average monthly salary at the Academy of Sciences was 226 *hryvnias*. (app. US \$45), well below the established minimum standard of 270 *hryvnias*. Serhii Udovky, "Proiekt bukhhal'ters'koho mifu," *Den'* (October 4, 2000).
- 42 Kovaleva, "Progress and Issues"; Rarog, "The Contract System"; Romanets', "Al'ma-materyns'kyi instinkt."
- 43 International Center for Policy Studies, "Development of Ukrainian Society."
- 44 Paton, "Main Results for 1997," <www.nas.gov.ua/zvit1997/r2.html>; Paton, "Main Results for 1998"; Oleksandr Rozhen, "Zbil'shennia kil'kosti larkiv ne kompensuie vtratu vchenykh," *Zerkalo tyzhdnia* no. 38 (September 30, 2000) <www.mirror.kiev.ua/paper/2000/38/1251u/edu.htm>.

- 45 Vitalii Kuksa, "Koruptsiia u shkoli—shkola koruptsii?" *Den'* (June 2, 1998); Galina Golovleva, "Korruptsiuu v obrazovanii ne utait," *Kievskie vedomosti* <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1998.html>.
- 46 Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi Stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Koruptsiia v osviti: stan sprav, sprobny borot'by, mozhlyvosti zapobihannia," (1998) (September 23, 2000) <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1998.html>.
- 47 Ivaniuk and Sereda, "Chy mozhna v Ukraini vstupyty do vuzu bez khabara?"
- 48 Romanets', "Al'ma-materny's'kyi instinkt."
- 49 Quoted in *ibid*.
- 50 Valerii Mazur, "VAK ne povynen hnaty brak," *Zerkalo tyzhnia* no. 27 (402) (July 20–27, 2002).
- 51 Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Iak vyzhyty osviti: problemy finansuvannia" (October 25, 1996) (September 23, 2000) <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1996.html>. Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Reformuvannia vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini: problemy finansuvannia" (1997) (September 23, 2000) <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1997.html>.
- 52 Rarog, "The Contract System." The author does not, unfortunately, provide his source for this information.
- 53 Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Reformuvannia vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini: problemy finansuvannia" (1997) (September 23, 2000) <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1997.html>.
- 54 International Centre for Policy Studies, "Development of Ukrainian society requires reforms in education"; Crighton and Galabov, "Comments on Ukraine."
- 55 Aleksandr Rozhen, "Professor, Konchaite eksperiment i zhmite na gaz," *Zerkalo nedeli* no. 15 (236) (April 17, 1999) <www.mirror.kiev.ua/paper/1999/15/1251/text/15-12-1.htm>.
- 56 The World Bank figure was subsequently questioned by Ukrainian academics who argued that it incorrectly included non-teaching staff and administration. Yet the figure, I believe, is not as far-fetched as it seems. If one were to include academic research personnel in Ukraine—research is, after all, an essential component of every faculty position in the West—then this figure appears much more realistic. See Kovaleva, "Progress and Issues," footnote 10; Council of Ontario Universities, *Ontario Universities—1999*, <www.cou.on.ca/publications/briefs_reports/online_pubs.htm>, Table 8.6, p. 103.
- 57 In the Czech Republic, for example, eighteen research institutes and four service facilities have been dissolved since 1989. The remaining institutes

were restructured and the total number of employees in the Academy of Sciences was cut by approximately 50 per cent. All members of research staffs are now also subject to regular evaluation and attestation. The Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, "Basic Facts and Mission of the ASCR," <www.cas.cz/en/basics.html>.

- 58 Instytut Osvitn'oi Polityky, Kruhlyi stil *Suspil'stvo i Derzhava: Dialoh dlia rozvytku osvity*, "Reformuvannia vyshchoi osvity v Ukraini: problemy finansuvannia" (1997) (September 23, 2000), <www.park.kiev.ua/osvita/archive/1997.html>.
- 59 Roman Cherniha, "Odynadtsiat' rokiv zastoju v NANU pislia proholoshenoho reformuvannia!" *Zerkalo tyzhnia* no. 8 (383) (March 2–8, 2002).
- 60 To give one example, sociology is now a required course for all university students in Ukraine. Instead of offering one standard course for all students at each university or offering a choice of electives, the course is taught separately at each faculty, often by the same individuals (i.e., sociology for physicists, sociology for economists, sociology for historians, etc.). Aside from the obvious inefficiencies of the system, it also promotes a negative atmosphere in the classroom, in which students, whose interests clearly lie elsewhere, are "forced" to take these kinds of required courses together in one group. In fact, recent student surveys in *Donetsk* confirm that many students resent these courses and consider the quality of the courses to be lower than those of their own program. See Kovaleva, "Progress and Issues."
- 61 Briukhovetsky, "The National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy."
- 62 At present, Ukrainian universities do not have boards of trustees, while the academic councils have only an advisory function. Boards of trustees usually include representatives from the academic community (elected faculty as well as students), the private sector, state bodies, and representatives of society at large. In Canadian universities, the senate/academic council is responsible for the university's academic affairs and the board of governors is responsible for its operations and financial stewardship. Although their roles are distinct, the two bodies must work together in order to govern the university effectively because most academic decisions have significant resource implications, and most resource decisions affect the delivery of academic programs and services. The president/executive head of the university normally chairs both the senate and the board of governors.
- 63 Ray Marshall, *Thinking for a Living: Education & the Wealth of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
- 64 Sasha Volkova, Liliia Ulitkina, and Vlad Mykhnenko, "Lytvyn—krade po dribnytsiakh. Poky shcho lyshe statti," *Ukrains'ka pravda* (January 25, 2002) <www.ppravda.com.ua/?20125-5-new>; "Lytvyn ziznavsia u plahiati," *Ukrains'ka pravda* (January 25, 2002) <www.ppravda.com.ua/?20128-6-new>.
- 65 *Ukrains'ka pravda* (February 1, 2002).

14

The Political Economy and Systematic Performance of Ukraine's Secondary and Higher Education

DENNIS SOLTYS

Starting from the analytical perspective of political economy, the emphasis in this chapter on Ukraine's education is not on the formal goals enunciated by Ukraine's educational authorities but on the way that education (or schooling, which is something else) contributes to the reproduction of social relations, which are characterized by patterns of domination and subordination. The political economy approach leads to such questions as: Why is schooling the way it is? What subjects and whose values are taught? Whose interests does schooling benefit, and to what ends? Why does the public support (or not support) a given schooling system, or regard this system as normal? This approach focuses attention on the relationship between schooling and the distribution of wealth, power, and prestige in society.

In this regard it is axiomatic that an educational system fits the society it is designed to serve. Accordingly, Ukraine's education functioned as a branch of a larger unit, the Russian-dominated USSR, with the USSR's political priorities and hierarchical social structure. Ukraine's colonial status led to an educational system that was deleterious to its own requirements on a number of levels. Here it is crucial to note that not only was Ukraine's educational system anti-ethnic Ukrainian in ideological content (ideological paradigms, curricula, and language of instruction are now changing), but also that Ukraine's educational system remains profoundly anti-ethnic Ukrainian structurally. Many correctives to the Soviet legacy, especially structural ones, still need to be implemented.

This chapter will evaluate Ukrainian secondary and higher education according to three standard purposes: for *industrial expansion, civic socialization and integration*, and for the *personal development of individuals*. The experience of Canada and the United States is appropriate here since this chapter is part of a conference of North American specialists on Ukraine, and because the two North American countries were historically agrarian—as Ukraine still is to a large extent.

Ukraine inherited the Soviet command-administrative and vocational paradigm for industrial expansion. Soviet planners had sought to produce a disciplined and stratified labour force, with specialists trained in appropriate numbers for different branches of the economy. The largest component of higher education was the system of technical institutes, with most of these subordinated to specific economic ministries and not to the state per se. The university sector was small, having about 11.5 per cent of all students in higher education,¹ and even here the social sciences and humanities components (what might be called the liberal arts) were intended to serve the propagandistic and legitimizing tasks of the regime. Since the administrative structure of the scientific, technical, and vocational schools reflected the structure of the economy, the system of higher education was fragmented vertically, contributing to the fragmentation of knowledge and impeding the horizontal flow of instructors and students at each level. This also meant that labour was badly misallocated in the Soviet economy. This lack of horizontal mobility of personnel and knowledge was one of the main weaknesses of Soviet education, science, and economy.

The direct subordination of education to the economy was another, even greater, weakness. Students had little room for the liberal self-exploration of their talents. Meanwhile, the preoccupation of Soviet economic and educational planners was actually to limit the number of aspirants to higher education, so that there would be enough labour for traditional manufacturing and other priority sectors such as energy extraction, mining and lumbering, steel making, and transport. That is, a perverse effect of central planning was to promote the *downward* mobility of students; two Western scholars called this the “cooling out of ambition.”² Therefore, far from having the world’s largest

higher educational establishment, as Soviet propaganda liked to assert, the USSR had only about half the proportion of students in higher education compared to the West European countries, and about one-third of the proportion of the United States and Canada. In addition, the choice of program offerings was unbalanced; the natural sciences, engineering, and agricultural sciences were vastly overrepresented, while the social sciences, law, and medicine were much underrepresented. The Soviet Union did have a large number of teachers; but most of these teachers instructed students in the overrepresented natural sciences and engineering professions just noted, to the neglect of a more balanced program offering.³

The Soviet Union had an educational establishment with a rather flat status-occupational profile. The system of preschool and primary instruction was very large, as was the system for vocational training, but there was a marked narrowing at the institute and university levels, where the Soviet Union had only about two-fifths the proportional number of instructors as in the United States and Canada. That is, the USSR had an educational system largely oriented toward the blue-collar trades, reflecting the essentially blue-collar profile of the economy. Central planning tended to solidify and reproduce this blue-collar profile, while higher education and basic science were relatively underdeveloped.⁴

In trying to ensure enough labour for the traditional blue-collar and manufacturing industries, Soviet propaganda idealized so-called "labour dynasties." Youths from rural and working-class backgrounds were encouraged to remain in agricultural and blue-collar occupations through the practice of streaming, while advancement to higher education occurred mostly for youths from the urban intelligentsia. Thus, during the final decades of the USSR, the social structure became increasingly rigid and career opportunities for working-class and rural youths declined. Soviet educational policy was intentionally socially regressive, and, in Ukraine's context, it was anti-rural and anti-ethnic Ukrainian as well.

A final, more subtle major weakness of Soviet education was the legacy of managerialism. The public was never invited to be an active constituency in educational policy and support.

Persuaded by smug official assertions that the Soviet Union's educational establishment was much larger and of better quality than it really was, the public believed that educational matters were well taken care of; the public deferred to state officials in educational matters. With the lack of an active public constituency pressing for educational improvement, the percentage of Soviet GNP devoted to education continuously declined both absolutely and relative to the advanced Western countries.⁵

The next major function of an educational system is civic socialization and integration, a function that includes the stratification of a modernizing society by certifying young people for career placement. Here one may first digress to the historical development of public education in the United States and Canada. These two countries originated as agrarian societies. North American farmers were always free landowners, so they were socially modern in this sense, and public education began as a broad *rural*, not urban, phenomenon. North American educational philosophy and design initially grew out of religious schooling and simple literacy and mathematics instruction. This educational philosophy and design are actually preindustrial; accordingly, there was always a large liberal arts content in North American education, and the educational system was not explicitly intended to stratify people for employment places in the economy. Both institutional religion and education were close to the grassroots, so citizens at the local level learned confidence and self-government, and North American education always had a competent grassroots constituency ready to support educational expansion. With time, some local schools developed into agricultural and industrial arts colleges and later into universities; many of these institutions are now world-class. First the United States, then Canada, developed very large public education establishments at all levels; these two countries now lead the world in the proportion of students in higher education.⁶

American and Canadian education have important commonalities and contrasts that are relevant to the present discussion. The main strength of American education is its mass character. Here it is important to note that the increase in academic attainment of such leading institutions as Harvard, Yale, and Rutgers, etc., coincided with, or was preceded by, the broad

participation of students from many social backgrounds in lesser institutions.⁷ That is, American public secondary and higher education opened the professions to talented students; a democratic educational system thus increases both access to and attainment within higher education. In contrast, an elitist system, more characteristic of Europe and the USSR, decreases educational attainment because it systemically discriminates against youths from lower socio-economic classes and accordingly has a smaller pool of natural talents. Therefore, it is essential to note here also that broader questions of citizenship, and of the empowerment of *all* social strata, are crucial to an effective educational system.

But even as large as the American educational establishment is, it has at least two great deficiencies. First, only about one-fifth of America's secondary schools, mostly in affluent, middle-class suburbs, traditionally produce more than four-fifths of all college and university students.⁸ This means that America's educational establishment still has enormous untapped reserves of natural talent. A second deficiency, related to the first, is that too high a proportion of school taxation and financing occurs at the municipal and state levels; this causes wide disparities in spending per student, depending on contingent factors such as geography, ethnic or racial background, and social class. Not only is this socially unjust, it is economically suboptimal and undermines support for education among those social classes that are relatively excluded from education's benefits.

The Canadian system has strong advantages. The Canadian secondary and higher education establishment is now proportionately on par or even larger than the American, thus drawing in a larger number of natural talents. And Canadian education is much more evenly financed. This education is highly centralized at the provincial level; the proportion of local property taxes marked for public education is smaller and is subject to strict provincial rules for equal distribution.⁹ Canadian education, therefore, integrates larger numbers of students from minority backgrounds, and a significantly larger proportion of Canadian university students come from middle- or low-income families.¹⁰ Thus Canadian education has the best of two worlds. First, it has the benefits of centralized and equitable administration; and second, it still shares with American education the traditions of

local activism and support. Canadians and Americans are among the most willing in the world to spend money on education. In Canada, financially conservative governments have found it difficult to reduce spending on education in spite of an anti-education corporate backlash because to do so would alienate a broad section of the middle class, who have children in higher education.

Now, how do the evolution and administration of education in North America compare with the historical picture in Ukraine? And how do civic socialization and integration compare? The main difference between North Americans of European background and Ukrainians is that North Americans were always free, while Ukrainians were always subordinated. North American farmers were independent landholders, they had the means to support education, and their children could migrate to the cities easily, especially since these cities were populated by people of the same nationality and culture as they were. In North America, agriculture and farmers were never identified with backwardness, as in Ukraine; instead, North American culture idealized the mythical values of the countryside over those of the city. For their part, Ukrainians historically owned little land, had only very few civic rights, and were hampered in their migration to the non-Ukrainian cities near where they lived. Thus, under both Czarist and Soviet rule, Ukraine had a regressive economic, social, and educational structure, along with an ideological superstructure that legitimized this status quo.

In Soviet Ukraine, a deformed type of administered modernization began in the cities and was extended, at a lesser rank of priority, to the countryside. The countryside was a colony of the city, and Ukraine's arteries of communication and control were staffed preponderantly by Russians or Moscowphile Ukrainians, as intended by Stalin's genocidal policies. Rural Ukrainians, who currently make up about 25 per cent of Ukraine's population, and Ukrainophones, who altogether make up about 50 per cent, are, in essence, a huge category of second-class citizens. (The Ukrainian journalist, Mykola Riabchuk, justifiably calls the prevailing situation one of "linguistic apartheid." The legalized institution of about 2,500 separate, state-funded Russian schools is the clearest manifestation also of structural apartheid.) The political and economic practice of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

Republic favoured the following: the engineering professions, extractive industry and manufacturing, urbanites, Russians, marginalized agriculture, light industry and services, rural dwellers, and Ukrainian-speakers. This led in the economic sphere to the misdevelopment of Ukraine's greatest natural asset—its land—and in the social sphere to systemic discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians, who were forced to accept economic and social policies that they would not have chosen in conditions of national independence. These Ukrainians have the characteristics of all subordinated populations, namely, greater rates of poverty, lower self-esteem or social status, and lower participation in education and civic life. In a phrase, ethnic Ukrainians have a "subject political culture."

Furthermore, the earlier Soviet-era destruction or deportation of intellectual families, and the later policy of the inter-republican/inter-ethnic "exchange of cadres," eroded societal traditions of educational support and deprived Ukrainian youths of role models. As a result, the 1989 Soviet census shows that 17.2 per cent of urban Russians (aged fifteen or older) in Ukraine had a complete higher education, while only 12.0 per cent of urban Ukrainians did so. Taking urban and rural populations together, Ukrainians had only 54 per cent of the incidence of completed higher education of the Russians.¹¹ Such educational inequality reduces the sense of common citizenship and endeavour in post-referendum Ukraine; it is socially unjust and economically suboptimal because the pool of natural talents is largely untapped. At the same time, many of those who advance do so on the contingent bases of advantageous geography, ethnicity, or social class instead of merit; and overt corruption in the country's educational system is said to be universal. Since educational certification is necessary for favourable employment, this means that in the south-eastern regions, where Russians comprise about one-third of the urban population and hold the most strategic employment positions in society, the Russians are able to dominate economically and socially. Yet the majority of ethnic Ukrainians also live in these same regions. This means that the second and third major functions of education—civic integration and the liberal self-development of individuals—are highly uneven and unjust in Ukraine. This reduces societal support for

education from within the marginalized Ukrainophone constituencies and undermines the legitimacy of the state.

Now, what are some correctives to Ukraine's colonial legacy? Correctives may be the most easily applied to the outdated vocational paradigm of Ukraine's scientific and technical education, for technical education lends itself more readily to managerial changes. Accordingly, a large number of scientific and technical institutes have already been transferred from the jurisdiction of the economic ministries to the Ministry of Education. At the same time, many of these institutes have been made into universities or polytechnical universities. This implies that these reconfigured institutions are moving toward broader program offerings, with easier lateral movement of knowledge and personnel at each level. Since the economy is no longer a planned one, and a private sector is developing, this also means that the old problem of the vertical fragmentation of science and technical institutes will decline. Scientific and technical institutions are free to find sponsors in the private sector, or partners abroad, unconstrained by artificial barriers of state jurisdiction and planning. The new higher schools are now free to anticipate market demands and to offer new types of courses to students, who in turn now have more opportunity to search for academic programs that may seem interesting. The main constraint on the reform of scientific and technical education is merely financial.

Much more problematic are the two other functions of public education: civic socialization or integration, and the liberal development of individuals on the basis of merit. These functions do not lend themselves to managerial solutions. Quite the opposite—these functions go to the very heart of the distribution of political power and civil rights in Ukraine's society, and to deeply ingrained cultural/ideological attitudes.

As already mentioned earlier, the two largest but most marginalized demographic groups in Ukraine are rural dwellers and Ukrainophones, but Ukraine cannot claim to be democratic and modern as long as these two groups remain marginal to society. Affirmative actions of various kinds are fully justified under democratic theory,¹² and modernization requires the participation of all social categories in public life. An essential first step toward the integration of Ukrainians into public life has been

taken in the Ukrainization of education in western and central regions of the country. This policy raises and affirms the esteem of ethnic Ukrainians, and the use of their native language reduces some of the disadvantages that Ukrainophones historically faced in career advancement in the cities. Unfortunately, Ukrainization in the south-eastern regions and in higher education proceeds only tentatively.¹³ Though the native language is no longer restricted by political custom and state policy geographically to Galicia and villages in general, it still has not found its way into the *functions* of commerce and science. This phenomenon is expressed in the idea that Russian should be given official status as the language of business. Since most communication in a private economy is *commercial* communication, this means that the moderate Ukrainization of education in public schools has only a limited effect in raising the self-esteem and social integration of Ukrainophones.

Rural Ukrainians continue to be undervalued as citizens; it is commonly assumed that spending on education and academic attainment remain much lower in rural areas than in urban.¹⁴ The rigid social stratification of Soviet times remains in place, and is actually increasing under conditions of a market economy. Aside from a general Ukrainization of primary and secondary schools (more successful in western and central Ukraine), there is no active state policy to redress the historical injustices of access to quality education in rural areas and small towns where ethnic Ukrainians live. Some urban educational institutions, such as the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the Lviv Polytechnic University, have a system of collegiums in order to reach out to rural youths and to enable these youths to register with them. However, these collegiums are not the result of a state policy of affirmative action, but depend on the leadership of these particular institutions. In the south-eastern regions of the country, it is unlikely that Russian rectors and Russophone urban dwellers will wish to support the rehabilitation of education in the Ukrainian village. Furthermore, about two-thirds of the new non-state post-secondary schools, which offer popular programs in commerce, business administration, and law, are found in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Crimea¹⁵—that is, generally in the most Russified regions of the country. The local

administrative *nomenklatura* favours Russian as the language of instruction, and Ukrainian education continues to be identified with lower quality and backwardness. There are, however, encouraging exceptions to this historically lower respect for Ukrainian-language institutions: the Kyiv National University and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy were recently ranked by the Sociological Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine as number one and two in quality of instruction in the country.¹⁶ Both of these are Ukrainian-language institutions.

But in general the picture is one of systemic discrimination against Ukrainophones—through continued Russification within urban schools, through underfunding of Ukrainian rural schools, through widespread poverty and disenfranchisement abetted by the policies of an often unaccountable neo-Soviet state and regional elite, and through widespread corruption in education, which allows better-positioned urban parents to bypass the merit principle by purchasing higher examination marks or other advantages for their children. In order to help correct this situation, Ukraine requires the centralization and democratization of education as in the Canadian model, though centralization should occur not on the provincial or oblast level but on the national level. The national government and the Ministry of Education should be strong enough to implement equal funding formulas for all of Ukraine's students, regardless of their geographical, class, or ethnic origin. Concomitantly, a greater transparency within educational institutions—following a more general democratization of Ukraine's society—would reduce corruption in education and, in contrast, strengthen the merit principle. In all of this it should be emphasized that one prominent feature of the American system, i.e., federalism, should not be recommended for Ukraine's educational administration. One should remember that today in the United States, federalism is a structure for administrative purposes. Civil rights in all US states are essentially the same for everyone. In the European context, however, federalism almost always has an ethnic, not civic, basis. European federalism enshrines ethnicity over civic citizenship. Concomitantly, in Ukraine the proponents of federalism, citing the "historical specificity" of certain regions, often have on the agenda limiting the rights of Ukrainophones to Ukrainian-language edu-

cation in these regions. In effect, this would re-legitimize the ethnically discriminatory policies of the Soviet era.

In Ukraine's context, therefore, the goals of equal social rights and the free development of individuals require the "strong government" model of Canadian educational administration, not the less-regulated American model. Unfortunately, it is the American "laissez-faire" model that is likely to prevail. Ukraine is characterized by strong regional industrial elites, which control substantial economic resources beyond the ability of Kyiv to tax, and by local departments of education, which tend to evade Kyiv's inconsistent nationalizing and democratizing educational policies. The central government is too weak to extract sufficient resources from the economy and to implement a uniform educational administration for the country.

There are also great attitudinal problems at work here. Some ethnic Russians are only lukewarm to the Ukrainization of education, which is not in their (short-term) interest; and urban Russians and Russophones are not likely to support the economic, social, and educational rehabilitation of the historically exploited Ukrainian villages. Along with the political-economic structures of internal colonialism, post-1991 Ukraine inherited an anti-rural and with it an anti-Ukrainian urban culture, so the society's undervaluing of rural dwellers and Ukrainophones is bound to continue for the foreseeable future.

In sum, this chapter argues that managerial measures and market mechanisms can and will lead to improvements in Ukraine's scientific and technical education. But these measures and mechanisms by themselves will not solve the problems of the civic integration of all of Ukraine's citizens, nor will the full personal development of individuals (and economic optimality) be achieved. Indeed, marketization (but without effective distribution of land to the peasantry) is leading to even greater social inequality and underutilization of talent. The new capitalist industrial elite is indifferent to educational democratization and reform. Ukraine's leftist political parties might appear to be ideological allies of democratic public education. However, the managerialist or paternalistic leftist parties usually have urban Russian or Russophone bases and are negatively oriented toward the rebirth of national Ukrainian education, and even

toward the civic enfranchisement of the general population on the social-democratic European or more private enterprise-oriented North American model.

The fundamental reform of Ukraine's education requires the realignment of the prevailing power relations in society. Lower-class Ukrainians need to acquire economic self-sufficiency and civic competence in order to become an effective constituency for social change. (As in North America, this empowerment could be aided by widespread land ownership and agriculture-based industrial development.) Unfortunately, the solution is also the problem. The Ukrainophones' subordinate status makes it difficult for them to become this effective constituency. Ukraine's system of secondary and higher education is therefore likely to remain socially unjust and to underperform economically; Ukraine will likely continue to have both a two-tier society and a two-tier educational system, with the long-term consequence of providing little civic cohesion for the country. Ukraine might not become a modern, democratic, European entity in more than superficial aspects. Probably only a massive civil rights movement, as occurred among Blacks in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s and First Nations peoples in Canada during the 1970s and 1980s, could change this pessimistic prognosis.

The modernization and reform of Ukraine's education are ultimately a question of overcoming both the ideological/cultural and structural legacies of 300 years of foreign rule, of the ossification of the paradigms of thought and of social customs and institutional practices of external and internal colonialism. To attain the equality in their own country that they have historically lacked, ethnic Ukrainians need to re-engage in the struggle for their equal rights, including rights in education.

NOTES

- 1 Dennis Soltys, "Upravlinnia osvitoiu: dosvid Kanady i problemy Ukrainy," *Ekonomika Ukrainy* 7 (1994), 74–80.
- 2 David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, *The Soviet Industrial Worker—Social Class, Education, and Control* (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1978).
- 3 Soltys, "Upravlinnia osvitoiu."
- 4 Ibid.

- 5 For an extended discussion of these points, see Dennis Soltys, *Education for Decline: Soviet Vocational and Technical Schooling from Khrushchev to Gorbachev* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), especially chapters two and three.
- 6 Dennis Soltys, "Hromadians'ki zasady i upravlinnia amerykans'koiu, kanads'koiu ta ukrains'koiu narodnoiu osvitoiu: makroistorychne porivniannia," *Visnyk Ukrains'koi Akademii Derzhavnoho Upravlinnia pry Prezydentovi Ukrainy* 2 (1998), 123–135. An excellent history of Canadian education is provided by Ronald Manzer in his *Public Schools and Political Ideas: Canadian Educational Policy in Historical Perspective* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994).
- 7 Manzer. Original source in Geraldine Joncich Clifford, *The Shape of American Education* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1975), 46.
- 8 Manzer and Clifford, *The Shape of American Education*, 46.
- 9 Soltys, "Hromadians'ki zasady." Original sources are T.E. Giles and A.J. Proudfoot, *Educational Administration in Canada* (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Ltd., 1994), 82, 89; Stephen T. Easton, *Education in Canada* (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1988), 9; Peter Atherton, "The Future Funding of the Public Education System," in *The Canadian Public Education System: Issues and Prospects*, edited by Y.L. Jack Lam (Calgary: Detselig Enterprises Ltd., 1990), 264–265.
- 10 *University Affairs*, "Defining Differences: Canadian Universities and Students Are Not All Alike," (January 1998), 17. Twenty-two per cent of university students come from families whose incomes are less than \$30,000 a year, and 23 per cent between \$30,000 and \$50,000.
- 11 1989 Soviet census.
- 12 See, for example, John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999).
- 13 For a detailed empirical description of Ukrainization in public education, see Jan Germen Janmaat, *Nation-Building in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Educational Policy and the Response of the Russian-Speaking Population* (Utrecht/Amsterdam: Royal Dutch Geographical Society, 2000).
- 14 This is a common empirical observation. Ukrainian Ministry of Education statistics on rural-urban financing are not made available. (I challenge the Ukrainian Ministry of Education to publish statistics on these fundamental human rights issues.)
- 15 V.I. Astakhova, "On the Development of Private Higher Education in Ukraine," *Russian Education and Society* 5 (1997), 73–83.
- 16 Circular letter from Dr. Viacheslav Briukhovetsky, November 16, 1998.

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15

Ukraine's Media Landscape

MARTA DYCZOK

Since the autumn of 2000, Ukraine has received much international attention. Indeed, at times the dramatic events following the disappearance of journalist Heorhii Gongadze made Ukraine seem like a locale in a political thriller novel.¹ Much of the focus was on media issues, since the Kuchmagate scandal began with an opposition journalist. For the past two years, much of what has been written and broadcast in the international media has simplified the issues facing the media in Ukraine today. This was in large part due to the sensational nature of the events, which included President Kuchma being listed among the top ten enemies of a free press for two years in a row,² and the considerable international attention they received.

The problems in Ukraine's media sector are much more complex than the reporting suggests. Journalists, editors, and broadcasters are working in a multifaceted political and economic context. In one significant way, Ukraine has experienced a media revolution since it became independent. The state gave up its monopoly on the mass media, so television, radio, and print media became diverse and in many ways controversial. Private ownership has brought with it a host of new problems, and freedom of the press does not yet exist. However, pluralism has appeared.

An independent media is generally considered a feature of a democratic society,³ and any analysis of media issues must be placed within a broader theoretical and comparative context.

When reviewing the history of media evolution in England in the eighteenth century, one almost has the impression that one is reading about Ukraine's current media situation. In his study on the media and democracy, British scholar John Keane writes that despite gains in the early decades, a free press remained a utopia. Newspapers were dominated by advertisements from which their owners derived the greater part of revenue. Distribution of newspapers and magazines was hindered by the post office and poor communication (roads, etc). Publishers faced problems with taxation, and had their content attacked in the courts and their licences revoked. Reporters had restricted access to Parliament and other sources of information, and were forced to practise self-censorship. A serious gap remained between the utopia of a free press and the reality of limited circulation, harassment, and corruption.⁴

Today there are many critics of media structures in developed democracies and market economies. They point to problems of concentration of ownership, close relations between political elites and media owners, lack of diversity or alternative views, and the primary importance of advertising.⁵ Post-communist states now share many of these problems in addition to the specific difficulties associated with the communist legacy. Many, including Ukraine, are experiencing so-called "backsliding" in the democratic transition in general, and in media issues specifically.⁶

This chapter looks at many factors influencing change in Ukraine's mass media—domestic, international, and transnational—in an attempt to place this analysis in a broader context. It looks at the various phases that have occurred during the transition from a fully state-owned media to one that is mainly privately owned. Ownership issues and the interrelation of politics and media are then described.

It then comments on the media profession, external factors, and trends to watch. It concludes by suggesting that although many positive changes have occurred in Ukraine's media since independence and the development of diversity, many problems remain and the overall situation is not static. The March 2002 parliamentary election revealed that the relationship between the media and the political process continues to change.

THE VARIOUS PHASES

As in many post-communist states, economics and politics have a direct bearing on the development of an independent media. Also, the overall situation in the country changes regularly. There have been at least six distinct phases of development in the media. The restrictions, which crept in during the late 1990s, were all the more disturbing since they followed a period of relative press freedom and expansion.

1. From 1989–1991 the communist monopoly and control of media were challenged and the status quo was upset.
2. This was followed by what is now referred to as “the golden era” of journalism, when private forms of ownership appeared. The first president, Leonid Kravchuk, was too busy building a state to worry much about controlling the media. In the years 1992–1995 many new media outlets appeared in Ukraine and operated with minimal interference from the state.
3. By the mid-1990s, a period of consolidation set in when budding oligarchs realized the potential power of the press and began buying up newspapers, radio, and TV stations. It was in the second and third phases that the legal and regulatory framework was created through legislation and, on paper, Ukraine now has an impressive set of laws that protect freedom of speech and journalists.⁷
4. When President Kuchma decided in 1998 to run for re-election, he also realized that it would be wise to ensure that the media could not undermine his campaign. In building political alliances, he also wanted to ensure that the state’s widespread corruption would not be exposed in the media and that his backers would be shielded from public scrutiny. His efforts to control the media are noticeable from 1998 onwards. This was done through both legal and illegal means. Libel legislation was used to silence critics, while visits from tax inspectors and other official forms of harassment became common tactics against opposition and outspoken media outlets. In

numerous cases, journalists were physically intimidated, threatened, and even assaulted or killed.⁸

5. Ironically, it was the attempt to silence all opposition that caused restrictions to ease in late 2000. News of the president's alleged involvement in the disappearance of a journalist created such a scandal that he was unable to continue openly silencing the media. This created a breathing space for journalists and editors, with the result that reporting became somewhat more open and balanced.
6. The parliamentary election campaign once again altered the media landscape. Many of the political battles, particularly over ownership issues, were publicized in the media. However, one interesting result of the election is that it demonstrated that the relationship between media control and electoral results are not a simple matter in Ukraine.

When looking at the present situation, there are at least four factors to consider: economics, politics, the media profession itself, and external influences. Although separate issues, they are interrelated.

OWNERSHIP PATTERNS

There are two main features that characterize Ukraine's media. The first, which is quite striking, is that Ukraine's media is *not* a profit-making industry. Part of this can be explained by the fact that the industry is oversaturated. In 2001, 10,144 periodicals were registered. This is up from 5,497 in 1996 and 1,794 in 1992.⁹ Similar patterns are visible in the broadcast sector. In 2001, the State Committee for Information Policy and TV and Radio Broadcasting issued 791 licences.

With such a dense media landscape, one would assume that there is a thriving market for information and entertainment in Ukraine. However, this is not the case. In fact, in any economy there is a limited advertising market and in Ukraine's current economic situation, the total advertising market is estimated as US \$50 million.¹⁰ Analysts estimate that for the existing media

outlets to operate at a profit, there should be at least an advertising market worth US \$110 million.¹¹ The available estimates suggest that many media outlets are operating at a loss since there is an insufficient advertising market to support all existing media.

The second important feature of Ukraine's media landscape is the ownership structure. Most of the country's media outlets are privately owned—the state controls less than 25 per cent of television, radio, and print media and, when broken down by sector, as much as 90 per cent of media outlets are privately owned. The majority of owners are oligarchs (Ukrainian and Russian), and apparently the latest status symbol for an oligarch is to own a TV station. Most already own a few newspapers.

Taken together, these two characteristics suggest that control of the media is motivated not by commercial interests but by political status. The media is used to fight political and economic enemies and to influence the president. However, media outlets are registered as businesses, and have increasingly faced allegations of money laundering. As rule of law takes root, primarily in the economic sector, the owners are becoming subject to taxation laws.

Not surprisingly, tracking ownership structures is rather difficult. In part this is due to the manner in which business is conducted in Ukraine, and also because as the economy becomes consolidated, business structures become similar to the commercial consortia in developed market economies. A third factor is legislation, which limits foreign ownership of Ukraine's media to 30 per cent and requires that at least 50 per cent of all programming be Ukrainian-produced. Both laws are routinely disregarded.

Perhaps the most interesting sector is television because of its potential as a profit-making venture and public opinion shaper. When Ukraine separated from the USSR in 1991, the state inherited three television stations with a national audience reach. They are called, somewhat unimaginatively, UT1 (Ukrainian Television 1), UT2, and UT3. Their audience reach varies somewhat, with UT1 having a potential audience of 50 million viewers, UT2 45 million, and UT3 35 million. This means that there are parts of the country where only Channel 1 is broadcast, making this the most prized of the three channels.

For a variety of reasons, all three of these nationwide channels continue to be owned by the state. However, the state leases air time to private TV companies and, in fact, most of the television programming currently on Ukrainian TV is not state-produced. In addition to these three channels, there is also a new channel called STB, which transmits its signal by satellite, regional TV stations, and cable TV. All TV companies in Ukraine must receive broadcast licences from the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB). The most sought after are those for broadcasting on one of the three national channels.

Channel 1 (UT1) broadcasts mainly programming produced by the National State TV Company and is generally considered the mouthpiece of the president. Their news programs generally have a Soviet style. This channel does lease some air time to private TV companies, notably ERA, reportedly associated with media tycoon Andriy Derkach, MP and son of the former Security Service of Ukraine chair, Leonid Derkach.¹²

Channel 2 (UT2) leases twelve hours of broadcast time, including all the prime-time slots, to the private TV company Studio 1+1,¹³ which has really become the face of Channel 2. It is in many ways the most interesting of the Ukrainian TV companies because a significant portion is foreign (yet non-Russian) owned. Although it is difficult to ascertain the total share percentage, one of the main owners of the company is Central European Media Enterprises. The CEO of this company is Ronald Lauder, son of cosmetic queen Estee, and the company has bought up TV stations throughout post-communist Eastern Europe.¹⁴ Previously a major partner had been the Rico Capital Group holding company, which was owned by former Ukrainian citizen Vadim Rabinovych. At the time when Studio 1+1 secured its broadcasting licence, Rabinovych was rumoured to be influential in the Kuchma administration. He later became a *persona non grata* and emigrated to Israel. In February 2002 he was back in Ukraine and was believed to be behind the attempt to force Studio 1+1 to shut down and its air time to be put out to tender.¹⁵ Studio 1+1 produces its own news shows and programs, broadcasts only in the Ukrainian language, and is the only TV company to produce its own films.

The advertising company producing commercials for Studio 1+1 is reportedly associated with famous Ukrainian oligarch, Democratic Union Party member Oleksandr Volkov, and recently Studio 1+1 was allegedly to be strongly connected with Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU[o]) leader Viktor Medvedchuk.

The third nationwide TV station, UT3, leases the full twenty-four hours of air time to a private TV company called INTER. This is a Russian-Ukrainian joint venture company; the Ukrainian partner is called INTER, and the Russian partner is ORT. Official information reports that 29 per cent of the company is owned by ORT, which means it is complying with Ukrainian legislation. However, more than 50 per cent of the programming is in Russian and Russian-produced, including Russian news broadcasts, an increasing trend on Ukrainian television. The honourable chair of INTER television channel is Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (obiednani) member Oleksandr Zinchenko. Zinchenko also chairs parliamentary committee on information policies and media issues and is accused of manipulating the issuing of licences for electronic media broadcast.

Two other interesting and increasingly influential television companies are STB¹⁶ and Novyi Kanal (New Channel)¹⁷ STB was initially created with United States Agency for International Development funds channelled through the NGO Internews,¹⁸ The aim was to create an independent TV station that would not be dependent on the state for transmission, and the station was set up with state-of-the-art satellite technology. In 1998 the station was privatized, with Internews retaining a 30 per cent share and the remaining 70 per cent was sold.¹⁹ With time this has become a recognized source of more or less objective information. It was the only station that agreed to invite members of all political parties for pre-election debates in the recent campaign.²⁰

Novyi Kanal began as a Kyiv-based regional TV company and has gradually increased its broadcast reach. The company's CEO, Oleksandr Tkachenko, is one of the most respected TV journalists/editors/producers, and it is largely his accomplishment that the company has so quickly gained a reputation for objective and full reporting.²¹ According to available information, it is owned by Russian capital; among its main shareholders are Alpha Group and Lukoil.

Another influential regional TV station is ICTV. It broadcasts in the capital city, Kyiv, Kyiv oblast, and a bit beyond. Previously 50 per cent owned by the American company, Story First Communications, it is now being reportedly associated with President Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law, Viktor Pinchuk. This station hires Russian journalists, Dmitriy Kiselyov among them, to act as anchors and hosts for programs.

According to polls, the most popular TV stations are non-majority Ukrainian-owned. They are able to provide more objective news programming because they are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, the issue of foreign ownership is tricky, particularly as most of the foreign capital in Ukraine's media sector is Russian. For a new state that has just moved away from direct foreign control, larger issues of national identity, state building, and language are closely intertwined with media ownership issues.

Somewhat different trends are apparent in print media. The national distribution system for print media has broken down, making regional media more important. Foreign capital is going into regional papers (for example, *Vysokyi Zamok* in L'viv, *Industrial'noe Zaporozhzhie*).

Another visible trend is that a large number of Russian newspapers are illegally penetrating the Ukrainian market. Of the top thirteen newspapers that have the biggest circulation in Ukraine, all but a few are published in Russian, five are just local offprints of Moscow periodicals, four have separate Ukrainian and Russian editions, and only three are published in Ukrainian.²²

A final point is that management problems and the lack of profits are just as important as political pressures.

From available information, it is clear that most of Ukraine's media outlets, especially in the broadcast sector, are owned by commercial structures controlled by Ukrainian and, increasingly, Russian oligarchs. This suggests that political interests supersede commercial ones in the media.

POLITICIZED MEDIA

Political interests in large part explain the restrictions on freedom of speech, since politicians and owners perceive the role of

their media outlets as avenues for furthering their political agendas.

Three state bodies regulate mass media. The Ministry of Information, which in 1998 was downgraded to a Cabinet of Ministers State Committee on Information Policy for Television and Radio Broadcasting,²³ represents the executive branch of government. This is the body that is responsible for overseeing the media industry, ensuring the implementation of legislation—in short, this is the government executive's tool.

The Parliamentary Committee on Issues of Freedom of Speech and Information represents the legislative arm of government. Like other committees of Verkhovna Rada, it drafts and tables legislation, suggests amendments to existing laws, and is occasionally called upon to interpret or explain items of the law. The third state body is the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting in Ukraine, which was created in 1998. Its role is to act as a state regulatory agency for broadcast media responsible for issuing and revoking licences to radio and TV stations. It is subordinate to the Ministry/State Committee on Information, although it is a separate legal entity.

Ukraine has adopted numerous laws to regulate its mass media. Shortly after independence, Parliament drafted a Law on Print Media in Ukraine (1992), followed by the Law on TV and Broadcasting in Ukraine in 1993. These two laws insure legal protection for freedom of speech and legalize multiple forms of ownership, including private ownership. In total, there are now at least sixteen pieces of legislation dealing with media, ranging from the constitution, which outlines the fundamental principles of free speech, to the Law on Copyright and Advertising, to the 1997 Law on Social Protection of Journalists (which deals with wage and benefit issues), to the Civil and Criminal Codes (which spell out which acts constitute libel and how citizens of Ukraine can legally defend their honour and dignity).²⁴

However, despite the plethora of legislation intended to safeguard freedom of speech, protect the rights of journalists and other citizens of Ukraine, and despite the elaborate regulatory framework created from above by the state, legislation is most often against—not protecting—the media and free speech.

The most common legal instruments used to silence journalists, close down newspapers and magazines, and take radio and TV programs off the air are the Civil and Criminal Codes (1995), which describe actions that violate the honour, dignity, or business reputation of citizens and organizations. Most court cases involving the media are claims against newspapers concerning the assault on the dignity or reputation of an individual or company and lawsuits for damages.

Other legal tools used against media outlets include allegations of irregularities in areas unconnected to the professional activities of the papers or programs. These are most often things like allegations of tax violations, or other accusations of irregularities, such as in registration procedures.

At times the state uses the broadcast regulatory agency (NCTRB) to curtail criticism. Licences are revoked, not renewed, or issued to more than one company at a time. Perhaps the best-known recent examples of this involve the radio station Kontinent, which broadcasts Radio Liberty, BBC, and Deutsche Welle into Ukraine. The radio station has been experiencing problems with its licence since 2001.

Perhaps the most disturbing fact is that despite all the legislation available to protect freedom of speech and journalists, in Ukraine journalists are still constantly subjected to threats, intimidation, physical attacks, and even assassinations. The most famous case is that of Heorhii Gongadze,²⁵ but there are numerous other, less well-known cases. These attacks are documented by a number of Ukrainian and international organizations,²⁶ yet they continue to occur with alarming frequency. Almost every month there are reports of such incidents. The latest happened in late April when an editor was attacked and a journalist beaten in two unrelated situations.²⁷

On a more positive note, an interesting development has occurred in legislation since 1998. A US-funded program, the Legal Defence and Education Program, run through IREX ProMedia, has been providing aid to the journalists and media outlets that have been unfairly persecuted through the courts. The program provides free legal services and advice in cases where the law has been used to silence opposition. Their experience shows that when well represented, journalists are actually winning cases,

appeals, and have succeeded in having cases dismissed. The program is also working with judges, lawyers, the courts, and Parliament to improve legislation and implementation of existing laws. The success of this program bodes well.²⁸

Despite the successes of this program, there is no doubt that the president continues to use the state apparatus to control media. Evidence of this is plentiful, including the reshuffling of the State Committee for Information, Television, and Radio in February 2002, just before the parliamentary election. The removal of Ivan Drach as head of the committee was the last act in eliminating all appointees of the Yushchenko government era.²⁹

Analysts disagree whether the president manipulates the oligarchs or whether they manipulate him, but regardless of who is doing the manipulating, the media is being used as an instrument in Ukraine's political game. The state no longer owns or controls all the media, and there is certainly diversity in publications and programs. However, all journalists and editors are forced to work within a framework defined by their owners and state regulatory bodies, and their scope for activity is restricted. Ukrainians know which shows and papers are pro-presidential, and which political views are being expressed in any given publication. There are few examples of unbiased political reporting since lawsuits, tax inspections, outright intimidation, and harassment can follow. In that environment, it is difficult for journalists and editors to maintain their professional integrity and role as the fourth estate.

THE MEDIA PROFESSION

President Kuchma has attempted to deflect criticism of his restrictions on media by claiming that the problem lies with the profession of journalism. He has said numerous times that there are no good journalists in Ukraine. Although there are very good journalists in Ukraine whose work meets international standards, they comprise a small portion of the professional body. Problems do exist within the profession itself. Most journalists and editors in Ukraine suffer from self-censorship. Many are willing to write and produce commissioned stories to supplement their low wages. Despite noticeable improvement from a decade

ago, the overall level of professionalism remains low, with many still confusing reporting with editorializing. Finally, there is a lack of professional solidarity—there is no single professional association that represents the interests of all Ukrainian journalists. Although considerable positive change has occurred within the media profession, journalists and editors are still in the process of learning how an independent media operates.

One interesting new development has been the creation of the Charter 4 group. In the wake of the Ukraine without Kuchma protest in spring 2001, a group of opposition-minded journalists formed an informal group, calling themselves Charter 4. The leaders of this group are Oleksander Kryvenko, Mykola Veresen', Yulia Mostova, and Taras Kuzmov. They have created an Ethics Committee that meets periodically with the aim of creating a professional ethics code, which all Ukrainian journalists will subscribe to. Their latest meeting was held in Kyiv on April 14, 2002.³⁰ Another of their activities has been to monitor abuses of press freedom and journalists' rights by travelling to the regions where these violations are occurring and raising the issue with local authorities.

EXTERNAL FORCES

Both Russia and the West are having an impact on Ukraine's media. Western states are providing financial assistance and expertise to Ukrainian journalists and media outlets to upgrade skills and improve the quality of their work. Governments are also pressuring Ukrainian officials to cease restrictions on freedom of speech. Russian involvement is more multidimensional and complex. Russian media, both print and broadcast, is penetrating Ukraine's market, creating competition and often bypassing Ukrainian legislation. Eighty per cent of the newspapers in circulation in Ukraine in 2001 were Russian; of these, 50 per cent were legally imported and 30 per cent were illegally smuggled. Most of Ukraine's private TV stations have significant Russian investment, in many cases exceeding the legal ceiling for foreign capital. This situation raises concerns about foreign (Russian) influence on Ukrainian public opinion. There

is also the issue of language—many media outlets are disregarding Ukrainian legislation, which requires 50 per cent Ukrainian content.

TRENDS TO WATCH

There are three processes currently underway that are likely to have a significant impact on Ukraine's media over the next few years.

Relicensing in the Broadcast Sector

Many of the current licences held by radio and TV stations are up for renewal in 2001–2002. The state regulatory agency, the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting, is conducting the reviews. It is looking at how the stations comply with existing legislation on: ownership structures (current law stipulates that only 30 per cent of any media outlet can be foreign-owned), content (the law requires that 50 per cent of programming be Ukrainian-produced), and financial performance. There are fears that this process will be yet another instrument to restrict opposition.

There have already been questionable revocations of licences, the most notorious example being the Kyiv-based Radio Continent. The station rebroadcasts Radio Free Europe (which first ran the Kuchmagate tapes in Ukraine), BBC, and other foreign programming. Its licence was revoked in April 2001 on the grounds that the station was operating at a loss and had failed to repay a state credit of 400,000 *hryvnias* (approximately US \$300,000). In late April 2002, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that the Kyiv-based TV station, UTAR, did not have its licence renewed by the National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting.³¹ The news editor, Leonid Voyevodyn, was quoted as saying that the station was striving to provide impartial and unbiased news coverage and did not aim to be an opposition media outlet,³² whereas opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko felt that this licence revocation demonstrated the administration's efforts to "clear out" independent media that refused to "service" only pro-presidential forces during the parliamentary election campaign.³³ The new licensing process is more complex and more

expensive—now two separate licences are required and the cost of licences has increased by 50 per cent.

State Efforts to Control the Internet

The Kuchmagate scandal made the power of the Internet apparent to Ukraine's political leaders. Although there are less than 1 million regular users in the country now, the number is growing by 40 per cent annually. The profile of regular Internet users (mostly the business sector and youth) suggest that this sector of the population is rather influential. Recent reports suggest that the security services are working toward gaining control of the Internet. The Slughba Bezpeky Ukrainy, Ukraine's KGB successor, is reportedly paralleling Russian steps to monitor Internet traffic through the installation of monitoring devices on Ukrainian servers. In June it was reported that SBU has applied for control of the dot-ua domain name, which became available in 2001 when the company that had registered it in 1992 became defunct. Another route the Ukrainian state may pursue is one followed by Central Asian countries, namely, to establish a monopoly on Internet usage through control of the phone lines. Communication experts dispute the ability to completely control Internet traffic; however, evidence suggests that certain circles in Ukraine continue to want to exert control.

Post-March 2002 Parliamentary Election Developments

Numerous international and Ukrainian observer groups were monitoring the media during the recent March 31, 2002, parliamentary election.³⁴ The reports now being released present a critical picture. Many of their conclusions are similar to those of the European Institute for Media, which are summarized as follows:

Overall, judged by Council of Europe standards and Ukraine's own legislation, voters have not been well-served by the Ukrainian media in this election, in terms of having access to impartial and balanced information about the parties/blocs involved in the elections. Media coverage on UT-1, Inter, ICTV and Studio 1+1 in particular was found to be biased in favour of United Ukraine and

the SDPU (u) and against the opposition parties. The print media tended to be partisan and not to distinguish between editorial opinion and news coverage. However, on the positive side, the media have provided voters a range and volume of information that could have assisted them in making their political choices. There has thus been some improvement in the situation compared to previous elections. There was far more information on offer than in previous elections and most of the main broadcasters provided formats for debates between the parties/blocs. The new Election Law has been assessed as an improvement on the previous one, and most of the legal problems observed were found to be connected with its implementation rather than its content. However, there have been clear and substantial violations of the provisions of the Election Law which have adversely impacted on the campaign."³⁵

Furthermore, the Internet newspaper, *Ukrainska Pravda*, printed a very interesting story on election costs.³⁶ The article estimates that US \$7,742,327 was spent on political advertising, of which 97 per cent was used for TV advertising, 2 per cent for print, and 1 per cent for radio. Of the total, approximately 72 per cent was for direct advertising, whereas 28 per cent was spent on what the article calls social-political campaigning. Most of the funds were used in the last two weeks of the campaign.

The biggest spenders were Women for the Future, who spent approximately US \$5.5 million, which exceeds the spending limit 2.5 times (according to the electoral law, the limit was US \$480,000). In second place was SDPU(o), which spent US \$792,082, 1.5 times more than legally allowed, and Nasha Ukraina was the third largest spender with US \$437,679.

In terms of spending for indirect advertising, the largest amount was spent by SDPU(o) (US \$1,350,023), followed by the Green Party (US \$315,382) and For a United Ukraine (US \$312,577). The four groups/parties that exceeded the spending limit were reported as:

SDPU(o) = US \$2,142,105 (by over 8.8 million *hryvnias*)
Women for the Future = US \$1,246,727 (by over 4 million
hryvnias)

Green Party = US \$715,400 (by over 1.2 million *hryvnias*)
For a United Ukraine = US \$ 635,513 (by over 830 million
hryvnias)

Based on these statistics collected by the group Freedom of Choice, a calculation was made comparing advertising spending with voting results. Apparently the most expensive votes were those for the All Ukrainian Christian Union, which paid 24.5 *hryvnias* per vote. Women for the Future spent 12.2 *hryvnias* per vote, and the Green Party 11.3 *hryvnias*.

Of those who crossed the 4 per cent barrier, SDPU(o) paid 7.1 *hryvnias* per vote, For a United Ukraine 1.1 *hryvnias*, Our Ukraine 0.4 *hryvnias*, and Yulia Tymoshenko's blok 30 kopeks. The party that spent the least per vote was the communists, whose votes cost only 10 kopeks.

These statistics, along with the results of the popular vote, suggest that the media had only a limited impact on voters' choices. It seems likely that all political parties and media outlet owners will reconsider their situation and relationship in the near future.

CONCLUSION

Let's return to the opening question, namely, does Ukraine have an independent media? In answering the question, a comparative perspective is useful. Compared to the situation of Ukraine's media in 1989–1991, it seems that there is indeed more freedom. Diversity now exists with a variety of owners and media outlets catering to both mainstream and specialized interests (sports, women, fashion, etc.). Aside from the ban on directly criticizing the president, quite a large amount of information is now made available to Ukrainian viewers, listeners, and readers. Censorship continues, but it is not as all-pervasive as during the communist period.

The gains in media freedom, which were achieved in the early years of independence in the early 1990s, have definitely been curtailed, which is a rather disturbing trend throughout the post-communist world.³⁷

Compared to the so-called established democracies, at first glance it appears that it is almost impossible to compare, since the United States, Canada, and Britain have a diverse and independent media. However, in a comparative analysis, the criteria are important.

When one looks at issues of ownership structures, and relationships between political elites and media owners, the situation in Ukraine does not vary significantly in kind to these developed states. Increasingly the difference appears to be more in degree rather than in kind.

A particularly worrying trend is the noticeable increase in Russian ownership of Ukraine's media, particularly in the television sector. Countries such as Canada have dealt with similar issues of influence from a more powerful neighbour. In Ukraine's case, this trend could have serious political implications.

The recent parliamentary election produced a number of interesting results. What is relevant here is that the media's role in politics and society appears to have undergone a change. When one considers the ownership structures of media outlets, particularly but not exclusively television, and compares them to electoral results, an interesting pattern emerges. Those political parties and blocs that have significant or even controlling influence over television prevented their critics from having equal access to the airwaves, but this did not result in an electoral victory. Perhaps the most interesting case here is the SDPU(o) and Yulia Tymoshenko. According to many sources, SDPU(o) owns a controlling share of one and possibly two television stations, whereas Tymoshenko and her bloc were almost completely barred from national and even regional television access.

Yet when one looks at the results, Tymoshenko's bloc received 7.2 per cent of the popular vote, while SDPU(o) gained only 6.24 per cent.³⁸ The pro-presidential *Za Iedynu Ukrainu* bloc received only 11.98 per cent of the popular vote, whereas opposition leader Victor Yushchenko's bloc received almost double that amount, 23.53 per cent. These results will undoubtedly lead political leaders and media owners to reconsider their strategy. It is not surprising that as media freedoms have been restricted, the media no longer plays an important role in shaping public opinion. This was very noticeable in the July 2001 referendum, which

was almost invisible in the media, and underscored by the recent electoral results.

Once the post-election dust settles, there will without a doubt be new changes in Ukraine's media sector.

NOTES

- 1 This image is confirmed by two new movies made about the Kuchmagate scandal: *PR*, directed by Charles Clover, and *Killing the Story* by BBC, both released in the spring of 2002.
- 2 For details, see the Web site of the Committee to Protect Journalists, a New York-based NGO that monitors violations of media freedom throughout the world and issues an annual report <www.cpj.org/>.
- 3 UN Freedom of Information Conference (1948) declared "Freedom of information is ... the touchstone of all the freedoms." See also Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); John Keane, *The Media and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity, 1991); Judith Lichtenberg, ed., *Democracy and the Mass Media* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Denis McQuaail, *Mass Communications Theory: An Introduction* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983); Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); Fred Siebert et al., *Four Theories of the Press* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956); and others.
- 4 For a full discussion, see Keane, *The Media and Democracy*.
- 5 For example, see Harold Adams Innis, *The Bias of Communication*, introduction by Marshall McLuhan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, [1951] 1964); Leonard Downie, Jr., and Robert G. Kaiser, *The News about the News: American Journalism in Peril* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2002); Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (with a new introduction by the authors) (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002); and others.
- 6 One recent example that looks at Russia is an article by Laura Belin, "Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media," in *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, edited by Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 323–342.
- 7 For details, see "Politicized Media" of this chapter.
- 8 A record of these violations is maintained by various NGOs. They include Reporters without Borders (<<http://rsf.fr/>>), the Committee to Protect Journalists (<www.cpj.org/>), and others.
- 9 It should be noted that many of the officially registered media outlets do not actually operate.

- 10 See *EIM Ukraine Media Bulletin* (June 2002), available at <<http://eim.com.ua>>.
- 11 These estimates provided by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Policy Research <www.uceps.com.ua>.
- 12 In the parliamentary elections of March 31, 2002, Andriy Derkach ran for office as a part of the proportional ballot of the For United Ukraine (pro-Kuchma) bloc. His father, Leonid Derkach, ran in a single-mandate constituency with support from the same pro-presidential coalition.
- 13 See <www.1plus1.net>.
- 14 For one of the few sources located on the company and its CEO, see Douglas Frantz and Raymond Bonner, "TV Venture by Cosmetics Heir Raises Questions," *New York Times* (April 1997).
- 15 On February 1, Kyiv's economic court ordered that the popular channel be shut down and its air time be put out to tender. The order followed a lawsuit filed against the NCTRB by AITI TV, a small television company whose financial support, like most television channels in Ukraine, is difficult to track. The company, which shared air time on UT2 with Studio 1+1, charged that its competitor had been illegally given air time by the NCTRB. The economic court agreed, and the NCTRB responded swiftly with an appeal and public statements of support for the channel. For details, see Jamestown Foundation, *MONITOR* (February 7, 2002); "The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review," *MONITOR*, VII, no. 3 (February 13, 2002) <www.bu.edu/iscip/news.html>.
- 16 See <<http://stb.ua>>.
- 17 See <<http://novy.tv>>.
- 18 Internews Network Inc. is a California-based NGO formed in 1982. Its funding comes from a variety of public and private foundations. From 1989 onwards, it has been operating in formerly communist European countries. In 1997, it reorganized its structure to create Internews International, which is a network of fourteen Internews organisations in various countries. Internews began activities in Ukraine in 1993 after approving a project proposal, which originated from a former International Renaissance Foundation employee. The first USAID grant (US \$7 million) created the Internews NGO in Ukraine, which was originally called International Media Centre-Internews (IMC). An office was set up in Kyiv, which has been managed by a succession of project directors, all of whom have been American citizens. More information is available on their Web site at <www.internews.org>.
- 19 For details, see "International Assistance and the Development of Independent Mass Media in Ukraine," Case Study for Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies in Post-Communist Societies, Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, principal investigators (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper #8, November 1999); full report available at <www.ceip.org/files/publications/Pub_by_project.asp#anchor>.

Case Study: <www.ceip.org/files/Publications/demNGOcase.asp?from=pubproject>; <www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Dyczok.pdf>.

- 20 For details, see *Dzerkalo Tyzhnya* (March 2002).
- 21 Oleksandr Tkachenko is currently CEO of the TV station New Channel. Previously he had created an independent TV company called NovaMova and revolutionized Ukrainian television with his current affairs program, "PislaMova." For details, see Marta Dyczok, "International Assistance and the Development of Independent Mass Media in Ukraine," Case Study for Democracy Assistance and NGO Strategies in Post-Communist Societies, Sarah E. Mendelson and John K. Glenn, principal investigators (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Working Paper #8, 2000): <www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Dyczok.pdf; 24pp>.
- 22 See Appendix 1.
- 23 See <www.sciptrb.gov.ua>.
- 24 Currently the constitution (Art. 15, 32, 34, 41, 54, 85-20, 85-24, 106-13, 106-14), adopted June 28, 1996, is the basic document guiding media policy. Other legislative acts include Law on Print Media in Ukraine (1992); Law on TV and Broadcasting (1993); Law on Copyright and Adjacent Rights (1993); Law on State Secrets (1994); Law on News Agencies (1995); Law on Advertising (1996); Law on National Council for TV and Radio Broadcasting (1997); Law on the Way of Covering the Activity of State Bodies and Bodies of Local Administration by Mass Media (1997); Law on Support of the Media and the Social Protection of Journalists (1997); Law on the System of Public Broadcasting (1997); Law on Introducing Amendments and Additions to Clauses of the Legal Act of Ukraine Concerning the Honour, Dignity, and Business Reputation of Citizens and Organizations (1993); Civil Code of Ukraine (protection of civil rights, honour, dignity) (1995); Civil Procedure Code (right of appeal, claims, complaints) (1994); and Criminal Code of Ukraine (acts inciting hatred, hostility, libel) (1995). For details, see the Ukrainian parliamentary Web site at <www.rada.kiev.ua/zak1.htm>.
- 25 For a detailed chronology of this case, see *EIM Monthly Ukraine Media Bulletins*, starting October 2001, These reports can be accessed at: <www.eim.org/>.
- 26 See reports by IMI, EIM, CPJ, Charter 4, and others.
- 27 See RFE/RL report from April 19, 2002: "Editor Attacked, Journalists Beaten." A man attacked, robbed, and beat Yevgeniya Stanislavskaya, deputy editor-in-chief of the paper *Podoliya*, which is published by the regional administration. In a separate incident in Zaporizhyya, troopers of the Interior Ministry Yaguar's special force attacked Dmitro Brovkin and Stanyslav Yefremov, journalists of the opposition TV station, Khortitsa, breaking their TV camera and beating them. The journalists complained to

the police, who refused to open a criminal case. (“Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations CIS Weekly Report,” April 8–14, 2002) at <www.rferl.org/newsline>.

- 28 For details, see the IREX ProMedia Ukraine Web site: <www.ipc.kiev.ua>.
- 29 For details, see *NIS Observed* VII, no. 3 (February 13, 2002).
- 30 For further information on the meeting, contact: cje@charter4.com.ua
- 31 This station was broadcasting on Channel 37.
- 32 Ukrainian Independent Information Agency (April 17, 2002).
- 33 RFE/RL Newsline (April 18, 2002).
- 34 For example, see European Institute for Media (April 1, 2002), Preliminary Report on Monitoring of Media Coverage during the Parliamentary Elections in Ukraine March 2002. Available at: <www.eim.com.ua>.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 2.
- 36 See <www.ПРАВДА.com.ua>, 5.04.2002, 16:00. Similar statistics were published in “Final Report (Summaries, Conclusions, Comments)” of the project Public Monitoring of the Electoral Campaign Financing 2002, prepared by Coalition of Ukrainian NGOs “Freedom of Choice” and Transparency International—Ukraine.
- 37 See reports on RFE/RL Newsline and Media Matters for details: <www.rferl.org/mm>.
- 38 For full election results, please see the web site of the Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine.

APPENDIX 1

NEWSPAPERS IN UKRAINE (2001)

	CIRCULATION	LANGUAGE
FAKTY I KOMMENTARI	1,010,000	R
SILSKI VISTI	474,000	U
IZVESTIYA-UKRAINA	272,000	R
TRUD (UKRAINA)	185,000	R
HOLOS UKRAINY	179,000	U&R
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA V UKRAINE	130,000	R
URIADOVYI KURIER	121,000	U
ARGUMENTY I FAKTY V UKRAINE	110,000	R
KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI	110,000	R daily U weekly
UKRAINA MOLODA	107,000	U
MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS V UKRAINE	100,000	R
ROBITNYCHA HAZETY	96,000	U&R
DEN	62,000	U&R

Part Six

Toward New

Cultural Creativity

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16

Ukraine after Independence: A Balance Sheet for Culture

GEORGE G. GRABOWICZ

As the twentieth century has drawn to a close and the new century has begun, it is reasonable to look back and survey the long road travelled, even if in purely chronological terms the stretch of road we are looking at is much shorter.* Still, the object of our interest—independent Ukraine—is of central importance for many of us, both professionally and culturally, not to say emotionally. It is essential, however, to remember the larger picture, not only for the usual benefit that perspective provides, but for the simple reason that discussing independent Ukraine, in whatever perspective or discipline—economic, political, juridical, but especially in terms of culture—requires a larger historical and conceptual frame than that provided by the last decade.

DEFINING CULTURE

The notion of culture, as we all know, is remarkably broad and polysemous. I remember not so long ago that the then Ukrainian Minister of Culture, Ivan Dziuba, complained that there were about 100 definitions of culture. The figure seems plausible. And one can certainly see how it would complicate his life, especially since in a perfect adaptation of Orwell's insight, the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture appears to deal with everything but culture,

* This paper is the text of the after-dinner talk presented at the Conference banquet.

as we are reminded by the anecdote, recounting a Kyivan phone conversation:

“Alo!”

“Alo! Eto garazh?” (This, of course, in Russian.)

And then the answer in perfect Ukrainian:

“Jakyj tam v sraci harazh—ce ministerstvo kul'tury!”

In general, it is easier to define culture by its absence, or by one's negation of it, as in the saying attributed to Joseph Goebbels: “When I hear the word ‘culture’ I reach for my gun.” True or not, this has the ring of authenticity. What is even more striking, however, is that this attitude, this (to use the current Ukrainian locution) allergy to culture is very much in evidence in the stance of the major Western granting agencies, for example the United States Agency International Development, with their multimillion-dollar budgets for aid for Ukraine, which apparently are designed to support anything—economic development above all, of course (regardless of whether anything is ultimately developed and despite the fact that the lion's share of that aid is soaked up by the fees and allowances of the Western consultants), or small businesses, or political consciousness raising, what have you—but not culture. I suppose there are one or two exceptions—agriculture, perhaps, and perhaps bacterial culture (say, for medical research). But never simply culture, or so it seems from my perspective.

That said, one should provide at least a preliminary delimitation of the subject. Clearly, the most frequent, conventional, and virtually automatic sense or definition of culture is focused on so called “high culture”—the arts, literature, music, theater, the cinema, and so on. Occasionally, as in the *Istoriia ukrajins'koji kul'tury* that was published in Kyiv in 1994, but which is a reprint of a popular and patriotic (and altogether mediocre) edition of the 1930s, this is fleshed out with a consideration of selected social and spiritual issues that, in Ukrainian, is called *pobut*. (The implicit model here is from early ethnology with its division into material and spiritual culture.) If we are speaking of recent publications in Ukraine, there are some significant achievements in this area, specifically in the narrower,

but therefore more definable and in a way more knowable field of popular culture. The *Narysy ukrajins'koji popularnoji kul'tury* (or Sketches of Ukrainian Popular Culture), edited by Oleksandr Hrytsenko and written by the researchers of the Institute of Cultural Policy (founded during the brief tenure of Ivan Dziuba as Minister of Culture and, surprisingly enough, still in place today) provides a fascinating glance at various (if not all) aspects of contemporary Ukrainian popular culture written—and this is very important—from the position of informed, current, and sophisticated methodology and theory. I should also note that the understanding of “culture” as high culture (the arts and so on) is not at all confined to, say, Eastern Europe, or specifically here in Ukraine. In a recent and well-acclaimed book, *The Pleasures of Babel; Contemporary American Literature and Theory*, the author, Jay Clayton, sets the scene of his study in the following way:

The view of culture as marginal to contemporary life is shared by the overwhelming majority of people who work in literary fields. Poets, novelists, book reviewers, literary critics, journalists, publishers, and agents all too often resign themselves to the supposed inability of culture to affect society. Everywhere one turns one hears of the superfluousness of culture, its irrelevance to the urgent concerns of modern life. (Clayton 1993:5)

The second and by far the most prevalent usage of the term “culture”—I mean specifically in Ukraine today—is determined by its political resonance. As we see, for example, in the writings and speeches of the former Minister of Culture, Dziuba, i.e., in his aptly named collection *Mizh kul'turoju i politykoju* (Between Culture and Politics) the focus is largely, perhaps even exclusively, on the role that culture plays in the formation of the new Ukrainian state, the paramount and ever-discussed issue of *rozbudova derzhavy* and, even more specifically, its role as an arena in the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine. The issue of cultural imperialism, of Ukraine's long-standing and arguably still extant colonial (or neo-colonial) status, its political, and, of course, cultural fragility or, at the very least, relative weakness in the face of its powerful, aggressive, and unpredict-

able northern neighbour is ever-present in the contemporary Ukrainian journalistic, political, and intellectual discourse. Paradoxically, in this discourse, culture in its immanent sense is seldom defined or even approached other than in a functional and pragmatic way. On reflection, however, this is entirely predictable. An important subset of this frame or aspect of culture is that of cultural policy—to which I will return in a moment.

There is, of course, the intrinsic meaning of culture. Since our conference is explicitly meant to address theoretical issues, let me also adduce some of these moments. Thus, for Bronislaw Malinowski, the father of modern cultural anthropology, culture is defined as a “coherent whole,” a system of realities that conforms to general laws and is not something chaotic, unpredictable, beyond scientific scrutiny, or indeed the simple exoticism that it was for many of his predecessors dealing with so-called primitive cultures (cf. *A Scientific Theory of Culture*). Moreover, Malinowski’s major contribution lies in relating culture to what he calls *basic human needs, which are then met by the cultural responses*. These, in turn, create new cultural needs that are imposed upon society as a secondary form of determinism.

In more recent theory—for example, in the writing of Melford Spiro—culture is defined as a *cognitive system*:

“Culture” designates a cognitive system, that is, a set of “propositions”, both descriptive (e.g., “the planet earth sits on the back of the turtle”) and normative (e.g., “it is wrong to kill”), about nature, man, and society that are more or less embedded in interlocking higher-order networks and configurations. (Spiro 1984:323)

Consequently, there are at least two ways that cultural and non-cultural propositions differ:

First, cultural propositions are traditional—that is, they are developed in the historical experience of social groups, and as a social heritage, they are acquired by social actors through processes of social transmission (enculturation) rather than constructed by them from their various private experience.

Second cultural propositions are encoded in collective, rather than private, signs and symbols. (Spiro 1984:323)

It goes without saying that with this encompassing and immanent understanding of culture, one can hardly postulate its irrelevance as is done by the narrow ("high culture") and implicitly nostalgic position that was described by Clayton.

Passing through various formulations and reformulations in culture theory, from Dilthey and Weber and Durkheim to the present, we can see an overarching tendency to confront Marxian determinism (the notion that culture has no autonomy outside the determining social, particularly economic, structures). As argued by Jeffrey Alexander:

Recent developments in cultural studies converge in their emphasis on the autonomy of culture from social structure. The meaning of an ideology or belief system cannot be read from social behavior; it must be studied as a pattern in and of itself. ... We cannot understand culture without reference to subjective meaning, and we cannot understand it without reference to social structural constraints. We cannot interpret social behavior without acknowledging that it follows codes that it does not invent; at the same time human invention creates a changing environment for every cultural code. ... Culture cannot be studied within the framework of a particular school, or even within the broader limitations of a particular discipline. Anthropology, history, political science, sociology, philosophy, linguistics, literary analysis—each has made distinctively different contributions. (Alexander 1990:25–26)

In order to be truly persuasive, however, these theoretical premises and syntheses must be anchored in historical reality. I would like to focus on the historical dimension, even while confining it to recent (i.e., Soviet and now post-Soviet Ukrainian) history. I will also touch upon high culture, culture and politics or simply political culture, and culture as social code. But I do intend to focus mostly on the latter two.

UKRAINE IN TRANSITION

One of the most frequently heard assertions, and something of a cliché by now, is that Ukraine is now in transition, that everything in it is the function of this transitoriness and that (implicitly)

judgment must be suspended, the benefit of the doubt given, and tolerance applied. But this is surely only part of the truth or rather a specific take on it—one that is most often heard precisely from the present establishment there and those in the West committed to working with it, or, like much of the press, stuck in commenting on surface reality in the most conventional and easily packaged way possible. Because the reality underneath, both in political and the broadly put cultural terms I have just noted is that present-day Ukraine—and this is often difficult for the Ukrainian diaspora to apprehend and accept—is essentially a continuation of Soviet Ukraine. In all that really counts—especially institutions, cadres, values, cultural style, and so on, in effect, in all the essential relationships of power and authority—the Soviet period and its practice remain fundamentally unchanged. Civil society is still much more a dream than a reality. What has changed is *the active role of the state*, especially its use of coercive and repressive police powers, censorship, and so on—and, of course, the significant shift in economic power, the presence of the market, and some Western investment, and (not least of all) formal independence, new chains of command and loyalties, changes in overall geopolitical orientation, and so on. This is not insignificant and it must be considered, but this hardly discounts the underlying continuity I am arguing for.

An insightful comment on this turnaround, this aporia between hoped-for ideal and reality, is provided by the excellent contemporary Ukrainian political critic, Serhij Hrabovs'kyj. Summing up the period of independence in a recent issue of *Krytyka*, he uses the telling title “Our Sovok Ukraine” (the common term *sovok* equates all things “Soviet” with the degraded, brutish, shabby—and totalitarian). And he argues that essentially:

A historical tragedy has occurred, one that is still not fully comprehended. The *narod* which is, after all, also the electorate, voted for the goals of those for whom the Ukrainian cause was genuinely a matter of life and death; but it gave power not to them, but to that very social class which ruled Ukraine during the Soviet period and at that time conducted policy inimical to anything Ukrainian. It is possible that some people in the *nomenklatura* did conceive of the need to create a genuinely new Ukraine, but objectively speaking

they were incapable of leading this class. Not in the least because Ukraine's *nomenklatura* was trained to implement the tasks of the "Union Center" and not make independent decisions, all the more so in an independent country.

In a very short time the broad masses began to associate everything "Ukrainian" not with freedom but with authority. There was something positive in it: authority is always acknowledged, even if it is not respected. But the negative side was more apparent: economic crisis, impoverishment, degradation of science and scholarship, and medicine, and even the decline in the population—all came to be associated with "Ukraine" and with "Ukrainianness." (Hrabovs'kyj 1999:4)

As sombre as this judgment is, it is, to my mind, essentially true and can be demonstrated precisely on the various levels of culture I have spoken of. I shall only touch upon some points here; my goal, clearly, is not an exhaustive analysis, but the outline of the problem.

If one speaks of culture in the narrow sense, i.e., as high culture, the arts, and so on, the matter may be put succinctly. While there have been considerable achievements in the years of independence—precisely in terms of individual artistic or intellectual efforts, publications, performances, and so on (high culture is primarily the work of individuals after all)—the overall picture is spotty at best since the institutional base is totally unreformed. As before, perhaps even more so, it is part of the *sovok*. And yet high culture is precisely that which requires institutional support, all the more so in a country where the government has a virtual monopoly on power and resources, and where a civil society has not yet been established. One can write a poem or compose a musical piece in one's study, but one cannot stage a play, put on an opera, or make a movie without significant institutional help. None (or extremely little) of that is forthcoming in Ukraine today. The official and only policy that exists at this point is one of *laissez faire* or of putative market economics, but of an exceedingly primitive and exploitative kind. In effect, Ukraine has no cultural policy, not even the means of effecting support for high culture through tax policies or the legislative empowerment

of philanthropy. As such, it is perhaps not unique in the world—one can always point to Belarus as being in still worse shape, but this is hardly a consolation. Just as it is small consolation to say that at least we do not have censorship; in fact, as the recent elections have shown, we do.

“UKRAINIANIZING” UKRAINE?

An issue that connects the absence of any clear-cut cultural policy—except for preserving the status quo and the privileges that accrue to the establishment—with broader political matters, our second level of culture is that of the official but amorphous and ambiguous policy of “building the state,” *rozbudova derzhavy*, which, as the Ukrainian punk poet Cybulko aptly put it, should be called *rozdubova derzhavy* (an allusion to “chipping away” rather than building).

The issue in question is some form of new “Ukrainianization.” For the patriotic or so-called national patriotic forces, this is the “minimum program.” This, however, does not command universal support. Large parts of the Ukrainian electorate, especially in the largely Russophone east and south of the country, are indifferent or opposed, and most of Parliament is also indifferent or opposed. In the absence of revolutionary change, i.e., under conditions of legal procedure, the impediments for even minimal Ukrainianization loom large.

Although there are several major components here, the most prominent among them is language. Historically this has always been the issue of issues—and rightly so, for language is the deepest and most effective carrier of the cultural code, encapsulating collective memory and values and identity, and recourse to it is the single most evident means of identifying with the given culture. Even if that identification is partial or conditional (if one is not ethnically Ukrainian, for example, or even if one is Ukrainian, one may wish to speak another language at home, say, Russian), knowledge and use of the language signals one’s acceptance of and respect for the culture and the institutions, and ultimately the state that have arisen on its basis. This much is a given, and is universally applicable. In Ukraine, however, it is an issue: the goal of bringing into life the law on language that

was promulgated just before independence, whereby Ukrainian is given the status of official language, is still far from achieved. In some areas—the Crimea, the Donbas, Luhansk, large areas of eastern and southern Ukraine—very little has been done to implement it. In fact, depending on the region, there is still much opposition from local authorities and the Russian-speaking population to the introduction of Ukrainian. In short, this is still a struggle, and various Ukrainian language newspapers often carry articles on the ongoing controversy and what for many Ukrainians is an ongoing trauma.

One may argue, of course, that with statehood achieved, the language issue recedes in importance: Ukraine (presumably) is now a country like any other, with institutions, laws, citizenship, and so on, and the quality of being Ukrainian is now established and conveyed through a range of formal measures (juridical, administrative, and so on), and not solely through the overarching, virtually metaphysical modality of language. Moreover, it has been suggested that in the interest of assuring the viability of the new state and asserting its multiethnic nature (Ukraine, after all, is home to all who live there, not just the Ukrainians), the language issue and its implied ethnocentrism should really be downplayed. It is more important, so this argument goes, that there be publications in Russian loyal to the new Ukraine than that they be in Ukrainian. And nothing will be so counterproductive to this new state than a linguistic Ukrainianization that needlessly alienates the large Russian minority.

It is hard to disagree with these positions, but they do not fully capture the situation. The major issue that is not considered here is precisely the large and still applicable historical pattern of Ukrainian dependence and second-class existence; in the radical formulation that was recently used by Jaroslav Dashkevych, who represents the intellectual wing of Ukrainian nationalism, or indeed in the Manifesto of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, recently published in *Towards an Intellectual History of Ukraine* (Lindheim and Luckyj 1996) in various areas of Ukraine (this is particularly true of the Crimea, but this may be extended to the other regions mentioned), Ukrainian society and culture exist in conditions approaching “apartheid”—as a

second-class community, in short. The trauma that this engenders—not only to the majority ethnic Ukrainians, but to the fabric of pluralistic Ukrainian society—is real and supersedes the fine distinctions of whether the discrimination in question is on the order of “apartheid” or of a less malign form. It certainly has generated a gamut of responses, the most constructive and structured of which are the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society, *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), and various publications (like the biweekly *Slovo* and others). There are also various right-wing and fringe articulations of this issue; a telling example is the newspaper *Mova je nacija* (The Language is the Nation).

The establishment of the Ukrainian language as a language with prestige, with official status, and as the basic medium of communication in a Ukrainian state is a legitimate issue and one that is entirely commensurate with the goal of a democratic and open society. In contrast to the situation of some years ago, the “language picture” is basically improving, the war is being won (above all due to the official use of Ukrainian in Parliament and in government, and to new entrance requirements for higher education), but the fact that it is still a struggle is indicative of the problems Ukrainian culture still faces. Ultimately, however, this is only the surface of more serious problems, specifically the interrelation of Ukrainian and Russian culture, the political and economic viability of the new state, and ultimately the overall attractive power of its society and culture.

Analogous to the language issue is the problem of education, of establishing a new “Ukrainian” curriculum without communist and Russocentric dogmas, distortions, and so on. Here, again, there is ongoing resistance. It is somewhat more covert than the sometimes virulent opposition to linguistic Ukrainianization, but it is present. While there is a general consensus (although for many it may well be more lip service than genuine conviction) that communist and imperial dogmas must be shed, and while there is an increasing desire among the middle and lower echelons of government to assert Ukrainian history and culture as individual and equal, this is more on the surface and more on the popular level than in deeper structures, or in the institutions that actually set the tone. Looking beyond the immediately apparent, one sees that the changes are often more cosmetic than

substantive. Institutes' names are changed—from Institute of Atheism to Institute of Comparative Religions, for example, from History of the Party to Political Science—but all the old people remain and with them all their inculcated dogmas, limitations, and, above all, their ignorance and incompetence. This is by far the bleakest aspect—the fact that there is no real reform in the policy on “cadres.” Especially in the humanities and social sciences, which are the core of the problem, there has been virtually no change, no significant (let alone massive) realignment of personnel. Everyone who taught and espoused Marxism-Leninism, official atheism, dialectical-materialism, socialist realism, and so on are still at their posts, presumably professing something else, but in fact capable of teaching or conveying only what they have done all their lives. (Anna Klimina, in an article intertextually entitled “The Captive Mind” to remind us of Czeslaw Milosz, showed that virtually all economics textbooks published in independent Ukraine in the last several years espouse Soviet-style managed economy and are totally innocent of Western standards of competence, let alone theory [Klimina 1997]).

One can take other indicators. It is estimated that when East Germany was absorbed into the Federal Republic of Germany, only 25 per cent of the scholars in the humanities and social sciences divisions of the East German Academy of Sciences were kept on; the rest were simply let go. In the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, as of now, no one has been fired or retired. There is not even any talk of this occurring in the near future. Not so long ago, at the general elections to the Academy, Boris Paton, who has been president since the Khrushchev era, and who had overseen the near total decline of the Academy in the humanities and social sciences, and the construction of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor, and whose *akademiky* were the first to attack the newly formed Rukh in 1989, was easily re-elected; there was no opposition to speak of. The various calls in the Ukrainian press for reform in the Academy were characterized by the Academy establishment as radical rabble-rousing and went unheeded. For its part, the answer this establishment continually proposes is measured evolution: “we are not in the position,” the argument goes, “to indulge in rapid shifts or changes; we simply do not have the new personnel to replace the old ones.”

While self-serving, this is only a superficial answer, indeed something of a red herring, and it is part of a larger systematics to which we shall return. At this point, if one considers scholarship, especially in the humanities, as part of culture—and one cannot but see it as such—then policy in this realm of Ukrainian culture is absent, or, more accurately, is both passively and actively obstructionist. Despite some activity—moves to open this or that institute or section, various conferences, or announcements of such or another prize—the structure as such has not budged. Insofar as systemic academic reform is concerned, the picture is bleak.

By all indications, the situation is similar in other institutions—museums, libraries, archives, and so on, which are all part of large, centralized bodies or ministries. To provide an accurate judgment, one needs constant and broad access to information, and while there is more of it than ever before, it is still not fully available. Judging by what is, the picture is mixed. Depending on local conditions—and this is very much a regional issue, with the western regions more open to reform than the eastern and southern ones—there may be genuine improvements, but there is little evidence of a national policy on these matters. Generally speaking, there have been virtually no reforms in the larger, national level, and in positions of real power, the *apparatus* and the cadres remain unchanged.

The most obvious instance of the assertion of a new Ukrainianness appears in the mass media—in the press, the radio, and on television. And here the picture is also mixed, showing positive and negative sides at the same time. On the one hand, there is great variety and real openness and freedom, especially in the print media, with dozens (if not hundreds) of new magazines, newspapers, bulletins; many of these are recent and many (surprisingly good ones) are located in the provinces. Their overall impact is unprecedented and unquestionably positive. On the other hand, virtually all of these publications are handicapped financially, with strictures (largely financial, although in some parts of Ukraine also political) on mail dissemination. Some have already shut down; many are on the verge of bankruptcy. What is more telling is that when compared to the Russian language press (originating in Russia and in Ukraine), the Ukrainian language press is in an acknowledged inferior position when it comes

to financial strength, size of print runs, and, above all—and this is the hardest to admit—quality. While there are some very fine printed sources—the newspaper *Den'* (The Day), *Suchasnist*, and some new ones like *Krytyka* among the journals—the overall picture, as virtually all in Ukraine would admit, shows a decided advantage for the Russian language press in terms of quantity and quality. Presumably, since the press is now independent, one cannot speak of direct government policy here. But this is only partially true—in fact, the government plays a major financial role, for it subsidizes some publications and not others. One can definitely speak of government policy relative to the non-print media, radio and television, where the state has tremendous advantages, if not a total monopoly. This is a broad and complex issue that I cannot address here. What is clear, however, is that policy is dictated by political and then economic interests; culture and cultural policy hardly play a role.

In effect, to the extent that the government, which still has a major monopolistic role in Ukrainian society, has or purports to have a stake in Ukrainianization, it is clear that that stake is primarily rhetorical. Where before it would publish communist propaganda in millions of copies, year in and year out, it now has made its stated commitment to supporting and asserting Ukrainian culture entirely secondary to economic exigencies, purportedly taking a *laissez faire* approach. So it would appear. But this is only on the surface. The real reason is altogether different and, as mentioned, altogether systemic.

POLITICAL CULTURE OR A NEW IDEOLOGY OF “UKRAINIANNES”?

If asserting a Ukrainian spirit, be it new or traditional, is the surface of present cultural policy (and, as we have just seen, it is in fact more stated than real, more hoped for than implemented), then the real content that lies beneath this surface is an attempt to establish a new Ukrainian state ideology. This is the closest Ukraine comes, I believe, to a national cultural policy. The conscious and unconscious assumption, of course (for the new establishment is, after all, the old establishment with only minor changes), is that every state has an ideology—how can one do

without one? Precisely in the spirit of pragmatism (not to say opportunism) that has been left on the ruins of the old Soviet Empire, and in keeping with the systemic forces in play, that ideology is basically politics writ large—in effect, it is the ideology of the state as such, which was witnessed so dramatically in the election campaign just completed, where the sitting president and his team suborned and usurped state-controlled media to swell and further his campaign, identifying in an age-old pattern the state with himself. In a curious and entirely patterned way, this conforms with the traditions of both the right (the nationalists) and the left (the communists). From both these sources, and from a general consensus in the ruling establishment, and perhaps in the population at large, there is agreement that the state is worth special and solemn and programmatic attention—intellectually, emotionally, and, above all, ritually. For all practical purposes, this is the ideology of statism, and calls for asserting, supporting, and expanding the task of state building, instilling a new state pride, and state consciousness are continually on the lips of various politicians and in the media. This is not ethnic nationalism, for in the calls for state building, *derzhavne budivnytstvo* or *derzhavotvorennia*, the appeal is to all the nationalities of Ukraine, not only the Ukrainians, and as such it is a positive and pluralistic conception, but it is also one that while maximally stressing consensus and confluence of various societal forces, all but consciously downgrades the role of individual and minority opinion, and beyond that seems rather indifferent to the cultural component. (For the nationalists, one should add, the official emphasis on pluralism is seen as a hedging on the essential Ukrainianness of the country. As we have already seen, in the writings of their serious spokespersons, Ukrainians are described as living in a situation of apartheid, as a discriminated majority. At the same time, they are correct in their judgment that the new ideology is sorely deficient in its understanding of Ukrainian culture.) Since it is an ideology in the process of being formed, one cannot yet speak of it as having definitively sacrificed cultural content (especially as it relates to intellectual and artistic quality and to structural reform) in return for consensus and political expediency, but the tendency is precisely in that direction. What is already clear is that in this proto-ideology of Ukrainian statism culture is seen functionally, as a political com-

modity, or opportunity, or problem to be solved or financed, but not as an immanent value. The test for this, again, is the question of genuine, systemic reform, and in this regard, culture, in the main, is treated opportunistically.

The final basic issue of cultural policy pertains to identity, especially as it relates both to one's history and prospects for the future and to one's contacts with the outside world. In effect, cultural policy must necessarily deal with history (past and future) and international relations; without them it will remain in some degree regional or provincial, colonial, or ethnographic. And here again, there is much ambiguity. On the one hand, considerable work is being done on restoring the record, on unearthing the past, serious and often groundbreaking work is devoted to the euphemistically called blank pages of official Soviet censorship and taboos and mendacity regarding the Ukrainian past, both distant and recent. But this is still being done with only a modicum of official government support. It may seem paradoxical, but in fact the government and state structures of a country that has come into being after having been condemned for so long to non-existence by its colonial masters still have not given voice to a policy regarding this centuries-long enforced, at times genocidally enforced, non-being. It is as if the state of Israel had doubts as to whether it should officially, as a matter of state policy, study the Holocaust, or commemorate the millions of victims of genocide. To put the question in this way is to begin to answer it: Ukraine is not Israel. In Ukraine the perpetrators of its former suppression, at the very least co-conspirators in this policy, are still part of the establishment. It must be said, of course, that some work on the recent past, on the dark night of Soviet rule—archival sources, material on the repressions, on the massive man-made famine of 1933 where more than 7 million peasants perished—is being published. But this is all done by individuals and by semi-private institutions. There is no national policy on this issue to speak of.

THE "AMNESIA PROJECT" AND SOVIETISM AS CULTURAL STYLE

The issue may be put even more bluntly. As I have argued in a recent article (Grabowicz 1999), the present state of affairs in

Ukraine relating to the past is like a massive amnesia. As far as the establishment is concerned, the past—specifically the Soviet past—is better left alone; if at all, it can be addressed in some distant future. Clearly, this is intended to protect the authority and reputation of those who until recently were actively involved in the Soviet apparatus and all its criminality. In Germany, the archives of the Stasi were opened; the Czech Republic has enacted and implemented a law on lustration; recently a similar decision was reached in Romania. In Ukraine the very subject is taboo. What is most striking is that even former dissidents, people like Myroslav Marynovych, with no history at all of collaborating with Soviet totalitarianism, are somehow innately opposed to opening the wounds, as they see it, of that traumatic past.

Ultimately, this, too, is understandable for the real issue that must be faced is how foreign and how native was the Soviet experience, how native, in fact, was Soviet ideology itself. Characteristically, virtually every articulated denunciation of bolshevism/communism casts it as a foreign, imported, or imposed element. This is particularly true of Russian treatments as well. For the Ukrainian anti-communist perspective—from the very beginning—this was a case of imposed “*Russian communism.*” The collapse of the Soviet state has led to some revision in long-standing paradigms, but the issue is not easily disposed of. One major complicating moment is that of duration. While both the Nazi and the Soviet periods and systems are analogous in terms of the brutality and misery they inflicted, the former lasted only twelve years and the latter several generations, or over seventy years. In that time it changed, of course, evolved in some ways, and, as some might argue, even mellowed. It certainly had time to become part of the historical and cultural experience and to effect a whole cultural style. What was thus arguably quite foreign at the beginning became at the end an all too native phenomenon. Even more difficult—and interesting—is the problem of the historical and cultural readiness or predisposition of Ukrainian society for communism as the core ideology (or “ideology”) and then for Sovietism as a cultural style. One can certainly note that Ukrainian society—which, of course, throughout this period is part of a larger, first Russian and then Soviet, imperial

framework and much more the object than the subject of the historical process—is still predisposed to the Soviet experiment by its populist traditions, its nativism and radicalism, its collectivist traditions, and, most evidently, of course, by the virtual absence of any form or legacy of civil society. In this connection I should merely like to point out that the institution of the intelligentsia as a uniquely empowered class or “*avant garde*” of society, as an opposition to the regime ever ready to take power from it, is itself an indicator of the absence of the differentiation and pluralism that come with genuine civil society and arguably an enabling precondition for a communist option.

Finally, the question of Sovietism’s nativeness or foreignness devolves on a major and arguably central issue—that of moral responsibility. For if the Soviet system was not just like that of any other country, only a little bit off, but a system that at various times was overtly genocidal, that waged pitiless, protracted war on its own citizenry, then—unless one totally shifts it out of the range of the rational and knowable and into a metaphysics of evil—the question of moral and indeed criminal responsibility must remain. The fact that at this time it is quite unfeasible to raise this question—that the present system in independent Ukraine is a continuation of the Soviet system in all basic structural respects and as such utterly opposed to raising these issues—does not obviate them or change them. They and the moral imperative that underlies them will remain to be confronted in some happier circumstances.

If only briefly, I should like to sketch out what I mean by Sovietism as a cultural style, specifically in the Ukrainian context. In effect, what began in the Stalinist 1930s as terror and administrative fiat became a model of thought and behaviour. Indeed, this is what establishes the continuity in the Soviet system after the terror has been removed. Ideology becomes cultural style.

Synoptically one can speak of it as several responses or forms of adjustment. Perhaps the most elemental, in a sense pre-existing, cultural model is that of populism, which I have already alluded to. This was the legacy of the entire early phase of the

modern period, the nation-building stage of the nineteenth century, and this is the frame or procrustean bed into which Ukrainian culture was placed as the country was subordinated to the imperial plan. While on the one hand imposed, this can also become a form of defence, precisely a sanctuary. As in the tradition of the early nineteenth-century literary style of *kotljarevshchyna*, the tradition of travesty and burlesque, the role of a "local," especially one who is "folksy" and simple, is functional. The role reduces threat by adopting submissive behaviour, while at the same time allowing a degree of surreptitious, sly resistance.

Equally functional, and equally part of the culturally preset pattern, are devices of mimicry and adaptation. While forms of survival, these are also forms least congruent with the ethos of various disciplines like science and scholarship. Their typical features in written production are rote schematism, citations instead of thought, and ultimately utter derivativeness. The traditions of mimicry and adaptation were most likely the reasons why the Ukrainian academic establishment, especially the humanitarian one, provided less principled opposition to party interference in academic policy than did the Russian. This may also explain the putatively greater openness in the Ukrainian case to academic quackery—of which the Lysenko case is paradigmatic. The overall phenomenon, of course, is also quintessentially colonial.

All of these features also characterize the post-Soviet phase, that which is now—formally—-independent Ukraine. Eight years of de jure and a few more of de facto independence are, of course, but a brief span of time as far as institutions, culture, social values, and especially political culture are concerned. In many ways, independent Ukraine is still very much a continuation of the Soviet system. Its institutions, its cadres, its political style and its establishments, its cultural and academic policy (such as it is or isn't), various forms of hybridity and mimicry, arguably even its style of corruption are much closer to the Soviet model than to the West. In one sense, much more of this is bared now—in the ostensibly post-Soviet period—than before. At the same time, a transition *is* occurring and as distant as an eventual triumph of civil society may be, some institutional seeds have taken root.

Underlying them is the human potential and pre-existent and much older Western or Westernizing traditions that may in time have an ever greater impact on both cultural and political development.

If I have painted a bleak picture, it was intentionally so—the facts, I believe, warrant it. In many respects Ukraine is now a hijacked country without a cultural policy, with few if any reforms, and with an embryonic and fragile democratic system. There is the real prospect of long-term autocratic rule, or of an entrenched South American-style oligarchy/kleptocracy taking root. Ukraine as a kind of East European Burkina Faso. (It is probably politically incorrect to pick one problem-ridden African country as an analogue, but I am merely repeating an analogy so often heard in Ukraine today.) And why should it appear far-fetched? Belarus—benighted Lukashenkoland—is a close neighbour ... and a perpetual caution.

The larger picture is also far from reassuring. In the world of globalism and supranational economies, all culture—on whatever level we frame the issue—is an endangered species, endangered by homogenization and subordination to the crassest and meanest commercial interests. We can take solace, therefore, in the knowledge that we are not alone, that in this process (an earlier rhetoric would have called it a struggle) we are on the right side, and may indeed find unexpected allies and even unforeseen resources. But one must make the effort. One's presence on the playing field is already half the battle. As Woody Allen said, the main thing in life is to show up.

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17

Characters Revealing Issues of Identity: In Terms of History, Nation, Religion, and Gender in Post-Soviet Ukrainian Drama

LARISSA ONYSHKEVYCH

POSTMODERNISM, POSTCOLONIALISM, AND INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY

Many observers have already noted that postmodernism has an unusual relationship with history, rarely interpreting it, almost ignoring it, while being selective in reference to the present. No great historical canvas is painted. It is the little person who is highlighted in postmodernism, the non-hero, who is outside the centre and in the present. In Ukrainian drama, this is how the hero has been presented in Eaghor Kostetzky's 1948 émigré work, *A Play about a Great Man*, the first classic example of postmodernism in Ukrainian literature.

Typical in postmodernism, authors take a very critical or ironic view of everything; such an approach or attitude may threaten to create a negative influence on an individual's identification with a group; however, in itself it would not automatically negate the formation of identity in the present. The issue of identity may be complicated when viewed in relation to post-colonial times, as it is in post-Soviet Ukraine. Some scholars note that a decolonized person or groups has a certain collective historical amnesia;¹ thus, we should not necessarily expect to find many traditional or national elements dealing with historical memory in post-Soviet literature.

One may ask, then, why continue to search for expressions of identity in the most recent Ukrainian drama at all? Because

drama, more than any other genre, expresses “the very age and body of the time, and form and pressure,” to borrow Hamlet’s words. Thornton Wilder expressed it similarly: “The theatre, is at its best, the quintessential expression of an era.”² The post-totalitarian, post-Soviet, and post-colonial era in Ukraine reflects its own particular pressures and expressions. Although most Ukrainian theatres now prefer to stage only well-established plays, since 1991 many new playwrights either follow a superficial “postmodern” style full of cynicism, sarcasm, carnivalization, and intertextuality while baring the human soul, or have joined the more introspective trend of the “Ukrainian alternative theater.”³

Today especially, when most Ukrainian authors don’t have much hope of having their plays staged at all,⁴ the more daring playwrights are driven by this need to express themselves and their time. Now, the Ukrainian author is not forced to be on the margins any more, to be “the other” as in the Soviet society, constantly being required to follow the “elder brother”; the new protagonist can now aspire to be in one’s own new centre. Such a centre has a different practical application in the post-Soviet era, especially in the present period of economic, national, and societal readjustment. Ukrainian playwrights now express opinions on issues of individual, historical, national, gender, and religious self-identification of their protagonists, and also deal with issues that were taboo during the Soviet period: individual self-expression, which includes religious as well as national aspects.

This study concentrates on plays written primarily from 1991 until 1999 by new and younger writers, in this manner hoping to filter out the residue of socialist-realist writing habits, expectations, or ideology. The under-forty generation does not share a particular consciousness; some are trying to find out *what is* consciousness, while others continue to ride on the last ripples of the diminishing tide of the once-Soviet or colonial establishment.

Since many issues of personal identity in Ukraine are constantly being affected and possibly changed by historical events, the age and geographical distribution of the writers is a reasonably significant aspect to note. I have studied sixty plays (fifty-one written in Ukrainian, two translated from Russian, and seven in

Russian) by thirty-five authors in Ukraine, twenty-one of them between eighteen and forty years of age, five in their forties⁵ and, for comparison purposes, two well-established writers just over sixty. The geographic distribution is reasonably representative for the whole of Ukraine: for the twenty-nine playwrights that I was able to identify (information about six writers was not available), eleven are from central Ukraine (Kyiv and Zhytomyr), seven from western Ukraine, five from the eastern part (Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions), and one from the south (Kherson). Significantly, only eleven of the thirty-five writers are women.⁶ It may also be of interest to note that four of the studied plays have been written by pairs of writers: sisters Rozbyshaky, Nezhdana, and Mykolaichuk; Serdiuk and Kozhelianko; and one in Russian by Ponomarenko and Vereshchak.

In this study I tried to identify expressions of individual identity in terms of individual self-expression, historical and national consciousness, Europeanness, gender, and religion.

INDIVIDUAL SELF-EXPRESSION

Although most of the above works display a significant amount of irony and cynicism with respect to any “heavy issues,” in twenty-three plays (primarily by women) there is a serious streak reflecting individual search for self and self-fulfillment, dealing mostly with understanding one’s priorities and values, and leading one’s life accordingly.⁷ These plays often are mini-pictures and statements of specific observations. For example, several protagonists caustically criticize the post-Soviet and post-colonial way of life, or are extremely unwilling to participate in the neo-capitalist or rather corrupt “Mafia” way of life, and escape into “an internal exile.” Others are willing to accept any superficial identity (national, political, or social) for the sake of escaping from possible physical threats or imagined persecution. Many characters complain or suffer for having been forced, during the Soviet era, to hide their true selves or act against their principles, whether in personal or group terms (especially in the plays by Viktor Lysiuk). Several plays reflect the absence of individual principles, thus stressing the actual desire to find or choose them.

The notion of not having a clear picture of oneself is often accompanied by a sense of being constantly watched. This is evident in several plays by authors of all ages: Volodymyr Serdiuk, Iaroslav Vereshchak, and Neda Nezhdana. The lack of individual self-expression and self-fulfillment is also demonstrated as a physical split of the protagonist, who is forced to talk with herself or with her own conscience (often using a different name, as in the plays by Lada Luzina, Lidiia Chupis, and Andrii Panchyshyn). This topic is most succinctly presented in *Without a Face* by Panchyshyn, where a double takes over everything from the protagonist: his wife, apartment, body, and individuality.⁸ The double represents a *lost* or *stolen* individuality that the protagonist has to pursue. The split individual only further stresses the disconnected, lonely, and helpless individual, pushed to the margins of society.

The narrative in the plays deals mostly with the little man, the *non-hero* outside the centre and often outside contemporary events. In a way, even without being aware of Kostetzky's émigré plays, many of the new Ukrainian playwrights follow his 1948 non-hero protagonists. In contrast, and quite surprisingly too, one may also find strong protagonists who are historical figures, who are shown finding their own existentialist values: the writer Lesia Ukrainka, the dancer Isadora Duncan, Madam Hanska, the Ukrainian wife of Honoré de Balzac.

ELEMENTS OF HISTORICAL AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Despite theoreticians' claims that the postmodern, and in particular, the decolonized person has a certain *historical amnesia*,⁹ and therefore deals only with the present rather than history, from time to time, the "little man" does demonstrate that he has a past, and this occasionally even becomes an issue in some situations in the above plays.

We are aware that totalitarian and colonial experience leaves a mark on the individual in terms of certain habits, if not the lack of ideology, and this experience continues to exist or to influence the protagonists subconsciously. Thus, in some plays, individual self-expression even includes historical and national

issues that may now be expressed directly without any of the earlier obligatory Soviet “common Slavic” ideology, which paid tribute to the “elder brother” but never acknowledged one’s own part in history. Edward Said calls such a society “the disinherited.”

The preceding centuries of Ukraine’s colonialism made certain historical themes or individuals taboo in Soviet Ukrainian literature; the new authors are now testing the waters as well as their knowledge of such facts when mentioning Ukrainian historical heritage. Fifteen of the plays have some reference to Ukraine’s recent or past history. Most of them are positive and rather didactic, though some satirize events to illustrate a point (e.g., Scythian-era matriarchy). Others present historical events or personages primarily in a positive manner: e.g., Olena Klymenko provides a collage of Ukraine’s milestone historical events and individuals in the last millennium (*Ukrainskyi Vertep*). Chupis presents them with a touch of pain (*Suffering*). Herod’s era and that of the USSR are often equated. Issues of clear-cut national identity are notably developed in the works of the two senior writers, Valerii Shevchuk and Iaroslav Vereshchak, especially in the former’s play, *End of the Century*.

Surprisingly, Soviet historical disinformation is not much evident in the plays. Only one play, while mentioning the 1709 battle of Poltava, treats it from the Russian point of view and not from Ukraine’s attempt to free itself from the Russians (the play is by Taras Ogloblin, a Russian-speaking Ukrainian). There are some references to the Soviet man-made famine of 1933 (with 7–10 million victims). This famine-holocaust and other historical events are mentioned as a list of painful “stations of the cross” type of experiences for the country as a whole. The more recent history, the Chernobyl disaster, turns up in two of the plays discussed,¹⁰ providing some protagonists with an excuse for a rather decadent way of life when faced with some biological threats of mutation. Chernobyl’s impact is still felt by the population, and is often presented either emotionally or cynically, even depicting a certain apocalyptic fear at the end of the millennium, as seen especially in the plays by Vereshchak and Shevchuk. The latter’s drama, *End of the Century* (*Kinets Viku*), employs a double play on the word *vik*, meaning both “century” and “age.” Besides

depicting the human toll, Lysiuk's play *Wormwood* also lists cultural losses: he incorporates many ancient Chornobyl-area folk songs, indicating that they will not be heard any more.

In several plays, there are caustic references to the Soviet period, life, and values, while at the same time, some men on the street wish the Soviets were back. Interestingly enough, most of the sarcastic comments about the Soviet period are found in the Russian-language plays. Occasionally they also include some unflattering or rude remarks about Ukrainians, and display a certain distancing from the present national independence or state building process (e.g., Igor Vinov depicts a scene with "mobs" waving flags and shouting the national anthem). Other writers depict contemporary Ukraine in sarcastic tones, portraying individuals who use the early years of independence for personal gain (e.g., in Vereshchak's *Santana*). The period of *perestroika* is often equated with the lack of moral principles. Oleksandr Irvanets sums up several political regimes in dark colours, showing corruption, deceit, and treason (*A Little Play for One Actress*).

All in all, twenty-five of the sixty plays mention the characters' national identity. Some authors have Russian protagonists making fun of Ukrainians, referring to them with derogatory terms (*khakhly* or *khlopy*); other characters identify with "Slavs" rather than with any particular nationality (e.g., in a play by a Russian-speaking Ukrainian writer), or with Russians (e.g., plays by Russian writers Maksim Kurochkin and Aleksandra Pogrebenskaia). One of Pogrebenskaia's protagonists stresses her Russianness, and the fact that several generations of her forebears resided in a Ukrainian city.¹¹ There are several protagonists who are ready to switch national or political identities (from communist to patriotic Ukrainian), depending on the benefits to be derived from a given situation.¹² There is a sarcastic reference to narrow-minded "patriots" looking for Ukrainian roots; in Nezhdana's *He, Who Opens the Door*—her two female protagonists make fun of Ukrainian patriotic identification and are willing to switch to any side, whether Ukrainian or Russian communist, just to survive an imagined threat, which turns out to be a situation forcing them to make a choice in terms of self-identity. In plays by Irvanets and Vereshchak and another one by Nezhdana, the issue of national identification surfaces when

either black marketeers or ex-cons converse only in Russian, express disdain toward Ukrainian issues or culture, and demonstrate regrets for the demise of the USSR. The characters are later shown to be ethnic Ukrainians. The *Homo Sovieticus*, brought up to disregard both non-Russian national identity, as well as ethical values, is shown to be alive and well, and living in Ukraine.

ISSUES OF ETHNIC OR NATIONAL DIVERSITY

Oleh Mykolaichuk and Dibrova cynically mention the West only as a goal for individual escape and financial gratification. The latter goes hand in hand with a prevalent satire on the Soviet or post-Soviet developed manner of manipulating friends and strangers for personal gain (e.g., finding overnight lodging with strangers in a strange city, or by hook or by crook inheriting an apartment in a city). Many plays provide illustrations of such relatively innocent projects, as well as serious law violations and racketeering (in Lysiuk's plays), as examples of uprootedness and disconnectedness in relation to one's society or state. Serious disregard for the law is not only a direct result of post-Soviet society's skepticism, but also reflects a society that does not yet identify with its new state or nation.

In these plays there are also references to ethnic minorities. Pogrebenskaia comments that a particular female protagonist has no Jewish blood, and therefore cannot be useful to anyone wishing to emigrate. Vinov's play discusses Jewish circumcision rituals. Kurochkin's play, referring to seventeenth-century historical events in Ukraine, expresses a negative attitude toward Poles, but is very friendly toward Russians. In Ukrainian-language plays, Russians from Russia are treated in a friendly manner, but some local Russian-speaking citizens are often depicted as having a negative attitude toward Ukrainians (usually they are Ukrainian Russophones). In almost all plays, Russians or Russian speakers still represent power, be they government officials or the Mafia.

Other plays usually depict ethnic minorities, such as Georgians, Bulgarians, and Turks, in a positive light. However, ethnic Germans are presented negatively; in Lysiuk's play, a German

woman, who used to be a KGB employee, has no moral or ethical values, kills her own son and harms her granddaughter. Interestingly enough, non-Russian ethnics (e.g., Gypsies, Turks) converse in Russian and identify with the old communist-Russian world.

In terms of the language spoken by the protagonists, all writers have most of their characters use literary Ukrainian; occasionally, some low-life characters speak in a Ukrainian-Russian mixture or *surzhyk*¹³ (Irvanets, Vereshchak). In two plays (by Vereshchak) Russian is used by a prostitute and a policeman on the take (both later turn out to be Ukrainian). All plays, except one, have the words transliterated into Ukrainian whenever presenting a character speaking Russian. This is definitely something new. During the Soviet era, Russian dialogue would be usually provided in Russian.

While the plays are often set in, or exhibit, a lower or mass cultural setting, intermittently one finds expressions and desires for a higher, spiritual culture. Thus, we often see an attempt at psychological reasoning or approaches to such situations (incorporated even in the titles of plays: “syndrome,” “seance of psychotherapy”), or in a quest for one’s roots and individual or group identification (seen in the utilization of old Ukrainian folklore theater “the *vertep*,” or archaic words (such as *prytcha*—a parable, *zhytiie*—life, and *taina*—mystery). The quest for personal, group, or national historical identification is partly due to post-colonial uprootedness, leaving people without their own history and being almost nationally *déclassé* in a normal life in Europe.

ISSUES OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Several plays show the protagonists to be quite comfortable in European or Western cultural proximity (plays by Ihor Bondar-Tereshchenko, Ivan Andrusiak, Natalia Chechel, Neda Nezhdana, Volodymyr Dibrova, Olena Klymenko, and Lesia Demska). The references are in terms of archetypes and quoted texts by well-known writers (Heidegger, Ionesco, Balzac) depicting the protagonists as knowledgeable about Western (European and American), as well as Eastern (Indian or Japanese) cultures,

and demonstrating their interconnectedness. Klymenko utilizes numerous quotations from Ukrainian authors, but does not flinch from quoting Russian poets as well. Vinov, too, although he produces several negative comments about the Ukrainian independence movement, sarcastically illustrates Russian and Asian centrism: a train from Moscow to a Ukrainian town has to pass through Peking.¹⁴ Some observations on cultural issues may be deduced from the names given to the protagonists. German names in a play set in Germany are to be expected; similarly, foreign visitors would have foreign names. However, in the plays set in Ukraine, foreign names are often given to a pretentious or frivolous characters, rather than those deserving respect (Angelica, Albina, Barbie, Dilda). On the other hand, Russified first names (Vierka, Masha, Zhora) do not take on any particular negative connotation.

ISSUES OF GENDER IDENTITY

Some of the young authors (Dnistrovyi, Mykolaichuk, Bondar-Tereshchenko, Nezhdana, Barnych, Shchurenko, and occasionally Ivashchenko) portray women in a conspicuously stereotypical and patronizing manner, which may even be called a "totalitarian" style. In these plays, men often treat women as inferior, shallow, materialistic, and willing to sell themselves even for little comforts. This denigration of women almost borders on subconscious misogynism or possibly some other syndromes. Several protagonists exhibit such attitudes typical of many Ukrainian males toward women, and even the writer Neda Nezhdana begins one play by describing a thirty-year-old female protagonist who "sits and flips over the pages of a magazine, obviously, a woman's magazine." The other participant in the two-character play is also a woman, but slightly younger (twenty-five or twenty-six years old); the age difference may be significant, indicating a more assertive, or rather more aggressive, younger woman growing up in post-Soviet times, who is not filled with constant self-doubts as the older one is. The play shows feelings of insecurity strongly tied to the female gender.

Except for the plays or sketches by Natalia Chechel, Yaroslav Vereshchak, Lidiia Chupis, Oleksandra Pogrebenskaia, and other

plays by Neda Nezhdana (*Messalina* and *Honoré, Where Is Balzac?*), many plays often portray women in a rather negative light, as insecure, frivolous, naïve, easily scared off, or discouraged from following their plans. Most female characters are shown to be very materialistic and practical-minded, willing to offer themselves in marriage in order to share an apartment (especially in the centre of the city, as in Mykolaichuk's *Territory "B"*), or are ready to provide sex for the sake of some other convenience (*Liar from Lithuanian Street* by Irvanets), or to escape threats or unpleasantness (*He, Who Opens the Door* by Nezhdana).

Many urban female characters are presented as hackneyed "dumb blondes" or some other non-thinking category. They are certainly not at the centre of events or decisions, and are definitely "the other" in most relationships or situations. They have little sense of self-worth as individuals or as women and, significantly, have no sense of national identity, and are ready to switch to any winning side. The sport of downgrading women is practised through the application of superficial claims of egalitarianism, which actually represents a patronizing treatment extended to women in Soviet days. In this post-totalitarian society, some see the economic situation as well as the culturally deprived periodicals as channels glamorizing superficiality and looks alone.¹⁵

Treating women as objects of ridicule (whether intellectually or sexually) is explained in discussions by some in Ukraine as due to the earlier too-eager and too-quick urbanization process of the rural population, especially men, who had a hard time fitting in the city where there were fewer prearranged roles for both genders; during the Soviet period, cities were left quite "cleansed" of Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially male, thus leaving few role models, except for the Russian establishment.¹⁶

As an extreme example of women bashing, Mykolaichuk, in the play *Matriarchy's Last Scream*, depicts a Scythian-era society with an inverted system to the present one, i.e., having a matriarchal order, with women serving as state leaders and chiefs of the armed forces. The collapse of the women's rule takes place when the leading fierce female general is captured, impregnated, and brought home to bear a baby. Although numerous writers

try to include scenes or characters providing comic relief, it seems that many Ukrainian playwrights pick women as objects *guaranteed* to produce laughter.

However, there are also female protagonists who pointedly discuss women's rights for equal individual expression. Lidiia Chupis (d. 1996) went to the other extreme, making her protagonist, Isadora Duncan, an example of a most independent creative individual, who proves her equality, freedom, and creativity ("I am a thing in myself" in *Potter's Wheel Dance*). Several other playwrights, among them Natalia Chechel, present female protagonists as introspective, serious, well-balanced, and talented individuals. Nezhdana also includes one female character with great dignity in a play about the poet Lesia Ukraïнка (*Enchanted Circle*). Another of her plays, which she wrote together with Oleh Mykolaichuk, about Balzac (*Honoré, Where Is Balzac?*), also portrays a strong and wise countess Hanska, who later marries the French writer. Nezhdana's *Messalina* shows a Roman empress, who is a wise though scheming woman, capable of very bold plans, although of a rather petty nature. Surprisingly, Yaroslav Vereshchak (who is sixty-two) presents women capable of outwitting men even in contemporary Mafia-style circumstances.

The senior writer of the group (not so much by age as by the most admirable stack of published tomes) is Valeriy Shevchuk. In the play *End of the Century*, he illustrates various diseases or negative traits of current Ukrainian society, which are, quite significantly, represented by seven *women*. The women are sisters, and all have lost (or never had any) children, thus showing no future for the society. Only their younger brother is free of their malaise and is a healthy, kind, smart, hard-working, intellectual, and successful musician. The classical parallels of these characters are obvious. However, one should note the strong sexism, the conscious assignations of negative qualities to one gender alone.

In most of the plays, the relations between women and men are often depicted as choices for the sake of convenience and not so much for love.¹⁷ Many plays show the protagonists paying for such bad choices all their lives. In terms of different choices, there are also mentions of homosexuality (Mephisto in *Liturgy*) and lesbianism is equated with death (in *Sphinx's Riddle*).

ISSUES OF RELIGIOUS IDEAS AND/OR ASPECTS OF IDENTITY

One might have assumed that it is much too soon to consider this aspect in the early post-Soviet period. However, in the sixty plays studied, thirteen authors incorporate rather serious discussions of Christian ideas or biblical situations (e.g., *Local Train at Eastertime* by Irvanets). Many protagonists express a respect toward religion, identify themselves with it, and still others employ biblical elements as allegory. Some also downplay or are suspicious of the ritualistic aspects of Christianity (plays by Lysiak). Andrusiak's protagonists carry on discussions on biblical and theological issues. Vereshchak discusses conscience as a dialogue of an individual with God (*Paid Services*), or deals with issues of God's will and forgiveness (in the play on post-Chornobyl effects, *ChaPaEs*). Ivashchenko's protagonists search for their faith and God. In a play by M. Barnych (*I—Cain*), a character throws a challenge to God about fate and what gives life meaning. Lysiuk associates religion (Christian or Ukrainian) with ritual (*The Belltower*); however, he also has his protagonists attempt to lead a truly Christian life or be on the verge of seeking an alternative pseudo-religion (the "Rune-faith" in *Barefoot Kyrylo*). At the same time, Lysiuk does not shy away from using Christian allegory for literary means (in *Wormwood*, which takes place in the Chornobyl area, a son is born to the protagonist just before Easter). As if to connect the present to older Ukrainian rituals, symbols, or culture, numerous authors rely on biblical symbolism, even in the titles of plays (*Liturgy*, *Herodeade's Syndrome*, a parable, etc.).¹⁸

CONCLUSIONS

Just as in caricatures, plays often present the most outstanding characteristic of a situation, character, individual, or society, and magnify it for us to notice. Similarly, current Ukrainian plays expose many aspects and issues of individual identification in terms of self-expression, historical and national consciousness, ethnicity, Europeanness, gender, or religion. They provide a slice of contemporary life in Ukraine, representing a part of that "quintessential expression of an era," as Thornton Wilder phrased it,

and reflecting numerous salient points of identity. Some scenes of self-revelation and, at best, of self-discovery, may appear rather stark, perhaps serving as an individual and national catharsis, according to Michael Naydan.¹⁹

What is quite noticeable in these plays is the isolation of individuals from society. There are many examples of complete disregard of larger or smaller groups or society as a whole (and thus also law), and an absence of identification with any of them. The "internal exile" (mentioned earlier) of many protagonists, usually with rather materialistic aspirations, depicts islands of men or families, at best, with no ties or responsibility to society and, often too, with a "historical amnesia." This is not just an example of a post-colonial situation, but also of a reaction to the earlier Soviet propaganda glorifying complete submission to the state and treating individuality as sinful. In her research on contemporary Ukraine, Catherine Wanner sees the Soviet process as one "stripping down the individuality and dignity of every citizen to create homo sovieticus."²⁰

Paradoxically, in the present post-colonial situation, the belated postmodernist trend, often expressing a disregard for history, may appear to represent just one reason for discouraging a discourse on national identity. In contrast, over a century ago, issues of individual self-expression or existentialist self-fulfillment had a reasonably solid representation in Ukrainian drama.²¹ In the plays written between the two world wars, historical, national, religious, and gender issues were also depicted.²² Obviously, during the Soviet period such topics were suppressed.

Now, while we look at the post-Soviet Ukrainian plays, with current postmodernist and post-colonial characteristics, we notice two different approaches to the subject of individuality, personal values, religion, national history, national language, and gender relations. One group of writers depicts the man on the street as one who is not bothered by any issues of identity. However, this blatant absence of expression of such ideas (while stressing material comforts and a complete disregard for others) also serves as a strong indirect criticism of such a situation. At the same time, the second group of recent Ukrainian plays employ a different approach, as the authors disclose how ideas of identity are becoming important to protagonists (and, to some

extent, to the country as a whole), as they start to deal with such issues and begin to pursue them in their new historical situation. As the playwrights reveal such concerns in their plays, they also illuminate for the readers the time and place where they occur, i.e., the 1990s in Ukraine.

NOTES

- 1 For a discussion of a post-colonial amnesia in certain societies, see Stephen Watt, *Postmodern / Drama: Reading the Contemporary Stage* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), 72–77.
- 2 Thornton Wilder in personal correspondence to me (March 31, 1973).
- 3 Serhii Vasyliiev defined alternative theater as “a craving to prove that it is the great hope of each soul to overcome absurdity by means of love and feeling.” He summarized the theatre’s existence between 1989 and 1994 in an article “Osiaiannia u pidpilli. Ukraïns’kyi alternatyvnyi teatr 1989–1994 rokiv: podvyh rukhu.” (“Ephiphany in the Underground. Ukrainian Alternative Theatre of the 1989–1994: The Movement’s Success”), *Kino-teatr 2* (1997), 24.
- 4 Discussion by nine playwrights and two directors: “Dramaturhiia ta її tin’: dialoh u dialozi” (“Dramaturgy and its Shadow: a Dialogue in a Dialogue”), *Kino-teatr 6* (1998), 23–26.
Some young writers, such as M. Kurochkin and S. Shchuchenko, have since left for Russia.
- 5 Volodymyr Dibrova now resides in the United States. See list of plays and details about the playwrights following the article.
- 6 Including the youngest and very talented Olha Zorenko.
- 7 Plays by Ivashchenko, Demchuk, Luzina, Chupis, Barnych, Lysiuk, Slipets, Panchyshyn and Shchurenko.
- 8 The play is actually a further development of the author’s hit song from the late 1980s. At that time, the protagonist had a Soviet conformist identity crisis, seeing his double on the street. What is interesting is that no political blame is assigned to the situation, just a statement of fact, an observation of a situation.
- 9 Watt, *Postmodern / Drama*.
- 10 Besides Lysiuk’s *Wormwood*, which is set in the Chernobyl area and is included in this list, there are at least six more new plays on the subject that I am aware of, written by older writers.
- 11 Pogrebenskaia’s *Autumn Flowers*, translated into Ukrainian, was staged in the Crimea in 1999 at an annual festival of plays, and received first prize.
- 12 Nezhdana’s play *He, Who Opens the Doors* also has an appropriate subtitle, *A Black Comedy for the Theatre of National Tragedy*.

- 13 *Surzhyk* is a colloquial mixture of Russian and Ukrainian, without following any one particular grammar. For a discussion on *surzhyk*, see Majkl Flaiier (Michael Flier), "Surzhyk: pravyla utvorennia bezladu" (*Surzhyk: Rules for Creating Chaos*), *Krytyka* IV, no. 6 (32) (June 2000), 16–17.
- 14 In 1933 the Ukrainian playwright Ivan Kocherha, in his *Masters of Time*, wrote sarcastically that a train from Ukraine to Paris has to go through Moscow.
- 15 Ievhenia Kononenko, "Zhinochyi ideal" ("Feminine Ideal"), *Narysy ukraïnskoi popularnoi kultury* (Kyiv: UCKD), 187.
- 16 The more traditionally patriarchal Russian attitude toward women (as described, for example, in the old Russian *Domostroï*) may have influenced the Soviet style in general, and thus was also felt in Soviet Ukraine.
- 17 Ie. Kononenko notes that Ukrainian women, while still dreaming of an ideal husband, for whom it would be worth sacrificing oneself, don't believe that they would find one like that, and instead marry a husband who could be a good provider and give the wife an opportunity to develop her talents. Kononenko, "Zhinochyi ideal," 188.
- 18 Many authors refer to God either in habitual expressions, or in discussions, or references to Christian holy days. While the Soviet regime changed the orthography to render "God" only in the lower case, the new Ukrainian orthography of 1990, 1994, and 1996 allows "God" to be written in the upper case. However, whether in the Ukrainian language plays or in Russian ones, old habits remain strong, and these words are still rendered in the lower case.
- 19 Michael M. Naydan, "National Identity for the Ukrainian Writer: Writing into the New Millennium," *Towards a New Ukraine II*, edited by Theofil Kis, Irena Makaryk, and Roman Weretelnik (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1999), 147.
- 20 She writes: "The system wanted individuals to identify with being Soviet, to see themselves as residents of a vast eleven-time-zone country on a unique mission. ... The structure of the Soviet system constantly underlined nationality as it constantly undermined it. This splicing of identity now serves as a residual factor perpetuating both confusion and apathy toward national re-identification in post-Soviet Ukraine."
- Catherine Wanner, "On Being Soviet," *Burden of Dreams: History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1998), 49–50.
- 21 Particularly at the turn of the twentieth century, in the plays of Lesia Ukraïnka and, in the 1920s and 1930s, in the plays by Volodymyr Vynnychenko or Mykola Kulish. See Larissa M.L.Z. Onyshkevych, *Existentialism in Modern Ukrainian Drama* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973).

22 Especially in the western parts of Ukraine, which was not under USSR until 1945. Examples of historical topics are found in the first part of the last century, in the plays by Volodymyr Vynnychenko, Vasyl Pachovskyi, and religious themes in later plays by Hryhor Luzhnytsky, while gender issues were reflected still in Ukraïnka's and Vynnychenko's works.

Table 17.1
Aspects of Identity: Ukrainian Plays of the 1990s

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Part Seven
Failures in the
Process of
Transition: Two
Case Studies

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18

Trafficking in Women in Ukraine

JANE RUDD

This article analyzes the social, political, economic, and gender perspectives that create a productive environment for trafficking of women in Ukraine. It reports on a study funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and conducted through Winrock International, at three of their Women for Women Centers located in Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donesk. The centres are involved in trafficking prevention work in Ukraine. The study indicates that women who are in a current or past situation of abuse are more vulnerable to being drawn into trafficking.

DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's separate statehood, the economy of Ukraine has suffered a serious blow. In reaction to loss of income, women in Ukraine have attempted to go abroad to work. All too often, they have ended up in trafficking. There continues to be discussion as to the definition of trafficking. The elements of trafficking about which we are most concerned can be described as follows: "To traffic women means to work upon their desire or need to migrate by bringing them into prostitution under conditions that make them totally dependent on their recruiters in ways which also impair their rights" (Altink 1995:1). Along with the imposition of slave-like conditions, women in trafficking almost never achieve the goal of

gaining any significant income. There are innumerable accounts of women who “disappear” after going abroad. Since most families lack the resources to search for their wives, daughters, or sisters, little is known of their final whereabouts and the women are eventually presumed to have died. So far, there is no way to estimate the number of women who go abroad, the number of women who return, or the number of those who simply disappear. Typical destination countries for Ukrainian women include Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Germany as the most common; United States, Poland, former Yugoslavia, Spain, and the Czech Republic as the somewhat frequent; and Japan and Sweden as the least frequent. While Ukraine has enacted a law against trafficking (Art. 124-1, Trade in People), it is largely ineffectual. “Ukraine’s Parliament adopted an anti-trafficking law in March 1998, and since then there have reportedly been 17 cases brought before the courts. Only one of these has been prosecuted so far, and although it resulted in a guilty verdict, the punishment was inconsequential” (Brama: Current Social Issues in Ukraine, 1998). In reality, trafficking of women continues to increase in Ukraine.

Women in Ukraine are often recruited for trafficking through friends, sometimes relatives, chance acquaintances, tourism agencies, newspaper advertisements, or even the Internet. One woman related that she had been “sold” to traffickers by a friend (Interview, Dnipropetrovsk Women for Women Center, October 2000). “On the whole Eastern European women seem to be recruited by accident, by people they meet by chance, for example in a café or on the street” (Altink 1995:132). They are most often recruited for what appears to be a position as a domestic or an au pair, a waitress or an entertainer. At other times they are directly recruited to work in prostitution, which the recruiters describe as glamorous and lucrative.

The United Nations, based on recent data, estimates there are 4 million victims of trafficking worldwide each year (Caldwell 1997). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM 1998), there are estimates that 400,000 women alone have been trafficked from Ukraine in recent years. In Ukraine, women’s advocate groups put the number at 500,000, with 400,000 women who were under the age of thirty emigrating in the last ten years. The Movement to Mothers (MOM) to Ukraine

Program estimates there are between 800,000–1.4 million young women who are at risk for trafficking (Syniuta 1999). Most non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will not give an estimate of the number of trafficked women because, according to one La Strada official, “It’s impossible to keep track of because many of the women who leave never come back, and those who do often do not confess that they’ve been trafficked” (Interview by Skotarengo 2000).

Teens and young women ages fourteen to twenty-one years old are most at risk of trafficking. Most are single, have no children, and are mainly schoolgirls or young college students. In a study conducted by IOM, among the at-risk group, half (50.6 per cent) were students and many were unemployed. According to the IOM (1998), 46 per cent of the respondents in that age group are at risk of trafficking. Many young women continue to consider migrating if they have the means and resources to do so, which traffickers are only too willing to provide (IOM 1998). Winrock International and the NIS-US Women’s Consortium (2000) is beginning to target women as young as twelve for their prevention efforts.

The health risks of trafficking are obvious. Women’s lives are at risk; physical, sexual, and emotional abuses are commonplace. When and if women return, they and Ukraine society have to deal with the social costs of their abuse. Numerous studies show there are lifelong physical and emotional after-effects of trafficking for women, if they manage to escape the slave-like conditions in which they are held. A statement by the World Federation of Ukrainian Women’s Organizations describes the situation of women who have been trafficked graphically:

Women, often not even treated as second-class citizens, are regarded as mere commodities to be bought, sold and finally discarded after use by traffickers. Healthcare ... is non-existent. The risk of disease is borne by the woman, condoms are not permitted, pregnancy is not even a deterrent as a woman is replaceable. (Brama: *Current Social Issues in Ukraine* 1999:1)

Currently, there is negative migration of people from Ukraine. Women may emigrate according “to the one-step pattern, that is

directly from the rural areas to their foreign destination," while the "two-step pattern involves women moving to cities and then to a foreign destination" (Altink 1995:55). Rural women come to the cities to work, to marry, or to get an education. The "chain migration" pattern is also seen, which consists of a friend or relative procuring a position and then inviting a woman to join her abroad. Certainly, the ability to travel outside of Ukraine has provided opportunities that women, in their desperation, want to believe will help them improve their lives.

In spite of strict immigration laws into Western Europe and the United States, tourist visas are easily available through traffickers. As well, "It is common practice for travel agencies in Eastern European countries to sell visas" (Altink 1995:124). Few women realize that a holiday visa does not entitle them to work abroad. Once the traffickers take their passports, the women are in precarious positions. One Women for Women staff member mentioned a "cycle of trafficking" in which women may go abroad once or twice for legitimate work, but ultimately end up in trafficking (Interview, Lviv, October 2000). One million Ukrainians go abroad every year looking for temporary employment; 40 per cent of families in the Lviv area have a member abroad working (State Committee of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs 1999). Because of a few "success" stories of women earning money abroad, women still take the risk, thinking that trafficking can never happen to them.

Organized crime groups are well prepared to take advantage of Ukrainian women's vulnerability. "According to United Nations official Jean Fernand-Laurent, trafficking in women is more profitable than arms or drug smuggling" (Altink 1995:2). These groups "work with corrupt authorities, launder money, have contacts in both legitimate areas and the underworld and form a hierarchy" (Altink 1995:4). For the most part, "women are reluctant to talk because Eastern European gangs are extremely violent and use every kind of threat to intimidate them" (Altink 1995:125).

While communists have always denied the existence of commercial sex in a workers "paradise" (Sylvia Ingra, Polish lawyer involved in anti-trafficking in Poland, in Altink 1995:40), prostitution existed in the Soviet Union, and Eastern European women

were known to be involved in prostitution in most Western European countries. Now it is believed that 90 per cent of women working as prostitutes in Amsterdam come from Eastern Europe (Altink 1995).

In addition, "There are special networks, based in Kyiv, ... which procure women for the soldiers at Unprofor (United Nations Protection Force) headquarters in Croatia" (Altink 1995:123). One young woman stated, "A man approached me on the streets of Kiev and asked me if I wanted to join a ballet show" (Altink 1995:126). Even more alarmingly, according to a BBC documentary, "the Russian mafia are setting up in the trade in human organs" (Altink 1995:155). University students interviewed in Kyiv had heard of this phenomenon (Interview, November 12, 2000).

Trafficking has been variously seen as a moral, migratory, criminal, human rights, public order, and labour problem (Foundation of Women's Forum 1998). Most NGOs in the Nordic countries share the view of prostitution as a symbol of men's ability to exert power over women and as a consequence of the structural subordination of women in society (Foundation of Women's Forum 1998). NGOs also view the issue as a human rights problem.

Strategies based on law and order perspectives are often employed by state governments. However, a recent study by the Global Survival Network found that Western European countries' efforts to prevent trafficking have a negative effect on the women they try to help (Caldwell 1997), mainly because when women are found, they are generally arrested and treated as criminals who are part of organized crime. When immigration policies are more stringent, as in Western Europe and the United States today, women fear reporting to police because they will be returned to Ukraine, where the criminal syndicates will retaliate against them (Caldwell 1997). Often women, before being returned to their own countries, are forced to testify against the traffickers, regardless of their health and safety needs. The European Union is beginning to address the issue of trafficking. A proposed bill includes "guarantees of protection for women who agree to give evidence and a reversal of the burden of proof so that it is placed upon the alleged trafficker" (News/EU 2000). In

the United States, the Victims of Trafficking and Victim Protection Act of 2000 was passed, giving services to women who have been trafficked (Brama: *Social Issues in Ukraine* 2000).

THE ECONOMY

According to numerous research studies and NGO workers, the main factor relating to Ukrainian women's vulnerability to trafficking is the lack of economic opportunity they face (Belk, Ostergaard, and Groves 1998; IOM 1998; Mihilova and Kiukova 1999; Smolenski 1995). The unemployment figure for women in Ukraine is estimated to be between 60–70 per cent (Hunt 1997; IOM 1998). The Foundation of Women's Forum (1998:1) attributes trafficking to "the world-wide feminization of poverty, women's unequal rights and access to formal labor [and] women's restricted abilities to gain power over their own lives in their home countries."

Pryce-Jones (1997) describes the background for trafficking in terms of the current globalization of our world. He sees public officials as irresponsible worldwide and, in a sense, approaching anarchy. "Globalized corruption is a more elusive enemy to democracy than either Nazism or Communism, but quite as absolute and lawless in its own way" (Pryce-Jones 1997:28). As a result of corrupt governments, Mafia groups are able to operate freely in the trafficking of women. The United Nations suggests that illegal groups make \$7 billion a year from the trafficking of women (1997, cited in Foundation of Women's Forum 1998). Women addressing the problem agree that "governments must view trafficking as part of the greater economic crisis [in Eastern Europe] and its biased effect on women" (Caldwell 1997:1).

How has the change from a communist regime to a market economy affected the situation for women in Ukraine? Unfortunately, not very positively. Many government officials now strive for personal wealth rather than economic reform. The Mafia show little restraint in their involvement in trafficking in women. Few businesses in Ukraine are legal. Most are conducted in the shadow economy because the taxation system makes it "almost impossible to conduct business legally in Ukraine" (Cowley 1994:17). The country as a whole has had as much as a 40 per cent decline

in gross domestic product (GDP), with industrial production overly affected (Jackman 1994). Access to Western markets is not yet available because of the poor quality of goods produced. As a result, many of the newly independent states (NIS) "can no longer sell what they produce, and they cannot yet produce what they will be able to sell" (Jackman 1994:341). In Ukraine, this has led to "long-term unemployment with the attendant risks of severe poverty or the development of illicit economic activities" (Jackman 1994:335). As their prospects for employment or re-employment remain dim, women are drawn to trafficking.

Ukraine once produced 34 per cent of the Soviet Union's steel, and 46 per cent of its iron ore, but these industries are now dormant (Cowley 1994). Each industry that collapses leaves many Ukrainians unemployed. Women are more readily unemployed as "employment decisions reflect a hierarchy dominated by male occupations ..." (Jackman 1994:333). It is difficult to move to another part of the country to obtain work because usually there is no work elsewhere and housing is not transferable. Once unemployed, it is difficult to obtain work in the private sector as the private sector tends to draw from those already employed in the state sector (Jackman 1994). In spite of the problems in the former Soviet Union, there were at least some social services, however inadequate. Now there are few social support systems; also, many people work and do not regularly receive payment.

Along with crippling economic issues, Ukrainians are struggling to establish a new identity that is based on several constructs and cannot be seen as simply socialist or capitalist (Stepanenko 1995). The geography of the country puts Ukraine between the east (Russia), the west (Western Europe), the south (Turkey and the Balkan countries), and the north (Baltic countries and Scandinavia), with conflicting demands from each region. This is reflected in various geographic sections of the country. The "Soviet-style," as it is commonly called on the streets of Kyiv, is evident in the east and south of the country; the "conscious Ukrainians" (Stepanenko 1995), who emphasize and revere their heritage, reside in the west of the country, where Ukrainian rather than Russian is the spoken language. Added to these divisions is an attitude of pessimism because of the state of the economy and the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl (Stepanenko

1995). Simultaneously, the rest of the world has moved into the "post-industrial society" (Stepanenko 1995:10) with a global economy requiring still another adjustment on Ukraine's part (Stepanenko 1995).

The United Nations currently sees four obstacles to full human development: HIV/AIDS, armed conflict and violence, increasing poverty, and gender discrimination (Annan 2000). Young women in Ukraine are faced with all four of these obstacles: HIV/AIDS, violence (even though there is no armed conflict), increasing poverty, and gender discrimination. While the United Nations sees the possibility of intergenerational patterns of poverty, violence, disease, and discrimination as having the potential to be reduced within a generation, in Ukraine, the opposite is true. Poverty is increasing due to continued poor economic conditions. The result is that "Ukraine continues to have the highest mortality rate and the lowest average life expectancy among the countries of Central and Eastern Europe" (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000:12). In fact, "the level of debt incurred by the countries of Eastern Europe, in proportion to their GDP, is higher than that of the developing countries" (Carter 1999). In 1999, in Ukraine, the share of foreign debt as percentage of GDP was 54 per cent (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000). Although there was a reported 4.3 per cent increase in industrial production in 1999, and a 3.4 per cent increase in GDP in 2000, this is slow start back to economic stabilization from a GDP that had declined by some estimates more than 14 per cent since 1991 (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000).

All these economic factors translate into real hardship for most Ukrainian families. In fact, "Subjective evaluations of family living standards in Ukraine show that 76% of families are constantly short of money, 23% live comfortably but cannot afford spending freely and must budget carefully, and only 1% are well off and can afford to live without budgeting" (United Nations Development Program 1999:209). Carter (1999) describes 60 per cent of families in Ukraine as living in poverty. Unfortunately, the "standards of living of the majority of the population of Ukraine now corresponds to a level at the end of 1950s" (State Committee of Ukraine and Youth Affairs 1999:143).

In a survey conducted in the Lviv Women for Women Center (2000) among forty-one women, over 50 per cent had a monthly family income of between 50–200 *gryvnas* (\$9–\$36). “Women constitute almost 80% of the unemployed, and 72% of the unemployed who are graduates of professional or technical colleges” (United Nations Development Program 1999:139–140). While this percentage of unemployed women reflects the poor economy in Ukraine, it also demonstrates women’s poor position in society at large and the Ukrainian educational system’s inability to address the relevant needs of the economy. Despite images of Soviet women working in what most Americans would consider non-traditional jobs, sexual stereotyping and prejudice persisted until the final years of the Soviet Union (Silverman and Yanowitch 1997). Now in an environment that feminists describe as “a postsocialist patriarchal renaissance,” women’s opportunities are even more scarce (Silverman and Yanowitch 1997:75).

The average income in Ukraine is 110 *hryvnias* per month (\$20), with half the population in cities (52 per cent) and more than half in villages (56 per cent) receiving less than 102 *hryvnias* per month (\$18) (United Nations Development Program 1999). The percentage of families growing their own food so they can feed themselves has increased from 29–56 per cent. Barter-generated income has had to grow dramatically in proportion to work income. “In rural families, (a third of all the population) the payment of work has decreased to 23%, and the incomes of personal part-time farming have grown to 53% and become dominant” (State Committee of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs 1999:148).

The economic situation is far worse for women because their average wage was 72 per cent of men’s average wage, as of 1999 (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000). Most women and some men agree that it is more difficult for women to obtain a job and easier for them to lose one; their dismissal rate in 1999 was 63 per cent (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000). Furthermore, women constitute 75 per cent of the population under the age of twenty-eight who are unemployed (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000). This rate of unemployment is even greater in the rural regions of Ukraine.

GENDER DISADVANTAGES

During communist rule, men needed to maintain the patriarchal structure as a form of power in a "party state" where the "form of rule was the political and economic disempowerment of individuals ..." (Watson 1993:473). During the Soviet regime, women blamed the state for their oppression and families were united against a common oppressor (Grapard 1997). Now men and, to some extent, women long for the traditional roles, men as a way to keep women out of the labour market and women as a relief from the punishing daily workload of home and family. This trend is based on the premise that "governments depend on ideas about masculinized dignity and feminized sacrifice to sustain that sense of autonomous nationhood" (Enloe 1990:196). Now more men are willing to go along with this trend as "returning women to the home signifies men's regaining control over what is 'theirs,' a reappropriation of (male) collective identity and a symbol of having wrestled control away from a dead state socialism" (Funk and Magda 1993:2). In spite of the Marxist ideology, but because of the particular history of the Soviet Union, women's rights have never been adequately addressed (Waters 1989).

All of these changes have had the effect of women experiencing less representation in government, increased levels of unemployment, and increased sexual exploitation. Even before the transition, women were in a precarious situation because "the importance of traditional gender identity was ... heightened as a cultural resource for both survival and resistance" (Watson 1993:472). Now, "the pornographic icon has replaced the cross as the new symbol of freedom" (Watson 1993:472). Watson feels this is the result of the masculinization of Eastern Europe that leaves women open to be marketed and generally degraded as women. "The prostitute, the lone entrepreneur breaking taboos, is the pioneer of the market economy, from which is supposed to come universal salvation" (Funk and Magda 1993:284). In the IOM study (1998) 52 per cent of women felt prostitution is a job because it is a means to earn money, and 78 per cent felt prostitution was a person's private affair. Prostitution is seen as an extreme form of coercion that often begins with familial abuse; it

is “organized and sustained by principles that underlie pernicious gender asymmetries in many domains of our social life” (Shrage 1989, cited in Sunstein 1989:227). Sunstein (1989:226) states, “The family is ... frequently treated, in law and theory, as an autonomous realm deserving protection from public intervention [and] often contains a variety of mechanisms for subordinating women ... includ[ing] domestic violence” Prostitution is the worst form of male dominance disguised as sexuality (Dworkin 1997, cited in Farley, Baral, Kiremire, and Sezgin 1998). Rather than the glamour that Ukrainian women hope for, they are subjected to “being dominated, being sexually assaulted, and being physically and verbally battered” (Farley et al., 1998:3). While physical and sexual abuse may have existed under communist rule, couples joined together as “a locus of resistance to state power and [the family] was not perceived as a locus of gender conflict” (Grapard 1997:671). In the socialist state, both men and women were powerless. Now “the distribution of new rights and of new social power is taking place in a strictly gender way, being fundamentally determined by the prerogative of the masculine” (Watson 1993:473). As Watson so aptly describes it, “the purging of the emasculation of men takes place at the expense of not only voluntary but also involuntary exclusion of women from the new public sphere, and essentially involves the de-grading of feminine identity” (Watson 1993:485).

This study makes no distinction between women who “decide” to be trafficked and those who are unwittingly lured into trafficking since most would agree with a former prostitute who said “all prostitution is forced prostitution. Whether we are forced to become prostitutes by lack of money or by housing or unemployment problems, or to escape from a family situation of rape or violence, we would not lead the ‘life’ if we were in a position to leave it” (Reanda 1991:204). While some women may agree to trafficking, it is hard to imagine any woman “choosing” prostitution. Nina Karpacheva, deputy head of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Commission on Human Rights, feels that 85 per cent of women in Ukraine are forced into trafficking (cited in Brama: *Social Issues in Ukraine*, 1998).

Skotarenko suggests young women see the opportunity to leave the country as glamorous and a way to “break away from

the authority of the family and old traditions" (personal communication, October 1, 1999). Having now been exposed to Western glamour in a stereotypic way through television, they assume that a similar lifestyle awaits them. Some families collude with young girls leaving home to be trafficked. "The mother, in particular, plays a central role in her daughter's life decisions" (World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children n.d.). Having been pushed to extreme limits by poverty, a family may see selling their young daughter as the only way out of poverty. An example given by Skotarenko (personal communication, October 1, 1999) is of a young woman whose mother talked her *out* of going abroad; instead, she found a job at home.

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

Along with a lack of power, women frequently experience physical or sexual abuse, either in their homes or at their places of employment, which contributes to the number of women lured into trafficking (Farley et al. 1998; IOM 1998; Nelson 1996; Mihilova and Kiukova 1999; Skolnik and Boontinand 1999; Skotarenko, personal communication, October 1, 1999). Leidholdt holds a similar belief: "voluntary entry into the sex industry was predicated on ... earlier abuse and exploitation. Sexual trauma—with its hallmarks of denial and repetition compulsions—is the training ground of many subsequent prostitution 'volunteers' (Leidholdt 1993:133). When Skotarenko interviewed women who had been trafficked, all of the women had some problems in their families, "usually abusive and/or drinking family members or young children to support" (personal communication, 1999). Silbert and Pines (1981:407) found "extremely high levels" of child abuse in a study conducted with 200 teen and adult women prostitutes in the United States.

Official statistics do not reflect the level of violence experienced by the various groups of women, but by all accounts, it clearly affects all age groups. Fifty per cent of adult women in this study have experienced violence and 20 per cent remain in a violent situation. Women are often physically unable to work as a result of violence they experienced in the home (Shepard and Pence 1988). Medical attention is frequently needed. The

Ukraine Ministry of Interior Affairs reported that 1,227 women were killed in 1999 as a result of domestic violence (cited in United Nations Development Program 1999). Currently, "assault on one's wife does not fit into any category of criminal actions within the Ukrainian Criminal Code" (United Nations Development Program 1999:222).

According to the UNDP study, "Fifty percent of women suffer from some form of sexual harassment at work" (United Nations Development Program 1999:222). As an example of gender stereotyping, "forty-eight percent of men and 36% of women think that a woman can provoke acts of sexual violence upon herself" (United Nations Development Program 1999:223). Women are often forced to leave their place of employment due to harassment, which "leads to double suffering from mental and physical humiliation, and from material problems that are entailed in leaving a job" (Vlasenko, Vinogradova, and Kalachova 2000:30).

The Dnipropetrovsk Women for Women Center (2000) conducted a study of 480 women between the ages of fifteen to over forty and found that 25 per cent of the women had experienced violence as children; seventy-nine women had experienced physical abuse; sixty-seven women had experienced psychological abuse; and seven women had experienced sexual abuse. In their current lives, women experienced psychological violence from friends and colleagues (34 per cent), boyfriends (18 per cent), and 17 per cent experienced violence constantly. Nineteen per cent of the women experienced abuse by their employers, while 26 per cent experienced discrimination by their employer. Fully 50 per cent of women experienced violence from their husbands; 15 per cent was physical, 4 per cent was sexual, 24 per cent was psychological, and 8 per cent was financial. Women also experienced domestic violence from father-in-laws, brother-in-laws, and other family members. Only 36 per cent of women in this situation feel they can leave their homes; 54 per cent of women want to stay, but want to see an end to the violence. Most women did not seek help; of those who did, 89 per cent did not receive adequate support and nothing changed in their situations.

The 1999 Ukraine Women's Reproductive Health Initiative (2000) indicated that 19 per cent of respondents had experienced domestic abuse, with 8 per cent currently experiencing domestic

abuse. These incidences were 50 per cent higher in rural than urban areas. While the staff at the Women for Women Centers believe there is a connection between women experiencing violence and their vulnerability to trafficking, this has so far never been confirmed in Ukraine, but is addressed in this study.

TEENS AND YOUNG WOMEN

In a study done by the IOM in 1995 on trafficking and women, three-quarters of the women designated at risk of trafficking were found to be under twenty-five years old, and many were teenagers between fifteen and eighteen years old (cited in IOM 1998). In a more recent IOM study (1998), women aged fifteen to nineteen were 45 per cent of the “at-risk” group (1998). The older the woman, the less intention she had of migrating (IOM 1998). Most of the women potentially at risk (60 per cent) are single, and tend to have fewer family obligations (IOM 1998).

In the pilot study for this research project, teens ages twelve to eighteen were especially vulnerable to trafficking in Ukraine today because of poverty, violence, and lack of opportunity in the future. Carter (1999) states there are at least 50 million children in poverty in Eastern Europe. Girls as young as thirteen are showing up as trafficking victims in the Netherlands (Altink 1995).

Nowadays, teens are less able to rely on their parents for support, as they struggle with the current poor economic situation. At all three Women for Women Centers, staff and participants related stories of teenage girls who were no longer living with their parents, of parents who would take what little money teens were earning for themselves, of teens living with grandparents who could not afford to support them financially, or who ignored them. According to one participant: “My parents are divorced; neither of them want me so I am living with my boyfriend. This isn’t working because he beats me up. He has also tried to get me to be a prostitute so he can have money” (Interview, October 2000).

Sexual violence is common for teen girls in Ukraine:

Out of all instances of rape reported to police, 55% of victims were underage (that is, younger than 18 years); among these 40% of victims were minors (that is, less than 14 years old). While more than half of victims did not know their abusers, over 30% (of teen women) knew them well; 13% were victimized by their relatives, older brothers, fathers, step-fathers or guardians. (United Nations Development Program 1999:212)

Persistent violence and poverty lead to desperate solutions for these teenage girls, of which going abroad is one. The Dnipropetrovsk Women for Women Center (1999) surveyed 783 teens and women between the ages of sixteen to twenty-four and found that 69 per cent of them would accept an offer to work abroad, even though few of them knew information regarding the legalities of working abroad. Fifty-eight per cent of survey respondents would rely on acquaintances to help them obtain a position, an approach that has been shown to lead to trafficking situations.

In this same sample of teens and women, 23 per cent had experienced physical violence, 62 per cent had experienced psychological violence, and 11 per cent had experienced sexual violence. The violence was perpetrated by friends (26 per cent), teachers (15 per cent), and parents (8 per cent). The violence was persistent in nature and 86 per cent of the teens and women currently lived in fear of violence. In this present study, a group of teens who were interviewed acknowledged frequent violence in schools along with the ready availability of drugs (Group interview, October 2000).

The Lviv Women for Women Center questioned fourteen teens and two women about the presence of violence in their lives (Lviv Women for Women Center 2000). Eleven of the sixteen experienced violence in the form of brutal fights, offences, and humiliation. Five experienced sexual violence. Three girls said violence was in their family. None of these three felt they would be able to talk about it. Fifteen girls felt lonely and desperate. None of the girls had sought help before. Thirteen girls said they would welcome information on how to protect themselves and their relatives.

TEENS IN INTERNATS

An *Internat* in Ukraine is comparable to an orphanage; children without parents or parental support are housed and educated in *Internats* from ages five to eighteen. Among workers at all three Women for Women Centers, it is generally agreed that teen girls from *Internats* are particularly vulnerable to trafficking as they have less potential for employment and have been more exposed to violence. While some children in *Internats* do have parents, many are without supportive parents or any support. The most common reasons parents were deprived of parental rights were: chronic alcoholism (46 per cent); amoral lifestyle (34 per cent); criminal offence and in jail (17 per cent); and incurable disease (3 per cent) (State Committee of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs 1999).

As of 1997, there were almost 4,000 female children living in *Internats* (State Committee of Ukraine for Family and Youth Affairs 1999:225). Often teen girls flee the *Internat*, and, with few or no resources, find themselves in trafficking. Altink (1995:38–39) describes runaways in the “border regions (of the Czech Republic) who are ‘from broken homes who can’t go back.’ They are taken in by gypsy families. German men come across the border to use their services.” According to police, 20,000 children are picked up on the streets each year in Ukraine. In 1998, there were 19,500 registered orphans in Ukraine (Kozmina 2000). It is commonly believed that girls who are homeless frequently become prostitutes. The Dutch-Ukrainian Art, Culture, and Science Foundation state that “80 percent of orphanage graduates eventually become criminals or prostitutes” (Kozmina 2000:4). “The major threats for ‘street girls,’ apart from criminal activity, are drug addiction, overdose, alcoholism and prostitution” (United Nations Development Program 1999:209).

UNICEF (1997, cited in Foundation of Women’s Forum 1998) reports an increase in the number of children placed in care at an early age, showing that child vulnerability is increasing from early years, which continues through adolescence when they are virtually on their own. As they leave institutional care, trafficking may seem a promising step to a better life. In fact, traffickers target these children.

RESEARCH

The research for this study was conducted in the fall of 2000. The study was conducted through the Trafficking Prevention Project, funded by the United States Agency for International Development and administered by Winrock International. Their main office is in Kyiv, with Women for Women Centers in Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Lviv. The study evaluated existing programs for effectiveness in conveying anti-trafficking messages to participants. It also assessed participants' vulnerability to being drawn into trafficking. A further objective of the study is the development of a research instrument that can be used in ongoing program evaluation at all the centres.

METHODOLOGY

This research can be defined as "participatory action research" in which increasing the researchers' understanding of the situation and increasing "the insight of the local people into what factors are the root causes" (Burkey 1993:60) of trafficking were both achieved. Burkey (1993:61) describes how necessary it is for researchers to immerse themselves in the reality they are studying. This includes extending empathy and friendship and being aware "of the fact that he or she is working with certain values which may differ considerably" from those of the people participating in the research. Based on this belief, the researcher collaborated closely with centre staff in designing the questionnaires for the study. While the questionnaires elicit quantitative data, there is also an opportunity for qualitative responses as well. In addition, as a result of the interviews with staff and participants at the centres, there are narrative findings as well. The fact that there were three centres, all in different areas of the country and therefore reflecting their own unique perspective, adds to the credibility of the findings.

The following circumstances influenced the study:

- Meetings were held with key agencies in Kyiv involved in anti-trafficking to determine the magnitude of trafficking in Ukraine and the current objectives in the

anti-trafficking campaign. Meetings were conducted with USAID, Project Harmony, the International Organization for Migration, La Strada, and the United Nations Development Program.

- Participant observation was conducted at the Women for Women Centers in Lviv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donesk. Discussions with staff were conducted at all three Women for Women Centers. The dialogues led to detailed knowledge of the training offered, populations served, and agencies with whom the centres interacted. A sense of the centres' mission and the complexity of the problems encountered was learned.
- Interviews and small group discussions conducted with participants led to detailed knowledge of the reasons women were attending the centres, feedback regarding the impact of the centres' training for the women, and discussions about current environmental factors in the women's lives that lead to risks of trafficking.
- Meetings and round table discussions were held with community groups that were working with the centres in trafficking prevention. They provided feedback on the impact of the Women for Women Centers in their communities. They also described their roles in the anti-trafficking campaign in Ukraine.
- It proved impossible to meet with women who had returned to Ukraine after having been involved in trafficking. According to staff at the centres, women were reluctant to admit they had been involved in trafficking as some women have been rejected by their families and communities for doing so. Women were also fearful of the traffickers and often could not return home or reveal their identities in any way. The staff at all three centres were able to relate detailed information about the situations of women who had been involved in trafficking. Much of this information came from the women's relatives, who had been in contact with centre staff while the women were abroad.
- The question as to whether participants would consider going abroad as sex workers was asked only of the adult

women in the study. The question was not asked of teens in the study. Since most of the teens attending the centres do so through arrangements with their *Internats* or schools, centre staff felt the question would be too controversial to be accepted by school administrators.

- Since the question of asking someone if she would consider working in the sex business is indeed controversial, the less threatening question “Are you thinking of going to another country to work” was asked instead. This question was addressed in a number of ways to determine under what conditions or in what occupation a woman would consider going abroad. These responses led to more definitive information about a woman’s intentions to go abroad.

As a result of studies to date, there is now a general understanding of trafficking. Therefore, this study looks at specific groups to assess their particular vulnerabilities and to identify ways of preventing trafficking. The groups were: teens from twelve to eighteen who live in *Internats* or teens who attend secondary schools; teens and young adult women who attend technical schools and adult women. The meetings and participant observation led to the following areas being selected for study:

- An evaluation of the training offered by the three original Trafficking Prevention Projects to determine their ability to effect changes in attitudes and beliefs of participants regarding their understanding of the dangers of trafficking.
- An assessment of participants’ vulnerability toward trafficking based on their attitudes and beliefs toward trafficking.
- An assessment of participants’ vulnerability toward trafficking based on their level of experienced violence.
- An assessment of participants’ vulnerability toward trafficking based on their level of economic and emotional support in their present life situations.

- An assessment of adult women's responses to going abroad to work as sex workers.
- A profile of women who are most at risk of trafficking in Ukraine developed from women attending the Women for Women Centers.
- An evaluation of advertising campaigns regarding anti-trafficking information.

The study at all three Women for Women Centers was conducted from November 13–17, 2000. Rather than representing all women in Ukraine from the ages of twelve to thirty, the sample was comprised of women who were seeking help or girls in schools where school personnel invited the centres' staff to give training sessions. Therefore, the findings cannot be generalized to women in the general population in Ukraine.

Three hundred and twenty-seven participants were administered questionnaires both before and after the training during the week of November 13–17, 2000. Only women who were coming to the centres for the first time were given the questionnaires. While most teens and women attend on average four to five training sessions, it was decided that surveying first-time participants at the training sessions would give a clear perspective of women's attitude and belief changes if they had not yet been exposed to other sessions at the Women for Women Centers.

The questionnaire was especially developed for this study. It was initially designed for adult women, then adapted to teen girls, and further adapted for teen girls residing in *Internats*. A pilot study was conducted at all three Women for Women Centers to refine the questionnaire. It was conducted on October 20 and October 23, 2000.

Findings from the study are in narrative, descriptive, and empirical form. Empirical findings have been analyzed using correlation analysis, and the tables indicate with a "yes" whether there is a correlation analysis. The correlation analysis means the relationships are significant at the 0.10 level or better.

The profiles of women are a compilation of many women's stories from a particular group. All identifying information is disguised. The stories of the women, while disguised, are nevertheless a source of empowerment for the staff and women

working at and attending the centres. This will enable research on this serious issue affecting women's survival to move away from what Carroll terms the "cult of power" and "the preoccupation with institutions, groups, and persons conceived to be powerful" (cited in Murphy 1996:527) and toward a focus on women.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Teens in *Internats*

Profile of a Teen in Internat

Teens in *Internats* have little support and therefore may be vulnerable to traffickers. However, there are differences among the teens that would lead one teen more readily into the hands of traffickers than another. For example, one thirteen-year-old, T., has a friend who has been involved in trafficking. T. does not want to go abroad. When asked more specifically, she thinks she would go abroad to finish her education. She even thinks there may be honest work for her abroad. She thinks she could find ways to be safe as a sex worker, although she knows it's possible to get tricked into sex work. However, she has a supportive family both financially and emotionally. She has not experienced violence.

In the same *Internat*, another thirteen-year-old, N., is clearly thinking of going abroad, a view that did not change after the training. Her reason for going abroad is to escape a violent situation. She wishes to go abroad to marry or to work as a housekeeper. She knows a lot of friends who have been in trafficking. She firmly believes there is honest work for her abroad, that she wouldn't get tricked into sex work, and that if she did, she would still be safe. She doesn't think her health or her chances for marriage will be damaged, or that her family will reject her if she becomes involved in sex work. Currently, she has no financial or emotional support from her family, and in fact feels that no one at all supports her financially or emotionally. She has experienced physical abuse with two different men and experiences emotional abuse from her employer. She has no understanding of the causes of the violence. She knew one of

the dangers of trafficking before the training and three after the training. In contrast with T., N. clearly is very vulnerable to being deceived into trafficking.

Findings

Eighty-five teens who live in *Internats* were part of this study. The average age of the *Internat* teen was fourteen. The desire to go abroad was not decreased by the presence of any form of financial support. However, a review of the data shows that teens in *Internats* have almost no financial support. Teens in *Internats* who may still have contact with family members often have families that are unable to support them financially. While some parents may supply financial support, it is meagre. Some of the teens in *Internats* work, but this is no deterrent to their wish to go abroad. By all reports, teens in *Internats* are far less well off than teens in secondary schools and living at home.

Only emotional and caring support from grandmothers appears to deter teens in *Internats* from considering going abroad (see Appendix A, Table 18.1). The unsettling finding that teens in this study considered going abroad slightly more after their first training than before needs to be understood by distinguishing between a change in attitude versus belief (see Appendix A, Table 18.1). In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that “attitudes and self-perceptions are more effectively addressed and potentially altered when people *experience* a new reality rather than when they are told that they ought to think and act differently” (Carstens and Julia 1999:56). Here is where the Women for Women Centers are influential. The advertising campaigns and even one training session can bring about *attitude* changes. However, subsequent training, the opportunity to talk informally with women attending the centres, to meet with the staff, and to absorb the atmosphere of the centres—which encourages a “can-do” attitude and lets participants know that they are important—can lead to more long-lasting changes in *beliefs* and, ultimately, changes in behaviour. These belief and behaviour changes were evident in the many teens and women whose testimony I heard or who were known to the staff previously or were among the staff who had originally attended the centres and were now working there in some capacity. Giving women the tools to become

aware of their life circumstances is a form of empowerment that “enables marginalized people to make use of spiritual as well as material resources and transform changed attitudes into changed behavior and social structures” (Carstens and Julia 1999:57). This is what the centres were doing.

Sixteen per cent of teens in *Internats* experienced physical violence, 12 per cent experienced sexual violence, 11 per cent emotional violence, and 5 per cent are currently experiencing violence (see Appendix A, Table 18.2). With teens living in *Internats*, the relationship between violence and going abroad is clear and dramatic. This remained true, even after the training sessions, for teens who had been physically abused by either a boyfriend, a close family member, a friend, or a stranger, and if they had experienced sexual abuse from a close family member (see Appendix A, Table 18.2). Clearly the experience of violence in their lives is a factor in their being at risk of trafficking.

Summary of Findings for Teens in Internats

With few exceptions, teens living in *Internats* want to go abroad, and in some cases, the desire increased. Certainly it is known that teens living in *Internats* receive somewhat meagre support, both financially and emotionally. Either they themselves have special needs or their families have experienced grave difficulties. This is not to impugn families or *Internats* who do their best to care for the teens, but when a country faces economic hardship, children in special circumstances often suffer. In speaking with one woman who had grown up in an *Internat*, she remarked, not unkindly, “it was a roof over my head.” Teens in *Internats* know of the difficulty they face when they prepare to leave the facilities. With little or no support, going abroad may seem like the perfect solution.

Teens in Secondary Schools

Profile of a Teen in Secondary School

L. is a sixteen-year-old secondary school student. She knows a lot about the dangers of trafficking, but still wants to attend training sessions at the Women for Women Center because “all my surroundings and my life is connected with such problems” that

the centres try to address. L. knows about not having enough money to live and about violence, and hopes the centre can help her with both. First of all, she and her mother had to move out of their apartment and live with her sister and her husband. This was because she and her mother were being physically abused by her father. It is hard to live at her sister's home because it is crowded and her sister's husband doesn't want her or her mother there. Last summer, her aunt took her to Poland where she worked (illegally) cleaning and caring for children. She made some money, most of which she gave to her mother and sister.

Since she returned, things are worse than before, she says. Her boss at work is mean and she hardly makes any money. On the way home from work the previous month (at 11 p.m.), she was attacked by a stranger. She has only just returned to school after recovering from her physical injuries. Now her brother tries to meet her after work to walk her to her sister's, she says.

L. can't wait until summer so she can go back to Poland and work with her aunt. In the meantime, she thinks that maybe the Woman for Woman Center can help her. She is optimistic and hopes that "soon it will be here [in Ukraine] like it is abroad."

Findings

There were seventy-four teens from secondary schools questioned in this study. The average age for teens in secondary schools was sixteen. Most of the teens (sixty-two) lived with both parents. Seven lived with only their mothers, and two with grandparents. As with teens in *Internats*, the number of teens in secondary schools who considered going abroad increased after the training sessions (See Appendix B, Table 18.3).

Neither financial nor emotional support dissuades secondary school teens from the idea of going abroad (see Appendix B, Table 18.6). Since families are so desperate financially, teens are increasingly left on their own, often when parents go abroad to find employment. The rate of violence experienced by teens in secondary schools was half that of teens in *Internats* (See Appendix B, Table 18.7).

Before the training, teens in secondary schools reported considering going abroad if they had experienced violence, usually to work as housekeepers or in a private business. Teens who had

experienced physical violence from a boyfriend considered going abroad to work as housekeepers or to look after children; if the physical violence was from a stranger, they considered going abroad to work in the entertainment business or in a private business. If they had experienced emotional harm from a close family member, they considered going abroad to work as a housekeeper or to look after sick people. If the emotional violence was from a friend, acquaintance, or stranger, they considered going abroad to work in the entertainment business.

After the training (see Appendix B, Table 18.8), teens who had experienced violence, especially those who were physically abused by a close family member, a friend, or by a stranger, still considered going abroad.

Teens in Secondary Schools: Summary of Findings

Neither financial nor emotional support dissuaded teens from considering going abroad to work. Situations of violence—especially physical or emotional violence with a close family member, a friend, or a stranger—are a push factor to go abroad.

Teens in Technical Schools

Profile of a Teen in Technical School

When O. saw the advertisement in the newspaper about free training on how to get a job, she decided to go to the Women for Women Center. She is eighteen years old and finishing her studies at the technical college and has no idea where she might find work. Right now she lives with her parents and they support her, but she really wants to move out because her father has been physically abusive to her and her mother for five years.

The training was wonderful for her, she says. She learned a lot about what she needs to do to get a job. She also found out that the women at the centre might be able to help her and her mother with her father. She plans to use the trust phone. She wishes she could attend another training session, but she lives in a small village and so far there has only been one session in the area.

O. said she talked to two women who went through the training with her; she had known them previously, but not talked

about the things they discussed in the training. Now they plan to meet at school and try to help each other. None of them want to leave the country to find work. All of them know how dangerous the situation is when one goes to another country without the right papers. There have been girls they knew who did so and they haven't been heard from since. She said they hope they do not get so desperate, but if they change their minds and decide to go, they will call the trust phone at the Women for Women Center and tell them where they are going.

Findings

There were a total of seventy-six students from technical schools in the study. The average age was seventeen years old. As with the secondary school students, most of the teens (fifty-six) were supported by their parents. Nine are supported by "other," meaning seven are supported by mothers and one each by grandparents and a boyfriend. The same number of teens in technical schools considered going abroad before the training as after the training (see Appendix C, Table 18.9).

Teens from technical schools who live in cities are less apt to consider going abroad (see Appendix C, Table 18.10). They may have more options in Ukraine than teens living in towns and villages. Women to Women Center staff have seen this pattern and expressed increased concern for teens in towns and villages. There are reports of villages with very few young women as most of them have gone abroad.

Neither financial nor emotional support is seen as a dissuading factor for teens in technical schools (see Appendix C, Table 18.10). Often teens from *Internats* go directly to technical schools and it is understood that many teens in technical schools have little financial or emotional support.

Teens in technical schools experience almost three times the rate of violence as teens in secondary schools (see Appendix C, Table 18.11). Twenty-two per cent of technical school students (seventeen teens) and 8 per cent (six teens) of teens in secondary schools had experienced violence in their lives, and 7 per cent (five teens) are currently experiencing violence (see Appendix C, figures 18.1, 18.2, 18.3, and 18.4). Since, as mentioned, many teens attending technical schools grew up in *Internats*,

this could be an indication that the violence they experienced as children is perpetuated in their relationships as young adults.

Participants described the violence as lasting anywhere from an isolated incident to extended occurrences over ten years. One young woman experienced emotional abuse from her guardian whenever she was with him. She attributes the abuse to his use of alcohol, cruelty, and a wish to control her life. She was forced to leave her home and has suffered emotionally as a result of the violence. Another young woman is experiencing physical, sexual, and emotional abuse from her husband, which has been going on for the last four years. The violence has caused her physical and emotional injury and interfered with her ability to attend school. Another woman was raped by a stranger and also experienced physical abuse from her father and stepmother. She thinks women go abroad because they are “in situations in which they can’t find a way out.”

Before the training, teens in technical schools who were involved in violence with boyfriends, family members, friends, or strangers all considered going abroad. The strongest desire came from teens who were still in a situation of abuse. Following the training, there were women in all categories of abuse—physical, sexual, and emotional—and in all categories of “experienced” violence who would still consider going abroad to work (see Appendix C, Table 18.12).

Technical School Teens: Summary of Findings

Teens in technical schools said they would consider going abroad to work. Teens who live in cities, as opposed to those who live in towns and villages, are less apt to consider going abroad.

Violence, especially physical violence from boyfriends, close family members, friends, or strangers, is a “push” factor with teens in technical schools. Additional training at the Women to Women Centers can help to educate technical school teens and provide legal resources to counteract violence. Most teens in technical schools who were in this study still lived with and relied financially on family members for support. Clearly the Women to Women Centers’ employment support will also assist these young women in finding employment and, as a result, the financial resources to obtain safer living situations.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR ALL TEEN GROUPS

The pattern of violence in young women's lives and their desire to go abroad is clear with all three groups so far discussed. Table 18.3 (see Appendix C) compares the level of violence among the three teen groups. Teens in all three groups are willing to consider going abroad, but do so in the belief that the trafficking experience cannot happen to them, despite massive evidence to the contrary. The staff at all three centres readily acknowledged that women in violent situations are more apt to consider going abroad. As well, there are numerous training sessions that address this issue and that inform centre participants of their human rights, which tends to mobilize them to take action if they are still in a situation of violence.

Adult Women

Profile of an Adult Woman

M. is twenty-five years old, and works in a state facility where she is regularly paid an amount that is barely enough to support herself. Her husband also works and she works at another job to make ends meet on a total family income of 500 *hryvnias* a month (\$90).

She is grateful to the Women for Women Center for helping her with "some domestic troubles" that include many years of physical and sexual abuse, first as a child and now in her marriage. This was the main reason she came to the centre and she wants to use many of the services, including training, which will help her to get better employment. She doesn't want to leave her marriage and her few friends and go to another country to work, but she has often felt so desperate and depressed that when a casual acquaintance offered her a job in the Czech Republic, she almost said yes, even though she suspected that it was to work as a prostitute. A woman she went to university with ended up in that situation because she did not have enough money to feed her children. She has since returned and her life is in ruins. M. is glad she doesn't have children, especially with her marriage a mess and not enough money to support them. She hopes, with the help of the centre, to improve her marriage and get a better job, so she will not have to leave the country.

Findings

Ninety-two adult women participated in this study. The average age of the women was twenty-three. Fifty-two per cent of the women were single, 37 per cent were married, and less than 1 per cent were divorced or in a stable, non-marital relationship. Sixty-two per cent of the women had no children, 28 per cent had one child, and 10 per cent had two children. Their level of education is quite strong. Fifty-nine per cent are attending or have completed higher education and 41 per cent are or have attended secondary or secondary vocational school. Seventy-nine women live in a city, eleven in a town, and one in a village. Note that fewer adult women considered going abroad after the training than before (see Appendix D, Table 18.14). This may reflect the more mature thinking of the young adult women, as opposed to the teens in the other three groups.

No type of financial support dissuades adult women from the idea of going abroad (see Appendix D, Table 18.15). Emotional support from mothers or husbands decreases their consideration of going abroad (see Appendix D, Table 18.15).

Fully 50 per cent of adult women participants had experienced violence. Twenty per cent remain in a situation of violence. As Table 18.16 (Appendix D) indicates, 51 per cent of participants experienced physical violence, 22 per cent experienced sexual violence, and 85 per cent experienced emotional violence. For comparison purposes, 31 per cent of American women report having been physically or sexually abused by a partner (The Commonwealth Fund 1993, cited in Friends News 2001). Note that women who are *currently* in a situation of violence would not consider going abroad (see Appendix D, Table 18.16). This is different from all three teen groups. Again, it may reflect a level of maturity in this somewhat older group of participants.

Before the training, there was a strong desire among adult women to go abroad to escape violence, especially those who had been physically and sexually abused by their husbands. After the training (see Appendix D, Table 18.17), women in all categories who had experienced violence continued to consider going abroad. This included those who had been physically or sexually abused by a husband, friend, stranger, or experienced a past situation of violence. As mentioned, only women who are *currently* experiencing violence did not consider going abroad.

Profile of an Adult Woman Considering Going Abroad as a Sex Worker

M., age twenty-nine, is an example of a woman in this situation. She came to the Women for Women Center because she wants to feel better about herself. She works in a state facility and, together with her husband, earns 700 *grivnas* per month, not enough to support herself and her two children. Her parents help her from time to time, and she has an agricultural garden. She has a few friends for emotional support.

She has experienced physical and emotional violence from her parents, husband, and employer "for a long time." She would consider going abroad to work in the entertainment business, even as a sex worker, because she believes life could not get worse than it is now and it might get better if she had more money. She knows the dangers, has had three friends who were trapped into trafficking, but hopes it would be different for her if she decides to go.

Right now, another friend told her about the Women to Women Center and she is hoping they can help her with her situation. She has already made appointments with the counselor and the lawyer.

Findings: Adult Women Considering Going Abroad as Sex Workers

As mentioned, the adult women were the only group in this study who were asked the question, "Would you consider going abroad as a sex worker?" Before training, 22 per cent (twenty) of the adult women would consider going abroad as sex workers. After the training, when asked whether they would consider going abroad as sex workers, the number of women considering it decreased by 4 per cent, from 22 per cent to 18 per cent (from twenty to seventeen women). This remains an alarmingly large number of women, who, despite the training and despite having heard the anti-trafficking messages, still felt desperate enough to consider this dangerous alternative. Reasons for considering going abroad to work in the sex business are listed in Figure 18.10 (Appendix E).

From anecdotal sources and information gleaned from the questionnaires, it is clear that most teens and women do not want

to go abroad at all and only do so out of desperation. Adult women who consider going abroad as sex workers gave such reasons as: “If my children were starving” and “If I couldn’t find any work at all in Ukraine.” The centres are doing an excellent job in giving women choices that allow them to lead more productive and fulfilling lives.

There were a number of correlations between women considering going abroad to work in the sex business and different forms of violence that they have or are experiencing (see Appendix E, Table 18.18). Women who experience physical or emotional violence from husbands, close family members, or friends would consider going abroad as sex workers to escape conflicts at work. There are women who are having serious struggles both in their homes and in their places of employment and feel there is nothing to lose by going abroad as a sex worker.

Adult Women: Summary of Findings

Adult women were not deterred from considering going abroad because of age, marital status, or means of financial support. Emotional support from husbands and mothers were factors that would dissuade them from leaving. The presence of violence in their lives was a “push” factor in their consideration of going abroad.

Adult women who would consider going abroad to work in the sex business were not deterred because of age, marital status, or means of financial support. The presence of violence in their lives was a “push” factor in their willingness to consider going abroad as sex workers. Many women in this group also spoke of their desperate financial situation. For some women, it would seem that the combination of violence and financial desperation led them to risk their safety and go abroad.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Teens in Internats

Establishing a mentoring program for teens in *Internats*, especially as they prepare to leave the *Internats*, would provide additional support and may prevent them from falling into the hands of traffickers. There is anecdotal evidence that informal

mentoring currently takes place between students in *Internats* and relatives from their extended families and even neighbours. Most mentoring programs are highly cost effective and produce numerous positive results for the teens (United States Department of Education 2000).

The strongest pattern remains with teens in *Internats* who have experienced violence (physical or sexual). More sustained anti-violence training and the use of therapy groups may help teens who have experienced violence to overcome the violent episodes and protect themselves from further violence. The Women for Women Centers currently provide such groups for teens and women who are able to attend. Such groups need to be provided in the *Internats* themselves.

Teens in Secondary Schools

Teens in secondary schools would benefit from further training as anti-trafficking prevention. In fact, according to Women for Women Center staff, teens often sign up for as many training sessions as possible, usually averaging between four and five. Data from this study indicates that teens in secondary schools *all* want to attend further training sessions. In conversation with teens who had participated in this study, they indicated that the sessions were extremely educational both in terms of employment strategies and information about what constitutes violence and ways to prevent it in their lives. Further study may well indicate that, shown other options, teens will choose to create a future within Ukraine. There is much anecdotal evidence to this effect. One young teen told me, "the center staff have saved my life." There are numerous stories of employment successes as well.

Teens in Technical Schools and Adult Women

Women from both of these groups generally come to more than one training session and are gaining the necessary information to change their belief systems and subsequently their behaviour with regard to the dangers of going abroad. Their multiple training sessions will also give them the opportunity to find paid employment and to address the issues of violence in their lives.

CONCLUSIONS

That the economic situation in Ukraine adversely affects women in such a way that they see going abroad as a solution to their financial problems is clearly a prime reason for women being lured into trafficking. The fact that the borders are now open makes this possible. However, it would be a mistake to minimize the effects of violence on women's decisions to go abroad. While many readily acknowledge the connection between women's violence and the desire to escape abroad, and even though the Women for Women Centers provide violence-prevention training, there does not seem to be a "belief" that diminishing violence would diminish the wish to go abroad. This may be due to a number of factors. Among the women and staff members, there is some reluctance to focus on an issue that is seen as negative and in the past. Their focus, rightly so, is on building a better future and helping women to achieve a stronger sense of themselves and improve their job skills. It is evident that there is a nationwide denial of violence. It is unclear whether this is because Ukrainians do not want to think of themselves as "backward" compared to Western countries or if they want to continue hiding such things as in Soviet times. As was no doubt the case during the Soviet era, perhaps women do not speak of the violence and abuse because they provide a measure of power and control in men's otherwise powerless lives.

The question remains as to how to reach the population at large regarding the relationship between trafficking and violence in women's lives. At the present time, violence in women's everyday lives is a delicate topic in Ukraine. Most funding organizations and the Ukraine government want to blame trafficking on the Mafia, who certainly promote and provide a conduit for desperate women. However, if violence instigated by the "average" Ukrainian father, husband, or employer is making women desperate enough to consider trafficking, outside funding organizations may not want to blame Ukraine's government. The government, which wants to assure the rest of the world that all is well in Ukraine, does not at present acknowledge or address the problem of pervasive violence in society.

However, once the problem has been identified and accepted, "local initiatives for breaking the vicious circle" (Burkey 1993:22) could be promoted. At the very least, additional services could be made available for women returning from a trafficking situation, women fleeing domestic abuse, and teens who are fleeing an untenable home situation. At the moment, there are only two battered wives shelters in all of Ukraine. Winrock International, in concert with other NGOs, is moving to establish more shelters (personal communication, Ellie Valentine, December 2000).

While one can argue that violence against women increases in poor economic times, there is also evidence that this abuse, while hidden, was also prevalent during the Soviet era. It has become a way of life that needs to be recognized as such, campaigned vigorously against, and ultimately diminished.

The attitude and belief changes necessary to reduce violence against women "will not take place unless there is consensus among the group attempting to carry out the transformation" (Burkey 1993:48). This consensus needs to be consonant "with their own social framework. New ideas and new behavior cannot be imported unmodified" (Burkey 1993:48). For the most part, people will try to solve what they perceive as the most urgent issues in their lives and anyone who knows of Ukrainians' woes would readily agree that the economic situation is most critical. It may be that until the economic situation improves, no other issue can be addressed.

In order to change the mindset of a population with regard to violence against women, "the question of central concern is one of how to empower the formation of *alternate* discursive structures and conditions ..." (Carstens and Julia 1999:53). Such structures could enable women to regard such violence as controllable. One way to do this is to let women in Ukraine know that women all over the world suffer from violence, and that it is internationally recognized as an unacceptable and reprehensible behaviour that prevents women from living full lives. This would counter the beliefs (especially among older women in Ukraine, the government, some social agencies, and even from organized religion) that women need to endure their husbands' violence. We who attempt to facilitate change need to keep in mind that "social development policies and programs must struc-

ture the processes of empowerment to span gender and generations” (Carstens and Julia 1999:55).

That women want to go abroad for an “adventure” is a commonly held belief among Ukrainians and funding organizations alike. This was not evident among the participants. Most women preferred to stay in their country. Those who considered going abroad did so out of economic necessity. Those who were desperate for financial reasons or to escape violence, or both, were the women who were willing to risk their safety with the traffickers.

Clearly, violence against women interrupts and delays the progression of development for all Ukrainians. “If within the definition of social development we accept that there is more to development than production and distribution of material goods ...” (Carstens and Julia 1999:52), it becomes critical to address violence against women before the quality of life in Ukraine improves.

Hunt (1997:4) makes the point succinctly: “Economic disparity [is] exacerbated by the exclusion of women from the core of society.” Reanda (1991:226) feels the issue of trafficking will be addressed only when “less visible forms of coercion—economic, cultural, social, or psychological ...” are dealt with before women will have the choice of an alternative way of life.

Hopefully the connection between violence and vulnerability to trafficking, as seen in this study, will be further evidence that the violence-prevention workshops conducted at the Women for Women Centers are indeed a critical tool in preventing trafficking.

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APPENDIX A

Table 18.1

Summary of Findings for Teens in *Internats*

Image not available

Table 18.2

Summary of Findings for Teens in *Internats*

Image not available

Table 18.3

Summary of Findings for Teens in *Internats*

Image not available

Table 18.4
Teens in *Internats*: Correlations between Experienced Violence and Consideration of Going Abroad (Post-training)

Image not available

APPENDIX B

Table 18.5

Summary of Findings for Teens in Secondary Schools

Image not available

Table 18.6

Summary of Findings for Teens in Secondary Schools

Image not available

Table 18.7

Summary of Findings for Teens in Secondary Schools

Image not available

Table 18.8

Secondary School Teens: Correlations between Experienced Violence and Consideration of Going Abroad (Post-training)

Image not available

APPENDIX C

Table 18.9
Summary of Findings for Teens in Technical Schools

Image not available

Table 18.10
Summary of Findings for Teens in Technical Schools

Image not available

Table 18.11
Summary of Findings for Teens in Technical Schools

Image not available

Figure 18.1
Experienced Violence 22% (17 teens)

Image not available

Figure 18.2
Physical Violence 17% (13 incidences)

Image not available

Figure 18.3
Emotional Violence 33% (21 incidences)

Image not available

Figure 18.4
Current Violence 7% (5 incidences)

Image not available

Table 18.12
Teens in Technical Schools: Correlations between Experienced Violence and
Consideration of Going Abroad (post-training)

Image not available

Table 18.13

Levels of Experienced and Current Violence among Teens in *Internats*, Secondary Schools, and Technical Schools

Image not available

APPENDIX D

Table 18.14

Summary of Findings for Adult Women

Image not available

Table 18.15

Summary of Findings for Adult Women

Image not available

Table 18.16
Summary of Findings for Adult Women

Image not available

Figure 18.5
Experienced Violence 50% (46 women)

Image not available

Figure 18.6
Physical 51% (46 incidences)

Image not available

Figure 18.7
Sexual 22% (20 incidences)

Image not available

Figure 18.8
Emotional Violence 85% (78 incidences)

Image not available

Figure 18.9
Currently Experiencing Violence 20% (18 women)

Image not available

Table 18.17

Adult Women: Correlations between Experienced Violence and Wish to go Abroad (Post-training)

Image not available

APPENDIX E

Figure 18.10

Adult Women: Reasons Women Would Consider Going Abroad as Sex Workers (Post-training)

Image not available

Table 18.18

Adult Women: Correlations between Violence and Considering Going Abroad to Engage in Sex Business (Post-training)

Image not available

19

The Political Economy of Welfare Reform and Poverty Alleviation in Ukraine

STEPHEN WHITEFIELD¹

Increased poverty has not been a uniform outcome of economic transformation in former communist states in Eastern Europe (Milanovic 1998). Indeed, those countries that have managed the transition most successfully have also, either as a cause or as an effect, experienced the smallest growth in the numbers of poor (Jensen 2001; Kramer 1997). The collapse of the command economy in Ukraine, however, was accompanied by declining output, a considerable increase in inequality, and a huge growth in poverty on almost every possible definition among a large part of the population.

The political economy of inequality and poverty in post-communist states is a complex phenomenon involving mutually sustaining elements that have been argued to produce both “positive” and “negative” equilibria. In the successful economic transitions—which started from generally more supportive initial conditions, including comparatively high levels of initial social equality—thorough economic reform packages were pursued. These led, fairly quickly, to economic recovery, state fiscal balance, relatively (to other post-communist states) high welfare spending within a framework of welfare reform measures (cf. Kramer 1997; and for a contrary view of the causal explanation, Lipsmeyer and Simmons 2001), and stable (and still comparatively low internationally) levels of social inequality and poverty (Milanovic 1998). These states also underwent the most thorough democratic transitions, for reasons that are probably

connected to the economic reform process, though again the causal arrow is difficult to point (see Jensen 2001).

On the other hand, it is also argued that a number of other states, including Ukraine, displayed a distinctly “negative” constellation of conditions that Joel Hellman (1998) has labelled “partial reform.” Partial reform, involving a different syndrome of economic and political circumstances, emerges from the interaction of political, state, and financial/industrial elites in which the mass public plays a subsidiary role. Broadly speaking, the three elite sectors transacted with one another to use state funds and regulations to subsidize private and quasi-private economic activity. The economic effects of this interaction include chronic state budget deficits and a lack of incentives and resources to industry for restructuring or growth. Social effects include declining living standards, big increases in inequality and poverty, and stalled welfare reform coupled with declining social services and social spending. Unlike the successful reform experiences, states in partial reform conditions also exhibit weak or incomplete democratic transformations, with strong executives tied to big money.

The explanation for the distinctive pathways taken by post-communist states is not yet agreed. Hellman in particular emphasizes the centrality of the interests of the “winners” in partial reform societies and the weak political input of the “losers” during the transition. But it has also been argued that initial conditions in countries like Ukraine meant that potential losers from economic reform were already in such a highly precarious economic position, by comparison with short-term losers in places like Poland or Hungary, that the expected losses of full market reform to the mass public were too great to make the risk worth taking, even if in the longer term the total losses for the popular sectors were larger (Jensen 2001; Przeworski 1991).

However, while the explanation for the initial choice of partial or full reform pathways is open to discussion, there is considerable agreement in the literature as to the consequences of the partial economic reform pathways.² Moreover, insofar as it purports to describe an “equilibrium” of interconnected and supporting elements in the political economy of post-communist Ukraine, the model points to numerous elite and mass *obstacles*

to further reform or to exiting from partial reform. Economic and political elites, for example, are closely connected and mutually dependent and are so insulated from public pressure that they have little incentive to embark on reforms that could undermine their capacities to extract “rents”—bribes, subsidies, political favours, and political backing. But the public itself, despite the highly unfavourable conditions it suffers under, also has little incentive to pursue the reforms necessary to exit partial reform, since these would mean, in the short term at least, yet further belt-tightening and hardship resulting from efforts to deal with the budget deficit by tax, revenue raising, and welfare reform measures. For example, poverty in Ukraine, as measured by Milanovic (1998), increased from 2 per cent of the population in 1987–1988 to 63 per cent in 1993–1995. The economic problems caused by partial reform, therefore, may have made public constraints even tighter. So, while poverty and hardship are high, moves to ameliorate them by, for example, introducing targeting of benefits on the poorest sections of society may be politically unsustainable because of the effects these measures would have on large sections of society who are already in great economic difficulty. Indeed, it might be argued that elite gains are so great, mass levels of poverty so high, and the state budgetary position so weak that there are no social, economic, and political resources to exit from such a highly suboptimal situation. As Gaddy and Ickes (1998), who coin the term “virtual economy” to describe a syndrome of economic circumstances that is comparable to the “partial reform” model, put it:

In sum, none of the participants in the virtual economy would appear to gain by its elimination. Any attempt to expose the truth about the virtual economy would be widely unpopular. It would mean slashing pensions, the bankruptcy of manufacturing enterprises and the loss of jobs and wages they provide. (Gaddy and Ickes 1998:60)

Despite this highly negative view of the possibilities of change within partial reform economies, there are probably a number of “disequilibrating” conditions in such societies, not least of which are the negative economic effects even on the “winners” of its

pathologies, where financial crisis (of the sort that gripped Russia in August 1998) may reduce their political power and their economic influence. Political and state elites in such societies, moreover, may also have incentives to support full reform in order to increase tax revenues (Olsen 2000). However, the focus of this article is on the extent to which claims about the conservative character of public opinion as a constraint on possible welfare reform are justified. What were the views of the public toward the welfare system in Ukraine in 1998–1999? Were some areas of reform of the benefits system more supported by the public? In particular, was there support for targeting of benefits? And if targeting of benefits had public support, would it make a significant difference to the extent of poverty in Ukraine? Answers to these questions will give an indication of the extent to which social attitudes constrain welfare reform programs in ways that the partial reform model might predict, and whether targeting of benefits might be possible and have significant effects on social outcomes.

To examine these questions, evidence is drawn from a number of surveys of Ukrainians conducted by the author in 1998 and 1999 within the framework of the EU/Tacis and Ukrainian Ministry of Labor and Social Protection project “Reform of Social Assistance in Ukraine.” These surveys include:

- A *National Barometer* survey that was conducted quarterly by Socis/Gallop in Ukraine, to which the author was able to add questions on social provision in four quarters—May, September, and December 1998, and the last in April 1999. The Barometer was based on a national sample of Ukrainians of approximately 1,200 respondents.
- A survey on *Consumption of Benefits* involving a national random sample, representative for Ukraine as a whole, of 2,000 respondents, also administered by Socis/Gallop, with fieldwork taking place in December 1998. The questionnaire asked both for answers from an individual respondent and for details of total household benefits from members of the household as a whole.

- A study of *Poverty in Dnepropetrovsk*, conducted by the Kiyev International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in February/March/April of 1999. In this case, as the project title implies, sampling was restricted to residents of Dnepropetrovsk oblast, with care to ensure that the sample was representative for the oblast as a whole and, given interests in rural poverty, that the rural population was properly sampled. Moreover, as a result of a further interest in assessing the extent to which the household housing and fuel subsidies—the only means-tested benefits of any magnitude at that time—were in practice directed at the poorest households in the region, sampling for the Poverty Assessment study was divided between 480 households drawn randomly from a list of addresses and a further 320 households drawn from the register of those in receipt of housing subsidy. In total, 800 households were sampled, with information based on 1,670 individuals.

Each survey was designed to address specific issues, such as the delivery of benefits to households, social attitudes toward targeting, and the potential impact of targeting of benefits on household poverty. Questions and sampling procedures, sampling size, and the questionnaire, therefore, differed from study to study. In the last two surveys, in order to obtain a clearer picture of the extent to which the benefits system was directed at those in the most difficult economic conditions, data collected focused particularly on household as opposed to individual circumstances, with “household” defined for interviewers and respondents as involving those people who lived together contributing to and drawing resources from a single household budget. Each of the tables below identifies the survey from which the particular analysis and discussion are drawn.

The results show the complexity of social attitudes toward the benefits system but also possibilities and incentives to reform. First, there were high levels of dissatisfaction with the welfare system in general, though the level varied by type of benefit. Second, there appeared to be strong support for the principle of targeting of benefits, though this picture was affected

somewhat when respondents were asked to consider their response in relation to concrete social groups and categories who were regarded as more or less needy. Finally, there were considerable possibilities within the existing budget constraints for poverty reduction. While public attitudes are only one facet of successful welfare reform and poverty reduction, and while, clearly, a return to economic growth would make welfare reform more tractable, the evidence from Ukraine suggests that an appropriately sensitive and nuanced reform package would not face the blanket social opposition that Gaddy and Ickes and some versions of the partial reform model predict.

TAKE-UP AND VALUE OF BENEFITS, AND SOCIETAL SATISFACTION WITH THE BENEFITS

Society's engagement with the benefits system, to repeat a point made above, is only one of the constraints to welfare reform, and by comparison with elite interests, not to mention weak state capacity (Cook 2000), it may not be the most important one. There is evidence, however, that coalitions of recipients of existing benefits have been significant factors in the calculations of both politicians and state officials in partial reform economies (Cook 2000; Whitefield and Vinogradova 1999). Moreover, in introducing reforms to welfare provision, national and local governments have inevitably to deal also with "exit" options available to the public. Cutting benefits and privileges (*l'goty*), for example, may raise serious agency costs and produce other negative effects. If previously free transport is charged for, someone has now to enforce collection of payment; if charges are introduced for health care, further declines in health are likely with the social costs associated, as people simply forgo treatment (Whitefield and Vinogradova 1999).

Insofar, therefore, as the public was and is an actor in Ukraine, it may be more easily mobilized to support reform under certain conditions: first, if the system delivers benefits in ways that allow for reforms that do not create a large number or social majority of losers; second, if the existing system is already subject to strong societal criticism; and third, as the next section

discusses, if there is popular support for an alternative to the existing arrangements.

To what extent are these conditions met by evidence from the surveys? The first thing to note about the benefits system in Ukraine is its complexity. The list of benefits about which respondents were asked, and for each of which there were at least a few recipients, amounts to twenty-three separate items, including eleven distinct benefits relating to some aspect of child care or maternity (see Table 19.1).

Table 19.1
Take-up of Benefits in Ukraine (by any member of household, in per cent)^a

Image not available

Moreover, a great many benefits were taken up by a very small proportion of households. A majority of the benefits available—fourteen—were taken up by fewer than 1 per cent, and only five benefits or subsidies were taken up by more than 5 per cent of households—free transport entitlements, pensions, child leave benefit, housing subsidy, and fuel subsidy. Support for the maintenance of a great many benefits, therefore, might be expected to be limited, given the narrow range of recipients.

At the same time, as Table 19.2 shows, the proportion of households in receipt of at least one benefit constituted a large majority (73.7 per cent) of those surveyed. And although the modal number of benefits received per household was still zero, the average value of benefits to households at 89.35 UAH per month amounted to a significant sum of money, the more so because the figure is underestimated by the difficulty in putting a monetary value on free transport entitlements.³ So while the take-up of many benefits was limited, involvement in some aspect of the benefits system was very broad and the value of the system's main transfers to households was considerable, as will be seen from our analysis of poverty. In these circumstances, public attitudes toward benefits reform are likely to be complex.

There is clear evidence, for example, of considerable concern among respondents about the effects of further reform of social assistance on their families' living standards, as the results in Table 19.3 show. A clear majority of the public in each of the quarterly barometers expected reforms to have at least some effect on their families, and only 6 per cent of respondents expected it to have none.

Mixed with this concern, however, was clear and strong dissatisfaction with the existing system of social assistance, both in general and with regard to particular benefits. When asked to assess the overall quality of social assistance in the country, a huge majority of respondents in each of the barometers was negative about it and majorities or near majorities in each case felt strongly negative. As Table 19.4 shows, almost no respondents were able to express any positive view of the benefits system as it was operating. This negative evaluation of the system also appeared when respondents were asked to express their level of satisfaction with benefits that they were receiving (Table 19.5).⁴

Table 19.2

Total Number of Benefits and Average Value of Total Benefits (per household, in per cent)^a

Image not available

Table 19.3

Reforms and Interests of Family (in per cent)^a

Image not available

In almost every case, satisfaction with both amounts of benefits and their administration was to the negative side of the median point in the five-point scale (1–5) and in a number of cases—particularly again with child-care benefits, but also with pensions—public satisfaction was extremely low.

Table 19.4

Assessment of Quality of Social Assistance in Ukraine (in per cent)^a

Image not available

Table 19.5

Levels of Satisfaction with Amount of Benefit and with Administration of Benefit (1 = completely satisfied, 5 = completely dissatisfied)^a

Image not available

There were notable exceptions to this rule, however: satisfaction with both the amount and the administration of free transport benefits was relatively and absolutely high; the administration of housing and fuel subsidies was also comparatively positive; and perhaps not surprisingly, in general terms, admin-

istration of benefits was more positively perceived than the amount of the benefits themselves.

Since any reform agenda creates winners and losers, the ease of reform is linked to reforming benefits from which the public derives little and to citizens' willingness to support measures that could direct resources at the most needy, even if it entailed some cost to them. The initial picture of public attitudes toward the welfare system and its reforms that emerges, therefore, is suggestive of both possibilities and constraints in this direction. On the one hand, involvement in the benefits system was pervasive and significant to household budgets; on the other, many benefits were taken up by only very small sections of society and were generally derided even by those who were in receipt of them. Society was concerned about welfare reform, but was highly dissatisfied with its operation. The evidence suggests, therefore, that there was scope for advancing a welfare reform agenda in at least some areas of the system so long as that agenda took into account the subtleties of public attitudes and welfare involvement.

SUPPORT FOR TARGETING

The question that arose from the previous section concerns the willingness of Ukrainians, including many who were in considerable economic difficulty, to contemplate the introduction of targeting of benefits payments to those in most need. Naturally, it may be that those who support targeting do so because they themselves expect to be the beneficiaries of the policy. The analysis below considers this possibility, since the plausibility of winning public support for welfare reform that is at all effective in tackling poverty within existing budget constraints will be premised on the existence of public support for targeting at least in principle and, in particular, on support from those who might not expect to be among those targeted.

A further consideration in the design of targeted programs is the extent to which support for the principle depends on conceptions of need and the needy. Public support for opposition to benefits reform may relate to the sorts of winners and losers that the system determines. If large groups of people are designated

to be in great need and/or entitled to benefits, regardless of their material circumstances, and if the nature of benefits in these cases constitutes a very significant part of the overall budgetary resources available, then the effective scope for reform is limited. However, the converse of this situation would by contrast suggest significant reform possibilities via targeting.

The evidence in the rest of this section bears on each of these areas. Tables 19.6 and 19.7 show the results of questions about the principle of targeting, asked of respondents in the National Barometer and Consumption of Benefits survey respectively. The results in both cases show high levels of support for payment of benefits only to those who can show financial need. In the National Barometer surveys, for example, complete support for the principle is consistently around 44 per cent of the sample, and when those who support less strongly are added, the figure is around 60 per cent, even including those who found it hard to answer. The levels of support in the Consumption of Benefits survey are more or less the same, though the level of complete support is somewhat lower at 37 per cent.

While there appears to be considerable support for targeting of benefits in principle, we might expect responses to be quite different when the question is concretized by reference to defined social categories. And indeed, responses do appear to be more complex when respondents were asked more specific ques-

Table 19.6
Support for Targeted Benefits by Income (in per cent)^a

Image not available

Table 19.7
Support for Targeting (In per cent)^a

Image not available

Table 19.8
Support for Means Testing by Social Category (in per cent)^a

Image not available

tions about who exactly should or should not be entitled to benefits regardless of their material circumstances. As Table 19.8 shows, there are significant differences in the extent to which social groups are perceived to be in need of support irrespective of their financial conditions. With regard to whether all members of a social category, only the needy within that group should be supported with benefits, or none within the group, social

attitudes vary. The entitlement to non-means-tested benefits for hospital patients, pensioners, invalids, and war veterans was especially well supported, though there was also clear majority support for targeting of benefits only to those in financial need with respect to other social categories that were in receipt of benefits, such as parents, families with many children, single parents, and the unemployed. In no case in Ukraine was there any significant support for withdrawing state support to all within a given category. Clearly the results show that there were considerable constraints in terms of public attitudes on policies that would affect important categories of the population, but the results also point to areas in which targeting, conceived by respondents in a quite concrete way, received strong social support.

Finally in this section, we consider whether support for targeting is an “easy option” because those people who are in favour of supporting only the needy via means testing while reducing benefits for others might in fact be precisely the people who expect to be the beneficiaries, or at least not the losers, from the introduction of this sort of policy. Table 19.9 shows the self-assessed household economic position of respondents cross-tabulated with answers from two of the national barometers to the question of support for targeting.

It should be noted that the number of respondents self-reporting family circumstances as above average was too small for their meaningful inclusion in the crosstabs, so comparison is restricted to “poor,” “below average,” and “average” self-identified groups. Significant differences do exist between groups in their level of support for targeting in the second survey—though not the first—with the poorest most likely (62 per cent) to be supporters compared to those below average (55 per cent) and average (54 per cent), but the results show majority support (even when including the “don’t knows”), with strong supporters the largest group by far, among respondents in *all* self-estimated economic categories in favour of the targeting of benefits.

The evidence in this season, therefore, suggests that there were considerable possibilities for welfare reform. Support for targeting as a principle was high, and even when respondents

Table 19.9

Support for Targeting of Benefits by Self-Estimated Family Circumstances (in per cent, with n's in brackets)^a

Image not available

were asked to make more concrete judgments with particular types of individuals in mind, there were fiscally significant groups of claimants under the existing system toward whom the public regarded targeting to be an appropriate policy. Moreover, the willingness to support targeting was not restricted to those who could expect themselves to qualify under means-tested targeting criteria. A majority of respondents who could expect not to qualify under such a benefits regime also appeared to support the policy. Given the extent of dispersal of benefits to Ukrainian households, as was shown above, this level of support is remarkable. It may be regarded as even more so if, as the next section will investigate, the dispersal of benefits in the system turns out to be unrelated to the material conditions of households because, under such circumstances, targeting of benefits would have economic consequences for non-poor households.

POVERTY, BENEFITS, TARGETING, AND BENEFITS REDUCTION⁵

The Ukrainian benefits system is complex, inefficient, and unpopular. It is also pervasive and important to the household budgets of large numbers of citizens. At the same time, support for targeting on the most financially needy was high, and not only among those who regard themselves as poor. But to what extent did the system in practice target benefits on the poorest sections of society? In other words, how progressive in character is the benefits system? And how much difference could be made to the level of poverty in Ukraine by the introduction of targeting?

To answer these questions, it is obvious that some measurement of the level of poverty in Ukraine is required. One such measure, presented in the previous section, involved National Barometer survey respondents' self-evaluation of their household economic situation. The Dnepropetrovsk survey, however, was specifically focused on finding more objective measures of household poverty. As is well known, measurement of poverty may be undertaken in numerous ways—on the basis of consumption, income, subjective estimates, or extent of relative deprivation—and estimated for individuals or households (Barr 1998). The measure that was adopted for the discussion below was based upon an index of consumption only, and the household was used as the unit of analysis. This approach is justified by the fact that in Ukraine, where monetary income is low, households are reliant on savings, reserves, and self-production of goods. Consumption expenditure, therefore, is estimated from data in the questionnaires as follows:

- The food component of consumption was computed by summing up the data from the consumption of foods by the household in the last fourteen days multiplied by their prices plus estimated total expenses of all household members during the last fourteen days outside the home; this figure was then multiplied by 30/14 to obtain the figure for a whole month.
- The non-food component of consumption was computed by summing up all non-food expenditures for the household during the last months multiplied by their prices.

- Household consumption was computed by summing up all food and non-food products.

The poverty line was constructed from two elements. First, we used the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection estimate of the cost of a “minimum basket” of foodstuffs in local (Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*) prices in January 1999, equal to 85.47 UAH per month. Second, the non-food element of the household consumption basket was estimated on the basis of observations in the body of data itself, by taking 150 households from the sample that lie closest in their food consumption to the minimum basket and taking the means of their non-food consumption, equal to 36.69 UAH per month (or 30.95 per cent of total consumption). This figure can be seen as the minimum non-food consumption of those households that can just afford the food basket. The household poverty line in Dnepropetrovsk, therefore, can be calculated as: $85.47 + 36.69 = 122.16$ UAH.

This poverty measure was then applied to the data obtained in the surveys. At the same time, the design of the survey also allows for an important subgoal of analysis to be undertaken. The largest means-tested household benefit in Ukraine was provided via the housing subsidy program, which paid benefits only after all household monetary income, including benefits, had been taken into account. Payment of this subsidy, as the analysis above showed, composed a significant part of the budget of many households in the country. However, by examining the extent to which the poor and non-poor were the recipients of this benefit, we can get a good idea as to the extent to which the benefits system was able to target the neediest section of society and to see how much effect the subsidy had on poverty reduction.

The results from the random part of the total sample show that the incidence of poverty in Dnepropetrovsk *oblast'*, on the consumption measure used here, was of the order of 35 per cent of the total number of households. Among those households sampled from the database of the housing subsidy office, however, poverty levels were much higher, at almost 49 per cent of households, and even when households in receipt of the housing subsidy from the random part of the sample were included, the incidence of poverty remains as high as 44 per cent compared to

37 per cent of those not in receipt of housing benefit. So despite receiving housing benefit that is targeted on the poor, those in receipt of this benefit remained significantly more likely to be poor.

This conclusion, however, does not at all imply that the benefits system had no effects on reducing poverty levels. We can estimate the extent to which it has these effects by calculating how much difference it would make to the numbers of poor by the consumption indicator used here if housing subsidies and other benefits were to be withdrawn—in other words, how many households that were not poor would be so categorized if they did not receive housing subsidy or all benefits other than pensions.⁶ The results indicate that the current benefits system does indeed play a significant role in reducing poverty levels in the oblast. For example, if housing benefit were to be withdrawn, the incidence of poverty would increase by almost 5 per cent among those currently in receipt of the benefit, and by almost 2 per cent across the whole sample. Even more striking is the fact that the increase in total poverty levels across the whole sample if all non-pension benefits were to be withdrawn would be almost 6 per cent.

However, the fact that housing subsidy and other benefits make a difference to the numbers of poor in the oblast should not lead us to conclude that the system is operating in an effective or just manner. Analysis shows that although poor households are more likely to be in receipt of benefits (57 per cent) than non-poor ones (49 per cent), large numbers of the poor do not receive it (43 per cent) while a *majority* (51 per cent) of non-poor households do.

Using these data, it is possible to construct three indices of the effectiveness of benefits for poverty alleviation: (1) the ratio of those poor in receipt of housing benefits to the total number of poor; (2) the ratio of those who receive housing benefits but who are not poor and therefore should not be, to the total number of all recipients of benefit; and (3) the ratio of those properly in receipt of benefits (e.g., not in receipt because of non-poverty or in receipt because of poverty) to the total number of people in the sample. Only 57 per cent of poor families were in receipt of housing benefit; 49 per cent of those in receipt of benefit would

not qualify on grounds of poverty; and only 53 per cent of the total sample were properly in receipt (or not) of benefits on grounds of poverty. Thus, the conclusion can be made that the benefits system was in large measure both unjust and inefficient. By implication, given that housing benefit is a targeted benefit, the rate of injustice and inefficiency in the benefit system as a whole should be expected to be significantly greater.

The importance of this finding, however, is that it provides a sense of the possibilities for poverty alleviation that would exist if benefits were to be targeted exclusively on the poor—though of course for a variety of reasons this might not be the only proper policy goal of the welfare system. The data from the surveys allow these effects to be estimated on the basis of the following assumptions: (1) that all non-pension benefits are excluded from the income of non-poor families and distributed equally to those who fall below the poverty line; (2) that non-poor families in this calculation include only those who would not be made poor by the consumption indicator if their benefits were to be taken away; and (3) that the resulting savings are divided equally among all poor households. As mentioned above, pensions are not taken into account in this calculation because they must be seen as based on prior inputs by citizens in work and, as the analysis above has shown, therefore subject to a perception of general entitlement. They are also excluded because they may be politically among the most difficult of all social benefits to alter because of their widespread uptake and their centrality to an anti-reform coalition. However, the model below will be even more powerful if it shows that targeting of benefits, leaving pensions aside, can still make a significant difference to the level of poverty.

The results in Table 19.10 indicate that even on these relatively modest assumptions about redistribution, enormous scope exists for poverty reduction by increased targeting. Average increase in benefits to poor households, for example, would amount to 68.89 UAH per month, and the number of households in poverty in Dnepropetrovsk would be reduced to 21 per cent—still a very high proportion—or a decrease of 17 per cent. Looked at as a proportional reduction in poverty, this result is even more striking. Poverty in the Dnepropetrovsk sample on the assumptions

Table 19.10

Calculation of the Effects on Poverty Levels of Equal Household Distribution of (Non-Pension) Benefits Only to Those in Poverty (in UAH and per cent)^a

Image not available

above would be reduced by 80 per cent. Other methods of distributing savings from removing benefits to the non-poor are also significant, though they might not have as great an effect on the total number of poor. For example, Table 19.10 also shows the effects of redistributing to those below the poverty line on a per capita basis; while poverty would still be reduced by 5 per cent to 33 per cent of the population, that represents a proportional reduction of only 15 per cent. The reasons for this are straightforward; those living alone constitute a significant part of the poor and would be relatively disadvantaged by a per capita redistribution scheme.⁷

The mechanics of targeting are therefore very important in determining the level of possible poverty alleviation. And as the analysis of the targeting effects of the housing subsidy indicates, ensuring that the poorest and most needy sections of society are the ones who benefit most from social payments is often extremely difficult to achieve in practice, despite the extensive procedures and efforts made by the housing subsidy administration. Particularly in a country like Ukraine, where the resources available to public administration are so limited, salaries are so low, and the level of demand is so enormous, the theoretical possibilities detailed here will be very difficult to achieve, although, as has

Table 19.11
Self-Estimated Material Position of Household of Poor Versus Non-Poor
Households (in per cent)^a

Image not available

also been shown, the housing subsidy program clearly did manage to some degree to target resources on the poorest households.

Given the logistical problems of targeting, some attention has been paid to “proxy means-testing,” in other words, identifying characteristics of the poorest and most needy in society where the infrastructure for means-testing benefits is lacking. In the Dnepropetrovsk study, for example, it appeared that among the strongest predictors of being in an at-risk-of-poverty position was whether the household had access to and was able to use land plots for food for household consumption; those that did not, often old and single people in towns, were significantly more likely to be poor. However, an even better predictor of household poverty by the consumption measure used here was exactly the self-estimation of household economic circumstances discussed above. As Table 19.11 shows, almost twice as many of those who are poorest by our consumption measure say that they lack money even to buy food than among the non-poor households. While it would be foolish to advocate self-assessment as a basis for payment of benefits in Ukraine, the data do show that the poorest households in Dnepropetrovsk know their situation all too well.

CONCLUSION

The evidence presented above points to constraints and possibilities in public attitudes and involvement in welfare programs

in Ukraine. Clearly, benefits are an important part of the household economies of large parts of the population of a country in which there are very many poor households. Alongside this, however, the benefits system was unpopular and weakly progressive. A new, targeted system was favoured, and despite the chronic budget difficulties of the Ukrainian state, the introduction of targeted benefits on the basis of existing budgetary resources would make a significant difference to the numbers of households in poverty.

The implementation of such a policy in Ukraine is clearly challenging in technical terms, given the state of public administration capacity and the experience (not entirely negative) of programs such as the housing subsidy in successfully targeting the poor. Moreover, such policies, even ones that draw different lines for inclusion or exclusion in benefits and therefore create different sets of winners and losers, face considerable opposition and contestation. While there is support for targeting, it is less strong when concrete individuals are considered than as a general principle, and some social groups and categories are, in terms of public attitudes, almost untouchable in their entitlements to benefits. The design of targeted reforms needs to proceed with care and attention if public support is to be maintained.

The evidence presented above is also important for the broader question of the sources of stability in partial reform societies. A number of analysts have pointed to the involvement of social attitudes in sustaining a partial reform equilibrium in which subsidies to industry that maintain soft budget constraints and the resulting chronic budget deficits in the state appear intractable, not only because of the interests of politicians and oligarchs—though these are probably the most important sources of support for partial reform—but because the public fears even greater impoverishment and loss of minimal social benefits. The analysis above, however, shows far fewer mass obstacles to welfare reform implementation than the partial reform model would predict, and even great support for welfare reform measures that constitute part of the shift from partial to full economic reform. Ukrainian society is concerned about reform to its shaky system of social assistance. But given how precarious the position is for a substantial portion of households in the country, support for targeted assistance is remarkably high. Ukrainians seem to care

to do something about the poor, or at least some among them designated as most needy, but they are also willing to see changes in the entitlements of many current recipients. Given this level of support, therefore, widespread knowledge of the potential effects of targeting on reducing poverty significantly in Ukraine might lead social support for such policies even higher.

There remains a challenge, however, in explaining *why* support for targeting is so high, even among those who by their own self-estimation are in household circumstances that, though difficult, might disqualify them from many benefits if targeting were introduced. Reasons need not be narrowly “rational.” Ukrainians, probably for historical reasons, do tend to be collectivist. Despite their being economically left-wing in orientation, it may be that in national circumstances of great and well-perceived poverty and fiscal constraint, this normative commitment translates into support for targeting of benefits on the most deserving of the needy. At the same time, as Linda Cook (2000) has pointed out in the Russian case (citing Nelson, Tilly, and Walker 1997), benefits in the Ukrainian case may be less strongly socially defended because they have been more eroded in value than would have been the case earlier in the transition. It may also be the case, on the other side, that there is a broader recognition that only by moving beyond the partial reform position will progress may be made in dealing with Ukraine’s economic difficulties such that the vast majority of the population can improve its living standards. This progress requires a social safety net quite different from the one that is offered by the “virtual economy.”

NOTES

- 1 Fellow in Politics, Pembroke College, Oxford University. The data on which the article is based are drawn from surveys conducted by the author as part of the EU/Tacis and Ukrainian Ministry of Labour and Social Protection project: “Reform of Social Assistance in Ukraine.” The author wishes to thank Vladimir Paniotto, Natalya Kharchenko, Christine Lipsmeyer, Robert McQuiston and NICARE, Gordon Peters, Nikolay Churilov, and Roger Vaughan. The content of the article is the sole responsibility of the author.
- 2 See, for example, the converging accounts from people with otherwise distinctive perspectives: Gaddy and Ickes (1998); Shleifer and Treisman (2000); Aslund (1999).

- 3 On the other hand, as the results below will show, the sums of money were not enough in themselves to exclude households from poverty.
- 4 Those not receiving any benefits were excluded from answering questions about how satisfactorily it was operating.
- 5 A fuller discussion of the study of poverty in Dnepropetrovsk is available in Whitefield, Paniotto, and Kharchenko (1999). The author acknowledges and is grateful to Paniotto and Kharchenko for their involvement in the analysis presented in this section.
- 6 The reason for keeping pensions in the calculation of household income for this model is explained below.
- 7 A similar model was also used to identify the budget savings from redirecting benefits from non-poor (by self-estimation measures) households in the *Consumption of Benefits* survey, and these results are shown in Table 19.12. Again, the results point to significant increases in possible benefits, and though these are less striking in terms of proportional reduction in the numbers of people in poverty, they nonetheless represent considerable sums of money to those in greatest need.
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Table 19.12

Effects of Redistribution of Benefits to Self-Estimated Poor (in per cent)^a

Image not available

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